The Interactivity of Political Engagement [a Masters thesis, 2006]

8/4/2019 The Interactivity of Political Engagement [a Masters thesis, 2006]

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The Interactivity of Political Engagement

GRAHAM LALLY

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree ofMSc in Public Policies for Science, Technology and Innovation

SPRU - Science and Technology Policy Research

University of Sussex

August 2006


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Acknowledgements

Thanks are due to a number of people without whom this dissertation would not have been

even half as complete or enjoyable. Thanks must go to Erik Millstone for his guidance and

advice, and to Carmen Long for remembering all the things I had forgotten. Extensive

gratitude must go to Professor Ed Steinmueller for his unquenchable source of knowledge,

ideas, criticality and patience. I would like to thank my family for their support, and for the

provision of wallet-threatening distractions which no doubt kept me sane. Finally, I could not

have done this without the patience, understanding, wisdom and numerical superiority of Julie

Morgan who has been there throughout, even while life has had far too much caffeine.

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Summary

This dissertation examines the links between the interactivity of network ICTs, political

engagement, and the structure of democracy. It investigates the role of the public sphere,

examines the different forms democracy can take, and analyses how the notion of interactivity

can be formalised, before applying these principles to some original empirical research. This

research seeks to understand differences and similarities between a number of organisations

and groups involved in the political process.

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Contents

Acknowledgements .....................................................................................................................2

Summary .....................................................................................................................................3Contents ...................................................................................................................................... 4

List of Tables, Figures and Graphs .............................................................................................5

1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................5

1.1. The Technology of Equality ............................................................................................ 8

1.1.1. Diffusion of access ....................................................................................................9

1.1.2. Diffusion of capabilities .......................................................................................... 10

1.3. Aims of the Research ..................................................................................................... 11

1.4. Why is this an important topic? ..................................................................................... 11

2. Theoretical Framework ......................................................................................................... 15

2.1. Public Spheres and Network Politics .............................................................................15

2.1.1. The Evolution of the Public Sphere ........................................................................ 152.1.2. Models of Democracy .............................................................................................17

2.2. Issues of Adoption ......................................................................................................... 21

2.2.1. Individual Factors ................................................................................................... 22

2.2.2. Social Factors ..........................................................................................................24

2.2.3. Political Factors .......................................................................................................26

2.2.3.i. Institutional Politics .......................................................................................... 26

2.2.3.ii. Socialization of Politics ................................................................................... 29

2.3. Defining Interactivity .....................................................................................................29

2.3.1. Measures of Interactivity ........................................................................................ 30

2.3.1.i. McQuail ............................................................................................................ 30

2.3.1.ii. Rafaeli ..............................................................................................................33

2.3.1.iii. Manca ............................................................................................................. 33

2.3.1.iv. McMillan .........................................................................................................34

2.3.1.v. van Dijk ............................................................................................................ 35

2.3.2. Collecting and integrating axes ...............................................................................37

2.4. Technology and Concepts ..............................................................................................41

2.5. Modern Communication Tools and Systems ................................................................. 43

3. Research ................................................................................................................................ 45

3.1. Hypotheses .....................................................................................................................46

3.2. Implementing the Framework ........................................................................................46

3.2.1. Notes on the coding of technologies ....................................................................... 463.2.2. Selection Criteria (or Units of Analysis) .................................................................49

3.2.3. Notes on the coding of websites ............................................................................. 52

4. Findings .................................................................................................................................53

4.1. Discussion ...................................................................................................................... 62

4.2. Limitations of the Study and Further Research ............................................................. 66

5. Implications and Conclusions ............................................................................................... 68

5.1. The Implications for Organisations ................................................................................70

5.2. The Implications for Policy-Makers .............................................................................. 70

5.3. The Implications for Citizens .........................................................................................71

Bibliography ..............................................................................................................................72

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List of Tables, Figures and Graphs

Table 1.van Dijk's dimensions of democracy 19Table 2.

Description of models of democracy19

Table 3.McQuail's dimensions of interactivity 31Table 4.McQuail's measures of interactivity 32Table 5.Rafaeli's measures of interactivity 33

Table 6.Manca's measures of interactivity 34

Table 7.McMillan's measures of interactivity 35

Table 8.van Dijk's measures of interactivity 37

Table 9.Summary of measures of interactivity 37

Table 10.Summary of distilled measures of interactivity 41

Table 11.Interactivity scores for list of technologies 48

Table 12.Technology use per site 55

Table 13.Total interactivity scores per site 54Table 14.Normalised scores per site 56

Table 15.Descriptive Statistics based on table 12 56

Table 16.Spearman's Coefficients 59

Table 17.Summary statistics for Principal Component Analysis 60

Table 18.Initial component matrix for Principal Components Analysis 60

Table 19.Rotated (via Varimax) component matrix for Principal Components Analysis 61

Table 20.Factor values per site 62

Figure 1.McMillan's four-part model of cyber-interactivity 35

Figure 2.Integrated hierarchy of Rafaeli's interactivity levels with Manca's feedback 40

Figure 3.Histogram of V1, amount of decentralisation over information storage 57

Figure 4.Histogram of V2, amount of decentralisation over message transmission

control

58

Figure 5.Histogram for V3, level of interactivity 58

Figure 6.Scatter plot for sites post Principal Components Analysis 62

1. Introduction

The Internet offers a vast potential to bridge previously unconnected spaces. Its point-to-point

nature, along with the established globe-spanning telephonic networks and the mass

production and availability of network terminals mean that individuals have an immense new

opportunity to engage with other individuals, from one living room to another on the other

side of the world. The move these networks have made, from only carrying voices to

conveying electronic signals representing anything that can be converted text, sound, video,

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money - has resulted in an entirely new, entirely different, and very exciting social

experiment that nobody planned. (Rheingold, 2000:xx)

This unbridled expansion in connectivity brings with it many emotions uncertainty and

opportunity, risk and optimism. The paradigmatic shift offered by the rise of such a

networked society places us in a state in which progress is difficult to predict, measure, or

even define. Set against an already inconstant political backdrop, analysing the threads that

draw together political opinion, technological progress and decisive policy-making becomes

more of a challenge than ever before.

This newly ubiquitous and personalised nature of network technology sheds fresh light on the

role of the individual within democratic society. As new avenues of social possibility are

opened up, so too are many questions concerning the identity of our selves as both users and

opinion-holders. How should we involve ourselves in political processes? What forums

should we participate in? How should we filter information or indeed why should we filter

it? As Boeder, writing of Poster, puts it, What kind of community can there be in this

space? (Boeder, 2005: no page, emphasis added)

In this dissertation, I raise the questions of how technology interacts with a view of the

public sphere that continues to evolve over time, whether an inequality exists in the

provision of political services based upon new technology, and where this technological trend

is likely to go in the future. I argue that, while a more diverse range of options for political

interaction is becoming available for the individual, the availability and variety of Information

and Communication Technologies (ICTs) available are not necessarily available to all

organisations. Rather, there are new opportunities for two sets of groups: those with sufficient

resources to implement a diverse set of technologies, and those with the technological

capabilities to implement appropriate technologies. Moreover, I argue that the availability of

new technologies to groups with limited resources goes hand in hand with a move towards

specialisation in political activities.

Before making these arguments, though, it will be necessary to first draw a frame within

which the topic can be understood properly. In order to accomplish this, I will discuss a

number of issues that relate in different ways to the research.

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The dissertation begins with a short introduction to the area of equality in technology. This is

intended to establish the currentpoliticalthinking in terms of what role technology plays in

society today, and to explain the variety of levels at which inequalities can be identified. This

is followed by a summary of the aims of this dissertation, and a discussion on what

importance it has.

The theoretical framework is laid out in three parts. First, I examine some high level models

of political networks, including a historical perspective based on Habermas' concept of the

public sphere and a system to map different models of democracy based on work by van

Dijk and Held. By presenting these abstracted ideas first, the more detailed notions and

patterns introduced later will be more easily understandable as parts of a whole. Furthermore,

it is hoped that by starting with the political side of the discussion rather than the purely

technical side, a human context rather than a technical one will be established. This

distinction, while possibly being subjective, is, in my view, an important one to make.

The second part of the theoretical framework investigates the relationships of technology on

three scales: with the individual user (e.g. usability), with society as a whole (e.g. network

externalities), and with politics as a specific set or activities and organisations within society.

This division of levels should aid the reader in connecting the abstract, macro-scale ideas

presented in the first section with the user- or connection-centric specifics looked at in the

section that follows.

This section, the third of the framework, describes a variety of ways in which the concept of

interactivity in technology and user interfaces can be analysed. Concepts of interactivity

from a number of fields are examined and compared, and their relevance to the topic at hand

is considered. This section is important, in that it provides the basis for, and leads on to, the

empirical research conducted later.

Following this theoretical framework, the research will be presented. As explained in more

detail below, this attempts to rate a number of politically-based websites along the measures

of interactivity as defined toward the end of the theoretical framework. The results of this

research will then be presented, examined and discussed using this framework as a

background. Finally, the limitations faced by the research, ideas for further study, and some

discussion of the implications of the findings will be explored.

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1.1. The Technology of Equality

For as long as networked ICTs have been available, people have noted the possibility that

these technologies can create new opportunities for inequality as well as equality and

collaboration. The apparent and sheer amount of fundamental change that this new breed of

technology can bring is often referred to as revolutionary, or considered as a new shift in

paradigm on the same scale as the introduction of railroads or electricity. (Freeman & Soete,

1997: 18-22)

Despite the ubiquity of ICT as part of both the global economy and a global society, concerns

over social equality are still very much in the minds of governments1 and researchers2. But

questions abound: Who is being left out, and of what exactly? Why are they being left out

so? Do they needto be connected? At what point, or at what level, should inequalities be

taken as acceptable? And does further technological advancement simply amplify these

issues, or offer a way to alleviate them? This section hopes to deal with some of these

questions by looking at the different scales at which inequalities can occur.

As networks have replaced or augmented traditional means of organisation, communication

and bureaucracy, the extent to which we become reliant on them has grown dramatically.

Gradually, the various domains that we all bear some relationship to every day have

incorporated and adapted these technologies of connectivity to suit their own purposes; from

military exercise to academic community, from passionate hobbyists to multinational

corporate firms and to small businesses. With this expansion has come greater

interconnectivity, and greater interdependency - more flexible production systems, more

possibility for global communication. Yet it would be foolhardy to assume that this expansion

has occurred in equal parts or without effect.

The distribution of technology must be understood on two levels, but this may only be done

(and hence the research given validity) by acknowledging the wider context within which it is

positioned. Firstly, there is the encapsulation of networks within a (for sake of argument)

capitalist system, a point which can hold influence over whether networks are intended for

1 See, for example, the report on Connecting the UK: the Digital Strategy (Prime Minister's Strategy Unit,2005)

2 See, for example, The UK Geography of the E-Society (Spatial Literacy, 2006)

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communication orcontrol(Barney, 2000. See also Dean, 2003; Sussman, 1997). Furthermore,

this market setting means that any imbalances in resources prior to the introduction of

technology are maintained (or even amplified) through the introduction of this extra, and

often expensive, product. Secondly, the progressive rate of technology introduces

inequalities according to the capabilities of individuals and organisations to continuously

adopt. Both of these will be looked at in more detail below.

1.1.1. Diffusion of access

The more traditional identification of the Digital Divide, while still depending somewhat on

who employs this term and to whom the argument is addressed (see Joseph, 2001 for

example), reflects upon and arises from the ability and/or motivation to purchase required

hardware, software and connectivity (such as ADSL, et al). As Peslak puts it:

The digital divide is simply the concept that some individuals or groups have access and

use of information technology whereas others do not.

(Peslak, 2006: no page)

This, in turn, is dependent on how necessary this hardware and software is perceived and

who holds these perceptions. This subjectivity is demonstrated through the numerous models

that tackle the provision by the state of various resources, such as basic levels of food,

clothing and health care. Such provisions, and ideas of what citizens are 'entitled' to, are based

on several factors. On one hand, the gap between the availability of resources and the extent

to which society as a whole relies on those resources may, if large enough, indicate or lead

to a two-tiered structure as identified above. On the other hand, intervention may have other,

undesirable effects, such as the disruption of possible market efficiencies.

Solutions being proposed and implemented for this divide include reduced cost hardware such

as more affordable laptops3 (a market-based approach), the UK's Home Computing

Initiatives4 and free public access at locations such as libraries (both more state-based

approaches). However, in the UK at least (and in much of Europe), such interventionist

schemes are implemented relatively little, and even less for connectivity. The prevalent mode

3 http://laptop.media.mit.edu/

4 http://www.ukhomecomputing.co.uk/, although no longer available since April 2006.

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of thought dictates that market forces should be allowed to develop as much as possible, such

that connectivity as a resource eventually reach accessible costs as a result of competition

(DTI, 2004). The intricacies of this argument are outside the scope of this research, but it is

certainly worth noting the current state philosophy here.

1.1.2. Diffusion of capabilities

Many people recognise that access alone is not sufficient to become an equal in networked

participation. Mossberger, Tolbert and Stansbury (2003) make a good effort to expand the

understanding of the term Digital Divide to include a variety of further divides that should

be considered additionally, although here we will concentrate on the second of these (after

issues of access). As they put it, having access to a computer is insufficient if individuals

lack the skills they need to take advantage of technology. (Mossberger, Tolbert and

Stansbury, 2003: 1)

The UK government highlighted this in its 2005 digital strategy report, noting that:

...cost is not the only or even the main barrier to take-up. First, some individuals may not

have the confidence or skills to use computers, even though they may actually want to getonline.

(Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, 2005: 5-6)

There are a variety of ways in which this problem may be addressed for instance, by

subsidising training schemes, encouraging more local and interpersonal support, and

providing spaces on-line that people are comfortable using. From a design perspective,

usability is an important issue with regard to both confidence and skill, and is an issue we

shall return to later.

Capabilities are subject to the same issues of intervention as access, although in a fashion that

is even more difficult to untangle. While an equal level of comfort and ability may be

obviously desirable in theory, in reality factors such as lifestyle and the amount of free time

an individual has may be restrictive to learning. Therefore, skills that are deemed to be

necessary to societal inclusion may need to be balanced against these alternative or 'wider'

social factors. (Mansell and Steinmueller, 2000)

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We will return to the ramifications of these layers of inequality later. For now, the important

concept to note is that inequalities are almost naturally created by the diffusion of ICTs, but

that with them come also the possibilities for renewed, and differentequalities.

1.3. Aims of the Research

This research aims to look at the third kind of inequality outlined above that of imbalances

in the political system caused or exaggerated through the selected application of ICTs, each of

which has different possibilities for networked interaction. It is not the aim of this dissertation

to make normative judgements over whether these imbalances are desirable, or even

avoidable. Instead, it is hoped that this dissertation will merely draw attention to the

development and implementation process of a number of ICTs, and provide some further

insight into the grey area that exists between the technology that each of uses or is expected

to use and the decisions that affect society as a whole.

1.4. Why is this an important topic?

The impact of new forms of communication on the way society is shaped is an ever-

increasingly complex question. It is a relatively simple matter to discern the immediate effects

of a single piece of technology on an individual at a particular moment in time (such as in the

study of Human-Computer Interaction, for example), but the complex patterns that emerge at

a larger, societal level mean that effects can often be unpredictable even when desirable.

Many concerns are raised only with hindsight, as an existing technology is adopted inincreasing amounts and the ramifications gradually become clear to those paying attention.

Perhaps it is the novelty and possibility of new concepts that obscures a rational foresight, but

the difference between what can be achieved and what willbe is a large one, and in this

manner the author of this research agrees with Clift: the existence of new technology does

not necessitate its use nor does it change the innate behaviour of citizens, politicians or civil

servants. (Clift, 2004: 4) This balance between technological determinism and social

constructivism will be investigated further later, but the notion is one to be remembered

throughout.

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We have already examined the most basic ideas that make up the Digital Divide - access,

confidence and skills. However, it can be said that there is a certain lack of enthusiasm to

investigate issues of inequality beyond these to examine topics of more subjective moral

value, for example, or to analyse the tools which we still place much faith in as a society. We

hope for the best, notes Barney, when we are unable or unwilling to thinkabout what is

best. (Barney, 2000: 5, emphasis in original) On a psychological level, this hope is often

preferable to dealing with reality in many instances, for example, faith in a theoretical

market optimum is a (rational) alternative to more detailed investigation. But just as issues of

access and capability do not always resolve themselves, so also can we not simply leave

further development solely in the hands of hope.

The normative nature of technology is an idea long-discussed in academic circles (for

example Winner, 1985), yet the matter is hardly discussed in the realm between policy-maker

and citizen. The idea of a Digital Divide, with its shifting definition as seen above, is

wielded more as a political argument than as the introduction to a wider-ranging discussion on

how our society inter-relates to technology. Yet, as we shall see in this dissertation, the nature

of how we govern ourselves is fundamentally entwined with how we apply our technical

knowledge.

The link between communication, debate and action is clear to all, even if the nature of that

link is complex and often confusing. By investigating the relationship between new forms of

communication and the evolution of political structures in the UK, this research hopes to

extend the perception of digital equality outwards, from simple attention to the individual as

seen in the divides so far, to what it means to be a connected individual. Does democratic

equality necessarily ensue following a satisfactory regime of access and skill? This research

argues that there remain many obstacles to obtaining such a position, and hopes to highlight

these through an examination of new political means from a mainly user-centric point of

view.

This perspective entails identifying the bridge through which individuals (or users) derive

their connectivity, and in doing so identify with a more digitally-connected society. This

research takes the idea ofinteractivity as the focal point of this bridge, a term that is at first

somewhat nebulous, but that will hopefully become more concrete as the discussion

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progresses.

A prime example of the importance of interactivity for the individual is found in Downes and

McMillan's excellent overview of the concept of interactivity:

Schaffer and Hannafin (1986) found that recall was significantly enhanced by increased

interactivity.

(Downes and McMillan, 1986: 160)

This is representative (by no means exclusively) of the psychological, user-centric impact that

technology can have that has a direct bearing on their ability to participate meaningfully in

debate. More generally, as Boeder notes, [p]ublic opinion can only be formed if a public that

engages in rational discussion exists. (Boeder, 2005: no page) This ability to engage with

both a group and with appropriate information emphasises the need to understand interactivity

as apoliticalartifact.

Furthermore, group engagement is a consistent theme in the literature on participation. Before

the rise of electronic networks, Habermas remarked:

In the course of our century, the bourgeois forms of sociability have found substitutes that

have one tendency in common despite their regional and national diversity: abstinence

from literary and political debate ... no public was formed around group activities.

(Habermas, 1989: 163)

This highlights the distinction to be made between mass communication andparticipation,

the latter of which is considered essential by most if a respectable version of democracy is to

be achieved. As Mossberger, Tolbert and Stansbury put it:

From radical models of a pure direct democracy to more transparent representative

systems, citizen participation is deemed as critical in governing accountability and public

dialogue.

(Mossberger, Tolbert and Stansbury, 2003: 88)

In summary, the link between how we interact with technology and how our society is

structured is a topic that bears more influence than it is otherwise given credit for in common

discourse. Amongst the novelty of new technologies and the rush to implement them, it is

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easy to forget that new trends are being established as a result. If we are to learn from the past,

then we must first observe what is happening in the present in order to apply the lessons

gained from existing research.

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2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. Public Spheres and Network Politics

2.1.1. The Evolution of the Public Sphere

In order to gain some historical perspective, this section will present a brief summary of the

evolution of the public sphere - in particular, the rise of a politics that could be considered

public in relation to the concept of a private domain. Here we will show that

communication technology has been an inherent part of politics for a relatively long time,and that a pluralistic approach to politics is not necessarily the modern result of a new

paradigm of technology either.

It is worth noting that the accuracy of describing the Internet as a new form of public sphere is

open to debate (Poster, 1995; Dean, 2003). Despite this, however, the public sphere paradigm

is a useful one. Not only does it provide an established framework within which the topic can

be systematically examined, it also suggests a central idea that allows for a historical

perspective to be drawn through the naturally-turbulent evolution of political debate.

In his widely influential book, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas

traces the beginnings of the idea back to an altogether new stage of capitalism that

developed in Great Britain in the 16th Century. (Habermas, 1989: 17) With the expansion of

foreign trade, a new infrastructure beyond the monarchy was needed to support the wider

markets, incorporating both political efforts and military force. (Ibid.) In order to support

these in turn, says Habermas, an efficient system of taxation was needed (Ibid.). This

transition from feudal representation to state rule created room for another sphere known as

the public sphere in the modern sense of the term: the sphere of public authority. (Habermas,

1989: 18)

At this point though, the definition of the term public is very much relative to the state of

affairs that preceded it, and is somewhat removed from the notion of a general public that is

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exercised today. Indeed, the private people who, because they held no office, were excluded

from any share in public authority. (Ibid.) But this changed, as a result of the increasingly

connected and dependent nature of this private sphere arising from mercantilism:

The economic activity that had become private had to be oriented toward a commodity

market that had expanded under public direction and supervision; ... Hannah Arendt refers

to thisprivate sphere of society that has become publicly relevant

(Habermas, 1989: 19, emphasis in original)

This was the beginning of the idea of a public sphere, as an integration of what was

previously isolated. The establishment of an overarching public authority, the countering

establishment of an idea of privacy, and the resultant push for feedback from one to the other

are all threads that are still very much relevant in examining the political landscape in a

current context.

By the end of the 17th Century, we can see the effect that the press were having on the

political process. Even if the idea of public accountability had yet to be formalised, the

concept had grown into an important political tool to be wielded when the time was right. The

public spirit was from this time onward an entity to which the opposition could appeal...

(Habermas, 1989: 64)

The 18th Century saw further increases in the decentralisation of power and a more scattered,

pluralistic (or even network) view of how debate should be carried out:

Political associations too were formed in great numbers. The twenty-six county

associations, founded in 1779 after the model of the Yorkshire Association, dealt with

questions of war expenditures, parliamentary reform, etc.

(Habermas, 1989: 65)

Furthermore,

Only toward the end of the eighteenth century did the parties attain an organizational

basis outside of Parliament ... With the founding of local committees they assumed their

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first solid organizational form.

(Ibid.)

We can see, then, that the fragmented nature of a public sphere that many seek to find in therecent rise of networked technology is not necessarily a new concept. The distinctions

between public and private spheres, where public refers to the state and private refers to the

market and the family, (Dean, 2003: 95) are conceptual inventions that merely serve to

simplify reality (and hence, to some extent, distort it). Recognising this, Dean re-establishes

the capitalist nature of the public sphere as communicative capitalism (Dean, 2003). By

classifying capitalism in this way, Dean also highlights the ongoing relationship between

numerous forms of capitalism with the public sphere; a relationship that is further traced by

Habermas' association of mercantile capitalism with the initial emergence of the concept, and

Barney's (2000) association of corporate capitalism with network control.

It would be highly unfair to extrapolate this, and conclude that allaspects of democracy are

an extension of capitalist methods and goals, though. In bringing this observation to light, the

aim is, firstly, to refute any claims that a fundamentally new mode of politics is represented

through emerging communication technologies (either by their promises, or their actualities),

and secondly, to understand the influences that hold sway over the diffusion of

communication technologies. With that in mind, a more general overview of the structure of

democracy will now be examined.

2.1.2. Models of Democracy

Having looked back at the way in which political participation has grown and been

influenced, it is now useful to identify a method of categorising different participatory

mechanisms. In this section, a relatively short summary of the range of structures a

democratic society and participatory politics can take will be presented. Here we will draw

primarily on the categories and descriptions given by van Dijk (2000), who in turns draws

upon and adapts held Held's widely-accepted Models of Democracy (Held, 1996). The

primary goal of this section is to provide the reader not with an extensive list of the

democratic models identified by various scholars, but to describe a practical set of dimensions

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that can be used to locate the discussion later on. Some examples, however, will be provided

by way of examples for these dimensions.

Van Dijk introduces two dimensions in order to differentiate between the various modes of

democracy discussed (van Dijk, 2000: 38-39). The first of these deals with theprimary goal

of a democratic model, which is polarised into opinion formation at one extreme, and

decision making at the other. The former refers to the airing of views how views are

manifested, accounted and processed. It is concerned with whether or not everyone (defined

according to the unit of application e.g. organisations or individuals) is represented, and

how that representation comes about. The latter is more concerned with arriving at a decision

on how to proceed, at some level, and as such deals with issues of deliberation, voting, and

the dissemination of information.

As we shall see, democracy models may sit towards one or the other, or locate themselves

between the two if equal emphasis is placed on each extreme.

The second dimension looks at theprimary means by which these goals are achieved, and

contrasts representative democracy at one end with direct democracy at the other. This

dimension is more self-explanatory than the first, and measures the level of intermediation

present between citizens and decision makers, or the lowest and the highest levels of

authority.

Within these two dimensions, van Dijk places a total of six democratic models, five of which

are taken from Held's initial list, with one further model libertarian democracy - being

introduced to fit in with what van Dijk describes as the dominant model among the pioneers

of the Internet community. (van Dijk, 2000: 44) As the influence of the Internet on politics

and vice versa - has shifted significantly within the years since van Dijk's introduction of this

model, it is questionable as to how relevant this last model is to research today. However, its

inclusion here is merely to show how different perspectives on democracy fit into the axes

chosen by van Dijk.

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Table 1.van Dijk's dimensions of democracy (Source: van Dijk, 2000: 39)

The table below presents summaries of the six models located within the two dimensions in

table 1.

Table 2.Description of models of democracy (Source: van Dijk, 2000: 39-45)

Model Description

Legalist Takes constitution and law as [the] foundation of democracy (van

Dijk, 2000: 39) and advocates market mechanisms over state

intervention. Accountability is more important than consultation with

citizens, as the role of the state is to uphold the legal frameworkwithin

which individuals make their own decisions (Held, 1996). Hence,

information dissemination and transparency is considered important

while decision-making mechanisms are considered unnecessary.

Competitive Representative with a clear division of labour between representatives

and voters (Held, 1996: 189) and an emphasis on voting to elect

individuals responsible for making decisions. Two-party systems are

the prime example of this model, although even if more parties are

involved, there remains a strong principle of majority rule whereby

popularity is essential.

Plebiscitary Direct democracy, such that there is a direct link between decision

makers and citizens, with an emphasis on decisions being made by

citizens through referenda mechanisms. Hence, the role of votingsystems becomes pronounced. Like the competitive model of

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Opinion Formation Decis ion Making

Representative Democracy Legalist

Competitive

Pluralist

Participatory

Libertarian

Direct Democracy Plebiscitary

Primary Goal

Primary Means


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democracy, majority rule may be prominent, although the rule is aimed

at decisions, rather than representatives.

Pluralist Consisting of many centres of power and administration (van Dijk,

2000: 42). A large number of organisations represent a multitude of

minority viewpoints (and hence less need for collective will to achieve

action), but there is less deliberation amongst citizens or organisations

than the plebiscitary model. Held (1996: 217) differentiates between

classicalpluralism and neo-pluralism, with the latter taking on a more

competitive, more corporate and less equitable foundation.

Participatory Maintains a decentralised mix of representation and direct democracy

as per pluralism, but places much more emphasis on active

citizenship (van Dijk, 2000: 44), with the aim of fostering

knowledgeable individuals that are able to comprehend and participate

in a collective political process.

In some ways, this reflects an attitude for the promotion of the

individual, rather than a workable model. For [i]f people know

opportunities exist for effective participation ... they are ... likely to

participate actively (Held, 1996: 268). (Of course, this establishes

something of a vicious circle in which the problem of initiating a

participatory process must be addressed.)

Libertarian Not originally proposed by Held, but introduced by van Dijk to take

into account the emergence of Internet pioneers with an interest in

organisational methods. Has an emphasis of autonomous politics by

citizens in their own associations using the horizontal communication

capabilities of ICT (van Dijk, 2000: 45) but also subscribes to free

market economics at the same time. In this sense, then, it is more

anti-institutional-politics than pluralism, and shares some ground in

common with legalism. The primary argument behind this model is

that the new networks make traditional political structures somewhat

obsolete. It should be noted that van Dijk's notion of libertarian

democracy mentions little of the right to ownership or the lack of

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collective action often associated with the definition of libertarianism.

As such, it is the autonomous, almost detachednature of the model

that is of most relevance here.

By examining the diversity of possible forms democracy can take, we achieve a number of

things. Firstly, we dispel the idea that democracy is a single concept with only one correct

definition. Stemming from this, it becomes clear that there is similarly no single best goal in

terms of what ICTs can achieve with regard to political structure. Secondly, some context is

provided for the environment in which technology assists the swing of power; as no single

politically-involved group can be readily placed in any one of the six categories above, it is

worth bearing this map of democratic models in mind as the aims and methods of different

organisations is studied.

2.2. Issues of Adoption

This section looks at some of the main influencing factors for the adoption, and the rate of

adoption, of ICT. It is not meant to be an exhaustive list, but should cover sufficient reasons

to give a broad understanding of the diversity of these reasons, and to provide evidence that

adoption is not a simple case of technological determinism.

Three types of issue will be looked at here, reflecting a range of levels that all influence the

take-up of technology, and are likewise influenced by it. By deconstructing the topic into

three levels - individual factors,social factors, andpolitical factors a distinction can be

drawn and a path traced between large- and small-level effects. By covering all three, some

useful context is given to each. This is not, however, intended to be a complete picture of the

architecture of the political domain as a whole, as such an undertaking would present much

lengthy irrelevance. Instead, this section intends to set out a basic framework for

understanding the role of the individual in conjunction with both technology (i.e. as a user)

and politics (i.e. as a citizen). There is much that could be said in the way of structural

analysis (see, for example, Knoke, 1990), economic and global infrastructures, and what it

means to be part of a state or even a culture (for example, Castells, 2004), but it is not the

intent of this research to investigate higher-level or more abstract relationships.

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2.2.1. Individual Factors

The first set of issues are those which deal with the direct interaction between technology and

the individual, or a user. In this sense, then, this is a set of 'micro' issues that can often be

studied on a relatively local scale (e.g. within a single laboratory, in the case of usability) or at

least on a case-by-case basis.

The first and second issues here relate to the initial concerns over technology inequality

covered at the start of this dissertation. The first usage factor is simple access, i.e. whether an

individual can reach an interface by whichever means. (Thus, economic inequality is not the

only form of lack of access. Sheer lack of hardware or software availability in a region will,

for example, also prevent a user from accessing a technology or a service.) The second factor,

as outlined by the UK government above, is whether a user has the confidence and skill to use

the technology at their disposal.

The third factor in this section is that of usability of technology. In terms of ICT, this is a

multi-faceted topic that has been studied for as long as the technologies have had practical

purpose. The usability of any system needs to take into account both how users operate and

how the system they are interacting with operates, but as the tools used become more

complex, more widely used and more central to every day life, an ever greater emphasis is

placed on the idea that they should be easy to use. In their role as automators and assistants,

good usability is key to greater efficiency:

Software with good usability enables users to perform their tasks intuitively and easily. It

supports rapid learning and high skill retention. ...Interfaces that are consistent also giveusers a sense of control

(Preece, 2000: 110, emphasis added)

Of course, the question here is not how technologies contribute to efficiency,per se, but

how they relate to group participation and political decision-making. In relation to this

context, we should note the similarity between information required to do a task, and

information required to make a decision or to engage in debate.

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Finally in this section, it is worth noting that while face-to-face meetings are often considered

the closest or richest form of communication, and the benchmark against which the

success of ICT is compared, restricted forms of interaction may not necessarily inhibit

deliberation and the informative process either. That is to say, one should not consider a form

of communication as lesser simply because fewer social cues are permitted.Lackof instant

feedback (or the expectation thereof), along with other restrictive aspects, may serve to

augment the conversation process:

text-only CMC is extremely popular, despite obstacles such as disrupted turn adjacency

and lack of simultaneous feedback. ... That leads Herring to claim that unique attributes of

CMC are actually leveraged by users to intensify interactivity and extend the limits of

traditional, spoken, conversation.

(Kalman, Ravid, Raban and Rafaeli, 2006: 4)

Dean goes a step further and questions the assumption of such a hierarchy with face-to-face

communication intrinsically placed at the top:

the idea of a face-to-face interaction needs to be understood as imaginary, as a fantasy

that relies on its opposition to mediated interactions for it [sic] claim to be inherently

richer. All interactions are mediated; there is no pure, immediate, fully-present, fully-

transparent encounter.

(Dean, 2003: 98)

Nonetheless, it remains true that the diversity of communicative clues (such as gesturing,

facial expressions, etc.) is rarely implemented to any great extent in a single technology (or,

indeed, amongst a variety either). Furthermore, such comparisons with real world

mechanisms are relatively extraneous to this research. By examining the role of technology at

this 'micro' level, we have seen how information and interpersonal messages are filtered by

technology as it is sent to and received by users, and how the ability of an individual to

contribute to a discussion is governed partially (i.e. aside from personal discussion abilities)

by the nature of said technology.

Following from this combination of messaging and interfacing, we now look at the more

social or group issues of technology adoption.

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2.2.2. Social Factors

This set of issues represent a 'macro' level, in contrast to the 'micro' level of technology and

the individual. It is intended to be somewhat broad, and a more directed approach to the topic

at hand will follow below. Issues at this level arise from group dynamics and the effects

on/from the adoption of technology, either by individuals or (by extension) by organisations.

The primary factor here looked at here is the idea of positive network externalities. In terms

of adoption, this refers to the advantage or value received by others in a network that

arises when an individual decides to adopt a certain technology. Economides (1996) interprets

the idea in two ways, according to the kind of participation that the network at hand

encourages. Firstly, he defines a 'direct' externality, whereby customers are identified with

components in a two-way network (Economides, 1996: 679), such that an individual

adopting a particular technology is then able to communicate or interact directly with other

individuals with access to the same technology. The telephone network is the prime example

of this as more people acquire a telephone each, the potential value (i.e. who a single person

can communicate with via their own) goes up.

Secondly, Economides defines an indirect form of externality in which communication ismore limited (Ibid). Under this definition, individuals who have access to a certain technology

are nonetheless restricted to interacting only with that technology, and not directly with other

users. The positive externality in this case, then, arises when the technology being adopted is

compatible with a second one, and vice versa. This compatibility means that as demand for

the first technology increases, so to does the demand for the second. Thus, an individual

adopter should, in theory, be offered a greater choice as a result of greater demand for both

technologies. A prime example of this 'indirect' externality is that of media devices. As more

people buy DVD players, for example, thepotentialmarket for a film released in the DVD

format increases, and so the likelihood of it being released in this way also increases. This

results in two things a greater choice of films in that format for each individual user, and a

correspondingly greater interest in the original technology.

The applicability of these two ideas needs to be examined in the context of political

participation, though. In political terms, the abundance of externalities very much depends on

the goal of the political system, as described above, along with the implementation costs and

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the benefit derived from implementation. In the case of competitive politics that rely upon

publicity, for example, a compromise must be struck between the number of (extra) citizens

reached through adopting a technology, and the resources required to implement it. If there is

little to differentiate parties, and the goal is simply to reach as many people as possible, then it

becomes most efficient to concentrate first on technologies with the largest user base. This

applies to all parties following the same approach, resulting in a rush to the middle of the

political sphere (Hotelling, 1929).

Meanwhile, minorities can be effectively ignored unless a) smaller, more focused (i.e. more

ideologically differentiated, and more demographically specific) parties emerge, b)

representative organisations outside, but connected to, the political system (with more specific

political aims) emerge in a pluralistic form, or c) the cost of reaching those minorities is low

enough for the established competitive parties to implement it. In reality, it is reasonable to

suggest that all three of these may occur, the extent of each influencing the extent of the

others.

Further, the symbolic nature of technology usage should not be ignored. The associations

made between the adoption of technology and status and/or perceived understanding of that

technology (Skuse, 2005) can lead to externalities arising from a more psychological basis.

Again, this will affect certain models of democracy more than others, but is certainly

something to be aware of.

Finally in this section, we should also consider the negative effects that externalities can have.

Traditionally, negative network externalities take the form of undesirable spillovers, whereby

the actions or communications between 2 parties negatively affect a third party as a result.

However, the generic nature of hardware, combined with the 'virtual', and hence and flexible,

nature of software means that such spillovers are rare, and that if they do occur, it can often be

relatively inexpensive to implement counter measures.

The most significant negative externality we are concerned with here is that of information

overload. This arises from the same positive network externalities looked at above, which

generate increased usage and, as a result, an increased amount of content or number of

messages. This effect is made more complex through the contextual nature of information, the

multiplicity of contexts, and the relative simplicity of computing. (Cohendet and

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Steinmueller, 2000) The cost to the user of processing these messages is non-negligible, and

so this increase in content represents a barrierto greater productivity from using

technology. As Jones, Ravid and Rafaeli note, the degree to which information technologies

can effectively control or aid computer mediated communication (CMC) is limited by the

finite capacity of human cognition. (Jones, Ravid and Rafaeli, 2001: 1) They also find

support for the hypothesis that users are more likely to end active participation as the

overloading of mass-interaction increases. (Jones, Ravid and Rafaeli, 2002: 10) Greater

amounts of information, then, leads to a compromise between being able to interact with a

large number of other people, and being able to interact in meaningful discussion.

This effect is amplified according to the nature of the communication in less moderated,

more public forums such as Usenet (Jones, Ravid and Rafaeli, 2002), the chance of

information overload overwhelming users is greater. This should be remembered when taking

moderation into account this shows that the practice may be used both for political agenda-

setting, and for community control.

2.2.3. Political Factors

Having highlighted the contrast between the two extremes of the individual and society, a

more in-depth and relevant line should now be drawn to connect the two extremes with a

political environment. In this section, the introduction to the public sphere, above, will be

drawn upon to investigate the possible interactions between technology and the political

domain. Of the three of these sections, this one will be the most applicable when the results of

the research are considered later.

2.2.3.i. Institutional Politics

Van Dijk (1999) offers two categories of political structuration that have divergent aims when

it comes to implementing technology.

The first of these regards the use of IT as being for the reinforcement of institutional

politics (van Dijk, 1999: 85, emphasis in original). Alluding to the hollowing out of state

politics (Rhodes, 1994), van Dijk describes this set as resisting the erosion of the nationalstate by using ICT to fortify the positions of the state (van Dijk, 1999: 85). This coincides

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with Chandler's observation of additional powers being acquired by central government in

the struggle to enforce greater local accountability (Chandler, 2000: 10). van Dijk places

Legalistand Competitive democracy models within this category.

The institutional reinforcement view, according to van Dijk (1996, 2000), supposedly

prefers ICT that resists meaningful debate between citizens. Instead, technologies that support

the flow of information in one direction, from government to citizen, are favoured. If citizens

are to have a say, it is only to make enquiries in order to receive information, rather than to

provide any political input or feedback. Under a competitive democracy, this choice also

extends to include technologies which communicate popularity (i.e. foster support for one

option amongst many, without necessarily any accompanying debate), while any

resemblance to direct democracy is deceptive. (van Dijk, 2000: 41)

This category therefore represents two important threads relating to ICT the use of

technology to control information, and the use of technology as a delivery/production tool.

Under the former, citizens are informed of decisions made and the current state of affairs.

Under the latter, options are kept separate from each other as a result of the disjointed nature

of technology.

This is analogous to the dichotomy drawn out by the manifestation of technology considered

as usability above or, in other words, the difference between the tooland the message.

Similarly, as we shall see later, it relates to the distinction made between to whom

information refers, and how it is delivered.

The idea of competitive democracy should at this point be compared to the competitive nature

of free markets, for while the influences between one and the other are unfortunately not

within the scope of this research, the effects and similarities are relevant enough here to merit

a mention. As Habermas remarks:

The influencing of consumers borrows its connotations from the classic idea of a public of

private people putting their reason to use and exploits its legitimations for its own ends.

The accepted functions of the public sphere are integrated into the competition of

organized private interests.

(Habermas, 1989: 193)

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The merging role of the individual as both a citizen responsible for (or to) the state, and as a

relatively passive consumer of private enterprise goods, goes hand-in-hand with the notion of

how the political realm should operate. The rise of large-scale production and accordingly

large-scale demand has led to a public sphere that the mass media have transmogrified into a

sphere of culture consumption (Habermas, 1989: 162). This, in combination with the sense

of information overload examined before, leads to attention itself becoming a currency for

which political parties must compete (in place of political or ethical stances). Thus, the

overlap in channels used to deliver product information (or, indeed, products) with the

delivery of political information has seen a fusion of the two:

Because private enterprises evoke in their customers the idea that in their consumption

decisions they act in their capacity as citizens, the state has to address its citizens likeconsumers. As a result, public authority too competes for publicity.

(Habermas, 1989: 195)

This is mirrored in Boeder's description of Rheingold's reasoning:

The consumer society has become the accepted model both for individual behaviour and

political decision making, Rheingold (1994) argues

(Boeder, 2005: no page)

This mode of provision of information to the citizen has two effects. Firstly, it leads to

information overload as discussed above, which reinforces the necessity for mediating

gatekeepers situated within the channels. Secondly, it makes competitive political

organisations increasingly dependent on these channels too. This dependency leads to a

feedback loop whereby control over the channel becomes more and more important:

ICT may be used as a means to reinforce or reinvigorate the position of institutional

politics in the system as a whole ... or as a means to weaken this position and to spread the

politics into society or outside the traditional national boundaries of the political system.

(van Dijk, 2000: 38-39)

According to Boeder, [w]hat dies in this process is the rational discourse at the base of civil

society (2005, no page).

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2.2.3.ii. Socialization of Politics

The second category is a fight for asocialization of politics (van Dijk, 1999: 86, emphasis

in original), pertaining to a more prominent role for social organizations and individual

citizens in particular (Ibid). Of the six democratic models outlined above, this category

includesplebiscitary democracy,pluralist democracy,participatory democracy and the

libertarian view. These models differ in terms of the level of representation afforded to

individual citizens and the level at which decisions should be made at, but all of them

represent a relative a wider dissemination of the political process than is otherwise present in

the institutionalised approach.

The political socialization view is united in an aim to get the views of citizens heard more,e.g. through telepolls, discussion lists, et aland to integrate political decisions more closely

with the opinions and ideas put forward by these citizens. The varying democratic models

gathered under this heading differ in terms ofwhere this voice is directed (along a

'representative versus direct democracy' dimension), leading to significant differences in the

overall structure of the political sphere.

In contrast to the first category, in which institutional politics is reinforced, a move away from

the top-down, broadcast style techniques of competitive democracy is advocated. It could be

speculated that this shift represents a force to counter a prevailing perception of the first

category in modern politics, although it must be stressed that this pure conjecture.

Nonetheless, the split between this category and the previous is symbolic of the dual nature of

the flexible networks around us, and of the possible opportunities offered by technology

versus the shaping of technology to meet existing paradigms. Whether or not this split is

readily observable, and whether claims of a general increase in individual freedom to gain

information (McQuail, 1987: 42) will be investigated in the research section.

2.3. Defining Interactivity

Interactivity is a term with many meanings and many connotations, often depending on the

context in which the term is used. At its most basic level, interaction refers to the ability for

parties involved in communication to act upon each other that is, to mutually influence

each other's behaviour. It can refer to the interdependency and influence between two people

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who mutually adapt their behaviour and actions to each other (Jensen, 1998: 188, cited in

Downes and McMillan, 2000: 158). Alternatively it can refer to the input to and output from

an electronic device that link the device with its user. In whichever sense it is looked at, it is

clear that it is key to a wide range of issues, including such diverse issues as performance

quality, motivation, sense of fun, cognition, learning, openness, frankness and sociability

(Rafaeli and Sudweeks, 1997: no page).

In the context of this research, however, we can think of the device - the tool of

communication as less of an endpoint, and more as a mediatoror a medium. ICT provides a

mechanism by which an individual may communicate with further otherwise-separated

individuals. In this sense, then, interactivity refers to both the way in which a user interacts

with the technology at hand, and to the level and quality of communication that can take place

between these individuals. As one of Downes and McMillan's interviewees notes, the

computer-mediated environment allows for 'three-party interactivity' involving two people

and a computer. (Downs and McMillan, 2000: 163)

The following section describes, in turn, ideas from a number of researchers on how

interactivity can be conceptualised and assessed. The aim here is to assemble a sufficiently

diverse range of measures in order to allow firstly some comparison between them, and

secondly some distillation into a core set of measures that are relevant to the research.

2.3.1. Measures of Interactivity

2.3.1.i. McQuail

McQuail (1987: 40-42) draws on the scheme proposed by Bordewijk and van Kaam (1986),

which attempts to provide a mechanism to locate patterns of information traffic, and plot how

they change as networks develop. These patterns are concerned with who has information,

and how it is controlled, producing a two-dimensional framework with the following pair of

axes:

1. Information Store, or where the relevant information is initially sourced from. At one

extreme, this may be centralised and be stored at (or originate from) a single source.Alternatively, this may be highly decentralised, with the information of interest being held

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by (or originating from) a large multitude of individuals within the network. In other

words, this dimension measures the spatial location of information. (It should be noted

that a specific instance of a network system is rarely concerned with allinformation

available to the actors within it. Hence the use of the term relevant information in this

case.)

2. Control over choice and time of subject, or who has power to choose which

information is made available from the store detailed above, and when. Generally

speaking, the constant-access, always-on nature of service technology, particularly when

based on top of static content or that stored in a database, means that such control over

timing is becoming less of an issue as more information is digitalised. However, it is still

relevant when considering access to information during, say, working hours or at press

conferences.

McQuail then plots these two dimensions against each other to produce a quartered table of

possible information patterns, as illustrated below. The definition of each of the four

crossover points is given following this.

Table 3.McQuail's dimensions of interactivity (Source: McQuail, 1987: 41)

Allocution

This encapsulates address and broadcasting - information comes from a single

source, and is disseminated outwards under terms and conditions that satisfy the sender, not

the receiver. A non-technological example would be the Prime Minister's Question Time in

the UK, to which all newspapers must send someone at the appointed time.

Consultation

31

Information Store

Central Individual

ALLOCUTION REGISTRATION

CONSULTATION CONVERSATION

Control of time & choice of

subject: Central

Control of time & choice of

subject: Individual


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The meaning of consultation here should not be confused with the inverse definition

often given to it. Here, the term refers to the ability of an individual to consult some place or

service for information (such as one might consult a watch to find out the time), as opposed

to an authority consulting citizens for views. Here, McQuail cites newspapers as an example

as, in their primary role (i.e. the main news stories carried), content differs little from one

newspaper to the next, and is often simply re-interpreted from a single news source.

Newspaper readers, however, can choose when and where they read the content. In this sense,

webpages carrying static content (i.e. content that does not change rapidly) can be considered

a consultative technology.

Registration

Here, information is derived from record-keeping, control and surveillance

(McQuail, 1987: 41), although the supervised gathering of opinion such as with voting

systems, on-line polls, etc. - have extended the definition into a networked era. Under this

category, information originates from a decentralised set of sources (users, in this context),

but its transmission is controlled by a single actor (such as a website). Tracking techniques

such as the use of cookies in web browsers also fall under this category. (McMillan, 2002:

273)

Conversation

This entails a high level of decentralised information storage (that is, originating from

many sources), with similarly decentralised control over access in that those who hold the

information can choose when and where they wish to make it available. Thus, in this context,

it is the users that are responsible for selecting and filtering the information they wish to

publish - whether it be information about themselves (in, say, a social network), personal

opinion, or more factual knowledge.

Table 4.McQuail's measures of interactivity

Centralisation/Decentralisation of information sources

Centralisation/Decentralisation of control over information access

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2.3.1.ii. Rafaeli

Rafaeli (1988) defined interactivity in terms of the level and depth of response that is

permitted or exploited between two parties. He proposed three forms of two-way

communication, distinguished according to how historically referential a single message

could be.

The first level is that of basic 2-way (non-interactive) communication. At this stage,

messages may be passed between the two parties, but messages themselves do not refer to

previous messages, and are effectively stateless or contextless.

In the second level, quasi-interactivity is achieved through reactive 2-way communication.Under this level, a message passed between the two parties may be a response to the

previous message that is, have a limited context of the immediately previous message.

The third and highest level is of full interactivity. In this, messages may not only refer to

their predecessor, but also messages referred to by that predecessor such that a recursive

relationship is set up through the chain of messages. By expanding the referential timeline

available at each transmission, a deeper sense of interactivity is permitted.

It should be noted that the three of these levels each supersede the previous, whereby the

second level may include the first (but not vice versa), and the third may include both the first

and second.

Table 5.Rafaeli's measures of interactivity

Non-interactive/Quasi-interactive/Fully interactive

2.3.1.iii. Manca

Manca (1989) offers a similar model, but one that is more concerned with a mass media

communication perspective (i.e. that of broadcast/broadsheet dissemination, with limited

opportunity for "upstream" communication). This incorporates the concept of "media

gatekeepers" (e.g. newspaper editors) that act as moderators and/or barriers to the "masses"

gaining access to these platforms. This inserts an additional link into the otherwise dual-party

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chain (i.e. 'sender-receiver' becomes 'sender-moderator-receiver') which may act as both

facilitators (by providing the receiver with access to data and messages that would not

otherwise be available ... and the sender with access to the means to reach the receiver

(Manca, 1989: 166)) and moderators (who decide which items are placed on the public

agenda and the degree of importance and urgency for each of these items (Manca, 1989:

169)). As Manca was referring originally to the realm of journalism in a state preceding the

rise of the network society, his description of gatekeepers is perhaps more formal and

structured than necessary when applied to this research, with editors being primarily

associated with the role. However, he does note that such definitions represent roles rather

than individual persons (Manca, 1989: 166), and as such, we should consider these roles

when determining interactivity in modern technologies.

Manca also offers a distinction between "information" and "feedback", with the latter

differing in the sense that it "should not be confused with the switching of roles on the part of

sender and receiver." (Manca, 1989:167) Recognising that feedback is an important step, and

(technologically) one that involves meaningful data (which, under other definitions, is eligible

to be counted as "information", we should attempt to integrate it with Rafaeli's model of

interactivity in order to be aware of it, and so be able to assess it to some extent. This will be

examined in further detail below.

Table 6.Manca's measures of interactivity

Presence of gatekeepers

Levels of feedback

2.3.1.iv. McMillan

Indeed, the idea of feedback is incorporated into McMillan'sfour-part model of cyber-

interactivity (McMillan, 2002). In this model, McMillan constructs a table of four categories

by cross-tabulating two dimensions (Level of receivercontrol andDirection of

communication) of two conceptual extremes each. Figure 1 shows this model, how feedback

fits in, and the three remaining categories:

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Figure 1.McMillan's four-part model of cyber-interactivity (Source: McMillan, 2002: 276)

We can see from this that there are some similarities with a number of axes suggested above.

For example, the existence of a monologue and mutual discourse coincides with the ideas

of allocation and conversation outlined by McQuail. Accordingly, we can note that the

first axis Level of receiver control clearly bears a resemblance to McQuail's

Centralisation of control over communication axis, while theDirection of communication

axis may be seen to be the same dimension as Centralisation of information storage. Finally,

we can compare the existence of a feedback category in McMillan's model to Manca's use

of the concept too. How these similarities are resolved will be expanded upon below.

Table 7.McMillan's measures of interactivity

Level of receiver control

Direction of Communication

2.3.1.v. van Dijk

van Dijk (2000) proposes a further 4 "levels" of interactivity, based on Williams et al (1988).

These levels attempt to integrate and bridge the gap between "(objective) medium

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characteristics" - or technological attributes, in this context and "(intersubjective) contextual

applications" - or less technological and more "interpersonal" attributes. He lists these levels

as:

1. Whether 2-way communication actually exists, first and foremost. This matches

McMillan's second dimension above, although McMillan continues to classify

communication even in the presence of one-way transfer only.

2. The synchronicity of the communication. This is a technological property, a measure

of how soon after one message the next can be sent - "the time dimension of interactivity".

On this attribute, though, van Dijk assumes that the more instantaneous the response, the

more interactive the technology is. However as we have seen, this may not necessarily

reflect the usability of the technology, or may even enhance it in certain cases.

3. How much control over communication there is present - that is, how much can a

receiver swap roles and become a sender? To integrate this with the model presented by

Manca in which a third party - a gatekeeper - is also present, one can extend this idea such

that this includes a measurement of how much any party can swap roles with either of the

other 2 parties. Naturally, there may be less incentive, for purposes of stability, etc and

due to the pre-determined "regulatory" power of the gatekeeper/moderator, to permit

either sender or receiver to swap into the gatekeeper role. However, certain technologies

or applications thereof may make this more explicit than others wikis, for example,

that allow any reader to make changes to the text, and thus in which users may act equally

in all 3 roles as they wish.

4. The intelligence of contexts and shared understanding, which van Dijk describes

merely as the contextual and mental dimension (van Dijk, 2000: 47). As technology

actively decouples the information being transmitted from the semantic context (reducing

the amount of tacit information made available to either party see Cowan, David and

Foray, 2000), van Dijk claims that this level has yet to be reached outside face-to-face

communication. Note, though, that this is at odds with Dean's claim that all

communication is interpreted in some way, and therefore such a distinction is harder to

make.

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We can note now that van Dijk describes these layers as "cumulative" rather than hierarchical.

It is clear that there is some dependency - for example, there must be a presence of 2-way

communication of roles are reversible. However, on the other hand synchronicity - the time

delay between messages - does not necessarily depend on a 2-way connection.

Table 8.van Dijk's measures of interactivity

Presence of 2-way communication

Synchronicity, i.e. delay between responses

Control over roles (sender, receiver, gatekeeper) within communication

Extent to which a shared context is possible

2.3.2. Collecting and integrating axes

In total then, this gives us the following list of axes which measure technology - or rather,

social elements of the implementation of technology (as opposed to purely technical

properties such as efficiency):

Table 9.Summary of measures of interactivity

Measure of Interactivity References

Centralisation/Decentralisation of information

sources

McQuail/Bordewijk & van Kaam

Centralisation/Decentralisation of control over

information access

McQuail/Bordewijk & van Kaam

Non-interactive/Quasi-interactive/Fully interactive Rafaeli

Presence of gatekeepers Manca

Levels of feedback Manca

Level of receiver control McMillan

Direction of Communication McMillan

Presence of 2-way communication Van Dijk

Synchronicity, i.e. delay between responses Van Dijk

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Control over roles (sender, receiver, gatekeeper)

within communication

Van Dijk

Extent to which a shared context is possible Van Dijk

As these dimensions have been adapted and assembled from slightly different fields (political

interactivity, mass communication, etc.), there is naturally some overlap and some irrelevance

when applied to our current context. For instance, it is clear that in a system that prescribes a

centralised control over information access, control over who is a sender and who is a receiver

is also affected as a result.

We can therefore narrow this list down by considering it from a number of perspectives.

Firstly, which properties can we assume as being either present or non-present, as a result of

the scope of the research?

Firstly, we can omit the binary measurement of whether 2-way communication exists or not,

as this is incorporated in other more extensive dimensions such as interactivity level, control

over roles, and centralisation/decentralisation measures.

The presence of gatekeepers is difficult to determine when the scope of the investigation is at

a purely technological level often, moderation or facilitation decisions are made

independently of the technology being used, even at the level of the sender determining which

messages to communicate before interfacing with an ICT. As it is difficult to therefore

determine this presence in a generic sense, this aspect will be encapsulated in the choice of

technologies, below. By considering the possibility for moderation on a per-technology basis,

a finer granularity of analysis should be able to be reached. That is, moderated technologies

will be gauged separately to their unmoderated counterparts, rather than attempting to

measure actualimplementations of moderation (as examined per-site) in the same breath as

potentialimplementations (as would be examined per-technology).

As noted above, there is clearly some overlap between Manca's description of feedback and

the idea of feedback in McMillan's four-part model. As McMillan's model explains Manca's

differentiation between feedback and information through a dual-axis context, there is

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little need to investigate the matter under both of the conceptual measures. Furthermore, the

resemblance of McMillan's chosen axes to those set out by McQuail (and hence the similarity

of McMillan's monologue to McQuail's allocution) highlights further redundancy. As a

result, we will restrict the research to using McQuail's two dimensions with the understanding

that this reflects a very close line of reasoning to both McQuail's and Manca's approaches.

However, in doing so, the idea of feedback is omitted. Following McMillan's contextual

approach to feedback as one category of interactivity with particular attributes (one-way

communication with a high level of receiver control), we can attempt to locate the concept

along Rafaeli's progression of interactivity in order to integrate feedback into the model used

here.

As Manca defines it, feedback is information regarding the receiver's use of the technology,

rather than information pertaining to the discussion being carried out via the technology

(Manca, 1989: 167). Thus, it is to be differentiated from Rafaeli's idea of "full interactivity" in

that it relates to the efficiency of the system itself, rather than the debate. In McMillan's

model, this split occurs at the border between feedback and responsive dialogue. In this

sense, feedback is aform of interactivity, but it allows for less conversation (and hence less

participation) than even a mildly responsive, yet nonetheless two-way dialogue as described

by McMillan's responsive dialogue and Rafaeli's quasi-interactivity. Taking this into

account, we can accordingly introduce the idea of feedback as a fourth category in Rafaeli's

taxonomy, such that it occurs between the first level of basic 2-way communication and the

second level of quasi-interactive 2-way communication. Note that, as McMillan defines it,

feedback conceived of as a one-way mechanism seems to 'disrupt' the assumption of 2-way

communication laid out by Rafaeli. It is here considered then that feedbackmustrefer to some

prior communication, thereby defining feedback as a responsive form of communication,

Documents

The Interactivity of Political Engagement [a Masters thesis, 2006]