The Nuclear Options: Decision Analysis at the Nexus of Engineering and Policy

Photos placed in horizontal position with even amount

of white space between photos

and header

Photos placed in horizontal position with even amount of white space

between photos and header

Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a

wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear

Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.

The Nuclear Options: Decision Analysis at the Nexus of Engineering and Policy

Jarret Lafleur, Ph.D.Homeland Security & Defense Systems CenterSandia National LaboratoriesLivermore, California

AIAA Society & Aerospace Technology Technical Committee Meeting

January 13, 2014

2

Presentation Roadmap

About Sandia U.S. Nuclear Policy Context Highlights from Recent Work

Structure for the Nuclear Force Structure Discussion Diversity and Deterrent Force Reliability Cost Estimation Office

3

ABOUT SANDIA

4

= NNSA Labs

= Science

= Nuclear Energy

= Environmental Management

= Fossil Energy

= Energy Efficiency & Renewables

Argonne

BrookhavenLawrenceBerkeley

Oak Ridge

Pacific Northwest

Idaho

Los Alamos

Sandia

SandiaAmes

Thomas Jefferson

Fermi

NationalEnergy Technology Princeton

Lawrence Livermore

Stanford Linear Accelerator Center

SavannahRiver

NationalRenewableEnergy

LEGEND

U.S. DOE National Laboratories

5

DOE/NNSA National Security Laboratory Broad mission in developing science and

technology applications to meet our rapidly changing, complex national security challenges

Safety, security and reliability of our nation’s nuclear weapon stockpile

Sandia National LaboratoriesExceptional Service in the National Interest

• Sandia began as the Z Division of Los Alamos in 1945, as a single-purpose engineering organization for non-nuclear systems in nuclear weapons.

• Became Sandia Laboratory in 1948 and a DOE national lab in 1979.

• Today Sandia is a multiprogram lab that engages a broad spectrum of national security issues.

Sandia’s Origin

On-site workforce: 11,200 FY10 regular employees: 8,400

FY10 budget: $2.5B

Technical Staff (3,844) by Degree(End of FY08)

Mechanical Engineering 16%

Electrical Engineering 19%

Other Engineering 15%

Other Fields 17%

Physics 6%

Chemistry 4%Math 2%

Other Science 4%Computing 16%

Top 3 hire fields comprise approximately 55% of technical hires

Disciplines of Most Technical Hires(FY03 – FY05)

Top 5 hire fields are approximately 70% of

technical hires

Top 11 hire fields represent approximately 90% of technical hires

CS CE EE ME

Physics

Chemistry

Chemical Eng

Materials Science Math

Biology Nuclear

Eng Aerospace

Eng

Sandia’s People

6

Sandia’s Five Mission Areas Nuclear Weapons Defense Systems and Assessments Energy, Resources and Nonproliferation Homeland Security and Defense Science, Technology and Engineering

7

8

U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY CONTEXT

9

U.S. Nuclear Policy The U.S. will seek the peace

and security of a world without nuclear weapons Reductions in numbers and role

in U.S. national security strategy May not be reached quickly

As long as nuclear weapons exist, the U.S. will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal, to: Deter potential adversaries Assure allies and partners they

can count on America’s commitments

http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, 1945-2009Includes active and inactive warheads. Several thousand additional warheads are retired and awaiting

dismantlement. Source: http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/nm_book_5_11/docs/NMHB2011.pdf

1

2

10

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, 1945-2009Includes active and inactive warheads. Several thousand additional warheads are retired and awaiting

dismantlement. Source: http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/nm_book_5_11/docs/NMHB2011.pdf

U.S. Nuclear Policy One way the U.S. demonstrates

commitment to the first goal is through constraints on the second goal: No nuclear tests No new warheads or nuclear

military capabilities However, weapons and

platforms continue to age. A number of decisions in the next

two decades on warhead and delivery platform life extension and replacement programs will have a long-term impact on the composition and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf

11

The U.S. Nuclear Triad

Air Land Sea

Source: http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=82

B-2 Spirit

Source http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=83

B-52 Stratofortress

Source: http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=113

LGM-30G Minuteman III

Source: http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/today/ssbn.html

Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine

Source: http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/trident-ii-d5-fleet-ballistic-missile--fbm-.html

Trident II D5Fleet Ballistic Missile

B61 Bomb

B83 Bomb

Air LaunchedCruise Missile

12

Recent Cases for Triad Leg Elimination

So

urce

: http

://ww

w.n

orth

ropg

rum

ma

n.co

m/a

na

lysis-cen

ter/othe

r-pu

blica

tions/

asse

ts/triad

-mo

no

gra

ph.p

df

So

urce

: http

://ww

w.g

lob

alze

ro.org

/en

/us-n

uclea

r-policy-co

mm

ission

-rep

ort

Source: http://csis.org/blog/should-we-eliminate-nuclear-subs

Rationale• Russia overflight

precludes non-Russia ICBM use

• ICBMs invite high risks of nuclear use based on rushed decision-making

Rationale• Of any other diad,

ICBM/SLBM is most similar in deterrent value and stability to the triad

• The U.S. is already on a path toward such a de facto ICBM/SLBM diad

Rationale• SSBN-X expected to

cost nearly $350 billion over 50 years

• Survivability is maintained by the aggregate of the air and land legs

• In likely nuclear use scenarios, capable nuclear offense is more important than a survivable defense

Air Land

Sea

Johnson et. al., Mitchell Inst. / Northrop Grumman, 2009 Cartwright et. al., Global Zero, 2012

Jacobs, CSIS, 2012

13

STRUCTURE FOR THE NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE DISCUSSION

Highlights from Recent Work

14

?

Triad Analyses: A Typical ApproachBrainstormed Force Structure #1

e.g., “Field the optimal U.S. nuclear force structure for the 21st century.”

Brainstormed Force Structure #3


Challenge: How to judge one alternative against another?Here, each evaluation was coupled with an implicit definition of objectives.

Pros Cons

Evaluation

Pros Cons

Evaluation

Pros Cons

Evaluation

Broad Objectives

15

A Formal Decision Analysis Approach

Broad Objectives




Structured CriteriaNote: Structuring objectives into criteria is not synonymous with specifying their relative importance.

How well does each alternative perform with respect to each criterion?

Evaluatione.g., “Field the optimal U.S. nuclear force structure for the 21st century.”

16

A Formal Decision Analysis Approach

What is an underlying, unifying value hierarchy for U.S nuclear force structure decisions?

Structured CriteriaNote: Structuring objectives into criteria is not synonymous with specifying their relative importance.

17

Literature Value Hierarchy Analysis

Note: This work makes no judgements on the validity of authors’ arguments. It examines only the structure of the arguments’ perceivable value hierarchies.

18

A Possible Unifying HierarchyStrategic Nuclear Force

Evaluation Criteria

CostsRisksCapacity to Promote Peace

19


Evaluation Criteria


Non-Nuclear Defense and Security

Credible Deterrence via Nuclear Weapons

Limiting and Reducing Nuclear Weapon Proliferation

“So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons … [but] make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary …”

President Barack Obama, April 2009

20


Evaluation Criteria





Resilience

= Additional lower tiers exist

During-Conflict Action

Pre-Conflict Restraint Encouragement

Denial of Benefits

Imposition of Costs

During Crisis

Strategic

Means

Ends

Cross-Cutting Means Accuracy

PenetrabilityCommand and Control IntegrationForce EndurancePromptness

RangeNumber of Deliverable WeaponsThird-Country Overflight Avoidance

Military Capability Destruction

Near-Term DamageLong-Term Damage

Survivability

Political Leadership DestructionIndustrial Capacity DestructionPopulation Destruction

Note: This hierarchy adopts the decomposition of deterrence from the Dec. 2006 DoD Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept.

Means vs. Ends Metrics

21


Evaluation Criteria





Resilience

= Additional lower tiers exist

Scenario #1

During-Conflict Action

Pre-Conflict Restraint Encouragement

Denial of Benefits

Imposition of Costs

During Crisis

Strategic

Means

Ends

Scenario #2 Scenario #3 Scenario #4 Scenario #5

Cross-Cutting Means Accuracy

PenetrabilityCommand and Control IntegrationForce EndurancePromptness

RangeNumber of Deliverable WeaponsThird-Country Overflight Avoidance

Military Capability Destruction

Near-Term DamageLong-Term Damage

Survivability

Political Leadership DestructionIndustrial Capacity DestructionPopulation Destruction

Philosophy: Overall deterrence can be considered a “portfolio” of specific deterrences.

22

How is such a hierarchy useful?

Provides list of criteria to address in a balanced, complete argument

Offers guidance on which criteria are logical components of others

Provides simple mental model of objectives, enhancing communication

Provides a pathway for quantitative, multi-objective decision analysis

Provides list of criteria authors should have addressed in a balanced, complete argument

Offers guidance on whether authors are arguing about competing criteria at the same logical tier

Helps isolate sources of disagreement between arguments

Provides visibility into which objectives the authors valued more highly than others

For the Policy Advocate For the Policy Analyst

23

DIVERSITY AND DETERRENT FORCE RELIABILITY

Highlights from Recent Work

Increased Risk of Common Mode Failure

Increased adversary risk

Diversity and Technical Risk

24

Component Diversity

Increased Development & Production Costs

Increased Cost of Surveillance, Maintenance

Cost

Notional Enterprise

Risk and CostEnterprise Risk

Highly Common Highly Diverse

Ava

ilable a

t:h

ttp://w

ww

.defen

se.g

ov/new

s/nucle

arwea

pon

spolicy.pd

f

“As the stockpile ages and becomes both smaller and less diverse … there is inevitably less flexibility to adjust for technical failures that could arise … Mitigating technical risk, therefore, will cause us in the near term to … seek to preserve diversity of warhead types in the overall stockpile.”

“[LEP options for the W-78 ICBM warhead] study will consider, as all future LEP studies will, the possibility of using the resulting warhead also on multiple platforms in order to reduce the number of warhead types.”

Diagram excerpted from McDowell and Walker,

“Lifecycle Opportunities and Challenges with an Interoperable Warhead

Approach”, Sandia National Laboratories

25

Triads, Diads, and Interoperability

Warhead Interoperability Decisions

Triad vs. Diad Decisions

Nuclear Force Diversity

Risk of Technical Failure

Can quantitative methods further inform these decisions?

influence

influences

influence

Reliability engineering encompasses a set of tools and techniques that describe the probability that a system is functional over a given time interval.

Deterrent Force Reliability: The probability that at least one form of a credible nuclear deterrent force is functional at a given time.

Deterrent Force Unreliability: The probability that at least one form of a credible nuclear deterrent force is not functional at a given time.

Reliability Block Diagram: A graphical representation of how the

components of a system are structured with regards to the system’s state of functionality.Series System

S1 S2

Parallel System

S1

S2

𝑅𝑠𝑦𝑠=𝑟1𝑟2 𝑅𝑠𝑦𝑠=1−(1−𝑟 1)(1−𝑟 2)

“Easy” to break

More difficult to break

or Deterrent Force Failure Probability

𝑅

𝑅

Symbol

(= 1–R)

Deterrent Force ReliabilityTerminology and Background

26

Today’s Force Structure

ICBM

SSBN

NN NEP

W87

NN NEPW78

NN NEP

W88

NN NEPW76

B-2

NN NEP

W80

NN NEPB83

NN NEP

B61

B-52

𝑅0.001=2.04×10−12

Deterrent Force Reliability

27

ALCM

SLBM

Deterrent Force Failure Probability vs. Single-Element Failure Probability Assumption

vs.𝑅 𝑟

(notional)

Deterrent Force ReliabilityEx. Reduced-Diversity Triad

ICBM

SSBNNN NEP

Warhead

NN NEP

Warhead

B-2

NN NEP

W80

NN NEPB83

NN NEP

B61

B-52

𝑅0.001=6.10×10−12

28

ALCM

SLBM

NN NEP

Warhead

vs.𝑅 𝑟


(notional)

Ex. Reduced-Diversity Triad, 1 IW (Land)

ICBM

SSBNNN NEP

Warhead

NN NEP

Warhead

B-2

NN NEP

W80

NN NEPB83

NN NEP

B61

B-52

𝑅0.001=6.09×10− 12


29

ALCM

SLBM


NN NEP

IW

vs.𝑅 𝑟

(notional)

(notional)

Ex. Reduced-Diversity Triad, 1 IW (Sea)

ICBM

SSBNNN NEP

IW

NN NEP

Warhead

B-2

NN NEP

W80

NN NEPB83

NN NEP

B61

B-52

𝑅0.001=2.05×10−12


30

ALCM

SLBM


NN NEP

Warhead

vs.𝑅 𝑟Properly chosen interoperability may maintain the deterrent force reliability of today’s force structure, even with reduced warhead diversity.

(notional)

Leg Elimination Options

ICBM

SSBN

NN NEP

W87

NN NEPW78

NN NEP

W88

NN NEPW76

B-2

NN NEP

W80

NN NEPB83

NN NEP

B61

B-52


31

ALCM

SLBM


Technical risks avoided through warhead interoperability investments may be dwarfed by technical risks accepted in a triad leg elimination decision.

500 times higher than baseline triad

vs.𝑅 𝑟1,000,000 times higher than baseline triad

1,000 times higher than baseline triad

32

COST ESTIMATION OFFICEHighlights from Recent Work

33

Cost Estimation Office Compared to previous

decades, constrained federal budgets have produced heightened awareness of cost considerations in weapon system development trade studies.

Sandia is leading development of a parametric cost estimation capability for early-phase weapon life extension program cost trades.

“A central finding of the book is that government officials [over the past six decades] made little effort to ensure that limited economic resources were used as efficiently as possible so that nuclear deterrence could be achieved at the least cost to taxpayers. While the costs of individual programs were debated from time to time, the near total absence of data documenting either annual or cumulative costs of the overall effort made effective democratic debate and oversight all but impossible …”

Brookings Institution Press, 1998

Sample Modern Parametric Cost Estimation Tools:

Aerospace & Defense InteractionsJanuary February March April

Jan. 23, 2013 El Segundo, CAAerospace CorporationConcept Design Center Concurrent Engineering Group

Jan. 22, 2013 Pasadena, CANASA Jet Propulsion LaboratoryTeam X Concurrent Engineering Group

March 26, 2013 Pasadena, CANASA Jet Propulsion LaboratoryCost and Risk Analysis Workshop

April 24, 2013 Washington, DCDoD Cost Assessment & Program EvaluationAdvanced Systems Cost Analysis Organization

Jan. 11, 2013 Dallas, TXLockheed Martin Aeronautics ADP (Skunk Works) Cost Est. Group

34

35

QUESTIONS?

Documents

The Nuclear Options: Decision Analysis at the Nexus of Engineering and Policy