The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 14 | Issue 9 | Number 2 | Article ID 4884 | May 01, 2016

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The Japan Lobby and Public Diplomacy

Jeff Kingston

At the January 2014 World Economic Forum inDavos, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō stumbled onthe world stage when he warned of the dangersof complacency regarding the possibility ofconflict between China and Japan, drawing aparallel between the UK and Germany on theeve of World War I when European diplomatswere 'sleepwalking' into the abyss. The mediasuggested it was a warmongering speech,based apparently on a misleading translation.Abe's spin-doctors were fuming at thedamaging misinterpretation, but given that Abemade a pilgrimage to the Yasukuni Shrine onlythree weeks earlier on 26 December 2013, it isunderstandable that the press was primed toassume the worst. This is because Yasukuni iswidely viewed as 'ground zero' for anunrepentant, glorifying narrative of Japan'swartime rampage in the years 1931-45. WhileBeijing and Seoul's criticism of Abe'sisit to theshrine was anticipated, Washington's swift andsharp rebuke was not.

Prime Minister Abe at the Yasukuni Shrine2013

Abe probably thought he would get a pass fromWashington, despite extensive behind the

scenes lobbying warning him not to go to theshrine, including a phone call from VicePresident Joseph Biden. This is because he hadjust closed a deal with then governor ofOkinawa Nakaima Hirokazu to proceed withplans to build a bitterly contested new Marineairbase in Ōura Bay, Henoko in exchange for alittle over $20 billion in aid spread out overeight years. The base is important to thePentagon and Abe appeared to deliver onsecurity what his predecessors could not. Buthe and his advisors misread Washington onhistory issues and paid the price.

Champagne corks were no doubt popping inBeijing and Seoul celebrating Abe's 'own goal'at Yasukuni and media drubbing at Davos.There was also a war of words conducted in op-eds in Europe and the US as usually dignifieddiplomats exchanged insults and invective,even invoking Harry Potter characters to vilifytheir counterparts. In The Telegraph(1/1/2013) , for example, the Chineseambassador to the UK wrote: 'If militarism islike the haunting Voldemort of Japan, theYasukuni shrine in Tokyo is a kind of Horcrux,representing the darkest parts of that nation'ssoul.' The Japanese ambassador replied in thesame tabloid, "East Asia is now at a crossroads.There a re two pa ths open t o Ch ina(http://www.theguardian.com/world/china). Oneis to seek dialogue, and abide by the rule oflaw. The other is to play the role of Voldemortin the region by letting loose the evil of an armsrace and escalation of tensions…" (TheTelegraph, 1/5/2014)

In January 2014, Ambassador Caroline Kennedyopened the bilateral rift further by tweetingcritically about Japan's dolphin hunt. Japan

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seemed to be on its back foot and thus thedecision at the Angouleme InternationalComics Festival in southwestern France tofeature a South Korean entry critical of Japan'scomfort women system reinforced perceptionsthat, on the global stage, Tokyo was losing thewar of words with its bitter rivals.

When Obama visited Tokyo in the spring of2014, Abe was still in the doghouse as Obamapointedly brought up the comfort women issue.Obama said that it is a crucial issue, one thathe knows the Japanese public understands andone that he thinks Abe gets, following this upwith further pointed comments in Seoul thatcould only be interpreted as critical of Abe.Indeed, Abe has spent his political careertrying to trash the 1993 Kono Statementacknowledging state responsibility for coerciverecruitment of comfort women, sparking afuror in 2007 when he quibbled about thedegree of coercion used in recruiting thewomen who were used as sex slaves onJapanese military bases around the region.Washington nudged Abe way beyond hiscomfort zone when he concluded a diplomaticagreement with Seoul at the end of 2015regarding the comfort women issue that pavedthe way for a meeting with Presidents ParkGeun-hye and Barack Obama in Washington atthe Nuclear Security Summit in March 2016.The agreement is unlikely to resolve theinescapable comfort women issues that roilbilateral relations and inflame publicperceptions, but for Abe it was a big stretch.This helps explain why in early 2016 heannounced h is reso lve to rev ise theConstitution as a way to appease supporterswho were dismayed by what they view as Abe'sapostasy on the sex slave controversy.

The ROK-Japan Agreement on the ComfortWomen requires Seoul to remove thisstatue in front of the Japanese Embassy,but the South Korea public opposes thisand activists maintain a 24/7 vigil.

Despite these setbacks, Team Abe runs animpressive PR operation in Japan, managingthe media quite effectively, limiting access,orchestrating press conferences and ensuringthat Abe is not put in a position where he has toimprovise, make unprepared remarks oranswer awkward questions. But the ways andmeans that work in Japan don't necessarilywork in the global arena. Access forinternational correspondents working in Tokyois the bait that the prime minister's officedangles in exchange for favorable coverage. Itis a cat-and-mouse game because thejournalists don't want to appear craven andTeam Abe is intent on squeezing out as manyconcessions as possible, such as magazinecovers and puff pieces.

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Back in 2013 when there was a buzz aboutAbenomics.

It's not always pretty, but that is how the gamegets played. NY Times correspondent MartinFackler told me that MOFA tried to get him towrite a letter of apology in 2009 for hispredecessor's reporting about comfort women,threatening not to give him an interview withAbe if he refused to comply. He refused, neverdid get that interview, and asserts this is acounterproductive strategy because it deniesthe government a chance to get its side of thestory out there. And feuding with the NY Timesdoes not seem an inspired policy to wininfluence in the US.

This article focuses on the Sino-Japaneserivalry as it plays out in the U.S., considered by

both nations to be one of the key battlegroundswhere the stakes are high in influencingpolicies and attitudes.

Japan Lobby and Alliance Management

All governments manage the media and everyadministration has a few spin-doctors tomassage the message. Tactics may vary, butgovernments hope to sway public opinion intheir favor. Key to understanding this lobbyingprocess in US-Japan relations is the role of USthink tanks and American Japan hands whowork as alliance managers and thus have astake in the outcome and act accordingly inconcert with Japanese counterparts, especiallyon security issues, but more generally as well.For example, the Trans Pacific Partnership isostensibly about economic issues, but PM Abe'sdecision to join was predicated on a geo-strategic assessment that doing so wouldstrengthen the U.S. security alliance andcounter China's growing influence in theregion. Abe has delivered more than all of hispredecessors combined on Washington'slongstanding wish list on security mattersranging from bases in Okinawa to easingconstitutional constraints on Japan's militaryforces, underscoring that the alliance is asubordinate relationship in which Americansdictate the terms. Ironically, in Abe the U.S.has a willing accomplice who frequently callsfor overturning the postwar order that his neo-nationalist constituency disparages as anunwelcome humiliation imposed by the U.S. tokeep Japan weak, dependent and subordinate.

PM Abe Shinzo is seen by Washington'ssecurity wonks as their man in Japan, so hisstrengthening of the alliance seems to be a keyachievement in bolstering t ies. Thisdevelopment involved considerable back stagemaneuvering and extensive communicationabout a range of security issues throughvarious channels. The Japan Lobby has evolvedfrom an organization focused on trade issues toone that is funding and guiding public

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diplomacy regarding China, especially oversecurity and history issues. In the 21st centuryJapan has found itself at cross-purposes withglobal perceptions about war memory,especially the comfort women issue, butChina's regional hegemonic ambitions underPresident Xi Jinping have facilitated anupgrading of US security cooperation withallies and partners in Asia, including Japan.

For example, in April 2015 Japan signed newUS-Japan Defense Guidelines, the first since1997, which greatly expand what Japan istheoretically prepared to do militarily insupport of the U.S. in the event it is attacked.In September 2015, despite overwhelmingpublic opposition, PM Abe rammed enablinglegislation through the Diet that easessignificantly constitutional constraints onJapan's military forces and allows theirdispatch anywhere in the world in the name ofcollective self-defense. Abe repeatedlyreassured the Japanese public that his securitylaws won't really have much of an impact whilein Washington he promised they would be agame-changer, a rhetorical maneuver thatsowed dissatisfaction on both sides of thePacific. While the Japanese public expressesconcern that the Abe Doctrine will endangerJapan because Tokyo may eventually be

dragged into conflict at America's behest,Washington 'alliance managers' are quietlydisappointed that after all the smoke cleared itappears that what Japan will be able to deliveris a lot less than they thought Abe committedto.

Protestors in August 2015 opposing Abe'sSecurity Legislation portray him as a USPuppet.

In trying to woo domestic and foreign support-both government and public-the media is onlyone battlefield in the larger war of publicdiplomacy, but a crucial one. Back in the 1980swhen bilateral tensions between Japan and theUS were high due to trade imbalances, Tokyoengaged professional lobbyists in Washingtonto woo Congressional and media opinion. Thisis how the game is played, but in that febrileatmosphere Pat Choate's Agents of Influence(1988) struck a chord. The Japanesegovernment was playing by established rules,but in Choate's book it was portrayed assuborning the system while those who lobbiedon Japan's behalf were depicted as betrayingtheir nation and abetting "the enemy". Thosewere the days when a cascade of 'revisionist'tomes hit the bookshelves, reassessing the US-Japan relationship, dismissing the more benignviews toward Japan that prevailed, and arguing

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that Japan had an advantage because it was notplaying by the same rules and the governmentwas managing not only markets, but also tryingto manipulate American public opinion.(Johnson 1982, Prestowitz 1988, Fallows 1990& 1995, and von Wolferen 1989) The Cold Warbargain of sacrificing US economic interests tohelp Japan become a showcase of thesuperiority of the American system, and astalwart ally hosting bases that allowedWashington to project its military might in Asia,was seen to be unsustainable and no longerjustified.

Hard as it is to imagine today, Japan wasportrayed as the relentless juggernaut thatwould stop at nothing to prevail and establish aPax Nipponica. There was even a multi-episodeBBC documentary of that title, conjuring upwarmed over 'yellow peril' nightmares,reinforced rather emphatically by IshiharaShintaro (1989) in his infamous The Japan ThatCan Say No. This polemic threatened, interalia, to withhold key semiconductor parts fromthe US military industry that would weaken itscapabilities and advocated that Tokyo cozy upto Moscow. However, Ishihara's gambit was illtimed as the Soviet Union was alreadyunraveling and in its death throes.

Back in 1987, NY Times journalist ClydeFarnsworth drew back the veil on Japan'slobbying efforts in Washington where nationsaround the world seek to buy influence andshape policy outcomes. Farnsworth (1987)wrote,

"The Japanese, according toCongressional aides, spent morethan $60 million last year for directrepresentation to improve theirimage and try to keep doors ajar intheir biggest market. That's fourtimes the level in 1984. Japan'si n t e r e s t s h a v e b e c o m eincreasingly intertwined withAmerica's, not only because the

United States consumes about afifth of Japan's total production,b u t a l s o b e c a u s e t h eJapanese investment here hasmushroomed."

Robert Angel (1996) further detailed Japan'slobbying efforts, providing an insider'sperspective as he headed the Japan EconomicInstitute between 1977-84, an organization inWashington that played a key role in the JapanLobby. He discounted the more alarmistportrayal of the Japan Lobby as exerting a"pernicious influence", but detailed the hydra-headed effort in a manner that left no doubtabout the extent of its activities and theunusual public/private cooperative nature ofthe enterprise:

"By Japan Lobby I mean Japan'sgovernmental and private sectorefforts to influence the policyformulation and implementationprocesses of the United Statesthrough unofficial, non-diplomaticmeans. My definition of the JapanLobby includes institutional andindividual participants in bothJapan and the United States. Theyshare responsibility for targeta n a l y s i s , p l a n n i n g , a n d

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implementation. But all importantdecisions are made in Japan, andJapan supplies nearly all of thefunding. Japan Lobby participantson the Japanese side includegovernment ministr ies andagencies, quasigovernmental andprivate-sector organizations,business corporat ions ando r g a n i z a t i o n s , a c a d e m i cinstitutions and their cooperativefaculty, Japan's version of think-tanks, publishers, public relationsfirms, and even political partiesand the personal offices of well-financed politicians. In addition,Japan Lobby managers haveestablished several foundationsthat channel amazingly generousfunding to Lobby participants whowould find it uncomfortable toreceive such funds directly fromthe Japanese government."

Angel asserted that every ministry was involvedin disseminating the government l inedomestically and internationally whilecorporate public relations departments andvarious foundations provided valuable support.The Japanese foundations, he argued, providefunds to experts and institutions that have ahigh degree of credibility with the US publicprecisely because it was assumed that theopinions and assessments they espoused wereuntainted by financial inducements. Thefunding was thus channeled in ways that don'timpugn the independence and credibility of thebeneficiaries. He alleged that the JapanFoundation established in 1972 under the aegisof the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was the firstand has been one of the most influential ofthese institutions, a key component of theJapan Lobby infrastructure. Aside from theseefforts to sway public discourse, Angel wrotethat, "the Japan Lobby has found a way tosupport the political campaigns of elected

officials without violating the law throughannouncements of intentions to invest inemployment generating projects."

In Bamboozled (Routledge 2002), Ivan Hall alsodraws attention to the unwitt ing andopportunistic dupes of Tokyo and the variousways that the Japanese government managesbilateral relations by influencing Americanperceptions. This is not exclusively agovernment effort, but Hall argues that itorchestrates non-government and quasi-government foundations, and media coverage,to incentivize positive assessments andcoverage while deliberately sidelining awkwardissues and critical observers. This shaping ofbilateral discourse, what he terms the 'mutualunderstanding industry', has been a criticalfactor in facilitating closer ties and highlightingcommon ground and ostensibly shared values.

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The shared values nostrum emphasizesdemocracy and civil liberties such as freedomof the press, requiring a degree of cognitivedissonance on both sides of the Pacific in lightof the margina l izat ion o f Okinawandemocratically expressed preference indiscussions about strong opposition to thesiting of U.S. bases in the prefecture and TeamAbe's orchestrated ouster of prominenttelevision anchors and commentators critical ofthe prime minister. (Kingston 2015a,b;Kingston 2016.) In my opinion, "The talismanicinvocation of shared values provides anideological foundation for pursuing commoninterests as defined by Washington. Sharedvalues might best be understood as the moodmusic for getting Japan to dance to America'stune, while making it seem that it is really onlytaking a principled stand based on its ownideals. Japanese leaders understand that as aclient state, it is in Japan's interest to take itscue about common interests from the UnitedStates." (Kingston 2015c)

Rising China

From the late 1990s there has been growinganxiety about "Japan passing", a fear that theUS is seeking closer relations with China,encapsulated in the G2 concept, at Japan'sexpense. The phenomenon of Japan passingstemmed from President Bill Clinton's nine-dayvisit to China in 1998, when he did not stop byJapan and consult with America's major ally inAsia. At the time, a growing trade deficitundermined bilateral relations and led to whatTokyo referred to as 'Japan bashing', a termmeant to dismiss any criticism of Japan.

In the 21st century, there is concern in Tokyothat growing US-China ties might underminethe security alliance, leaving Japan isolated in adangerous and hostile neighborhood. At theextreme, Tokyo worries that the US won't cometo its aid in a territorial conflict with Chinabecause it doesn't want to risk its economicinterests. The rapid rise of China as an

economic and military power has transformedthe geopolitical landscape in East Asia in waysthat Japan finds threatening; double-digitannual growth in China's defense spending,now treble Japan's military budget, a moreassertive foreign policy regarding regionalterritorial disputes and unresolved grievanceswith Tokyo over history have had significantrepercussions.

Japan should be reassured by public opinionpolls in the US that indicate a deep reservoir ofgoodwill, as 74% of Americans in 2015 expressa favorable view of Japan. In contrast, this 2015Pew Poll found that American attitudes towardChina remain negative with 54% expressing anunfavorable view and 38% holding a positiveview. (Pew 2015) Back in 2005, 43% werefavorable to China while only 35% wereunfavorable and thereafter until 2011 favorableviews (51%) exceeded unfavorable views (36%).Since 2012, however, a majority of Americanshave expressed negative views of China, a timewhen a rupture in Sino-Japanese relationsdeveloped over Tokyo's nationalization of theSenkaku Islands. There is no reason to believe,however, that Japan's public diplomacy has hadany role in this sharp negative swing inAmerican opinion towards China. As Tokyo viesfor influence and tries to nurture closer ties, itis benefitting from China's clumsy diplomacyand 'radar rattling' maritime forays. Accordingto Pew, negative American views are driven bythe large amount of US debt held by China,cyber attacks, trade deficits, Beijing's growingmilitary power, perceptions that a rising Chinais causing a loss of US jobs, in addition tohuman rights and environmental issues. TheUS media has been quite critical of China overa range of issues and in the US Republicanpresidential campaign, Donald Trump hasengaged in China bashing, although he has alsotagged Japan for free riding on the US militaryand suggested it along with South Koreadevelop its own nuclear weapons.

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Republican Presidential Candidate DonaldTrump Slams China and Japan.

In addition, the Obama Administration hasadopted a neo-containment policy toward Chinain a bid to counter its regional hegemonicambitions. The Obama pivot to Asia, orrebalancing, has involved upgrading defenseties in the region, including Japan, Australia,the Philippines and India, and tapping intoregional concerns about what a rising Chinaportends. This is the context in which the USpromoted TPP and opposed Beijing's AsianInfrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB); onlyJapan among close US allies stood withWashington by refusing to join China's 2015AIIB initiative. The goodwill generated by HuJintao's earlier smile diplomacy has evaporatedto Tokyo's advantage. Xi Jinping's maladroitdiplomacy and muscle flexing has stoked an Arcof Anxiety in Asia that has undermined itsinterests and helped Japan overcome its owninept forays in public diplomacy. Its noexaggeration to say that Japan's most effectivestrategy is to let China alienate Americanpublic opinion all by itself.

Public Diplomacy Battles

In Asia in Washington, Kent Calder (2014) callsWashington, D.C. the world's, "preeminentagenda setting center." This is because of theoutsized power of the US and the concentrationof international organizations, foundations,

think tanks and non-government and non-profitorganizations involved in trying to shapepolicies and attitudes render Washington acrucial battleground for Asian governments.Asia's pivot to Washington aims to influence USpolicies, counter rivals' similar efforts andnurture warmer relations at the expense ofrivals.

Calder, Director of the Reischauer Center forEast Asian Studies at SAIS/Johns HopkinsUniversity in Washington, concludes that theheyday of Asian lobbying is past, "So formallobbying on behalf of Asian interests, whilequite intense in the 1970s and 1980s, appearsto have been epiphenomenal and to havewaned substantially over the past two decades,just as the pace of classical Washingtonlobbying itself appears to have done." (Calder2014: 131) Apart from Japan, the two most

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determined Asian lobbyists in Washington areChina/Taiwan, each claiming to representChina, and South Korea. Their lobbying hasgenerated a competitive battle over territorialand historical memory issues that Calder thinksTokyo is losing. Drawing attention to what hedescribes as Beijing's more aggressive,extensive and successful lobbying effortsCalder writes,

"To a greater degree than mostforeign nations, China representsits interests in Washington byworking through local Americanorganizat ions with s imi larconcerns, rather than directly.U.S.-China relations also involve ahost of other semiofficial supportorganizations, including theNational Committee on U.S.-ChinaRelations (NCUSCR), the ChinaInstitute, the U.S.-China PolicyFoundation (USCPF), and theC o m m i t t e e o n S c h o l a r l yCommunicat ion with China(CSCC). These bodies havecollectively helped to stabilizeChina's role in Washington,including agenda setting, earlywarning, public education, andinformal lobbying." (Calder 2014:145)

He adds, "While these mediating NGOs havesome analogue in U.S. relations with NATO,and to a lesser degree in American ties withKorea, they have no good parallel in U.S.-Japanrelations." (Calder 2014: 146) Perhaps, butCalder's description of the China lobby seemsquite analogous to what Angel writes about theJapan Lobby and the influential US-JapanCouncil, according to its website, "is a JapaneseAmerican-led organization fully dedicated tostrengthening ties between the United Statesand Japan in a global context." Moreover,Calder's high appraisal of China's lobbying

efforts is unconvincing as its soft power effortshave fallen flat and its lobbying is widelydisparaged as heavy-handed and ineffective.

In contrast to Beij ing's ostensible PRjuggernaut, Calder writes, "over much of thepast two decades, both the Japanesegovernment and the country's private sectorhad a remarkably low profile in Washington,even as their competition has grown moreactive." Calder paints a picture of a recedingJapan across-the-board with significant recentdeclines in Congressional exchanges, fewerthink-tanks with Japan-oriented programs,fewer Japan specialists in Washington, and ashrinking number of Japanese students andresearchers in the US.

Yet on history issues, the Embassy has beenassertively engaged, especially regarding thecomfort women. Calder blasts the 2007 debaclewhen, "the embassy spent substantial politicalcapital trying to head off a congressionalresolution of censure (H.R. 121) … thatoffended both major human rights and AsianAmerican constituencies in the U.S. Congressand the Democratic Party. The struggle endedwith a motion of censure, opposed by theJapanese Embassy in Washington, passing theU.S. House of Representatives." It was nothelpful that on June 14, 2007 conservativeJapanese supporters of Abe's apologist stanceon the comfort women placed a full-pageWashington Post ad blasting the resolution onthe eve of the vote, making it awkward forJapan's friends on the Hill to stave off thelegislative censure as they had several timesbefore.

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This is the ad placed in the WashingtonPost on June 14, 2007 by the Committeefor Historical Facts.

Calder, (2014:186) also asserts there is a morep r o a c t i v e a p p r o a c h t o m o b i l i z i n gJapanese–Americans, "Since early 2009, whenthe U.S.- Japan Council (USJC), a group ofJapanese American leaders devoted tomaintaining effective working relations amongAmerican, Japanese, and Nikkei communitieswas founded, relations between the embassyand the Japanese American community havegrown even closer." The USJC was established

at the instigation of Hawaiian Senator DanielInouye (1924-2012), the most prominentJapanese-American politician in U.S. historywho was an ardent opponent of CongressmanMike Honda's comfort women campaign and areliable supporter for Tokyo in the corridors ofpower.1 Below we discuss this developmentregarding the anti-comfort women statuecampaign in San Francisco.

Calder i s less impressed by what hecharacterizes as Japan's inbred, hereditarydiplomatic corps, concluding that it has notbeen terribly effective: "In bilateral skirmisheswithin Washington against East Asianneighbors over territorial and historical issues,for example, the neighbors typically come outahead, although Japan achieves its policy goalsbilaterally with the United States on mostimportant security questions." (Calder2014:188)

Ringing the alarm bells, Calder adds, "Also in2009 as much as 60 billion renminbi ($8.8billion) was pumped into the Big Four Beijingmedia outlets (Xinhua News Agency, CCTV,China Radio International, and China Daily) tofund their global expansion." China has alsobeen nurturing closer relations with the 4million Chinese American citizens of the UnitedStates, something he believes Japan has foundmore awkward due to wartime internment ofJapanese-Americans.

William Brooks (2013), a 35 year StateDepartment veteran and adjunct professor ofJapanese Studies at SAIS, agrees that Japan islosing out to China in the information warswaged in Washington between these East Asianrivals, writing, "it is increasingly the focus of anenhanced media-centered effort to favorablyinfluence American views in the capital areaand across the country on their respectivecountries. China, through its sophisticatedCCTV World channel, has emerged as the cleartechnological leader in the de factoinformation-providing rivalry with Japan. It has

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set up a Washington bureau and state-of-the artprogramming that is as sophisticated as CNN's,even to the extent of adding top-notchAmerican anchors and reporters to presenthard-hitting balanced news and features to aworld audience. Japan has no comparable U.S.-based programming." In his opinion China hasearned a super-achiever award for its Englishlanguage media efforts, noting that the ChinaDaily US edition is available on Kindle for only$5 a month, China Watch is a free insert inmajor newspapers like the Washington Postand CCTV broadcasts (with 2 channels inEnglish) are readily available on satellite, cableand the Internet. All of this helps shape USopinion towards China and gives it anopportunity to counter negative coverage in USand other international media while alsopresenting human-interest stories that appealto audiences. It also broadcasts grislydocumentaries about the Sino-Japanese warthat viscerally challenge the revisionist historytropes favored by PM Abe and otherrevisionists. But who actually watches CCTVand to what extent are they persuaded byBeijing's propaganda since nobody believesthat press freedom exists in China for the verygood reason it does not and the intimidationand arrest of journalists for doing their job isroutine. Moreover, China's forays into socialmedia have repeatedly back-fired as videosdepicting various aspects of China such as themaking of the thirteenth five-year plan seemmore a cringe worthy parody of nationbranding than crack public diplomacy.2

While Japan has NHK World, its level ofprofessionalism pales in comparison to CCTVand, Brooks points out, it doesn't tailor itsprograms to US audiences the way that CCTVdoes. The Japanese media, in his view, is farbetter at disseminating news about the US toJapanese rather than conveying Japan's viewsand influencing American public opinion.Instead, "There seem to be endless fashionshows and cooking shows, and the emphasis on"Cool Japan" – programs centering on the wide-eyed views of young foreigners living in Japanregarding aspects of the country that appeal tothem, or perplex them." Brooks concludes that,"While China is making a tremendous effort toreach American audiences with a full platter ofnews, documentaries, special programming,and broadcasts out of Washington and NewYork, Japan seems to be slipping off America'sradar scope as information from domestic andJapanese news sources tailored for anAmerican audience becomes a scarcecommodity." In his view, by remaining passivein this lopsided information war, Japan's mediahave punched below their weight in the US tothe detriment of Japanese interests.

Japan's Public Diplomacy

A veteran Japan hand with extensivegovernment and academic experience warnsthat, "The Abe administration has a badreputat ion among some segments inWashington because of the history issue. Thatis well known. The problem here is thetendency for the GOJ to shun those who arecritical of the Abe administration -- probably onorders from thepolitical elite. Abe's April 2015speech to Congress helped repair his tatteredimage, but if he issues a statement in mid-August that is seen as watering down Japan'sprevious apologies for wartime acts, then nomatter how much money is poured into PR, itwon't buy any goodwill in this town. He will bepilloried." Perhaps, but Abe did not getpilloried for his evasive August 14, 2015statement, perhaps attesting to savvy image

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management by PR firms.

An American insider with extensive foundationexperience involving Japan explains, "theGaimusho has become much more seriousabout its public diplomacy efforts in the States.The Embassy has pumped a lot of money intothe major think tanks in Washington in order tosupport Japan-related public events andprojects. MOFA has also published glossybrochures in English that argue Japan'sposition on various disagreements with China(and South Korea re the Takeshima/Dokdodispute). Japanese funding is underwritingvisits to Japan by young Americans and there isincreased funding for English-speakingJapanese scholars who can more articulatelyargue Japan's case in overseas academicforums and the like."

"So what we're seeing now is a much moresophisticated and well-funded public diplomacyeffort by Japan than in previous years. It's hardto gauge how effective and influential thisultimately is--particularly in the universe ofother countries ' charm offensives inWashington. True, it may be paying more thanother countries, but it also has deeper pocketsthan most other countries and, as far as itsnational interests are concerned, it cannotafford to be marginalized in the capital of itssole security guarantor," he says.

Moreover, "Another dilemma for Japan is that ithas to strike the right balance between publicdiplomacy and carrying out an all-outpropaganda campaign. The latter mightbackfire if it's seen as too heavy handed. Forinstance, I'm not sure but I don't think that theGOJ is explicitly telling the think tanks that it'sfunding to promote a specific message abouthistory or territorial issues, etc. You might saythat that's implicitly expected through thefinancial support that the GOJ provides."

"That said, I'm not naive enough to think thatall this money swirling around is of no concernwhatsoever. I am somewhat concerned about

the quality of objective analysis of Japan whenso many American researchers and scholarsdepend on Japanese money for their livelihood.The Abe administration is particularly thin-skinned when it comes to outside criticism andI wouldn't be surprised if it were to withholdfunding from people that it considers"unfriendly" to its cause.

So, I guess in the final analysis, Japan iscertainly playing hardball in the publicdiplomacy realm. (emphasis added) That mayat times seem over the top but I do think thereis a vigorous message war going on betweenChina and Japan, and the GOJ has to do what itcan to come out on top of that game."

Brad Glosserman, Executive Director of PacificForum CSIS Hawaii and co-author of TheJapan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian

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Security and the United States (Columbia2015), says, "if the question is the competitionfor influence WITHIN the US, I don't thinkJapan has much to worry about. There isinterest, there is knowledge, there is suspicionand there is influence - all are differentoutcomes and I am not sure that China isgetting much positive out of their ConfuciusInstitute (CI) program; academics are verymixed, China specialists typically scathing andadministrators more supportive- until there isan incident that exposes Beijing's heavy hand.In short, the best thing for Japan to do is to letthe CI project be and not compete. I wouldhave thought that the head to head competitionwith Korea over the comfort women statuteswould have shown that such crude behavior isa loser's bet."

He adds, "the biggest issue is the lack of weightJapan brings to global issues and the globalarena. Japan does seem like a presence thatreflects an increasingly uchimuki (inwardlooking) mentality, a sense that the outsideworld is a hostile place, a sense that Japan isfirst and foremost Japanese, and of Asia, not inAsia, and certainly not in anywhere else."Overall, Japan projects disinterest in globalissues not directly affecting it such that "Tokyoseems an incredibly selfish actor. Either way,no one really cares about Japan's preferences."

There is little to worry about in terms of vyingfor US support because, "Japan has long had itsgroup of supporters - the chrysanthemumcrowd and alliance managers - that largelyinsulated it from the vicissitudes of waves ofnegative opinion. Absent some big screw upthat harms US national interests, that bufferwill remain."

In his view, "competition with China is a losingbet. Tokyo doesn't have to engage in thatcompetition directly; Beijing will prove its ownworst enemy. Japan should not position itself asan enabler or excuse for bad decisions inChina. It should do its own thing and let its own

values shine through." It is thus perplexing toobserve the counterproductive blunders ofAbe's brasher public diplomacy.

Japanese Hardball3

Despite Calder's more benign assessment of abumbling, slow off the mark public diplomacy,Japan is not exactly a retiring wallflower. Asnoted above, the Japanese government,foundations and firms have developed aninfluential network in the U.S. that dates backto the 1970s, an era of acrimonious tradefrictions. This Japan Lobby has tackled variousother issues and is now a valuable weapon inJapan's public relations war against China inthe US. The Sunlight Foundation andProPublica estimate that total Japanesespending on lobbying and public relations was$4.2 billion in 2008, putting Japan third behindthe United Arab Emirates and the UnitedKingdom while South Korea ranked eighth with$2.9 billion (ProPublica August 18, 2009).4 Andthis lavish spending is not new as The Centerfor Public Integrity found in 2005, for example,that Japan and China / Taiwan both rankedamong the top ten in terms of lobbyingexpenditures during the 1998-2005 period.(Calder 2014:92)

Calder's overall portrait of the Japan Lobby is afar cry from Angel and Hall's account in the1990s and Choate's in the 1980s. In his viewthere have been signs of change since 2005suggesting a more proactive and effectivepublic diplomacy, but overall he still thinksJapan is losing this battle to its rivals fromSeoul and Beijing. Brooks also suggests thatBeijing has a much slicker, well-funded andeffective media strategy and that there are veryfew efforts to project Japanese views in the US.It is important, however, not to confuse thequantity of funding with the quality of thepublic diplomacy and it is not clear that China'sefforts have in fact been very effective.Problematically, the target audience sees thathand of the state behind all of these initiatives,

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thus undermining their credibility and impact.For example, China's Confucius Institutes havedrawn considerable criticism that suggests thatthey have not been effective in improving USopinion toward China, but may have influenceon the research agendas of China specialistsand university departments' hiring and publicoutreach activities. (Sahlens 2013, 2014)

China's Soft Power Confronts Opposition.

There are signs of a more proactive Japanesepublic diplomacy, but as with the comfortwomen resolution battle in the US Congress in2007, the Embassy may be digging a hole,deepened by private efforts, in promoting arevisionist narrative of history that downplaysJapanese depredations. It appears that thecomfort women statues that are popping uparound the US are attracting similar Japanesegovernment and nongovernmental efforts thatare likely to backfire, putting Japan into thecrosshairs of history and gender.

In 2015 Japan announced it would treble itsbudget for public diplomacy to $500 million,apparently a response to perceptions that thegovernments of China and South Korea areembracing a more assertive diplomacy aimed attarnishing Japan's reputation. Japan's diplomatsnow can't complain about a lack of firepower inwhat is often likened to a public relations war.Conservatives have long grumbled that Japan'sdiplomats have been ciphers on the world

stage, adopting a reactive and ineffectiveapproach to countering misinformation andmisinterpretation of government policies andinitiatives. But based on Japan's recentmiscues, taxpayers have every right tocomplain that this gold-plated, brazendiplomacy is undermining Japan's stature. Thislavish funding was also justified in terms offunding Japanese studies at universities tocounter China's Confucius Institutes and toestablish Japan Houses in London, Los Angelesand San Paolo. It is not clear what role theJapan Houses will play that is not already beingplayed by various existing organizations, butthe sites were selected due to sizeableJapanese communities and it appears that theywill serve to disseminate information andgovernment views on issues that crop up in themedia, promote soft power and generatesinecures for retiring diplomats.

Public diplomacy is the art of convincing andseducing other governments and people inother nations to agree with, support oracquiesce to the policies and positions of thepractitioner's government. On this score Japanis not doing too badly, but there have beensome unfortunate lapses. For example, inJanuary 2015 Japanese diplomats visited theoffices of a US textbook publisher to complainabout errors in a two paragraph descriptions ofthe wartime military "comfort women", a bêtenoire of reactionaries and the government ofPrime Minister Abe. The world history textbookin question does contain several errors, but thequestion is whether this diplomatic pressurewas the best way to handle the problem.Presumably, diplomats understand the societyin which they are representing theirgovernment so could have anticipated theresulting US media backlash against Japan, onethat questioned Tokyo's stance on press andacademic freedoms.

Perhaps more successful are the 'infomercials'that Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has runon CNN, one in 2016 focusing on the Rule of

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Law at Sea that highlights naval cooperationwith Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and thePhilippines. (Japan Times, March 15, 2016)China is not named, but is nonethelessimplicated as the transgressor and commonthreat. These expensive forays into publicdiplomacy on international commercialtelevision signal an end to Japan's low-keydiplomacy and suggest just how high Tokyothinks the stakes are in the battle with Chinafor global hearts and minds.

Cartoon depicting aggressive China.

The conservative Sankei newspaper advocatesa more aggressive diplomatic stance on historyissues that dovetails with the mission of NipponKaigi (Japan Conference), a neonationalistorganization including numerous LDP Dietmembers, and a sprinkling of high profilepundits and presidents of companies anduniversities. From their perspective Japan hasbeen too reticent and too polite; it needs totake the gloves off on the world stage. It doesnot seem to have occurred to them that thismight be a counterproductive strategy and thaton history issues it leaves Japan vulnerable tocriticisms of whitewashing, backsliding andpromoting an exonerating narrative thatglorifies wartime and colonial excesses.

Actually, Japan's reticent diplomacy over theyears has paid dividends as polls show thatAmericans rate Japan more highly on historyissues than Germany, a nation usually held upas the model penitent. It takes confidence for agovernment to acknowledge and atone for theshameful past, build a track record of peaceand believe that global support will follow. Pollsindicate that Japan's self-effacing style over theyears has won widespread admiration forBrand Japan, but this is now at risk from theAbe government's swaggering publicdiplomacy, a shift in tone that reflects morediffidence than confidence. Let's examine a fewinstances where Japan's hardball has backfired.

Sakura i Yosh iko i s a prominentconservative pundit affiliated with NipponKaigi.

Germis Affair 5

In an April 2, 2015 essay in the Number OneSh imbun pub l i shed by the Fore ignCorrespondent's Club of Japan, veteran Germanjournalist Carsten Germis wrote about hisexperiences of being harassed by the Japanesegovernment basically for doing his job. In hisview, the Abe government is overly sensitive topress criticism and responds aggressively intrying to suppress such views. Team Abe hasbeen especially sensitive to criticism aboutwhat Germis terms, "a clear shift that is takingplace under the leadership of Prime MinisterShinzo Abe – a move by the right to whitewashhistory."

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In 21st century Japan, there is far too muchofficial paranoia that all criticism of Japan isaiding and abetting China and Korea. Officialseverywhere get testy about negative coverageand Japan is certainly not the only countrywhere journalists are singled out forharassment. Journalists who have worked inChina have many stories to tell about intrusivemonitoring and restrictions that makereporting the news in Japan seem relativelyeasy and pleasant. But everyone knows thatChina is not democratic and doesn't tolerate afree press while it is generally assumed Japanis and does. The intolerance towards criticismis based on the erroneous belief that allcriticism of the Japanese government, and orAbe, reflects anti-Japanese sentiments. There isalso a presumption that journalists are "guests"who should be polite to their hosts whilescholars who take Japanese research moneyalso risk being labeled traitors if they expresscritical views.

Anna Fifield, the Washington Post's Tokyocorrespondent has written about Tokyo'sclumsy media intimidation and says, "As we cansee in the cases of NHK and Asahi being hauledover the coals for their reporting, the Japanesegovernment is trying to silence anyone whodoesn't toe the government line, but thegovernment has a much harder t imerestraining the foreign press in this way. Thatdoesn't mean they're not trying. Like manyother foreign journalists, I've been on thereceiving end of unwelcome emails trying toinfluence my coverage on the history issue." 1

Justin McCurry at the Guardian, David McNeillat The Independent and The Irish Times,Martin Fackler at the NY Times and othersrelate similar experiences. This can't helpJapan's image.

Carsten Germis's visit to the disputedislands of Dokdo/Takeshima drew the ire ofJapan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Germis argues that if Japan's popularity inGermany has suffered, it is not due to themedia coverage, but to Germany's easilyunderstood repugnance at historicalrevisionism. In this context, the Japanesegovernment's efforts to promote an exoneratingand valorizing narrative of the wartime past areself-defeating. Germis revealed that, "Thepaper's senior foreign policy editor was visitedby the Japanese consul general of Frankfurt,who passed on objections from 'Tokyo.' TheChinese, he complained, had used it for anti-Japanese propaganda."

"It got worse. Later on in the frosty, 90-minutemeeting, the editor asked the consul generalfor information that would prove the facts inthe article wrong, but to no avail. I am forcedto begin to suspect that money is involved, saidthe diplomat, insulting me, the editor and theentire paper. Pulling out a folder of myclippings, he extended condolences for my needto write pro-China propaganda, since heunderstood that it was probably necessary forme to get my visa application approved."

"Me? A paid spy for Beijing? Not only have Inever been there, but I've never even appliedfor a visa. If this is the approach of the newadministration's drive to make Japan's goals

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understood, there's a lot of work ahead. Ofcourse, the pro-China accusations did not goover well with my editor, and I received thebacking to continue with my reporting. Ifanything, the editing of my reports becamesharper."

The Japanese diplomat subsequently allegedthat he never made such allegations, possiblydue to the misunderstanding of the editor or anerror in translation. (Asahi 4/28/2015) Dr. PeterSturm, the FAZ editor involved, emailed methat the conversation with the Japanese ConsulGeneral took place in August 2014. "He said hewas instructed by 'Tokyo' to lodge a formalcomplaint about Carsten Germis' reporting. Hehad with him a number of papers in Japanese,which he continually consulted during theconversation. He also submitted a letter to theeditor by the Japanese Ambassador to Germany(in German) that we published on our letterspage a day or two after the conversation hadtaken place. In this letter the Ambassadorsummarized the official position of the JapaneseGovernment. The conversation was conductedin German, which the Consul General speaksexcellently. Therefore there was no interpreterpresent." (Personal communication April 28,2015)

Sturm added, "I can confirm the ConsulGeneral made the remarks about CarstenGermis' personal integrity exactly in the wayCarsten reported. As far as our newspaper andme personally are concerned we never were'anti-Japanese' – or ever will be. I tried to tellthe Consul General that our concern aboutcertain aspects of policy, which had found theirway into the columns of the paper were derivedsolely from a deep sense of friendship towardsan allied country."

In these times those who criticize Abe are oftenaccused of Japan-bashing and venality. This is aconvenient way to marginalize critical voices,suggesting that they have insidious motives andare helping, as alleged in the Germis case,

Chinese propagandists in exchange for moneyand favors. It doesn't seem to matter that noevidence was presented or that suchallegations are demonstrably untrue. Labelingcritics as Japan-bashers evades engaging thearguments and the facts and instead relies oncheap shot ad hominem attacks, tarnishingJapan's image.

Officials also warned several foreigncorrespondents, including Germis, not tointerview Nakano Koichi, a respected politicalscientist at Sophia University. Nakano's criticalassessments of PM Abe's policies andrevisionist views on history are widely quoted.The government's press handler asserted thathe is unreliable and steered journalists tosources that adhere to the government line,including a free lance foreign journalist whoappeared on the scene in 2014 with no priorexperience in Japan. Doing so only enhancedNakano's reputation and boosted interviewrequests because journalists understand that ifthe government is slagging him, it is probablybecause he speaks truth to power. Otherforeign journalists confide that they have feltpressure and know that their reporting mightjeopardize gaining access, as blacklistedreporters/newspapers don't get interviews withAbe or his inner circle. Some current and ex-government officials confide that theypersonally think Team Abe's effort to moreaggressively assert revisionist history iscounterproductive and harming Japan'sinternational image, but they do as they aretold.

Controlling the press has become more toxic incontemporary Japan because it involvesgovernment officials, and those who do theirbidding, impugning the professional integrity ofjournalists and their sources as a way todiscredit the analysis. Spin doctors everywheremassage the message, wine and dinejournalists, dangle access as an inducementand take umbrage at what they feel is unfairreporting, but what is now going on in Japan is

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getting more "Rovesque". Karl Rove andScooter Libby in the Bush Administrationreveled in their power and intervenedaggressively to push their storylines in waysthat rewrote the rules of engagement with thepress. Libby was convicted of a felony for hisrole in "Plamegate" that involved outing ValeriePlame a CIA agent, the wife of Joseph Wilson,an administration critic.

Nothing that the Kantei (Prime Minister'sOffice) has gone so far comes close to that levelof vindictiveness, but as Martin Facklerexplains, "Some degree of push back bygovernments against media coverage is normalin most democracies. For instance, I have dealtwith White House press handlers who will biteh a r d i f t h e y t h i n k r e p o r t e r s h a v emisrepresented what the President said. On theother side of the coin, the Japanese governmentgoes further in certain ways, playing this gameof denying access to and bad mouthingjournalists who don't toe the line. I think theyuse these tactics because they probably workwith the local press. I'm surprised that they'dthink the same tactics would work on foreignpress."2

Why is the government expending so muchpolitical capital on promoting revisionism andgoing after critical journalists? Ellis Krauss, aleading specialist on the Japanese media at theUniversity of California-San Diego, told me, itwas "…because for most of the postwar periodthe Left always connected the defense/ArticleIX issue to the war guilt. So Abe and his croniesbelieve that unless they legitimize the prewarmilitary they won't be able to justify the SDFand constitutional changes they want tomake."3

Krauss also thinks that, "MOFA is tryingdesperately to please Abe for fear he will pickon them as a scapegoat. The media iscowed…This campaign reflects a hugeinsecurity, not confidence, about Japan, abouttheir identity, about their history."

Krauss has coined the term "Abenigma", notingthat, "the real mystery is why Abe and theJapanese media don't realize how counter toJapan's own national interests this is. Warmemory is an issue that Japan cannot win on.Right wing denials only help the Chinese andKorean nationalists (who are themselvesirrational on this issue), and will alienateAmericans, their strongest ally, and theEuropeans and Australians, their naturaldemocratic friends." In his view it's not aboutapologizing, but rather "it's about denial, likeHolocaust denial in Europe. The best thing theJapanese government and right wing can do forJapan's own interests is just shut up on theseissues." But, Abe's advisors and supporters takea rather different view on national interestsand, seeing the battles over history in terms ofidentity politics, insist on exculpatoryrevisionist narratives that draw internationalcensure.

Churlish on UNESCO

The Japanese government's denunciation ofUNESCO's decision in October 2015 to inscribeChina's submission of "Documents of NanjingMassacre" in the Memory of the World Registeris both churlish and regrettably one-sided.Such fulminating damages Japan's reputationbecause i t sends a message that thegovernment is seeking to downplay or deny theatrocities committed by Japan's Imperial ArmedForces in the war of aggression it instigatedagainst China. At the same time, UNESCO alsoaccepted two sets of archives compiled byJapan, including a submission aboutmistreatment of Japanese POWs by the SovietUnion following the end of WWII; of 600,000sent to Siberia, 60,000 never made it home. SoJapanese accusations that Beijing is politicizingUNESCO seem self-serving and inconsistent.Oddly, Japan alone is allowed to position itselfas a victim of WWII while nations victimized byJapanese imperialism are castigated fordrawing attention to Japan's misdeeds andsubject to accusations of discrediting the

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Memory of the World Register. UNESCO didnot accept China's dossier on the comfortwomen, a decision that further underminesJapan's intemperate attack on UNESCO'salleged bias.

Hashima (aka Battleship Island) site ofcoal mine where Koreans were pressed intoservice during the early 20th century wassubsequently made famous in the JamesBond movie Skyfall (2012) and as of 2015was designated an UNESCO WorldHeritage site.

In July 2015, the government also made a hashof the UNESCO designation of 23 MeijiIndustrial Revolution sites after some verypublic wrangling with South Korea, with Tokyoalso accusing South Korea of politicizing theprocess. Seoul had opposed the listing of sevensites honoring Japan's modernization becausethey involved 57,900 Korean forced laborers,but finally acquiesced to Japan's proposal. Thisis because Japan agreed to establish aninformation center that would acknowledge theforced labor and because Japan's ambassadorto UNESCO Sato Kuni stipulated, "Japan isprepared to take measures that allow anunderstanding that there were a large numberof Koreans and others who were broughtagainst their will and forced to work underharsh conditions in the 1940s at some of thesites, and that, during World War II, theGovernment of Japan also implemented its

policy of requisition." The meeting of mindswas short lived as Foreign Minister Kishidaasserted, quite wrongly, that "forced to work"does not mean "forced labor". This peevishoutburst was probably aimed at smoothing theru f f l ed f ea ther s o f ben igh ted LDPconstituencies, but that does not make hisremarks any less fatuous and unbecoming ofJapan's top diplomat. Additionally, in the wakeof the brouhaha Japan dispatched an envoy tomeet with Bulgarian Irina Bokova, the DirectorGeneral of UNESCO, providing an opportunityto express a desire to appoint a permanentJapanese observer to the Memory of the WorldRegister while conveying veiled threats aboutwithdrawing Tokyo's funding, and dangling thepossibility of GOJ support should she decide torun for UN Secretary General, apparentlycontingent on accommodating Tokyo'sconcerns

Flouting Rule of Law

In the category of what not to do, resumption ofwhaling is a major stumble for Japan because itundermines its rule of law diplomacy in waysthat anger many of its major allies and others.In the war of words with Beijing, Tokyo hasgained moral authority by criticizing its rivalfor not abiding by the rule of law and trying tochange the status quo through unilateralmilitary coercion. So Japan's defiance of theInternational Court of Justice's ruling thatJapan's research whaling program in Antarcticwaters violates the terms of the 1986moratorium of the International WhalingCommission is a major setback because indoing so Japan is exempting itself from the ruleof law it otherwise assiduously upholds.

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In 2016 Japan resumed whaling in defianceof the ICJ.

When the ruling was issued in March 2014,Japanese foreign ministry spokesman, ShikataNoriyuki, told reporters that Japan respectedthe rule of law and would abide by the decision.This was the right call because by agreeing toparticipate in the ICJ process Japan andAustralia committed to accepting the outcome.Subsequently, in 2015 Japan reversed itself andis now flouting the ruling by resuming thewhale hunt in the Antarctic. This is not a goodprecedent to shore up Japan's legal position inany potential future arbitration cases thatmight arise over territorial claims or EEZs.Moreover, in terms of public image in the US,Europe and beyond, whaling is a losingproposition, something that provokes aviscerally negative reaction. In 2016, forexample, Japan's research whalers killed over200 pregnant minke whales in the Antarctic,justifying this cull as essential to determine theage at which minke whales reach sexualmaturity, but again convinced few in the courtof public opinion while disregarding the rule oflaw it frequently invokes in pillorying China'sterritorial aggrandizement. Domestically itsalso hardly inspired policy given that almost noJapanese consume whale, and the entireprogram is only viable with heavy governmentsubsidies. Moreover, health authorities havefound very high concentrations of mercury andPCBs in whale meat, advising pregnant womennot to eat any at all. Pro-whaling advocates in

the Japanese government and Diet may thinkthey are justified on cultural and culinarygrounds, but they are harpooning Brand Japan.Nevertheless, their transgressions pale incomparison to revisionists' falsehoods seekingto rehabilitate Japan's shabby wartime past.

Statues of Reproach

Like many other academics and journalists inJapan and the US, in 2015 I received copies oftwo books from Dr. Kuniko Inoguchi, an LDPmember of the Upper House: History Wars:Japan-False Indictment of the Century compiledand published by the Sankei Shimbun andGetting Over It! Why Korea Needs to StopJapan Bashing by Sonfa Oh a professor atTakushoku University in Tokyo. The U.S.-registered Japanese nonprofit Global Alliancefor Historical Truth claims credit on its websitefor the Sankei book distribution. Dr. Inoguchilaments that unnamed individuals with politicalambitions have distorted 20th century regionalhistory and that "this distorted history has beenexported into some areas outside of East Asia."

Revisionist tracts sent to Japan specialistsaround the world.

It is unlikely that these polemical jeremiads will

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convince anyone to change their mind and aremore likely to incite a negative reaction in theUS because they read like propaganda. TheSankei slams China's alleged backing of acomfort woman statue and Pacific War Museumin San Francisco, apparently misunderstandingthe local politics of these initiatives. Itconveniently overlooks how in 2013 HashimotoToru, as mayor of Osaka, sister city of SanFrancisco, drew the ire of the San FranciscoBoard of Supervisors with his commentsjustifying and downplaying the comfort womensystem. The Sankei raises the alarm aboutongoing "History Wars" in the US, what it callsthe main battlefield for public opinion,asserting that China is orchestrating discordbetween the US and Japan. If so, Beijing isdoing a lousy job as more Americans by fardistrust China, by an almost 2:1 margin; only38% of Americans have a high opinion of Chinawhile 74% have a favorable view of Japan. (Pew2015)

Local Bay Area activists report that before theBoard unanimously approved the comfortwomen memorial in September 2015, the JapanLobby was vigorously working behind thescenes to kill the resolution. Local Japanese-A m e r i c a n s p r i v a t e l y c o n f i r m t h a tdisinformation was sowed and that they werepressured to lobby against the resolution, withcontinued Japanese corporate funding hangingin the balance. One wrote in an email: "TheConsulate General of Japan was not justactively lobbying against the proposedresolution on recommending a "comfortwomen" memorial in San Francisco, but alsofeeding false rumors to prominent members ofJapantown establishment and pressuring themto support its effort to block the resolution,creating serious divisions within JapaneseAmerican community as well as in larger AsianAmerican community." Another referred toJapanese pressure brought to bear on Boardmembers, with "the implicit threat that Jtown'spolitical contributions may be at stake. But theytook notice when the API (Asia Pacific Islander)

Caucus of the California Democratic Partyendorsed the resolution. We need more supportfrom the Democratic leadership (endorsementletters, etc.) to push back against the uglyforeign government intervention on ourpolitical process."

The Board disregarded spurious allegationsabout incidents of discrimination and bullyingtargeting ethnic Japanese children in Glendale,California after a comfort woman statue waserected there. A local SF observer reports that,"Supervisor Mar contacted various people inGlendale, including city officials, board ofeducation, local Japanese American groups,and others and confirmed that there are nosuch bul lying or hate crimes againstJapanese/JA children there." Glendaleauthorities dismissed these unsubstantiatedallegations as fabrications by opponents to thestatue, pointing out there were no reports toschools or police at the time. It seems thatJapan would do better to ignore these statueand memorial initiatives because interventionhas repeatedly backfired, throwing fuel on thefires of recrimination over the shared EastAsian past of colonialism and war. Two newones unveiled in October 2015 in Seoul, oneplaced by Chinese-American activists depictinga Chinese comfort women, and an appeal toadd a Filipina statue to the memorial, suggestthe perils of Japan's current tactics.

Japanese delegation protests Glendale's

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comfort woman statue.

Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and South KoreanPresident Park Geun-hye understand somethingneeds to be done about the comfort womenissue, but they still have a way to go. It isunlikely that the Dec. 28, 2015 "final andirreversible resolution" to issues surroundingthe women who worked in wartime brothels atthe Japanese military's behest will prove to bemuch of a resolution at all. Indeed, the cleverevasions and semantic parsing could easilyunravel and become another bone of contentionand trigger renewed mutual recriminations.The UN has issued a yellow card to Tokyo onthe 2015 comfort women agreement, with theCommittee on the Elimination of DiscriminationAgainst Women (CEDAW) stating it, "did notfully adopt a victim-centered approach" andwas evasive on responsibility for the humanrights violations endured. In its March 2016report, CEDAW also admonished Japaneseleaders for ongoing disparaging statementsabout the comfort women and urged thereinstatement of the comfort women issue insecondary school textbooks. Subsequently, onMarch 11, 2016 a group of UN human rightsexperts issued a statement rebuking theJapanese and South Korean governments forthe diplomatic chicanery, insisting that they,"should understand that this issue will not beconsidered resolved so long as all the victims,including from other Asian countries, remainunheard, their expectations unmet and theirwounds left wide open." They also expressedconcern that the South Korean government"may remove a statue commemorating not onlythe historical issue and legacy of the comfortwomen but also symbolizing the survivors' longsearch for justice."

Japanese conservatives insist that the Yen 1billion (about $8 million) Seoul is promisedunder the accord won't be paid until after thecomfort woman statue across the street fromthe Japanese Embassy is removed, but citizens

maintain a 24/7 vigil around the bronze figureof a school girl to prevent its removal. Forcibleremoval risks igniting a firestorm of protestthat would ensure the accord going up insmoke and perpetuation of bilateral discord nomatter what the diplomats want to believe. Butif the statue remains, the accord will bederailed because the 'not called reparations'won't be paid.

In addition to such diplomatic deceit, Japan'shardball tactics on the comfort women issueinvolve crude campaigns in the U.S. Whatshould we make of the Voices of Vietnam, awell-funded group that has hired formerMinnesota senator Norm Coleman to be thepoint-man in demanding President Park Geun-hye apologize for Vietnamese comfort womenwho served some 320,000 Korean soldiersfighting at the behest of Washington in theVietnam War? This organization held a pressconference on October 15, 2015 in connectionwith Park's summit with President Obama,timed to maximize publicity. In a Fox News op-ed published on the eve of the summit,Coleman demanded Park apologize to theVietnamese vict ims of Korean sexualpredations, write, "Failing to make such anunequivocal apology would only underminePresident Park's moral authority as she pressesJapan to apologize for the sexual violenceperpetrated against South Korean 'comfortwomen' during World War II." Apparentlyattacking Park is the main mission of anorganization that seems, rather curiously, tohave sprung up out of nowhere according tocontacts in the Vietnamese U.S. diaspora.Certainly, amends to these women-there are anestimated 800 survivors who served Koreansoldiers- and the thousands of children ofmixed ancestry born to them are in order, butwhy hasn't Coleman spoken out about the farlarger, problem involving US soldiers? And,does Coleman think that the comfort womensystem is really the same as what happened inVietnam?

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South Koreans opposed to removal ofstatue.

K-Street Maneuvers

K Street is synonymous with lobbying and PRfirms that offer clients services that help themgain access and convey their messages. Japanvigorously lobbied to amend the Trans PacificPartnership (TPP) in the US, hoping to makeadjustments in line with Japanese governmentdesires. Wilson and Needham (2014) writingabout Japanese lobbying on TPP in thenewsletter The Hill reported that, "Akin Gumpwas influential in the creation of the U.S.-JapanCaucus in Congress, cofounded last year byReps. Devin Nunes (R-Calif.) and JoaquínCastro (D-Texas). Japan paid Akin Gump$638,000 last year, the most of any firm it hadon retainer." The Hill reports that overall Japanspent $2.3 million on US consultants from 2014until early 2015 and keeps 20 firms on retainer.

Ackley (2015) adds, "The government of Japanknows its way around K Street. In the monthsleading up to Japanese Prime Minister ShinzoAbe's visit to Washington this week, thecountry spent more than $1.2 million onlobbying, law and public relations firms,according to documents filed with the JusticeDepartment. As the country navigatesnumerous policy issues, including a massivetrade deal with the United States, it relies onthe hired help of such firms as Akin Gump

Strauss Hauer & Feld, Hogan Lovells and thePodesta Group. Japan enlisted the DaschleGroup, the firm of former Senate MajorityLeader Tom Daschle, D-S.D., just this month. "

PM Abe addresses joint session of the USCongress April 29, 2015.

Bogardus (2014) writes, "K Street operators…offer on-the-ground intelligence aboutCongress and the executive branch thatdiplomats and other Japanese officials mightotherwise miss. They also help forge ties andset up meetings with government officials,think tank policy wonks, corporate lobbyistsand journalists." Lobbyists also are monitoringthe comfort women story for the JapaneseEmbassy: "K Street has compiled informationon meetings between House members andKorean-American groups - many of whichpushed for the original resolution. HoganLovells also tracked what Honda, Royce andRos-Lehtinen said during an event honoring thesixth anniversary of passage of the comfortwomen resolution. The firm has also compiled alist of memorials to comfort women across theUnited States, as well as advertisements andstate legislation. " (Bogardus 2014)

Rabin-Havt (2015) explains the logic of hiringformer high ranked officials and politicians,

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"This points to the reason Japan and othercountries are eager to hire former seniormembers of Congress and well-connectedinsiders. The ability to glean information fromformer colleagues and contacts is just asimportant as their skill at influencing legislativeand administrative outcomes. This expertise isparticularly crucial during complex foreignnegotiations requiring approval of a finicky andpartisan Congress."

Conclusion

It is hard to reconcile Calder's wallflower Japanwith significant counter evidence discussedabove about a more aggressive publicdiplomacy as the hybrid public and privatesector efforts of the Japan Lobby are playinghardball, especially on history issues, andramping up overall lobbying efforts. Calder'sview that Japan's public diplomacy has notbeen as effective as its rivals and inept inidentifying and exploiting opportunities is notconvincing. China seems even more hopelessthan Japan in public diplomacy. Japan is notalone in hiring lobbyists and is not the onlynation underachieving on its public diplomacy,but like China, its hardball tactics seem to bebackfiring. Given the reservoir of goodwill inthe US public towards Japan, and favorableattitudes at the highest level of governmentthat contrast with hostility towards China,Japan would be better served by a low keypublic diplomacy rather than the moreimperious approach favored by Team Abe.

The Japan Lobby is becoming more activeunder PM Abe and fighting battles over historythat are not promoting a more positive image.It need not do so as a 2015 Pew Poll indicatesthat Americans rate Japan more highly ondealing with wartime history than Germany,the nation usually touted as the model penitent;61% of Americans believe that Japan hasapologized enough or has nothing to apologizefor compared to 54% expressing similar viewsabout Germany. (Pew 2015) There is a risk that

Japan's newly aggressive strategy on wartimecontroversies will backfire, undermininggoodwill in the US while roiling regionalrelations in northeast Asia. Japan has reapedthe benefits of a more reticent, self-effacingdiplomacy, one that acknowledged much moreabout wartime excesses than the Abe Cabinet isprepared to tolerate. The growing intolerancein Japan toward critics in media and academiahandicaps Japan's public diplomacy whilerevisionist rewriting of history makes it looklike its shirking responsibility. In short,hardball history initiatives represent a dead-end and Japan would be better served in its PRbattle with China by focusing on contemporarysecurity and territorial issues and championingthe rule of law where its case is far morecompelling. Quibbling and caviling overmemory wars that focus global attention onJapan's worst moments is a dead-end, no-winstrategy. This distracts attention from Japan'sstrengths and its enormous accomplishmentsover the past 70 years in promoting peace,stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific. Inpromoting a national identity that takes pridein the nation, it is this post-1945 record thatmerits the limelight. Thus, Abe and fellowrevisionists are unwittingly helping Asian rivalsand undermining Japan's public diplomacy.

SOURCES

Ackley, Kate. "Japan Taps Lobbyists to BolsterU . S . T i e s "(http://www.rollcall.com/news/japan_taps_lobbyists_to_bolster_us_ties-241489-1.html?zkPrintable=true), Rollcall, 4/27/2015

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Jeff Kingston is Director of Asian Studies at Temple University Japan and has authoredand edited a number of books on Japan including Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan(2014) and Asian Nationalisms Reconsidered (2016). He is an Asia-Pacific Journal editor.

Notes1 In June 2011, Inouye was appointed a Grand Cordon of the Order of the Paulownia Flowers(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Order_of_the_Paulownia_Flowers), the highest Japanese honorconferred on a foreigner who is not a head of state. He was only the seventh American overalland first Japanese-American to receive this award. He was decorated, "to recognize hiscontinued significant and unprecedented contributions to the enhancement of goodwill andunderstanding between Japan and the United States." Hawaii 24/7, June 22, 2011.2 "Now in China-13th Five Year Plan Now" see Youtube.com 2015.3 The focus here is on Japan's public diplomacy and lobbying efforts, but it does appear thatChina engages in similar tactics through its Confucius Institutes in terms of influencingacademia and the US-China Business Council that includes many Fortune 500 member firmsthat are experienced and adept at the art of political lobbying. In addition, Chinese-Americangroups are active, especially on war memory issues. Over the past two decades the growingheft of Chinese companies means they also can exert more influence in terms of where theydecide to invest and the jobs that go with that. Clearly China does not gets its way on manyissues such as buying firms deemed to have national security importance, trade disputes andits growing assertiveness in the South and East China Sea and polls suggest it has clearly notcharmed the American public.4 China did not make the list, but whether this means low spending on lobbying or somethingelse is unclear and I have been unable to find comparable estimates of what China spends onlobbying.5 This section draws on Kingston 2015b from The Asia-Pacific Journal.6 Interview April 2015.7 Interview May 2015.

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8 Interview April 2015.