WHAT IS THE IBP?The IBP, acronym for the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, is the official national organization of the entire lawyers in the country.

WHAT DOES INTEGRATION OF THE BAR MEAN?

Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by government authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.

Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers and ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.

LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL BASISSection 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the constitutional basis which provides for the powers of the Supreme Court, among which:

Sec.5 (5). Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all the courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The legal basis is founded on the principle that the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar.

HISTORY

The IBP came into being when the Supreme Court created on October 5, 1970 the Commission on Bar Integration which was tasked not only to ascertain the advisability of integration of the Bar, but even more, to serve as a common vehicle of the Court and the Bar in fashioning a blueprint for integration and putting the same into actual operation. Republic Act No. 6397, which became effective September 17, 1971, confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. Then on January 9, 1973, the Supreme Court, by a per curiam resolution, pursuant to its constitutional mandate, ordained the integration of the Bar in accordance with its Rule 139-A, effective January 16, 1973. Within the next succeeding months, the IBP was organized. On February 17, 1973, local chapters all over the country were finally formed and elections for chapter officers were held. Then on March 17, 1973, the first batch of representatives to the IBP House of Delegates composed of 104 delegates representing the IBP Chapters nationwide convened in Manila and elected its first set of IBP Governors.

Republic Act No. 6397 confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. Presidential Decree. No. 181 was promulgated on May 4, 1973 constituting the IBP into a body corporate and providing government assistance thereto for the accomplishment of its purposes.

OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES The following are the general objectives of the Integrated bar:1. to elevate the standards of the legal profession;

2. to improve the administration of justice; and

3. to enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibilities more effectively.The purposes of the Integrated Bar are those which are included in the per curiam decision of the Supreme Court dated 9 January 1973, ordaining the IBP:1. Assist in the administration of justice;2. Foster and maintain, on the part of its members, high ideals of integrity, learning, professional competence, public service and conduct;3. Safeguard the professional interests of its members;4. Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;5. Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information relating thereto;6. Encourage and foster legal education; and7. Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and make reports and recommendations thereon.

MEMBERSHIPThe following persons are, automatically and without exception, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines:(a) All lawyers whose names were in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court as of January 16, 1973; and(b) All lawyers whose names were included or are entered therein after the said date.A. RegistrationEvery person who has been admitted to the practice of law shall register with the IBP not later than 60 days after said admission. Registration is made by filling out forms and paying membership dues or fees at the IBP national office or local chapter. Any change in the information entered upon registration must be reported to the Chapter Secretary within 60 days who shall then promptly report it to the National Office.

B. Termination of Membership

A lawyer may terminate his membership in the IBP voluntarily or involuntarily. Voluntary termination of membership may be done by filing a verified notice to the Secretary of the Integrated Bar, which shall be then brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. He shall forthwith cease to be a member and his name will be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. Involuntary membership happens when a member is suspended or disbarred.

Retirement is another reason for termination of membership to the IBP. A lawyer who shall have attained the age of 75 years, or shall have been 40 years as a lawyer and is unable to engage in the practice of law by reason of physical disability or judicially adjudged mental incapacity, may be retired from the IBP by filing a verified petition to the Board of Governors. He shall thereafter not practice law and pay IBP dues.

C. Reinstatement of Members

Reinstatement may be made by those who voluntarily and involuntarily terminated their membership, or those who were suspended or disbarred, by submitting a written application to the Board of Governors according to its prescribed rules and regulations. All applications for reinstatement shall be forwarded by the Board to the Court with its appropriate recommendation.A retired member may be reinstated to active membership upon written application to and approval by the Board.The Board shall make periodic reports of retirement and reinstatement of members to the Supreme Court.D. Duties of MembersA member is required and expected to:a. Be a good lawyer. -- It shall be the duty of every member to embody the virtues of a good lawyer as provided for by the Constitution, the laws, the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics and the Lawyers Oath. He must not perform infractions which may merit his termination of membership in the IBP.

b. Pay membership dues religiously. As held by the Supreme Court in its per curiam decision in the matter of the integration of the Bar ( 9 January 1973), no organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar. Non-payment of dues may be a ground for termination of membership.

c. Maintain good standing in the IBP. -- - Every member who has paid all membership dues and all authorized special assessments, plus surcharges owing thereon, and who is not under suspension from the practice of law or from membership privileges, is a member in good standing.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

A. NationalThe IBP is administered by a Governing Board consisting of nine Governors representing the nine regions of the IBP. The Governing Board elects the IBP National President and IBP Executive Vice President from among themselves or from outside the Board. From among the Board, the national officers will be chosen.

The IBP House of Delegates decide on important matters. The chamber is composed of not more than one-hundred-twenty (120) members apportioned among all IBP Chapters in major cities throughout the country. Every two years, the IBP Governing Board makes a reappointment of delegates among all IBP chapters.

There are also National Committees which perform essential functions.

a. The Board of Governors-- The Board shall have general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP. Among its most important functions are to make appropriations and authorized disbursements from the IBP funds; engage the services of employees, define their duties and fix their salaries; act on reports and recommendations submitted to it; promulgate Canons of Professional Responsibility, subject to approval of the Supreme Court; promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment and maintenance of lawyer referral services; impose sanctions for non-payment and delinquency in the payment of IBP dues; etc. The Board holds office for two years (from July 1 to June 30), or until their successors shall have been duly elected.

b. National Officers-- The President and Executive Vice President are to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors. The governors shall be ex officio Vice President for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board. The Executive Vice President shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term. The Presidency shall rotate among the nine Regions. Each of the national officers perform duties as mandated by the IBP By-Laws.

c. The House of Delegates-- The House is the deliberative body of the IBP. The delegates discuss important matters among themselves, and its Resolutions shall bind the Integrated Bar when concurred in by the Board of Governors. Reapportionment of the House takes place every two years.

d. National Committees- The officers are appointed and the number of officers per committee is fixed by the Board of Governors. Committees may be added or removed according to the Rules of the IBP. The current committees are:

1. Committee on Chapter Affairs- makes studies of, and submit reports and recommendations on, the establishment, organization and operation of all Chapters, the apportionment and reapportionment of the seats in the House of Delegates, and the means and methods of encouraging and coordinating Chapter activities and of promoting maximum involvement and participation of the members of the Integrated Bar in the activities thereof and of their respective Chapters.

2. Committee on Legal Aid- promotes the establishment and efficient maintenance of Chapter legal aid organizations suited to provide free legal service; direct and supervise all Chapter legal aid organizations; maintain maximum levels of coordination and cooperation with other organizations having similar objectives; receive and solicit aid and assistance from any available and suitable source or sources, provided that the independent character of the legal aid is not impaired; and, in general, do or cause to be done all things necessary and proper for the promotion of legal aid activities, projects and objectives.

3. Committee on Administration of Justice- studies the organization and operation of the judicial system and recommend appropriate changes in practice and procedure to improve the efficiency thereof, and, in that connection, shall examine all proposed changes in the system; also collates information and submit appropriate recommendations on judicial appointments, judicial tenure and compensation, and retirement pensions.

4. Committee on Legal Education and Bar Admissions- makes continuing studies of, and submit recommendations on, the curriculum and teaching methods in law schools, as well as standards and methods in law schools, as well as standards and methods in determining the qualifications of applicants for admission to the Bar, and whenever requested shall assist in the investigation of the qualifications of persons seeking admission to the Bar; also formulates, and promotes or co-sponsors with other groups of institutions, programs designed to afford members of the Integrated Bar suitable opportunities for acquiring, here and abroad, additional professional knowledge, training and skill.5. Committee on Professional Responsibility, Discipline and Disbarment- formulates the Canons of Professional Responsibility for adoption by the Board of Governors and approval by the Supreme Court, and submits recommendations on methods for the effective enforcement thereof as well as on appropriate amendments thereto; has authority to express advisory opinions, upon written request of any member, on any matter affecting his own professional conduct.

6. Committee on Research Services- plans the research services of the Integrated Bar in substantive and adjective law, and, together with other institutions, promote legal research and law reform and development; selects areas of the law in need of general study, revision or codification; formulates plans and prepares budgets for specific research projects; assesses the availability of qualified personnel to perform research work; and submits recommendations thereon.

7. Committee on Legislation- studies all proposed changes in the Constitution and in statutes and laws of general interests or general application and submits reports thereon, and, with the approval of the Board of Governors, shall represent the Integrated Bar in supporting or opposing such proposals.

8. Committee on Public Service- prepares and submits plans for advancing public acceptance of the objectives and purposes of the Integrated Bar, and shall execute such plans as are approved by the Board of Governors.

9. Committee on Inter-Professional and Business Relations- maintains liaison between the legal profession and other professions as well as business groups in order to acquaint the latter on the nature and proper scope of the practice of law.

10. Committee on Books and Publications- makes studies of, and submit recommendations on, matters and materials for publication, and ways and means of assisting in the efficient publications of legal literature at reasonable costs, and of discouraging unnecessary publications or duplication thereof.

11. Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law- keeps the Integrated Bar informed with respect to the practice of law by unauthorized persons and entities, as well as the participation therein of members of the Bar, and recommends ways and means for the elimination and prevention of unauthorized practice of law.

12. Committee on Law Reporting- examines and appraises methods of reporting and disseminating legislation, presidential decrees, court decisions, the Rules of Court, and decisions of administrative tribunals and agencies, with particular emphasis on the correction of deficiencies; conducts a continuing study and evaluation of corresponding trends and reforms in other jurisdictions; and submits appropriate recommendations thereon.

B. Local

a. Regions. The IBP is divided into nine regions:1. Northern Luzon- consisting of the provinces of Abra, Batanes, Benguet, Cagayan, Ifugao, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Kalinga-Apayao, La Union, Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, and Quirino.2. Central Luzon- consisting of the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Tarlac, and Zambales;3. Greater Manila- consisting of the City of Manila and Quezon City;4. Southern Luzon- consisting of the provinces of Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Marinduque, Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro, Quezon, and Rizal;5. Bicolandia- consisting of the provinces of Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Catanduanes, Masbate, and Sorsogon;6. Eastern Visayas- consisting of the provinces of Bohol, Cebu, Eastern Samar, Leyte, Northern Samar, Samar, and Southern Leyte;7. Western Visayas- consisting of the provinces of Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Palawan, Romblon, and Siquijor.8. Eastern Mindanao- consisting of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan Del Sur, Bukidnon, Camiguin, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Misamis Oriental, Surigao del Norte, and Surigao del Sur; and9. Western Mindanao- consisting of the cities of Basilan and Zamboanga, and the provinces of Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Misamis Occidental, South Cotabato, Sulu, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur.b. Chapters. A Chapter of the IBP shall be organized in every province. Every city shall be considered part of the province within which it is geographically situated. A separate Chapter shall be organized in the following political subdivisions or areas:

1. The sub-province of Aurora;2. Each congressional district of the City of Manila;3. Quezon City;4. Caloocan City, Malabon and Navotas;5. Pasay City, Makati, Mandaluyong and San Juan del Monte;6. Cebu City; and7. Zamboanga City and Basilan City.A lawyer is considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office is located. In the absence of an office, his place of residence will be the basis as to which Chapter he must belong. A member cannot belong to more than one Chapter simultaneously.Each Chapter shall have its own local government as provided for by uniform rules to be prescribed by the Board of Governors and approved by the Supreme Court. The government of the Chapter is vested in a Board of Officers composed of a President, a Vice President, a Secretary, a Treasurer, an Auditor, a Public Relations Officer and five Directors. The officers shall be elected at the biennial meeting and shall hold office for a term of two years until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified. In addition to the elected officers, the immediate Past-President shall ipso facto become an ex-officio (non-voting) member of the Board of Directors.

LEADERSHIP

A. Who may run for office?

Only members in good standing may become officers. No person who is not a member of the Integrated Bar may become an officer.

B. Who may not run for office?

Since the IBP is a non-political Bar, no lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality.

C. Duties of IBP Leaders

Leaders or officers of the IBP, whether in the local or national levels, are those that are mandated by the By-Laws of the IBP and Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court. In general, leaders must make sure that the objectives of the IBP are met, that the rules are properly implemented and that their members manifest their cooperation. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A. National Headquarters- The office of the National Headquarters of the IBP is located at: IBP Building, No.15 Julia Vargas AvenueOrtigas Center, Pasig City, Philippines 1600.

B. IBP Presidents

JOSE B.L. REYES LILIANO B. NERI MARCELO B. FERNAN EDGARDO J. ANGARA 1973-1975 1973-1975 1977-1979 1979-1981

YSIDRO J. PEREZ RAUL S. ROCO SIMEON M. VALDEZ VICENTE D. MILLORA 1981-1983 1983-1985 July 1985-Mar 1986 Apr 1986-Mar 1987

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,JR LEON M. GARCIA, JR. EUGENE A. TAN NUMERIANO G. TANOPO,JR. Mar 1987-June 1987 1987-1989 1989-1991 1991-1993

MERVYN G. ENCANTO RAOUL R. ANGANGCO JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON ARTHUR D. LIM 1993-1995 1995-1997 1997-1999 1999-2001

TEOFILO S. PILANDO, JR. JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ JOSE VICENTE B. SALAZAR FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA 2001-2003 2003-July 2006 July 2006-June 2007 2007-2009

SANTIAGO M. KAPUNAN ROAN I. LIBARIOS VICENTE M. JOYAS OIC, 2009-2011 2011-2013 2013- present

C. The 21st Board of Governors (Current)

VICENTE M. JOYASChairman of the Board

ROSARIO T. SETIAS REYESzVice Chairman &Governor for Greater Manila

EDWIN O. BETGUEN MARIA IMELDA Q. TUAZON RAMON S. ESGUERRA AVELINO V. SALES, JR.Governor, Northern Luzon Governor, Central Luzon Governor, Southern Luzon z Governor, Bicolandia

JOSE VICENTE R.M. OPINION VON LOVEL D. BEDONA DALE BRYAN D. MORDENO NOEL A. BENGovernor, Eastern Visayas Governor, Western Visaya Gov., Eastern Mindanao Gov., Western Mindanao

CASESRepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCJanuary 9, 1973IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

R E S O L U T I O NPER CURIAM:On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration1submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of the saidReportand the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 5262of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" that"this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted,3and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda.4Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.TheReportof the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.The following are the pertinent issues:(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of itsReport, thus:Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This requiresmembershipandfinancial support(in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditionssine qua nonto the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:(1) Assist in the administration of justice;(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning, professional competence, public service and conduct;(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information relating thereto;(6) Encourage and foster legal education;(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and make reports and recommendations thereon; and(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession to:(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers;(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice maintained through influence or position;(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service;(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our provinces;(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country;(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.Anent thefirst issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."Resolution of thesecond issue whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:Constitutionality of Bar IntegrationJudicial Pronouncements.In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality.The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning: Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court. Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities. These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there can be no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.1. Freedom of Association.To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of group activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect.The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar.

2. Regulatory Fee.For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court levies a tax.A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of annual dues.3. Freedom of Speech.A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established.The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government.4. Fair to All Lawyers.Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.To resolve thethird and final issue whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar.Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in thenational pollrecently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast theirplebiscite ballotson the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal.5All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustiveReportof the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.Footnotes1 Created by Supreme Court Resolution of October 5, 1970 "for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction," the Commission is composed of Supreme Court Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro (Chairman), Senator Jose J. Roy, retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, Supreme Court Associate Justice (then Court of Appeals Presiding Justice) Salvador V. Esguerra, U. P. Law Center Director Crisolito Pascual, Ex-Senator Tecla San Andres Ziga, and San Beda Law Dean and Constitutional Convention Delegate Feliciano Jover Ledesma (Members).2 Filed on July 11, 1962 (by a Committee composed of Jose W. Diokno, Roman Ozaeta, Jose P. Carag, Eugenio Villanueva, Jr. and Leo A. Panuncialman), the petition represented the unanimous consensus of 53 Bar Associations (from all over the Philippines) reached in convention at the Far Eastern University Auditorium in Manila on June 23, 1962.3 Written oppositions were submitted by Attys. Cesar Fajardo and Vicente L. Arcega, the Camarines Norte Lawyers League, Atty. Fructuoso S. Villarin, the Camarines Sur Bar Association and the Manila Bar Association.4 The Petitioners and the Negros Occidental Bar Association submitted memoranda in favor of Bar integration, while the Manila Bar Association submitted a memoranda opposing Bar integration.5 All figures are as of January 8, 1973.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCB.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.In his letter,1dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.2On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment3statinginter alia: that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual dues.In his reply4dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyers-members reside.Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?We rule in the negative.An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.5The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as conditionsine qua nonto the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.7Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar8- which power required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar,9thus:For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.This question has been settled in the case ofIn re Atty. Marcial Edillon,10in this wise:. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions,11one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of law.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Garcia, JJ.,concur.Footnotes1Rollo, p. 1.2Rollo, p. 5.3Rollo, pp. 12-16.4Rollo, pp. 18-25.5In reAtty. Marcial Edillon,A.C. No. 1928, 03 August 1978, 84 SCRA 554, 562.6In reIntegration of the Bar of the Philippines, 09 January 1973, 49 SCRA 22, 25.7Ibid., citing Lathropv.Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102, N.W. 2d 404; Lathropv.Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 6 L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826.8Article VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution.9Appendix D, Legal and Judicial Ethics, Martin, Ruperto G., p. 440.10Supra,note 5, pp. 567-568.11In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Deliquency of Atty. M.A. Edillon,A.C. No. 1928, 19 December 1980, 101 SCRA 612, 617.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCA.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)R E S O L U T I O NCASTRO,C.J.:The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule)1 in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:SEC. 10.Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.2The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers.3Aproposto the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the court.4The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 63975authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex."The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:xxx xxx xxx(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with themseriatim.1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.6Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations.7All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.8Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.9Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.102. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which power the respondent acknowledges from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.113. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.12But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege,13and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion.14InIn Re Sparks(267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.Footnotes1 Adopted in the Supreme Court's Resolution, promulgated on January 9, 1973, ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines.2 114 A.L.R. 101.3 Memorandum of Authorities on the Constitutionality of Bar Integration, cited in the Report of the Commission Bar Integration on the Integration of the Philippine Bar, Nov. 30, 1972; see also Supreme Court Resolution of January 9, 1973, ordaining the integration of the Philippine Bar.4 In re Integrating the Bar, 222 Ark 35, 259 S. W. 2d 114; Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 40 So. 2d 902; Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280: In re Edwards, 45 Idaho 676, 266 P. 665; Commonwealth ex rel. Ward vs. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41 98 S. W. 2d 53; Ayres vs. Hadaway 303 Mich. 589, 6 N. W. 2d 905; Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195; Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d 515; Clark vs. Austin, 101 S. W. 2d 977; In Re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Assn., 133 Neb. 283, 275 N. W. 265, 114 A.L.R. 151; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 291; Baker vs. Varser, 240 N.C. 260, 82 S.E. 2d 90; In re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma, 185 Okla, 505, 95 P. 2d 113; State ex rel. Rice vs. Cozad, 70 S. Dak. 193, 16 N. W. 2d 484; Campbell vs. Third District Committee of Virginia State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18 S. E. 2d 883; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230,102 N. W. 2d 404.5 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, approved on September 17,1971.6 In re Unification of New Hampsire Bar, 248 A. 2d 709; In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex. 550, 4P. 2d 643; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N. W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 6 L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826; Railways Employes' Dept. vs. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, 100 L. ed. 1112, 76 S. Ct. 714.7 Diokno, Jose W., "Bar Integration A Sword and a Shield for Justice" (Manor Press, Q.C., 1962) p. 17.8 Fellers James, "Integration of the Bar Aloha!", Journal of the Am. Judicature Society, Vol. 47, No. 11 (1964) p. 256. 9 Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102, N.W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 6 L, ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826.9. Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis., 2d 230, 102, N.W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 6L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826.10 Hill vs. State Bar of California, 97 P. 2d 236; Herron vs. State Bar of California, 24 Cal. 53, 147 P. 2d 543; Carpenter vs. State Bar of California, 211 Cal. 358, 295 P. 23; In re Mundy, 202 La. 41, 11 SO. 2d 398; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291; In re Platz, 60 Nev. 24, 108 P. 2d 858, In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex. 550, 4 P. 2d 643; Kelley vs. State Bar of Oklahoma, 148 Okla, 282, 298 P. 623.11 Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 40 So. 2d 902; In re Integration of Bar of Hawaii, 432 P. 2d 887; Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d 515; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291; In re Unification of New Hampshire Bar, 248 A. 2d 709; In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex. 550, 4 P. 2d 643; State Bar of Oklahoma vs. McGhnee 148 Okla, 219, 298 P. 580; Kelley vs. State Bar of Oklahoma, 148 Okla, 282, 298 P. 623; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230,102 N. W. 2d 404.12 In re Gibson, 4 P. 2d 643.The following words of Justice Harlan are opposite: "The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a 'free speech' issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government." (Concurring opinion of Harlan,J, joined by Frankfurter,J., in Lathrop vs. Donahue, 367U.S. 820, 6 L.ed. 21191, 81 S. Ct. 1826, citing Cardozo, J. with Branders and Stone, JJ., concurring, in Hamilton vs. Regents of Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245, 79 L.ed. 343, 55 S. Ct. 197.)13 Inre Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291.14 Bar Flunkers Case, 50 O.G. 1602; In re Aguas, 1 Phil. 1, and others.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCB.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH

R E S O L U T I O NPADILLA,J.:Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1) day to four (4) years.On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character.1In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to considerde novothe question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this case, to find room for forgiveness.However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes1 Resolution, p. 8.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONA.C. No. 6689 August 24, 2011RIZALINA L. GEMINA,Complainant,vs.ATTY. ISIDRO S. MADAMBA,Respondent.D E C I S I O NBRION,J.:We review Resolution No. XVIII-2008-101 dated March 6, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), dismissing the complaint filed by Rizalina L. Gemina (complainant). The complaint charged Atty. Isidro S. Madamba (respondent) with deceit, malpractice and gross negligence, and prayed for his suspension/disbarment.1The complainant alleged that she is an heir of the registered owner of several parcels of land located in Laoag City.2These parcels of land were unlawfully sold by Francisco Eugenio in connivance with the respondent. The documents pertaining to the transactions over these lands were notarized by the respondent either without the presence of the affiants or with their forged signatures. The documents the complainant referred to were:1. Waiver of Rights & Interest2. Affidavit of Buyer/Transferee3. Deed of Adjudication3& Sale4. Affidavit of Non-Tenancy5. Deed of Absolute SaleThe complainant alleged that the Waiver of Rights and Interests was submitted by Eugenio to the Department of Agrarian Reform. This document shows that it was entered in the respondents Notarial Register as Doc. No. 2283, Page No. 252, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003. However, when she went to the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Regional Trial Court, Isabela, to request for a copy, she found out that Doc. No. 2283, Page No. 252, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003 was an Affidavit of Buyer/Transferee allegedly executed by the Spouses Efren Alonzo and Imelda Alonzo on September 29, 2003. In the column "REMARKS" of Document No. 2283, the word cancelled was written, but no reason was given for the cancellation, nor was a copy of the alleged cancelled document in the records. The same Affidavit of Buyer/Transferee was also entered in the respondents Notarial Register as Doc. No. 2285, Page No. 253, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003. The complainant submitted a Certification dated May 3, 2004 issued by Clerk of Court Artemio H. Quidilla, Jr., that a certified true copy of Doc. No. 2283, Page No. 252, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003 cannot be issued because the respondent did not submit notarial reports for the years 2003 and 2004, although he was commissioned as a Notary Public for these years.4The complainant also asked for a certified true copy of a Deed of Adjudication and Sale allegedly executed by Eugenio and the other heirs, and notarized by the respondent on July 22, 2003. The instrument shows that this document was entered in the respondents Notarial Register as Doc. No. 2263, Page No. 248, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003, but no copy was submitted to the OCC. In the column "REMARKS," the words "without copy" appeared, without stating the reason for the absence of a copy. Clerk of Court Quidilla issued a Certification dated June 21, 2004 that indeed, no copy was submitted.5In another unlawful sale of a parcel of land, an Affidavit of Non-Tenancy was notarized by the respondent. It was entered in his Notarial Register as Doc. No. 2448, Page No. 276, Book No. VIII, Series of 2004. The affidavit referred to a Deed of Sale involving a 2,500-square meter property. The Deed of Sale was notarized by the respondent on November 14, 2002 and entered in his Notarial Register as Doc. No. 2212, Page No. 239, Book No. VIII, Series of 2002. To verify the authenticity of the Deed of Sale, the complainant tried to secure a copy but she discovered that no such Deed of Sale existed. In fact, a different document corresponds to Doc. No. 2212, Page No. 239, Book No. VIII, Series of 2002. It refers to an Affidavit of Discrepancy, instead of a Deed of Sale. On the column "REMARKS," the word "cancelled" appeared without indicating the reason for the cancellation. This was confirmed by Clerk of Court Quidilla in his 1st Indorsement dated July 16, 2004, stating that "Doc. No. 2212, Series of 2002 pertains to an Affidavit of Discrepancy executed by Joseph Lim Clemente on November 15, 2002."6In his Comments and Compliance dated August 29, 2006,7the respondent admitted the complainants allegations on the notarization of the subject documents, but denied any participation in the sale and transfer of the lands covered by the documents. He claimed that it was his secretary who prepared and drafted the documents. He claimed that his only participation was to affix his signature on the documents; he was already 82 years old and insulin dependent, so he had no more time to prepare documents and enter documents in his notarial register. He begged for leniency and consideration from the Court, and asked for forgiveness for his inadvertent acts. He apologized and committed himself not to repeat these misdeeds.In a resolution dated November 29, 2006, we referred the complaint to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.8In the position paper she submitted to the IBP, the complainant reiterated her charges against the respondent, further stating that as a member of the Philippine Bar, the respondent allowed himself to be used as a Notary Public to illegally enable third parties to claim rights over properties to which the complainant has hereditary rights. By notarizing documents through false representations, without the signatories personally present before him as required under the Notarial Law, the respondent should be held guilty of dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar.9The respondent likewise reiterated in his position paper10his explanations contained in his comment su