CENTRE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

Working Papers

Working Paper Number 56

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ORANG ASLI IN THE

MALAYAN EMERGENCY 1948-1960

by

John Leary

-'-~--~"""" MONASH UNIVERSITY KP JB 2423

CLAYTON 3168 AUSTRALIA

"

PERPUSTAKAAN NEGARA MALAYSIA

PREFACE

The Emergency

The Emergency in Malaya from 1948 to 1960 was an ideologically motivated insurrection by the

Malayan Communist Party (MCP) seeking the overthrow of the British Colonial Government in

Malaya. The Communists who were almost all Chinese, were supported by a small number of

Malayan and Indian Communist Party members and a few Malayan radical secessionist groups.

The Emergency was declared in 1948 by the British High Commissioner Sir Edward Gent in

response to labour unrest in the mines and plantations of Malaya and direct attacks upon

civilians and police brought about through actions of the MCP directed by the Politbureau and its

Secretary-General Chin Pengo

The plan had been to drive out both rubber estate and mining managers by a deliberate campaign

of killing individuals and so terrorize others into abandoning their posts. The process of

government was to be disrupted through causing officials and civil authorities to flee the

assassination and terror squads of the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) the military arm

of the MCP. The MCP failed in both those objectives.

In the early years of the Emergency the British/ Malay Security Forces, consisting of the Malay

Police Force, augmented by Special and Auxiliary constables, supported by British/ Gurkha/ Malay

Army Units, with the Royal Air Force, Royal Australian and New Zealand Air Force units and the

Royal Navy, had difficulty in defeating a tough and dedicated enemy. The Malay Police Force

was the mainstay of the Security Forces. Overall control of the operations against the

M CP /MRLA remained in the hands of the civil authorities. The military's role was to act in

.:'Support of the civil power.

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2 6 SEP 1995 Perpustakaa n Negan.

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PERPUSTAKAAN NEGARA MALAYSIA

The Orang Asli were to be drawn into the battle by both sides, mainly in non-combatant roles as

guides and porters. The MRLA used them as an early warning shield for deep jungle camps and

as food suppliers for some units. The Security Forces found them invaluable as porters in jungle

operations to carry the heavy wireless equipment and spare rations. Many other uses were made

of the Orang Asli as the Emergency went on but these will be elaborated upon in this paper.

PERPUSTAKAAN NEGARA MALAYSIA

Asli

Atap or Attap

Basha

Batin

Beaufighter

Bren Gun

CT

DZ

FARELF

Force 136

Gurkha

Gunung

Ibans

IMP

lahat

lelutong

Kampong

Ladang

LZ

MCA

MCP

Merdeka

MIC

Min Yuen

(i)

GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

Original or source (Malay) - Asal - origin.

Palm Thatch.

Hut.

Aboriginal Headman.

Propeller Fighter-bomber (World War 2).

Light machine gun of Czechoslovakian origin.

Communist Terrorist.

Dropping zone for air drops or paratroops.

Far East Land Forces.

British WW2 clandestine unit in South East Asia.

Nepalese mercenary in British Army.

Mountain (Malay).

Sarawak (Borneo) tribesmen used as guides by Security Forces.

Independence for Malaya Party.

Wicked (Malay).

Wild rubber.

Malay Village.

Aboriginal cultivated area.

Landing zone for helicopters.

Malayan Chinese Association.

Malayan Communist Party.

Free, Independent (Malay); in this context it means Independence.

Malayan Indian Congress.

Masses Organization - back up for MRLA.

PERPUSTAKAAN NEGARA MALAYSIA

MPAJA

MRLA

Orang

PAAC

Padi

Parang

PRO

Sakai

SAS

Senoi

SF

Senoi Pra'ak or Pra'aq

SEP

Sitrep

Squadron

Squatters

S.T.

Sungei

Troop

UMNO

(ii)

Malayan Peoples anti-Japanese Army.

Malayan Races Liberation Army.

Classifier for Person (Malay).

Perak Auxiliary Aborigine Constabulary.

Rice.

Machete (Malay).

Public Records Office.

General derogatory name for Aborigines.

Special Air Service Regiment.

Major Aboriginal tribal group.

Security Forces.

Armed Aboriginal Police Unit.

Surrendered Enemy Personnel.

Situation Report.

SAS unit approx 50 to 100 men.

Chinese living in illegal small holdings on jungle fringe. Straits Times.

River (Malay).

SAS unit approx 15 to 25 men.

United Malays National Organization.

PERPUSTAKAAN NEGARA MALAYSIA

'""I11e importance of the Orang AsH 1 in the Malayan Emergency 1948-1960

Introduction

The proposition put forward in t~is presentation is that the Orang Asli, by their simple

p resence in particular areas in Peninsular Malaya, had an effect on the 1948-60 Emergency out of

3..11 proportion to their actual numbers. I will suggest that this presence influenced one of the

~o protagonists, the Malayan Communist Party, to take it into consideration when it changed

m ilitary tactics in 1951. The other, the Security Forces, in turn, changed their tactics because

L h at Orang Asli presence was becoming a menace.

The Orang Asli are often depicted as passive outsiders, led, drawn or coerced into the

GLrmed struggle by the opposing armed parties, but in fact the individual groups of Orang Asli

knew where their interests lay and supported the most active and seemingly superior armed force

in their particular area. It is not proposed to concentrate on their exotic social structures and

c ultures, they can tend to obscure their normal human traits, strengths and failings. Instead I

1ntend to demonstrate how the Emergency and its concomitant proliferation of armed forces in

remote Orang Asli areas caused tensions among the inhabitants of those areas resulting in

vriolence by Orang Asli against one or other of the armed groups or among themselves.

Even though the Orang Asli were widespread throughout Peninsular Malaya they were very

£ ew in numbers. The 1947 census gave their total number as 34,737 out of a total population of

4 .9 million2. P.D. Williams-Hunt, the Federal Adviser on Aborigines claimed in 1952 that this

:figure was a gross underestimation of Orang Asli numbers and that the total should have been

100,000.3 The Orang Asli were not a homogeneous group but were classified in three separate

m ajor groups which were themselves also not homogeneous (see map 1). these major groups

'-Vere,4 with approximate population numbers:

N egrito

S enoi

P roto-Malay (Jakun)

( Orang Melayu Asli)

In the North and North East

In the main range area of the Peninsula

In the Centre and Sou th

3,000

21,200

10,500

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The life styles of the vanous groups ranged from the subsistence wandering hunting

Negritos, through semi-nomadic cultivators to settled group leading a life very like the rural

Kampong Malay. The Federal Adviser on Aborigines classified the various groups life styles from

known data in 1950 as shown in table 1.5

Position in Malay Society.

Leading up to the Emergency and in its early years the Orang Asli were not generally held

ill high esteem. Captain Edney-Hayter had been appointed Protector of Aborigines for the

Malayan Union in 1946 but the responsibility for Aboriginal Welfare still remained a matter for

the various states. His office of Protector of Aborigines was considered as part of the Museum

Department and as such his position was regarded more as a research and reporting function

rather than as one of any real significance.6

Apart from the colonial and Malay administration officers responsible for their welfare, the

Orang Asli were ignored by the mass of the populace and exploited by merchants, small holders

.and middle men directly in contact with them.7 In a letter to the State Secretary Selangor on

1he 4th September 1950, the Chief Secretary observed,

.. . the social problem of aboriginal welfare cannot be disregarded merely

because aborigines are unimportant in the economic life of the country

and present no potential threat to its welfare. 8

As late as 1955 the Straits Times published an editorial that said in part:

In the definition of Malayan "peoples" the Aborigines were not included

They were part of the animal life in or around the fringe of the jungle.

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,-.

Way of Life. : Negritos.

I

t . Wandering hunting com- Haro~ mWliueli with no ladangs . Some Jlhai.

;' Some Lana;' .

Senoi.

None known

.2. Wandering ' hunters planting Some Jehai None known patches but not hving in ? Negrito. neat them. J erantut.

3. Hunting group~ with some ! Jehai Some PIt cultivation and houses but : Some Mmdraq frequent moves. Added : Some Lanoh. . income from sale of jungle : I i

produce.

4. Groups practising shifting agriculture and moving ' lome distance ellch year.

None known but Jehai and Lanon trencling this way.

5. Groups practising shifting agrIculture but felling ladangs adjacent to one another for a number of years.

None known

6 . Groups with rubber and fruit :None known plantations hut yearly I

ladangs in addition.

7. Groups in a fixed ktlmpong None following a Malay wily of life . Fruit, rubber, wet padi ~ Rwahs and larger dome~tic arurTlBJs.

8. Groups with a yearly ladang None but splitt ing thelr man-power between the ladang and nearby eHate labour.

9. Wandering ~e8 people living None largely in boau. .

10. Pormer Orang Laue settled in coastal fishing villages (5).

I I. Groups livin~ in semi slavery adjacent to Malay kam­ponq,.

None

Some J~hai Some Lanoh

,Serna" Jtranr.

i f

PIt Some Tl!l1Ur Some Sl!rnai Che Wong

. Jah Hut

Most of the Tcmtr. Some Serna;.

Some Serna;

A number of Sernai communities.

Sonar in Cameron H i g h I II n d sand Pende.

None

None

Some PIt

I '

Aboriginal Malay!.

? Strna.q Palonz (1)

None known .. .

Ternoq (2) Oragn Kanaq (3).

Some Jakun Orang Hu/u

Sl!mdai Some Jakun Stmaq Sernang.

I I ,

Approx. % of total

Aboriginal population.

Lesll than 2%

Less than 2 %

About 3 %

About 15%

About 3S %

Some Sernda; About 20 % DdanaJ. Jakun. Several other

group,.

AboriginRl Malays in About 15% part~ of: Sdangor, Negri Sembilan, Malacca, Pahang and J ohore (~)

Probable but none yet About 1% reported.

Orang Stltear, some DtJl'n Do/aq .

Dt$r'n Dolaq Orang Stlae (Ii) Orang Kallang.

Some StINt/a; Some Jakun.

2-3%

NOll!l . - The percentages shown are only I rough guess as no attempt has ever been made to enumerate Aborigines by way of life . The relative ratios are believed to be more or JeS! corr~ct.

(I) This group, south of Tasek Bera in Pahang, ha~ never been seen by a reliable observer and is inserted on the evidence of adjacent Aborigines and the Security ~orces.

(1) The T~rnoq, Ulu Sg. Rompin, Pahang, show evidence of a !ltrong Negrito Hrain. (l) An imported group from the Riouw islands. Total 34 only . Normal location KOla Tinggi. At present in

the Research Station of the Adviser on Aborigines near Kuala Lumpur. (t) Few of these people have distinctive group name~ .

(5) It appears that the island populations off the en~t coaH although regarded as Malays still have headmen termed Batins and are therefore almost certainly settled Orang Laut.

(II) The Stlar and Kallang are Muslim Aborigines on Singapore Island and on lome of the British and Indonesian hlands to the south of the Colony. I

•

PERPUSTAKAAN NEGARA MALAYSIA

3

Even their number was a matter for speculation. All the peoples of

Malaya had staked their claims and inalienable rights except these

wretched people driven into the jungle fringes. 9

The Malay Communist Party and the Orang Asli

The association between the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and the Orang Asli went back

to World War Two when the military arm of the MCP, the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army

(MPAJA) went underground to escape and fight the Japanese.10 In building up their jungle camps

and courier routes they were often helped by the Orang Asli. The MCP were most particular

about paying Orang Asli who assisted them and also promised to protect them from Japanese

reprisals. 11 They were not above using terror to obtain their way and killed Orang Asli who did

not cooperate or who helped the Japanese. Many of the rural Chinese in the MP AJ A had

previous association with the Orang Asli as traders or tin poachers, and some cohabited with or

married Orang Asli women. In 1950 Williams-Hunt gave these classifications of Chinese relations

wi th Orang Asli:

In broad terms Chinese living amongst the Aborigines can be divided into:

a. Chinese with Chinese wives; usually shopkeepers

b. Chinese with aboriginal wives; often jelutong tappers or collectors of other jungle

produce

c. Chinese children adopted by aborigines; normally girls but some boys

d. Chinese wives of aborigines; very rare, only one case known so far

e. Half-caste children being brought up as aborigines, a very large number of cases. 12

Categories b,c,and e reflect close Chinese-Orang Asli relations in World War Two and later.

t Pat" Noone, the Protector of Aborigines in Perak before World War Two, who had married a

PERPUSTAKAAN NEGARA MALAYSIA

4

lemiar woman, also went underground and gave the MP AlA expert advice, as an anthropologist,

<<In how to deal with the Orang Asli in their environment. He also advised his Orang Asli

< ontacts that the MP AlA were their frienes and protectors. l3

In the political turmoil between the end of 1945 and the declaration of the Emergency the

-MCP kept some contact with the Orang Asli through Chinese squatters, traders and buyers of

~ungle produce. In the early days of the Emergency the MCP jMRLA'sj main sources of supplies,

information, manpower and food were the Chinese squatters on the jungle fringe. Even though

old deep jungle14 courier routes and bases in Orang Asli areas were used there was not a great

need for them.

The Security Forces

The Security Forces used Orang Asli as porters and guides when the Emergency began.

Intelligence about the MRLA locations and movements was bad at the beginning of the armed

conflict. IS A lot of time and material was wasted by the Army, in particular, in so called

"jungle bashing" looking for MRLA bases and units in the deep jungle when most were located on

the jungle fringe near their sources of supply. Bombing of Orang Asli clearings by the Air Force

and uncouth dealing with Orang Asli by other Service Arms did not help in gaining their

confidence. A progressive step in dealing with the Orang Asli was the formation in 1950 of a

small unit, the Perak Aboriginal Areas Constabulary (P AAC).16 Consisting mainly of Malays with

some part Orang Asli and a few Indians and Chinese it was officered by British personnel. Its

objects were to police Orang Asli areas in Perak, gather intelligence, establish the location of

Orang Asli groups, their numbers, their headmen and win them over to the side of the colonial

authorities. The idea was sound but its execution bad. The European officers in the field were

careless and cocky and when three of their officers, while rafting down the Sungei Plus, were

killed by the MRlA in 1951, its value as a unit deteriorated)7 The MRLA had demonstrated to

the Orang Asli that they could kill anybody threatening their hold on the aboriginal groups.

PERPUSTAKAAN NEGARA MALAYSIA