The Origin of the APL Strategic Systems Department

THE ORIGIN OF THE APL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS DEPARTMENT

In 1957, the Navy’s Special Projects Office approached APL for assistance indeveloping the Polaris Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) Strategic Weapon System. Theprimary task was to define and execute a comprehensive FBM test and evaluationprogram to validate the integrated weapon system design. The launch of Sputnikcreated a widespread view that a “missile gap” existed with the Soviet Union. Inresponse, the United States accelerated all ballistic missile programs and assigned thehighest national priority to Polaris. On 1 August 1958, the APL Polaris Division, theforerunner of our Strategic Systems Department, was created to focus dedicated supporton this national priority program. This article discusses the origin of the FBM Program,the roots of our involvement in it, details of significant contributions made by APL, andthe evolution of programs that define our Department today.(Keywords: Ballistic missile, Polaris, Solid propellent, Strategic weapon system, Test andevaluation.)

The Origin of the APL Strategic Systems Department

John M. Watson

INTRODUCTIONOn 1 August 1998, the APL Strategic Systems

Department (SSD) celebrated 40 years of continuoussupport to the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) Program.During that interval, the Navy’s Strategic SystemsPrograms (SSP) has developed and deployed three gen-erations of increasingly capable strategic weapon sys-tems (Polaris, Poseidon, and Trident) and sixsubmarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) variants:Polaris A1, A2, A3; Poseidon C3; and Trident I (C4)and Trident II (D5). The FBM Program is unquestion-ably one of the largest, most successful weapon systemdevelopment efforts ever attempted.1–4 It is remarkablethat a program of this stature began on such tenuousfooting.

JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 19, NUMBER 4 (19

The Special Projects Office (SPO), the predecessorof SSP, was created in November 1955 under RearAdmiral William F. Raborn in response to an “urgent”Department of Defense need to develop an Intermedi-ate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM). The initial SPOprogram involved a joint effort with the Army to adapttheir liquid-fueled Jupiter missile for sea-basing. Fewthought this concept could become a practical navalweapon. Raborn envisioned a solid-propellant ballisticmissile on a submarine, always ready and invulnerableto detection and attack, as the ideal deterrent. Unfor-tunately, solid-rocket technology had not progressedsufficiently to enable production of large-diameter highspecific impulse (Isp) solid-propellant rocket motors.

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J. M. WATSON

Significant advances in navigation, inertial guidance,and materials technologies plus entirely new technol-ogy bases for underwater launch and reentry systemswere also needed to make this vision a reality. Althoughthe challenges were daunting, Raborn initiated an al-ternative development program to pursue a solid-propellant SLBM and recruited Captain (later ViceAdmiral) Levering Smith (Fig. 1), one of the Navy’s topsolid-propellant experts, to lead this effort.

Not surprisingly, Levering Smith knew of APL’s ac-complishments, capabilities, and programs by the timehe reported to SPO in 1956. He was a wartime col-league and friend of Drs. Ralph E. Gibson and Alex-ander Kossiakoff, the APL Director and AssistantDirector for Technical Operations, respectively. InLevering’s previous assignments—as the AssociateTechnical Director of the Naval Ordnance Test Sta-tion, Inyokern, California (later named China Lake),and Commander, Naval Ordnance Missile Test Facility,White Sands Proving Ground, New Mexico—he pre-sided over many of APL’s guided missile tests. In early1957, Smith approached Dr. Gibson for assistance indeveloping Polaris. He requested that APL provide afull-time technical advisor to the program and considerhelping SPO in the planning and execution of the

Figure 1. RADM Levering Smith. As the SPO Technical Director(SP-20, 1957–1965) he led the team that conceived, built, anddeployed the first-generation Polaris Fleet Ballistic Missile Strate-gic Weapon System. Under his leadership as Director of SPO(1965–1977), a fleet of 41 SSBN submarines became the back-bone of the nation’s nuclear strategic deterrent. (Photo courtesy theU.S. Navy.)

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Bureau of Ordnance (BuOrd) test and evaluation pro-gram to validate the FBM subsystems and integratedweapon system designs. The principal reasons for SPOasking us to undertake this effort were our status as anindependent university laboratory with an establishedreputation for technical excellence and integrity,and our extensive experience in guided missile technol-ogy (Bumblebee Program) and associated shipboardlaunching and fire-control systems. In particular, theAPL-led shipboard integration and testing of the Ter-rier missile was uniquely valuable.

Gibson recognized the national importance of Po-laris and the potential for APL to make significantcontributions. He agreed to “loan” Dr. Richard B.Kershner, head of the APL Terrier Program, to LeveringSmith on a half-time basis. In mid-1957, Dick Kershnerbecame SP-2001. He served as both an independenttechnical advisor to Smith and a “special representativeof the Laboratory” with the aim of identifying Polarisneeds where APL expertise might assist. A formal APLcontract was established with SPO on 1 October 1957.

The scope of APL’s support increased dramatically bymid-1958 as the first missile developmental flight testsapproached and because of the accelerated Polarisschedule caused by the launching of Sputnik. On 1August 1958, the APL Polaris Division was created tohandle the expanding effort. The Polaris Division is theorigin of our Strategic Systems Department.

Throughout 40 years of support, APL has mademany significant contributions to the FBM Program.Two early “breakthroughs” were particularly important:(1) satellite navigation, leading to the Navy’s Transitsystem, and (2) the canted, rotatable-nozzle thrust vec-tor control system, which enabled Polaris to use a newhigh-energy solid propellant to achieve its 1500 nmiIRBM range objective.

The planning and execution of the operational testand evaluation programs for Polaris and its successorsestablished a continuing requirement for our support.SSD has developed new and innovative test concepts,analytical methodologies, and special instrumentationto address the challenging and unique evaluation re-quirements of each new generation of FBM StrategicWeapon System (some of these are discussed in otherarticles within this issue). This “cradle-to-grave” life-cycle evaluation process provides a crucial mechanismto identify deficiencies and trends and to initiatematerial, procedural, and training improvements tomaintain the exceptional reliability and readiness thatare a hallmark of the FBM Program.

THE NATIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILEPROGRAM

Long-range ballistic missile concepts were studied inthe United States beginning in 1946 but were not

NS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 19, NUMBER 4 (1998)


developed because of technology limitations and thelack of clear military requirements. The atomic weap-ons used to end World War II were large and heavy.Ballistic missiles to carry these weapons required newand powerful propulsion systems, reliable guidanceconcepts, and high-temperature reentry materials.

Until such technology became available, the air-craft was the preferred long-range nuclear weapondelivery system. The military services believed thatpractical long-range ballistic missile weapons were atleast a decade away. Thus, ballistic missile researchproceeded at a leisurely pace until the Soviet Unionexploded its first atomic weapon in 1949. The KoreanWar followed soon thereafter, as did intelligence reportsof Soviet ballistic missile tests. The emerging Sovietthreat revitalized the dormant U.S. ballistic missileinitiatives. In 1948, the “Key West Agreement” hadassigned our armed services separate roles in nuclearwarfare. The Intercontinental-range Ballistic Missile(ICBM) went to the Air Force, the Army was autho-rized to develop an IRBM, but a Navy ballistic missilerole was not acknowledged.

The highest-priority post–World War II Navy mis-sile development was directed toward an anti-air fleetdefense capability, the BuOrd-sponsored “T-missile”programs (Terrier, Tartar, and Talos) developed by APL.Simultaneously, the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics com-menced developing the first submarine-based strategicweapon, the turbojet-powered Regulus I missile, andhad ambitions for a fleet of submarines armed withadvanced air-breathing cruise missiles.

In early 1954, President Eisenhower appointed aspecial committee chaired by James Killian of theMassachusetts Institute of Technology to review thestatus of long-range missile developments in an effortto define a national ballistic missile program. Officiallyknown as the Technologies Capability Panel, the Kil-lian Committee’s report, Meeting the Threat of SurpriseAttack,3 became the foundation for initial U.S. strategicplanning. The report emphasized the need for the “ur-gent” development of IRBMs, noting that developinga 1500-nmi IRBM would be “much easier and havegreater assurance of success” than the 5500-nmi ICBM.Specifically, the committee recommended that “Therebe developed a ballistic missile (with about 1500 nau-tical miles range and megaton warhead) for strategicbombardment; both land-basing and ship-basing shouldbe considered.”3

The President acknowledged that ballistic missilesshould receive the highest priority, but decided that thedevelopment programs would be limited to a primaryand a backup design for both an ICBM and an IRBM.Because the Navy had not developed a consensus onthe value of ballistic missiles to their mission, DoDassigned responsibility for the early missile develop-ment programs to the Air Force (ICBM 1, Atlas;


ICBM 2, Titan; IRBM 1, Thor) and the Army (IRBM2, Jupiter). To participate, the Navy would have toconvince one of the other services to enter into a jointprogram.

On 17 August 1955, Admiral Arleigh Burke becameChief of Naval Operations, and within 24 hours oftaking office, he arranged for a briefing on the statusof the Navy IRBM concept, which was being called theFleet Ballistic Missile. The Admiral was convinced thata mobile offensive ballistic missile had tremendousmilitary advantages and that the Navy could best offerthat mobility. He immediately built support for theFBM and cobbled together a joint effort with the Armyto develop a sea-based version of its liquid-fueled Ju-piter. On 8 November 1955, Secretary of DefenseWilson issued a memorandum to the military servicesauthorizing the development of an IRBM at “themaximum speed permitted by technology.”

The IRBM component of the National BallisticMissile Program (Fig. 2) became the “land-based devel-opment by the Air Force (IRBM 1) and a Joint Army–Navy program (IRBM 2) having the dual objective ofachieving an early shipboard capability and providinga land-based alternative to the Air Force program.”3

Within a week, the Navy SPO was created (17 Novem-ber 1955) to evolve the Navy’s strategic ballistic missilerole, with Rear Admiral Raborn as its first Director. AJoint Army–Navy Ballistic Missile Committee wasformed to coordinate the development of the Jupitermissile for Navy use. The division of responsibilities leftthe primary missile development tasks with the Army,while the SPO would concentrate on the ship-board systems necessary to integrate the missile intolarge Mariner-class merchant ships, and later onto asubmarine.

The Jupiter missile was large and heavy and had notbeen designed for shipboard handling, maintenance, orship dynamics. The most critical issue, however, was itsliquid oxygen fuel. This required complex shipboardplumbing and pumps, causing excessive fueling delays.Boil-off of liquid oxygen posed a particularly intractableproblem in a submerged submarine. There was greatconcern regarding the safety of handling liquid propel-lants aboard all ships. Raborn was convinced that theNavy should develop a solid-propellant missile as analternative to Jupiter and base it on a submarine. Hewanted a simple, rugged, reliable, and instantly readymissile “like a cartridge in a gun.”

Unfortunately, propulsion technology had not ad-vanced sufficiently to make this approach practical.Production of large-diameter high Isp rockets was lim-ited by the mechanical properties and manufacturingtechniques for existing propellant formulations. Othersolid-propulsion challenges were unstable combustion,inability to assure thrust termination at the precisevelocity-to-be-gained (for accurate warhead delivery),

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J. M. WATSON

Atlas(liquid)

Titan(liquid)

Thor(liquid)

Jupiter(liquid) Polaris

(solid)

Air Force Army Navy

5500-nmirange

1500-nmirange

Note: equivalent to ICBM,land-based IRBM.

ICBM IRBM

1500-nmirange

Figure 2. Strategic ballistic missile development in the United States began with four programs, a primary and a backup for an ICBM (Atlas,Titan) and an IRBM (Thor, Jupiter), which were land-based in the United States and overseas with NATO allies, respectively. The Navyproposed a novel solid-propellant missile (Polaris) based on a submarine as an alternative IRBM. It was mobile, always ready to launch,invulnerable to detection and attack, and did not require negotiations for a foreign deployment locale. This appealing concept led to theFleet Ballistic Missile Strategic Weapon System.

thrust vector control schemes, nozzle reliability, andconstruction techniques for large combustion cham-bers. Nevertheless, the promise of solid propellants wasso compelling that Raborn and the SPO team set outto gain support for a solid-fueled approach as an alter-native FBM.

In January 1956, SPO asked the Lockheed Missilesand Space Division (LMSD) and the Aerojet-GeneralCorporation for assistance in developing solid-fueledSLBM concepts. The two companies quickly respondedwith a conceptual design for a missile with clustered 40-in.-dia. rockets carrying the large Jupiter warhead,called “Jupiter-S” (Fig. 3). This initial concept wasimpractical but served to convince DoD that the Navy’sresearch into solid fuels would be of long-term benefitto all missile programs.

In March 1956, SPO secured approval for “systemsstudies” of a solid-fueled IRBM 2. With the outline ofa formal program in hand, Raborn recruited Captain

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Levering Smith to head the pursuit of a practical solid-fueled FBM design. Smith officially reported to SPO inMay 1956 as the first Head of the new PropulsionBranch (SP-27, later renamed the Missile Branch).

During the summer of 1956, SPO participated in acrucial study on antisubmarine warfare held at NobskaPoint, Woods Hole, Massachusetts. The study grouplearned of the stunning news that drastic reductions inthe size and weight of significant-yield nuclear war-heads were imminent, enabling a much smaller solid-propellant missile than the Jupiter-S. The Nobskapanel concluded that a fleet of nuclear submarinesarmed with the smaller missile would be a far betterstrategic deterrent than the ongoing FBM Program andrecommended that the Navy adopt the new missileconcept.

Strengthened by this information, Arleigh Burkeand Raborn convinced the Navy of the merits ofthis new approach (named Polaris by Raborn). On


8 December 1956, the Secretary of Defense approved therecommendation to terminate Navy participation in theJupiter Program and concentrate on Polaris, signifying theofficial beginning of the FBM Program. SPO continued torecruit the cream of the BuOrd engineering staff to forma strong systems engineering and technical directionteam to manage FBM development. A study group,which later became the permanent Steering TaskGroup, was organized to identify trade-offs and selectenvelope parameters for the Polaris weapon system byMarch 1957. In December 1956, Levering Smith wasappointed Deputy Technical Director, and by July 1957,he became the SPO Technical Director (SP-20), spear-heading the development of Polaris.

THE ALLEGANY BALLISTICSLABORATORY

The seeds for APL involvement in the FBM Programwere sown at the end of World War II. At that timeCommander Levering Smith was Head of the BuOrdRocket Propellant Research and Development Divi-sion. While there, he became a colleague of RalphGibson, who had led the wartime research on solid-rocket weapons under Dr. Clarence Hickman’s Section

Figure 3. The Navy Special Projects Office was originally char-tered to adapt the Army Jupiter/IRBM missile for sea-basing. Analternative solid-propellant missile approach led to the Jupiter-S,and finally to Polaris. Polaris was small enough to be based on anexisting submarine in sufficient quantity (16) to make it a practicalstrategic deterrent.

65.3 ft

41.3 ft

105 in.120 in.

54 in.

Jupiter/IRBM1954

(110,000 lb,liquid fuel)

Jupiter-S1956

(162,000 lb,solid fuel)

Polaris1958

(28,000 lb,solid fuel)

Jupiter-S

(a)

(b)

28.5 ft



H, one of the family of university affiliated entitiesorganized by the National Defense Research Commit-tee (NDRC) to focus the scientific community on im-portant World War II military needs. One mission ofSection H was to improve the characteristics of existingsolid propellants with a research and experimental testprogram aimed at understanding and controlling theinternal ballistics of rockets. Section H began the firstNavy development of solid-propellant weapons at theNaval Powder Factor, Indian Head, Maryland, undercontractual arrangements with George WashingtonUniversity (GWU) in October 1941. With the need foradditional laboratory space, Section H moved to analternate site near Cumberland, Maryland, which theynamed the Allegany Ballistics Laboratory (ABL). ABLoperated under an NDRC contract with GWU fromFebruary 1944 until the end of the war.

As World War II was winding down, ABL was facedwith demobilization and an uncertain future. APL, onthe other hand, was successfully transitioning (Fig. 4)from its wartime mission—the development of theproximity (VT) fuze under NDRC/Section T—to itspost–war era mission to develop guided missile technol-ogy (Bumblebee Program) that would defend the Fleetfrom an advanced air threat.

In the summer of 1945, Gibson and Kossiakoff, thenDirector and Assistant Director for Research at ABL,respectively, visited our Laboratory to explore the ap-plication of Section H rocket expertise to the Bumble-bee Program. They found the challenges irresistible andinstead of returning to their prewar academic careers,they decided to join the APL staff along with severalother ABL colleagues, including Drs. Frank T. Mc-Clure, Kershner, and a year later, William H. Avery.These five eminent scientists collectively broughtto APL not only an extraordinary background in pro-pulsion, but also a unique group of visionaries whowould have a profound impact on the destiny of ourLaboratory.

Also during this time, Levering Smith recognizedthe enormous future potential of solid rockets and tookdecisive action to protect the momentum that hadaccumulated during the war. In late 1945, he brokeredan arrangement to preserve ABL by persuading theHercules Powder Company to operate it for BuOrd as agovernment-owned/contractor-operated facility. Withhelp from Gibson, he arranged for continuity of ABLactivities in support of Bumblebee development needsunder APL technical direction. Hercules moved severalhundred employees from other sites to support thiseffort.

These actions had an immediate payoff, as ABLproduced the first large, operational solid-propellantmotor for APL’s Terrier missile. The wartime experi-ments of Drs. John Kinkaid and Henry Shuey (Explo-sives Research Laboratory, Bruceton, Pennsylvania)

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J. M. WATSON

Figure 4. Transition of APL to the post-war era. OSRD was created to facilitate technology transfer of NDRC-developed prototypeweapons to industry. NDRC/Section T became APL under The Johns Hopkins University (10 March 1942) to oversee the wartimeproduction of the proximity (VT) fuze. APL began transitioning to its post–World War II era mission under contract to the Navy (1 December1944; the Bumblebee Program). The Allegany Ballistics Laboratory staff shown here transferred to APL at the end of the war. Each roseto a leadership position and played a prominent role in charting the future course of APL.

Executive Office of the President

Office of Scientific Researchand Development (OSRD)

Director: V. Bush

Section TSpecial Assistant to the Director:

CMDR W. S. ParsonsChairman: M. A. Tuve

Transferred to OSRD 10 March 1942Contract: OEMSR-431

National DefenseResearch Committee (NDRC)

Division 3: Special Projectiles(Div. A, Sections H and L)

Division 8: Explosives(Div. B, Section A-1)

Allegany Ballistics LaboratoryNDRC, Section H

R. E. GibsonA. KossiakoffR. B. KershnerF. T. McClureW. H. Avery

The Johns Hopkins UniversityApplied Physics Laboratory

Director: M. A. TuveEstablished 10 March 1942

Task A: Proximity (VT) Fuze

Task F: Bumblebee Project (Dec 1944)Task P: Polaris (Oct 1957)Task S: Navigation Satellite (Jan 1959)

Navy DepartmentBureau of OrdnanceContract: NOrd-7386

1 December 1944

World War II Management Post-war Management

World War II solid-rocketresearch and development

Solid-propellantformulations

Carnegie Instituteof Washington, D.C.

Note: On 9 December 1942,NDRC was reorganized into19 divisions (not shown here).

had resulted in a manufacturing process for double-basesolid propellants that allowed them to be cast intomolds. This process was used by Drs. Lyman Bonner andRichard Winer at Hercules/ABL to produce the Terriermotors.5 The process was unique in that it was “scal-able” to larger-diameter motors, thus establishing thefoundation for an order-of-magnitude increase in thesize of solid-fuel motors for ballistic missiles and spaceexploration. Little did Levering Smith know in 1945that his swift action to preserve ABL would be ofextraordinary benefit to the Polaris Program that hewould lead many years later. The collaboration betweenAPL and Hercules/ABL continued and produced animportant propulsion breakthrough for Polaris.

THE POLARIS AD HOC GROUPIn the fall of 1956, as SPO was marshaling its forces

to push for approval of Polaris, Admiral Raborn decidedthat a technical peer review of the program would behelpful. Acting upon Raborn’s request, Dr. C. C. Fur-nas, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research andDevelopment, assembled an independent team of ex-perts, called the Polaris Ad Hoc Group, whose objec-tive was to review the critical technical problemsinvolved in the FBM Program. Furnas formally invitedAPL to lead this review. Kossiakoff was asked to chairthe group, and Avery participated as a panel memberalong with five experts from other organizations.

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The group traveled to various FBM contractor sitesand examined technical phases of the program, partic-ularly those concerned with the solid-propellant rock-ets. Although the program was still in its formativestage, two missile configurations had been defined,Polaris A, an “interim” developmental variant intend-ed only to flight-test candidate missile technologies,and Polaris B, which was planned to be the first oper-ationally deployed tactical missile. At that time, theobjectives for the interim Polaris A capability were toachieve submarine basing by 1 January 1963, have asurface launch capability only, have provisions to adaptto a surface combatant ship, and achieve a 1200-nmirange. Polaris B objectives were to establish a fullyoperational submarine basing by 1 January 1965, bothsurface and submerged launch capabilities, and a 1500-nmi IRBM range.

The Ad Hoc Group made important recommenda-tions to SPO in July 1957. Their findings indicated thatthe interim Polaris A was on track but that the tech-nology and design to achieve the tactical Polaris Bcapability were less certain. A significant Polaris Brange penalty resulted from using steel motor cases withheavy nozzles and inert components on both stages; theability to meet the 1500-nmi range would also requiredevelopment of an entirely new high-energy propel-lant, better than any that existed. The Ad Hoc Groupanticipated the problems that this new propellant’shigher-temperature exhaust gases would impose on the



survivability of inert parts, particularly nozzle throatsand jetevators. (The jetevator is a solid ring of molyb-denum on each of the static motor nozzles that is ro-tated into the exhaust stream for thrust vector control.)They cautioned that the new Polaris B propellant couldpose a risk from an increased detonation hazard orunstable resonant burning phenomenon. If such prob-lems arose, they would go undetected until late indevelopmental testing, which would pose a major riskto meeting the deployment schedule. As a result, thegroup concluded that a major improvement in the stateof rocket art would have to be made before Polarisobjectives could be met, and that the importance of thePolaris objectives warranted a backup program on acompetitive family of propellants. APL assisted SPOand Hercules/ABL in creating this backup propulsionprogram.

THE IMPACT OF SPUTNIKOn 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union stunned the

world by placing Sputnik I, the first artificial Earthsatellite, in orbit. The successful orbiting of the muchlarger and heavier Sputnik II followed only a monthlater. In response, the highly publicized attempt to rushan American satellite (Vanguard) into orbit was spec-tacularly unsuccessful. These events created a wide-spread view that we were lagging the Soviets in missiletechnology (the so-called “missile gap”). Americantechnical prowess had suffered a huge setback thatthreatened to undermine public trust in the capabilitiesof the military and the policies of the Eisenhower ad-ministration. A dramatic and sweeping response wasorganized in the military and civilian sectors of thegovernment, emphasizing the importance of scienceand technology (a legacy we live with today). Theresponse to Sputnik included

• Resurrection of the Explorer Project, which success-fully launched the first U.S. satellite on a military(Jupiter) missile

• Creation of the National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration (NASA)

• Creation of the Advanced Research Projects Agency(ARPA) and the DoD Research and Engineeringorganization

• Authorization for development of both Thor andJupiter IRBMs as well as the mobile Army Pershing 1

• Acceleration of the Atlas ICBM and Polaris IRBMstrategic programs

The accelerated Navy program advanced the inter-im Polaris capability by 2 years (June 1961) and theoperational system by 18 months (April 1962). PolarisA, originally intended only as a test bed, was modifiedto allow both submerged and surface-launch capability,and it become the first deployed tactical missile

JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 19, NUMBER 4 (

(designated Polaris A1). Its shorter range (1200 nmi)provided the interim weapon system capability. PolarisB, the original tactical missile design (redesignatedPolaris A2), retained its 1500-nmi IRBM range spec-ification with an earlier deployment milestone. A newrequirement for an advanced missile with a range of2500 nmi (Polaris A3) was added with a planned mid-1964 deployment milestone. What was a hectic paceat SPO became an urgent “wartime-like” developmentof extensive visibility.

THE APL POLARIS DIVISIONA contract for APL to support SPO and Polaris

(Task P) was established in Amendment No. 88 toNOrd-7386, covering a 1-year term beginning 1 Octo-ber 1957. A Special Projects Group (CLS, established15 November 1957) was formed under Kershner with10 part-time Bumblebee staff. The initial Polaris tasksassigned to APL were shipboard safety and damagecontrol, weapon system test and evaluation, and re-search into unstable burning of solid-rocket propel-lants. On 1 December 1957, Kershner left the TerrierProgram to become the Supervisor of the Polaris Pro-gram and Assistant, Bumblebee Supervisor for Polaris.The latter position reflected APL’s intent to performappropriate engineering development work for Polarisin addition to studies, experimental work, and theprincipal task of defining the FBM operational test andevaluation program. Once the active test phase for thePolaris AX missile developmental flight tests neared,the scope of the APL effort increased dramatically. TheLaboratory’s Polaris Division (PO) was created on 1August 1958 to dedicate efforts to these needs. Figure5 shows the structure and evolution of the APL orga-nization supporting the FBM Program.

The APL Polaris Division is the forerunner of ourStrategic Systems Department. Three new groups wereformed: Polaris Analysis and Performance Require-ments (POA) under Robert C. Morton, Polaris Eval-uation and Test (POE) under Dr. Robert K. (“Kirk”)Dahlstrom, and Satellite Navigation Development(POS) under Kershner. POA was assigned to coordi-nate analysis of the Polaris subsystems with operationalconcepts to define performance requirements and toproduce a test concept for the integrated weapon sys-tem. Morton, Supervisor of the Terrier Systems Group(TES), had led the shipboard integration and testingfor Terrier, including definition of performance require-ments and planning for its BuOrd evaluation test pro-gram. Dahlstrom, “Doctor D” to his colleagues, wasknown as the wizard of experimental test evaluations.He participated in the proximity (VT) fuze program,assisted in the development of the Navy’s torpedoinfluence exploder, supervised the APL flight testproject that developed the supersonic ramjet engine,

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J. M. WATSON

Figure 5. Evolution of the APL organization supporting the Fleet Ballistic Missile Program.

Polaris Ad Hoc GroupChairman: A. Kossiakoff

Special Projects Office (SPO) ,Established 11 November 1955

RADM W. F. Raborn

Steering Task Group (STG)

Technical Director (SP-20)CAPT Levering Smith (Jul 1957)

(SP-2001, R. B. Kershner)

Polaris Division (PCO)Head: R. B. Kershner (24 Dec 1959)

PAE: Analysis and Evaluation (R. C. Morton)PEI: Eval. Instrumentation (R. K. Dahlstrom)

Polaris Division (PCO)Head: R. C. Morton (8 Apr 1963)

Strategic Systems Division (SSD)Head: R. C. Morton (1 May 1972)

Strategic Systems Department (SSD)Head: R. C. Morton (20 Jan 1975)

Research Center (RC)Chairman: F. T. McClure

The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

Rotatable-nozzleTVC invention

SP Technical andOperational Evaluation

test programs

DASOCET

Patrol

Satellitenavigationinvention

CombustionInstabilityResearchProgram

Transit (NAVSAT)Navigation System

L. P. Montanaro (1981–1989)D. L. Eddins (1989–current)

R. W. Hart

ARPANational Solid

Propellant Program

Space DevelopmentDepartment (SD)

Head: R. B. Kershner (1 Apr 1966)

Space DevelopmentDivision (SDO)

Head: R. B. Kershner (24 Dec 1959)

Special Projects Group (CLS)Supervisor: R. B. Kershner (15 Nov 1957)

Hercules/ABLPolaris A2 second-stage

motor

Submarine TechnologyDivision (STD)

Head: J. R. Austin (9 Nov 1977)

Submarine TechnologyDepartment (STD)

Head: J. R. Austin (1 Jan 1984)

Polaris Division (PO)Established 1 August 1958

Head: R. B. KershnerPOA: Analysis and Performance Requirements (R. C. Morton)POE: Evaluation and Test (R. K. Dahlstrom)POS: Satellite Navigation Development (R. B. Kershner)

and served as Assistant Supervisor of the APL TalosDivision. Doctor D’s reputation in reading obscuretelemetry and divining the underlying explanation forproblems was legendary throughout the Navy. LeveringSmith specifically requested that Dahlstrom lead theAPL effort to conduct the independent analysis of thePolaris missile developmental flight test program. Thetasks for which POE were responsible included thereview of flight test instrumentation and operationsplans, establishment of data requirements, telemetryprocessing, and independent flight evaluations.

POS was initially tasked to perform studies of aworldwide navigation concept based on satellites, anidea conceived by APL scientists listening to Sputnik.On 15 January 1959, this activity evolved into a newprogram: Task S, Satellite Doppler Navigation Systems,focused on the development of techniques, equipment,satellites, and ground stations to prove the feasibilityof the new navigation concept called Transit. This led

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to the creation of a new Space Development Division(SDO) under Kershner, the origin of the APL SpaceDepartment. The Polaris weapon system evaluationtasks in POA and POE were merged to form the coreactivity that has evolved over 40 years into our Stra-tegic Systems Department.

APL’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEPOLARIS FBM PROGRAM

The Laboratory conducted many small studies andengineering investigations for SPO at the outset of thePolaris Program. These involved reviews of the Polarisguidance electronics packaging approach, limitationson jetevator steering control, staging and warhead sep-aration concepts, issues related to a land-based versionof Polaris, submarine vulnerability and system firingrates, missile shipboard safety, and conceptual design ofa launch tube quenching system. APL designed and



fabricated the prototype Polaris A1 reentry system nosefairing eject mechanism that was later adopted byLMSD. The Laboratory’s major activities in support ofPolaris are summarized in the following paragraphs.

Satellite Navigation (Transit)A prime example of the unexpected benefits of sci-

entific curiosity is the invention of satellite navigationby APL scientists in March 1958. Drs. William H.Guier and George C. Weiffenbach were intrigued withthe Doppler shift of radio transmissions from Sputnik,and they used this effect to precisely determine itsorbital parameters. Frank McClure had the brilliantinsight that, by inverting the calculation of orbital pa-rameters, one could accurately locate (navigate) posi-tion on the surface of the Earth. In his historic 18March 1958 memorandum, McClure disclosed theinvention of Doppler satellite navigation, noting the“possible importance of this system to the Polaris weap-on system.” His satellite-based navigation conceptwould let submarines at sea precisely update their in-ertial navigation systems from a covert posture, in allweather conditions, anywhere in the world, therebyenabling the Polaris weapon system to maintain itssystem accuracy. Gibson and Kershner immediatelybriefed Raborn and Smith, who enthusiastically en-dorsed the idea and asked APL to prepare a proposalfor a program implementation. This proposal led toTask S,6 the Transit Satellite Navigation System.

Thrust Vector Control of Solid-Fueled RocketsAttainment of the 1500-nmi IRBM range required

a new high-energy solid propellant and novel thrustvector control (TVC) and termination schemes. Aero-jet General, the initial Polaris rocket motor contractor,approached the problem by adding massive amounts ofpowdered aluminum to a polyurethane-based propel-lant formulation to increase Isp (a breakthrough discov-ered by Atlantic Research Corp. in January 1956) aswell as to control unstable burning phenomena.

TVC for a solid-propellant IRBM had never beendemonstrated. LMSD was planning to use a jetevatorfor Polaris TVC on both stages. However, the jetevatorTVC concept exhibited serious problems when usedwith the new aluminized propellants. First, the elevatedmotor exhaust temperature induced cracking and fail-ure from thermal shock; second, the aluminum-oxideexhaust particulate had a tendency to deposit on thejetevator, causing it to jam.7 The approach was ade-quately modified for use with the Polaris A1 motorpropellant but was determined to present a high risk foruse with the new propellant needed for Polaris A2. Analternative TVC concept would be required.

Maximizing the performance of the second stageproduced the most effective approach to gaining


additional range capability. APL performed a system-atic review of TVC schemes for SPO. This review ledKershner and Frank H. Swaim to invent a new TVCconcept using a canted, rotatable nozzle (Fig. 6).8,9

Unlike the jetevator, the rotating nozzle minimized theloss of axial thrust in steering, thereby maximizingrange capability. This invention provided a simpler,lighter-weight, and more reliable approach to TVC foradvanced solid-fueled rockets and represented a propul-sion breakthrough for the Polaris and Minuteman bal-listic missile programs.10 With SPO support, APLassembled a prototype demonstration team; ClevelandPneumatic Industries, Inc., built the new nozzles, andHercules/ABL integrated them into a prototype motor.Tests of the new motor in February 1959 were success-fully conducted at the Naval Propellant Plant, IndianHead, Maryland.

The range of the interim Polaris A1 missile had tobe increased by another 300 nmi to meet the specifiedminimum 1500-nmi IRBM range expected fromPolaris. The combination of the APL rotatable-nozzleTVC invention with the Hercules/ABL-pioneeredlightweight filament-wound fiberglass epoxy-resinmotor case and their high Isp castable double-base pro-pellant offered a significant integrated performance en-hancement, which approached the needed rangeincrement. SP-20 supported this “alternate” Polarissecond-stage design commencing in June 1958 andadopted this approach for the A2 missile in early 1959.

The Polaris A2 missile IRBM range was ultimatelyachieved by lengthening the A1 first-stage design by 30in., keeping the same proven A1 propellant and jete-vator TVC in the larger first stage (to avoid too manyradical changes at one time) and adding the Hercules/ABL–APL enhanced-performance second stage. On 10November 1960, the first successful flight test of thePolaris A2 achieved a range exceeding 1400 nmi. APL’sleadership, and the TVC invention of Kershner andSwaim, were vital to achieving the first successful solid-fueled IRBM (Polaris A2).

Research on Unstable Burning of Solid-RocketPropellants

APL began a theoretical and experimental researchprogram to explain the mechanism of unstable burningand to find a means to control solid rocket propellantinstability. The accelerated national ballistic missileprograms, along with the emerging importance of large-scale solid-rocket motors, prompted the Director ofDefense Research and Engineering, Dr. Herbert York,to create a nationwide triservice solid-propellantresearch program at ARPA. Since significant work hadalready begun at APL under Robert W. Hart, McClure,and Avery in support of Polaris, York asked McClure,Chairman of the APL Research Center, to lead the

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J. M. WATSON

Thrust terminationassembly

Rocket motorcase

Second-stageconduit

Second-stage hydraulicactuator packageRocket nozzle

assembly

180°

270°0°

90°

A1A2

(a)

(b)

(c)

New propellantFilament-wound chamberNew TVC concept

Proven A1 propellant30-in. extended first stage

Figure 6. This APL-invented canted, rotatable-nozzle thrust vector control system (a) enabled Polaris to use new high-energy solidpropellant to achieve its 1500-nmi IRBM range performance objective. APL collaborated with Hercules/ABL to develop an “alternate”Polaris second-stage rocket motor design (b) that was adopted for the tactical A2 missile. A 300-nmi range improvement over A1 wasachieved in the A2 by lengthening the first stage and adding this Hercules/ABL–APL high-performance second stage (c).

nationwide combustion instability research effort. Thecontributions made by McClure and Hart led to thefundamental understanding and empirical characteriza-tion of unstable burning phenomena (acoustic reso-nance). Levering Smith would later comment on thesignificance of this work in remarks presented at theAPL dedication ceremonies in memory of McClure on3 December 1973:

By 1957, the importance of the submarine-carried solid-propellant missile as a deterrent of nuclear war was becomingclear. But it was also clear that, if the development ran intoproblems of combustion instability, we would be at a loss todeal with them because the underlying physical principleswere not well enough understood. Mac [McClure] was per-suaded to become leader of a panel on the combustioninstability of solid propellants to direct and coordinate aprogram supported by the Special Projects Office. The stimu-lating leadership and remarkable technical insight that Dr.

384 JO

McClure gave to the work of the panel from 1957 to 1964accounted to a major extent for the success of the program.During this period about 100 papers were published, 33 fromAPL, of which 26 were authored or co-authored by FrankMcClure. The work of McClure and Hart led to a definitionof a practical test of the susceptibility of potential rocketpropellants to burning in an unstable way, so that after1964 only formulations that were free from this hazardwere chosen for full-scale development. Thus, a major con-tribution was made to creating the engineering tools neededto confidently design large, as well as small, solid propellantrocket motors. As a result, incalculable savings havebeen realized in the Polaris, Poseidon, and Minutemanprograms.

FBM Test and Evaluation ProgramThe FBM development effort included three basic

test programs, a research and development (R&D)

HNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 19, NUMBER 4 (1998)


program, a preliminary acceptance program called theShipyard Installation and Test Program, and the Spe-cial Projects Technical and Operational Test Program.The last program was developed by APL and consistsof two phases, now called DASO and CETs (Demon-stration and Shakedown Operation/Commander-in-Chief [CINC] Evaluation Tests). The DASO isconducted at Cape Canaveral, Florida, and includes thefiring of a test missile to certify the integrated perfor-mance of the weapon system hardware, procedures, andcrew. This operation validates that each new or over-hauled SSBN is ready to transition to the operationalCommander and also provides important performancedata. The second phase involves a periodic randomselection of a deployed SSBN from the Fleet, conver-sion of several tactical missiles to a test configuration,and a launch operation simulating the tactical scenarioas closely as possible, including the use of tactical com-munications assets.

The CET Program allows the current capability ofthe deployed force to be derived from demonstratedresults throughout the life of the weapon system. Plan-ning for the weapon subsystem test and evaluationprogram was led by Bob Morton and the POA staff;Kirk Dahlstrom and POE concentrated on the Polarismissile and reentry body developmental flight testevaluations (Fig. 7). The Polaris development effortculminated with the successful launch of two PolarisA1 missiles from USS George Washington (SSBN-598)on 20 July 1960. APL Polaris Division staff onboard andashore participated in the technical review of subsystemperformance, which resulted in approval to conductthese historic launches.

The APL analysis support for Polaris was originallyintended to be temporary, lasting only through the firstfive SSBNs. However, as the Polaris Fleet began con-ducting tactical deterrent patrols, new problems wereencountered and questions were raised within DoDconcerning the submarine’s ability to know its positionaccurately enough to ensure that the desired systemaccuracy was being achieved. Levering Smith prevailedupon APL to expand its support to develop an appro-priate Patrol Evaluation Program. This led to the de-velopment of formal patrol data requirements and thefirst-generation Patrol Operational Readiness Instru-mentation. The first APL SSBN tactical patrol evalua-tion was conducted for USS Theodore Roosevelt (SSBN-600) in November 1962. A new office was createdwithin SPO (SP-205) to handle the test and evaluationprograms and interface with the operational forces.

The Laboratory recommended that SPO initiate anew test concept called the Weapon System ReadinessTest (WSRT) as part of the Patrol Evaluation Program.The WSRT sends a test message to the Fleet, whichcauses each tasked SSBN to conduct a simulatedlaunch exercise. The WSRTs provided a means to


Figure 7. (top) Rear Admiral Levering Smith and Robert C. Morton,Supervisor of the APL Polaris Division, discuss results of a Polaristest missile launch aboard USS Lewis and Clark (SSBN-644) in PortCanaveral, Florida, 1966. (bottom) Dr. “Kirk” Dahlstrom is presentedthe Navy Distinguished Public Service Award by Vice AdmiralWilliam F. Raborn in 1961 for his “outstanding contributions to thesuccessful development of the Fleet Ballistic Missile System.”

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J. M. WATSON

demonstrate response time and produced a representa-tive sampling of subsystem errors needed to ensure thatsystem accuracy was being achieved while on patrol.

The APL FBM evaluation task expanded in 1965 toinclude support for a new Joint Chiefs of Staff directivefor an annual assessment of strategic nuclear weaponssystems by the CINCs responsible for their operationalemployment. The Weapon System Evaluation Group/Institute for Defense Analysis prepared a set of commonguidelines for each CINC to use in operational testsizing, analysis, and reporting. Using these guidelines,APL assisted SPO in defining the FBM DASO/CETflight test programs, conducted mission planning andtargeting, developed DASO/CET weapon system pro-cedures, and evolved a detailed analysis methodology.The first comprehensive APL CINC Evaluation Reportwas completed for the Polaris A2 FBM Strategic Weap-on System in 1966.

The continuing evaluation of the DASO, CET, andPatrol programs provides a crucial mechanism tomonitor the deployed weapon system, identify deficien-cies and trends, and recommend material, procedural,or training improvements needed to maintain the ex-ceptional reliability and readiness of the FBM StrategicWeapon System.

On occasion, APL has undertaken an engineeringdevelopment task to expedite a solution to a significantproblem. For example, the Laboratory took this ap-proach in 1963 to resolve major performance deficien-cies in the SSBN hovering system. An exact replica ofthe SSBN pneumatic hovering controller was built andtested in a ship-motion simulator, which led to thediscovery of an unexpected SSBN roll-coupling phe-nomenon. APL designed and fabricated an improvedcontroller and successfully demonstrated the hoveringperformance improvements with this prototype in-stalled in an SSBN for a DASO. A ship alterationdesign change (SHIPALT) was approved by the Navy,and kits were manufactured at APL and sent directlyto the Fleet. A follow-on effort led to an APL designfor an improved solid-state hovering controller thatbecame the standard for new SSBNs.

In 1968, SPO asked APL to develop a program thatevaluated the prelaunch survivability of the SSBN fleetby addressing technical issues related to submarinedetectability. This effort, which began in the PolarisDivision as the SSBN Security Program, established thebasis for the creation of the third APL department toevolve from the Polaris FBM Program, the SubmarineTechnology Department. Two other non–weapon sys-tems evaluation tasks began in the 1970s, the SSBNSonar Evaluation Program and the Range Systems Pro-gram. Figure 8 depicts the evolution of the StrategicSystems Department programs. A detailed discussion of

386 JOH

our current programs is provided in the next article ofthis issue.

SUMMARYThe Strategic Systems Department began on 1

August 1958 when the APL Polaris Division was found-ed to help the Navy develop the FBM Strategic Weap-on System. The objective of this article was to detailthe start of the FBM Program, the reasons why theNavy asked APL to help in its development, and someof our early contributions. I have chosen to elaborateon certain aspects of the Polaris propulsion develop-ments because of the importance of the solid-propellantmissile to the viability of this weapon system concept,and because the extent of APL’s contributions in thisfield is not generally known. However, it was the in-spired efforts of many people in many organizations, ledby the talented Navy SPO management team, whichachieved the numerous technical advances on a seem-ingly impossible schedule that made the FBM StrategicWeapon System a reality. Dr. Alexander Kossiakoff ex-pressed it this way on 15 November 1977:

I don’t consider the word ‘miracle’ in reference to whatLevering has done in bringing the Fleet Ballistic Missilesystem into being as an extravagant term. A man whocombines the creativity and imagination of the engineer, therigor and depth of understanding of the scientist, and thedecisiveness and courage of the military officer can literallywork miracles. Levering Smith is indeed such a man, andmiracles he has indeed wrought.

REFERENCES1Baar, J., and Howard, W. E., Polaris!, Harcourt, Brace and Company, NewYork (1960).

2Sapolsky, H. M., The Polaris System Development, Harvard University Press,Cambridge, MA (1972).

3Spinardi, G., From Polaris to Trident: The Development of US Fleet BallisticMissile Technology, Cambridge University Press (1994).

4Watson, J. M., “The Strategic Missile Submarine Force and APL’s Role in ItsDevelopment,” Johns Hopkins APL Tech. Dig. 13(1), 125–137 (1992).

5Dyer, D., and Sicilia, D. B., Labors of a Modern Hercules, Harvard BusinessSchool Press, Boston, MA (1990).

6Johns Hopkins APL Tech. Dig. 19(1), The Legacy of Transit (Jan–Mar 1998).7Fuhrman, R. A., The Fleet Ballistic Missile System: Polaris to Trident, AIAAPaper 77-355, Washington, DC (7–9 Feb 1978).

8Kershner, R. B., A New Method of Thrust Vector Control for Solid Fuel Rockets,JHU/APL, Laurel, MD (9 Sep 1958).

9Kershner, R. B., and Swaim, F. H., Jet Control by Rotatable Offset Nozzle,Patent No. 3, 165, 889 (filed 24 Nov 1958), U.S. Patent Office (19 Jan 1965).

10Norris, J. G., “New ‘Breakthrough’ on Polaris Disclosed,” The Washington Postand Times Herald (24 Feb 1959).

ACKNOWLEDGMENT: I wish to thank Drs. Kossiakoff, Eaton, and Avery forfinding the time to discuss the historical aspects of this article with me and for theirthoughtful insight and recommendations. Thanks to the staff of the APL Libraryand Archives and to Alice Knox (Office of Communications and Public Affairs),who were indispensable for their timely support in collecting references. I would liketo acknowledge the assistance of Gerald A. Bennett (ADC) and Thomas L. Moore(JHU Chemical Propulsion Information Agency), who provided valuable resourcesand shared their passion for the history of this program. Also, from the NavyStrategic Systems Projects, thanks to Judy Hallmark, Juanita Conley, and HughIckrath for their kindly assistance in providing access to Polaris historical files.



UK Polaris

UK Trident II

Lance, GLCM

NMD Interceptors: ERIS, EKV, etc.

Tomahawk

Mk 113/Sonar SSBN Security

Ocean Engineering Program Range Systems Program

Satrack I ACES Satrack II ENTB/Satrack III Sonar Evaluation PGM

Improved SLBM Accuracy Program Ocean Data Acquisition Program

BMDO Programs (POET, T&E)UUV Program

National Missile Defense T&ECVO ProgramUAV/SSN Demo.

JCM ACTDShip Control Training

DASO/CET Programs

Pershing Evaluation Program OSAP

Underwater Launch Program Crossflow Program

LonarsHovering

Polaris A1 Polaris A2

Polaris A3

Poseidon C3 Trident I (C4)

PIIP1 P1a

Trident II (D5)

Patrol Evaluation Program Commander in Chief (CINC) Evaluation ProgramPOR 1-A

(FBM Evaluation)A2-66

(First CINCEVAL)

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Year

SLBMs

Theater NuclearForces (Europe)

Ballistic MissileDefense

SLCM

ICBM

Other

Navy

USAF PeacekeeperUS Army Pershing

Brilliant Pebbles

Strategic Communications Evaluations Transfer to Fleet Systems Department

New Submarine Technology Division

Trident CCS

INT REC

SSD Programs

Strategic systems

Tactical systems

Theater systems

Ballistic missile defense

Undersea systems

Civilian programs

RAJPO

Color Legend

Missile Systems Evaluated

DRN

Figure 8. Evolution of the Strategic Systems Department (SSD) Programs. This chart summarizes the major systems for which SSD hashad a significant test and evaluation role and the various programs which define SSD today.

THE AUTHOR

JOHN M. WATSON is a member of the APL Principal Professional Staff andthe Chief Engineer for the Strategic Systems Department. He graduated from theUniversity of Detroit in 1966 with a dual major in mechanical and aeronauticalengineering (B.M.E./B.A.E.). From 1963 to 1966, he was employed by the U.S.Air Force in the Flight Dynamics Laboratory at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio,where he worked on aircraft and missile stability and control systems andsimulations. Mr. Watson joined the Missile Group of the APL Polaris Divisionin May 1966. He has participated in numerous Navy FBM (Polaris, Poseidon,and Trident) and Army Pershing weapon system test and evaluation activities.From October 1986 to July 1990 he acted as Supervisor of the APL EuropeanField Office in Heidelberg, Germany, where he managed the operationalevaluation of the Pershing II theater-strategic weapon system. Mr. Watsonassisted the U.S. Army, Europe, and the Pershing Operational Test Unit inplanning the Pershing II retrograde and on-site inspection processes as part of theINF Treaty. His e-mail address is [email protected].

JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 19, NUMBER 4 (1998) 387

mailto:[email protected]

Documents

The Origin of the APL Strategic Systems Department