The Neo-Communist Regime of Present-Day China

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R E S E A R C H A R T I C L E

The Neo-Communist Regime of Present-Day China

Theodor Tudoroiu

Published online: 23 August 2011

# Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies 2011

Abstract The first goal of this article is to define the neo-communist regime as aspecific type of undemocratic post-communist construct. Three case studiesanalyzing the regimes led by Zhan Videnov in Bulgaria, Ion Iliescu in Romania,and Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Belarus are used to identify its main characteristics.The second goal is to show that the present-day Chinese regime falls into thiscategory. As such, it does not represent an intermediate or transitional phase. Thishard neo-communist regime is the final stage of the Chinese post-communist

transition. In the foreseeable future, it will most likely preserve its presentcharacteristics.

Keywords Neo-Communist Regimes . Post-Communism . China . Bulgaria .

Romania . Belarus

Introduction

From Zagreb to Hanoi, the post-communist world has experienced a great variety ofundemocratic political regimes. They have been variously labeled hybrid, semi-consolidated authoritarian, soft authoritarian, consolidated authoritarian, hardauthoritarian, ethnocratic, ultra-nationalist, and sultanistic. This is by no means acomplete list. Furthermore, some of these categories overlap. It is against thisbackground of both factual and theoretical complexity that this article tries to reachtwo goals. The first is to show that some post-communist regimes can be reasonablylabeled neo-communist as they share specific features, the same ideology, andsimilar links with the communist past. Three case studies picturing the regimes led

J OF CHIN POLIT SCI (2011) 16:407429DOI 10.1007/s11366-011-9163-1

The author is grateful to Dr. Stfanie Von Hlatky-Udvarhelyi (Centre for International Peace and SecurityStudies) and to reviewers of Journal of Chinese Political Science for their helpful suggestions.

T. Tudoroiu (*)Centre for International Peace and Security Studies, 307-3125, Boulevard des Trinitaires, Montral,Qubec H4E 2S2, Canadae-mail: [email protected]


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by Zhan Videnov in Bulgaria (199596), Ion Iliescu in Romania (199096), andAlyaksandr Lukashenka in Belarus (since 1994) are used in order to identify theessential characteristics of these neo-communist constructs. The second goal is toshow that the present-day Chinese regime falls into the same category. As such, it

does not represent an intermediate phase in the transition from totalitariancommunism to some other possible final stage. This mature, hard neo-communistregime is the very final stage of the Chinese post-communist transition. In theforeseeable future, it will most likely preserve its present characteristics.

The following section makes the theoretical portrait of a neo-communistregime. The Neo-Communist Regime of Zhan Videnov in Bulgaria (199596),The Neo-Communist Regime of Ion Iliescu in Romania (199096), TheNeo-Communist Regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Belarus present the threecase studies. China as a Neo-Communist Regimeanalyzes the neo-communist

features of the Chinese regime. The articles findings are summarized and furtherdiscussed in the final section.

Neo-Communist Regimes

This article is based on the assumption that its potential readers are politicalscientists familiar with basic notions like democracy, authoritarianism, totalitarianismor communism. To the unlikely lector unaware of the works of Hannah Arendt or

Guillermo O

Donnell, I will only offer an intuitive description of the differencebetween authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. The former is well illustrated by theblue letters of the revolving billboard suspended in 1974 around the Buenos Airesobelisk: Silence Is Health ([23]: xxvii). The Argentinean military junta was thusexpressing the ideal of any authoritarian leadership: avoiding open criticism. Thecaudillo is happy if people simply accept his rule. An example closer to the subjectof this article is provided by Richard Baum in his picture of the present day ChineseCommunist Party (CCP):

Increasingly, the Party is seen by many groups and individuals in society as

largely irrelevant in their daily livesan annoyance to be avoided wherepossible and endured when necessary (quoted by [48]: 26).

For a totalitarian regime, on the contrary, such a situation is clearly unacceptable.To give another Chinese example, the CCP was hardly just an annoyance duringthe Cultural Revolution as it controlled every detail of public (and, frequently,private) life. Totalitarian regimes are not satisfied with avoiding open criticism. Theyrequireand imposethe active support of the entire population. Millions ofstarving Cubans and North Koreans have to show unquestionable enthusiasm fortheir respective beloved leaders. Totalitarianism cannot be avoided where possible.

It is an all-encompassing system of control that regiments pupils in Soviet-typeKomsomol; youngsters in Nazi Hitler-Jugend; and helps the adults to pleasantlyspend their spare time in Mussolini-sponsored Dopo Lavoro sport facilities whileladies socialize within the Nazi Womens League. Paradoxically, totalitarian regimescan only exist in modern societies as modern technology is essential in creating theirorwellian mechanisms of indoctrination and control.

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These are well known elements. Much less research has been dedicated to the neo-communist political systems. In fact, neo-communism is a term frequently associatedwith political parties, not regimes, in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.Authoritarian regimes in these regions are seldom assessed as neo-communist because

most of them also use ultra-nationalist propaganda in order to legitimize themselvesoras in some of the Central Asian republicshave all the attributes of sultanisticregimes. Researchers have also paid little attention to neo-communism as other, moreinteresting types of regime were created in the post-communist area. They include manyhybrid regimes (for a discussion of this term, see [10]), such as Yeltsins Russia ([49]:67). Other examples are Estonia and Latvia. After independence, these two Balticstates had ethnocratic regimes, neither democratic, nor authoritarian. While localRussian minorities were clearly discriminated against, the rest of the two societieswere paradoxically democratic (Oren and Ghanem 2004). In fact, as Henry Hale

noticed, in certain cases it is difficult to speak of a trajectory toward or away fromideal-type endpoints like democracy or autocracy ([26]: 134). Many post-Soviet andBalkan states had or still have semi-authoritarian regimes,

ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy,the existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limitedsphere of civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal or evenauthoritarian traits ([45]: 3).

The growing number of such regimes attracted many researchers, determining

them to ignore the more limited domain of neo-communism. This article tries to fillthis gap by demonstrating that a part of the post-communist undemocratic regimescan be reasonably labeled neo-communist as they share specific features, the sameideology, and similar links with the communist past. The research uses three casestudies: the regime of Zhan Videnov in Bulgaria (199596), that of Ion Iliescu inRomania (199096), and the one headed by Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Belarus,since 1994. The three case studies are presented in the following sections in order toallow the subsequent comparison with the Chinese regime. At this point, I will onlyidentify the common characteristics that define neo-communist regimes.

The first and most evident element is the link between neo-communism andcommunism. Unless President Hugo Chvez of Venezuela proves otherwise, neo-communist regimes can only exist in former communist states. In 1989, ZbigniewBrzezinski described a 4-phase process of retreat from communism. Progressiveliberalization transforms communist totalitarianism in communist authoritarianismwhich is replaced by post-communist authoritarianism and, finally, by post-communist pluralism ([5]: 255). Neo-communist regimes are part of the third phase,post-communist authoritarianism. In some casessuch as Bulgaria and Romaniathis was indeed an intermediate step on the road toward democratic pluralism. ButBelarus shows that democratization is not the only possible outcome. The neo-

communist regime can turn into a stable political structure that puts an end to theliberalization process and suppresses efficiently any internal contestation. Therefore,it is difficult to generalize the hollowness and bankruptcy of all post-communistauthoritarian regimes and to identify this phase as moribund and the precursor to theeventual implosion of communist party-states and their replacement with an entirelynew phase, () post-communist pluralism ([48]: 15). Furthermore, the neo-

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communist phase is not necessarily more liberal than the previous one. In bothBulgaria and Belarus, the fall of communism had been followed by a more or lessgenuine process of democratization. The instauration of neo-communist regimes, in199495, was a clear set-back that visibly deteriorated the citizens political rights

and civil liberties (see Fig. 1; explanations are provided in The Neo-CommunistRegime of Zhan Videnov in Bulgaria (199596) and The Neo-Communist Regimeof Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Belarus). Therefore, the neo-communist regimes arenot necessarily an intermediate step in a progressive process of liberalization that leadsto democracy. Yet, it is true that they cannot exist outside Brzezinskis retreat fromcommunism. Basically, the neo-communists (who are in fact un- or slightly-reformedcommunists) try to stop and, if possible, to drive back the decay of communism. Thetiming of this reaction is essential. If it takes place early in the process, it will preservethe communist regime itself. To have a neo-communist regime, the decay of the

totalitarian system must have advanced beyond the no-return point. In 198889,Videnov and Lukashenka would have tried a communist restoration. Five years later, thiswas impossible and they had to choose the neo-communist path. This is why the neo-communism can be assessed as an effort to mirror totalitarian communism with moremodest, authoritarian means. A good description of this type of regime was made byEmil Constantinescu, Romanias president between 1996 and 2000, in an articlepublished by Le Monde on February 22, 1997:

We are not talking about classical communism but rather of a form that isboth old () and new because of its goal, which is to preserve all that can be

preserved, both in men and structures, of the old regime: as many as possibleof the large enterprises, as many monopolies as possible, especially in the areasof energy and agriculture, as many of the political and economic leaders aspossible, and as much as possible of an isolationist and anti-Westernmythology, ready to halt all openings towards Europe and the rest of theworld (quoted by Gallagher 2001: 392).

0

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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Belarus Romania Bulgaria China

Fig. 1 Freedom House political rights and civil liberties average scores for Bulgaria, Romania, Belarus,and China 19902010. (Source: Freedom House [1419])

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This preservation effort is undeniable. From the very beginning, neo-communists try to save (or restore) communist structures, methods, and personnel.The communist-created bureaucratic and repressive apparatus is used to control thecountry. Under new names, the former communist parties remain in power. The

leaders of the neo-communist regimes are always former communist activists.However, they quickly realize that the conditions have changed. Authoritarianinstruments cannot equal totalitarian ones. Furthermore, it is impossible to restorethe centrally planned economy. The new rulers are therefore facing problems of acompletely new type. Under these circumstances, they have to elaborate strategiesthat have little in common with the classical communist approach. Despite its linkswith the past, the neo-communist regime creates progressively its own structures,patterns, and peculiarities.

The second fundamental feature of neo-communist regimes is their authoritarian

character. A web of populism, political favoritism, patronage, intimidation, anddisrespect of political rights and civil liberties hampers the functioning of democraticinstitutions. The judiciary is subordinated to the executive. The Parliament is eitherfully controlled by the neo-communists and their allies or is stripped of many of itscompetences. The former communist secret services are reinforced and used to spy,infiltrate, and control opposition groups and political parties. Strictly speaking, theelections might be free; but they are not fair. The regime is in control of the officialmass media and makes serious efforts to subordinate most or all private newspapersas well as radio and TV stations. It also forbids or hampers the diffusion of foreign

electronic media. The electoral competition is therefore completely distorted, withthe ruling party in a position of quasi-monopoly during the electoral campaign. Theimbalance is further increased by the usually charismatic figure of the neo-communist leader, by his populist economic policies, by the machinations of thesecret services and, if needed, by vote rigging. While this is a universal recipe, twoseparate categories of neo-communist regimes seem to exist: soft authoritarian (thattry to preserve the appearance of a democratic, multi-party political system) andhard authoritarian (which are, de facto, one-party systems). In fact, the soft onesare nothing more than hard authoritarian regimes still under construction.Lukashenka himself headed between 1994 and 1996 a soft regime, but this wasonly the first step of a more ambitious project. Videnovs rule was simply too short(199596) to reach the desired level. However, its increasingly anti-democraticactionssuch as the anti-NGO campaignsuggest an intended trajectory ofBelarusian type. The only relatively stable soft neo-communist regime, that ofIliescu, was due to Romanias dependence on Western financial support and to theensuing politics of ambiguity (see The Neo-Communist Regime of Ion Iliescu inRomania (199096)).

A specific ideology is the third feature of the neo-communist regimes. In the early1990s, the neo-communists were still dreaming of resurrecting the communist past.Nevertheless, they could not state this openly as, at that moment, communism hadvery negative connotations both internally and internationally (the only self-labeledcommunist party that returned to power, the Party of Communists of the Republicof Moldova, won the parliamentary elections only in 2001). Iliescu, for example,was forced to rename the human-faced communism he was advocating inDecember 1989 into social-democracy (see The Neo-Communist Regime of Ion



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Iliescu in Romania (199096)). This is why neo-communist parties usually callthemselves Socialist or Social-Democrat. It is undeniable that they advocate leftistsocial and economic policies (see below). But, unlike Western Social-Democrats,they pay only lip service to democracy. As soft neo-communist regimes turn hard,

they start to reject openly the democratic values. Lukashenka provides the bestexample: his anti-democratic discourse became progressively identical to that of thepost-soviet Central Asian autocrats. Still, neo-communists make little use ofnationalist propaganda. This is rather unusual in the post-communist world. (Ultra-)nationalism was the fundamental element of authoritarian regimes led by SlobodanMiloevi, Franjo Tuman, and Vladimr Meiar. It has also been instrumentalizedby many other post-communist strongmen, from Nursultan Nazarbayev to VladimirPutin. Most of the neo-communists, however, adopted the opposite trend. In a wayreminiscent of Communist Internationalism, they preferred to build special

relations with Russia. Belarus even concluded a treaty virtually surrenderingnational sovereignty. The only partial exception is Iliescus regime. While makingvisible efforts to improve links with Moscow, it also allied itself with two ultra-nationalist parties hostile to the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. But this waspart of its communist heritage: unlike his neighbors, Romanias Nicolae Ceauescuhad enforced his Stalinist regime with the use of nationalist (and especially anti-Hungarian) propaganda. In any case, Iliescus nationalism was marginal incomparison with the neo-communist features of his regime. Overall, the neo-communist doctrine is not as clearly formulated as the communist ideology. This is

not the consequence of ideological incoherence; rather, it comes from the fact thatneo-communists are forced to conceal their real projects during the softauthoritarian phase. They usually start with a Social-Democrat doctrine that isprogressively modified in a way favoring undemocratic trends as well as thepreservation of communist elements; the fully developed form is reached only in thehard authoritarian phase. However, as this evolution follows in all cases the samepattern, neo-communism can be easily recognized among the post-communistideologies even during its early phases.

The fourth element further differentiates the neo-communists from theirneighbors. It concerns the important role played by neo-communist redistributivesocial and economic policies in the construction of new regimes. Lukashenkassocial market economy was paralleled by Videnovs insistence on the vital socialfunctions of the state sector and his open criticism of capitalism and egotism ofthe market (see The Neo-Communist Regime of Zhan Videnov in Bulgaria (199596) and The Neo-Communist Regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Belarus).While economic strategies were not identical, all three case studies show high levelsof official opposition to market reform and especially privatization. This was easierfor the leadership in Minsk, as Russian economic support allowed it to eliminate anydependence on Western financial institutions. Bulgaria and Romania depended onInternational Monetary Funds assistance and were constantly under the pressure ofits economic recommendations. Nevertheless, in December 1996 Videnov preferredto jeopardize a desperate attempt to obtain IMF supportimplicitly triggering thefall of his government and the end of his own political careerinstead ofabandoning his economic options. This was not senseless stubbornness. The neo-communists were fully aware of the relation between economic liberalization and the

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creation of a new middle class potentially hostile to their monopoly on politicalpower. A strong state sector, on the contrary, was preserving their control of theimportant part of the electorate working in huge, unproductive communist-typeindustrial plants. This, together with the personal convictions of the neo-communist

leaders, explains the surprisingly similar economic approaches that can be identifiedin the three case studies. The problem is that neo-communist economic policies leadsystematically to serious economic crisis. In order to survive, the regime needs aninput of financial resources. Lukashenka has been able to secure it from Russia,which would seldom criticize his undemocratic behavior. But the Kremlin did nothave the capacity to provide the same amount of aid to Videnov and Iliescu, whowere forced to rely on the conditional support of Western financial institutions.Consequently, the former lost power while the latter could not take his regimebeyond the grey area of soft authoritarianism. It can be concluded that the inbuilt

lack of economic performance is a major limitation of the normal development ofneo-communist regimes.Neo-communisms final feature is the systematic harassment of nascent civil

society. In principle, all authoritarian regimes should realize that the civic sectorrepresents the most dangerous threat against their survival, at least in the long term.Surprisingly, most post-communist autocrats became fully aware of this danger onlyin the wake of the color revolutions. Videnov and Lukashenka, on the contrary,had started explicit anti-NGO campaigns almost 10 years earlier (see TheNeo-Communist Regime of Zhan Videnov in Bulgaria (199596) and The

Neo-Communist Regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Belarus

). Unable tomobilize their population on the basis of a new, aggressive ideology such as ultra-nationalism, the neo-communists had to pay much more attention to the socialmechanisms favoring or menacing their authoritarian project. This is why they werefast in taking measures against the development of domestic non-governmentalorganizations and the involvement of foreign ones. These measures, however, weredifferent and had diverging results. Lukashenka, taking advantage of his isolationfrom the West, was able to discourage the development of all NGOs and to repressesbrutally those engaged in the promotion of democracy. Bulgarian and Romanianneo-communists had to pay the price of their economic dependence on Western aid.Videnov limited his actions to the severing of all links between official institutionsand the civic sector (thus cutting the financial support critically needed by theNGOs). Iliescu was afraid to do even that and tried to use the secret services in order toinfiltrate and control key non-governmental organizations, as he did with oppositionpolitical parties. Both failed to stop the development of the civic sector and were finallyoverthrown due to the mass mobilization championed by the civil society. Basically, theyhad entered a vicious circle. Having developed only soft authoritarian regimes, theywere unable to suppress the civic sector. In turn, this sector vocally criticized theirundemocratic actions and prevented the creation of a hard authoritarian regime.Finally, civil society became strong enough to put an end to the neo-communist system.This confirms the fact that soft neo-communist regimes have to be perceived as atransitory phase. They can evolve toward a hard regime or disappear; but they cannotsurvive indefinitely under this intermediate form.

On the basis of these elements, I will define a neo-communist regime as a post-communist authoritarian regime preserving or restoring communist structures,



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methods, and personnel within the framework of a specific ideology that includes thepromotion of redistributive social and economic policies while avoiding the use ofnationalism as the main instrument of political mobilization. Such regimes are fullyaware of the danger represented by the development of civil society and do

everything in their power to hamper or incorporate it. Depending on domestic andinternational conditions, they can succeed in this effort and become stable hardneo-communist regimes; or they can fail and disappear. Soft neo-communistregimes represent only an intermediate phase that evolves in one of these twodirections. The following three sections present the case studies on which thisdefinition is based. The Chinese regime is then analyzed in order to identify its neo-communist characteristics.

The Neo-Communist Regime of Zhan Videnov in Bulgaria (1995

96)

In the first half of the 1990s, the relative electoral equilibrium between the superficiallyreformed Bulgarian communists (whose party was renamed the Bulgarian SocialistParty, BSP) and the pro-democratic Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) led to almostpermanent government instability. It was only in the December 1994 parliamentaryelections that the BSP succeeded in obtaining 43.5% of the votes. In alliance with twosmall parties, the former communists could finally create a stable government ([6]: 777).At the same time, however, they initiated a clear return toward Bulgarias communist

past [21]. The new Prime Minister, Jan Videnov, used his party

s increased influence inorder to build a neo-communistsoft authoritarian regime.The new government was controlled by the conservative, unreformed branch of

the Bulgarian Socialist Party. In fact, the importance of this branch allowed analyststo claim that BSP was a genuine communist party ([32]: 87) and the least reformedof its kind between the Oder and the Dniester([9]: 91). Openly opposed to economicreforms and pro-Western foreign policy, having adopted a platform of a furtherslowing down of the transition process and a recovery of some aspects of thetotalitarian system (ibid.), Videnovs government rapidly took measures presentedby Western newspapers under such headlines as Bulgaria in Danger ofRecommu-nisation (Hartmann 1995; [20]: 125). Figure 1 shows the Freedom Housequantitative evaluation of political rights and civil liberties in the four countriesassessed by this article. A one-to-seven scale is used, with one representing thehighest degree of freedom and seven the lowest. 3.0 is the limit for partly free statesand 5.5 for not free ones (for further details see [16]). In Bulgaria, the socialistvictory was immediately followed by a deterioration of political rights and civilliberties that would last even longer than Videnovs regime.

Neo-communism was equally visible in Sofias new economic policies, whichwere diametrically opposed to IMF and European Union recommendations. Inparticular, because of their vital social functions, the government supported thestate sector and its companies on the verge of bankruptcy ([20]: 131). Foreign policywas openly reoriented toward Russia. Cheap energy imports were presented as afundamental reason for this move, which in fact allowed Videnov to ignore Westernpressure. However, inefficient economic policy and worsening relations withWestern providers of financial aid would soon lead to catastrophic consequences.

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The most obvious miscalculation of Bulgarian neo-communists was theiroverconfidence in the economic component of their doctrine. Unlike Iliescu andhis more prudentpolitics of ambiguity(see the next section), they decided to createan economic system that had in fact quite little in common with Western-style market

economy. It was based on a rather simple pseudo-Keynesian chain: inflationarystimulation of state industry, increase of demand, increase of taxation income and ajust social security policy as a result ([9]: 1067). Consequently, industry sooncollapsed, generating a 10% drop in GDP over 1996 alone. The currency lost 50% ofits value in the summer of 1996, and a further nine-tenths in January 1997 ([9]: 99).Between January 1996 and January 1997, the average monthly wage diminishedform $118 US to $12 US and the average pension went from $37 US to $4 US ([20]:130). A social crisis broke out. Strikes, marches and protest meetings (mobilizing upto one million persons) were organized in order to bring down the government.

Consequently, in the October-November presidential elections the UDF candidatescored 60% of the poll ([8]: 234).A desperate attempt to obtain IMF support failed because Videnov was not

willing to abandon his economic options. He resigned on December 21, 1996, bothas prime minister and leader of the party. As the BSP was preparing to designate anew government, peaceful demonstrations were organized by the opposition askingfor early elections. Progressively, they became violent. On January 10 protestersinvaded the Parliament building. Strikes and demonstrations raged across thecountry and Bulgaria stood nearer to open revolution and perhaps civil war than at

any other time since 1989

(ibid., 234

5). Unable to control the situation, the neo-communists gave up and accepted early parliamentary elections. In April 1997, theUDF got 52% of the votes while the BSP was supported by only 22% of theelectorate ([6]: 781). This put a definitive end to the neo-communist Bulgarianregime.

The anti-neo-communist mass mobilization of 19967 is the consequence of awider phenomenon: the profound transformation of the Bulgarian society and theimpressing development of its civic sector. The diffusion of democratic norms andvalues progressively challenged the hegemony of neo-communism. For example, theperception of threats from ethnic minorities diminished from 46% in 1992 to 29% in1998. The preference for an authoritarian leader decreased from 66% in 1992 to 45%in 1994 and to 22% in 1996 ([25]: 100; 34). There was also the rapid development ofBulgarian NGOs. By the end of 1996 Gill [22] evaluated their number at 2,900 andGiatzidis [21] at 6,000. It is true that, as in most CEE countries, only a part400 to500of these organizations were really active, mainly due to lack of funding. Statesupport was nonexistent; private sector financing was scarce. Internationalorganizations were the main source of funding, providing around 95% of NGOstotal budget (ibid., 121). Still, the influence of these organizations was continuallyexpanding. Between April 1994 and December 1996, the number of thoseunconditionally in their favor passed from 13% to 25% while those completelyunfavorable diminished from 5% to 4%. The trend was maintained in subsequentyears (ibid., 114). The Bulgarian neo-communists did not ignore the mortal dangercivil society represented for their authoritarian construction. Immediately afterassuming power, Videnov started a systematic campaign against civil society ingeneral and the NGOs in particular. State authorities tended to present all NGOs as a



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nuisance, as amateurs or even as organizations carrying out anti-governmentalactions ([21]: 124). Moreover,

a number of nonprofit organizations active in civic-education and ethnic-minority issues were declared agents of foreign interests aiming toundermine Bulgarian statehood. State employees, including teachers, havebeen instructedunder threat of sackingto boycott conferences andseminars organized by non-government organizations. Most ministries, bythe autumn of 1995, had withdrawn from common projects withnongovernment organizations ([35]: 2930).

Nevertheless, these efforts were finally fruitless. It was precisely the mobilizationof civil society that led to the definitive end of neo-communists rule in early 1997(see [9]: 9697).

Basically, domestic and international conditions prevented Videnovs regime fromgoing beyond the stage of soft authoritarianism. Consequently, it was unable toadopt the more efficient (and more brutal) measures needed in order to eliminate thecivic activism and to stop the democratization process. Two conclusions can bedrawn from the Bulgarian case. First, neo-communist economic policies lead toserious economic crisis. The regime is therefore unable to survive withoutappropriate external financial support. Second, soft neo-communist regimes cannotstop the diffusion of democratic values among their citizens. As the Belarusianexample will show, in order to do this they need to evolve into hard authoritarian

regimes.

The Neo-Communist Regime of Ion Iliescu in Romania (199096)

In December 1989, a series of bloody events led to the replacement of the RomanianStalinist dictator, Nicolae Ceauescu, by a group of second-rank communist officialsheaded by Ion Iliescu, a former minister and ex-university colleague of Gorbatchevs[7, 12, 50]. Ceauescus sultanistic rule was replaced by a neo-communist softauthoritarian regime that lasted until 1996. Iliescu was not a brutal, fully-fledgeddictator. He imposed a limited authoritarianism that sought to uphold the appearanceof formal democracy. Yet, he did not restrain from using brutal force to suppressprotest movements. Mass-media and especially state television and radio were understrict control. There was no truly independent legal system. No less than nine secretservicesin fact, unreformed former departments of Ceauescus infamousSecuritatewere used to spy, infiltrate, and control opposition groups and politicalparties as well as the civic sector. Blackmail and intimidation of politicians andjournalists were common. National minorities were persecuted [6, 31, 56]. Theruling partysuccessively called the National Salvation Front, the Democratic

National Salvation Front, the Party of Social Democracy in Romania and the SocialDemocratic Party (see [6]: 8457)was in fact the unreformed Romaniancommunist party. In early 1990 its ideology was supposed to be close to human-faced communism. Later, some confused Social-Democrat orientation was claimed.When, after the 1992 elections, it lost absolute majority in Parliament, politicalsupport from another neo-communist and two ultra-nationalist parties was accepted.

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This reinforced neo-communist and ultra-nationalist trends of what had already beena regime hostile to liberal democracy, market economy, and pro-Western foreignpolicy [6, 33, 56]. However, the neo-communist character of the regime remainedunchallenged. The nationalism was used for purely tactical goals. Figure 1 shows the

Freedom House quantitative evaluation of the desperate state of political rights andcivil liberties under Iliescus rule. It is true that, in comparison with 1990 (when thecountry simply belonged to the not free category), the following years showedsome improvement. But Romania remained partly free until the fall of Iliescu.

Neo-communist orientations were equally present in the governments economicpolicies. Constant efforts were made to hamper the development of the marketeconomy and to facilitate the survival of a large state-owned sector. Ironically, thishad the direct consequence of deepening the economic crisis that, in turn, increaseddependence on Western financial aid. This forced Iliescu to adopt the so-called

politics of ambiguity [51]. Clearly authoritarian practices were constantlyaccompanied by pro-democracy statements. The creation of a special relation withRussia was hidden under the appearance of maintaining good relations with theWest. And the authoritarian regime had to maintain its soft character, which in turnmade impossible the control of the diffusion of democratic values. This eroded thesupport for undemocratic ideologies in a way strikingly similar to the Bulgariancase. The vote for neo-communist parties in legislative elections (Chamber ofDeputies) diminished from 66.31% in 1990 to 30.75% 1992 and to 21.52% in 1996([6]: 8768). The perception of threats from ethnic groups and minorities decreased

from 60% in 1992 to 32% in 1996 ([25]: 100). In the words of Romania

s newPresident, Emil Constantinescu, the popular mentality has changed a great deal inthe past 7 years. People are ready for real change and reform and are prepared tobear the costs ([60]: 42). The change was most visible at the level of the civilsociety. Inexistent in 1989 and unimpressive in 1992, it had rapidly expandedafterward ([55]: 9). By 1996 there were no less than 8,000 NGOs. It is true that onlyabout 200most of them Western-financedwere very active ([56]: 409). Butanalysts constantly emphasize the impressive dynamics of Romanias new civicsector and its active role in monitoring the respect of democratic principles and thedevelopment of democracy as well as in critically emphasizing elements ofcontinuity between the totalitarian past and the neo-communist regime ([42]: 166).The general progress of democratic norms and values and the mobilization led bycivil society determined the total defeat of Iliescu and his party in the 1996 generalelections. The neo-communist regime came to an end. Democratic political forcesresolutely oriented Romania toward a pro-democratic, pro-Western trajectory. Theneo-communists themselves realized the irreversibility of the change. It was clearthat the support for an undemocratic regime was now insignificant. When the 2000elections brought them back in power, they carefully avoided anti-democratic andanti-Western moves. In 2004 Iliescu even succeeded to secure Romanias accessionto NATO, which he had opposed 10 years later. It was an implicit recognition of theneo-communisms failure that confirms the conclusions drawn in the case ofneighboring Bulgaria. On the one hand, less aggressive neo-communist economicpolicies determine a longer lifespan for the regime. But they still generate economiccrisis and implicit dependence on foreign financial support. On the other hand, softneo-communist regimes are unable to stop the diffusion of democratic values and the



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progressive erosion of their monopoly on power. As the following section will show,such regimes have to become hard neo-communist in order to survive.

The Neo-Communist Regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Belarus

Under its first leader, Stanislau Shushkevich, the newly independent Belarus showedsome signs of liberalization. In 1994, however, Alyaksandr Lukashenka (Luka-shenko is the Russian form of the name) became president. He rapidly built what isconsidered the most autocratic regime in all of Europe. In a November 1996referendumwhich is frequently compared to a coup dtatthe Constitution wasamended to establish a truly super-presidential system ([46]: 210). Lukashenkaobtained the right to dissolve the parliament and rule by decree without

parliamentary approval. He was able to select the majority of the judges of theConstitutional Court, to control the recruitment and appointment of governmentofficials at both central and regional level, and to establish state control of the media.Independent newspapers were shut down. Some survived only being printed abroad([47]: 67). Only pro-Lukashenka official parties were allowed into the Parliamentelected in 2000, 2004 ([44]: 223), and 2008. Members of the opposition werearrested, prosecuted, and convicted arbitrarily. Non-governmental organizations havesuffered from persistent administrative and financial harassment ([47]: 67). Figure 1provides a quantitative assessment of the terrible situation of political rights and civil

liberties in Belarus. The Freedom House score started to worsen immediately afterLukashenkas election as president. It stabilized at six (seven represent the extremecase of total lack of freedom) for 8 years before worsening even more in 2004, whenit reached the present stable level of 6.5.

The creation and consolidation of this hard authoritarian regime was possibledue to the economic and political support of Russia. The Belarusian neo-communistswent much farther than Videnov in rejecting market reforms and maintaining astrong state-owned economic sector. Under the official designation of social marketeconomy, they control an economic system featuring administrative controls onprices on a vast scale; subsidies on products or enterprises representing almost 20%of the GDP; and the lowest private share in GDP among post-communist countries(25% in 2006) ([44]: 2246). Unsurprisingly, the government in Minsk soon facedmajor economic difficulties. But Bulgarian-type collapse has been avoided due toRussian subsidies representing around 10% of the Belarusian GDP ([59]: 457).

On its side, the Kremlin has good reasons for providing economic and politicalsupport. In exchange, it secured the control of a very important geostrategic position.The Belarusian ally gives Russia a stronger military and strategic position in CentralEurope and it increases Moscows capacity to put pressure on Ukraine. Furthermore,it controls the shortest transport routes for Russian raw materials, particularly oil andgas, to Western Europe and Kaliningrad ([29]: 133). The convergence of Belarusianand Russian interests was so important that, in the second half of the 1990s,Lukashenka seriously envisaged a union of the two countries as he intended tobecome the leader of the new federation after Yeltsins retirement ([59]: 457).However, the situation changed fundamentally when Putin became president.Rivalry between the strongmen in Minsk and Moscow (see [29]: 132) progressively

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reduced Belarusian enthusiasm for a common state. Economic disputes emerged([58]: 87; [37]) and the bilateral relations began to be marked by ups and downs. Inthe summer of 2010 the Kremlin even initiated a short-lived media war (The

Economist July 27, [53]). Yet, by December 2010 friendship had been restored:

president Medvedev supported openly Lukashenkas victory in the rigged presiden-tial election despite the brutal suppression of the ensuing protest demonstrations(The Economist December 29, [54]). There are periodical quarrels but Moscow isunwilling to alienate a valuable ally and remains Lukashenkas reliable supporter.

In response to Western pressure to democratize, Belarus severed most links withthe OSCE, the European Union, NATO, the US, and many European states. Thisreduced drastically Western leverage on the government in Minsk. Equallyimportant, the countrys isolation hampered the diffusion of democratic values.The quite impressive degree of popular support for Lukashenka is also favored by

specific social circumstances. 63.7% of the electorate are over the age of 40. Theywere educated in the pre-Gorbachev period, regret the fall of the Soviet Union, andhave little natural affinities for change and Western influence. This ageing,conservative electorate is very receptive to the neo-communists depiction ofBelarus as an oasis of economic stability. Due to Russian subsidies, the populationhas generally been protected from dramatic changes, shock therapy, the presence ofoligarchs, mass privatization, and high prices for amenities such as housing, heating,and food ([41]: 3523, 362). Serious socio-economic crises in other CIS republics aswell as limited and distorted information provided by state controlled media further

increase their fear of change. A 2003 national survey showed that the leadingmajority associates democracy with crisis and complete anarchy and other negativequalifications. Furthermore, between 1998 and 2003 the number of subscribers tomore authoritarian policies clearly increased from 36% to 49%. About two-thirds ofthe population stated that they did not care who was in power, as long as thesituation improved ([46]: 2267). The situation and the dynamics of societal changeare therefore opposed to those of Videnovs Bulgaria and Iliescus Romania.

In addition, the regime discourages the development of non-governmentalorganizations and represses all NGOs directly or indirectly engaged in the promotionof human rights. To give just an example, following the adoption of new legislationin December 2005, organizing or participating in an activity of an unregistered NGObecame a criminal offence which carries a prison sentence of up to 2 years. Asregistering a non-governmental organization in Belarus is extremely difficult, thenew measures further increased the already high capacity of the authorities toobstruct, harass and intimidate civil society activists, many of whom have been finedand imprisoned [2]. Obviously, this hampers the development of Belarusian civilsociety. Western governments and NGOs have tried to help change this situation byfinancing democracy-building activities [4]. Yet, the external support for thedevelopment of the civil society could not overcome the unfavorable localconditions and the regimes repressive policies. The ensuing weakness of the civicsector and very limited diffusion of the democratic values explain why the majorityof Belarusians remain favorable to the neo-communist leadership.

The case of Belarus shows that a neo-communist regime can overcome allchallenges and turn into a stable, long lasting political system. Unlike his Bulgarianand Romanian colleagues, Lukashenka was able to use Russias support in order to



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avoid the economic crisis generated by his neo-communist economic policies. As hisregime rapidly became hard authoritarian, it also succeeded in suppressing thedevelopment of the Belarusian civic sector and eliminating the perspective of anydemocratization process. For an external observer such as the Chinese Communist

Party, the neo-communist regime in Minsk can be a very useful model.

China as a Neo-Communist Regime

Despite the dismantlement of the totalitarian system and of the centrally plannedeconomy, China remains under the full control of the Communist Party. Thecommunist doctrine has considerably evolved but has not been replaced by acompletely different ideology such as ultra-nationalism. And the political system

mirrors President Constantinescus description of the Romanian neo-communism:We are not talking about classical communism but rather of a form that is bothold and new (see Neo-Communist Regimes). Consequently, China seems to haveclear affinities with other neo-communist regimes. A more detailed analysis can onlyconfirm this first impression. In Neo-Communist Regimes I presented the fivecharacteristics of a neo-communist regime. They are (1) the link with the communistpast, (2) the regimes authoritarian character, (3) a specific ideology, (4) redistributivesocial and economic policies, and (5) the systematic harassment and control of thenascent civil society. The rest of this section will show that these elements represent

the key features of the present Chinese regime.

1. Link with the Communist PastThe assessment of neo-communist regimes in Eastern Europe or the former

Soviet Union starts frequently from the fact that they are not the democraciesthey usually pretend to be. In China, the situation is different: in many cases, theanalysis starts from the fact that the present political system is no more thecommunisti.e. the totalitarianregime it used to be. Indeed, descriptions ofthe present Chinese political system range from a hybrid of state socialism andprivate capitalism to a repressive and pathological adventure of bureaucraticcapitalism and market Stalinism that blends the worst elements of bothworlds ([39]: 56). Since Deng Xiaopings 1978 Practice is the Sole Criterionof Truth campaign, China witnessed a series of reforms leading to the virtualdismantlement of communist totalitarianism. The principle of get rich first,adopted in the 1980s, was pushed to an extreme during Jiang Zemins tenure asGeneral Secretary of the CCP (19892002) and President of the PeoplesRepublic of China (19932003). GDP growth became the single most importantperformance indicator for local government officials ([63]: 2). Jiangs 2001 newpolicy, the Tree Represents, put an end to the proletarian character of theCommunist Party by encouraging the recruitment of entrepreneurs andintellectuals from the private sector labeled as representatives of the advancedproductive forces. The Three Represents indicated a radical shift in partyphilosophy, party composition, and party orientation as they replaced the majorelements of egalitarian communism with the new principles sanctioning fullmarketization, private ownership, and the circulation of assets ([48]: 1123).

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Reforms continued under Jiangs successor, Hu Jintao. In 2004 the principle ofprotecting the private property was written into the constitution. The PropertyLaw of China was finally approved in 2007 ([34]: 48; for an analysis of theideological change see [34]: 449; [48]: 111127; and [36]). In fact, on the

economic side the old three major elements of socialismthe plannedeconomy, public ownership, and the distributional principle of each accordingto his workhave been completely eliminated ([48]: 113). The CommunistParty also abandoned the total control of Chinese society, allowing andsometimes even encouraging the development of civil society elements (seebelow). Its traditional instruments of controlpropaganda, coercion, andorganizationhave all atrophied and eroded considerably. Globalization andinteraction with the outside world have further undermined the partys dominantposition ([48]: 34). Richard Baums assessment of the CCPs irrelevance for the

daily life of many Chinese citizens, an annoyance to be avoided where possibleand endured when necessary (see Neo-Communist Regimes), perfectlydescribes the present situation. All these are fundamental changes. However,the link with the communist past continues to be obvious. China is clearlypreserving much of its communist structures, methods, and personnel. Thecountry is ruled by the same party that uses the same state bureaucracy, military,and secret services. The party-state apparatus is unchanged. Moreover, thepreservation of the communist label shows that the regime assumes openly itsrelation with the communist past.

2. Authoritarian CharacterAs already stated, the picture described in the previous paragraph is hardlythat of a totalitarian regime. Still, China did not become a democracy. It remainsa one-party, authoritarian regime. Political rights and civil liberties havedisastrous levels. As Fig. 1 shows, Chinas Freedom House score stabilizedsince 1998 at 6.5. Seven is attributed to states where political rights are absentor virtually nonexistent as a result of the extremely oppressive nature of theregime and where is virtually no freedom. An overwhelming and justified fearof repression characterizes these societies [16]. It is true that there is a slightimprovement by comparison with the 19891997 period during which theaverage was 7 (as it had been during the Cultural Revolution). But between theend of the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen events (19771988), theFreedom House score was 6 [14]. This means that the present level of politicalrights and civil liberties in China is worse than during most of the 1980s. It isdifficult not to compare this strange situation with that of Belarus, whereLukashenkas regime is more oppressive than the Soviet Union in its final years.The conclusion is obvious: like its counterpart in Minsk, China ceased to be atotalitarian country. But it continues to be ruled by a hard authoritarian regimethat has done nothing to improve the political rights and civil liberties of itscitizens. In fact, most of the CCP discourse on democracypresented by officialpropaganda in relation with the concept ofDemocracy with Chinese Character-isticsrefers largely to within-system or intraparty democracy thatpromotes freer discussion and collective decision making inside the CCP([48]: 120). The overall political system is excluded and remains fullyauthoritarian.



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3. Specific IdeologyThe third element of a neo-communist regime concerns the ideology. The

new Chinese communist doctrine is obviously different from classicalcommunism. Still, the communist heritage cannot be denied. Furthermore, its

evolution is reminiscent of other neo-communist ideologies. It is true that theinitial soft authoritarian step is missing. This is due to the fact that China didnot experience a catastrophic fall of the totalitarian regime followed by a briefperiod of democratization. Hard authoritarianism directly replaced totalitari-anism. Consequently, there was no pseudo-Social-Democrat episode. Thetransformation of classical communism stopped at a stage similar to IliescusDecember 1989 human-faced communism. From the very beginning, its anti-democratic character could be compared with that of Lukashenkas post-1996,mature regime. Another difference is Beijings use of nationalism as a source

of political legitimacy. However, the Chinese regime is seldom assessed asmainly nationalist. Rather, the use of nationalism has the same tactical role as itdid in the case of Iliescus Romania.

It is interesting to note that the Chinese post-totalitarian regime follows thesame patterns as its East European equivalents in adapting the communistheritage to the new authoritarian environment. In a revue of the literature on theChinese Communist Partys future, David Shambaugh identified pessimistsand optimists ([48]: 2538). The former see the Chinese political system asembattled and endangered (ibid., 25). Sooner or later, the CCPs inability to

solve growing socio-political problems will lead to regime change. The latter,however, argue that the Leninist institutions in China remain strong and areundergoing a reinstitutionalization that will allow the survival of the presentauthoritarian regime (ibid., 33). Shambaugh himself shared this opinion andconvincingly demonstrated that the CCP carefully studied the fall ofcommunism in Eastern Europe and the USSR and took measures to reinventitself and sustain its role indefinitely (ibid., 104). Ideological change isparalleled by complex organizational reform categorized by Andrew Nathan infour clusters: succession processes, meritocratic promotions, bureaucraticdifferentiation, and improved channels of mass participation and appeal (see[43]). Besides ideological and institutional adaptation to the new, post-totalitarian conditions, other elements are used to ensure the regimes survival.On the one hand, there are two generally admitted sources of legitimacy: theeconomic growth and the already mentioned use of nationalism. On the otherhand, one should not ignore the importance of the intimate relationship betweenthe communist leadership and the state bureaucracy ([24]: 54). All theseelements seem to allow the CCP to strengthen its rule and remain in power as asingle ruling party ([48]: 3).

4. Redistributive Social and Economic PoliciesThe fourth main feature of a neo-communist regime is illustrated by the

redistributive social and economic policies advocated by Videnov, Iliescu, andLukashenka. At first glance, China totally lacks them. Under Deng and Jiang,the previously existing policies of this nature were simply dismantled. Wildcapitalism took their place: if Marx could see Guangdong today he would die ofanger ([39]: 9). Yet, the Chinese communists became aware of the fact that

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increasing social injustice could delegitimate their rule. The ensuing agile,responsive, and creative party effort to relegitimate the postrevolutionaryregime was coordinated by Hu Jintao ([30]: 406). Its key element was theconcept of Harmonious Socialist Society. It was first mentioned officially in

November 2002, defined in 2004, and proclaimed as the driving ideology in2005. A target date (2020) and specific objectives and tasks were announced inOctober 2006 ([52]: 1401). The Harmonious Socialist Society is a complexideological construct whose analysis goes beyond the scope of this article (see[27]: 148150, [52]: 1402). Yet, one of its key elements is promoting socialequity and justice. The goals to be reached by 2020 include the emergence of areasonable and orderly income distribution pattern (my italics) as well as theestablishment of a social security system covering both urban and rural residents[61]. Of course, this is much less than what Videnov and Lukashenka advocated.

However, it is close to what Iliescu promised (and considerably more than what heactually delivered). Hu Jintao and his team rejected a Videnov-type approachbecause it leads systematically to serious economic crisis that creates a permanentdependence on external financial support. As they have carefully studied the otherpost-communist experiences, the Chinese communists were fully aware of thisdanger. They also knew that in Eastern Europe the redistribution and opposition tomarket reforms were not a goal in themselves. Rather, they were a way to preventthe process first described by Lipset: the economic development modifies thesocial structure in a way favorable to the growth of the middle class. In turn, this

leads to a change in the political culture that supports democratization anddemocratic consolidation (for a recent update of this theory, see [1]). Consequent-ly, the Chinese regime adopted an original solution. It decided to put in place onlylimited, Iliescu-type social policies. At the same time, it continued to encourageeconomic development (thus avoiding a Videnov-style collapse) while inhibitingits effects on the development of democracy.

In a comparative study of economic development in the Sunan and Wenzhouregions, Zhang Jianjun identified two strikingly different regional developmentpatterns. In Sunan, local government played important entrepreneurial roles in ruralindustrialization and collective ownership was predominant. Consequently, powerhas been concentrated in the hands of the local state and elites. In Wenzhou, people/entrepreneurs are the main force driving development, so private business is thedominant ownership form; power is more dispersed. These different power relationsdetermined opposite policies in the privatization of collectively owned enterprises:manipulated privatization in Sunan and relatively transparent privatization inWenzhou. This led to the creation of different class structures in the two regions.Entrepreneurial-initiated development in Wenzhou produced more economicequality and a flat class structure while government-led development in Sunancreated more inequality and a polarized class structure due to the governmentcontrol of business opportunities. Today,

Wenzhou is characterized by vibrant grass-root democratic practices, representedby competitive village elections and various bottom-up associations. In contrast,authoritarianism still prevails in Sunan, manifested by controlled village electionsand government organized business associations ([62]: 34).



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Consequently, rapidly developing China does not have a homogenous society

progressing toward a Western-type class structure that can only lead to middle-

class triggered democratization. The Sunan pattern suggests that at least in a part

of Chinas regions, economic development does not create a social environment

favoring democratization. In other words, unlike the East European neo-communists, the Chinese regime found the way to ensure its survival without

adopting counter-productive economic policies. This is indeed a key difference

from the normal neo-communist pattern. Yet, even among communist

countries there were atypical economic experiments such as the very liberal

policies adopted by Titos Yugoslavia. Despite their incompatibility with the

economic approaches of other communist states, they did not radically modify

Yugoslavias communist character. Present China might have original economic

options and plans for only limited social policies. Still, this is not enough to

counterbalance the many similarities it shares with other neo-communistregimes.

5. Systematic Control of the Nascent Civil SocietyThe fifth feature of neo-communism is the systematic control of the

nascent civil society. Socio-economic development can endanger anauthoritarian regime in the long run. The development of civil society, onthe contrary, has immediate consequences. Videnov and Iliescu lost poweras a result of civic mobilization. A similar process took place during theColored Revolutions. As it was shown in Neo-Communist Regimes, neo-

communists are more sensible than other authoritarian leaders to this danger.Unlike the promoters of ultra-nationalism, they do not have an aggressiveideology able to mobilize the society and legitimize their undemocraticactions. Being aware of this vulnerability, they take systematic action tohamper the development of civil society.

Post-totalitarian China has witnessed the explosive growth of the number ofnon-governmental organizations. In 1989, there were 4,446 registered civilorganizations ([28]: 162). In 2005, the number of NGOs wasaccording tothe Ministry of Public Affairsclose to 280,000 ([38]: 10). Other sourcesclaim that non-governmental and nonprofit civilian-run non-enterprise unitsreached 700,000 in 1998; while in 2005, there were more than 310,000officially registered civic organizations above county level ([34]: 50). Someestimates for 2005 also take into consideration organizations that are notofficially registered and put the total number of NGOs at 3 million ( ibid.; [38]:10). However, it is not certain that this growth is indicative of a genuinedemocratization potential. The development of the Chinese NGOs is in factcontrolled by the communist authorities. The post-totalitarian state is retreatingfrom many domains of socio-economic life and needs a substitute. Therefore,it has encouraged the creation of NGOs in the economic sphere, in the field ofsocial welfare, and in the domain of social development. Still, all these NGOsbasically serve the governments interest: they are helping hands, rather thanautonomous organizations ([63]: 3). Jean-Philippe Bja goes as far as statingthat the present system reserves to the CCP the right to create NGOs whichrepresent society ([3]: 83). Consequently, while non-governmental organiza-tions are being encouraged to play a greater role in areas such as poverty

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reduction, charity or environmental issues, their influence is virtually absent insectors related to religious issues, ethnicity, and human rights ([63]: 34). Thisis easily ensured by the bureaucratic mechanisms regulating NGO activity. InChina, all associations have to register with the government and must have a

state organizational unit as its supervisory organization. ([11]: 523).Furthermore, only one association is allowed for each sector or area of sociallife (ibid.). A new NGO cannot be established if in the same administrativearea there is already an association doing similar work. NGOs are alsoprevented from developing an extended organizational network as they cannotestablish regional branches. Moreover, the government forbids the formation ofassociations that might challenge it politically or could weaken its control oversociety ([40]: 901). Overall, there is a visible structural weakness in Chinas civilorganizations, including the inability to grow and expand, a shortage of funds, low

capacity, low efficiency, and poor internal management ([28]: 163). The onlypossible solution, international support, had to be discarded when the ColorRevolutions of Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan generated a great deal of alarm,fear, even paranoia in China ([48]: 91). Precisely because one of the main causesof their success was Western support for the development of local civil society, thegovernment in Beijing became openly hostile to any external assistance forChinese NGOs. An example is the 2005 visit of George Soros, president of theSoros Foundation and Open Society Institute. Upon arrival, he found that hislectures and meetings had been cancelled while the domestic Chinese media were

forbidden to report on the visit (ibid.).However, the CCP has tolerated and even encouraged the development of non-governmental organizations. The CCP has attempted to incorporate the civicorganizations into the formal and informal structure of the party-state apparatusand integrate their participation in the conduct of public affairs and servicedelivery in achieving the goals of redistributive social and economic policies [13,57]. The overall effect, however, is the same as in Belarus as the authoritiessucceed in almost completely annihilating the NGOs ideological autonomy. Thedevelopment of Chinese civil society has been manipulated in a way that makes itunable to bring a major contribution to the democratization of China, at least inthe foreseeable future.

Therefore, the present Chinese political system shares the characteristics of thethree East European neo-communist regimes presented in the previous sections.The differences due to its different genesis are limited. China follows the regulartrajectory of a Belarus-type, hard neo-communist regime in terms of communistheritage, authoritarianism, ideology, prevention of pro-democracy socio-economicdevelopment, and control of the civil society. As the following section will show,the main consequence of this situation is the predictable stability of the Chineseregime.

Conclusions

Against the rather diversified landscape of undemocratic post-communistregimes, neo-communism represents a special category. It preserves or restores



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communist structures, methods, and personnel in the framework of anauthoritarian political construct whose ideology usually includes the promotionof redistributive social and economic policies and avoids the use ofnationalism as the main instrument of political mobilization. The coherent

efforts to hamper or stop the development of civil society represent a typicalfeature of these regimes. It is the success of these efforts that determines theevolution toward and the survival of hard neo-communist political systems.The soft regimes, unable to control the growth of the civic sector, are sooneror later overthrown due to the general mobilization championed by the civilsociety.

Bulgaria, Romania, and Belarus have experienced neo-communist regimes.While not analyzed in this article, 20012009 Moldova can provide anotherexample. In a different sub-region of the post-communist area, China is ruled

today by a regime that belongs to the same category. Its only atypical elementconcerns the weak point of its East European counterparts: Beijing rejectseconomic policies that include the opposition to market reform. This opposition,intended to avoid the creation of a strong middle class favorable to democracy,leads to economic crisis and dependence on foreign financial support. Thecareful scrutiny of the communist and neo-communist East European experiencemade the Chinese leaders aware of and hostile to such dependence. Theypreferred an economic approach ensuring both economic viability and a patternof socio-economic development fully compatible with their undemocratic

regime. An original solution was also adopted with respect to the developmentof civil society. NGOs have actually been encouraged, but within a system thatcontrols their development and suppresses their ideological autonomy. Thisprevents the non-governmental organizations from performing the politicalfunctions normally ascribed to civil society. Consequently, they are unable tomobilize the Chinese society against the authoritarian regime. Despite theseoriginal options, Chinas political system is strikingly similar to those ofVidenov, Iliescu, and Lukashenka. Furthermore, Chinas neo-communist regimeis a hard one. It is not threatened by the domestic and internationalvulnerabilities that led to the demise of the Bulgarian and Romanian regimes.Internally, it benefits from the uncontested control of society, which it inheritedfrom the totalitarian regime without the delegitimizing parenthesis of ademocratic episode. Internationally, it has a strong position that makes externalpressure to democratize totally inefficient. Basically, the regime is similar tothat of Belarus. But it is more stable as it has no need of foreign economicsupport and, consequently, it is immune to external factors.

Many analysts see the present Chinese political system as an intermediate phasein the transition from totalitarian communism to different possible final stages. Theview of this article is that the transition is in fact over. It is now a stable, hard neo-communist regime that has fully developed its ideological and organizationalstructures and patterns. Furthermore, it is not confronted by any major challenge. Aslong as it controls the development of the civil society and is able to avoid patternsof socio-economic development favoring democratization, at least in the mediumterm, the neo-communist regime would be able to preserve its present characteristicsas well as its uncontested control over China.

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428 T. Tudoroiu
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Theodor Tudoroiu works mainly on subjects related to the post-communist states, authoritarian regimes,and democratization.

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The Neo-Communist Regime of Present-Day China