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       P   h  o   t  o  g  r  a  p   h  y

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    It’s just after 6pm, the light dying out, the air cold.

    Gradually, people start gathering on what has become

    an established route: from the Council of Ministers to the

    yellow cobbled streets of the National Assembly. The crowd

    expands, filling Tsarigradsko Boulevard all the way to Sofia

    University, enveloping the Alexander Nevsky cathedral, its

    golden domes buttressing the low sky. The streets, rattlingwith old city trams during the day, now witness a different

    reverberation: “O-STAV-KA!” or “Resign!”, the citizens shout,

    waving posters, angry picket signs and dummies of the

    people who are supposed to represent them.

    Known more for their images, videos and improvised

    happenings than for speeches or manifestos, they are

    among the millions who, since 2011, have marched

    and occupied spaces everywhere from Egypt to the US,

    Russia, Spain, Brazil and Turkey. Against the backdrop

    of global protest, events in Bulgaria have seemed to

    pale in significance, receiving very little international

    coverage. Unlike the brutal repression in Taksim Square,

    the militaristic theatre in Cairo and, most recently, the

    mass demonstrations tear-gassed and stun-grenaded

    in Kiev, the daily rallies that began last year have been

    remarkably peaceful. Described by some as an example of

    what the Serbian activist Srdja Popović calls “laughtivism”,to outsiders the protests might even resemble a summer

    pastime for smartphone-wielding middle-class Bulgarians,

    complete with young children, pets and plenty of cold beer.

    Yet for this notoriously apathetic Balkan nation and recent

    EU member, the events of the last several months mark a

    major social and cultural leap, an expression of the deep

    discontent that has been building since the promised End

    of History two decades ago.

    Early last year, Prime Minister Boiko Borisov resigned

    amid anti-austerity demonstrations. The biggest protests in

    15 years, they were attributed to worsening living standards

    and a sudden hike in electricity prices, but they took a

    distinctly anti-government turn after the widely reported

    self-immolation of 36-year-old Plamen Goranov. Though he

    was one of six people to set themselves on fire in Bulgaria

    in less than a month, Goranov, who did so on 20 Februaryin the town square of Varna as an explicit protest against

    the city’s long-term mayor, drew comparison with Mohamed

    Bouazizi, the Tunisian street vendor whose self-immolation

    became a catalyst for the Arab Spring, and Jan Palach, the

    Czech history and politics student who set himself on fire

    in response to the crushing of the Prague Spring. Hailing

    Goranov as a symbol of the country’s profound political

    crisis, crowds mobilised in Sofia, Plovdiv, Blagoevgrad, Ruse,

    Sliven and Varna and, unappeased by Borisov’s sacking of

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    his nance minister or his promises to slash prices, toppledhis government. “I can’t look at a Parliament surrounded

    by barricades,” he said, explaining that it was better to step

    down than rely on police truncheons “to protect ourselves

    from the people”.

    Taking ofce in 2009, he had been greeted as a

    saviour, promising to sweep Bulgaria clean of corruption

    and organised crime. A former reghter and bodyguard

    to dignitaries such as the late communist dictator Todor

    Zhivkov and the ex-king Simeon Saxe-Coburg, Borisov,

    with his formidable physical presence and straight-talking

    approach, was a textbook populist leader, wooing the press

    and the people with new highways, ribbon-cuttings and

    highly publicised arrests. Over time, though, cracks began

    to show. Some of the secret recordings of illicit phone calls

    his government released backred, revealing that Borisov,

    like his predecessors, was offering protection for some

    shady schemes even as he targeted others. There were

    allegations of media censorship and ties with mobsters –

    known as “mutri” or “thick-necks” – and soon both he

    and his centre-right party GERB (Citizens for European

    Development of Bulgaria) were widely discredited.

    His replacement, Plamen Oresharski, was elected as

    a supposed antidote; his cabinet was met with a kind of

    hopeful neutrality. Oresharski, with his serious, reliable air,

    is best known as one of the architects of the currency board

    imposed on Bulgaria in 1997 as part of an IMF programme

    to save the country from currency collapse and 1,000 per

    cent ination. He had consolidated his hardcore neoliberal

    pedigree as nance minister in the 2000s, and was

    considered just the man to “x” the economy. Yet it was

    Oresharski who, in mid-June, fresh from his election at the

    head of a Socialist-backed government, ignited an entirely

    new and signicant surge of protest. The match was litby his decision, announced without debate in the National

    Assembly, to appoint the media magnate Delyan Peevski as

    head of the State Agency for National Security (ДАНС).

    This corpulent, improbably antagonistic-looking man,

    the 33-year-old son of Irena Krusteva, the former head

    of the national lottery, is largely known for his murky

    connections. After becoming head of Bulgaria’s large sea

    port at Varna during his second year at university, he went

    on to be red from a post as deputy minister for disastermanagement over allegations of corruption at the tender

    age of 25; Peevski then began a notably passive spell in

    parliament, where he missed 92 per cent of legislative

    sessions between 2009 and 2013. He went in for crude

    threats against parliamentary opponents, enjoyed close

    ties with state prosecutors and the media, and had no

    intelligence experience whatsoever. Handing Peevski the

    guardianship of Bulgaria’s internal and external security –

    a role that now included responsibility for organised crime –

    felt positively Orwellian. In an interview, he made it clear

    he was keen to punish: “Whoever was in the wrong will feel

    the full severity of the law.” 

    In the context of Bulgaria’s recent history, this

    was hardly news. If UK voters are still capable of being

    scandalised by revelations of corruption, in Bulgaria, it

    has seeped into the fabric of everyday life. After years

    of repeated and increasingly agrant transgressions,

    the public has come to take the abuse of power as a

    given. The latest bribes, embezzlements and smear

    campaigns have become permanent conversation llers,

    along with pensions, May graduation balls and pickled

    vegetables for winter. So when, just hours after the Peevski

    announcement, thousands of people took to the streets,

    organising via social media with the hashtag #ДАНСwithme

    (literally “dance with me”), it marked a sharp turn for a

    civic consciousness long stuck between banality and dread.

    Oresharski revoked the appointment ve days later but,

    for him and his shaky, month-old government, the die was

    cast. The price citizens demanded was their resignation.

    Perhaps Bulgarians are growing tired of strongmen

    and “saviours”. For hundreds of years, the country was,

    to use Jonathan Franzen’s description of Lithuania in The

    Corrections, “passed along between powers like a muchrecycled wedding present”. In the incoherent architecture

    of the capital, Soa, its early 20th-century Viennese-

    style facades plastered with elegant wreaths and lyres

    cohabiting with featureless Soviet concrete, you can read

    the signs of the ve-century Ottoman rule, the San Stefano

    Peace Treaty of 1878, the USSR’s invasion, the post-war

    communist takeover.

    The post-communist anarchy of the 1990s brought

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    with it a creeping individualism and stoked the fantasy of

    a charismatic individual who might transform Bulgaria into

    a true European country through sheer force of will. In

    these years, wealth concentrated in the hands of the few

    and any meaningful distinction between the private and

    public sectors disappeared in a labyrinth of bureaucracy

    and opaque corporate accounting. Luxury cars, bleachedhair and monogrammed bags appeared everywhere and the

    phenomenon of chalga, a pornified form of pop-folk music,

    seemed to penetrate all corners of the culture, embraced by

    national television channels and public figures. “Throughout

    the dejected years of the transition,” the novelist Theodora

    Dimova writes, the ruling classes “managed to eliminate

    hope and nurture a generation clogged with chalga.

     ‘Whoever doesn’t like chalga, emigrate!’ Some emigrated

    abroad, others within themselves.” Pop culture glamorised

    easy money and shady deals, while constant transgressions

    by both left and right induced a deep political apathy that

    seems only now to show signs of lifting. It’s no wonder the

    protesters do not organise themselves along party lines.

    For one thing, the current government is a paradoxical

    coalition of the Social ist Party, their traditional backer the

    MRF (who represent Bulgaria’s large Turkish minority) and

    the far-right nationalists ATAKA (“attack”), led by a politicalprovocateur with a history of bashing the MRF and storming

    mosques in broad daylight. What’s more, the only other

    party in parliament is Borisov’s GERB.

    Caught off guard, the government first tried to ignore

    the demonstrations and censor the coverage, hoping it

    would all just go away. Instead, it grew in size, boldness

    and creativity: flash mobs of clowns carried brooms

    and signs saying “Let’s sweep out the trash”; a young

    ballerina danced on the yellow cobblestones of the National

    Assembly; a diver emerged from the sea bearing a banner

    that read OSTAVKA; on 14 July, a crowd thanked the French

    ambassador for his support by staging a reenactment of

    Delacroix’s Liberty Leading the People. This vibrancy and

    diversity of expression has been a defining feature of the

    protests and the new atmosphere they have created. On

    the 40th day, demonstrators trapped lawmakers inside

    the parliament buildings for eight hours: when the police

    loaded MPs onto a white bus, intending to drive through the

    crowds, the demonstrators threw up makeshift barricades

    of torn-out paving stones, trash cans and potted plants

    from nearby restaurants.

    Police repression was stepped up following that

    incident, but the government also began trying other

    tactics to undermine the demonstrations. They orchestrated

    clumsy “counter-protests”, bribing and mobilising a few

    hundred people at a time, many of whom seemed oblivious

    to what was going on and cheerfully admitted they had

    been paid for their “trip to Sofia”. They also cast aspersions

    on the allegiances of the demonstrators, branding them

    middle-class “Soros-oids” in thrall to Washington and

    Brussels. It was an attempt once more to conjure up

    what the film and theatre director Yavor Gardev calls the

     “mythical-astrological idea of Bulgaria as a little planetsurrounded by two bigger ones – the East and the West,

    which are magnetically pulling her on both sides”. Despite

    their best efforts, the fact remains that no counter-protest

    has ever reached the number of people gathering on the

    streets of their own accord almost every night since June.

    While the mantra “Resign!” has been the loudest

    message heard at the protests, their aims have grown

    broader and deeper than the overthrow of this one

    government, which people know from experience would

    do little to change the status quo. The social theorist Julia

    Kristeva, who criticised Bulgaria’s lack of an aesthetic of the

    public sphere in her 2000 book The Crisis of the European

    Subject , may have been impressed by the events of 23

    October, when students at Sofia University (inspired in

    part by the style of Occupy) reclaimed its public space,

    bringing classes to a halt to proclaim a “moral revolution”.

    Starting with around 50 students in one of the main lecture

    halls, the numbers grew and the gesture quickly gained

    public recognition and support. The students explicitly

    dissociated themselves from all political parties, instead

    organising workshops and street demonstrations that aimedto rethink what a desirable future might look like. “We are

    awake!” proclaimed the banners hung from the university

    walls, the slogan of those the nation has come to know as

     “the early risers”. Against the paid counter-protesters and

    fake students who have tried to discredit them, as well as

    the attempted invasions by ultra-nationalist government

    supporters and other thugs, the student occupation

    managed to sustain a fragile balance, preserving complexity

    and ambivalence. “We are not paid to protest,” a student

    representative said. “We are paying, with our faces, with

    our free time, with our work time, with our youth, so we

    can possibly have a future here.” 

    The Sofia occupation inspired others, of the National

    Academy of Theatre and Film, the National Art Academy,

    the New Bulgarian, Technical, Plovdiv and Veliko Turnovo

    universities, as well as a number of demonstrations of

    solidarity abroad. More importantly, though, the studentswere able to forge links with the crowds in the streets.

    Just as the protests were beginning to diminish at the

    end of the summer, the student occupation brought them

    thundering back to life: crowds marched in support of

     “the young people fighting for Bulgaria instead of leaving

    it, as thousands have so far”. The head of the Theatre

    Guild closed all theatres for several days in solidarity with

    the students, while actors and artists on one occasion re-

    created a mass funeral procession from Alexander Morfov’s

    play Life is Beautiful , walking under the slogan: “Let’s bury

    the morals of Bulgarian politicians.” 

    Some criticise this protest movement for its lack of

    clear political goals, but as Kristeva said of the student

    strikes at the Sorbonne in ’68: “to think is to revolt, to be

    in the movement of meaning”, as well as that of the street.

    Rejecting the coercive logic of tactical voting, of acceptingthe lesser evil, the student occupation has helped open

    up a new collective discourse. By their reclamation of

    public space, they have physically rejected the privatising,

    individualising impulse of the ’90s. Simply put, the protests

    mark a real desire for change. More than 60 per cent of the

    country say they are in sympathy with the protesters. So

    far, they have had one undeniable effect: they have swept

    away the entrenched apathy on which Bulgaria’s corrupt

    political class has rested easy for so long.

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