The New Japan is definitely recommended as an in-sightful textbook for cultural studies for Japanese col-lege students who now search for their own culturalidentity in a drastically transforming world…. [T]heauthor’s unique discussion for creating an individual-istic collectivism for Japan’s future is tremendously edu-cational for international students as well.

—Akio InoueProfessor and Director of Oyasato Institute for

the Study of Religion, Tenri University

David Matsumoto speaks in a unique voice in his criti-cal analysis, The New Japan. It is the voice of the Japa-nese diaspora. Matsumoto is a Japanese American whois not only a first-rate social scientist but also a majoractor in the world of international judo competition. Hehas spent a lifetime traveling back and forth betweenthe U.S. and Japan, living, working and playing. He isable to integrate three sets of data: the findings of ahost of well-executed social psychological studies, in-cluding his own; the findings of national surveys con-ducted by the Japanese government and media; andhis own participant observations of the land of his an-cestors. The result of this integration is the articulationof a major challenge facing Japan in the twenty-firstcentury, the harmonic creation of what Matsumoto calls“individualistic collectivism.” This is a ground-break-

The New Japan: DebunkingPraise forSeven Cultural Stereotypes

ing analysis which takes us beyond the conventionaldualisms of the intercultural field.

—Jacqueline WasilewskiInternational Christian University, Tokyo

At a time when we Japanese have to reexamine ourstrengths and weaknesses during the current transi-tional period, The New Japan is a timely contribution.The author (himself a Judo player and having Japa-nese roots) has [written] a resource book for reflectivebut forward-thinking Japanese and for those who haveJapanese partners in their business…lives. With thisbook in hand, we [will] no longer suffer fromstereotypic…conceptualizations of Japanese culture. Irecommend this book for my friends all over the world.

—Toshihiro Kanai, Ph.D.Professor of Organizational Behavior

Graduate School of Business Administration,Kobe University

NEWJAPAN

THE

David Matsumoto may be reached at dm@sfsu.edu forfurther information about his research and the contentsof this book.

NEWJAPAN

THEDAVID MATSUMOTO

DebunkingSeven

CulturalStereotypes

First published by Intercultural Press. For informationcontact:Intercultural Press, Inc. Nicholas Brealey PublishingPO Box 700 3-5 Spafield StreetYarmouth, Maine 04096 USA London, EC1R 4QB, UKTel: 207-846-5168 Tel: +44-207-239-0360Fax: 207-846-5181 Fax: +44-207-239-0370www.interculturalpress.com www.nbrealey-books.com

© 2002 by David Matsumoto

Production and design by Patty J. Topel

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be repro-duced in any manner whatsoever without written permissionfrom the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations em-bodied in critical articles or reviews.

Printed in the United States of America

06 05 04 03 02 1 2 3 4 5

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Matsumoto, David Ricky.The New Japan: debunking seven cultural stereotypes / DavidMatsumoto

p. cm.Includes bibliographic referencesISBN: 1-877864-93-5

1. Japan—Civilization—1945– I. Title.DS822.5.M3674 2001952.05—dc21 2001051919

Dedication

To Paul EkmanMentor, Colleague, and Friend

I am proud to call him my teacher

vii

Table of Contents

Figures and Tables ................................................................................. ixAcknowledgments ............................................................................... xiiiForeword .................................................................................................... xv

Chapter 1: Japanese Culture, Past and Present .................... 1Classic Conceptualizations of

Japanese Culture ...................................................................... 3Contemporary Views of Japanese Culture ................. 9Stability in Contemporary

Japanese Society ................................................................... 20The Causes for This Degree of Unrest ....................... 28

Chapter 2: Seven Stereotypes about JapaneseCulture and Their Reality ........................................ 35

Stereotype 1: Japanese Collectivism ............................ 37Stereotype 2: Japanese Self-Concepts .........................47Stereotype 3: Japanese Interpersonal

Consciousness ........................................................................ 54Stereotype 4: Japanese Emotionality ........................... 57Stereotype 5: The Japanese Salaryman...................... 67Stereotype 6: Japanese Lifetime

Employment ..............................................................................74Stereotype 7: The Japanese Marriage ......................... 79Conclusion ................................................................................... 84

viii

Chapter 3: Why Did Japanese Culture Change? ................ 91Understanding What Culture

Is and Is Not ............................................................................. 92Japanese Cultural Change ................................................ 103Changing Moral Values in

Japanese Society ................................................................. 109Some Reasons for Changing Morals

and Social Behavior in Japan ...................................... 112The Search for Morality

among Japanese Youth ................................................... 124

Chapter 4: The Meaning of Changing JapaneseCulture in Everyday Life ........................................ 131

The Japanese Business World ....................................... 132The Educational System ..................................................... 146Sports ............................................................................................ 158Changing Japanese Culture and

Everyday Life .......................................................................... 168

Chapter 5: Visions of a New Japanin the Future ................................................................. 179

The Cultural Challenge forCorporate Japan .................................................................. 181

The Cultural Challenge for the JapaneseEducational System ............................................................ 186

The Cultural Challenge forJapanese Sports ................................................................... 190

Transforming Japanese Culturein the Future ........................................................................... 195

Challenges for the Future .................................................. 198

Appendix ................................................................................................ 207

References ............................................................................................... 215Index .......................................................................................................... 225

Table of Contents ix

FiguresUnless indicated otherwise, the vertical axes in all figures pre-sented in the book represent the actual scales used and re-ported in the research cited. In some cases these were scalesbased on scores from instruments used uniquely in those stud-ies; in others they were percentages. More detailed informa-tion concerning the exact nature of the data can be obtainedby contacting David Matsumoto or by referring to the origi-nal research cited.

1.1 Japanese People’s Views onContemporary Society ....................................................... 22

1.2 Attitudes of Japanese and Finnish Youthtoward the Future .............................................................. 207

1.3 Comparison of the Merits ofInformation Technology ................................................... 25

2.1 Collectivism Data ................................................................... 208

2.2 Collectivism Study ................................................................. 208

2.3 Collectivism Scores toward Families inFour Countries ..................................................................... 209

2.4 Collectivism Scores toward Strangers inFour Countries ..................................................................... 209

2.5 Individualists and Collectivists amongJapanese Students ................................................................ 45

2.6 Individualists and Collectivists amongJapanese Adults ..................................................................... 46

2.7 Independent and InterdependentSelf-Concept ............................................................................. 49

2.8 Self-Concepts in Four Countries .................................... 52

x

2.9 U.S.-Japan Differences in Self-Concept ................... 210

2.10 Self-Concepts ............................................................................. 53

2.11 Interpersonal Relationship Consciousness .............. 57

2.12 How Employees View Their Jobs ................................... 71

2.13 Determiners of Salary and Position in Japan ....... 210

2.14 Age-Group Breakdown of EmployeesFavoring Merit-Based Wage System ......................... 72

2.15 Employees Ambivalent toward orDissatisfied with Reward System ................................. 73

2.16 Number of People Wishing to Change Jobs ........ 211

2.17 Number of Part-Time Workers ...................................... 211

2.18 Changes in Marital Attitudes ............................................. 81

2.19 Approval of Divorce ............................................................... 83

3.1 Japan’s Birthrate since World War II ......................... 106

3.2 Percentage Who Believe Youth LackMorals and Social Skills .................................................. 212

3.3 Behaviors Youth Are Lacking .......................................... 111

3.4 Why Teaching Children to Behave Is MoreDifficult Today ....................................................................... 120

3.5 People Believing Social Skills Are the Family’sResponsibility ......................................................................... 121

3.6 Causes of Enjo Kosai ........................................................... 126

4.1 Does Sexual Discrimination Exist in Japan? .......... 212

4.2 Number of Juvenile Arrests for Bullyingand Related Matters .......................................................... 151

4.3 Juvenile Arrests ....................................................................... 153

Table of Contents xi

4.4 Juvenile Arrests by Age .................................................... 154

4.5 Values Differences among Judo Coaches .............. 164

5.1 Can You Get Almost Anything Enjoyable withMoney? ..................................................................................... 200

5.2 Where Should More Attention Be Paid? .................. 213

Tables1.1 National Income of Top Eight Countries

and SWB Scores .................................................................... 26

2.1 Expression of Emotions ....................................................... 62

2.2 Reaction to Pictures Showing Emotions .................... 66

3.1 Two Factors Affecting Culture ........................................ 100

4.1 Some Possible Alterations in Work-RelatedValues ......................................................................................... 145

4.2 Dropout Rates for Elementary, Junior High,and High Schools ................................................................ 152

xiii

Acknowledgments

I am indebted to many people who have helped mealong the way in the production of this book:

To my friend and colleague in Japan, Atsuo Miki,who encouraged me to write a book like this and gaveme valuable guidance and suggestions along the way.Thanks for your friendship and support in not onlythis book but all my writing endeavors.

To Professor Kyoko Yashiro of Reitaku University,who read the entire manuscript and made many sug-gestions for improving the text. Thank you also foryour friendship and collegiality throughout the years.

To Professors Yohtaro Takano and SusumuYamaguchi of Tokyo University, who provided me withvaluable references and helped foster my interest incultural values in contemporary Japan. Thank you forthe many opportunities you provided me and for thewonderful discussions we have had over the years onthe topics discussed in this book.

To my editor at Intercultural Press, Judy Carl-

xiv

Hendrick, and all others there who worked on the text,who encouraged me to work on this project, and wentwell above and beyond the call of duty in editing (insuch a professional way, I might add) my unintelli-gible writing and transforming it to semi-intelligent (Ihope!) prose. I thank you for your professionalism,insight, wisdom, and encouragement.

To my wife, Mimi, for providing the best homeenvironment within which anyone could possibly work,for reading the entire manuscript from start to finishin various forms, and for providing me with impor-tant feedback at each step of the way. Thank you forbeing you.

To my children—Sayaka, Satoshi, and Masashi—who really had nothing to do with this book but arethree of the best kids in the world, and I just wantedto say that. Thanks.

Even though I have been lucky enough to havethe help and support of these and many other peopletoo numerous to mention here, any mistakes or prob-lems in the book are unquestionably mine and minealone.

—David MatsumotoSan Francisco 2002

xv

Foreword

Kyoko YashiroReitaku University

In The New Japan David Matsumoto presents a com-plex reality of Japan that many scholars of Japaneseculture have failed to address in English so far. He givesconvincing evidence from current studies and surveysthat show that generalizations made from previousworks about Japanese people and culture no longerhold with younger generations. His explanation of howthis change was brought about and what kind of tur-moil Japanese society is currently facing demonstrateshis intimate and deep contact with Japanese peopleand society. His proposals for solving the problemsare pertinent and welcome.

Indeed, the older generation, meaning those whogrew up before WWII, were collectivistic, had interde-pendent self-concept and interpersonal consciousness,

xvi

controlled emotion, had seemingly limitless loyalty totheir company and work, and had strong marital com-mitment. Many Japanese still cling to these imagesbecause they believe these are their fundamental val-ues. However, as Matsumoto argues, data from theyounger generation show that Japanese are becom-ing as individualistic as westerners (or even more soor in different ways), and place more importance onemotions than Americans in interpersonal relation-ships. And with preference given to specialists ratherthan generalists in the business world, the youngergeneration is moving away from loyalty toward com-panies and moving toward self-satisfaction and ful-fillment in their jobs. The same can be said for theirconcept of marriage; they marry for love, not for thefamily.

The older generation lament the deterioration ofmorality among the young, calling them shin-jinrui(new humans), and feel powerless in directing themto keep the tradition. Matsumoto’s model of culturalchange sheds some light on the issue. He proposesthat Japan is going through rapid change from a lowresource availability-population dense culture to a highresource availability-population dense culture. In thisprocess traditional collectivism culture has changedinto individualism/collectivism duality culture, but it isnot changing into a complex individualistic culture likethe U.S.

The sense of powerlessness currently shared bythe older generation was largely created by defeat in

Foreword xvii

the war and the subsequent post war education. AsMatsumoto points out, the U.S. occupation force suc-ceeded in implementing “democratic” and “individual-istic” education. But we need to understand that thisprocess stripped Japanese of their confidence in theirconcept of country and people on which to base theireducation of the young. Thus, education of the youngwas largely left to mothers in the homes and youngnew teachers in the public schools. Fathers’ absencefrom home and community greatly contributed to de-cay in social morals of the young, though it broughtabout miraculous economic growth to Japan. Moraldecay in affluent society-Japanese style is what we havenow.

In Japan there is a lot of discussion on how tocope with changing society and younger generationsof workers. Matsumoto outlines new managementstyles, new teaching materials and methods, new familyrelationships necessary in business, schools andhomes respectively. As a judo master, he expresseshis sincere hope that sports will be used to teach highmoral standard as well as excellent skills. These argu-ments and hopes are shared by many enlightenedmanagers, educators, and parents in Japan today.Matsumoto’s The New Japan is a strong endorsementto those who are striving to bring about many of thepractical and pertinent proposals Matsumoto putsforth in this book.

—Kyoko YashiroProfessor, Reitaku University

xviii

1

1

Japanese Culture,Past and Present

Contemporary Japanese culture is considerably dif-ferent from previous, traditional notions of it and frommost people’s current stereotypes, including those ofthe Japanese themselves. Japan is commonly andstereotypically known as a land of nobility and chiv-alry with values such as honor, pride, and persever-ance. These form a moral code of everyday living thathas permeated Japanese society for generations, evencenturies. Yet, contemporary Japanese culture (espe-cially for younger Japanese) seems to operate fromdifferent values, attitudes, beliefs, norms, and behav-iors. In short, Japan is evolving into a society with adifferent culture.

In this book I will explore the nature of the culturaland social differences in contemporary Japanese cul-ture as compared with traditional Japanese culture.Chapter 1 describes classic and then contemporary

2

conceptualizations of Japanese culture, demonstrat-ing how they paint a picture of a homogeneous,unicultural Japan that has existed for centuries. Aca-demics and laypersons alike, as well as Japanese andWesterners, have all painted the same picture, andthese stereotypic images and perceptions of Japanhave, for all intents and purposes, become Japan. To-ward the end of this first chapter, I will explore currentinstability in Japan. Then I will present data to sup-port the hypothesis that there is a substantial degreeof unrest, apprehension, and dissatisfaction in thecountry today, and I will suggest that these worriesexist at least partially as a result of a clash of culturaldualities in contemporary Japan. In short, I believe thatthe view of a tranquil, homogeneous Japanese cul-ture can no longer be supported.

In chapter 2 I will present data from selected re-search in social psychology comparing Japanese in-dividuals in Japan with those in other countries andfrom polls and surveys conducted in Japan by Japa-nese companies and the Japanese government in re-cent years. While it is impossible to survey all possibleresearch related to the points I make in this chapter,these data should give any reader reason to questionstereotypic notions of contemporary Japanese culture.In chapter 3 I will speculate about the reasons forJapan’s dramatic cultural and social change in the pastfew decades. In chapter 4 I will describe the impact ofthe changing Japanese culture on everyday life in Ja-pan. Finally, in chapter 5 I will provide some food for

Chapter One 3

thought concerning the various directions, shapes, andforms Japanese culture and society may take in thefuture.

Classic Conceptualizations ofJapanese Culture

For over a century, Japanologists have characterizedJapanese society and culture as homogeneous, cen-tered on a few core values, personality traits, and moralvirtues. These views have been promulgated by Japa-nese and non-Japanese alike, in academic and non-academic circles. While a comprehensive review of theliterature is beyond the scope of this book, I will re-view below what many believe to be some of the clas-sics in the study of Japanese culture, highlighting theconsiderable similarities in their portrayals of Japan.

A pivotal episode in the history of Japan that hada great influence on the study of the country and itsculture is the Meiji Restoration. Prior to the Meiji Res-toration in 1862, Japanese society was basically closedoff from the rest of the world by the government es-tablished by the Tokugawa Shogunate. The Meiji Res-toration refers to the events in Japanese history thatled to the overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate andthe restoration of governmental power by the emperor,who took the name of the Meiji (enlightenment) Em-peror.1

With the Meiji Restoration came open trade, ex-change of peoples, and the flow of ideas across bor-

4

ders. Consequently, interest in Japan and in the Japa-nese culture began to flourish. Much of this interestmay have been due to Westerners’ sense of wonderabout Japan; it was so different from any other coun-try with which they were acquainted. This sense ofmarvel led to writings in many areas of social science.Historians, for example, began to study and write aboutthe history of Japan, and Japanese literature becameavailable to the rest of the world; for example, West-erners were introduced to the Tale of Genji (GenjiMonogatari), The Pillow Book (Makura no Soshi), andother such works. And, of course, with these workscame knowledge of Japan’s culture and people.

From the late 1880s until the period immediatelyfollowing World War II, a number of major works be-came classics in our understanding of Japanese cul-ture and its people. They not only provided penetrat-ing and insightful analyses of Japanese culture, knowl-edge of which was relatively unavailable to the rest ofthe world for literally centuries, they also provided non-Japanese with explanations for the curious and oftenbaffling aspects of Japanese behavior.

One of the earliest and most often cited works, forinstance, about Japanese culture from an outsider’spoint of view was that of the English-educated, Irish-Greek writer Lafcadio Hearn. In his book Glimpses ofUnfamiliar Japan (1894), Hearn portrayed the Japa-nese as a humble, persevering people who, in the faceof danger, threat, grief, and other disheartening emo-tions, managed to maintain a sense of dignity about

Chapter One 5

themselves and smile. He saw the Japanese as peoplewho had instituted politeness as a social rule—whobrought mannerisms and etiquette in social interac-tion to their highest standard. In the preface to hiswork, he wrote,

But the rare charm of Japanese life, so differentfrom that of all other lands, is not to be found inEuropeanized circles. It is to be found among thegreat common people, who represent in Japan,as in all countries, the national virtues, and whostill cling to their delightful old customs, theirpicturesque dresses, their Buddhist images, theirhousehold shrines, their beautiful and touchingworship of ancestors. This is the life of which aforeign observer can never weary, if fortunateand sympathetic enough to enter into it—the lifethat forces him sometimes to doubt whether thecourse of our boasted Western progress is reallyin the direction of moral development. (xiii)

A major impetus to the fascination with whichWesterners have viewed Japan was Japan’s victoryover Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905).People the world over marveled at how a tiny islandcountry like Japan could win a war against a largeand powerful country like Russia (meanwhile wonder-ing about how their own country would fare in waragainst Japan). At the same time, they wondered abouta people who could conquer a nation such as Russiaand then allow Russian officials to wear their weap-ons to the peace treaty ceremony.2 Partly in responseto the request (and even outcry) for knowledge about

6

Japan at this time came Inazo Nitobe’s book, Bushido:The Soul of Japan (1969),3 which attempted todemystify and explain the Japanese character usingthe concepts of the feudal warrior, or samurai.4 Ac-cording to Nitobe, bushido can be most closely asso-ciated with the English word chivalry, and it is this senseof chivalry that permeates the Japanese character.

Chivalry is a flower no less indigenous to the soilof Japan than its emblem, the cherry blossom;nor is it a dried up specimen of an antique virtuepreserved in the herbarium of our history. It isstill a loving object of power and beauty amongus; and if it assumes no tangible shape or form,it not the less scents [sic] the moral atmosphere,and makes us aware that we are still under itspotent smell. The conditions of society whichbrought it forth and nourished it have longdisappeared; but as those far-off stars whichonce were and are not, still continue to shedtheir rays upon us, so the light of chivalry, whichwas a child of feudalism, still illuminates ourmoral path, surviving its mother institution. (1–2)

Bushido was composed of a set of core valuesthat included rectitude or justice, courage, benevolence,politeness, veracity, sincerity, honor, loyalty, and self-control. Many of these are exactly the same valuesthat Hearn had previously written about on his own.Stoicism was also a major part of bushido, as werethe concepts of giri and on (two different types ofobligation). Training and education in the bushido waywere based on three major principles: wisdom, be-

Chapter One 7

nevolence, and courage.5 It is significant that Nitobe,a native Japanese, wrote this work, because it dem-onstrated consistency between Japanese and non-Japanese writers in their understanding of the essen-tial nature of the Japanese culture and individual. Thepopularity of Nitobe’s book in Japan among Japa-nese laypersons even today also speaks to this.

World War II stimulated another push to under-stand Japanese culture, bringing forth Ruth Benedict’s1946 classic in cultural anthropology, The Chrysan-themum and the Sword. Benedict’s work focused onJapanese values such as giri and on, chuugi (loyalty),self-discipline, virtue, honor, and righteousness, es-pecially on the place of these values in the system ofethics and morality in the lives of everyday Japanese.Benedict especially focused on the portrayal of Japanas a “shame culture,” where people are motivated bythe threat of social isolation or sanction from thepeople around them. This tendency is related to thenotion that the Japanese are group-oriented and thatconsciousness of and identification with others andwith ingroups take precedence. In many ways the con-tent of her work was very similar to the earlier worksby Nitobe and Hearn, perhaps partially because dur-ing World War II she was assigned to the U.S. Officeof War Information to study Japan, thus the obviouslinks to a warrior code.6

Another classic in cultural anthropological stud-ies of Japan is Ronald Dore’s book City Life in Japan(1958). From his ethnographic study of a neighbor-

8

hood in Tokyo in which he had lived for severalmonths, Dore wrote about key concepts he consid-ered central to Japanese culture and personality. Hefocused on the Japanese concept of seishin, which isloosely translated as “spirit” or “willpower,” and com-mented that the Japanese belief in seishin and its pow-ers was a core personality trait that permeated Japa-nese culture. The themes that describe this concept—strength, fortitude, perseverance, single-mindedness,group spirit, self-discipline, loyalty, and devotion—ringa familiar note with Dore’s predecessors’ descriptionsof the nature of Japanese character.7 These conceptsnot only described the Japanese; they were the idealsthat they strove to achieve, and did, and that set themapart from Westerners.

Another noted Japan scholar, Ivan Morris, wrotea seminal book entitled The Nobility of Failure in whichhe demonstrated that the Japanese view failure, notsuccess, as heroic, and that this is peculiar to the Japa-nese. Morris understood the tragic side of Japaneseculture and used the concept of makoto (sincerity) toexplain the selflessness and sacrifice of many tragicheroes in Japanese culture. Morris’ work was popularnot only in the United States but also in Japan, and itmaintained the image of the Japanese people andculture as based on values such as makoto.

The works of the authors that have been brieflyreviewed here—Hearn, Morris, Nitobe, Dore, andBenedict—are considered by many to be classics in thestudy of Japanese culture. They share a remarkable

Chapter One 9

degree of similarity in their portrayals of the key moralvirtues and values of the Japanese culture and people:humility, perseverance, politeness, modesty, frugality,chivalry, justice, courage, discipline, benevolence, sin-cerity, honor, loyalty, and self-control. While many ofthese concepts may have had their roots in the moraland ethical code of the Japanese military class—inbushido—over time they were idealized, ritualized, andinstitutionalized to become part and parcel of the Japa-nese cultural landscape. As such, a fairly homogeneouspicture of Japanese culture and society emerged, andmany Japanese cultural practices in religion, art, mu-sic and dance, and other cultural rituals and artifactswere exported around the world as a means by whichto instill these types of values and traditions amongnon-Japanese nations as well.8 In this way, millions ofpeople around the world were influenced by Japa-nese culture and society. And these views undoubt-edly influenced many contemporary perceptions ofJapanese culture and psychology in important andfundamental ways.

Contemporary Views of Japanese CultureA contributing factor to many of the contemporaryworks on Japanese culture has been Japan’s uncannyrise to economic power after being decimated in WorldWar II. Rising from the ashes, albeit with the neces-sary aid of foreign intervention, Japan was able toharness all of its people’s energy to create what has

10

become the world’s second largest economy. In manybusiness areas, Japanese products are second to none,and Japanese innovations, research, and developmentin various fields of technology continue to lead theworld in creating a different and better quality of lifefor millions.

Thus, interest in and marvel at the Japanese cul-ture and people switched from the battlefield—classicworks on Japan’s military class and war—to the board-room. But many authors, in trying to understand andexplain Japan’s economic feats, retained the stereo-typic view of the Japanese culture and people as ratherhomogeneous and unicultural.

One of the most influential writers in recent historyhas been Chie Nakane, whose works on Japanese so-ciety and culture have furthered the perception thatJapanese culture is homogeneous. In her book Japa-nese Society (1970),9 Nakane focused on the “truly basiccomponents and their potentiality in society—in otherwords, social persistence” (ix). She suggested that eventhough Japanese culture and society may change invarious ways over time, there are core aspects that haveremained the same and that are identifiable.

The persistence of social structure can be seenclearly in the modes of personal social relationwhich determine the probable variability ofgroup organization in changing circumstances.This persistence reveals the basic value orienta-tion inherent in society, and is the driving forceof the development of society. (ix)

Chapter One 11

Nakane suggested that the overall structure ofJapanese society is not one of horizontal stratifica-tion by class or caste, but of vertical stratification byinstitution or group of institutions. She argued thatthis social structure is so pervasive in Japan that itresults in a quite homogeneous social structure andin considerable similarities in interpersonal relationsand individual psychologies (at least in relation to so-cial behavior).

Nakane’s analysis of social groups focused on twomajor points. First, she pointed out that social groupsin Japan are formed on the basis of situation, not at-tributes. Consequently, social groups include mem-bers with differing attributes. Group cohesiveness isensured because even though people may have dif-ferent attributes, they are led to feel that they are mem-bers of the same group (the creation of group iden-tity); this feeling is justified by stressing group con-sciousness: “us” versus “them.”10

Consequently, the power and influence of thegroup not only affects and enters into theindividual’s actions; it alters even his ideas andways of thinking. Individual autonomy is mini-mized. When this happens, the point wheregroup or public life ends and where private lifebegins no longer can be distinguished. There arethose who perceive this as a danger, an en-croachment on their dignity as individuals; onthe other hand, others feel safer in total-groupconsciousness. There seems little doubt that thelatter group is in the majority. Their sphere of

12

living is usually concentrated solely within thevillage community or place of work. (1970, 10)

Nakane characterized Japanese social groups asfamily-like, based on the concept of Japanese ie(house), and pervasive within the private lives of theirmembers. She suggested that “these characteristicshave been cautiously encouraged by managers andadministrators consistently from the Meiji Period. Andthe truth is that this encouragement has always suc-ceeded and reaped rewards” (19).

Nakane’s second major point was that Japanesesocial groups are characterized internally by verticalrelationships, oftentimes established through elabo-rate ranking systems. Once ranking is established,strong emotions tie the hierarchy together through acultural system of loyalty (chuugi) from the bottomand paternalistic obligation (onjo-shugi) from the top.Consequently, Japanese value orientations, accordingto Nakane, center on loyalty, persistence, perseverance,and obligations, many of the same characteristics thathave been espoused previously by influential writers.

Nakane suggested that the cultural compositionof Japanese society, combined with the social persis-tence of these structural elements of society acrosshistory, has created a relatively homogeneous Japa-nese culture and society.

This structural persistence manifests one of thedistinctive characteristics of a homogeneoussociety built on a vertical organization principle.Such a society is fairly stable; it is difficult to

Chapter One 13

create revolution or disorder on a national scale,since there is segmentation of the lower sectorsinto various group clusters fenced off from eachother. Structural difficulties stand in the way of abroad scope of joint activity—members of a tradeunion, for example, are too loyal to their owncompany to join forces with their brothers inother company unions; student unions areunable to muster the great majority of studentsbut develop groups where the solidarity of onegroup differentiates it from another. (1970, 149)

Scholarly literature in sociology, anthropology,psychology, economics, humanities, and literature ech-oes the images of the Japanese discussed by Nakane.Many scholars have used the concepts described ear-lier in interpreting Japanese people and culture. Otherconcepts taken up in contemporary literature on Ja-pan include discipline (kiritsu), order (chitsujo), meek-ness (sunao), and goodwill (koui), all of which are re-lated, at least to some degree, to previous conceptu-alizations about Japan. As portrayals of this type be-came increasingly popular over the years, the Japa-nese people and culture became synonymous withthem.

Even relatively recent writing by noted scholars andauthorities on Japan continues to portray Japanesepeople and culture as homogeneous. Edwin Reischauer,for example, in his 1988 book entitled The JapaneseToday: Change and Continuity, commented about theself-sacrificing and unselfish nature of the Japanesepeople toward groups.

14

Various societies differ greatly in the relativeemphasis placed on the individual and thegroup. Certainly no difference is more significantbetween Japanese and Americans, or Westernersin general, than the greater Japanese tendency toemphasize the group at the expense of theindividual…. The key Japanese value is harmony,which they seek to achieve by a subtle process ofmutual understanding, almost by intuition, ratherthan by a sharp analysis of conflicting views orby clear-cut decisions, whether made by one-man dictates or majority votes. (128, 136)

Although Nakane’s Japanese Society, describedabove, was originally published in 1970, her views onthe homogeneity of Japanese culture and society wereessentially unchanged even twenty-seven years later.

In the prehistoric period, the Japanese islandswere covered by a single cultural type known asJomon culture. There were also minority groupsof people known as Ainu and Ezo. But they havemixed extensively with the majority of Japanese.Thus considered from a broader view, only asingle ethnic group has occupied Japan for avery long time.

Later, rice growing was initiated under theinfluence of the Asian continent. The rice-planting culture quickly spread throughoutJapan, resulting in the creation of a nationalculture based on wet-paddy cultivation.

Looking at the various other nations of theworld, both in Europe and Asia, it is hard to findanother nation in which the entire population isincluded in such a common culture. In other

Chapter One 15

words, Japan is an unusually homogeneoussociety. If Japan is approached for [sic] this pointof view, it may be surprisingly easy to under-stand. (1997, 181–83)

The Publisher’s Foreword to the 1976 reprintingof Lafcadio Hearn’s 1894 work also promulgated thestereotypic view of the homogeneous and uniculturalJapanese society.

Even though much has changed in Japan sincehe [Hearn] came under the spell of that country,what he had to say about it still has a remarkablevalidity, for the Japanese spirit has changedconsiderably less than the material conditions ofJapanese life. In a word, the Japanese characterand the Japanese tradition are still fundamentallythe same as Hearn found them to be, and forthis reason his books are still extremely revealingto readers in the West. (ix)

A surprising amount of comparative American-Japanese research exists. Recently, I did a computersearch for comparative studies in the fields of psy-chology and communication alone, and found wellover one thousand citations for works published overthe past twenty years or so. I certainly have not readall of them, but I have read a fair portion and havefound that all of those, to a fault, describe Japaneseculture the same way as described here. When differ-ences between Americans and Japanese are found,such differences are said to exist because the Japa-nese are group-oriented and interdependent; because

16

they value harmony, cooperation, and cohesion; andbecause they suppress their true feelings.

In short, Japanese culture and people are portrayedin academic circles today in a fashion similar to theway they were portrayed in the writings of Hearn,Benedict, Dore, Morris, Nakane, Nitobe, Reischauer,and every other leading Japanologist. If contempo-rary views of Japanese culture are not exactly the sameas those held one hundred or more years ago, theyare logical extensions of them (e.g., collectivism maynot have been discussed as such, but the current fo-cus on Japanese collectivism may be viewed as anextension of previous views of loyalty, sincerity, sacri-fice, etc.).11 These stereotypic images of the Japaneseculture and people are no longer merely stereotypes;they are the Japanese.

Japanese Culture in the Media

These stereotyped depictions of the Japanese exist notonly in the scholarly literature; they are also promul-gated via movies and other media. One relatively re-cent film, Rising Sun, portrays the Japanese as doingwhatever they can for the sake of the company—evencovering up a murder and keeping special housingfor mistresses (group consciousness, collectivism, sac-rifice). The movie depicts the Japanese workers as rigid,disciplined, austere, and all-obedient to the elderstatesman chairman of the board (loyalty, filial piety,obligations). There is a martial-arts-like quality to themanners, etiquette, and respect displayed by the sub-

Chapter One 17

ordinates in the movie (politeness, meekness, sincer-ity), and some of the main Japanese characters areskilled in karate (as if all Japanese people are profi-cient in martial arts). Although the cultural attributesare translated to the contemporary corporate world,the underlying image of the Japanese is the same—that of the bushido warrior.

Even some recent writings on Japanese econom-ics and business management call the Japanese com-pany workers (salarymen) “samurai in suits.” This im-age is promulgated by almost every type of commu-nication and information resource that exists—schol-arly and popular books, academic journal writing,business and practical books, movies, magazines, tele-vision, and the like.

Within the Japanese media, who can doubt thelong-standing popularity of the movies and bookscommonly known as Chuushingura (the story of theforty-seven ronin) or the “nobility of failure” in the sto-ries of Tora-san (Otoko wa tsurai yo, literally “Men Havea Hard Life” or, more simply “What a Life”), whose mov-ies graced theaters and televisions on New Year’s inJapan for years? The Chuushingura stories are notonly an interesting description of history; they havecome to idealize the character and virtue the Japa-nese want to ascribe to themselves. The poignancy ofthe forty-seven ronin is yet another example of thewarrior code that many Japanese revere and identifywith, as are many of the images from the mass media.

18

Japanese Culture as Viewed by Japanese

Many Japanese scholars have used religion in attempt-ing to explain the origins of the Japanese culture andspirit. The origins of Buddhism and Shintoism and theteachings of Confucius are often used as a base fromwhich core Japanese values—hierarchical relationships,cooperation, group harmony, filial piety, and the like—have been ingrained in the Japanese for hundreds orthousands of years. Other scholars continue to usethe concept of bushido to explain the Japanese cul-ture and character.

Japanese psychologists have described the psy-chological nature of the Japanese. Hiroshi Minami, forexample, proposed three aspects of the Japanese—in-ner, outer, and active. The inner aspect includes faint-heartedness, shyness, reserve, and resignation. Theouter aspect contains such traits as consideration,gentleness, and kindness. The active aspect refers tostudiousness, aspiration, and work discipline. Minami’stheory provides an organizational framework for thecore psychological characteristics that we have beendiscussing throughout this chapter.12

Another well-known psychologist is Takeo Doi,who wrote a book entitled The Anatomy of Depen-dence (Amae no Kouzou). In this book Doi suggestedthat interdependence (amae) is a basic value of Japa-nese people. This concept has been used to explaincollectivism and group harmony, as amae is at thecore of group consciousness in Japan.

Chapter One 19

Some writers have suggested that collectivism andgroup harmony are fixed patterns of character—ar-chetypes—that are unconscious and that cut acrosshistorical generations. These writers use the conceptof archetypes first suggested by the psychoanalyst CarlJung to suggest that these archetypes are a collectivepart of the Japanese personality and an indisputableaspect of Japanese character.

Finally, some Japanese writers have described howthe value of harmony, or wa, was added to the Con-stitution of Seventeen Articles by Crown PrinceShotoku, according to the Nihon shoki (a historical-mythological document explaining the origin of Ja-pan). Values such as harmony and collectivism areviewed as inherent aspects of the Japanese spirit andare keys to distinguishing the culture of Japan fromthat of China or India.

These views are not limited to academics. I comeacross many students from Japan who are studyingin the United States in fields such as psychology orcommunication. They often base their research onthese same images and stereotypes of Japan. Thesestudents—born and raised in Japan—view Japan as aland of makoto, sunao, gaman (patience, tolerance),shinbou (perseverance, endurance), and the like.

Undoubtedly, Japanese people think about Japanin this way partly because they want to and partlybecause these notions are ingrained in them from earlyon. There is nobility in these descriptions, and the Japa-nese themselves actively promote the inherent good-

20

ness of their images of themselves, even if they knowthat the reality may be different.

Allow me to recap these values and virtues thatare common to the warrior class, that so aptly de-scribe all of Japanese culture, character, personality,and people. They include rectitude or gi (justice), yuu(courage), jin (benevolence), rei (politeness), makoto(veracity and sincerity), meiyo (honor), chuugi (loyalty),and kokki (self-control). These are the values that, ac-cording to Japanese and Westerners alike, describeJapanese culture.13

In summary, stereotypic views about Japaneseculture are promulgated not only by Westerners butalso by Japanese scholars, writers, and the Japanesepublic. This is what the Japanese want to think aboutthemselves, and this is how they want to portray them-selves to the rest of the world.

Stability in ContemporaryJapanese Society

As the world collectively holds on to these stereotypicviews about Japanese culture and society, contempo-rary Japan seems plagued with a sense of confusion,unrest, and anxiety, which raises questions about theveracity of these comfortable and familiar views today.An increasing number of people in Japan are worriedand confused about their lives, society, and culture. Thepicture of contemporary Japanese culture and societypainted not only by anecdotal and personal experiences

Chapter One 21

but also by objective data provides a stark contrast tothe picture of the homogeneous, collective, and har-monious Japanese society of the past.

For example, the Japanese government has peri-odically commissioned large-scale surveys of the gen-eral population in order to gain a sense of the pulseof the general public. One such survey was conductedin 1999 (Kokumin Seikatsu Hakusho), and the resultswere reported to the Japanese Cabinet (10 December1999) by the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) of theJapanese government.14 An overwhelming majority ofthe more than three thousand Japanese participantsreported considerably negative views on contempo-rary Japanese society (Figure 1.1, page 22).

The Asahi Shimbun (newspaper) also conductedan annual face-to-face survey on similar issues re-lated to the Japanese public’s views on contemporarysociety. In one survey conducted in December, 1997,three thousand individuals (2,314 respondents) wereasked to select the single word they thought best de-scribed current society.15 The word selected most of-ten by the respondents was confusion (32%), followedby unfair (18%), selfish (17%), and decadence (11%).Only 7 percent of the respondents said that theyviewed society as stable.

The Asahi Shimbun conducted another face-to-facesurvey of Japanese individuals on their opinions aboutlife under recession in 1998. The survey was conductedin March with three thousand randomly selected vot-ers (2,211 respondents). Their outlook, in general, was

22

not positive, as most individuals surveyed (75%) re-ported anxiety concerning what is known as the “BigBang,” a term given to the government’s attempt to cre-ate financial system reform in order to revitalize theeconomy. By making the Japanese financial marketcommensurate with the international markets of NewYork and London, Japan began to engage in planningthat would bring about major changes in areas such asfinancial services, securities, insurance, real estate, andthe like. These impending changes, of course, broughtabout uncertainty and anxiety among the Japanesepeople, which were reflected in the survey data.

0

20

40

60

80

100

HGFEDCBA

79.4 79.2 76.2 75.369.9 68.6 66.7

57

Figure 1.1*

Japanese People’s Views on Contemporary Society

Percentage of people who re-sponded thatA There are many irresponsible

people.B Everyone acts selfishly.C Everyone is too busy to relax.

D Social justice and a sense ofmorality are declining.

E Society is buffeted by changes.F People are cold toward others.G Public morals are corrupt.H There are many uncertainties.

* See page ix for a statement regarding figures.

Chapter One 23

Needless to say, such anticipation of large-scalefinancial changes forced people to rethink their wayof life, which in fact has major implications for socialand cultural change. A full 59 percent of the peoplesurveyed in the 1998 Asahi Shimbun survey reportedthat they were seriously reconsidering their way oflife because of the current situation in Japan.

In a separate study comparing youth aged four-teen to eighteen in Japan and Finland (conducted byKomazawa Women’s University, the NHK [NihonHousou Kyoukai] Research Institute in Japan, and Fin-land Gallup in 1995), 2,989 Japanese teenagers and acomparable number of Finnish teenagers were askedabout their attitudes toward the future outlook of theircountry over the next ten years.16 Most of the Japa-nese teenagers reported that they were “not very hope-ful” or “not hopeful at all” (see Figure 1.2 in the Appen-dix). The comparison with the Finnish youth data isstartling.

When the Japanese youth were queried in moredetail about their responses, they indicated that theywere fairly certain that, relative to past trends, Japan’scourse would take a turn for the worse over the nextten years. Seventy-eight percent of them believed thatthe environment will become even more polluted thanit is now; 65 percent believed that crime and violencewill worsen; 54 percent believed that social securityprotections will weaken; and 53 percent believed thatthe employment situation will worsen.

Even Japanese responses to emerging technolo-

24

gies had a negative flavor. This is surprising becauseJapan is a world leader in technology, and the Japa-nese public makes great use of technological advancesin their everyday lives. For example, in the 1997 AsahiShimbun opinion poll, people were asked about theirreactions to improving and emerging technologies inthe workplace. While many responded that comput-ers and other technologies did make things more con-venient and business more effective, 31 percent saidthat they either could not keep up with those changesor might lose their jobs because of them. While not amajority, these people represent such a large percent-age that their attitudes cannot be ignored.

Even in an international comparison of attitudestoward the merits of advancing information technol-ogy conducted by the EPA (with three thousand re-spondents in Japan aged eighteen to sixty-nine years),the Japanese consistently had the least positive out-look of the countries surveyed: Japan, United States,England, France, and Germany (Figure 1.3, page 25).

Perhaps some of the most telling statistics regard-ing the current tenor of attitudes in Japan come fromEd Diener and Shigehiro Oishi’s (2000) study of sub-jective well-being across forty-two countries. Subjec-tive well-being (SWB) refers to the degree to whichpeople evaluate their lives in a positive fashion. Thegreater the SWB, the more positive they feel about thequality of their lives. Diener and his colleagues havedeveloped a method for measuring SWB reliably, val-idly, and cross-culturally and have used this measure

Chapter One 25

in numerous studies in many different countries. In theirmost recent work, they examined the relationship ineach of the forty-two countries between the averageSWB and national income, as measured by purchas-ing power parity in U.S. dollars. Even though their re-sults indicated a fairly strong and consistent correla-tion between income and SWB across all countries,closer inspection of the data indicated that of the eightcountries with the highest national income, Japan hadthe lowest average SWB score (Table 1.1, page 26).

These data are even more remarkable when oneconsiders how economic growth may be related toSWB over time. Diener and Oishi examined the rela-tionship between these two variables across time infifteen countries. Data from Japan were collected overtwenty-two years, during which time Japan experi-

0 20 40 60 80

Making daily lifemore convenient

Receiving thelatest information

Receiving lotsof information

Knowing globalinformation

Increasingbusiness chances

Improving scienceand technology

Germany France England U.S. Japan

Figure 1.3Comparison of the Merits of Information Technology

26

enced an average of 4.1 percent economic growth perannum, the highest of all of the countries included inthe comparison. However, Japan’s SWB scores showedvirtually no relationship to the growth.17

Table 1.1National Income of Top Eight Countries and SWB Scores18

Country Income Life Satisfaction

Luxembourg $28,770 0.68

United States $25,860 0.78

Switzerland $25,150 1.38

Japan $21,350 -0.90

Iceland $21,150 0.97

Norway $21,120 0.80

Denmark $20,800 1.28

Belgium $20,270 0.70

Statistics compiled by various agencies of the Japa-nese government also raise questions about contem-porary culture and society. As much of the public al-ready knows, the number of all crimes reported, aswell as the number of arrests made by police, has risensteadily since 1984; and deaths due to certain diseasessuch as cancer and heart disease have also risen sincethe 1950s. Increases in both of these areas are to beexpected because, during the same time, the popula-tion has grown considerably, in sync, actually, withthe rates of increase in overall crime and deaths dueto cancer and heart disease. Yet, two statistical find-ings are of note to our discussion here.

Chapter One 27

First, while the rise in overall crime is consonantwith increases in the general population, the case offelony offenses stands out. From 1984 to 1989 felonyoffenses actually decreased every year in Japan. But inthe ten-year span from 1989 to 1999, felony offensesincreased dramatically, almost doubling. Thus, relativeto the data for previous felony offenses, the change inthese statistics during that ten-year period is alarming.The fact that these offenses tend to be the most mor-ally reprehensible speaks volumes concerning the pos-sible changes in social and cultural fabric of the coun-try; these crimes are lamented in the newspapers, tele-vision, and print media in Japan almost daily.

Second, the fact that deaths due to cancer and heartdisease have increased, while at the same time thosedue to cerebrovascular disease have decreased, is in-dicative of a trend toward increasing individualism inthe culture. In a study conducted by my laboratory(Matsumoto and Fletcher 1996), we found that indi-vidualistic cultures are associated with higher degreesof heart disease and cancer, while collectivistic cul-tures are associated with higher incidences of cere-brovascular diseases. The changes in incidence ratesof these diseases in Japan, therefore, are congruentwith the notion of a changing culture.

Collectively, then, the figures in this section reflecta growing degree of unrest, dissatisfaction, and anxi-ety among many Japanese people. These data runcontrary to the popular, stereotypic beliefs about Japa-nese culture and society. What’s going on?

28

The Causes for This Degree of UnrestClearly, there are no easy answers to the question ofwhat is going on in Japan to cause such unrest. Thecauses, in fact, are multiple and include political, so-cial, economic, and psychological factors, all of whichinteract to produce a unique experience for Japaneseindividuals—the blending of traditional and contem-porary characteristics of society.

In this book, I explore one of these factors—thechanges in Japanese culture and society and the con-sequences of these changes on the psychology ofJapanese individuals. In short, I believe that deep-seated changes in Japanese culture and society arecreating a stressful environment in which people mustlive and function. Those changes then lead to feelingsof dissatisfaction, unrest, anxiety, and apprehensionabout the future. I believe that cultural duality, nothomogeneity, exists in Japan today and that previousstereotypic conceptualizations of Japanese culture aresimply not adequate representations of the values,attitudes, and beliefs of large segments of the currentJapanese population.

In this book I will show how Japanese culture isundergoing a major evolution, thereby creating a het-erogeneous society with multiple cultures. In particu-lar I will show that the cultural values held by many ofthe younger generations (i.e., under thirty-five yearsof age) in Japan are considerably different from thoseheld by their elders—and from the predominant ste-

Chapter One 29

reotypes of Japanese cultural and moral values. Inmany societies such cultural changes can be inter-preted as merely a “generation gap” between older andyounger individuals in the society. In Japan, too, thepredominant belief until now has been that upongraduation from college and entrance into a company,the Japanese individual becomes a shakaijin (personof society), and the Japanese companies and variousorganizations work to resocialize the Japanese indi-vidual into the dominant Japanese cultural mores andnorms.19 I, however, believe these socioculturalchanges to be major and pervasive, permeating manystrata of society, and not “fixed” by a readjustmentupon employment. These changes have, in fact, forceddifferences in attitudes concerning education, person-nel and human resources decisions within Japanesecompanies, and everyday life in Japan.

Nakane (1970) wrote that Japanese culture is sur-prisingly easy to understand. As it stands today, how-ever, I believe that Japanese culture may be one of themost difficult to understand because of the combina-tion of influences it must reconcile: traditional, his-torical aspects of Japanese culture; the influx and in-fluence of other cultures; the advent of technology;the changing population density and sociodemo-graphic characteristics; and affluence. These factorsinteract to produce a unique contemporary culture thatcannot be pigeonholed into an easy-to-understandformat. How can one understand the image of girls intraditional kimonos on seijin shiki20 day walking down

30

the street, their cellular phones ringing with the melo-dies of a popular musician. Such cultural clashes areapparent everywhere in Japan today.

In the next chapter I will provide data about sevenselected stereotypes of Japanese culture to demon-strate how Japanese culture has changed drastically. Iwill then discuss why these changes have occurredand their implications for business, school, sports, andeveryday life. Quite frankly, much of the strain peopleexperience today is, in my opinion, the result of op-posing cultural values held by large segments of thepopulation, the stress that is created by a cultural du-ality, and the resulting social and psychological con-sequences. I will conclude the book by giving somethought to what the future may hold for Japan as itnegotiates these changes, evolving into a different and,I hope, better Japan, striving for a brighter future forits children.

Textnotes1 Of course the Meiji Restoration represented much more

than political overthrow and change at a single time. Theyear attributed to the Restoration, 1868, represented thepoint in time when social and cultural unrest, combinedwith increased pressure from outside Japan, came to a headafter years of simmering. Whether the Restoration repre-sented a revolution in the European or American sensehas been debated among historians. For more informa-tion on the history of the Restoration and these issues,consult Hall (1968) and Hall and Jansen (1968).

Chapter One 31

2 The surrender of the Russian Army at Port Arthur in 1905was photographed and depicts this scene, which by someaccounts was unheard-of in the European history of war-fare.

3 The English version published by Tuttle lists the originalpublication date as 1905. The original Japanese edition,however, lists the publication date as 1899.

4 Apparently, Nitobe wrote the book partly to describe theJapanese culture to his American wife, Mary, who had askedmany questions of her Japanese husband about the Japa-nese character, and partly to satisfy requests from profes-sional colleagues. With the close of the Russo-JapaneseWar in 1905, the book became popular, explaining whatwas unique about the Japanese that enabled the countryto be victorious.

5 It is interesting to compare Nitobe’s account of bushido withthat of earlier writings, such as Tsunetomo Yamamoto’sHagakure: The Book of the Samurai, originally written overa period of seven years, from 1710 to 1716. The principles ofthe way of the warrior as espoused in this work are funda-mentally different from those described by Nitobe. InHagakure there is a profound emphasis on two major is-sues: one’s attitude toward death and loyalty to one’s mas-ter. Although other concepts and values, such as those men-tioned by Nitobe and others, are mentioned in various placesin this collection of writings, they are strongly overshad-owed by the two major concepts. I interpret the differencesexisting between these two major pieces of writing to be aproduct of Japan’s history. Hagakure was written before theend of Japan’s Warring Period (Sengoku Jidai) and well withinmemory of the Shimabara rebellion in 1638. Thus, the prin-ciples of the bushi as expounded in this writing were moreextreme, raw if you will, when death in battle was viewed ashonorable. “Merit lies more in dying for one’s master thanin striking down the enemy” (1979, 55) is a theme that ap-pears consistently throughout Hagakure.

32

When Nitobe’s Bushido was written, however, Japan hadbeen at peace for three centuries. As wars and battles werenonexistent, the moral code of the warrior evolved froman emphasis on battle to a focus on a warrior’s way of life.As such, the view of bushido came to be idealized. Thus,the moral codes and values described by Nitobe read muchlike a stylized code of ethics because in a great sense thatis exactly what they had become.

6 Another reason why her work reflects much of the tradi-tional, stereotypic views of Japan is, I believe, because un-like most writers of cultural anthropology, she was unableto visit and live in Japan and experience the country first-hand and in-depth because of the war. Thus, primary re-sources were interviews with Japanese Americans, currentevents, and published works on Japanese culture andpeople. Reliance on self-reports instead of actual observa-tions and experiences of Japanese life may in fact foster astereotypic view of a culture. Such self-reports, especiallyconcerning Japan, may tend to be as much social(re)construction as they are objective indices about Japa-nese culture and lifestyle. The interviewees studied and thereports read may have led to the glossy, stereotypic pic-ture of the Japanese in The Chrysanthemum and the Sword.

There are also several other issues to consider. First theJapanese Americans who were available for Benedict tointerview had in fact left Japan for one reason or another,and, while they may have been born in Japan, they maynot have been representative of Japanese in Japan (Takaki1989).

Second, during World War II many Japanese immigrantsand their families were interned in camps. It is not knownwhat influence this life experience may have had on thereports of Japanese culture the interviewees may havegiven. These two issues, therefore, suggest the potentialfor a sampling bias among the interviewees utilized by

Chapter One 33

Benedict in her research. That Japanese in Japan havemarveled at the “accuracy” of Benedict’s work is not sur-prising, though, as her stereotypic notion of the Japaneseculture and character is essentially perpetuated by Japa-nese writers as well.

7 See a review of Dore’s City Life in Japan and a related workby Brian Moeran (1986).

8 One of these cultural imports is the art and sport of judoand its derivative, jujitsu. The spread of jujitsu and judoaround the world coincided with the heightened interestin Japanese bushido. Demonstrations, championships,matches, and seminars were established around the worldby leading Japanese instructors of judo and jujitsu. Thespread of such Japanese cultural artifacts is quite aston-ishing; today, for example, judo is one of the most popu-lar, well-practiced sports in the world, with one of the larg-est international sports organizations in the InternationalOlympic Committee (currently 183 countries are officialmembers of the International Judo Federation).

9 Japanese readers may also want to see her Tate-shakai noningen-kankei: Tanitsu-shakai no riron (Personal Relationsin a Vertical Society: A Theory of Homogeneous Society). 1967.Tokyo: Kodansha.

10 See also the Triandis et al. (1988) article on differences iningroup and outgroup relationships between individualis-tic and collectivistic cultures.

11 This point is important, as much of the data I present inchapter 2 speak directly to collectivism and its opposite,individualism.

12 Minami also suggested that because these three aspects ofthe Japanese personality are such strong components ofthe Japanese character, the Japanese have a basic uncer-tainty of the self—who they are—because who they are de-pends on which aspect of the self they happen to be in atthe time.

34

13 To be sure, Westerners also have negative stereotypes ofthe Japanese. For example, many individuals, dating fromHearn’s writing, comment on the “inscrutability” of the Japa-nese. Related to perceptions of inscrutability are images ofthe Japanese as sly, sneaky, untrustworthy. Such negativeimages have been considered by some to be at the root ofdiscriminatory practices against the Japanese and Japa-nese Americans (e.g., see the literature on Japanese intern-ment camps during World War II, or Shintaro Ishihara’s[1989] book entitled The Japan that Can Say No).

14 www.epa.go.jp15 Kanzaki.com/jpoll/regular97.html16 www.freenet.hut.fi/monitoimitalo/nuoriso/chapter6.html17 To be sure, the degree of relationship between national

economic growth and SWB was virtually nonexistent forall the countries studied. This suggests that, on average,people do not report being happier despite the availabilityof more goods and services.

18 Life Satisfaction scores are expressed as standardizedscores, with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. Thenegative score for Japan indicates that the Japanese SWBscore is almost 1 standard deviation below the average ofall countries compared. “Income” purchasing power parityin U.S. dollars where available and GNP elsewhere.

19 For example, Nakane (1970) wrote,It is often agreed that, in these “modern” days, theyounger generation tends to infringe the rules of order.But it is interesting to note that young people soon be-gin to follow the traditional order once they are em-ployed, as they gradually realize the social cost that suchinfringement involves. (32)

20 Seijin shiki is an annual “coming of age” event where chil-dren are, at the age of twenty, officially recognized as adults.

35

2

Seven Stereotypes aboutJapanese Culture and

Their Reality

In this chapter I discuss seven well-known and well-accepted stereotypes about Japanese culture and so-ciety and present evidence from research that sug-gests they are not adequate representations of Japa-nese culture today. Some of the research I reviewcomes from contemporary psychological research,published in scholarly, peer-reviewed journals; otherdata come from surveys conducted within Japan bythe government or the private sector, such as thoseintroduced in the second half of chapter 1. All of theresearch reviewed, regardless of its source, involvesas participants Japanese individuals born and raisedin Japan and does not include Japanese Americansor other Japanese immigrant groups found outsideJapan.

36

The studies that come from research published inpeer-reviewed journals typically involve university stu-dents as participants. Other studies reviewed, how-ever, involve nonstudent samples and span a widerange of ages of people in Japan. This point is impor-tant because some people believe that the culturalchanges we are witness to today are limited to uni-versity student samples, the typical participants in psy-chological research. If you only view research resultspublished in peer-reviewed journals and considernothing else, this may be a plausible argument. I be-lieve, however, that findings from the business andmarriage studies described below, which are basedon samples of Japanese participants of different ages,amply suggest that what we are observing is not lim-ited to university students. Instead, these data indicatethat a true cultural evolution is occurring in Japan. Anew, qualitatively and meaningfully different cultureis emerging. What we are observing in our everydaylives in Japan is not a fad or a generation gap that theyouth will “get over,” but are signs of real and drasticchanges in the culture of this society.

The evidence, therefore, forcefully challenges thevalidity of stereotypic notions about Japanese cultureand society, rendering them more myth than truth,more fantasy than reality. Although discussion of onlyseven aspects of Japanese culture is not at all com-prehensive, I do believe these aspects are at the heartof deep-seated changes in the very fabric of societyand point to the fact that Japan is in the midst of a

Chapter Two 37

huge transformation whereby multiple cultural groupsare being created.

Stereotype 1: Japanese CollectivismBackground

One of the most common stereotypes that Japaneseand non-Japanese alike have about Japanese cultureconcerns the cultural dimension known as collectivismand its counterpart, individualism. Cultural psycholo-gists and anthropologists have used this construct foryears to describe cultural differences in self-other rela-tionships across different societies of the world.

Basically, individualism and collectivism reflect thedegree to which individuals in any society identify with,sacrifice themselves for, and otherwise coexist withothers around them. On the one hand, individualisticcultures foster the needs, wishes, and desires of indi-viduals over their ingroups (see discussion of ingroupsand outgroups below). As such, they value competi-tion, uniqueness, and separateness. The United States,Australia, and Great Britain are commonly thought tobe individualistic societies. In these cultures individu-als are valued, as are autonomy and independence.Such values manifest themselves in a variety of ways:child rearing (e.g., getting children to sleep in their ownroom as soon as possible), education, and employ-ment. As it is said in the U.S., “The squeaky wheel getsthe grease,” and those who stand out reap many so-cial benefits.

38

Collectivistic cultures, on the other hand, foster theneeds, wishes, and desires of ingroups over individu-als. They foster values such as cooperation, harmony,and conformity. In such cultures people are expectedto “go with the flow,” sacrifice their personal aspira-tions and desires for the sake of the common good,and maintain a strong group identity.

To understand how individualism and collectivismaffect social behavior, we must also discuss the so-ciological concept known as ingroups and outgroups.People in all societies categorize others in their socialsphere; it is a natural, necessary, and normal part ofsocial behavior. Ingroup relationships are those thatare characterized by familiarity, intimacy, a shared his-tory, and potential future relationships. Typicalingroups include family, close friends, loved ones, workcolleagues, peers, and the like. Outgroup relationships,however, are characterized by unfamiliarity, a lack ofintimacy and emotional ties, and distance. Typicaloutgroup others include strangers, casual acquain-tances, and the like.

The relationship between the self and ingroup/outgroup members differs according to individualismand collectivism. In individualistic cultures, people tendto make fewer distinctions between ingroups andoutgroups, because of the emphasis on individualsrather than groups. In collectivistic cultures, however,people tend to make greater distinctions betweeningroups and outgroups, because of the importanceattached to the relationship of the self to the ingroup.

Chapter Two 39

The strong distinction between ingroups andoutgroups actually helps to maintain ingroup harmonyand cohesion. This tendency is considered an essen-tial part of collectivism; in collectivistic societiesingroups are much more sacred and protected thanin individualistic societies. In collectivistic societies onebelongs to fewer ingroups, but the ties to, identifica-tion with, and psychological importance of thoseingroups are stronger than in individualistic societies.

Over the years many writers have referred to theJapanese culture as collectivistic, as described in chap-ter 1. Many of the classical writings about Japaneseculture, for example, describe the importance of thegroup over individual needs and use terms such asloyalty, filial piety, obligation, and sacrifice to describemany of the main values of Japanese culture. Con-temporary works by Chie Nakane, Edwin Reischauer,and others also paint a similar picture of Japanesecultural values centering on collectivism.

The Evidence

In fact this stereotypic view of Japanese culture ascollectivistic received some scientific support in a large-scale study on values in the workplace by organiza-tional scientist Geert Hofstede over thirty years ago(1980; 1984).1 In his study, managers and other em-ployees of a large, international business firm (the iden-tity of which was originally concealed but was laterrevealed as IBM) completed a large survey on theirattitudes, beliefs, and values about work. The respon-

40

dents included employees from subsidiaries in ap-proximately fifty countries around the world, involv-ing literally thousands of respondents. Hofstede ana-lyzed the data and found that one of the dimensionsthat differentiated the responses was individualismversus collectivism. When he placed the countries inorder according to this dimension, Hofstede found thatthe United States was at the far end of individualisticcultures, while Japan ranked toward the middle (i.e.,much more collectivistic).

Despite this early support for the stereotype con-cerning Japanese collectivism and American individu-alism, there has been no support for this distinction inrecent psychological research directly testing this no-tion. In fact since Hofstede’s original study, seventeenother studies have been conducted directly examin-ing Japanese collectivism and American individualism,and not one has supported this claim.2

For example, my laboratory conducted a study inwhich we asked 138 American and 137 Japanese uni-versity students to complete a test for individualismand collectivism (Matsumoto et al. 1997b). This testincluded over one hundred questions, was based onyears of work in the field, and has been reliably usedin a number of studies concerning this cultural dimen-sion. When we tested for differences between the twogroups on their overall individualism-collectivismscores, we found no differences.

Other researchers have reported similar results. Forexample, Kim Carter and Dale Dinnel tested American

Chapter Two 41

and Japanese university students on two scales de-signed to measure collectivistic attitudes and values(Carter and Dinnel 1997). On the Collectivism Scale,there was no discernible difference between the Ameri-cans and Japanese. On the Collectivistic Values Indexscale, the Americans actually scored higher than theJapanese on collectivism (see Figure 2.1 in the Appen-dix). This suggests that not only is the stereotype con-cerning Japanese collectivism not supported, but infact the opposite may be true—the Japanese may ac-tually be less collectivistic, that is, more individualisticthan are Americans.

Japanese psychologists interested in individualismand collectivism have also reported similar findings.For instance, Susumu Yamaguchi, a social psycholo-gist at the University of Tokyo, and his colleagues stud-ied collectivism in Japan, Korea, and the United States(Yamaguchi, Kuhlman, and Sugimori 1995). These re-searchers asked 238 American (146 in Delaware and92 in Washington), 295 Japanese, and 293 Koreanuniversity students to complete a scale designed tomeasure collectivism. When the researchers analyzedthe data for differences among the countries, theyfound, to their surprise, no differences between theAmerican and Japanese students on collectivism. Thisfinding also provides no support for the contentionthat Japanese individuals are more collectivistic thanAmericans. (The Korean students, however, were sig-nificantly more collectivistic than both the Americansand the Japanese; see Figure 2.2 in the Appendix.)

42

When various aspects of collectivism and individu-alism are studied separately, the findings are even morerevealing. For example, in the study conducted by mylaboratory that was described earlier (Matsumoto etal. 1997b), we asked American, Japanese, Korean, andRussian university students to complete a test of indi-vidualistic and collectivistic values in relation to theirinteractions with their family members. Many socialscientists, Japanese and non-Japanese alike, have of-ten described the importance of the nuclear family asthe most stable and prototypical example of collectiv-istic values and behaviors in Asian cultures. These ste-reotypes no doubt owe some of their origin to theimportance of the family and family structure in Con-fucian teachings, as well as in religions such as Bud-dhism, Shintoism, and Taoism, all of which have amajor influence over Japanese and other Asian cul-tures.3 Thus, I predicted that the Korean and Japanesestudents would have the highest collectivism scoresin relation to interactions with their families, whileRussians and Americans would have the lowest.

The data, however, proved otherwise. Koreans didhave relatively high collectivism scores in relation to theirfamilies (4.39). But Russian students had the highestcollectivism scores (4.41), and both Russians and Ameri-cans (4.10) had significantly higher collectivism scoresthan the Japanese (3.41), who had the lowest scores onthis scale (see Figure 2.3 in the Appendix). These dataindicate that of the four countries surveyed, the Japa-nese had the lowest collectivistic attitudes, values, and

Chapter Two 43

beliefs toward their families, which runs contrary toprevalent notions of Japanese ie and collectivism.4 Andthese differences were quite substantial.

Japanese relationships between the self andoutgroups also do not conform to the stereotypicnotion of such relationships in collectivistic societies.As I discussed earlier in this section, strangers are aprototypical outgroup category, and collectivistic cul-tures foster fundamentally different relationships withoutgroup “others” than do individualistic cultures; insupposedly collectivistic cultures such as Japan, indi-viduals make large distinctions between ingroups andoutgroups. In the past Japan was said to have a soci-ety that was relatively closed to outsiders, one in whichit was difficult to gain entrance to an ingroup. In indi-vidualistic cultures such as the United States, peoplehave apparently made less differentiation betweeningroups and outgroups because people are viewedas individuals first, not as agents of a group.

Yet, data from the Matsumoto (1997b) study con-cerning collectivistic values toward strangers—clearlyan outgroup category—do not support this conten-tion. One would expect that the Japanese and Kore-ans would have relatively low scores here, becausecollectivistic societies would encourage less tolerantor friendly (collectivistic) attitudes and behaviors to-ward people who are clearly outsiders. The Ameri-cans and Russians, on the other hand, would bethought to have relatively higher scores. But the Rus-sians and Japanese had the highest collectivism scores

44

in relation to strangers, while Americans had the low-est. This suggested that the Japanese made fewer dif-ferentiations between ingroups and outgroups thandid the Americans, which is exactly contrary to the ste-reotypic belief about entrance to groups in suppos-edly collectivistic cultures such as Japan (see Figure2.4 in the Appendix). Again, the size of the differenceobtained here was substantial.

These findings exist not only in studies in socialpsychology involving questionnaires, but also in re-search examining actual behaviors. Japanese psycholo-gist Toshio Yamagishi, for example, conducted two stud-ies in which American and Japanese students partici-pated in small monocultural groups that required co-operative behavior to perform a task (1988a; 1988b).When a system of mutual monitoring and social sanc-tions existed for individual participation in the group,the Japanese students did indeed contribute more tothe group than did the Americans. But, when the sys-tem of monitoring and sanctions was eliminated, it wasthe Americans, not the Japanese, who contributed more.In fact more Japanese chose to leave the group thandid Americans. American participants had higher levelsof trust and cooperation in the unmonitored setting.These findings imply that Japanese cooperative behav-ior in group settings may be limited to certain types ofcontexts, especially those in which one’s behavior ismonitored and reinforced. When such external con-straints do not exist, Americans exhibit higher degrees

Chapter Two 45

of cooperative behavior than the Japanese. Clearly, thesetypes of findings, like those described above involvingquestionnaires, challenge the stereotype of Japanesecollectivism and American individualism.5

In an earlier study conducted by my research lab, Iestimated the percentage of Japanese individuals whodemonstrate not only collectivistic/individualistic behav-ior but also values and attitudes. In that study, for ex-ample, I classified Japanese university students basedon their responses to an individualism versus collectiv-ism questionnaire (Matsumoto, Kudoh, and Takeuchi1996). The results were impressive (see Figure 2.5).

Figure 2.5Individualists and Collectivists among

Japanese Students

29.2

70.8

Individualists

Collectivists

46

In the same study we compared the Japanese uni-versity students’ responses with those of Japaneseworking adults whose average age was thirty-nine. Weclassified the adults as either individualists or collec-tivists, depending on their responses on the question-naire, using the same criteria as for the students. Theresults from the adult sample were contrary to thoseof the students (see Figure 2.6).

Figure 2.6Individualists and Collectivists among

Japanese Adults

The data reported here clearly indicate that there isa major rift between the cultural values of Japaneseyouth, exhibited by the data from university studentsamples in numerous social psychology studies, andthose of mainstream Japanese culture. These findingsare not a fluke; they are consistent across many studies

32.1

67.9

Individualists

Collectivists

Chapter Two 47

and different methodologies—both questionnaire andactual behavioral and laboratory studies—conducted byboth Japanese and non-Japanese researchers.

Some people may believe that these data are in-dicative of just a fad or a generation gap of some sort.They generally suggest that once Japanese youth be-came socialized after graduation from the universityand enter the workforce (shakaijin), they are onceagain initiated and socialized into Japanese culturalways, by companies and society as a whole.

There is certainly some truth to this notion, and thedata presented immediately above could be interpretedas part of that phenomenon. While this notion ofreculturation may have been accurate in the past,6 I donot believe that it can account fully or satisfactorily forthe data described here or for many of the other changesin Japanese culture that I report below as well. I believethese data indicate that Japanese culture and societyare clearly in transition, with major and widespread dif-ferences in beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviorsamong individuals and groups. Quite frankly, the dataargue against the stereotypic notion of Japanese col-lectivism, at least among the younger generations, andspeak directly to the existence of at least two groups inJapan with quite different cultural value systems.

Stereotype 2: Japanese Self-ConceptsBackground

In social and personality psychology, one of the most

48

interesting and frequently researched areas of studyis self-concept. In psychology the self is thought to bea center for organizing and monitoring behaviors,perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and individual differ-ences. Self-concepts are used to describe people’spersonality traits and characteristics and can also becalled self-descriptors or self-construals.

The study of the self and self-concepts has had along history in the field of psychology in the UnitedStates and Europe. Because it has been shown to be auseful psychological construct, cross-cultural psy-chologists have recently also been interested in study-ing similarities and differences in self-concept acrosscultures, especially in Japan. But, one of the research-ers’ first discoveries was that the meaning of termslike self and self-concept was different in Japan fromwhat it was in Europe and the U.S. As such, it wasdifficult to study it reliably.

A few years ago psychologists made great stridesin their understanding of the constructs of self-con-cept across cultures and suggested that self-conceptsdiffer fundamentally across cultures. More specifically,researchers Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama(Markus and Kitayama 1991) and many other socialscientists have come to believe that people in indi-vidualistic cultures have independent self-concepts.This means that the individual sees him- or herself asa distinct, separate, and autonomous entity. Othersmay be close, but they never penetrate the boundarybetween self and others. This independent self-con-cept is illustrated on the left side of Figure 2.7.

Chapter Two 49

Figure 2.7

On the other hand, Markus and Kitayama wrote,and other social scientists concur, that people in sup-posedly collectivistic cultures such as Japan have aninterdependent self-concept.7 The interdependent self-concept is one in which the boundary between one-self and others is not as rigid as in the independentself-concept. Being autonomous, separate, and uniquefrom others is not as important. Rather, this self-con-cept is based on the view that one is fundamentallyand inextricably connected with others. Thus, percep-tions of oneself are inevitably related to the existenceof others in one’s ingroup.

As you can imagine, there are many consequencesfor differences in behaviors between people with in-dependent versus interdependent self-concepts. Forexample, people with independent self-concepts aresupposed to be able to make decisions independently,with little or no reliance on the guidance or advice ofothers (see chapter 4 for more detail). People with in-

self

Independent Self-Concept Interdependent Self-Concept

self

50

terdependent self-concepts, however, are expected topay special attention to the wishes and desires of thosearound them in making important decisions, becausethose others are a fundamental part of oneself. Peoplewith independent self-concepts are thought to per-ceive of themselves in terms of personal attributes,such as being friendly, outgoing, quiet, and the like.People with interdependent self-concepts are thoughtto perceive themselves in terms of the roles they playin society, such as father, mother, teacher, boss, andthe like. People with independent self-concepts arethought to achieve things in life for themselves; peoplewith interdependent self-concepts are thought to doso for the sake of others.

Social scientists have studied the differences be-tween people with independent and interdependentself-concepts in many other ways as well. Most im-portant for this discussion is the widely accepted no-tion that the Japanese have interdependent self-con-cepts while Americans and many other individualisticcultures have basically independent self-concepts. Thisstereotype, in fact, is in agreement with the stereotypediscussed in the preceding section concerning collec-tivism and individualism.

The Evidence

Contemporary research in psychology provides nosupport for the stereotypic beliefs about the Japaneseself-concept, however.8 These studies have actuallymeasured independent and interdependent self-con-

Chapter Two 51

cepts using valid and reliable measures. In the studybriefly described above, for example, Carter and Dinnel(1997) measured independent and interdependent self-concepts in large samples of American and Japaneseuniversity students. When they analyzed the data, theyfound that the students in the two countries did notdiffer statistically on either type of self-concept, chal-lenging the stereotype of Japanese interdependentself-construals.

Likewise, well-known author in the field of inter-cultural communication William Gudykunst and hiscolleagues administered a variety of scales measuringindependent and interdependent self-concepts inJapanese, Korean, Australian, and American students(1992). Their data also revealed no statistically signifi-cant differences among Americans, Japanese, and Aus-tralians on either independent or interdependent self-concepts, once again challenging the stereotype ofJapanese interdependent self-construals. Their datadid show, however, that Koreans had significantlylower independent self-concept scores and higher in-terdependent self-concept scores, consistent with anAsian stereotype (Figure 2.8, page 52).

Some studies even report that Americans havemore interdependent self-concepts than Japanese do,or that the Japanese have more independent self-con-cepts than do Americans, which is contrary to prevail-ing stereotypes. In one study by Ronald Kleinknecht,Dale Dinnel, and their colleagues, for instance, largesamples of American and Japanese university students

52

completed a scale measuring independent and inter-dependent self-concepts (Kleinknecht et al. 1997). Thedata revealed no difference between the two coun-tries on independent self-concepts; the Americans,however, had significantly higher scores on interde-pendent self-concepts, directly contradicting the typi-cal stereotype (see Figure 2.9 in the Appendix).

In yet another study, this one conducted by Min-Sun Kim and colleagues, participants in four groups—mainland United States, Hawaii, Japan, and Korea—com-pleted two scales measuring independent and interde-pendent self-concepts (1996). Mainland Americans hadthe highest independent self-concept scores; Koreanshad the lowest. The scores for the Japanese on thisscale were similar to those for participants from Ha-waii. In addition the participants from Japan had thelowest scores on interdependent self-concepts (Figure2.10).

4.2

4.4

4.6

4.8

5.0

5.2

5.4

5.6

InterdependentIndependent

5.48 5.43

5.27 5.32

4.44.37

4.68

4.49

U.S.

Japan

Korea

Australia

Figure 2.8Self-Concepts in Four Countries

Chapter Two 53

Figure 2.10Self-Concepts

These studies, and others I have not discussed here,show rather convincingly that the stereotypic notionsof scientists and laypersons about self-concepts andself-perceptions in Japan relative to countries such asKorea, Australia, and the United States are simply nolonger true, especially for university students typicallyparticipating in social psychology research.9 As withthe research I described earlier, these studies have beenconducted by Japanese and non-Japanese scientists,using different methodologies, over a long period oftime. The reliability of their findings is, in my mind,without doubt or reproach. Clearly, this stereotype issimply not congruent with contemporary Japaneseculture and the psychology of the younger genera-tions.

4.2

4.4

4.6

4.8

5.0

5.2

5.4

5.6

InterdependentIndependent

5.15

4.934.8

4.38

5.06

4.86

4.7

4.87

U.S. Mainland

Hawaii

Japan

Korea

54

Stereotype 3: Japanese InterpersonalConsciousness

Background

It is widely thought that Japanese people are highlyconscious of others when making decisions and do-ing just about anything else. The degree to whichpeople are aware of others in their lives and in theirenvironment is known as interpersonal consciousness.It refers to an awareness of the existence of othersand the degree to which this recognition affects ormediates one’s behavior.

This perceived high degree of interpersonal con-sciousness is no doubt related to the stereotypes aboutJapanese collectivism and interdependent self-con-cepts. If the Japanese are collectivistic, the reasoninggoes, and if they have interdependent self-concepts,then being relatively more conscious of others in nor-mal life activities is a normal consequence becausethe existence of others is a fundamental aspect of theirown sense of self and personality. Also, the supposedemphasis on collectivism suggests that Japanese in-dividuals take into account the needs, wishes, desires,and goals of the group over their own individual needsand preferences.

In fact interpersonal consciousness is related tothe notion of an interdependent self-concept as de-scribed in the preceding section. If the perceived Japa-nese collectivistic culture fosters an interdependentself-concept, then the Japanese self is fundamentally

Chapter Two 55

and profoundly intertwined with the existence of oth-ers. One cannot think, the reasoning goes, about one-self or about issues regarding the self independentlyof thinking about others. This construct is widely usedby contemporary scientists in many social areas toexplain cultural differences in behavior between Ja-pan and other cultures.

The Evidence

To a large extent, however, this stereotype, too, is notsupported by the data presented so far in this chap-ter. These data already clearly suggest that the notionof Japanese interpersonal consciousness may be moremyth than reality.

Aside from the studies already reviewed, one studyspeaks directly to the notion of the degree to whichAmericans and Japanese emphasize social contextwhen making decisions (which is a form of interper-sonal consciousness). In this study, conducted jointlyby an American and a Japanese researcher (Arikawaand Templer 1998), American and Japanese univer-sity students completed two scales. One scale mea-sured collectivism, and the other measured conscious-ness concerning social context. When the researchersanalyzed the data on the first scale, they found thatthe Americans had a slightly higher average score oncollectivism than did the Japanese, but this differencewas not statistically significant. The results are, how-ever, consistent with many other studies and with thoseabove addressing Stereotypes 1 and 2. When the re-

56

searchers analyzed the social context scale, they againfound that the Americans had a higher average scorethan did the Japanese, and this difference was statisti-cally significant, indicating that the Americans, not theJapanese, had higher degrees of (at least this aspectof) interpersonal consciousness.

In another study Japanese social psychologistYoshihisa Kashima and his colleagues administered abattery of psychological tests to university students inAustralia, Japan, Korea, mainland United States, andHawaii (Kashima et al. 1995). The tests included a scalethat measured kanjin shugi, or the degree of inter-personal or relationship consciousness. The research-ers believed that the Japanese and Koreans would havethe highest scores on this scale, in congruence withthe stereotype of Asian collectivism. When they ana-lyzed the data, however, they found that mainlandAmerican women had the highest scores on this scale,followed by Australian women. Japanese women hadthe third to lowest scores, and Japanese men had thelowest (Figure 2.11).

Considered together with the research reviewedpreviously concerning collectivism and self-concepts,the studies reviewed here indicate quite convincinglythat Japanese university students do not have highdegrees of interpersonal or interrelationship con-sciousness when making decisions or engaging inother types of behaviors. This stereotype, also, appearsto be more myth than reality.

Chapter Two 57

Figure 2.11Interpersonal Relationship Consciousness

Stereotype 4: Japanese EmotionalityBackground

Over one hundred years ago, Lafcadio Hearn, whom Imentioned in chapter 1, spent the last fourteen yearsof his life in Japan and wrote several books about hisnewly adopted country. Throughout those books hemarveled at how the Japanese people and culture wereso different from those of Europe and the West. Atone point in his book Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japanhe wrote about the Japanese smile.

-0.8-0.6-0.4-0.20.00.20.40.60.8

Kanjin shugi

.41.26 .2 .18 .17

-.03

-.21 -.23 -.27

-.59

Mainland American Women

Australian Women

Korean Women

Hawaiian Women

Korean Men

Hawaiian Men

Australian Men

Japanese Women

Mainland American Men

Japanese Men

58

A Japanese can smile in the face of death, andusually does. But he then smiles for the samereason that he smiles at other times. There isneither defiance nor hypocrisy in the smile; nor isit to be confounded with the smile of sicklyresignation which we are apt to associate withweakness of character. It is an elaborate and longcultivated etiquette. It is also a silent language. Butany effort to interpret it according to Westernnotions of physiognomical expression would bejust about as successful as an attempt to interpretChinese ideographs by their real or fanciedresemblance to shapes of familiar things….

The smile is taught like the bow, like theprostration…. But the smile is to be used uponall pleasant occasions, when speaking to asuperior or to an equal, and even upon occa-sions which are not pleasant; it is part of deport-ment. The most agreeable face is the smilingface; and to present always the most agreeableface possible to parents, relatives, teachers,friends, wellwishers, is a rule of life…. Eventhough the heart is breaking, it is a social duty tosmile bravely. ([1894] 1976, 658–59)

As I mentioned in chapter 1, Hearn, like so manypeople before and after him, saw the Japanese ashumble, persevering people who, in the face of dan-ger, threat, grief, and other disheartening emotions,manage to maintain a sense of dignity about them-selves as they smile. He also saw the Japanese as hav-ing instituted politeness as a social rule and as havingbrought mannerisms and etiquette in social interac-tion to their highest standard.

Chapter Two 59

What Hearn wrote about has been commentedon by many other social scientists interested in theexpressive behavior of the Japanese. These notionshave contributed to a stereotype about Japanese emo-tionality that is commonly characterized by the no-tion of the “inscrutability” of the Japanese; that is, theynever show their true emotions and often choose tosmile to conceal their true feelings. Such notions havealso contributed to the stereotype of the Japanese asemotionless robots. Westerners have also inferred thelack of variety and intensity in expressive behavior tobe indicative of a lack of subjective emotional experi-ence. These notions about Japanese emotions andexpressive behaviors fit in well with the stereotypicnotions about Japanese culture and society describedin chapter 1, in both classical and contemporary por-trayals.

The Evidence

These stereotypic notions were actually confirmed ina well-known psychology experiment conducted overthirty years ago by psychologists Paul Ekman andWallace Friesen (Ekman 1972; Friesen 1972). They askedAmerican and Japanese university students to cometo a laboratory, where they watched films that weredesigned to make them feel disgusted, angry, sad, andeven fearful.10 During the first viewing the studentswatched the films individually, with no one else in theroom. During this time their facial expressions werebeing videotaped. When their videotaped expressions

60

were later analyzed, the researchers saw that theAmericans and Japanese produced almost exactly thesame expressions of disgust, anger, sadness, and fearat about the same times during the film. In a secondpart of the experiment, the same participants watchedthe films again in the presence of an older experi-menter. This time the researchers found that the Ameri-cans generally showed the same negative expressionsas in the first session. The Japanese students, how-ever, almost invariably smiled during the times theyfelt negative emotions, even though they had revealedthe negative emotions in the first viewing.

Ekman and Friesen interpreted the data by sug-gesting that the Japanese had a display rule that didnot allow them to reveal their true feelings in the pres-ence of the experimenter; in fact, they chose to hidetheir feelings with smiles, pretending as if everythingwas okay. The concept of cultural display rules wasoriginally coined by Ekman and Friesen in 1969 andrefers to rules learned throughout life that dictate themodification of expressive behavior depending onsocial circumstances. All people in all cultures andsocieties learn the rules of appropriate expression sothat they may act as socialized agents within their ownsocieties. The existence of Japanese cultural displayrules, therefore, provides us with a mechanism thatcan explain expressive differences in public and pri-vate situations, omote and ura (“front” and “back”),honne and tatemae (“true feelings” and “outward ap-pearances”), and the like.

Chapter Two 61

Findings such as Ekman and Friesen’s tended toreinforce the stereotypic view that the Japanese nevershow their true emotions, at least in public. That theJapanese students smiled despite what must have beenquite intense, negative feelings is similar to what Hearnwrote in Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan (see quote onpage 58). When interpreted through Western eyes andcultural filters, this view has also led to negative atti-tudes and value characterizations of the Japanese, thatthey are less emotional, value feelings less, and areless trustworthy, sincere, and appropriate.

But these global, overarching stereotypes are prob-ably not true today. The first matter to consider is thatthe data in Ekman and Friesen’s study were collectedin the late 1960s, a considerable time ago. Whethercultural trends and behaviors are the same today, af-ter the extensive social and economic changes thathave occurred in Japan during that time period, ishighly questionable. I would doubt that the same find-ings would be obtained in a similar study today.11

Contemporary research has shown that Japanesepeople are highly emotional, that they value their andother people’s emotions, and that interpersonal rela-tionships depend on accurate, if not tacit, communi-cation of emotions and feelings. These claims weresupported in a study I conducted where American andJapanese university students rated the appropriate-ness of expressing seven different types of emotionsin eight different social situations (Matsumoto 1990).If the Japanese conformed to the overall stereotype,

62

the data would have indicated that they expressedemotions less frequently than Americans did in allsocial contexts and for all emotions. I found, however,that this was simply not the case. The Japanese didindeed express negative emotions less toward ingroupmembers—family, friends, work colleagues, and peers—than did the Americans. The Japanese also, however,expressed positive emotions more frequently than didthe Americans toward these same groups. When weexamined the data for outgroup relationships, the re-sults were reversed; the Japanese expressed morenegative emotions and fewer positive emotions to-ward outgroups than did the Americans (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1Expression of Emotions

Why does this rather complex pattern of findingsemerge? There are, I believe, two factors that explainthese findings. First, the Japanese learn to contextualizetheir behavior more than Americans do.12 That is, theJapanese learn that different behaviors are appropriatein different contexts, depending on whom one is with,what is occurring, the setting, the target of the emotion,and the like. American display rules, on the other hand,call for less differentiation across contexts; individuals

With outgroups (strangers, casual acquaintances, etc.)

Americans > Japanese

Japanese > Americans

With ingroups (family, friends, work colleagues, peers, etc.)

Japanese > Americans

Americans > Japanese

Positive emotions

Negative emotions

Chapter Two 63

prefer to reveal their personalities, preferences, emo-tions, and styles across contexts. In short, Americansvary their behavior less according to context. For ex-ample, Americans would prefer to have the environ-ment change to match their individual styles and pref-erences rather than to change their behavior. Japanese,on the other hand, prefer to accommodate to the con-texts, which allows them to vary their behavior more.13

Understanding American and Western preferencesfor cross-context consistency allows us to easily un-derstand how previous stereotypes about Japaneseemotionality were created and fostered. When out-siders view Japanese emotions, oftentimes they are insituations or contexts in which the suppression ofemotions is dictated by Japanese cultural display rules.But because Americans believe in cross-context con-sistency, they generalize this tendency to all contexts,inferring that Japanese people hide their emotions—or have no emotions—in general. The problem is com-pounded by the fact that many Japanese themselvescontribute to this stereotypic attribution by claimingthat they always suppress their true feelings.14

The second factor for this pattern of data is re-lated to the meanings of specific emotions. We knowfrom work in sociology, psychology, and anthropol-ogy that emotions have different social meanings.Some emotions, for example, help to create and main-tain bonds among people. The shared joy of a groupachievement or the shared sadness at the loss of aloved one in a family oftentimes brings people closer

64

together. Other emotions, however, help to cut bondsor to differentiate among people. Anger, jealousy, frus-tration, and scorn can easily drive wedges betweenpeople, disrupting group harmony and cohesion.

When we put these two factors together—contextualization and the differential social meaningsof emotions—we can easily understand the data. Japa-nese may amplify positive emotions and downplaynegative emotions toward ingroups because theseactions help them to create stronger bonds with thesegroups of individuals, fostering harmony and cohe-sion. On the other hand, they also amplify negativeemotions and downplay positive ones to outsidersbecause these emotions help them to differentiatebetween their ingroups and outgroups. Such a pat-tern of data would not occur as much in the UnitedStates because there is greater need for consistencyin individual behavior regardless of context.

In actuality such notions support the contention ofJapanese collectivism, contradicting the evidence pre-sented earlier in this chapter on that topic. There aretwo points that deserve mention here. Much of the evi-dence reviewed in Stereotype 1 contradicting Japanesecollectivism was generally collected in the 1990s. Thedata collected in the display rule study described in thissection, however, was collected in the 1980s, ten yearsearlier. While in the broader picture, ten years is notreally a long time in terms of cultural changes, in thecase of Japan, I would contend that one can witnessconsiderable cultural changes during this time frame.

Chapter Two 65

Second, the evolution of Japanese culture from col-lectivistic to noncollectivist need not occur across alldomains of psychological behavior. It is entirely pos-sible, for example, that attitudes and values, variablesthat are typically measured in questionnaires, maychange while actual behaviors and expressions maybe slower to change. If different domains of behaviorchange at a differential pace, this would explain whythe data in Stereotype 1 and this stereotype appearcontradictory.

Not only are traditional stereotypes about Japaneseemotional expressions incomplete; contemporary psy-chological research on Japanese perceptions of oth-ers’ emotions also points out that Japanese are veryemotional. My colleagues and I have conducted a num-ber of studies examining American and Japanese dif-ferences in emotional perception. These studies have arelatively simple methodology. Participants view differ-ent expressions, and for each one they tell us whatemotion is being portrayed, how strongly it is beingexpressed on the outside (i.e., the display intensity), andhow strongly the person is probably feeling it on theinside (i.e., the experience intensity) (e.g., see Matsumoto,Kasri, and Kooken 1999). When we showed Americanand Japanese university students pictures of neutralfaces—that is, faces with no emotional content—there wasno difference in their judgments about the pictures. Thus,we were confident that there was no difference betweenthe American and Japanese bases for their ratings. Whenwe showed them pictures of weak, moderately strong,

66

and very strong expressions, however, the distinctionsbetween the two groups were clear. In each instance,Japanese observers believed that the poser in the pic-ture was feeling more emotion and at greater intensitythan did the Americans. Thus, the Japanese participantsassumed that more intense emotions were being feltby people than the Americans did, regardless of theactual intensity of the expression (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2Reaction to Pictures Showing Emotions

The data from these studies argue convincingly thatthe global, overarching stereotype about Japanese in-scrutability and their emotionlessness is not accurate,at least for the Japanese university student populationsthat were the participants in our many studies in thisarea. If anything, I believe the Japanese are highly emo-tional and value their own feelings and those of othersabove all else. Much of Japanese culture and society, infact, is characterized by rituals and customs to pre-serve the sanctity and importance of human emotion,not downgrade it. I believe that the Japanese emphasis,

Intensity of Expression

Neutral

Weak

Moderately Strong

Very Strong

Differences in Perception of the Poser’s Subjective Experience

No differences between American and Japanese observers

Japanese observers saw more intense emotions than Americans did

"

"

Chapter Two 67

not de-emphasis, on the importance of emotion canbe seen in everyday discourse, in the logic underlyingmany Japanese cultural artifacts and rituals, in litera-ture, media and film, and in historical events.15 The rea-son many researchers in the past could not see thefull range of Japanese emotions was probably becausethey had never studied the whole range across a widevariety of contexts. Furthermore, Westerners most likelyinterpreted the meaning and importance of emotionthrough their own cultural filters.

Stereotype 5: The Japanese SalarymanBackground

One reason Japan has become a major economicpower since World War II is the well-known work ethicof the Japanese company employee. In Japan an em-ployee of a company is typically called a “salaryman.”This term generally calls forth a stereotypic image ofan individual who has sacrificed his (usually male) lifefor the sake of the company. He spends long hours atthe office, often working late into the night, and doesn’thesitate to come to work on the weekends, sacrificingpersonal and family time. He commutes hours everyday to his job and works diligently and loyally, for thesake of the company and the Japanese economy as awhole. His social relationships are often with col-leagues in the company, and he is often willing to moveto different areas of Japan, and lately to the rest of theworld, for the sake of the company.

68

Many non-Japanese have characterized Japanesesalarymen as “samurai in suits,” likening them to thebushido warrior class of the past and its associatedset of values and norms. This concept became ex-tremely popular throughout the 1970s and 1980s,partially as a way to explain Japan’s economic recov-ery and boom. The salaryman became an image forliterally millions of Japanese employees who wereunited in a single campaign not only for their ownbusiness and company but for national prosperity aswell.

The image of the loyal salaryman became a ste-reotype; he was in many senses the backbone of theJapanese economy. Of course Japanese products ex-celled in quality in many areas of the world, but theJapanese salaryman and his work ethic were the heartand soul of Japan’s development and progress. Thefocus on Japan’s work ethic, on the salaryman’s per-severance and fortitude, is undoubtedly a remnantfrom both classic and contemporary views of Japa-nese culture and society. Attitudes about and stereo-types of the Japanese salaryman are shared not onlyby Westerners but by the Japanese themselves.

The Evidence

Some evidence suggests that the stereotype of thesalaryman is apropos today. For instance, a few re-cent surveys of Japanese workers seem to suggestthat they are highly satisfied with their jobs. The EPA,for example, sampled 3,392 salarymen in 1995 and

Chapter Two 69

found that 62.1 percent of them reported that theywere either “satisfied” or “fairly satisfied” with their cur-rent position. In a similar poll conducted by AsahiShimbun in 1996, 66 percent of the respondents re-ported that they were satisfied.

A closer inspection of the data, however, suggeststhat all is not well among the so-called salarymen. Forexample, in the data reported by the EPA, there weretwo factors that were associated with differences insatisfaction—income and company size. The data in-dicated that people with larger incomes were moresatisfied than were people with smaller incomes, sug-gesting that younger workers are generally less satis-fied with their jobs than older workers, becauseyounger workers generally have lower salaries. This istrue for both men and women. Remember, the datapresented in the first four stereotypes in this chapterwere gathered from Japanese university students. Here,however, is evidence of dissatisfaction among rela-tively young Japanese workers, who have graduatedfrom the universities and thus extend the previous find-ings beyond college life.

The EPA data also indicated that workers in largercompanies were more dissatisfied than were workersin smaller companies. This finding is counterintuitive,because larger companies generally offer greater in-come, employment stability, and fringe benefits suchas employment-related housing. Thus, the greater dis-satisfaction among the younger employees is not sim-ply a matter of money. This finding also goes against

70

the preference of many Japanese salarymen in the pastto work for larger, more stable companies.

Company size is also negatively related to percep-tions about work. Individuals who were employed bylarger companies often reported that “working is nomore than a means to earn income” more than didindividuals employed by smaller companies. This no-tion is also confirmed by the 1996 Asahi Shimbunstudy in which most Japanese workers reported thatthey considered their job basically as a source of in-come. A smaller percentage saw their jobs as theirpurpose in life. These data run contrary to the preva-lent stereotype of the past, where larger companiesoffered individuals a lifetime career and were not sim-ply viewed as a method of making money. These dataalso contradict the previous stereotype of the salary-man as a “worker bee,” dedicating his life to benefitthe company and the Japanese economy. In addition,these data run contrary to the responses of a similargroup of individuals in the United States in the AsahiShimbun report (Figure 2.12).

There have also been important shifts in employeeattitudes toward work and effort. In the EPA study,while most of the Japanese respondents reported thatthey “try to do their best for their company,” this largepercentage was clearly carried by many of the olderworkers with higher incomes. In fact, closer inspec-tion of the data indicated that employees in the 20–29 and 30–39 age groups were significantly less in-clined to report that they try to do their best for the

Chapter Two 71

company. And employees of larger companies, andthose with less income, reported less inclination to dotheir best. Clearly these data correlate with employeesatisfaction as described above and run contrary tothe worker bee stereotype of the salaryman.

One of the pillars of the Japanese human resourcessystem is the pay-based-on-seniority system. That is,as employees age, their pay usually increases, often-times regardless of ability or merit. Yet, this pillar isgradually crumbling. In the EPA study a whopping 76.5percent of the respondents indicated “companiesshould pay more attention to differences in individualability in deciding salaries and promotions.” The per-centage of respondents agreeing with this statementwas understandably lowest among men with the high-est incomes. The results from the Asahi Shimbun sur-vey were similar (see Figure 2.13 in the Appendix).

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

OtherSource of IncomeDutyPurpose in Life

29

51

8

22

57

26

61

Japanese

American

Figure 2.12How Employees View Their Jobs

72

In fact a majority of employees clearly favor a meritsystem of wages, and their ranks have grown sub-stantially since 1978 (52.4% in 1978 to 63% in 1995).The preference for a merit system is stronger amongyounger workers (but still is shared by more than halfof workers in the 50–59 age group) (Figure 2.14).

Figure 2.14Age-Group Breakdown of EmployeesFavoring Merit-Based Wage System

These data suggest that current Japanese work-ers are not content to start at the bottom and spendtheir entire working life climbing their way up gradu-ally, with no relationship between their pay and theirabilities aside from their age. Consequently, there aregrowing numbers of employees who are increasinglydissatisfied with the way their efforts are rewarded intheir companies, which is yet another contradiction tothe stereotypic image of the Japanese salaryman (Fig-ure 2.15).

50

55

60

65

70

75

50–5940–4930–3920–29

72

68

64

60

Chapter Two 73

On top of this the EPA data clearly indicate thatemployees with higher educational degrees desiresocial status and promotion. Research has also shownthat many of these same individuals, especially thosewho have received undergraduate and graduate de-grees from American or European universities, feel thatthey deserve more frequent promotions and higherpay than others. These highly educated employees alsoadd to a growing sentiment of change.

Collectively, the data in this section demonstraterather convincingly that employee attitudes in Japanare quickly changing. In summary more Japaneseemployees view their jobs merely as a means of ob-taining an income rather than as a career or their pur-pose in life. More Japanese individuals are rejectingthe seniority-based system and prefer salary sched-ules and benefits that are based on achievement and

Figure 2.15Employees Ambivalent toward

or Dissatisfied with Reward System

50

60

70

80

90

100

1999199319871981

71

86.2 87.890.4

74

ability. Taken altogether, the stereotype of the Japa-nese salaryman who is willing to sacrifice himself andhis family, who is happy to be a worker bee for thesake of company and country, and who does not rel-ish rewards based on individual achievements is moremyth than reality, especially among younger workers.

Stereotype 6: Japanese LifetimeEmployment

Background

One of the pillars of Japanese society in the past wasthe system of lifetime employment. When individualsjoined a company, they were expected to stay withthe company for their entire working lives. Both thecompany and the employee shared a reciprocal senseof duty and obligation. The company was obligatedto provide for the employee for life, not only in termsof salary increases but also by providing opportuni-ties for personal growth and expansion of duties andresponsibilities commensurate with ability and theoverall harmony and balance of the company. Em-ployees reciprocated with their undying loyalty to thecompany; they were expected to stay with the com-pany through good economic times and bad and tosacrifice their lives for the sake of the company (andfor the national good).

This foundation of expected reciprocal obligationin Japanese society also had important ramificationsfor all other aspects of society, especially education.

Chapter Two 75

Almost every mother in Japan strongly believed in theimportance of an education. A good university de-gree, it was thought, would lead to employment in areputable company, which would in turn become alifetime commitment. Employees gave their entire livesto a company and expected the company to give themguaranteed employment in return. Lifetime employ-ment meant stability, which, in turn, required a highstandard of excellence from the educational system—from preschool all the way to university. Thus, manyfamilies put considerable pressure on their childrento perform in school, even as early as preschool, sothat they could later be accepted to and graduate froma good university and become employed by a repu-table company. This belief is still prevalent today andis one of the reasons why high school students spendso much time, effort, and money preparing for uni-versity entrance exams. And this filters down to en-trance exams for high school taken by junior high stu-dents, for junior high taken by elementary school stu-dents, and in some cases, even for elementary schooltaken by preschoolers. This social pressure undoubt-edly led to the creation of such terms as kyoiku mama(education mama).

The social obligations incurred by the Japanesecompanies in the form of lifetime employment, andthose incurred by the individual employees, are di-rectly in line with the stereotypes of Japanese cultureand society cultivated over the years. Obligation,commitment, loyalty, sense of duty, and sacrifice are

76

exactly those values and attitudes that have charac-terized Japanese culture in both classic and contem-porary works.

The Evidence

The harsh reality of the economic crises faced by Japanover the past decade, however, has resulted in an im-portant change in these beliefs. Results from govern-mental EPA surveys in 1999, for example, indicatedclearly that the number of companies that offer lifetimeemployment had dropped from 27.1 percent in 1990 toonly 9.9 percent in 1999.16 At the same time, companiesabandoning lifetime employment increased from 36.4percent to 45.3 percent during that same period. Andthe percentage of companies that were in limbo re-garding lifetime employment and other personnel is-sues also rose from 25.4 percent to 38.3 percent.

As Japanese companies increasingly abandon life-time employment, many are adopting a merit systemin their labor management practices (reported in theEPA survey report of 1999). This type of system re-wards abilities and achievements and no doubt re-flects the demands of increased world competition onJapanese businesses and the changing attitudes of thecontemporary Japanese worker.

These changes in Japanese companies have beenaccompanied by changes in the attitudes of Japaneseemployees. While most employees would certainlyprefer to stay with the same company throughout theirworking life, a full 60.8 percent of the respondents

Chapter Two 77

from the EPA’s 1995 survey indicated that they wouldchange jobs if their work did not match their expecta-tions or abilities. These data are complemented by the1996 survey by Asahi Shimbun that indicated that afull 47 percent of the people surveyed believed theyshould change jobs if they were dissatisfied with thework. In fact, from 1987 to 1998, the number of peoplewishing to change jobs gradually and steadily in-creased, for both men and women (see Figure 2.16 inthe Appendix).

While lifetime employment has greatly diminishedin Japan, the number of part-time employees contin-ues to rise for both men and women, according to the1999 EPA survey. This trend no doubt reflects the an-swer to the problems many companies have experi-enced due to rising costs associated with hiring per-manent lifetime employees (see Figure 2.17 in the Ap-pendix).

According to figures released by the EPA in 1999,a full 19 percent of individuals 25 to 29 years of agehoped to become entrepreneurs rather than seek life-time employment in a single company. Moreover, thisfigure was relatively stable at approximately 20 per-cent through age 54 for all individuals seeking a jobchange.

The recruitment of new employees in April, fol-lowing March graduations, has also gradually declinedover the years. In 1998, 88.7 percent of recruits werenew graduates; the remainder were not. In five yearsthe number of new graduate recruits in white-collar

78

jobs is projected to drop to 80.6 percent, while therecruitment of older graduates and flexible recruitment(the recruitment of anyone at anytime) are projectedto increase to over 19 percent. In some specialty fields,such as research and technical areas, the number ofnew graduate recruits projected is even lower, accord-ing to the same EPA survey in 1999.

These data suggest that the stereotype of guaran-teed lifetime employment stability is more myth thanreality in today’s Japan. Today’s employees believe inability, achievement, and merit as the primary decid-ing factors influencing wage increases and promo-tion. They are increasingly unafraid to change jobs orto become entrepreneurs. There is no longer a guar-antee of a good job in a stable company immediatelyafter graduation, and even if one is lucky enough toget a job, there is no guarantee that the company willmake a lifetime commitment or that the employee willvoluntarily stay with the company for life. The belief inthe link between a university education and lifetimeemployment is more myth than reality.17

The data presented in this section and the previ-ous one speak clearly to the point that Japanese busi-ness culture, at least as represented in the minds, atti-tudes, values, and beliefs of the typical Japanese em-ployee (especially but not limited to younger ones) isquite different from the stereotype about the Japa-nese worker held for years after the war. These differ-ences have led to meaningful and important changesin many Japanese business practices, particularly in

Chapter Two 79

relation to personnel, human resources, and labormanagement. These alterations, in turn, affect every-thing from commitment and loyalty to recruitment, re-tention, and termination. Japanese business culture,like its mainstream societal culture, is going through amajor transition.

Another important point about the data in thesetwo sections is that this evidence suggests that thechanges in Japanese cultural values held by univer-sity students clearly extend to the younger genera-tions in the workforce. In other words, these data sup-port the contention that the changes we are witness-ing are not just a fad or a result of university life; theyare, in fact, representative of the broader changes inculture and society that are occurring in Japan today.

Stereotype 7: The Japanese MarriageBackground

One of the pillars of Japanese society has undoubtedlybeen marriage. In traditional Japanese marriage, laborand responsibility were clearly divided between menand women. Men worked and were responsible foreverything outside the home. The women managed thefamily finances, raised the children, and looked after allhousehold affairs (and were typically the kyoiku mama,pushing their kids to complete their homework, par-ticipating in school activities for parents, enrolling theirchildren in cram schools known as juku, and the like).The husband was lord of his castle, expecting and re-

80

ceiving obedience and conformity from wife and chil-dren. Quite frankly, husbands were masters, and wivesdevotedly supported their husbands.

This view of marriage and the separate roles formen and women are clearly rooted in classic concep-tions of Japanese culture. The very structure and func-tioning of the Japanese household is firmly rooted inConfucian and other religious tenets concerning hier-archical relationships within the house. This very con-cept was so important to Japanese culture and societythat Chie Nakane also linked it with the structure ofvertical relationships in her thesis (1970). Therefore, mar-riage and household provide the final stereotype that Iwill address here about Japanese culture and society.

The Evidence

Research over the past few years demonstrates quiteconvincingly that fewer Japanese than ever agree withprevious views of marriage and family life. From 1983to 1995, for example, there was a sharp decrease inthe percentage of men and women who agreed withthe view that a wife should devotedly support herhusband. There was also a decrease in the percentageof individuals surveyed who agreed with the less con-servative view that the father works while the wife looksafter the family. At the same time, there was an in-crease in the percentage of individuals who saw hus-bands and wives pursuing their own individual andindependent lifestyles. More people also came to be-lieve that husbands and wives should be good friends,

Chapter Two 81

and a small percentage of people in 1995 felt thathusbands should defer to their wives (Figure 2.18).18

Figure 2.18Changes in Marital Attitudes

These changes are consonant with data from othersurveys as well. According to Asahi Shimbun’s surveyin 1996, for example (compared with responses from1994), more people disagreed that males should con-centrate on their jobs while females should do theirbest in housekeeping and child care (52% in 1996 ver-sus 36% in 1994). And in its 1997 survey, AsahiShimbun asked respondents whether they viewed hus-bands and wives as one flesh or as independentpeople. Although 29 percent saw married couples asone flesh, an overwhelming 69 percent saw marriedcouples as two independent people.

0

10

20

30

40

Husband Defers t

o Wife

Good Friends

Independent

My Home

Separa

te Role

Wife Devo

ted

to Husband

7

9.1

20.220.1

27.9

32.7

27.7

15

23.8

0

16.5

10

1983

1995

82

Also contributing to this trend is the finding insome surveys that the most dissatisfied marriedcouples are those who live with the husband’s mother,which is a traditional arrangement in Japanese fami-lies. This finding is true for both husbands and wives.

While marriage was seen as the ultimate goal forwomen in the past, increasing numbers of womentoday approve of a single lifestyle. In the 1997 EPAsurvey, in fact, 55 percent of the women polled ap-proved of a single lifestyle. These data agree with othervital statistics reported by the Japanese governmentthat indicate that women are marrying at later agesand having children later as well. They also have greaterlife expectancies than in the past and are probablyasking questions about how they want to spend theirlonger lives.

Indeed, greater numbers of people than ever be-fore have come to the conclusion that human happi-ness is not only to be found in marriage. And follow-ing quite naturally from this conclusion, increasingnumbers of Japanese individuals are finding it appro-priate to get divorces when things don’t go well intheir marriage (Figure 2.19).

Not only is divorce on the rise among youngercouples; greater numbers of older married couples arealso getting divorced, coming to the realization thatnothing requires the couple to stay together after thechildren are raised. Moreover, most Japanese individualssurveyed believed that this trend toward divorce amongolder couples would increase (69% of all individualssurveyed).

Chapter Two 83

Figure 2.19Approval of Divorce

These data clearly indicate that the nature of theJapanese marriage has changed dramatically over thepast decade. Furthermore, these changes are likely tocontinue into the near future. The husband-as-mas-ter and wife-devoted-to-husband style of marriage isa relic of the past. In fact in contemporary Japaneseculture, one or even two divorces are really “no bigdeal.” The term batsu ichi, translated literally as “onestrike,” has come to refer to people who have gottendivorced once, but they no longer have to live withthe stigma of having done so. Moreover, many indi-viduals in Japan do not mind and even prefer marry-ing someone who is batsu ichi, reasoning that he orshe has experience with marriage and has suppos-edly grown from the experience. This is clearly con-

20

30

40

50

60

70

NoYes

45

61

45

31

1988

1997

84

tradictory to the classic and stereotypic views of mar-riage that in many ways formed the basis for much ofJapanese culture. Thus, another stereotype is de-bunked.

Changes in the nature and function of marriage inany society, not only Japan’s, have fundamental andprofound implications regarding changes in all otheraspects of culture and society, from education to childrearing and from business to dealing with old age.We will discuss some of these implications later in thisbook.

ConclusionIn this chapter I have provided evidence to suggestthat previous classic and stereotypic views of sevenaspects of Japanese culture and society are no longertrue. These included aspects of Japanese character andpersonality: collectivism, self-concept, interpersonalconsciousness, and emotionality. We also discussedchanges in the attitudes and beliefs about the Japa-nese salaryman, lifetime employment, and Japanesemarriage. Collectively, they paint a picture of contem-porary Japan that does not conform to the stereo-typic notions that previous and current works on Japa-nese culture conform to. To my way of thinking, manyviews of present-day Japanese culture are more myththan reality.

Of course, not all is changed in Japan, and onecan still find many Japanese whose lives and lifestyles

Chapter Two 85

do indeed conform to our classic conceptualizationsof Japanese culture. Because much of the researchreported in this chapter has involved Japanese indi-viduals in major cities like Tokyo and Osaka (and inother areas as well), it is entirely possible that much ofwhat is reported here is limited to major urban areasand that life in less urban areas is more reflective ofthe stereotypic views of Japanese culture. I don’t doubtthat this is the case.

I am not arguing for an either-or case about theJapanese culture. What I am saying is that the amountof change in contemporary Japanese culture and so-ciety is sufficient to raise serious questions about thevalidity of previous stereotypic views of Japanese cul-ture, especially those that purport a unicultural, ho-mogeneous view of the culture and all of its people.While changes in seven areas of life are surely notcomprehensive, I contend that they are representativeof widespread changes in many other aspects of Japa-nese society today.

Textnotes1 In actuality most of the data for Culture’s Consequences

(1980; 1984) were collected in the 1960s.2 Detailed reviews of this literature can be found in

Matsumoto 1999b; Takano and Osaka 1997; and Takanoand Osaka 1999. Even Hofstede’s data ranked Japan (rela-tively more collectivistic than the U.S.) in the middle of allcountries surveyed on the individualism-collectivism scale.

86

3 See also the work by Nakane described in chapter 1 on theimportance of the notion of ie in Japanese culture.

4 I do not believe, however, that these data argue againstNakane’s concept of the importance of ie in Japanese so-ciety. On the contrary, I believe the notion of its impor-tance is quite accurate and that changes in mainstreamJapanese society and culture as a whole are probably re-lated to changes in the fundamental nature of relation-ships within Japanese homes.

5 The data from this study may also indicate that Japanesecollectivistic behaviors may exist only within a collectivisticsystem that incorporates moral sanctions and monitoring.That is, when the sanctions and monitoring are removed,the collectivistic nature of behavior disappears. The extentthat this may be true is also evidence of changes in Japa-nese culture.

6 See Nakane’s comments reported in chapter 1 on this is-sue.

7 I say supposedly here because I believe research on thisissue says otherwise, as described earlier in this chapter.Indeed, the link between individualism-collectivism andindependent-interdependent self-construals was essentialto Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) theory; they claimed thatindividualistic cultures foster an independent self-construal,while collectivistic cultures foster an interdependent self-construal.

8 Markus and Kitayama (1991) claim that there is substantialsupport for their argument that the Japanese have an in-terdependent self-construal. The research they cite to sup-port their contention, however, never measured self-construals directly. Rather, it measured differences in a va-riety of psychological constructs and inferred the existenceof self-construal differences to account for the observeddifferences in the other psychological variables. But the

Chapter Two 87

evidence clearly does not support the view that such dif-ferences are rooted in differences in self-concept.

9 This really poses a problem for researchers who reportdifferences between Americans and Japanese on otherbehaviors, because it is almost impossible to account forthose differences by using cultural differences in self-construals when those differences don’t actually exist inthe first place.

10 The power of these films to elicit negative emotions wasconsiderable, as they included scenes of amputations, si-nus surgery, childbirth with forceps, and an aboriginal pu-berty rite with a rock.

11 By this comment, I do not mean to diminish the impor-tance of Ekman and Friesen’s study at the time it was con-ducted, or its findings. Indeed, their study remains a classicin the field of emotion research.

12 The acute reader may notice an apparent contradictionbetween the thesis in this passage and my review of theprevious stereotype regarding Japanese interpersonal con-sciousness. On one hand, I suggest here that the Japaneseconsider context important and learn to contextualize theirbehaviors much more than the average American does.On the other hand, I described in the previous section howJapanese interpersonal consciousness is not necessarilygreater than what would be expected in the United States.The apparent contradiction comes from the suggestion thatthe focus on contextualization is related to interpersonalconsciousness. While the two concepts may be and oftenare linked, I believe that it is theoretically and pragmaticallypossible, however, to separate the two. Interpersonal con-sciousness as I have defined it here refers to the degree towhich people recognize and are aware of others in theirenvironment. Context, as used here, on the other hand,refers to a broader range of parameters of the environ-ment, including time, place, setting, and situation as well as

88

others. It is entirely possible, therefore, that behavior behighly contextualized in the broader sense of the term con-text while interpersonal consciousness—the degree to whichthe awareness of others may affect behavior—is diminish-ing.

13 A simple illustration of this difference can be seen in ev-eryday life. Say, fwor instance, that some obstacles are be-tween you and your intended destination. Americans wouldbe more likely to take the straight path, moving inanimateobjects to get to their goal. Japanese, however, would bemore likely to simply go around the objects. That is, forAmericans, the context assimilates to their behaviors; Japa-nese people accommodate to context.

14 In actuality, what I think is occurring is that the Japanesedo suppress their feelings and expressions in some con-texts, but not all; and, as the data indicate, they probablyexaggerate their expressions and feelings in some contexts.I think they extrapolate their suppression of feelings in somecontexts to a stereotypic view of themselves, partly becauseit is noble and partly because those situations are oftenmost stressful for them and therefore remain in their con-sciousness longer. Behavior can also change, at least su-perficially, while values and attitudes—and feelings—remainthe same, as in the “cultural chameleon.”

15 Japanese concepts such as perseverance, for example, re-fer to the control of emotion. Institutionalized politeness isa method for preventing offense and negative emotion.Compassion and honor have been themes for dramas andnovels for centuries, highlighting the importance of emo-tion. In short, while the Japanese are encouraged to hidetheir emotions in some contexts, they are socialized to havea rich emotional life.

16 The EPA report cites the Ministry of Labor’s “Survey onEmployment Management” as the source of these figures.

Chapter Two 89

17 This is not to argue, however, that education is not impor-tant. In fact education may be crucial for people to gain theskills to propel the graduate into merit-driven companiesor to launch entrepreneurial enterprises. The belief in theimportance of education in the future is probably evidencedby the increasing number of students enrolled in collegesand universities in Japan today despite the fact that theabsolute number of university-age individuals in the popu-lation is decreasing. What I argue for here is that the beliefin the link between education and lifetime employment ismore myth than reality.

18 These data are reported in the EPA’s 1995 report on theNational Survey on Lifestyle Preferences.

91

3

Why Did Japanese CultureChange?

So far, we have seen strong evidence to suggest thatJapanese culture is in transition. The data from socialpsychology studies and national surveys speak forthemselves, but they have also been confirmed by ev-eryday life experiences living, working, and playing inJapan.

In this chapter I explore some of the reasons I thinkJapanese culture and society are undergoing suchdrastic changes. My analysis uses constructs and no-tions that are true not only for Japan, but are gener-ally applicable to understanding cultural change andevolution in all parts of the world. Indeed, Japan isnot alone in experiencing cultural change; what is spe-cial about the Japanese case, though, is the uniqueway in which the change is occurring in relation toprevious stereotypic notions of the culture, and theapparent effects these shifts are having on social eti-

92

quette and morality at the start of this millennium.Before giving the reasons I think Japanese culture isevolving, let me first explain what I mean by the wordculture, because this definition is integral to an under-standing of how culture changes over time.

Understanding What CultureIs and Is Not

Common Usages of the Word

First, let’s examine how we use the word culture in oureveryday language.1 When we think of the word cul-ture, we often think of nationality, race, or ethnicity.When we speak of culture, we talk about Japaneseculture, American culture, French culture, and so on.This usage essentially equates nationality, race, orethnicity with culture, and they are often used inter-changeably. But, in my mind, culture is not nationality;it is not the citizenship on your passport. It is muchmore than that.

Culture as an Abstraction

Culture cannot be seen or felt or heard or tasted. Whatis concrete and observable to us is not culture per sebut the differences in human behavior we see in ac-tions, thoughts, rituals, traditions, and the like. We seemanifestations of culture, but we never see culture it-self. For example, look at the cultural differences ingreeting behaviors. In many Western cultures, we learn

Culture

Chapter Three 93

to shake hands when we greet others, and hand-shak-ing has become ritualistic and automatic for many ofus. People of other cultures, however, have differentways of greeting people. People of some cultures, forexample, greet each other with a slight bow of thehead. Some cultures enhance this bow with handstogether in front as in prayer. Some cultures, like thatof Japan, instruct their members to bow from the waistwith the face lowered out of sight. Still other culturesengage in only an “eyebrow flash,” the raising andlowering of the eyebrows. We can witness these ac-tions, and many other behavioral manifestations ofculture, but we never see culture itself. Instead, we in-fer that a cultural difference underlies these variousbehaviors and that because the behaviors are differ-ent, the culture must be different. Culture, then, is usedas an explanatory concept to describe the reason be-hind the differences in behaviors that we see.

In this sense culture is an abstract concept. Weinvoke the concept of culture to describe similaritiesand differences among individuals within a group. Inother words we use the concept of culture as an ex-planatory construct to help us understand and cat-egorize within-group similarities and between-groupdifferences. It is a theoretical or conceptual entity thathelps us understand why we do the things we do andexplains why different groups of people do things theirown way. As an abstract concept, then, culture is verymuch a label.

94

The Cyclical and Dynamic Nature of Culture

But like many labels, culture has a life of its own. Justas similarities within and differences between groupsgive rise to what we know as culture as an abstractconcept, that abstract concept feeds back on thosebehaviors, reinforcing our understanding of thosesimilarities and differences. Culture, in whatever waywe come to know it, helps to reinforce, promulgate,and strengthen the behavioral similarities and differ-ences that produced it in the first place, producing acycle of reciprocity between actual behaviors and ourtheoretical understanding of them as culture.

This reciprocal relationship helps explain why weare taught to do many things simply because that isthe way they have always been done and it is how theyshould be done. Learning to eat a certain way, with acertain etiquette, with certain foods, with certain uten-sils, in a certain order, simply because “that’s the waythings are done” is just one of many examples of howthe abstract concept of culture drives behavior. It is inthis fashion that culture and the actual behaviors cul-ture describes share an intimate relationship. While itmay appear that culture is an abstract theoretical con-cept that “sits” above people and mysteriously influ-ences our behavior, that is not the case. As an ex-planatory concept that people have created, cultureshares a close relationship with behaviors. Thus, cul-ture is a summative label for behaviors, while at thesame time it influences and affects behaviors.

Chapter Three 95

For this reason, changes in behaviors will neces-sarily bring about changes in culture. Because cultureis a concept we produce to help us explain actual be-haviors, a discrepancy between behavior and cultureproduces tension in this relationship that often leadsto a change in culture. Therefore, as your behaviorschange during the course of your life, however slightly,these changes may be related to changes in culturewithin yourself and across people of the same gen-eration. Differences in behaviors between younger andolder generations surely signal differences in the un-derlying culture of these two groups and contributeto the generation gap.

There is always some degree of discrepancy be-tween the behaviors mandated by culture and theabstract concept of culture. That is, there is never aone-to-one correspondence between the behaviorsmandated by an underlying culture and the actualbehaviors that occur. There will always be some de-gree of discrepancy, however small, between the two,despite their close and intimate relationship. Thus,there is always a dynamic tension in this relationship.In this sense, even as an abstract concept or principle,culture is never a static entity. It is dynamic and chang-ing, existing within a tensive relationship with the ac-tual behaviors it is supposed to explain and predict. Infact, the degree of tension between culture as an un-derlying construct and the behaviors that it mandatesmay be an important aspect of culture itself.

96

Definition of Culture

To me culture is an organized system of rules sharedby a group of people and transmitted from one genera-tion to the next. It is the attitudes, values, beliefs, opin-ions, norms, customs, heritage, traditions, and behav-iors that a group shares and that are communicatedfrom generation to generation.

Applying this definition to Japan suggests thatwhat is important about Japanese culture is not nec-essarily the fact that one is born and raised there2; itis, instead, the fact that Japanese people share, to somedegree, an organized system of rules that govern theirbehaviors, actions, and so forth, and it is that which iscommunicated from one generation to the next. Thisis true, in fact, for all cultures.3

There is not necessarily a one-to-one correspon-dence between culture and nationality. Certainly, thereis some kind of relationship between Japan and whatwe know as Japanese culture, just as there is a rela-tionship between the United States and what we knowas American culture. It is also true, though, that thereare many degrees of individual differences in culture.That is, different people hold the values and attitudesof the mainstream culture to different degrees. So, justas we know people who are very “traditionally” Japa-nese, we also know Japanese people who are not.

Likewise, there is not a one-to-one correspon-dence between culture and race or ethnicity. In fact,close examination of the scholarly literature on racein biology, physical anthropology, and other disciplines

Chapter Three 97

indicates clearly that there are really no biological orgenetic markers that reliably distinguish among groupsof people. Theories (and evidence supporting thosetheories) concerning the origins of supposed races arealso problematic and are fraught with difficulties.Moreover, the concept of race is different across dif-ferent languages and cultures. Thus, the concept ofrace is not as stable as people assume it to be. There-fore, culture is not necessarily race, nationality, orethnicity. It is a functional, sociopsychological constructthat we all share. It is not biological or genetic; it islearned and it is environmental.4

On the other hand, there are groups of people whocan probably be characterized as cultural groups ac-cording to the definition I offered earlier, but who arenot usually considered cultures; for example, disabledindividuals or people of different sexual orientations.What gives these groups their flavor and importanceis their culture, defined as the sociopsychological or-ganizational system of rules they all share.

Differences in Culture within Countries

Because culture exists in groups smaller than a nationand because there are always some members of anycultural population who do not hold the views, atti-tudes, opinions, and values of the larger, mainstreamculture, there is always some degree of tension or con-flict among the groups. Harry Triandis (1994; 1995),one of the leading cross-cultural psychologists, hasreported that as many as 30 percent of the individuals

98

in any cultural group do not necessarily conform tothe mainstream values of the larger group. Thus, forexample, in even the most individualistic cultures hehas studied, around 30 percent of the people in thosecultures actually hold collectivistic values. The same istrue of collectivistic cultures. The findings from thestudies I have conducted, reported in chapter 2—whichrevealed that around 70 percent of the younger gen-eration were individualistic while 30 percent were not,and vice versa for the older working sample—are clearlycommensurate with Triandis’ thesis.

The United States offers an excellent example ofthe complexity of national culture. Many ethnic groupsin the U.S. actually claim more traditional values oftheir homeland than do the members of their originalcountries. That is, Japanese Americans, Chinese Ameri-cans, Korean Americans, and Filipino Americans areoften more traditionally Japanese, Chinese, Korean,and Filipino than people in their native countries. Inone study we conducted, for example, we examinedcollectivistic values among Koreans in South Korea,third-generation Korean Americans, and non-AsianAmericans (Lee 1995). We projected that the level ofcollectivism would order itself in this manner: Kore-ans > Korean Americans > non-Asian Americans; inreality the Korean Americans were the most collectiv-istic, more collectivistic than Koreans in Korea. Otherscholars writing about immigrant Asian ethnic groups,such as Ronald Takaki of the University of CaliforniaBerkeley, have also come to the same conclusion (see,

Chapter Three 99

for example, his Strangers from a Different Shore, 1989).So, we must realize that there is great diversity withregard to culture, even within national cultures.

Factors that Affect Culture

Because of these cultural dynamics, it is relatively easyto understand why any culture, not just Japanese, is afluid, dynamic, ever-changing entity. Because cultureis a summation of ways of living, it follows that if apeople’s ways of living change across time, their cul-ture will change. I believe we see the results of thisphenomenon at work all around the world today.

For this discussion, let me focus on two of the myriadof important factors I believe affect culture: populationdensity and availability of resources. The particular com-bination of these two factors easily affects ways of lifethat are necessary for survival and that, in turn, affect(and are affected by) culture. Consider, for example, apossible classification scheme based on these two fac-tors in relation to one dimension of culture—individu-alism/collectivism (see Table 3.1, page 100).

In a situation in which large numbers of peoplelive in a relatively confined space (i.e., high populationdensity) and where the availability of the resourcesnecessary for living is low (such as low income, lowdegree of arable land for farming, etc.),5 conditionsnecessitate considerable degrees of inter- and intra-group harmony, cooperation, and cohesion in orderfor individuals to survive. Indeed, individuals would

100

find it difficult to survive alone, and survival itself woulddepend in large part on the ability of individuals toband together in sizable groups to pool resources,divide tasks, and share resources in order to live. Theseare some of the classic characteristics of collectivismand certainly are commensurate with previousconceptualizations of Japanese culture. I call this “tra-ditional” collectivism.

Table 3.1Two Factors Affecting Culture

On the other hand, consider the context in whichsmall numbers of people live in wide-open spaces withabundant resources for living (i.e., low population den-sity), such as the American West in the 1800s or eventhe American Midwest today. Such people feel lesscompelled to work together, cooperate, collaborate;in other words, be collectivistic. They will instead beself-sufficient and relatively autonomous, which arethe hallmarks of what I call “traditional” individualism.

In the case where population density is low andwhere resource availability is also low, collectivism isnecessary in order to pool resources to survive. Thispooling, however, occurs within relatively small groupsof people or communities, with simpler social struc-

High

Low

Low

“Traditional” individualism

HighPopulation Density

“Traditional” collectivism “Simple” collectivism

“IC duality”

“Complex” individualism

Reso

urce

Av

aila

bilit

y

Chapter Three 101

tures than societies with a high population density.This case may be exemplified by cultural groups inparts of Africa, Asia, or South America who are essen-tially isolated from urbanized or developed commu-nities, but who lack the resources to survive withouteach other’s help. For comparison purposes, I call thiscultural typology “simple” collectivism.

The fourth typology in this table is a unique andfascinating case. I believe that the characteristics ofthe culture of people who live in areas of high popu-lation density and high resource availability dependon the cultural milieu of their history. Here things geta bit complicated. If a culture that is traditionally col-lectivistic, with high population density and low re-source availability, gains resources to live, then I be-lieve their culture has the potential for becoming moreindividualistic as their need to cooperate lessens.Should such a situation occur across generations, onepotential outcome is that younger generations willdevelop a cultural orientation that is different (i.e., moreindividualistic) from their predecessors’. I label this situ-ation “IC duality,” where individualism (I) and collec-tivism (C) co-exist in different segments of the popu-lation.6 This is exactly what I believe has happened inJapan (IC duality will be taken up in more detail be-low).

If, however, a culture that is traditionally individu-alistic, with low population density and high resourceavailability, experiences an increase in population den-sity, I believe the people retain their basic individual-

102

ism but that it is manifested in more complex waysbecause of more complex stratifications in society. Icall this “complex” individualism. The difference in in-dividualism in America, for example, between a ruraltown in the Midwest (traditional individualism) andthe individualism exhibited in New York City or LosAngeles (complex individualism) would exemplify thisevolution.

Surely there are many other factors that affect cul-ture, including economic, political, geographic, climatic,and historical determiners. And there are many waysof understanding the influence of such factors on cul-tural dimensions other than the individualism andcollectivism dimension. My main point here is thattrends that affect the way of life of a people over aconsiderable length of time have the potential tochange culture, because culture is the summation ofthe rules and systems of living. I believe that popula-tion density and resource availability are especiallygermane, however, to understanding the changes inJapanese culture over the past half century.

The thesis I wish to develop is that much of theconfusion and conflict that currently exist in Japanesesociety results from the combination of at least twofactors: a growing culture of individuality, especiallyamong the younger generations, within a previouslypredominantly collectivistic society, and the percep-tion of a lack of morality and social etiquette in today’syouth. First I will describe the dramatic change in Japa-nese culture over the past fifty years, then the growth

Chapter Three 103

of individuality within Japan, and finally, the changingmoral values in society.

Japanese Cultural ChangeCultural change occurs all over the world and for manydifferent reasons. Refugees, asylum seekers, and im-migrants to new lands, for example, often learn newcultural values as they assimilate. Countries invadedduring wars are often forced to learn new cultures.Countries that receive large numbers of immigrantsfrom one or more countries are exposed to their ma-terial goods and psychocultural artifacts—music, popu-lar culture, and the like—often resulting in culturalchange. And countries and cultures like Japan, whichhave undergone major changes in the fifty-some yearssince World War II, have experienced major social andcultural changes.

Japan is certainly not an anomaly in the sense thatcultural change has been occurring. In fact all culturesof the world are constantly evolving because of chang-ing environmental conditions. What is striking in theJapanese case, however, is the speed of transforma-tion of cultural values from one end of the spectrumto the other.

To be sure, Japan was probably very collectivisticin the past, as we discussed in chapter 1. At the end ofWorld War II, this collective consciousness was calledto arms. The joint efforts of the entire country werenecessary to rebuild the nation from the ruins in which

104

it lay after the war. In addition Japanese pride requireda strong and united front against the American occu-pation forces, who appeared to want to have their waywith Japanese society and culture. Thus, Japan set outon a mission to rebuild and transform its economyinto a power to be reckoned with, which of coursealso increased dramatically the availability of resourcesfor its people.

The transformation from the end of the war untilthe present has been a miracle. The Japanesegovernment’s plan from 1961 to 1970, for example,called for the national income to be doubled by 1970and for spectacular growth in a number of industrialsectors. History has proven that this ambitious planwas not a fantasy. Japan’s average growth rate peryear between 1946 and 1956 was 10.6 percent (com-pared with 4.3 percent in France). From 1957 to 1959,it was 9.2 percent, and from 1959 on it remained rela-tively high. In comparison, Japan’s annual growth ratein the first half of the century was 4 percent.

Along with this rate of economic growth was con-comitant growth in personal income. After the warthe annual income for many individuals in Japan was$200–$300; by the 1960s it had risen to an astonish-ing average of $8,810 (in current income figures). To-day, annual income is many times more than that. Inaddition personal investing compounded personalincome. Many individuals made large amounts ofmoney in the Tokyo stock exchange in the 1960s, but

Chapter Three 105

since that time more people have turned to depositaccounts and savings for their personal investments.The amount of savings per individual in Japan rela-tive to the rest of the world has been well documented,with estimates as high as an average of 30 percent ofexpendable income. Higher incomes have meant in-creased spending for convenience goods, foods, andluxury items.

Today, as the world’s second largest economy,Japan is one of the strongest nations in the world fi-nancially. And this transformation has had an enor-mous impact on the psychology of its people. Japa-nese individuals have more money and more items tomake their lives more comfortable than ever before.

Thus, according to the analysis described above,the Japanese have had a substantial increase in theamount of resources available to them. And this isespecially true when compared with the resourcesavailable to the Japanese people just one generationago. The degree of increase in resource availabilityfrom one generation to the next cannot be denied.

At the same time, changes have occurred in popu-lation density. Although the actual amount of arableland in Japan has not changed appreciably, the birth-rate, while climbing immediately after the war, has beendeclining ever since and is today at its lowest pointsince the war (Figure 3.1, page 106). Thus, there is areal decrease in the absolute numbers of people be-ing added to the Japanese society.7

106

Figure 3.1Japan’s Birthrate since World War II

In addition, the introduction of personal conve-nience technologies, such as the Walkman stereo, cel-lular phones, and personal computers, have in mymind created an additional psychological distance be-tween people. For instance, when people talk to theirfriends or acquaintances on the cell phone while onthe train, they create a psychological distance betweenthemselves and all the people around them. It is as ifthey don’t exist. The same is true when people listento their stereo headphones or stay at home and com-municate with others almost exclusively by e-mail. Achild listening to his or her Walkman in the family caron a drive somewhere has created psychological spacebetween him- or herself and the rest of the family.Thus, technological advances and the declining birth-rate have led to a functional decline in population den-sity.8

1

2

3

4

5Birth rate4.5

2

1.4

1947 1960 1999

Chapter Three 107

According to the analysis described earlier, whathas happened in the Japanese society is a functionaldecline in population density coupled with increasedresource availability. These two facts lead to an inevi-table decrease in collectivistic behaviors, values, andgroup consciousness, and an increase in individual-ity, uniqueness, and separateness. With greater re-source availability, Japanese individuals no longer needto rely on each other for their survival, thus weaken-ing collectivism and group consciousness consider-ably. In their place have risen individual effort and self-sufficiency. Individuality and uniqueness have cometo overshadow more traditional collectivistic ways ofthinking. This is why we observe the results I havereported in study after study on Japanese culture insocial psychology and in surveys conducted in Japanby different agencies, as we discussed in chapter 2. Inshort, I believe Japan has moved from traditional col-lectivism to IC duality (refer back to Table 3.1 on page100).9

Still, it is important not to lose sight of the fact thatthese changes are superimposed on a base of collec-tivism. As I mentioned earlier, a tensive relationshipexists between culture and behavior, because not ev-eryone conforms to the mainstream or predominantcultural mores. In the past this degree of tension withinthe Japanese culture was probably insufficient to makemuch of a difference to society at large. In addition,social rules and sanctions existed to deal with suchdivergences of culture and behavior (e.g., the social-

108

ization process within companies as described by ChieNakane 1970). In Pertti J. Pelto’s (1968) terminology,Japan was rather “tight”—homogeneous and monoc-ultural. These characteristics were associated with anapparent peace and stability.

Yet, with the changes in ways of life and behaviorin the past fifty years, the divergence between the older,stereotypic views of culture and actual real-life waysof living has grown, resulting in greater tension withinsociety. As the divergence increases, social rules andsanctions for dealing with such divergent behavior nolonger work. I believe it is this cultural tension that iscontributing to much of the data we examined in thesecond half of chapter 1.

I leave this section of the chapter with a finalthought about cultural change in Japanese history.Evidence for the fluidity of Japanese culture acrossdifferent periods of history is strong and growing.Some historians believe, for example, that the Japa-nese culture was very open to the outside world and,by the way, individualistic from 1400 to 1600. Duringthis time trade and relations were conducted with manyother countries, and the nature of the psychology ofthe Japanese during this period of history was cen-tered more on uniqueness and individuality than hasbeen the case in recent history. The century of theWarring Period (Sengoku Jidai) and the closing of Ja-pan and the beginning of the Tokugawa Period, how-ever, had an enormous impact on the culture and psy-chology of the Japanese people as individuals. These

Chapter Three 109

social and political changes had large repercussions,which helped to divert the Japanese psyche back tothe more traditional, conservative outlook of collec-tivism. With the rise of individuality, uniqueness, andseparateness over the last fifty years, however, we nowsee another swing in the pendulum of culture. Thechanges are perhaps more rapid now than at previ-ous points in history because of the technological andeconomic innovations that enable changes in cultureto occur more rapidly now than in the past. Thus, Japa-nese culture has swung widely throughout history, andthese swings are only natural when culture is seen asa sociopsychological construct that varies accordingto a number of external factors.

Changing Moral Values inJapanese Society

While the previous section discussed how the Japa-nese culture has changed from one of traditional col-lectivism to IC duality, another factor I believe has con-tributed to the growing state of confusion and unrestin contemporary Japanese society has to do withchanges in moral values and social behavior duringthis same time period. An increase in the cultural val-ues of individualism and separateness in and of itselfis not necessarily a cause for concern in contempo-rary Japanese society, or in any society. What has beena cause for concern, however, is the perception thatmany of the younger generations today, who seem-

110

ingly hold views of newfound cultural individuality,are also considered to lack the morality or ethics thatwould make them decent citizens.

This perception is well noted by surveys of Japa-nese individuals conducted by the Japanese govern-ment. In the EPA’s 1995 survey, for instance, whichinvolved a random sampling of 4,400 Japanese menand women between the ages of 20 and 59 (3,392valid responses), individuals at all age ranges felt thatchildren and juveniles in general lacked basic moralskills and social etiquette (see Figure 3.2 in the Ap-pendix).

While some people believe that only the older gen-erations lament the changes in moral virtues in theyounger generations, what is striking about these datais that people ranging in age from 20 to 59 believethere is a problem in morals and social etiquette. Thus,the cry for social discipline is not a generational issue;it is a social issue that permeates all levels of society.

When the surveyed individuals were asked to iden-tify the specific aspects of behavior they thought werelacking in youth today, most people chose as follows:(1) perseverance, (2) good manners, (3) responsibility,and (4) tolerance and generosity of spirit. In additionpublic-mindedness and economy were also mentionedby a large number of those surveyed (Figure 3.3, page111, lists the top six answers given by respondents).

Chapter Three 111

Figure 3.3Behaviors Youth Are Lacking

These concerns are identical to the moral valuesand virtues espoused by Japanese and non-Japanesealike in previous stereotypic conceptualizations of Ja-pan. Perseverance, good manners, responsibility, toler-ance, and public-mindedness read as if they come fromInazo Nitobe’s Bushido or Ruth Benedict’s The Chry-santhemum and the Sword. Thus, the changes in moralvirtues perceived by many of the current population inJapan speak to the heart and soul of the Japanese cul-ture and character as recognized for centuries.

These changes in moral virtues and social behav-ior compound the difficulties brought about by the

0

20

40

60

80

Economy

Public-

Mindedness

Toler

ance

and G

enero

sity o

f Spirit

Responsib

ility

Good Man

ners

Perse

veran

ce

64.2 62.357.6

51.3

41.333.4

112

changing cultural values described earlier in this chap-ter. Some may say that changing morality is a productof changing culture; others may advocate the oppo-site. To me, it doesn’t matter which produces which;the fact of the matter is that they both occur and areperceived simultaneously in contemporary Japaneseculture, and for that reason, it is the association be-tween a growing culture of individuality and the per-ception of lack of morality and social etiquette that isa cause of confusion and conflict in Japanese societytoday.

Some Reasons for Changing Morals andSocial Behavior in Japan

There are undoubtedly many factors that contributeto the changing morality in Japan, just as there aremultiple factors that cause cultural change in any so-ciety. In this section, I examine two main factors:parenting and child-rearing practices, and socialcauses.

Before delving into this subject in more detail, how-ever, it is important to note that I recognize that someJapanese readers may perceive that I am blaming themfor the decline in morality. I intend no such blame.Rather, I attempt to identify and explain the factors Ibelieve are contributing to these changes, and par-ents, for example, are partially responsible for thosechanges. Responsibility, however, is different fromblame; the latter is negative, which I do not intend to

Chapter Three 113

be. Rather, I am attempting to describe the changes inmorality and the public’s perceptions of them in asobjective a manner as possible, without placing myown value judgments on them. (I will, however, in thelast chapter offer personal comments about the newmoral values and their future.)

Child Rearing and Parenting: The Impact of anUnbalanced Emphasis on Education

In my view one of the major contributing factors tothe changes in social behavior that Japan has wit-nessed in recent years is related to child-rearing andparenting practices, that is, what goes on in the home.One of the largest influences on child-rearing prac-tices in contemporary Japan has been the almost ex-clusive emphasis on education and the interesting andpeculiar family dynamics this emphasis has created inmany Japanese families.

As we discussed in Stereotype 6 in chapter 2, formany years lifetime employment in Japanese compa-nies was a stable component of society. As one’s ini-tial employment essentially set one up for the rest ofhis (usually) or her life, being hired by the best pos-sible company upon graduation from university be-came extremely important. Because of this pressure,most people in the past, and to a great extent today,believed that the key to a successful and stable futurewas a good education. A solid degree from a top-notch university would almost ensure recruitment andemployment at a large, stable company. Therefore, the

114

attainment of a degree from a well-known college oruniversity became a goal of many families for theirchildren.

But there was a trickle-down effect. In order to en-ter a good university, one had to graduate from a goodhigh school and have high grades. Thus, the emphasison graduating from a good university caused an in-crease in pressure to enter and succeed in a good highschool. The trickle-down effect did not stop there, how-ever. To enter a prestigious high school, one had tograduate with high marks from a good junior high, andso forth all the way down to preschool. Lifelong eco-nomic stability and contribution to society as a citizenpressured even young children to perform well.

This pressure did not stop at the school system. Inorder to help their children get ahead, many parentssent their children to preparatory schools, or juku, inthe evenings or on weekends to help ensure their highperformance on entrance exams and in regular school,so that they could graduate and move on and even-tually win a place in a prestigious university. In thisway, education, and more importantly academic per-formance, have come to consume the lives of manyJapanese individuals from their very early, formativeyears through high school and university. It is not un-common for these children and teenagers to studyfrom morning to night, almost every day, in order toget ahead academically.

As an educator, I have nothing against a healthyemphasis on education and study in the family. Edu-

Chapter Three 115

cation is important for children and youth in order forthem to become valued contributors to tomorrow’ssociety. The educational system meets important so-cialization goals as well; school is where friendshipsare made and where young people learn how to dealwith social problems and work out solutions.

Nevertheless, when education is emphasized asthe sole element of one’s existence, social conse-quences are inevitable. Children’s whole lives revolvearound study and grades. They spend the majority oftheir waking hours in school or juku and then at homestudying. When children study to the almost total ex-clusion of all other kinds of learning experiences andsocial contact, they become “study robots,” and prob-lems in social development and morals are likely.

Kyoiku Mamas

Both parents are major contributors to this social epi-demic. Many mothers—the so-called kyoiku mamas—raise their children with little emphasis on friendshipsand other normal and healthy relationships, evenwithin the family. Success as mothers is intricately re-lated to the success of the children in school and even-tually in landing a good job. Ultimately, then, socialsuccess is equated with status and income. But theprice for such achievement is high. Mothers, unawareof the dangers, pressure their children to excel aca-demically, not realizing that their sons and daughtersmay also become social misfits.

116

Moreover, when behavioral problems occur, manykyoiku mamas are willing to ignore them as long astheir child continues to study and earn good grades.Such exclusive emphasis on academic performancehas led, essentially, to a blind spot in such mothers’view of the socialization of their children as social be-ings who need to learn to interact appropriately withothers.

Many families opt to send their children to liveaway from home for the sake of education, thus exac-erbating the problem. It is not uncommon, for example,for families to send their junior high and high schoolchildren to live in dorms run by schools. Althoughsuch living arrangements can provide valuable edu-cational experiences, the children are denied the enor-mous benefits that the family itself can provide in theinculcation and development of a healthy self-con-cept, of social skills, and of morality.

For many years now I have been involved with edu-cational and cultural exchange programs between theUnited States and Japan. While I do not have quantita-tive data, I have witnessed many instances where wehave observed problems with Japanese students andtheir host families on these exchange programs. Manyhost families have reported to us that their Japanesestudents would not socialize with the family, would infact lock themselves in their rooms rather than interactwith the family, would forget even simple manners andfail to greet family members (“Good morning,” “Goodnight,” etc.), and would generally not fit in at home,

Chapter Three 117

oftentimes despite attempts by the host family to drawthem out. When we have investigated these cases, wehave often found that such problematic students havecome from a dorm-living situation rather than fromtheir family’s home. Students who live in dorms for muchof their young lives may, I believe, forget—or neverlearn—the basic social skills of living and interactingwith family members (or at the very least, these skillsmay not have been reinforced). They may be excellentstudents academically, but there appears to be valu-able experiential learning that is lost in the exclusiveemphasis on academics.10

Many Japanese families send their children to livein dorms during junior high and high school not onlyfor academic reasons but for other reasons as well, suchas participation in sports clubs and teams. And althoughtheir abilities in those specific athletic activities may im-prove, there are social consequences to consider.

I also know of Japanese parents who send theirelementary school-aged children abroad to receive aneducation that includes foreign language training.There are elite international schools in Japan as well.These families often have the economic resources andinternational connections that allow them to providesuch “opportunities” for their children. Again, there maybe benefit in language and academic skills training;however, one has to wonder whether such actionsare beneficial to the development of the child as awhole person, especially at such a crucial stage in hisor her psychological development.

118

Absentee Fathers

Fathers also contribute to this picture. Because fathersin the past two or three decades have spent most oftheir waking hours on the job, they have rarely spenttime with their families.11 The impact of this is major,because considerable research in developmental psy-chology has repeatedly demonstrated the importanceof the father in the effective and appropriate social-ization of his children in many social constructs, in-cluding social skills and morality.

When behavioral problems occur while their chil-dren are growing up, many fathers ignore them. Manyof today’s fathers are afraid to discipline their chil-dren, most likely because they feel guilty about notbeing at home very much to take care of them; be-cause they feel sorry for their children, who are bottledup so much of the time studying; or because they wantto have positive times and feelings with their childrenduring what little time they have. Many such fathersengage in what I would call “popularity parenting.”

Popularity parenting, however, often prohibits fa-thers (mostly) from providing moral and social guid-ance, discipline and punishment when needed, andboundary setting for their children. Hence, many con-temporary Japanese fathers are not the moral beaconsthat they were the past. Developmental psychology hasincreasingly recognized the importance of such moraldiscipline and social training by both parents on theoverall development of their children. In Japan, suchresponsibility has traditionally fallen on the shoulders

Chapter Three 119

of the fathers, and if they are not present or do notfulfill this role, their children often grow up with a lackof conscience about right and wrong, good and bad.

Thus, the societal pressures of education, which havereached epidemic proportions in many families overthe years, the traditional views of marriage and worklife, combined with other social factors, have produceda situation wherein many of Japan’s youth today havegrown up with little socialization training.

Many of these observations are supported by data.In the 1995 EPA study cited earlier, for example, therespondents were asked why they thought teaching chil-dren to behave properly has become more difficult overthe years. The most common response was the em-phasis on education. The next most common responseswere that lifestyles have become more affluent and thatparental authority has declined (Figure 3.4, page 120).

On top of this, one would think that attributingthe cause of social problems to the emphasis on edu-cation would be strongest among those with less edu-cation, and that those individuals with higher educa-tional degrees would probably not see the problemsin education. In fact, however, the survey data indi-cate exactly the opposite; individuals with higher edu-cational degrees actually see more problems in theemphasis on education than do people with lowereducational achievements.

Most individuals surveyed believe that Japanesefamilies are simply not doing their job in socializingthe adults of tomorrow and in teaching the proper

120

social behavior and moral values required of valuablecitizens. When the data presented in Figure 3.3 on page111 (which identifies the social values that most Japa-nese adults deemed lacking in Japanese youth) areexamined and when the same respondents were askedwhether these aspects of behavior should be instilledwithin the family environment, the evidence is irrefut-able (Figure 3.5).

Given that most people surveyed believe that so-cial values and skills should be instilled through thefamily and that the youth of Japan have problems inthese specific areas, one can only reasonably concludethat most Japanese surveyed feel that families are sim-ply not doing the all-important job of educating theirchildren to become successful and valuable citizens.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Children

More

Selfis

h

Community’s R

ole

Small

er Fam

ilies

Paren

tal Authority

Affluen

t LIfe

styles

Emphasi

s on Ed

ucation

26.1

20.2 20.1

1310.5

7

Figure 3.4Why Teaching Children to

Behave Is More Difficult Today

Chapter Three 121

While education is important, the overemphasis oneducation and the academic pressures parents exerton their children from a very young age have undoubt-edly contributed extensively not only to the culturalchanges we have been discussing in this book, butalso to the social and moral challenges that Japan facestoday.

Social Factors

Social forces are also potential contributors to thechanging moral values in contemporary Japanese

Figure 3.5People Believing Social Skills

Are the Family’s Responsibility

0

20

40

60

80

Economy

Public-

Mindedness

Toler

ance

and G

enero

sity o

f Spirit

Responsib

ility

Good Man

ners

Perse

veran

ce

56.1

79.2 77.2 76.9

41.4

21.8

122

society. For example, as the number of cars has in-creased and livable space has decreased, more fami-lies have decided not to allow their children to runand play outside with their friends because it is toodangerous. The possibility of kidnapping by strang-ers and other social crimes also contributes to thistrend. Thus, children are becoming increasingly iso-lated from each other, losing valuable opportunitiesto learn about social appropriateness from others.

This tendency has had several negative conse-quences, in my view. First, when kids don’t have thechance to run and roughhouse and use their bodies,they do not develop and mature as well physically asthey could. When we are young, physical developmentis essential to mental, spiritual, and social develop-ment. Physical prowess is an important ingredient inself-confidence and discipline. With decreasing oppor-tunities for play, children are not able to develop theirbodies and their minds.

Play also contributes to the development of manyimportant social skills. By developing friendships andeven resolving fights with their peers, kids learn manyvaluable social skills. Unfortunately, in the current situ-ation, where children are not allowed to develop theseaspects of themselves because they cannot play out-side as much as in the past, they do not learn the ap-propriate social and moral lessons that such interac-tion affords. Instead, they develop a strange sense ofmorality, in which even life and death have little moremeaning than they would in a video game. Japan is

Chapter Three 123

not alone in this trend, of course. Witness the increasein juvenile violence in many Western developed na-tions in recent years, especially in the United States.

This leads to another point—the consequences ofextensive use of video and computer games and theInternet. Despite all the positive outcomes associatedwith their development, they also contribute to thisproblem. Children today spend hour upon hour play-ing computer games, chatting with others via e-mail,or surfing the Internet. The rules that governed socialetiquette, manners, and appropriateness are beingthrown out the window in today’s society as childrencarry on conversations with complete strangers, de-veloping cyber relationships in lieu of real ones. Theproblems associated with excessive television viewingin the past are well documented; yet, interactive tech-nology brings with it a new set of concerns.

The day prior to writing this passage, I heard onthe news about two girls in Japan—one in high school,the other in junior high—who met on the Internet andbecame close in a cyber relationship. The high schoolgirl was depressed about a relationship problem witha boy, so the younger girl jumped on a train to meether in Kyushu (the junior high schooler lived inNagoya), and together they jumped from a buildingout of despair. Events such as this point out thechanges in moral values and the psychological numb-ing that occurs after long exposure to violent videogames and other media.

Certainly, the mass media—television, comics, mov-

124

ies, and daily news—contribute to Japan’s changingmorality.12 This includes the glamorization of the be-haviors and lifestyles of professional athletes and en-tertainers, whose behavior the youth imitate. Theirimages, plus the products they display, are constantlyprojected to millions in ads on trains, on television,and in movies and magazines.

Thus, the major factors that are contributing tochanging moral values in Japan include social as wellas familial ones. Because they are so pervasive in Japa-nese society, their influence on changing culture andmorality is beyond doubt. I do not believe the domi-nant cultural values and morality to be malicious inany way (although I realize that maliciousness cer-tainly seems to be tolerated in many instances); in-stead, the current trend is to abandon previous ste-reotypic notions of culture and morality. Thus, con-temporary Japanese moral values are not necessarilycharacterized by evil, but instead by an absence ofgood.

The Search for Moralityamong Japanese Youth

That many Japanese youth are not receiving trainingin social behavior or morality in their homes is a ma-jor concern for many. Morality gives all of us a senseof purpose and a philosophy of life. It gives us valuesthat serve as guiding principles by which we can di-rect our thoughts, actions, opinions, and behaviors. It

Chapter Three 125

provides us with a sense of purpose and serves as asort of bedrock or foundation, allowing for spiritual,emotional, and intellectual growth.

If many Japanese youth are not receiving trainingin social skills or morality, then exactly what kind ofmorality and value system do they have? In my ob-servations, one value that many Japanese haveadopted is materialism, the acquisition of money andexpensive consumer goods. Quite frankly, the youthof Japan have come to treasure money and what itcan buy. Again, I do not condemn the desire for suchthings; it is only natural in the commercial and capi-talistic societies in which we—Japan, the United States,and most industrialized nations—live. What strikes meas peculiar is the meaning that this search for materialgoods has acquired in Japan.

One problem that is indicative of this social ten-dency among Japanese youth today is known as enjokosai, or the young schoolgirls who go on dates andprovide sex for money. In a 1998 survey by AsahiShimbun, people were asked what they perceived tobe the main contributing factors to this obvious so-cial problem. The most common response was that“parents cannot discipline their children.” The secondmost common response was that “society overempha-sizes the desire for goods” (Figure 3.6, page 126).

Of course only a small proportion of youngschoolgirls engage in this practice. But that such a prac-tice exists at all is cause for concern over the height-ened desire for money and goods. Thus, enjo kosai is

126

just the tip of the iceberg of other such practices, val-ues, and beliefs that are rooted in an emphasis onmaterialism.

Another indicator of the search for morality amongcontemporary Japanese youth is their desire foruniqueness. There is an overwhelming willingness tochange—or at least tolerate changes in—some of thevery characteristics that make the Japanese Japanese.For example, today it is not uncommon to walk aroundthe streets of any major city in Japan and see younggirls wearing platform shoes with soles so large andso high as to look ridiculous in relation to the rest oftheir bodies. It is also not uncommon to see bothyoung boys and girls with their hair dyed all sorts ofcolors. Such statements indicate a desire to be unique

Figure 3.6Causes of Enjo Kosai

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Media

Men W

ho Pay f

or It

Socia

l Desi

re for G

oods

Paren

ts’ La

ck of D

isciplin

e

34

30

18

8

Chapter Three 127

or nonconformist and bear a remarkable resemblanceto the youth fads in Western Europe and the UnitedStates.

Ijime (bullying) has increased alarmingly in the pastdecade or two and is apparently related to changes incultural values and morality. Obviously, individualswho engage in bullying (or in so many of the othertypes of behaviors that are characteristic of the newJapan) are getting something out of this behavior. Itfulfills some kind of psychological need that they have.The question I raise here is what need is being met?What are they searching for?

When we consider the complete picture I havepainted of contemporary Japanese culture—greaterfunctional psychological distances among people,greater resource availability, overemphasis on educa-tion, the lack of social etiquette and morality—I canonly conclude that Japanese youth, lacking a sense ofmorality and conviction in their lives, are searchingfor spiritual fulfillment of some sort. Despite theglamor, glitz, money, and neon lights of major Japa-nese cities, there is an emptiness that is difficult to pin-point. I think it has to do with a decline in spiritualmeaning—in beliefs, philosophies, morality, ground-ing—that has occurred in association with the chang-ing culture. This spiritual emptiness creates a longingthat constantly begs for nourishment. Yet, the onlynourishment it knows is through money, goods, andthe constant search for uniqueness. Most people even-tually find that such solutions are only temporary and

128

cannot really address the deep-seated need for spiri-tual and moral nourishment that we all require. It is asif hungry people are being continually fed popcorn—lots of bulk but no nutritional value. And they remainessentially hungry, regardless of how much popcornthey eat.

The changes in Japanese culture that we have beenexploring in the last two chapters have had drasticeffects on society—business, interpersonal relation-ships, family life, educational systems and practices,and the like—and on culture, in the sense of our indi-vidual moralities and philosophies of life. The datapresented so far are indisputable, as they representthe results from numerous research studies and sur-veys. Collectively, they speak loudly and clearly con-cerning the changes that have occurred in Japanesesociety and culture in recent history, and the conse-quences of those changes on the individuals who makeup Japanese society. Growing cultural dualities andthe diminishing moral base of society, left unchecked,do not bode well for the future. In chapter 4 we willexplore some of the implications of such culturalchanges.

Textnotes1 Here I refer to the American English usage of the term. I

realize, however, that the connotations of the word in otherlanguages may differ, even if they have a close semanticequivalent. Some languages, in fact, may not even have aword for culture as we know it.

Chapter Three 129

2 I do recognize that “birthright” is often viewed by manyJapanese as a necessary condition to being Japanese.

3 I do not mean to suggest that other similarities among theJapanese, including similarities in appearance and what-ever biological or genetic overlaps may exist, are not im-portant. They certainly contribute to an overall picture ofthe Japanese individual and culture, whether actual or per-ceived. I do believe, however, that the most important andsalient aspects of being Japanese are those aspects thatrefer to functional, sociopsychological traits, including lan-guage, thoughts, behaviors, attitudes, values, shared his-tories, and the like. These aspects of culture are, to me,much more important and are the focus of my thesis here.

4 I do believe, however, that the sociopsychological constructof culture shares an intimate relationship with biology, af-fecting biology across time and generations, and vice versa.

5 Such conditions exist in many areas of the world todayand throughout history, such as in rural areas of Centraland South America, East and Southeast Asia, and certainlyJapan in the past.

6 While individualism and collectivism may coexist, the typeof individualism that may be witnessed in such societies isnot the same as that practiced in predominantly individu-alistic societies because it is an individualistic pattern ofbehavior superimposed over an existing base of collectiv-ism. Equating such a cultural pattern with individualism intraditional individualistic societies is, I believe, a mistake.

7 There is, of course, still an annual increase in the total popu-lation size. What I am saying here is that the degree towhich population density changed is negligible when com-pared with the vast increase in resource availability due toincreases in personal income.

8 It is also true that such technological advances in commu-nication also bring people closer together. But I contend

130

that this is true only for the interactants of the communi-cation. When a Japanese person speaks on his or her cel-lular phone in public amongst a crowd, it requires somedegree of a lack of interpersonal consciousness amongthose people in the immediate area. Functional space isthereby created, which brings about decreases in popula-tion density functionally.

9 Another major factor contributing to Japan’s culturalchange not discussed here concerns the influence of thepostwar educational system implemented by the Ameri-can occupation forces. European- and American-basededucation is founded on a certain social and cultural ru-bric, and it fosters a way of thinking that is culturally ap-propriate for those countries but not for others (all educa-tional systems are rooted in their home culture). This wayof thinking is grounded in what may be termed “logicaldeterminism,” where theories are connected in a linear,cause-effect fashion. This way of thinking, as well as theother cultural products of the educational system imposedon Japan, probably made a large contribution to the cul-tural changes that have occurred in the country.

10 Certainly, many exchange students do well on their ex-changes, forming new bonds and relationships with theirhost families.

11 This is related to the concept of moretsu sarariman, whichdescribes the businessman who works feverishly for thecompany to meet demands and quotas, often from earlymorning to late at night.

12 Consider, for instance, the recent Japanese movie BattleRoyale, in which teens are killed by a variety of gruesomeand awful methods, and where “life is a game.”

131

4

The Meaning of ChangingJapanese Culture in

Everyday Life

Changes in Japanese culture over the years have hadmany important implications regarding everyday lifein Japan. We are all witness to the many difficulties,challenges, and obstacles that differences in thinking,attitudes, values, and behaviors bring to our work, play,and homes. Throughout this book, I have tried to builda case to suggest that many of these differences areoccurring as a result of the growing cultural dualitywithin the Japanese society—of growing individual-ism grafted onto a collectivistic base—and of chang-ing moral values.

In this chapter, I examine four areas of our lives inwhich the changing Japanese culture is played out—work and business, sports, education, and everydaylife. Cultural dualities are challenging existing socialstructures, social behavior, and rituals in all facets of

132

life, forcing us to consider, and reconsider, the mean-ing of an evolving Japanese culture in people’s lives.

The Japanese Business WorldClearly, corporate Japan has done an amazing job ofrising from the economic ashes of World War II toenable Japan to become the major economic powerthat it has grown to be today. Japanese managementpractices, efficiency, manufacturing technology, and thepsychology of the Japanese worker have been themarvel of the world for years and have been studiedcountless times by anthropologists, sociologists, psy-chologists, economists, politicians, and scientists inmany other fields as well. Japanese products areknown around the world as some of the best, if notthe best, in their respective areas. Japanese conglom-erates and affiliates are established in many countries,helping to contribute to local and national economieson many different levels.

Many of the changes in Japanese employees’ atti-tudes, values, beliefs, and behaviors that we have dis-cussed, however, illustrate that the Japanese businessculture and organizational climate are profoundly dif-ferent today from what they were in the past. Thesechanges, in conjunction with the harsh economic re-alities in bottom-line profitability that many compa-nies faced in the past decade, mean that Japanesecompanies and businesses must face many difficultchallenges in the next several decades, not only to stay

Chapter Four 133

competitive and financially viable, but also to ensuremaximum productivity among their workers and em-ployees.

We have already seen some of the results of cor-porate Japan’s answer to the cultural evolution occur-ring in Japan. Companies are instituting earlier retire-ment ages, offering fewer lifetime employment oppor-tunities, and increasingly administering systems of wageand promotion based on merit, achievement, and abil-ity rather than merely on seniority. These changes havenot been easy to implement, because the previous sys-tems of lifetime employment and salary based on se-niority were rooted in a cultural rubric that was apro-pos for a previous Japanese society and which manypeople today still believe in.

The changing cultural values and the existence ofcultural dualities in Japan bring with them a numberof changes on the level of the individual worker aswell. In this section, I briefly discuss several psycho-logical consequences of the new cultural duality inJapan on the Japanese workforce.

The Meaning of and Attitudes toward Work andCompanies

Some pillars of the Japanese character, as we havediscussed throughout this book, were the notions ofloyalty, commitment, sacrifice, and dedication to theingroup. These values were some of the hallmarks ofthe stereotypic notions of Japanese culture that wereinculcated from the time of the bushido warriors and

134

that continued to be promoted in Japan after WorldWar II. More recently, these values have been used todescribe the Japanese worker in studies of industrialand organizational psychology, economics, and busi-ness management to explain the contributing factorsof the rise of the Japanese economy.

The emerging cultural duality, however, is bring-ing about differences in these values, which, in turn,translate into real changes in behaviors. For example,people in different cultures hold different meaningsof work. Workers in typically collectivistic cultures, suchas the Japan of the past, tend to identify with theircolleagues and with their company. In Japan the com-pany and colleagues used to be fundamentally inter-related and became integral parts of the workers’ self-identities. These tendencies were no doubt related tocultural differences in self-concept and manifestedthemselves in a variety of ways, such as the manner inwhich people identified themselves by company ororganization first.1 Bonds between colleagues and thecompany were strong and fundamentally and quali-tatively different from those connectors for people withindividual self-concepts from different cultures. Inshort, in the Japan of old, work, work colleagues, andthe company became synonymous with the self.

People in individualistic cultures, however, have aneasier time separating themselves from their jobs, andthis tendency is working its way into the evolving Japa-nese culture. Workers find it easier to distinguish be-tween “work time” and “personal time”; they make

Chapter Four 135

greater distinctions between company-based expenseaccounts and personal expenses; and they makegreater distinctions between social and work activitieswith regard to both their work colleagues and theirbusiness associates (potential clients, customers, andso forth).

The changes in work values also mean that em-ployees don’t have to put their entire heart and soulinto their current job and company, which is inevitableif they feel the company is not going to repay their ef-forts or offer lifetime employment. Workers are oftennot as willing to commit themselves to overtime worktoday, especially without compensatory pay. Overtimeoften cuts into personal enjoyment time or time withthe family. In the past, workers were more willing tosacrifice their personal or family time for the sake ofthe company; now, however, the boundary betweenpersonal and company time is becoming clearer, andemployees are more likely to protect their personal time.Overtime, which was one of the ways in which the Japa-nese worker bee demonstrated his or her commitmentto and sacrifice for the company, was one of the majorreasons why the Japanese economy succeeded to thedegree that it did in the past.

Cultural differences in the meaning of work mani-fest themselves in other ways as well. In collectivisticcultures such as old Japan, work is seen as the fulfill-ment of an obligation to a larger group. Thus, in oldJapan there was little movement of an individual fromone company to another because of the individual’s

136

social obligations to the company to which he or shebelonged and to colleagues.2 In individualistic coun-tries leaving one job (or even switching occupations)and going to another is easier because of the separa-tion of the job from the self; a different job will ac-complish the same goals. With the growing base ofindividualism in Japan today, mobility is also on therise. With fewer prospects of lifetime employment inmany companies, and with considerable dissatisfac-tion among workers about how their effort is beingrewarded, more workers today are actively seekingopportunities in other companies while still employedby another. Such job searching while being employedwas previously unheard-of in Japan.

Leadership and Management

Leadership and management styles have also beenchanging and are likely to continue to do so. For ex-ample, leaders and managers in the past were expectedto look after their subordinates not only in terms oftheir work and life within the company, but of theirprivate lives as well. Employees did not hesitate toconsult with their bosses about problems at home andto seek advice from them. Leaders, more often thannot, saw the need to help their subordinates with theirprivate lives as an integral and important part of theirjobs. It was not uncommon for Japanese bosses tofind marriage partners for their subordinates and tolook after them in personal ways, outside as well asinside the company.

Chapter Four 137

Undoubtedly, one of the major reasons why thisstyle of leadership existed is related to the meaning ofwork and the relationship between work and self inJapan in the past. As we discussed earlier, the bound-aries between work and personal lives were not clear.Because the worker’s existence at work became anintegral part of the self, the distinction between workand company on the one hand and one’s personallife on the other was blurred. Essentially, work wasone’s life. Thus, leaders took care of their employeesmuch as parents would take care of their children.There was a bond between them that extended wellbeyond the company.

In contemporary Japan, however, such expectationsand behaviors are changing, in large part because ofthe changing Japanese culture. As workers begin todraw sharper distinctions between their personal livesand work, the boundaries between self and family onthe one hand and work, company, and colleagues onthe other become greater. Efforts by superiors to inter-vene in the lives of their subordinates are more oftenthan before being looked upon as interference or anintrusion on privacy. The only “legitimate” area of inter-vention by a superior in the life of a subordinate is slowlybecoming that which is defined by the job itself, andthe legitimate time of such intervention is slowly beingaccepted as work hours only.3 As Japanese culture con-tinues to change, management and leadership style willsurely continue to evolve as well.

138

One Japanese psychologist, Jyuji Misumi, has pro-vided a framework by which we can understand suchchanges in leadership, management, and supervisionassociated with culture (Misumi and Peterson [1985]).He suggests that management involves general anduniversal functions that all effective leaders must carryout, but that the manner in which they are dispatchedcan vary. He then contrasts functions related to taskperformance and group maintenance and suggeststhat both domains involve universal leadership goalsthat are consistent across cultures and companies. Dif-ferent specific behaviors may be used to accomplishthese managerial goals, however, depending on situ-ations, companies, and cultures.

While both functions are relevant to all leaders,Japanese companies in the past were characterizedby a greater emphasis on group maintenance thanon task performance. Of course, performance has al-ways been important in companies, but the collectiv-istic nature of Japanese culture in the past also meantthat task performance must be balanced by a greatdegree of group maintenance activities. This empha-sis is related, in my mind, to Japan’s previous empha-sis on harmony.

The changing Japanese culture, however, meansthat such an emphasis on harmony may not be asstrong today as it was in the past.4 Thus, leadershipbehaviors may be more focused on task performancethan on group maintenance. This means that the na-ture of leadership and supervision is changing from

Chapter Four 139

one of a family-oriented leader to one of content spe-cialization and task specificity.

Many of these differences between previous andcontemporary conceptualizations of leadership arereflected in a newspaper article about Makoto Naruke,former president of Microsoft Japan (Japan Times, 11March 2001). The article described Naruke as a “per-verse” individualist who embraces opportunity whereothers see gloom, and “who avoids following thecrowd and does things that others dare not.” In factwhen the firm’s sales increased nineteenfold duringhis tenure, his interest in the job faded:

Microsoft was fun in the beginning because thefirm was very unique back then…. But now thereare many others doing the same. It’s not that Iwant to become No. 1 among many. I wouldrather be one of a very few, if not the one andonly…. When you keep doing one thing forsome time, don’t you get tired? If you do, youcan just quit. It’s so easy now…. Even if youdon’t know what you want to do next, you canlive on part-time jobs till you find out what youreally want to do. (1)

This clearly doesn’t sound like the voice of a typicalJapanese leader of the past. It reflects the change inJapanese culture that is permeating corporate Japantoday.5

Motivation and Productivity

One of the most interesting findings in socialpsycholoogy research in the United States is that group

140

productivity often declines in larger groups (Latane,Williams, and Harkins 1979). These findings have con-tributed to the coining of the expression “social loaf-ing.” Two factors appear to contribute to this phenom-enon, at least in the U.S. One is the reduced efficiencyresulting from the loss of coordination among work-ers’ efforts; as group membership increases, presum-ably the lack of coordination among people reducesefficiency, resulting in the lack of activity or duplicateactivity, which in turn results in the loss of productiv-ity. The second factor involves the reduction in effortby individuals when they work in groups as comparedwith when they work by themselves. B. Latane and hiscolleagues (Latane, Williams, and Harkins 1979) haveconducted a number of studies investigating groupsize, coordination, and effort and have found that inlarger groups, a lack of both coordination and effortresulted in decreased productivity. Latane (1981) at-tributed these findings to a diffusion of responsibilityin groups. That is, as group size increases, the respon-sibility for getting a job done is divided among morepeople, and many group members ease up becausetheir individual contribution is less recognizable.

Previous cross-cultural research in Japan, how-ever, indicated that exactly the opposite phenomenonoccurred there. For instance, Sanshiro Shirakashi (1985)and Susumu Yamaguchi, Koichi Okamoto, and TakashiOka (1985) conducted studies involving Japanese par-ticipants performing several tasks. They showed thatnot only did social loafing not occur but that being in

Chapter Four 141

a group actually enhanced individual performance fortheir subjects. P. Christopher Earley (1989) and Will-iam Gabrenya, Y. Wang, and Latane (1985) noted asimilar phenomenon in samples of Chinese school-children. This opposite effect has been called “socialstriving” and has been claimed by many writers as onefactor that has contributed to the postwar economicsuccess of Japan.

Writers typically speculated that social striving oc-curs in cultures like Japan and China because of theircollectivistic nature. Because collectivism fosters inter-personal interdependence and group collective func-tioning more than individualistic cultures do, groupstend to be more productive in these cultures preciselybecause they foster coordination among ingroupmembers. They also place higher values on individualcontributions in ingroup settings.

Changes in Japanese culture, however, suggest thatsocial striving and its positive contribution to produc-tivity may not ring as true now or in the future. Astraditional collectivism diminishes and is replaced byindividualistic tendencies, especially among much ofthe younger workforce, one may expect a resultingdecrease in social striving and an increase in socialloafing. If so, these changes mean that leadership andsupervisory styles need to change in order to deal withchanges in productivity that are caused by changingJapanese culture.

These notions are bolstered by the studies con-ducted by Toshio Yamagishi described in chapter 2.

142

You will remember that Yamagishi conducted two stud-ies in which American and Japanese students partici-pated in small groups that required cooperative be-havior to perform a task (Yamagishi 1988a, b). Whena system of mutual monitoring and social sanctionsexisted for individual participation in the group, theJapanese students did indeed contribute more to thegroup than did the Americans. But when the systemof monitoring and sanctions was eliminated, it wasthe Americans, not the Japanese, who contributedmore. In fact, more Japanese chose to leave the groupthan did Americans. American participants had higherlevels of trust and cooperation in this condition, andthere were no differences between Americans andJapanese in their contributions to the provision of asanctioning system. Clearly, these types of findingsraise questions about whether or not previous tradi-tional, stereotypic views of the Japanese worker-beeproductivity will be valid now or in the future.

Other Areas of Work

Many other aspects of work, beyond those discussedso far, are changing as well. Take, for instance, inter-personal relations. Workers nowadays are more dis-tant toward their work colleagues because of the re-duced emphasis on harmony, and greater distinctionsare drawn between oneself and one’s peers in thecompany. Increasing individualism also brings with itless status differentiation. Thus, employees do not havethe blind trust in and loyalty to their bosses and su-

Chapter Four 143

periors that they had in the past, and they are lessafraid to question authority.

Increasing individualism also brings with it an in-creased recognition of individual differences and lessdistinction between the sexes. This is a particularly in-teresting trend. When Geert Hofstede did his well-known studies of cultural differences in work-relatedvalues (Hofstede 1980, 1984), the Japanese wereranked the highest on the cultural dimension of Mas-culinity, which also meant the greatest distinctionsbetween the sexes. Individualism, however, promotesan awareness of the merit and uniqueness of eachindividual, regardless of gender (at least theoretically).Thus, awareness about sexual discrimination and ha-rassment is on the rise in Japan, along with the grow-ing awareness that men and women should be treatedas equals, which is a direct consequence of individu-alism. In the 1999 EPA survey conducted by the Japa-nese government, the majority of men and women ofall ages who were surveyed felt that sex discrimina-tion exists in Japan (see Figure 4.1 in the Appendix).

Although the trend is slow, more women are ris-ing to positions of leadership in all areas of Japanesecompanies and government. And along with this trend,demeaning tasks and responsibilities, such as that ofthe typical tea lady of the past, are slowly being eradi-cated.

Finally, increased individualism is also resulting inan increased ability to think creatively and critically.Thus, individuals in Japanese companies are able to

144

think creatively about ways to deal with the problemsthat companies face due to recession and other eco-nomic crises. This is due in part to the emphasis withinindividualism on creativity, autonomy, and uniqueness.When Japan was a more homogeneous, collectivisticculture, such creativity was rarer, was not sought out,and was not rewarded.6

Summary

These, and many other changes in the individual psy-chologies and behaviors of Japanese employees, arenatural and inevitable consequences of the changesin Japanese culture that we have discussed. In Table4.1, I summarize these and other possible changes inwork-related values, attitudes, and behaviors, contrast-ing stereotypic attitudes of the past with those of thepresent and the future. As tensions continue to risebetween traditional and contemporary views of work,worker relations, and personnel and labor manage-ment systems, they continue to challenge an alreadystrained corporate and labor system that is strugglingfor survival against worldwide competition. Thus, cor-porate Japan faces not only external competition, butinternal struggles as well. Inevitably, Japan will not beable to face its external competition well if it does notadequately and satisfactorily address the needs andchallenges brought about by its internal factors.

Chapter Four 145

Table 4.1Some Possible Alterations in Work-Related Values,

Attitudes, and Behaviors in a Culturally Changing Japan*

Japan Now and in the Future

Lower expectation the company will provide for the employee

Importance of employees’ personal time

Small companies attractive

Self-serving involvement with the company

More importance attached to freedom and challenge in jobs

Managers aspire to leadership and variety

Managers rate having autonomy as important

Managers endorse “modern” points of view, employee initiative and group activity

Individual decisions better than group ones

Managers choose pleasure, affection, and security as goals

Individual initiative is socially encouraged

Need to make specific friendships

Managers make decisions after consulting with subordinates

Employees less afraid of disagreeing with their boss

Companies’ interference in private life rejected

Lower job stress

More women in jobs; more mixed sex composition

Japan in the Past

Reliance on the company to provide for the employee

Sacrificing personal time for the company

Large companies attractive

Moral involvement with the company

Moral importance attached to training and use of skills in jobs

Managers aspire to conformity and orderliness

Managers rate having security in their position as important

Managers support “traditional” points of view, not employee initiative and group activity

Group decisions better than individual ones

Managers choose duty, expertise, and prestige as goals

Individual initiative is socially frowned upon

Social relationships predetermined by ingroups

Managers make decisions auto-cratically and paternalistically

Employees fearful of disagreeing with their boss

Companies’ interference in private life accepted

Higher job stress

Fewer women in jobs; less mixed sex composition

* Adapted from Geert Hofstede’s Culture’s Consequences: Inter-national Differences in Work-Related Values, 166–67.

146

The Educational SystemSince the end of World War II, Japan’s educationalsystem has been one of the strongest pillars of soci-ety. There is no doubt about the quality of the educa-tion of the average Japanese student. Many interna-tional studies in educational psychology that havecompared academic and scholastic skills and aptitudesof students around the world consistently rank Japa-nese students at the top or near the top in almostevery field measured. This is especially true in sub-jects such as math and science.7

The substantial difference in the quality of educa-tion between the United States and Japan is reinforcedfor me every year when my family hosts high schoolstudents from Japan on homestay cultural exchangeprograms. These students come to the U.S. for two orthree weeks and are required to attend high schoolwith their host families’ high school students. Inevita-bly, they tell me that much of American school life isboring, especially math.8 When I ask them why, theyalways tell me the same thing—the math American highschool students are struggling with is math the Japa-nese students learned in junior high, and in some cases,in elementary school.

The same is true for English grammar. At San Fran-cisco State University, where I teach full-time, studentsfrom many different countries, including Japan, takemy courses. Many students (but not all) write Englishwith a surprising degree of proficiency, which often

Chapter Four 147

impresses me. When my daughter receives letters inEnglish from her Japanese friends, I often think thattheir written English is better than many native En-glish speakers’ English. Of course, not every Japaneseuniversity or high school student has great Englishskills. But I cannot even imagine the typical Americanhigh school or university student coming close to writ-ing a letter or a paper in another language.

The evolving Japanese culture that we have beendiscussing has broad and far-reaching implicationsfor the Japanese educational system. In the followingsections I discuss some of the issues and problemsthat Japanese education faces; I believe most are di-rectly related to the changing Japanese culture andemerging cultural dualities.

Student Attitudes

One major problem that Japanese institutions ofhigher education face, for instance, concerns the be-haviors and attitudes of many of their university stu-dents. My colleagues tell me many stories about Japa-nese students who come to class only to sleep, talkwith their friends, or daydream. In many instances,students will leave their cellular phones on during class,answer them if they ring, and actually have telephoneconversations with others during lecture!

Certainly, not all university students act like this. Ihave taught in Japanese universities and have beenpleasantly surprised at the high level of motivation andinterest shown by the students to learn the material

148

presented.9 Nonetheless, it is true that students doexhibit the behaviors described above, and I cannothelp but think that such behavior is entirely contra-dictory to how Japanese students of the past wouldhave been even if they had had such gadgets as cellu-lar phones.

There have also been major changes in students’attitudes toward achievement and academic success.Students today are much more likely to attribute theirachievements and success to their own aptitudes andabilities. In the past students would have been morelikely to acknowledge the contributions of thosearound them, such as their teachers, family members,and the like. Students today are less likely to acknowl-edge such external contributions to their achievements.When teachers and family members, however, expectsuch acknowledgment and do not receive it, the resultcan be strife and conflict.

Increasing individualism in Japanese culture has,in part, brought about such changes in students’ atti-tudes. Attribution concerning achievement and suc-cess, for instance, is a well-studied area in social psy-chology, and it has been well documented in the pastthat attributing success to internal factors (e.g., one’seffort, ability, degree of study, etc.) is the norm in indi-vidualistic cultures. In collectivistic cultures, however,students are more likely to attribute academic successto external factors (e.g., the kindness of the peoplearound them, luck, fate, etc.). Because Japan has movedfrom a socially homogeneous, collectivist culture to

Chapter Four 149

that of a duality that includes individualism, it is nowonder that such attributional styles are emerging.

This emerging cultural duality also contributes tochanging student attitudes in classrooms and in ev-eryday interactions with teachers, as described above.As we discussed in chapter 3, the evolving Japaneseculture is also associated with changes in morality;even basic rules of politeness and social etiquette arequickly being overturned. There is less of a sense ofinterpersonal consciousness and harmony. Thus be-haviors that threaten to disrupt group functioning,such as what occurs in many classrooms today, haveemerged.

Of course, economic realities also enter into thispicture. Population statistics reveal that the number ofyoung people entering colleges and universities willdecrease dramatically over the next ten years. If uni-versities and colleges are too strict in grading theirstudents, resulting in a higher failure rate, potentialnew recruits will seek admission to other, less rigor-ous schools. If this occurs, universities with high aca-demic standards will be faced with declining enroll-ments and financial difficulties. Thus, there is pressureamong the faculty and administration to ease up onacademic standards to allow students to pass andgraduate, despite the obviously failing quality of aca-demic work. This, coupled with the perceived ease ofgraduation from Japanese universities, is also a chal-lenge for the Japanese educational system and soci-ety in the future.

150

Bullying

One of the worst problems facing the Japanese edu-cational system—and the families that must be involvedwith it—is ijime. While it is nothing new, ijime appearsto be on the rise over the past decade or so. I cannothelp but think that problems such as this are increas-ing at least in part because of the overemphasis oneducation; the pressures that teachers, parents, andsociety put on students regarding study and grades;and the lack of moral and social behavior training infamilies today. Japanese culture is unique not so muchin the fact that it is changing but because these changeshave occurred with incredible speed and with a dras-tic change in moral values among many of the Japa-nese youth.

Data compiled by the Japanese government10

shows unequivocally the steady increase in bullyingin the schools today. See the data on juvenile arrestsfor matters related to bullying from 1991 to 1995 (Fig-ure 4.2).11 These data do not reflect everyday bullyingproblems that do not lead to arrests, such as theoftentimes verbal, and sometimes physical, abuse ofstudents by students.

In some instances, cases of physical abuse directlyrelated to bullying have led to severe consequences.In some clubs, for example, I know of several instancesof abuse by sempai (senior member) to kohai (juniormember) that have led to death. Such extreme degreesof abuse seem to be more frequent nowadays, and I

Chapter Four 151

interpret such disturbing trends as due to a deteriora-tion of moral values among youth today in Japan.

Dropouts

Another major problem in relation to the educationalsystem concerns the widespread occurrence of drop-outs. Currently, many students are dropping out ofschool, and this trend has been on the rise over thepast decade. As can be seen in the data compiled bythe Japanese government and represented in Table 4.2,this trend is evident in junior high and elementaryschool.

Many observers comment that there are multiplereasons for this large increase in dropouts, includinganxiety, emotional disturbance, juvenile delinquency,a desire to have fun, or apathy. I interpret these dataas being directly related to the changing Japaneseculture and the emergence of cultural dualities. In ad-

0

30

60

90

120

150

0

100

200

300

400

500

19951994199319921991

95105

90

160

Num

ber o

f Cas

es

Num

ber o

f Peo

ple

103

Figure 4.2Number of Juvenile Arrests forBullying and Related Matters12

152

dition many observers suggest that students nowa-days cannot adjust well to school life, which leads toproblems such as dropping out of school or ijime. Inother words, families are not adequately preparingtheir children for adjustment to life outside the homeenvironment. When they enter school, these childrenencounter a system that is based on the previous, col-lectivistic Japanese culture. That is, the educationalsystem itself—including its administrative structure;teaching methodologies; teacher attitudes, values, andbeliefs; student-teacher ratios; the physical layout ofclassrooms; and so on—are all manifestations andproducts of a certain cultural period, correspondingto previous, stereotypic notions of Japanese cultureand society that are not congruent with society today.As such, when students enter school, they are con-fronted with a major cultural clash. Because manychildren and youth do not yet have the emotional or

Table 4.2Dropout Rates for Elementary,Junior High, and High Schools

Year Elementary School Junior High High School1991 12,645 54,172 112,9331992 13,710 58,421 101,1941993 14,769 60,039 94,0651994 15,786 61,663 96,4011995 16,569 65,022 98,1791996 19,498 74,853 111,9891997 20,765 84,701 111,4911998 26,017 101,675 111,3721999 26,047 104,180 Not available

Chapter Four 153

psychological skills to weather such conflict and donot receive guidance in how to resolve them, they ei-ther drop out or find other ways to cope with theirstress, including bullying and juvenile delinquency.

Juvenile Delinquency

The changing Japanese culture has also brought aboutincreases in juvenile delinquency, which in turn is as-sociated with minor and major crimes and the use ofdrugs. While not directly related to education per se, Iinclude this discussion here because I believe that thesedata reflect, in part, problems within the educationalsystem brought about by cultural dualities.

As can be seen in Figure 4.3, juvenile arrests forcriminal delinquency span a range of activities, the mostcommon of which involve some kind of larceny or theft.

Figure 4.3Juvenile Arrests13

Larceny 81,060 (64.2%)

Others 4,036 (3.2%)Others 28,449 (22.5%)

Assault and Murder (1%)

DisorderlyConduct15,449

(12.2%)

Shoplifting32,176

(25.5%)

MotorcycleTheft

19,770(15.7%)

BicycleTheft

14,227(11.3%)

Others14,887(11.8%)

Embezzlement24,413(19.3%)

Total Number126,249

154

When broken down by age, an interesting pictureemerges (Figure 4.4). The ages during which the great-est number of criminal delinquency activities are oc-curring is between 15 and 16 years of age. This corre-sponds to the age range at which students move fromjunior high to high school in Japan.

Figure 4.4Juvenile Arrests by Age14

As we have discussed, I believe these data reflect,in part, student attempts to cope with the stressbrought about by emerging cultural dualities. The cul-tural clashes between the old (some may say archaic)educational system and contemporary societal andcultural values, and the resulting lack of moral guid-ance among the youth, stress the system and bringabout some of the consequences we are witness totoday.

14 Years Old23,377(18.5%)

15 Years Old30,072(23.8%)

16 Years Old30,310(24.0%)

17 Years Old19,765(15.7%)

18 Years Old13,431(10.6%)

19 Years Old9,294(7.4%)

Number of Criminal

Delinquency126,249

Chapter Four 155

Family Attitudes

A friend of mine told me once about her experienceswith a Japanese parent-teacher association (PTA) at aschool in Japan. The PTA members were upset be-cause their children/students were exhibiting and ex-periencing more and more problems in school, in-cluding some of the problems we have discussed here.Yet their basic approach was, essentially, to look tothe schools to provide moral education for their stu-dents.

While I do agree that education should be dis-pensed in a manner that brings about morally appro-priate behaviors as outcomes, I am not at all sure thatschools should be the primary moral socializationagents for children or that parents should look toschools to do that for them. It is akin to what is hap-pening in many areas of the United States, where par-ents look to schools to protect their children from vio-lence or to instill the value of studying and obtainingan education in the first place. In my experience, it isvery difficult for schools, or any other system outsideof the family, to have such an impact on their mem-bers if the families do not hold the same values andgoals and become the primary enculturation agents.For families, whether Japanese or American, to lookto schools to instill such basic values in their studentsis a misplaced attribution of responsibility.

This attributional style on the part of parents andfamilies is due, in part, to the changing cultural rubricof Japan. The attribution of responsibility described

156

here is a tendency that is exhibited in other individu-alistic cultures; thus many of today’s parents exhibitsuch tendencies, as do their children. In addition, manyparents still appreciate the value of an education onlyto the extent that their children do well on tests, as wediscussed in chapter 3, and depreciate the moral andcharacter development of their children in the pro-cess.

Individualized Attention and Its Implications forEducational Reform

There are other consequences of social and culturalchanges that are not as dramatic as ijime and juveniledelinquency. For example, increasing individualityamong students and families has brought about anincreasing awareness and perceived need for individu-alized attention and instruction. Accordingly, one ofthe goals of the Japanese government’s educationalreform plan15 is to lower the student-teacher ratio to20:1. Such a trend is entirely counter to the prevailingJapanese educational practice of large student-facultyratios and group-oriented teaching methods that arewell documented in international studies of educa-tion and educational psychology. If such trends con-tinue, they will in time force educational practices,pedagogy, methodology, and even curriculum tochange.

The current and previous Japanese educationalsystems have been excellent at producing students

Chapter Four 157

who can excel in academic material requiring rotememorization. Yet it has not done well at fosteringother thinking skills, such as creativity or critical think-ing. Many Japanese youth today, with their essentiallyindividualistic natures, have a need to be creative andto think critically. Thus they are frustrated with theJapanese system that discourages these skills in favorof rote memorization of facts. This is yet another ex-ample of the cultural clash that the youth of Japan areexperiencing today and that will undoubtedly lead tocurriculum reform. Such changes in curricula, more-over, will in turn lead to changes in teacher training,methodologies, and basic aspects of the Japanese edu-cational system in the future.

Summary

There are many other differences in student and fam-ily behaviors associated with the changing Japaneseculture. The interaction between these evolving cul-tural characteristics and the overemphasis on educa-tion, on the one hand, and the underemphasis onmoral and social development on the other, promiseto provide obstacles to the Japanese educational sys-tem for years to come. To a large extent, these issuesare similar to those being faced in many countries andsocieties of the world. The real issue concerns the de-gree to which the Japanese can treat these obstaclesas challenges, thus turning them to their favor.

158

SportsIn any culture sports serves as a stage from whichcultural values, and important changes in cultural val-ues, can easily be witnessed. Sports in all of its facetsis value laden, and we can observe those values inathlete training and competition, team and individualactivities on and off the field of play, and in society’sreactions and attitudes toward sports and athletes. Starathletes play a central role in illuminating social val-ues; they set the stage for appropriate and inappro-priate behavior, values, attitudes, beliefs, and opinions,all of which are communicated via mass media to therest of society. Because youth attempt to emulate starathletes, the athletic world plays a major part in mold-ing culture as well as modeling it. For these reasons,and as an example of more generalized social change,I examine here how Japanese cultural changes haveoccurred as witnessed through sports.

Competition and the Olympic Ideals

Competition is at the heart of any sport, whether it beteam or individual, against others, or against a clock.In English the etymology of the word competition ac-tually stems from a Latin word meaning “to seek” and“to rise together.” That is, the original meaning of com-petition suggests that competitors come to the play-ing field not only to see who is better but also to risetogether, to complement each other in improvingthemselves. Self-improvement through competition

Chapter Four 159

should occur not only in athletic skills but also, or moreimportantly, in interpersonal skills. In other words,competition is supposed to bring out the best in all ofus as people; it should teach us respect for each other,humility in our own limitations, cooperation with team-mates, and hard work—many of the values that wecan strive for in the other aspects of our lives.

It was with this intent that Baron Pierre deCoubertin of France restarted the modern OlympicGames. His goal was to use the Olympics as a methodfor bringing countries together, for however short aperiod of time, and to use sports to put differencesaside, to learn about each other, and to improve theworld. In this way, the modern Olympic movementwas founded with the pinnacle of sporting ideals inmind.

Nowadays I cannot help but think sometimes thatwe have wandered far from this meaning of competi-tion. This is true, of course, in the United States, theacknowledged home of professional sports in theworld. Unfortunately, sports in the U.S. has quicklyeroded from a complementary system of moral edu-cation through physical activity to a world governedby cash and by win-lose thinking. Nowhere is this moreclearly evident than in professional sports. This sad-dens me, because it seems that those athletes whoare truly at the top of their respective sports and thusserve as role models for all youth should be the onesto model the values, attitudes, and behaviors repre-sented in the original meaning of competition: con-

160

sideration for others, respect, humility, discipline, andself-restraint. The highest-level athletes should be thebest representatives of the virtue of a country or cul-ture. They should be the model citizens of their soci-ety. They should, through rising and coming togetherthrough competition, be universal symbols of a betterworld.

Instead, the professional sports arena seems tobe characterized by selfishness, greed, rudeness, andarrogance, especially in the United States. Witness theviolent behavior that some basketball players exhibitto their coaches, and yet they are allowed to continueto play basketball at a considerable salary. Witnessboxers who bite their opponents, who are convictedof heinous crimes, and who nevertheless remain starsin the public’s eye. Witness baseball players who canmake comments in the press that many interpret asracial slurs and yet be treated as heroes by many oth-ers. And those professional athletes who do espousethe moral virtues as originally expounded in the Olym-pic movement are portrayed by the press as anoma-lies, not typical role models.

Celebrity sports has real-life social consequences.For instance, many of our youth are learning that theydon’t have to study in school, that getting a good edu-cation is not important, but being good at sports is.Sports has become an end in itself rather than a meansto a higher end. Students learn that winning is every-thing, and that as long as they win, they can do any-thing they want, say anything they want, and be any-

Chapter Four 161

thing they want. The youth are learning that they don’thave to be in school in the first place, or that it is merelya temporary place to develop their athletic skills untilthey can make it into the professional ranks later on.If they can hone their basketball or football or base-ball skills, they may have a chance to play in the prosand be set financially for life.

But alas, for every one person who makes it to theprofessional level, there are thousands and thousandswho do not. In this reverse way, the glorification ofsports and athletes may be part of the problem, notpart of the solution.

Sports and the Japanese

My experiences with Japanese athletes and sportgroups in the past led me to believe that the Japanesecompetitor was a person of high moral standards, asymbol of what was best about the people of his orher country. I believed this person had strong moralconvictions, engaged in fair play, and believed his orher opponent to be worthy of the highest respect.Competition was marked by valor and dignity. Rulesof engagement encouraged these unspoken laws ofmorality, and athletes followed a certain protocol, winor lose. While there was certainly individual and grouppride, there was also respect for others and for thecompetition itself. Winning was certainly important,and I do not suggest that it shouldn’t be importanttoday as well, but winning and losing were not theonly things that mattered. When athletes won, they

162

showed restraint and respect for the feelings of theiropponents. When they lost, they showed humility andacceptance. There was valor not only in victory, butalso in defeat.16 The Japanese were great warriors, notonly in the sense of competition and results, but alsoin terms of the way they carried themselves as citizensof their country and of the world. Like many people, Irespected these great warriors as well as their phi-losophy and way of life.

As Japanese culture changes, however, so doesJapanese sports. Watching Japanese athletes nowa-days, I don’t feel the respect for them that I did in thepast. Sure, some athletes model the athlete of the past.But for every time I see a Japanese athlete who carrieshim- or herself with great dignity, I see many otherswho do not. This is true in professional sports and inamateur sports in Japan.

Judo

The sport I know best, judo, is itself rife with such so-cial change.17 Even though judo is a vestige of moraltraining derived from budo (systems of moral and in-tellectual education), these virtues and values of thepast do not seem to be carried on in training and com-petition. Japanese judo, at least the way it seems tome, has bought into the commercialism of interna-tional sports, and in large part judo athletes perceivetheir sport solely in terms of winning and losing (i.e.,not as an art with the main goal of developing char-acter). Traditional judo, which included moral and in-

Chapter Four 163

tellectual education, has lost its meaning because theJapanese have come to see winning in competition asthe only viable option that determines or defines theirself-worth and that of the Japanese people. Winningis more important than being a role model for theyouth of Japan or honoring the image and valor ofthe country through sport.

For example, I often witness international judomatches and practices around the world. At the high-est level of competition, it is very difficult to tell thedifference between the skill levels of athletes. If yougo to any average judo dojo anywhere in the world,however, and compare it with any average judo dojoin Japan, you would be shocked to see that non-Japa-nese who practice judo display the behaviors, values,and practices of moral discipline and manners thatare associated with traditional judo, but the Japaneseoften do not. Many Japanese judo instructors whovisit other countries to teach judo similarly observethat although skill and ability levels are generally higherin Japan, the values, ethics, and moral teachings as-sociated with judo are often better preserved in othercountries. In fact, this is one of the reasons why judois so popular in other countries—because it is not seensolely as a sport.

One possible reason for this trend may be thatjudo teachers are not instilling traditional values in theirstudents. Or, I wonder, perhaps this trend is simply aproduct of those among the youth generation in Ja-pan who are actually competing. Recently, my col-

164

leagues and I completed an interesting study on thevalues of judo coaches and teachers in the UnitedStates, Poland, and Japan (Matsumoto, Takeuchi, andHoriyama 2001). These coaches and instructors com-pleted three lengthy values surveys. One of them mea-sured six different scales: individuality, achievement,patriotism, honor, justice, and spiritual balance. Whenwe examined the differences among the countries onthese six scales, we were surprised to find that Ameri-cans and Poles had significantly higher scores thanthe Japanese on patriotism, honor, justice, and spiri-tual balance. The Japanese, however, had higher scoreson achievement and individuality (Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5Values Differences among Judo Coaches

-1.5

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

Achiev

emen

t

Indiv

iduali

ty

Spirit

ual B

alanc

e

Justi

ce

Honor

Patri

otism

United States

Poland

Japan

.03

-.33-.47

.23

-.1

-1.02

.46

.92

-.12

.6

1.1

-.62

-.08

-1.07

.35

-.51

-1.23

.64

Chapter Four 165

These data are simply amazing to me, and theyindicate that, even in a sport that has its roots in Japa-nese budo, the primary emphasis of judo coaches inJapan is on individuality and achievement. It seems tome that judo in the other countries has retained muchmore of its original meaning than it has in Japan.18

In another study conducted by my colleagues andme (Takeuchi, Wakayama, Okada, and Matsumoto,2001), we administered the Intercultural AdjustmentPotential Scale (ICAPS) to 570 Japanese university stu-dents of judo in Japan. The ICAPS is a scale that mea-sures the ability of an individual to adjust to life in adifferent culture. In doing so, it measures four basicpsychological skills that are considered necessary forsuccessful adjustment—emotion regulation, openness,flexibility, and autonomy. The reason we chose thistest to administer to Japanese students of judo is thatthese psychological skills are precisely those that aresupposedly improved in the character developmentaspects of the art of judo. Despite these assumptions,however, the data indicated that those involved in judohad significantly lower overall scores than those whowere not, and drastically lower scores on emotionregulation. This latter finding is especially crucial tothis discussion, because emotion regulation is a keycomponent of self-discipline, one of the outcomes thatis supposed to develop through the practice of judo.19

My observations of an event that happened at andafter the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney are also aneye-opener. Many sporting fans around the world

166

know of the famous judo match between two nationalfavorites—David Douillet of France and ShinichiShinohara of Japan.20 During this match, there was acontroversial action that looked as if either opponentcould score. In fact, if called in Douillet’s favor, the scorewould have been minor; if it had been Shinohara’sscore, however, it would have been an ippon, which isthe equivalent of a knockout in boxing, and wouldhave ended the match. The outcome of the three ref-erees’ judgments was a score for Douillet. The matchthus continued. Douillet actually gained other pointsduring the remainder of the match, but Shinohara didnot, and Douillet eventually won the match and thegold medal.

This match resulted in an uproar from the Japa-nese judo contingent and the Japanese public. TheJapanese coaching staff protested the outcome of thecall and the match, and the Japanese media went ber-serk in portraying the “unfairness” of the match andthe “problem” with the referees.21

What happened after this match was over, how-ever, is the point of this story. That evening the e-mailboxes of the International Judo Federation and ofmany of its members and officers were flooded bymessages, mainly from Japan, protesting this call.While that in itself is not surprising, what was surpris-ing was the tenor and manner in which these mes-sages were delivered. Quite frankly, there were hun-dreds of vicious, personal attacks against the organi-zation and specific individuals. The slanderous and

Chapter Four 167

outrageous personal attacks were carried on formonths. By far, the bulk of this mail came from Japan.

The referee who officiated the controversial matchreceived the brunt of these attacks. In addition to per-sonal attacks on his character, he also received manydeath threats, and in one case actually received a dollthat was cut in half and mailed to his house. The dollwas mailed from Japan. He eventually had to vacatehis home for several weeks because the Japanese presshad found out where he lived and had camped out-side his house.

Who won or lost is really not the point in this story.What saddens me is the way so many Japanese de-cided to carry on a personal vendetta against othersbecause of the loss and because of the manner inwhich judo leaders in Japan permitted it to happen.The manner in which this entire episode unfolded was,to me, evidence of the lack of moral virtue and valuesthat characterized Japan in the past. Being saddenedat the outcome, outraged at the perceived unfairnessof a referee call, or frustrated with the loss are all ac-ceptable and understandable. Death threats, however,cross the line between acceptable and not. It is, as wehave been discussing throughout this book, evidenceof the changing nature of Japanese culture.

Summary

I am sure that these trends witnessed in judo are notlimited to that sport alone but are true in many othersin Japan; they reflect the great social and cultural evo-

168

lution of the time, and are not endemic to any singlesport. As sports has become very commercialized, itis difficult not to think of sports solely in terms of win-ning and losing. On television, for example, we areconstantly witness to many sports champions beforeand after competition. But how often are athletes askedto appear on television because of their moral valuesand their overall worth as people and role models,even if they have lost their matches? Not very often.As I discussed above, these trends have major impli-cations for society and for the training and prepara-tion of our youth for the future. Of course, not all judoinstructors are like those I’ve described above, and notall coaches, instructors, mentors, and athletes in manyother sports are like them, either.22 Yet, these trendsdo describe a large segment of Japan’s dynamicallychanging population.

Changing Japanese Culture andEveryday Life

As I have discussed throughout this book, traditionalJapanese culture has been the marvel of social scien-tists for decades. Values such as perseverance, respect,loyalty, politeness, frugality, modesty, and the like werethe hallmarks of a society that was, and in many waysstill is, considered the jewel of civilization. Interper-sonal relationships were warm, friendly, and cordial;the family was the strongest unit of society, and therelationship between parent and child was the model

Chapter Four 169

held for many other relationships.Yet values such as perseverance are eroding in daily

life. People are becoming increasingly impulsive,quicker to lose control of their emotions. The inabilityto control one’s feelings and impulses has had majorconsequences for society, as in the problem with ijimein the schools. The data presented above concerningICAPS scores of Japanese students of judo also speaksto the inability to control one’s emotions among thisgroup of individuals.

Frugality is being replaced by excessiveness. Ex-travagance, luxury, and convenience are landmarks ofthis new lifestyle. In particular, the values of material-ism and commercialism, as well as the increasing needfor uniqueness that is associated with individualism,are major contributors to the current trend towardextravagance. In fact, many studies in social and cross-cultural psychology have demonstrated an empiricalrelationship between the value of individualism on thecountry level and materialism and commercialism.Why? Capitalist countries with free-market economies,such as Japan and the United States, tend to foster allthree of these values. When considered in this man-ner, the opening of Japan with the Meiji Restorationalong with the effects of the occupation after WorldWar II (especially education reform) have had impor-tant cultural consequences to Japan that perhaps couldnot have been foreseen at those times.

One of the hallmarks of traditional Japan was po-liteness. In fact, much of Japanese culture and society

170

could be understood in terms of institutionalized po-liteness, as reflected in its many rituals. New Year’sgreeting cards, ochuugen and oseibo gift exchanges,forms of greetings (aisatsu), bowing, and many otheraspects of everyday Japanese life are all forms of in-stitutionalized politeness. They form much of the struc-ture of everyday life in Japan.

Many of these forms of politeness, however, havebeen forgotten or are being ignored by contempo-rary Japanese. I seriously doubt that people are beingintentionally rude; rather, I see the decline in such val-ues and rituals as an inevitable consequence of thetypes of changes that have been occurring in Japa-nese culture. In particular, I think that the increasingamount of rudeness that we are witness to in our ev-eryday lives—on the trains, in public, and so forth—also reflects the great deal of stress that many Japa-nese people feel, not only from their normal, every-day activities, but because of the great social and cul-tural confusion in which they have to live.23 That is,the cultural changes that we have been discussing,which have essentially led to a cultural duality withina single society, have also produced tension and stressthat is felt and acted out by the individuals who liveand function within such an environment.

Changes in Japanese culture have also broughtwith them changes in the nature and meaning offriendship. Traditional collectivistic values meant thatone had only a few really good friends but had deep,long-lasting emotional ties to those few friends. In-

Chapter Four 171

creasing individualism, however, also seems to bringwith it larger friendship circles but less intense emo-tional ties to those friends. If some friendships are cut,others easily replace them. These differences in inter-personal relationships can be witnessed in individu-alistic and collectivistic societies everywhere (see, forexample, Triandis et al. [1988] for more on this topic).

In the San Francisco Bay area, there are many Japa-nese sojourners and immigrants, especially interna-tional students. I know of some cases where youngmen and women actually form relationships as loversalmost on the basis of convenience in finding a room-mate. That is, they agree to become lovers as well asroommates so that they can save on housing costs.When one of them has to go back to Japan, they thenbreak up the relationship. This is a pretty extreme ver-sion of relationship formed by convenience and canonly occur, to my mind, within a prevailing individual-istic value system with a different sense of morality,precisely as we have been discussing.

The nature of family relations has also fundamen-tally and profoundly changed, especially in terms ofparent-child relationships. In my experience, many Japa-nese youth are growing up today lacking respect fortheir parents and taking clear advantage of them. Theymay see their mothers as glorified maids and may eventreat them as such. Fathers don’t fare much better;many Japanese youth today disrespect or even resenttheir fathers, who in many cases were absent much ofthe time when their children were growing up. Thus,

172

children are raised with less basic respect for parentsand other family members, and this ultimately spillsover into their relationships with all others as adults.

One must keep in mind, though, that this is a two-way street. Children may learn to disrespect their par-ents and take advantage of them because mothers andfathers alike are not considering carefully the long-term implications of their child-rearing practices.

Not all families are like this, of course. Many finefamilies in Japan model and teach their children solidvalues. What I mention here, however, is a growingtrend within Japanese society that should be of con-cern to many. I believe that this trend is a major con-tributing factor to changes in the psychology of Japa-nese employees and students, as discussed earlier.

Technology, such as the Walkman, cellular phone,Internet, e-mail, and laptop computers, has contrib-uted greatly to changing Japanese culture and willcontinue to do so in ways that we cannot imaginenow. What we do know is that these devices, whiledesigned for convenience, have created psychologi-cal space between people and have meaningful impli-cations for interpersonal relationships in Japanesesociety. I have traveled to over forty countries, and thefascination with and total reliance (of the Japanese)on the cellular phone is second to none. Such trendscannot occur without social and cultural conse-quences.

To be sure, some of the changes in Japanese soci-ety due to the evolution of cultural duality can be con-

Chapter Four 173

sidered good. For example, increasing Japanese indi-vidualism is associated with increases in volunteerism.These types of activities are typically found in indi-vidualistic cultures, most likely because all people aresaid to be equal, and as such, we should do what wecan to help each other, even perfect strangers. Thus,the increase in volunteerism and concerns about so-cial and individual welfare are in my opinion a directconsequence of increasing Japanese individualism.

Another such example is the increasing focus oncare for the elderly, which has become an importantissue in Japan because of the large elderly popula-tion. Related to this focus is the increasing awarenessof the importance of social welfare programs. Manycolleges and universities are now geared toward pro-viding education in some aspect of social welfare, andthe fact that many students are enrolled in such pro-grams alludes to social trends that I believe are theproduct of an increasing vision of individualism inJapan.

Another positive consequence of the emergingfocus on individualism and individuality is the in-creased attention given to such social problems asbullying and sexual harassment. In the past these andother social problems were simply ignored and toler-ated as part of the “system.” With the increasing focuson individual self-worth, such social problems arebeing tolerated less and less. Bullies are being pur-sued and reprimanded, and new systems are increas-

174

ingly being put in place to deal with sexual harass-ment in universities and businesses around the coun-try. While awareness is still a far cry from that of theUnited States (which may be at its own extreme in thisregard), Japan has progressed in these areas consid-erably when compared with even a decade ago.

A final example of a positive consequence ofJapan’s emerging individualism is the increased at-tention given to individuals with mental health prob-lems such as depression, anxiety disorders, or othersocial or psychological disorders. In the past theseindividuals were generally treated as misfits, lockedaway at home, and basically kept away from the day-light of society. Or they struggled to hide their prob-lems from society when possible. Nowadays, how-ever, there are increased efforts to help these individu-als, especially from a psychological viewpoint. Theseefforts are evident in the increasing number of psy-chological and counseling clinics in Japan as well asdegree programs offered by Japanese universities.

In this chapter I have tried to describe how manyof the changes in actual behaviors, interpersonal rela-tionships, and real-life experiences in Japan are di-rectly or indirectly related to the changing Japaneseculture and emerging cultural dualities. Taken collec-tively, they paint a rather different picture of the ho-mogeneous, self-effacing, collectivistic Japanese cul-ture and society than is continually portrayed in themedia and by scholars and the lay public alike. Quite

Chapter Four 175

frankly, much (not all) of Japanese culture is simplydifferent from what we have been led to believe—orwant to believe.

Textnotes1 Even the tendency to use last names first in self-identifica-

tion can be considered a manifestation of this tendency, asit gives primary emphasis to the group to which one be-longs (in the case of names, the group is the family).

2 In fact, in the past, workers who moved from one com-pany to another were often stigmatized as unreliable oruntrustworthy.

3 Of course, I am not saying that all such efforts by leadersand managers in corporate Japan today are viewed as suchintrusions. What I am saying, however, is that there is agrowing sense of such feelings, and they are likely to growas Japanese culture continues to change and evolve.

4 This does not mean that it is nonexistent. I am suggestingthat it is less important today than in the past, especiallyamong younger Japanese workers.

5 That is not to say that leaders of the past did not havesimilar such characteristics. I think there were many suchcorporate leaders, including Sony’s Akio Morita, for in-stance. I cite this article here because it is apropos of thetime and period.

6 One may also say that independent thought was punished—“Deru kugi ha utareru” (The nail that stands up will bepounded down).

7 The quality of Japan’s education in math and science wasonce again confirmed by the results of the 1999 Third In-ternational Mathematics and Science Study. For more de-tails, see www.timss.org.

176

8 Of course, part of the boredom problem is the languagebarrier, as many don’t have the language skills to fully un-derstand what is going on in class.

9 I must say, though, that I do not teach full-time at theseuniversities. Instead, I typically teach in intensive coursesthat are essentially electives; thus, there may be a self-se-lection process occurring in the classes I teach and in thestudents to whom I am exposed.

10 http://jin.or.jp/insight11 I do not have more current data, but I cannot help but

think that the trend is similar to that depicted here.12 http://jin.or.jp/insight13 Ibid.14 Ibid.15 http://www. mext.go.jp16 One of the most famous individuals in Japanese judo, for

example, is Akio Kaminaga. Although he lost the gold medalmatch in judo in the 1964 Tokyo Olympics to AntonGeesink, the way he lost and the way he carried himselfthroughout the event and after has made him a legend theworld over.

17 I have done judo for thirty-four years, and am a sixth-de-gree black belt. I have been a former medalist in nationalcompetition in the United States and have been a coach-ing staff member to many international competitions, in-cluding two Olympics and three world championships.

18 Differences in national pride between the present and thepast in Japan are evident in many Japanese immigrants tothe United States. When I speak with some of the olderimmigrants who live in the U.S., they often tell me that de-spite the fact that they may have been just average youthsin Japan, when they moved to the States they tried hard tosucceed in life and “do the right thing” simply “because they

Chapter Four 177

were Japanese.” They didn’t want others to think badly ofall Japanese because of their own shortcomings. That is,they wanted to uphold their nationalistic pride during theirsojourn. Younger Japanese immigrants and sojourners tothe States, however, have relatively less national pride. Theirmotivations to excel are often more personal and individu-alistic. Thus, the data for Japanese judo coaches presentedabove are commensurate with social changes as a whole.

19 These outcomes were never studied systematically beforein Japanese students of judo because of the lack of psy-chometrically sound measures of these key psychologicalconcepts. The availability of the ICAPS, however, which wasvalidated with Japanese samples, makes these types ofstudies possible.

20 The immense popularity of the sport of judo and of thismatch in particular can be noted by the fact that, in France,there were more television viewers watching this matchalone than watching the opening ceremonies of the Olym-pic Games. A similar sizable viewer share occurred in Ja-pan as well.

21 These actions on the part of the Japanese media were aidedby a rather one-sided commentary by a member of theJapanese national coaching staff.

22 For example, take Midori Ito’s performance at the 1992Winter Olympics. Before her last performance, she was toldit was impossible for her to get a gold medal. If she skatedto a conservative routine, she would easily get a bronzemedal. If she skated to a rigorous and more challengingroutine, she might get a silver medal. Yet, if she went forthe silver but performed poorly, she might not get anymedal at all. Nevertheless, she opted to skate her heart outin a difficult routine. That challenge, pride, and determina-tion captured the hearts of many and helped to raise heron a pedestal, despite the fact that she did not get the goldthat day.

178

23 Not to mention the great pressures felt by the people dur-ing uncertain economic times, as when this book was be-ing written.

179

5

Visions of a New Japanin the Future

Change is inevitable in all societies, and many of thechanges we are witness to today in contemporary Ja-pan, for good or bad, are natural and inevitable. Theyare somewhat akin to similar changes that are occur-ring, or have occurred, in many other countries andcultures around the world. The changes that are oc-curring in Japan are unique, however, because theyare not simply reflective of the minor changes inlifestyles typically associated with technologicalprogress and modernization in many other societies.Instead, they reflect a major evolution in underlyingassumptions, attitudes, beliefs, and value systems—thatis, changes in culture. The emerging cultural dualitiesthat we have discussed throughout this book involvenewfound heterogeneity, individuality, and dissatisfac-tion with traditional ways. These changes challengethe essence of Japan in many different ways.

180

How well is Japan coping with this upheaval? Thedata I have presented here suggest that Japan as asociety and the Japanese as individuals are strugglingto find ways to channel their emerging cultural dual-ity into positive outcomes. Thus, there is a lot of roomfor growth and potential.

One of the reasons the Japanese are struggling isbecause they, and most students of Japan for thatmatter, have been slow to recognize that the changesthat are occurring are cultural and as such, have notbeen dealt with head-on. The changes have been slowand silent, beneath conscious awareness, creeping upon Japan until it seems as if everyone woke up oneday to a different Japan.

In this final chapter, I offer some visions of a newand different Japan, one that does not throw out theprevious, traditional Japan, but instead, one that cel-ebrates the Japan of old within a contemporary andmore modern cultural and social framework. As hu-mans, we are uniquely equipped to think about ourlives, chart new courses and directions, and take anactive role in not only reacting to change, but alsopredicting and even directing change for the better. Ioffer this chapter with the assumption that there is abetter society not only to which the Japanese canevolve but also one that they can be active partici-pants in molding.

Chapter Five 181

The Cultural Challenge forCorporate Japan

Even though Japan has been busy battling with eco-nomic problems for some time and attempting to dealwith changing cultural values and attitudes on the partof its workers, even larger challenges lie ahead in thenext ten or twenty years because of the cultural dual-ity within the labor force today. One group, generallythe older (i.e., over forty years of age), holds more orless to the traditional Japanese values of patience, per-severance, hard work, loyalty to the company, and thelike. The second, younger group has a different set ofvalues: merit, individual ability, achievement, and per-formance. They are also more willing to change jobsand companies to suit their needs.

The challenge to corporate Japan, because of theexistence of these two groups, comes largely in theform of labor management and human resourcespractices. Issues concerning hiring, retention, promo-tion, evaluation, wages, and even termination are basedon a system of rules that are created within a particu-lar cultural framework of fairness. Now comes the dif-ficult part: perceptions of fairness and justice can be,and usually are, very culture-specific.

With essentially two separate cultural groups nowmaking up the labor force, however, one of the majorchallenges is that what is considered fair for one groupis not necessarily fair for the other. Thus, while pro-motion and wage increases based on seniority may

182

be perceived as fair by the older, traditional Japanese,it will not be perceived that way by the younger, moreindividualistic and merit-driven employees. When suchhuman resources systems are perceived as unfair, feel-ings of loyalty, commitment, and trust decline, whichis what we are observing today.

Many of the feelings and reactions I have observedamong the Japanese labor force in relation to chang-ing personnel systems, especially in terms of the de-cline in lifetime employment and the institution ofmerit-based performance, remind me of what hap-pened during the days of glasnost and perestroika inthe former Soviet Union. These changes, broughtabout essentially for sociopolitical and economic rea-sons, were also fueled by a changing youth culturethat questioned the traditional ways of Marx. Manyof the older generation, however, lamented Russia’sconversion from a socialist to a capitalist society. Theywere very worried about their futures. As many toldme, communism and socialism may not have beenthe best political and economic systems in the world,but at least there was stability; they knew where theywere and where they would be in the future, and theycould count on stability in their homes and lives. But,with the introduction of glasnost and perestroika, theirfutures were shaky, society was turned upside down,and the younger and older generations were at oddswith each other. While the social changes in Russiamay have been perceived as essentially good by manyoutsiders, to those middle-aged and older individuals

Chapter Five 183

who had given their lives to the system and who hadtrusted the system to take care of them in their lateryears, the changing society and culture brought onlyworry and apprehension.1

The problem that faces corporate Japan today ishow to create a system of personnel/labor manage-ment that can be perceived simultaneously as fair toboth cultural groups that form its workforce. Whilesuch a goal may seem unlikely to many, the approachto this issue need not be a mutually exclusive di-chotomy. There are many ways for corporate Japanto react to the country’s evolving culture and to createnew systems of labor management, ones that essen-tially incorporate multiple cultural value systems todevelop a collectively fair system of hiring, promo-tion, and termination. Such a view may require thecreation of individualized systems of hiring, retention,pay, and promotion that are commensurate with mul-tiple cultural expectations of fairness.

What makes dealing with these issues particularlydifficult is the existence of the stressful and tense en-vironment in which individuals and employees mustfunction effectively. Thus, not only is there stress placedon the employees because of the necessity to be pro-ductive and competitive within a global or domesticmarket economy; there is the additional stress placedon individual employees by the dual cultural systemwithin which they must operate. This undoubtedlymakes corporate life in Japan especially difficult dur-ing these trying times and creates an extra burden for

184

corporations and top-level executives in designingways to effectively deal with these challenges.

One key to Japan’s future prosperity is not neces-sarily how it deals with the cultural needs it has rightnow; rather, it is whether Japanese companies cancreate a system of organizational culture and climatethat is flexible enough to flow with the continuing evo-lution of Japanese culture over the next several de-cades. That is, instead of merely reacting to the cur-rent situation, corporate Japan must begin to con-sider how it can proactively influence cultural changesin the future. Some of these changes will involve thetransition from the traditional total quality manage-ment systems that Japan has become famous for towhat is known as learning and world-class organiza-tions in organizational and business literature. Japa-nese companies need to move from essentially a pas-sive role in social change to an active one in guidingand easing this and other transitions.

The Japanese corporate world must begin to rec-ognize the enormous role it plays as an agent forchange in shaping Japanese culture. Corporations are,after all, the end point of the major goal of education.In a broad sense, therefore, many of the skills empha-sized by the educational system are dictated by cor-porate Japan’s requirements for effective operation. Ifcorporate Japan chooses to recruit, hire, and retainindividuals with certain sets of skills, then the educa-tional system will necessarily react accordingly. In thisfashion, corporate Japan, as a proactive agent, will

Chapter Five 185

effect social and cultural change.2

What I mentioned earlier bears repeating: the la-bor force may essentially represent a cultural dualityright now, but in twenty to thirty years, the individualsconstituting the younger generations now will havebecome the older generation, and a new young gen-eration will take its place. In other words in onegeneration’s time, corporate Japan will be looking atan entirely different type of individual to become themainstay of the labor force. It is at this crucial point intime, then, that the Japanese business sector has thechance to influence that future generation; the oppor-tunity won’t be available later.

Where to begin? Although I may not have the an-swers, I do know where corporate Japan can start tosearch for solutions. Fairness and justice, for instance,are well-studied topics in social psychology, not onlywithin the United States but across many countriesand cultures. The information from that body of knowl-edge needs to be brought to the attention ofbusinesspersons in corporate Japan who can reviewand evaluate existing human resources practices anddesign creative new policies and practices for thepresent and for the future. At the same time, researchon organizational culture and companies as changeagents of society needs to be brought to bear. Othersources of necessary information may also exist. Theright mix of people with the appropriate informationneeds to be assembled for creative brainstormingabout solutions that are specific to the Japanese. In-

186

formed decisions, not guesses or best approximations,are the key.

The Cultural Challenge for the JapaneseEducational System

Although there is no doubt in my mind that Japan’seducational system has met well the needs of societyto produce citizens of the recent past, we know fromour discussion in chapter 4 that today’s and tomorrow’sneeds require creative change within the educationalsector. In this section of the chapter, I develop four ar-eas of consideration that are directly related to Japan’sevolving need for changes within the educational sys-tem.

First, English training must shift from an emphasison reading and writing to conversation. Most Japa-nese students learn some English during their juniorhigh and high school years, and while most can readand write English, they cannot speak it very well. Lim-ited oral English skills mean limited conversationalskills. Given that conversational English is clearly thelanguage of the next century, if the Japanese are to bewell prepared to contribute to world affairs, they mustbe able to communicate well with others who speakEnglish.3

Second, the Japanese educational system needsto examine how well it is training its students in inter-national and intercultural adaptability. In the UnitedStates, living effectively in a multicultural environment

Chapter Five 187

is a major topic in education, from elementary schoolthrough university. This emphasis on multiculturaleducation is no doubt a reflection of the growing rec-ognition of the diversity of the world in which we liveand of the importance of gaining some basic skills inorder to function effectively within that diversity. InJapan, however, most intercultural training is simplylanguage training, and more specifically, English lan-guage training. But research has demonstrated con-vincingly that language skills alone are not sufficientto ensure intercultural sensitivity. What is necessary isthe development of a core set of psychological skillsthat enable us to live flexibly and effectively in a dy-namic, multicultural environment (for more informa-tion, see Matsumoto [1999b]). Language training with-out accompanying cultural competence training canamount to nothing more than equipping speakers tooffend others faster, a current problem among manyJapanese who speak English without cultural aware-ness.

In fact, in the book cited above, I report researchusing the ICAPS (described in chapter 4) in largesamples of American and Japanese university students.As I explained there, the ICAPS assesses the four keypsychological skills I believe are important to functioneffectively in a multicultural environment—emotionregulation, openness, flexibility, and autonomy. Ourstudies have indicated quite convincingly that Japa-nese university students have considerably lowerICAPS scores than do American students.4 Thus, while

188

it is apparent that the Japanese educational systemmay produce students who undoubtedly have supe-rior math and science abilities, such skills may begained at the sacrifice of the interpersonal and inter-cultural skills that are necessary for life in the newmillennium. This finding may also explain why Japa-nese society is having such a difficult time dealing withemerging cultural dualities—because its individuals arenot psychologically prepared to handle the stress in-herent in an environment of diversity. If this is the case,it suggests that the Japanese educational system re-examine its priorities and, as described above, con-sider the improvement of such intercultural skills aspart of its educational curricula. The development ofthese skills will undoubtedly aid in the developmentof other values that are important in our increasinglypluralistic world, such as tolerance for diversity, re-spect for others, conflict resolution skills, and the like.

Third, the Japanese educational system needs toreexamine its emphasis on rote memorization and thelearning of facts. In my experience the typical Japa-nese student excels at learning facts and figures andat performing other academic tasks that essentially re-quire patience, perseverance, and effort. What manyJapanese students lack is the ability to think aboutproblems creatively, critically, and autonomously.5 Thesingle-minded focus on entrance examinations, whichby their very nature are tests of memory, has essen-tially brought about a culture of “memory robots” whoexcel at memorizing information, but who have diffi-

Chapter Five 189

culty in thinking creatively about the world aroundthem. They are good (perhaps some of the best in theworld) at memorizing all the facts about anything,through the sheer amount of time and effort placedon the memorization process.

In my experience these memory robots are notsolely a consequence of the educational system; itseems that the response of many Japanese individu-als in leadership positions to calls for improvement orchange is simply to do more of the same thing theyhave been doing for years. The response of many teach-ers, then, is to require students to learn more by study-ing more and memorizing more, thus producingmemory robots.6 The response of many sportscoaches to the challenge of domestic and internationalcompetition is similar—to require athletes to trainlonger and harder doing generally the same thingsthey have been doing. In addition the response ofmany managers in corporate Japan is also to havetheir employees produce more by working longer andharder at performing essentially the same tasks in thesame manner as they have been doing. Thus, the ro-bots I refer to here do not exist solely because of theeducational system but because such behavior is en-couraged in many arenas of life.

Years and years of this reinforcement can essen-tially stifle creativity, which is a major problem facingJapan today.7 This is a serious limitation, because as aresult many Japanese students cannot get outside their“cultural box” to think about the world in new ways.

190

Creativity and critical thinking are essential ingredi-ents to being successful, competitive, and effective citi-zens of tomorrow’s world.

Finally, Japanese teacher training institutions needto add to their curriculum the study of theory andmethodology that teachers can use to develop in theirstudents some of the skills and values that I have beendiscussing, and that are important to living in thetwenty-first century. In many classrooms in Japan to-day, for example, teachers still practice the passivelearning approach, where students all sit facing theteacher, who lectures uninterrupted for an entire classperiod. One particular corollary of this approach isthe dominance and omnipotence that is associatedwith the role of the teacher. I know of many instanceswhere teachers get quite upset when students merelyraise their hands to ask questions or, heaven forbid,challenge what the teacher may be saying. Such teach-ing methods inevitably lead to a stifling of creativityand independent, critical thinking. The physical layoutof the learning environment is also designed to meetthe needs of yesterday’s Japan, not today’s—and es-pecially not tomorrow’s.

The Cultural Challenge forJapanese Sports

In this section, while I direct my comments to the sportI know best, judo, I cannot help but think that much ofwhat I discuss here should be applicable to other

Chapter Five 191

sports and cultural activities as well. All sports, espe-cially those considered in the physical education cur-ricula of schools, colleges, and universities, most likelyneed to deal with the issues described below in someway, shape, or form.8

The emergence of cultural dualities in Japan hasessentially created a dichotomy in Japanese judo. Onthe one hand judo is a sport. This is the view of theyounger generations, who generally see judo in lightof the Olympic Games and other high-level competi-tions, and of many coaches. In this view of judo, likeany other sport, the goal of practice is to win at com-petition. One’s worth as an athlete, coach, or adminis-trator is determined in large part by the success ofone’s team in competition.

On the other hand, many others, especially theolder generations, see judo as a martial art, a way oflife, a method for teaching moral values and virtues toyoung people and for developing responsible citizens.Competition is not considered to be necessary or im-portant, and neither is winning. What is important ischaracter development.

There is a major rift between these two groups, asI would imagine there is in many types of cultural orsporting activities in Japan. The mass media have bla-tantly promoted the win-lose perspective. Among allOlympic sports, judo garners more medals for Japanthan any other category, and the media swarm aroundthe athletes, bringing an incredible amount of public-ity, public relations attention, and many other benefits

192

to the judo organization. Winning medals also hasimportant economic ramifications behind the scenes,as funds from the Japanese Olympic Committee (JOC)are granted to the All Japan Judo Federation in largepart based on medals won. The more medals, the moremoney. (This is, in fact, not unique to Japan.) Moremoney means greater resources for training that willensure future success. This cycle results in an almostexclusive focus on training to win, at the sacrifice ofpersonal character development and the attainmentof moral virtues. Enormous pressure is brought to bearon the coaches, then the athletes, not only by the or-ganization but by society as well.9

The rift is widened still further because of thesociopolitical nature of sports administration. Inevita-bly, because of the emphasis on winning medals incompetition, individuals who harbor similar goals andvalues (i.e., of winning) are drawn to administrativeinvolvement. Those are the people who are elected orappointed to important positions in sports adminis-tration. Others who feel and think differently either donot have the power to say anything or are left outsidethe system entirely. Those who “rock the boat,” that is,expound values or a philosophy that may be contraryto the prevalent competitive views, may be cast aside,isolated, and/or discriminated against in many ways.

These differing philosophies about the nature, role,function, and goals of judo are at least partially rootedin the cultural duality that exists in Japan today. Viewsof judo as primarily a sport, with its emphasis on indi-

Chapter Five 193

vidual achievement, are rooted in the growing senseof individuality and autonomy that has infiltrated main-stream Japanese youth culture and originally got itsstart during the American occupation following WorldWar II. It makes sense, in fact, that in order to aspire tothe highest levels of sports competition, such as theWorld Championships or Olympic Games, one mustnecessarily be individualistic and selfish in one’s fo-cus, because such achievements require tremendousamounts of self-determination and motivation. Viewsof judo primarily as a system of intellectual, moral, orphysical education are rooted in the culture that char-acterized previous, stereotypic notions of Japan.

The challenge for the Japanese judo world of thefuture, therefore, is to bring these two groups ofpeople—or more importantly, these two different phi-losophies—together so that they may exist simulta-neously and complement each other. How can this bedone? First of all, one would have to start with thevision that individual achievement at the highest lev-els need not require the sacrifice of the developmentof moral values and virtues. The degree to which sucha vision can be shared by athletes, coaches, adminis-trators, the media, and the general public will enablethese groups to come together to redefine the mean-ing of sports, competition, and training in the originalspirit of the Olympic movement.

Second, at least in the case of judo, an organiza-tional structure within Japan (and elsewhere) that al-lows for the dual monitoring and administration of

194

both philosophies is already in place: the JOC. Withinthis body are national federations of the various sports.In Japan, for example, judo is represented by the AllJapan Judo Federation. It is only natural and proper,therefore, for all sports-related matters of judo com-petition in Japan to be regulated by the All Japan JudoFederation. In Japan, however, there is yet anotherorganization—the Kodokan—which, as the founder ofjudo in the world, is considered the “mecca” of judo. Itcould well serve as the moral light of judo in Japan,and in the entire world, creating and administeringprograms of moral, intellectual, and physical educa-tion all over the world. This program, then, couldcomplement the activities of the bodies that regulatesport judo.

These potential developments depend on the abil-ity of leaders in judo in Japan to recognize the majorproblems and challenges facing the discipline and toenvision solutions to these problems. Society as awhole also plays a major role in promoting the imageof athletes. We all like winners, and we have honoredand glorified champions in many different ways. I amnot saying that we necessarily downplay this attitude,but I am suggesting that we open our minds to a largerdefinition of winning. Winning in a sports competi-tion can be a glorious achievement and should right-fully be praised. Yet winning at life and being a citizenof strong character is also a glorious achievement thatdeserves its fair share of recognition.

Chapter Five 195

Transforming Japanese Culturein the Future

One of the challenges that lies ahead for Japan re-garding its emerging individualism is how to channeland transform it in such a manner as to lead to lessstressful, more productive, and happier lives. The in-creasing individualism and other changes in Japaneseculture are not themselves problematic; they are natu-ral and inevitable reactions to changes in the environ-ment within which we live, brought about by technol-ogy, affluence, changing demographics, and the like.These cultural adjustments are Japan’s reaction to itschanging world and, as such, should be guided, notsuppressed.

Let’s first pause to consider the nature of Japan’sindividualism. Many people believe that it is an at-tempt to become more American. That is, becauseAmericans are stereotypically considered to be indi-vidualistic, I think that many Japanese believe they areadopting American individualism. Many people, in fact,attribute Japan’s growing individualism directly to theUnited States.

Such a view is not entirely incorrect, especially whenone considers that many of the educational, business,political, and structural reforms of Japan after the warwere instituted by Americans, most notably by Gen-eral Douglas MacArthur. In many senses, therefore,the social and cultural changes we are witnessing to-day may in fact be a direct consequence of the re-

196

forms that MacArthur instituted in postwar Japan,especially those in education.

Quite frankly, though, Japanese individuality can-not be American individualism.10 It makes no moresense to transplant American individualistic values andcustoms to Japan and expect them to grow in a simi-lar manner than it does to borrow Japanese manage-ment practices at Toyota and simply apply them toAmerican auto manufacturers. Replanting one culturalsystem in other cultural soil doesn’t work. Cultural traitswork in their original culture precisely because of thelarger environmental context in which they exist. Thatis, American individualism works in the United Statesbecause of the country’s geography, resources, lan-guages, history, and a host of other factors. Transfer-ring such values to the Japanese context will not cre-ate another America. Instead, what results is a uniqueform of Japanese individualism that is clearly perceivedas antithetical to the mainstream culture.

Japanese individuality is clearly not American in-dividualism. What we have in Japan is almost a rejec-tion of traditional Japanese values, which is mislabeledindividualism or “the American way” by many in Ja-pan. Japanese individuality is unique; it is a seeminglydichotomous reaction to traditional Japanese collec-tivism, individuality that exists within a greater collec-tivistic society.

How can this unique form of individualism bechanneled into positive outcomes? I believe the futureof Japan partially rests on its ability to create an in-

Chapter Five 197

dividualistic collectivism that represents a rapproche-ment of two opposing cultural dimensions, a culturethat enjoys and celebrates individuality and diversityand at the same time recognizes the pursuit of groupand collective goals. It would be a culture that recoversand celebrates the cultural values and perspectives thathave made Japan unique for centuries, but that alsofinds new ways of reframing and expressing them.11

And what might this individualistic collectivism looklike? It is a cultural rubric that has at its core the basiccollectivist values and virtues that Japan has come tobe known for across the centuries: perseverance, loy-alty, commitment, dedication, harmony, self-discipline,and the like. Add to these Japan’s emphasis oningroups, social stratification, and hierarchies, and wehave the bedrock of traditional Japanese culture uponwhich aspects of individualism can be added.

Contemporary and future Japan may come to seethe myriad ways in which these values may be ex-pressed with an overlay of individualistic traits thatoperate at the level of the person. An example mayhelp here. Certain actions, for instance, the bow, be-came synonymous with particular values (e.g., respect);the lack of such actions symbolized the nonexistenceof that value. In the future, individualized collectivismmay mean that the core Japanese values may be ex-pressed not in one, but in two, three, a hundred, or athousand ways, depending on the individual. That is,individuals may develop their own unique ways ofholding and expressing these core values. Thus, what

198

may become institutionalized or ritualized is not nec-essarily the age-old actions that have traditionally ex-pressed a core value, but tolerance and reinforcementof unique ways in which individuals can express them.

Individualized collectivism is a concept that sug-gests that a society can celebrate cultural diversity inthought or action (individuality) while maintaining corevalues related to the importance of group and hierar-chy (collectivism). I do believe it is important for Japanto maintain its basic core values, those that have cometo represent the essence of Japanese culture. There isno reason to “throw out the (so-called) baby with thebath water,” nor should people fear that traditionalaspects of Japanese society will be lost. Instead, Ja-pan needs to find ways in which its basic essence canbe celebrated in different and unique ways by itspeople. Achieving such a goal will require coordina-tion, in a sense, among parents, educational systemsand agents, corporate Japan, the political infrastruc-ture, and the like. Yet, it can be achieved.

Challenges for the FutureTechnological advances promise to continue to influ-ence culture and society for years to come. We havelearned to graft cartilage in a damaged knee. Medicalscientists have reproduced brain cells in monkeys. Wecan keep people physically alive today longer than everbefore. We can grow test-tube babies. We have im-planted artificial hearts. One day we may be able to

Chapter Five 199

prolong life beyond our wildest dreams, and even bringabout death in a quick and painless manner.

As technology advances, however, complex ques-tions about morality and ethics that we have nevereven dreamed of arise, along with new moral dilem-mas and challenges that we will need to face. Futuretechnological developments in weapons and commu-nications technologies will also bring their own moraland ethical dilemmas. Friendships, work and status re-lationships, and family ties will all be different. Peoplewill have new ways of thinking about themselves, theirloved ones, and their futures. With such great changesoccurring, how can everyday life not be fundamen-tally influenced by technology?

I believe that many Japanese individuals recog-nize that many challenges will face them in the future.Because of this growing awareness of the need for areexamination of social and cultural values, many Japa-nese are refocusing their energies on new and betteroutcomes, challenging their previous beliefs and theirown stereotypes of the world.

In any capitalistic society, it is a truism that moneyis supposed to be able to buy happiness (althoughone may not readily admit it). And to a certain degree,people believe this to be true. In all of the opinionpolls conducted by the government and by privateagencies, for example, life satisfaction is always highlycorrelated with family income. That is, the more moneyavailable, the happier a person is in general. In thesesame surveys, job satisfaction is also always positively

200

correlated with income. That is, as your pay increases,so does your satisfaction with your job.

Of course, these associations are never perfect,which is why I believe that money can buy a certainamount of happiness, but not all.12 In fact, many Japa-nese individuals are beginning to reexamine the roleof materialism in terms of what is really important intheir lives. In a survey by Asahi Shimbun (1998, 11March), for example, comparing responses from 1985with those from 1998, a substantially smaller percent-age of individuals believed that almost anything en-joyable can be obtained with money (Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1Can You Get Almost Anything Enjoyable with Money?

These figures tell me that Japan may be on the re-bound from the decadence of materialism that may havecharacterized it prior to 1985. Just as many scholarsbelieve the United States is experiencing a turnaroundin its social and cultural values, becoming more con-

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

OtherNoYes

60

4037

59

3 1

1985

1998

Chapter Five 201

servative and rebounding from a few decades of mate-rialistic decadence, Japan appears to be doing the same.

In fact, more recent polls13 indicate that the num-ber of people who believe that more attention shouldbe paid to the welfare of the nation and of society,instead of focusing on personal fulfillment, is on therise (see Figure 5.2 in the Appendix).

Another sign of positive change is that Japan’s Min-istry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Tech-nology has unveiled its “Educational Reform Plan forthe Twenty-first Century,” which calls for education re-form and the revitalization of schools, families, and com-munities.14 These reforms center around seven coregoals:1. Improve students’ basic scholastic proficiency in

easy-to-understand classes2. Encourage youth to become open and warm-

hearted adults through participating in commu-nity services and various programs

3. Change learning environments to those that areenjoyable and free of worries

4. Make schools that parents and communities cantrust

5. Train teachers as real professionals of education6. Promote the establishment of universities that meet

international standards7. Establish an educational philosophy suitable for

the new century and improve the provision foreducationIt is no coincidence that the Ministry of Education’s

202

reform plan touches on many of the issues we havediscussed in this book, particularly those earlier in thischapter on the cultural challenges for the educationalsystem. Nurturing youth into becoming “open” and“warmhearted” citizens speaks to many of the issuesconcerning values and moral virtues we have dis-cussed, as does internationalizing and modernizingeducation. Of course, the future will be the judge as towhether such reform plans are merely lip service ormeaningful plans of action with significant conse-quences.15 The fact that such reform is discussed andimplemented is at least a step in the right direction.

These data and the growing voice of many con-cerned Japanese citizens whom I meet professionallythrough my research and teaching or personally inmy travels suggest that in fact Japan may well be onthe road toward self-evaluation of its social and cul-tural values and toward redirecting them to a collec-tively more functional and effective set of beliefs andbehaviors than exists today.

As Japan looks to the future, all agents of soci-ety—parents, families, teachers, and co-workers as wellas institutions, organizations, companies, and the like—will need to come together to develop an outlook forthe future that holds true to those values, attitudes,beliefs, and behaviors that define us not only as es-sentially Japanese but also as essentially human. Weshould define those values and not have them de-fined for us by technology, money, changing demo-graphic situations, or our own apathy or ignorance. I

Chapter Five 203

am not one to tell any individual, let alone a nation,what those values should be. They become, I believe,self-evident as long as we engage in the process ofactively and deliberately thinking about and choosingthem for ourselves and teaching them to our children.If we don’t take such a proactive role, we run the riskof losing our human essence—what makes us funda-mentally and profoundly different from all other ani-mals. If we have the courage to choose our moral val-ues and actively teach them to our children, then wewill be able to live more enlightened lives. Japan, itseems to me, is at the brink of once again leading theworld in teaching the rest of us what it means to behuman, through navigating the challenges posed byits newfound heterogeneity and dualistic cultural iden-tity. Effectively dealing with its emerging cultural dual-ism in what was once a more homogeneous,unicultural society, may be Japan’s biggest challenge,and contribution to its legacy, for generations to come.

Textnotes1 Japan’s situation is not totally akin to Russia’s, in that Ja-

pan has much of the corporate infrastructure and resources,including capital and cultural resources, with which to ad-dress its needs and challenges. Thus, while Russia contin-ues to struggle today economically, Japan has the poten-tial to fare much better in dealing with the cultural changesbecause of its economic position.

2 Of course, it is not easy to achieve these goals. Witness thedifficulties many Japanese companies have had in adapt-ing to new styles of thought and action after they merged

204

with European or American companies, such as Nissan andRenault.

3 Some people may suggest that I am an ethnocentric Ameri-can who doesn’t see a similar need for the United States,and who believes that the world should accommodate toAmericans’ convenience. I do not believe that; I also be-lieve that it is important for Americans, who are perhapsthe most monolingual, monocultural people of the world,to gain language (and more importantly, cultural) compe-tence in a language other than English.

4 Some critics may suggest that it is only natural that Ameri-cans score higher on this test than do the Japanese be-cause an American created the test. But remember that thetest was originally developed by and validated on Japa-nese samples, not American.

5 This is also related to their lower ICAPS scores describedabove, which are likely a product of the overemphasis onrote memorization.

6 The fact of the matter is that the current elementary andjunior high school situation has changed so much thatteachers often can’t control what goes on in class.

7 The problem is exacerbated because, as I have suggestedelsewhere, I believe that contemporary Japanese youth wantto be creative because of their newfound individuality.

8 In fact I am absolutely convinced that the issues should bethe same, because the original intent of sporting activitiesas part of physical education was to complement intellec-tual education in the classroom by providing moral andphysical lessons outside the class. It seems to me that manysports, not only judo, in the physical education curricula inschools have lost this original objective.

9 I do not underestimate the effects of the American occu-pation of Japan after World War II on this view of judo.After the war, judo was initially banned by the occupation

Chapter Five 205

forces, only to be resurrected a few years later, but only asa sport, not as a martial art. Thus, the almost exclusive fo-cus of judo as a sport can be seen as having its roots dur-ing the American occupation. Judo’s emergence in theOlympics in 1964 continued to foster this view thereafter.

10 To me, American individualism, revolving around self-reli-ance and freedom, symbolizes four key concepts: equality,choice, personal responsibility, and commitment. Equalityis a cornerstone value that ensures that people treat oth-ers with kindness, consideration, and sincerity, in the hopethat others will treat them in the same fashion. Individualchoice means that people have the ability to choose whatpath in life is right for them, their friends, their families,their careers, their dreams, and their goals. Taking respon-sibility means that individuals accept the obligations andduties that are associated with the choices they make intheir lives, whether good or bad, right or wrong, and thatonce choices are made, individuals assume the personalresponsibility to put out the effort that is required to maketheir choices come true. Finally, American individualismincludes a good deal of commitment to home, church, andcommunity, for which they have held much respect. Tradi-tional Americans have been devoted and committed to theirhomes and families, to their religious and spiritual lives,and to the communities in which they have lived. They haveworked together, played together, and genuinely cared forthe people in those three groups. American individualism,therefore, is not a rejection of all others; instead, it is asymbol of a balance of individual uniqueness and collec-tivistic concerns.

11 You may notice the deliberate use of individuality in thecontext of Japan and individualism in reference to theUnited States. These terms are not identical. Edward Stewartand Milton Bennett make a distinction between the twoterms (1991). My understanding of the difference concerns

206

the unit of analysis. Individuality refers to the fact that indi-viduals within any society or culture may have strong orunique personal characteristics that make them stand outwithin their social context. Certainly, individuality can oc-cur within any sociocultural context, whether individualis-tic, collectivistic, or otherwise. Individualism, however, re-fers to a system that exists on the social and cultural levels,that is certainly witnessed in individuals but clearly existsin other strata of society as well (e.g., family, business prac-tices and procedures, government, laws, etc.). In text, I referto the creation of an individualistic collectivism as a socialsystem, which is broader than Stewart and Bennett’s con-cept of individuality but not as encompassing as individu-alism.

12 Also consider the data on national income and life satis-faction presented in chapter 1.

13 See, for example, the 1999 Opinion Survey on Social Con-sciousness from the public relations office of the primeminister, 1-6-1 Nagata Cho, Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo, 100–8914.

14 see www.mext.go.jp15 These new goals of educational reform have been an-

nounced. The issue now is to implement reform. But changewill not be easy, especially because the real power in theeducational system is in the hands of the “old boy” net-work. To the advantage of this group, the law often pro-hibits its members’ removal from positions of power, mak-ing educational reform difficult and slow.

207

0

14

28

42

56

70

No Opinion

Not Hopeful

at All

Not Very Hopeful

Fairly Hopeful

Very Hopeful

7

1519

59

43

129

1

21

13

Japan

Finland

Figure 1.2Attitudes of Japanese and Finnish Youth

toward the Future (page 23 of text)

Appendix

208

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

JapaneseKoreansAmericans (Seattle)

Americans (Delaware)

43.1

42.3

46.2

43.6

Figure 2.2Collectivism Study† (page 41 of text)

32

34

36

38

40

42

Collectivistic Values IndexCollectivism Scale

41.7 41.340.5

36.4

Americans

Japanese

Figure 2.1Collectivism Data* (page 41 of text)

* from Carter and Dinnel 1997† from Yamaguchi et al. 1995

Appendix 209

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

JapaneseAmericansRussiansKoreans

4.39 4.41

4.10

3.41

Figure 2.3Collectivism Scores toward Families in Four Countries

(page 42 of text)

Figure 2.4Collectivism Scores toward Strangers in

Four Countries (page 44 of text)

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

JapaneseAmericansRussiansKoreans

2.3

2.8

2.0

2.6

210

0

20

40

60

80

OtherAbility and Achievement

Age and Seniority

18

70

12

Figure 2.13Determiners of Salary and Position in Japan

(page 71 of text)

4.2

4.4

4.6

4.8

InterdependentIndependent

4.8 4.8

4.6

4.4

United States

Japan

Figure 2.9U.S.-Japan Differences in Self-Concept‡

(page 52 of text)

‡ from Kleinknecht et al. 1997

Appendix 211

0

200

400

600

800

Women

Men

Total

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

Figure 2.16Number of People Wishing to Change Jobs

(page 77 of text)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Women

Men

1990 1995 1996 1997 1998

Figure 2.17Number of Part-Time Workers (page 77 of text)

212

0

20

40

60

80

100

55–5950–5445–4940–4435–3930–3425–2920–24

Women

Men

Figure 4.1Does Sexual Discrimination Exist in Japan?

(page 143 of text)

0

20

40

60

80

100

50–5940–4930–3920–29

87.6 89.5 89.5 85.2

Figure 3.2Percentage Who Believe Youth Lack Morals and

Social Skills (page 110 of text)

Appendix 213

0

20

40

60

More Fulfilled Personal Life

National and Social Development

Don't Know

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

Figure 5.2Where Should More Attention Be Paid?

(page 201 of text)

215

References

Arikawa, Hiroko, and Donald I. Templer. 1998. “Compari-son of Japanese and American College Studentson Collectivism and Social Context of DecisionMaking.” Psychological Reports 83, 577–78.

Barry, Herbert. 1980. “Description and Uses of the Hu-man Relations Area Files.” In Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology. Vol. 2: Methodology, editedby Harry C. Triandis. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Befu, Harumi. 1986. “The Social and Cultural Backgroundof Child Development in Japan and the UnitedStates.” In Child Development and Education inJapan, edited by Harold Stevenson, HiroshiAzuma, and Kenji Hakuta, 13–27. New York: W.H. Freeman.

Benedict, Ruth. 1946. The Chrysanthemum and the Sword:Patterns of Japanese Culture. New York: HoughtonMifflin and Company.

Berry, John, W. H. Poortinga, Marshall H. Segall, and PierreR. Dasen. 1992. Cross-Cultural Psychology: Re-

216

search and Applications. New York: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Carter, Kim, and Dale Dinnel. 1997. “Conceptualizationof Self-Esteem in Collectivistic and Individualis-tic Cultures.” Paper presented at the Western Psy-chological Association.

Diener, Ed, and Shigehiro Oishi. 2000. “Money and Hap-piness: Income and Subjective Well-Being acrossNations.” In Culture and Subjective Well-Being,edited by Ed Diener and Shigehiro Oishi, 185–218. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Dinnel, Dale. 2001. “Culture and Self: A Reconceptualiza-tion of the Role of Individualism and Collectiv-ism.” Paper presented at a conference in Bath,NSW, Australia.

Doi, Takeo. 1973. The Anatomy of Dependence. Tokyo:Kodansha International.

Dore, Ronald. 1958. City Life in Japan: A Study of a TokyoWard. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Earley, P. Christopher. 1989. “Social Loafing and Collec-tivism: A Comparison of the United States andthe People’s Republic of China.” AdministrativeScience Quarterly 34, 565–81.

Ekman, Paul. 1972. “Universal and Cultural Differences inFacial Expression of Emotion.” In Nebraska Sym-posium on Motivation, 1971, edited by J. R. Cole,207–83. Lincoln: Nebraska University Press.

Ekman, Paul, and Wallace Friesen. 1969. “The Repertoireof Nonverbal Behavior: Categories, Origins, Us-age, and Coding.” Semiotica 1, 49–98.

References 217

Friesen, Wallace V. 1972. “Cultural Differences in FacialExpressions in a Social Situation: An Experimen-tal Test of the Concept of Display Rules.” Dis-sertation, University of California, San Francisco.

Gabrenya, William K., Y. Wang, and B. Latane. 1985. “So-cial Loafing on an Optimizing Task: Cross-Cul-tural Differences among Chinese and Americans.”Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 16, 223–42.

Gudykunst, William B., G. Gao, K. L. Schmidt, and T.Nishida. 1992. “The Influence of Individualism-Collectivism, Self-Monitoring, and Predicted-Outcome Value on Communication in Ingroupand Outgroup Relationships.” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 23, 196–213.

Hall, John. 1968. Japan: From Prehistory to Modern Times.New York: Dell Publishing.

Hall, John, and Marius Jansen. 1968. Studies in the Insti-tutional History of Early Modern Japan. Princeton:Princeton University Press.

Hearn, Lafcadio. 1894. Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan.Reprint, Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1976.

Hofstede, Geert H. 1984. Culture’s Consequences: Inter-national Differences in Work-Related Values,abridged ed. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

———. 1980. Culture’s Consequences: International Dif-ferences in Work-Related Values. Beverly Hills:Sage Publications.

Ishihara, Shintaro. 1989. The Japan that Can Say No. NewYork: Simon and Schuster.

218

Japan Times. 2001. “Perverse Individualist Embraces Op-portunity Where Others See Gloom.” 11 March,1.

Kashima, Yoshihisa, Susumu Yamaguchi, Uichol Kim, andS. C. Choi. 1995. “Culture, Gender, and Self: A Per-spective from Individualism-Collectivism Re-search.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-ogy 69, 925–37.

Kim, Min-Sun, J. E. Hunter, A. Miyahara, A. M. Horvath,M. Bresnahan, and H. J. Yoon. 1996. “Individualversus Culture-Level Dimensions of Individual-ism and Collectivism: Effects on Preferred Con-versation Styles.” Communication Monographs63, 29–49.

Kleinknecht, Ronald A., Dale Dinnel, Erica E. Kleinknecht,Natsuki Hiruma, and N. Harada. 1997. “CulturalFactors in Social Anxiety: A Comparison of So-cial Phobia Symptoms and Taijin Kyofusho.” Jour-nal of Anxiety Disorders 11, 157–77.

Kroeber, Alfred Lairs, and Clyde Kluckhohn. 1952. Cul-ture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions.Cambridge, MA: Peabody Museum.

Latane, B. 1981. “The Psychology of Social Impact.” Ameri-can Psychologist 36, 343–56.

Latane, Bibb, K. Williams, and S. Harkins. 1979. “ManyHands Make Light the Work: The Causes andConsequences of Social Loafing.” Journal of Per-sonality and Social Psychology 37, 322–32.

Lee, Minjoo. 1995. “Differences between Americans, Ko-

References 219

reans and Korean Americans on Individualismand Collectivism.” Thesis, San Francisco State Uni-versity.

Markus, Hazel R., and Shinobu Kitayama. 1991. “Cultureand the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emo-tion, and Motivation.” Psychological Review 98,no. 2, 224–53.

Matsumoto, David. 1999a. “Culture and Self: An Empiri-cal Assessment of Markus and Kitayama’s Theoryof Independent and Interdependent Self-Construals.” Asian Journal of Social Psychology2, 289–310.

———. 1999b. Nihonjin no kokusai tekiouryoku. Tokyo:Honno Tomosha.

———. 1990. “Cultural Similarities and Differences in Dis-play Rules.” Motivation and Emotion 14, no. 3,195–214.

Matsumoto, David, Theodora Consolacion, HiroshiYamada, Ryuta Suzuki, Brenda Franklin, SunitaPaul, Rebecca Ray, and Hideko Uchida. In press.“American-Japanese Cultural Differences in Judg-ments of Emotional Expressions of Different In-tensities. Cognition and Emotion.

Matsumoto, David, Hokao Takeuchi, and Kenji Horiyama.2001. “Cultural Differences in the Values of JudoInstructors.” Budagaku Kenkyu 34, no. 1, 1–10.

Matsumoto, David, Fazilet Kasri, and Kristie Kooken. 1999.“American-Japanese Cultural Differences in Judg-ments of Expression Intensity and Subjective Ex-perience. Cognition and Emotion 13, 201–18.

220

Matsumoto, David, Fazilet Kasri, Erin Milligan, Usha Singh,and Jenny The. 1997a. “Lay Conceptions of Cul-ture: Do Students and Researchers UnderstandCulture in the Same Way?” Unpublished manu-script.

Matsumoto, David, Michelle Weissman, Ken Preston,Bonny Brown, and Cenita Kupperbusch. 1997b.“Context-Specific Measurement of Individualism-Collectivism on the Individual Level: The IC In-terpersonal Assessment Inventory (ICIAI).” Jour-nal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 28, 743–67.

Matsumoto, David, and Debora Fletcher. 1996. “CulturalInfluences on Disease.” Journal of Gender, Cul-ture, and Health 1, 71–82.

Matsumoto, David, Tsutomu Kudoh, and SachikoTakeuchi. 1996. “Changing Patterns of Individu-alism and Collectivism in the United States andJapan.” Culture and Psychology 2, 77–107.

Minami, Hiroshi. 1970. Psychology of the Japanese People.Honolulu: East-West Center.

Misumi, Jyuji, and M. F. Peterson. 1987. “Supervision andLeadership.” In Advances in Organizational Psy-chology: An International Review, edited by Ber-nard M. Bass, Peter J. D. Drenth, and PeterWeissenberg, 220–31. Newbury Park, CA: SagePublications.

———. 1985. The Behavioral Science of Leadership: AnInterdisciplinary Japanese Research Program. AnnArbor: University of Michigan Press.

Moeran, Brian. 1986. “Individual, Group, and Seishin:

References 221

Japan’s Internal Cultural Debate.” In JapaneseCulture and Behavior: Selected Readings, editedby Takie S. Lebra and William P. Lebra, 62–79.Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Morris, Ivan. 1975. The Nobility of Failure: Tragic Heroesin the History of Japan. New York: Holt Rinehartand Winston.

Murdock, George P., Clellan S. Ford, and Alfred E. Hudson.1971. Outline of Cultural Materials. New Haven,CT: Human Relations Area Files.

Nakane, Chie. 1997. “Japanese Culture within InternationalSociety.” In Japan as I See It, edited by NHK Over-seas Broadcasting Department, 179–93. Tokyo:Kodansha.

———. 1970. Japanese Society. Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press.

———. 1967. Tate-shakai no ningen-kankei: Tanitsu-shakai no riron. Tokyo: Kodansha.

Nitobe, Inazo. 1905. Bushido: The Soul of Japan. Reprint,Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1969.

Pelto, Pertti J. 1968. “The Differences between ‘Tight’ and‘Loose’ Societies.” Transaction, 37–40.

Reischauer, Edwin O. 1988. The Japanese Today: Changeand Continuity. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Shirakashi, Sanshiro. 1985. “Social Loafing of JapaneseStudents.” Hiroshima Forum for Psychology 10,35–40.

Stewart, Edward, and Milton J. Bennett. 1991. AmericanCultural Patterns: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, 2ded. Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press.

222

Takaki, Ronald. 1989. Strangers from a Different Shore: AHistory of Asian Americans. New York: PenguinBooks.

Takano, Yohtaro., and E. Osaka. 1999. “A Supported Com-mon View: Comparing Japan and the U.S. on In-dividualism/Collectivism.” Asian Journal of SocialPsychology 2, no. 3, 311–41.

———. 1997. “Nihonjin no shuudanshugi to Amerikajinno kojinshugi: Tsuusetsu no saikentou.” JapaneseJournal of Psychology 68, 312–27.

Takeuchi, Musayuki, Hidenaka Wakayama, Ryuji Okada,and David Matsumoto. 2001. “Intercultural Ad-justment Potential in Japanese Judo Players.” Pa-per presented at the 2001 Annual Conference ofthe Japanese Association for Physical Eduation,Sapporo, Japan.

Triandis, Harry C. 1995. New Directions in Social Psychol-ogy: Individualism and Collectivism. Boulder, CO:Westview Press.

———. 1994. Culture and Social Behavior. New York:McGraw-Hill.

Triandis, Harry C., R. Bontempo, M. J. Villareal, M. Hsai,et al. 1988. “Individualism and Collectivism: Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Self-Ingroup Relation-ships,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-ogy 54, no. 2, 323–38.

Yamagishi, Toshio. 1988a. “Exit from the Group as anIndividualistic Solution to the Free Rider Prob-lem in the United States and Japan.” Journal ofExperimental Social Psychology 24, 530–42.

References 223

———. 1988b. “The Provision of a Sanctioning Systemin the United States and Japan.” Social Psychol-ogy Quarterly 51, 265–71.

Yamaguchi, Susumu, D. M. Kuhlman, and S. Sugimori.1995. “Personality Correlates of Allocentric Ten-dencies in Individualist and Collectivistic Cultures.”Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 26, 658–72.

Yamaguchi, Susumu, Koichi Okamoto, and Takashi Oka.1985. “Effects of Coactors’ Presence: Social Loaf-ing and Social Facilitation.” Japanese Psychologi-cal Research 27, 215–22.

Yamamoto, Tsunetomo. 1979. Hagakure: The Book of theSamurai. Tokyo: Kodansha.

225

Index

Aabsentee fathers, 118–21, 171–72All Japan Judo Federation, 192, 194Asahi Shimbun (newspaper) surveys:

1996: 69, 70, 71, 77, 811997: 21, 24, 811998: 21–22, 23, 125, 200

athletes, Japanese:emerging reality of, 162traditional, 161–62

athletes, professionalas role models, 158, 159–61

BBenedict, Ruth, 7, 111“Big Bang,” 22Buddhism, 18, 42bullying:

nontolerance of, 173–74as problem in schools, 150–51and changing cultural and moral values, 127

226

bushido (way of the warrior/code of chivalry), 6, 9, 17, 18, 31n, 68,133

Bushido: The Soul of Japan (1969), 6, 111business practices, corporate Japan:

as agent for change, 184–85emerging changes in, 78–79, 132–33future challenges for, 181–86

Ccancer and heart disease, deaths due to, 26–27Carter, Kim, 40–41, 51character (personality) traits, Japanese. See values: traditionalchild-rearing practices, 113–21Chrysanthemum and the Sword, The (1946), 7, 111Chuushingura story (of the 47 ronin), 17City Life in Japan (1958), 7–8collectivism vs. individualism:

“complex” individualism, 101–02emerging reality of, 39–47, 65, 196IC duality, 101, 107, 109“simple” collectivism, 100–01stereotypes of (collectivism), 37–39“traditional” collectivism, 100, 107“traditional” individualism, 100See also individualistic collectivism, cultural pattern of

competition (in sports):contemporary reality of, 159–61, 191original meaning of, 158–61, 191

Confucius, teachings of, 18, 42, 80Constitution of Seventeen Articles, 19consumer products, technological. See technology, innovations

incontextualization:

defined, 87nillustration of, 88nSee also under display rules, cultural

core values, Japanese. See values: traditional

Index 227

corporate Japan. See business practices, corporate Japan; labormanagement practices; management styles

Coubertin, Baron Pierre de, 159crime rate increase, 26–27cultural chameleon, 88ncultural change, postwar:

and economic-growth rate increase, 104–05effects of, 128and history, 108–09and personal income, 104–05and population density, 105–07, 129nand resource availability, 105, 107speed of, 103, 109, 150technology as factor in, 172

cultural duality:emerging/contemporary (see individualistic collectivism, cul-

tural pattern of)negative effects of, 170–72positive effects of, 173–74

culture, concept of:as abstraction, 92–93, 94, 95aspects of, 129nand biology, 129ncyclical/dynamic nature of, 94–95definition of, 96–97and ethnicity/race, 92, 96–97factors affecting, 99–103individual differences within, 96, 97and nationality, 92, 96, 97

DDiener, Ed, 24–26Dinnel, Dale, 40–41, 51display rules, cultural, 60, 62, 64

contextual vs. cross-contextual, 62–64defined, 60

divorce, trend toward, 82–83

228

Doi, Takeo, 18Dore, Ronald, 7–8Douillet, David, 166

EEarley, P. Christopher, 141Economic Planning Agency. See EPA surveyseducation, challenges for future, 186–90

high quality of, 146–47overemphasis on, 75, 113–17, 119, 121, 127, 150, 157trends in, 156See also schools

Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology, Ministry of,201–02

education, problems facing:bullying, 150–51dropouts, 151–53family attitudes, 155–56juvenile delinquency, 153–54student attitudes, 147–49

educational reform, need for, 156–57in creative/critical thinking abilities, 188–90in English language skills, 186and goals of, 201in multicultural adaptability, 186–88and old-boy network, 206nin teaching methodology, 190

Ekman, Paul, 59–61elderly, care for, 173emotionality. See display rules, cultural; emotions; expressive be-

havioremotions:

perceptions of others’, 65–66social meanings of, 63–64

employee attitudes. See work

Index 229

employment, lifetime:abandonment of, 76, 133and effect on educational system, 74–75, 113–14emerging reality of, 76–79reciprocal obligations of, 74stereotypes of, 75–76

EPA surveys, 119, 1431995: 68–69, 71, 73, 77, 89n, 1101997: 821999: 21, 24, 76, 77

expressive behavior:emerging reality of, 59–67stereotypes of, 57–59

Ffamily:

attitudes toward education, 155–56role in changing moral values, 112, 113–21as socialization agent, 116–21and surnames, 175nSee also absentee fathers; child-rearing practices; kyouiku

mamasfamily relations:

emerging trends in, 42–43, 80, 171–72traditional, 42, 168–69

Finland Gallup (joint survey by, 1995), 23friendship, nature and meaning of:

emerging trends in, 171traditional, 170–71

Friesen, Wallace V., 59–61

GGabrenya, W. K., 141gender roles:

contemporary, 143traditional, 79–80

230

generation gap, 29, 36, 47, 95Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan (1894), 4–5, 57–58, 61Gudykunst, William B., 51

HHagakure: The Book of the Samurai (1710–1716), 31nHearn, Lafcadio, 4–5, 6, 8, 15, 34n, 57, 61Hofstede, Geert H., 39–40, 143

IIC duality. See individualism/collectivism dualityindividualism/collectivism: as dimensions of culture, 37, 99individualism (American), 195–96, 205nindividualism/collectivism as example of cultural variance, 98

factors affecting, 100–102in workplace, 142–44

individualism/collectivism duality (in Japan), 99–101individualism/individuality contrasted, 129n, 196, 205–206nindividualistic collectivism (in Japan), 196–98individuality (Japan), 102, 109, 196–98, 204n, 205–206nindividualized instruction, 156ingroups vs. outgroups, 38–39, 64

emerging reality of, 44–45stereotypes of, 43–44

instability. See social unrest, currentIntercultural Adjustment Potential Scale (ICAPS), 165, 169, 187International Judo Federation, 166interpersonal consciousness, defined, 54

distinguished from social context, 87–88nemerging reality of, 55–56social context as form of, 55–56stereotypes of, 54–55

Ishihara, Shintaro, 34nIto, Midori, 177n

Index 231

JJapan that Can Say No, The (1989), 34nJapanese Americans, 32n, 34n, 35, 98, 176–77nJapanese Olympic Committee (JOC), 192, 194judo, 33n

challenges for future, 193–94coaches’ and teachers’ values, 164–65, 168contemporary, 162–63, 165–67as martial art vs. sport, 162–63, 191traditional, 162–63, 167

jujitsu. See judoJung, Carl, 19juvenile delinquency, increase in, 153–54

KKaminaga, Akio, 176nKashima, Yoshihisa, 56Kim, Min-Sun, 52Kitayama, Shinobu, 48–49, 86nKleinknecht, Ronald A., 51Kodokan, 194Komazawa Women’s University (joint survey by, 1995), 23kyoiku mamas (education mamas), 75, 79, 115–17

LLatane, B., 140, 141

MMacArthur, General Douglas, 195–96management styles, 181

emerging, 137–38, 138–39traditional, 136–37, 138

Markus, Hazel R., 48–49, 86nmarriage:

emerging reality of, 80–84

232

traditional view of, 79–80, 119mass media:

as factor in changing moral values, 124and influence on sports, 158, 191stereotypes propagated in, 16–17

materialism:future role of, 199–201and individualism, 169meaning of prevalence of, 125–26, 127–28

Meiji Period (1868–1912), 12Meiji Restoration (1868), 3, 30n, 169memory robots, 188–89Microsoft Japan, 139Minami, Hiroshi, 18Misumi, Jyuji, 138Moeran, Brian, 33nmoral/social skills training, underemphasis on, 115–21, 155–56,

157moral values, changing, 91–92

as contributor to social unrest, 109factors in, 122–24as perceived in younger generations, 102, 109–10reasons for, 112–21role of family in, 113–21, 150, 152

Morita, Akio, 175nMorris, Ivan, 8motivation (at work). See productivity, workforce

NNakane, Chie, 10–13, 14–15, 29, 34n, 80, 86n, 108Naruke, Makoto, 139NHK (Nihon Housou Kyoukai) Research Institute (joint survey by,

1995), 23Nihon shoki (Chronicle of Japan, A.D. 720), 19Nitobe, Inazo, 6–7, 111Nobility of Failure, The, 8

Index 233

Ooccupation forces, American, 104, 130n, 169, 193, 195–96, 205nOishi, Shigehiro, 24–26Oka, Takashi, 140–41Okamoto, Koichi, 140–41Olympic Games, 159, 165, 176n, 177n, 191, 193, 205nOlympic ideals, 158–59

vs. contemporary ideals, 159–61Opinion Survey on Social Consciousness (1999), 206n

Pparenting. See absentee fathers; child-rearing practices; family;

family relations; kyoiku mamaspart-time employees, 77Pelto, Pertti J., 108Peterson, M. F., 138Pillow Book, The (of Sei Shonagon), 4politeness:

emerging trends in, 170traditional forms of, 170

population density, 29, 99–102, 105–07, 129nproductivity, workforce:

in collectivistic societies, 140–41emerging, 142in individualistic societies (U.S.), 140social loafing vs. social striving, 140–41

RReischauer, Edwin O., 13–14resource availability, 99–102, 105, 107, 127Rising Sun (film), 16–17rote memorization vs. creative/critical thinking, 157, 188–89Russia, 5, 182Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), 5

234

Ssalaryman:

emerging reality of, 69–74stereotypes of, 67–68

samurai in suits, 17, 68school dropouts, trend in, 151–53schools: as socialization agents, 115, 155–56self-concept, construct of, 47–48, 134self-concepts, interdependent vs. independent:

emerging reality of, 50–53stereotypes of, 48–50, 54–55

sexual discrimination, 143sexual harassment, 173–74shame culture, 7Shimabara rebellion (1638), 31nShinohara, Shinichi, 166Shintoism, 18, 42Shirakashi, Sanshiro, 140–41Shotoku, Crown Prince, 19social behaviors. See moral values, changingsocial change. See cultural change, postwarsocial etiquette. See moral/social skills training, underemphasis

onsocial loafing vs. social striving. See under productivity, workforcesocial unrest, current, 2, 20–27, 170

causes of, 28–30changing moral values as factor, 109overemphasis on education as factor, 121

sports:challenge for future, 190–94as exemplar of social change, 158, 167–68See also competition; judo

stereotypes, of Japanese, 3–9seven challenged, 35–85strictures on, 47 (generation gap), 85 (urban areas)

stress. See social unrest, currentstudent attitudes, contemporary, 147–49

Index 235

study robots, 115subjective well-being (SWB), research on, 24–26

TTakaki, Ronald, 98–99Tale of Genji (Murasaki Shikibu), 4Taoism, 42teacher, role of, 190technology, innovations in, 10, 23–24, 106, 123, 172, 198–99Third International Mathematics and Science Study (1999), 175nTokugawa Shogunate, 3, 108Tora-san, stories of, 17Triandis, Harry C., 33n, 97–98, 171

Uuniqueness, pursuit of:

and individualism, 107, 169and youth fads, 126–27

Vvalues:

contemporary/emerging, 1, 125–28, 179 (see also work: indi-vidualistic attitudes toward)

of individualistic societies, 37, 155–56, 205n (see also underwork)

traditional (stereotypic), 1–2, 3, 6–7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19–20, 38, 39, 84, 111, 168, 197 (see also work: collectivisticattitudes toward)

See also moral values, changing

Wwage system, merit-based:

adoption of, 76, 133vs. seniority, 71–73, 181–82

Wang, Y., 141

236

Warring Period (Sengoku Jidai), 31n, 108work:

changing attitudes toward, 70–74, 76–77, 78, 132, 135, 142–44

collectivistic (traditional) attitudes toward, 75–76, 133–34,135–36, 181

individualistic attitudes toward, 134–35, 136, 181worker bee stereotype, 70, 71, 74, 142workforce, cultural duality in, 181–86. See also work: changing

attitudes towardworkplace, contemporary:

creative/critical thinking in, 144interpersonal relations in, 142–43women’s position in, 143See also under work

World War II, 4, 7, 103, 134, 146, 193internment camps, Japanese American, 32n, 34npostwar rise to economic power, 9–10, 67, 104, 132

YYamagishi, Toshio, 44, 141–42Yamaguchi, Susumu, 41, 140–41Yamamoto, Tsunetomo, 31nyounger generations, 1, 23, 36, 53, 79, 163

as more individualistic, 101–02and nontraditional cultural values of, 28–29, 46–47perceived lack of moral values in, 109–10in workforce, 69, 181

youth culture. See younger generations