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International Journal of Accounting & Business Management
www.ftms.edu.my/journals/index.php/journals/ijabm
Vol. 6 (No.1), April, 2018
ISSN: 2289-4519 DOI:10.24924/ijabm/2018.04/v6.iss1.21.38
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Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Research Paper
THE IMPACT OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON FIRM PERFORMANCE: A STUDY ON BOMBAY STOCK EXCHANGE IN INDIA
Sahibzada Muhammad Hamza
Lecturer
School of Accounting and Business Management
FTMS College, Malaysia
Siti Suziyati Suman BSc(Hons) Accounting & Finance Student
Lords Ashcroft Business School
Anglia Ruskin University, UK
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of ownership structures on firm performance in India. Textiles, oil marketing and distribution, movies and entertainment industries were studied through 50 companies registered in Bombay stock exchange within the span of 2011 -2015 and total observations of 250 firms-years. The independent variable is managerial, concentrate, institutional and foreign ownership while the dependent variable is Return on Assets. The research employed Descriptive Statistics, Pearson correlation coefficient and multiple linear regressions for gauging the impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable. Simple convenience sampling technique is used to select the sample size and E-view software was adopted to generate the data for analysis. The findings show that concentrate ownership has a significant positive impact on Return on Assets. While managerial and institutional ownership have positive insignificant impact on ROA. Lastly, foreign ownership is found to have a negative insignificant impact on ROA. Furthermore, it is recommended that future researchers are encourage different industries with the same framework to investigate the impact which might be different due to the difference in the nature of the industry. While another framework with more different ownership structure options can be designed and test to see more aligned results. This Study will eventually benefit the textiles, oil marketing and distribution and movies and entertainment sectors r to deal with their ownership structure in future. It also helps to guide them in determining the costs, improving the relationship in organization within the firms and make a good understanding on how the ownership structure would bring influence on the firm performance.
Key Terms: Structure, Managerial ownership, Concentrates ownership, Institutional ownership,
Foreign ownership, Firm Performance, ROA, and BSE
ISSN: 2289-4519 Page 22
1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this research is to examine the impact of ownership structures on firm
performance in Indian textile, oil marketing and distribution and movies and entertainment
sector registered in Bombay stock exchange. Ownership structure is an important factor which
affects a firm’s movement especially its health (Zeitun & Tian, 2007). Berle and Mean (1932)
are the pioneers of studying ownership structure which they conducted in United States
corporate law where they hypothesize that an inverse correlation should be observed between
the diffuseness of shareholdings and firm performance. From the conflicts of interest between
controllers and managers, it was concluded that with increasing ownership diffusion, the
authority of the shareholders to control management is minimized (Berle & Mean, 1932).
Previous studies in India has been done by Singh and Gaur (2009) on corporate
sector, Srivastava (2011) on actively listed company constitute the bulk of trading and Nazir
and Malhotra (2016) on corporate governance. While globally the studies in this topic done by
Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) on financial performance of Japanese corporations; Grant and
Kirchmaier (2004) in Europe corporate governance industry; Karaca and Ekşi (2012)in
manufacturing industry on the Istanbul stock exchange. Mostly researches has been done in
corporate governance sector and the common variables used are ROI, ROE and ROA (Kaur &
Gill, 2008; Srivastava, 2011;Nazir & Malhotra, 2016).
The interest conflict between a firm’s managers and owners influence the decision
made by themselves which leave impacts on company performances. Undeniable, when the
control of a company is separate from its ownership, agents either managers may not generally
act to the best interest of its shareholders (Bonazzi & Islam, 2006). Moreover, the issue of
ownership structure on firm performance within any company has become a serious discussion
in corporate governance for decades as the problem of “separation of ownership from control”
always arises within organization in different types of ownership structures (Srivastava, 2011).
Adding to it, ownership structure has been always dictated by other country-level
corporate governance characteristics such as stock market development and the state
intervention with the regulations natures (Porta et al., 1998).A firm with the different
ownership structure will not have the same level of efficiency, where the high concentrate
companies can be more efficient in which the concentration may alleviate the interest conflicts
among agents (Ramli, 2010).While in poorly performing firms, the directors may be assumed
doing a poor job in overseeing management and have less opportunity to be the directors at
other firms (Kaplan & Reishus, 1990). This is why ownership matters to be discuss.
By conducting this research, it can add a new element in contributions to the previous
literature on firm's’ performance and ownership structure. The study also beneficial for
corporate, textiles, oil marketing and distribution and movies and entertainment sectors since
the issue in ownership structure are mostly addressed to them especially in managing
ownership and its control within the growing firms surround them and may also help the
company Board of Director to deal with their ownership structure in future. It also helps to
guide them in determining the costs, improving the relationship of the organization within the
firms. Indirectly this research information can help the firms in textiles, oil marketing and
distribution and movies and entertainment sectors to have a good understanding how the
ownership structure would bring influence on the firm performance.
Research Objectives:
To identify and examine the impact of institutional ownership on ROA
To identify and examine the impact of managerial ownership on ROA
To identify and examine the impact of concentrated ownership on ROA
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To identify and examine the impact of foreign ownership on ROA
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined ownership structure as capital commitments,
which involves inside investors (supervisors) and outside investors (debt and equity holder).
Bansal (2005), demonstrated that the committee of investors and shareholders (proprietors) is
made up of individual peoples, groups and institutions whose have different goals, interests,
investment horizons and capabilities. Abel & Okafor (2010) defines ownership structure as the
percentage of share held by managers (managerial ownership), institutions (institutional
ownership), government (state ownership), foreign investors (foreign ownership), and family
(family ownership).
Numerous theoretical models and frameworks have been developed in order to
identify the relationship and the impacts of ownership structures trend towards firm
performances. Most common theoretical adopted was the Agency Theory which is created by
Jensen and Meckling (1976). This theory emphasises on the separation of firm management
and ownership. The theory was born as the consequences of conflict of interest between agents
(shareholders and managers) and due to problem in separation of firm management and
ownership (Abdul Jamal et al, 2013). Secondly, Stewardship theory was introduced by
Donaldson and Davis (1991) to understand the existing relationships between ownership and
management of the company. This theory arises as an important counterweight to Agency
Theory (Pastoriza, 2008). While Transaction cost theory was initially developed by Coase
(1937) to discuss how the costs of engaging in an action by an organization affect its behavior.
Modern corporations generally have easy access to finance; but their shareholders are more
dependent on the managers (Volonte, 2012). Lastly, Property Rights Theory developed by
Coase (1960) stresses that property rights give the freedom to decision maker and control its
financial performance. Referring to Alchian and Demsetz (1973), the ownership of property
rights didn’t set specifically only for certain groups which can be owned privately, government
and even by society (Shleifer & Vishny (1997).
Table 1: Summary of theories on Ownership Structure
Theories Description Sources
Theory of the
firm
Theory of market in which firms are crucial actors Coase (1937)
Agency Theory Explain the relationship between principal and agents Jensen and
Meckling
(1976)
Principal agent
theory
Emphasis the conflict between shareholders and the
management
William
(1963)
Stewardship
theory
Understanding the existing relationship between
ownership and management within the firm
Donaldson
and Davis
(1991)
Property rights
theory
Specification of individual rights determines how
costs and rewards will be allocated for the
participants in all organization
Coase (1960)
Transaction cost
theory
Discuss how the cost of engaging in action by an
organization affects its behavior
Coase (1937)
ISSN: 2289-4519 Page 24
Several researches were conducted previously in India to examined the ownership
structure impacts on firms performance such as likeNazir and Malhotra (2016) did on
corporate governance, Singh and Gaur (2009) did study on corporate sector, Srivastava (2011)
on actively listed company constitute the bulk of trading, Kumar (n.d) did on corporate
governance, Singh and Singh (2016) study on cement industry, Haldar and Rao (n.d) make
research by analyzing firms traded on Bombay Stock Exchange, Balasubramanian and Anand
(2013) study about ownership trends in corporate. Mostly researches has been done in
corporate sector and the common variables used are ROI, ROE, ROA, concentrate and
managerial ownership (Kaur & Gill, 2008; Srivastava, 2011; Nazir a& Malhotra, 2016).
Globally there are numerous studies conducted on the topic. Some notable amongst
them are mentioned; Lazaretou and Kapopoulos (2006), conduct study to investigate if there’s
a strong evidence to support the notion that variation across firms in observed ownership
structures impacts in systematic variations in observed firm performance. Demsetz and
Villalonga (2001) by using endogenous variable and two types of ownership structure which
reflect on different group of shareholders with conflicting interests. The findings suggest that a
more concentrated ownership structure positively relates to higher. Chen (2012) makes a
research to investigate the effect of ownership structure on firm performance on Non-financial
Listed Companies in Scandinavian. Furthermore, Radice (1971) prove that owner-controlled
firms tend to have higher profit rates and growth rates. Wahla, Shah and Hussain (2012) make
a research to analyze the significant relationship of Ownership Structure with Firm
Performance in non-financial companies listed at Karachi Stock Exchange with a period of
2008 to 2010. Wei et al., (2014) make a research to determine the relationship between
ownership structure and firm performance in Malaysia in trading and services sector. They
conduct the research by testing dependent variables like firm age, firm size, leverage, return on
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q; and independent variable which are
managerial ownership structure and Non-managerial ownership structure. This study includes
of testing 70 companies in treading and services sector which listen in in Bursa Malaysia
within the year from 2008-2012 (5 years). The finding concludes that the firm size, leverage
and Tobin’s Q have significant relationship with ownership structure of the company. Zakaria,
Purhanudin and Palllanimally (2014) conduct a study to examine the impact of ownership
structure on firm performance of the Malaysian listed Trading and Services firms. Phung and
Mishra (2015) conduct a study to examine the effect of ownership structure on firm
performance, for firms listed on Vietnamese stock exchanges, using 2744 firm-year
observations covered from year 2007 to 2012.
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework
Concentrate
Ownership
Institutional
Ownership
Foreign
Ownership
Managerial
Ownership
ROA
ISSN: 2289-4519 Page 25
Investors are large institutional investors such as banks, insurance companies,
investment companies (Bush, 1998). The institutional ownership is gauged through the ratio of
shareholding held by institutions to the total number of shares (Fazlzadeh et al., 2011;
Nuryanah & Islam, 2011). Cornett et al (2003) found that large stockholders and institutional
investors have become increasingly active in corporate governance, especially in
underperforming firms. Bethel et al. (1998) find that block share purchases by institutional
investors are most likely in highly diversified firms with poor profitability.Cornet et al. (2003)
has proven that there's a significant positive relationship between institutional ownership and
corporate performance especially in the organizations' working income (operating cash flow)
and the ownership percentages and institutional stockholder number. The total share or stock
hold by institutional ownership within the firm has high influence on ROA. The increases of
independent directors percentage would aligning the interests conflict between managers and
shareholders which reduce the conflicts and resulting in higher ROA (Cornett et al 2003).
H1: There is a positive significant impact of Institutional ownership on ROA.
Li and Sun (2014) defined managerial ownership as the ratio of equity owned by
directors. The diffuseness of shareholdings of today Modern Corporation decides the
detachment of ownership and control, that’s why it causes a conflict of interest problem,
occurs among the management and the shareholders which may leave consequences into firm
performance (Berle and Means, 1932).This can be observed from Morck, Shleifer and Vishny
(1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) studies that the relationship between managerial
ownership and firm performance should be focused. However, Demsetz (1983) state that an
expanded level of insider ownership can diminish corporate performance.
H2: There is a positive significant impact of managerial ownership on ROA.
Ownership concentration is the ownership share (votes) of the largest owner in
percentage (Pathirawasam, 2013). Hill and Snell (1998) found good relationship between
ownership structure and firm performance which is measured by using profitability.
Concentrated firms will encourage innovation as a strategy to increased firm value rather than
diversification strategy because it will make the manager tied along with the interest objective
(Zakaria, Purhanudin & Palanimally, 2014).Hill and Snell (1998) got that there’s a good
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance which is measured by using
profitability. Then Claessens, Djankov & Pohl (1997) prove that ownership concentration has a
strong positive relationship with the profitability. They conclude that the firm with high
concentrated generated higher profitability and market value. Mitton (2002) also found the
same finding where the high concentrated company has a better stock market performance
during the economic crisis of Asian. Furthermore, by reducing the monitoring costs, ownership
concentration will help in improving the firm performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).
H3: There is a positive significant impact of concentrate ownership on ROA.
Foreign ownership is found in the increasing output, employment and wages of target
firms in respect to residential procured firms (Wang and Wang, 2014). Along with this its
directly can influence the company performance. Barbosa, Natalia & Louri (2003) state no
evidence shows that multinational corporations are performing well than the domestic
corporations in Greece and Portugal which is measured by ROA. Li and Jeong-Bon (2004)
point out that foreign ownership generated higher ROA and ROE compared to domestic
ownership.Furthermore, the presence of foreign ownership improves the comparative cost
advantage of firms(Micco, Panizza, & Yañez, 2004).
H4: There is a positive significant impact of foreign ownership on ROA.
ISSN: 2289-4519 Page 26
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The research design adapted for this study is explanatory research design to test the
causal relationship between the independent and dependent variable. Quantitative secondary
data has been collected for the defined variables to examine the topic. To examine the
hypotheses, companies from three sectors (textiles, oil marketing and distribution; movies and
entertainment) which are publicly listed in Bombay Stock Exchange has been chosen within
the time span of 2011-2015. 50 total companies were being selected for the sample by using
convenient sampling technique. The companies were chosen based on availability of data in
the annual reports. Thus the study would take data from the published annual reports which are
accessible in the company’s official website. For the ethical issue, as this was a secondary
research the copyright and legal access to the owner’s works will be applied to avoid
misconduct in this research and the proper citation of the real facts using Harvard Referencing
is provided. Then E-views employed software to analyze the Correlation analysis and the
Multiple Regression analysis as this research used convenience sampling technique to collect
the data.
4. RESULT AND DISUCSSION
Descriptive statistics
Table 2: Descriptive Means and Standard Deviation
N Min Max Mean Std. Deviation
Concentration ownership 250 373.43 2308 15.03 299.84
Foreign ownership 250 156.73 2926.78 15.34 397.21
Institutional ownership 250 1016 8666746 15.77 109.48
Managerial ownership 250 1879 31087 43.87 217.20
As shown at the Table 2, the average mean for the independent variable Concentration
Ownership is 15.03 with the standard deviation of 299.84. This indicates that the 15% of
ownership is concentration ownership from the selected sample of the Australian Mining
Industry. Secondly, the average mean for the independent variable Foreign Ownership is 15.34
with the standard deviation of 397.21. This indicates that the 15% of ownership is foreign
ownership from the selected sample of the Australian Mining Industry. Furthermore, the
average mean for the independent variable Institutional Ownership is 15.77 with the standard
deviation of 109.48. This indicates that the 15% of ownership is Institutional ownership from
the selected sample of the Australian Mining Industry. Lastly, the average mean for the
independent variable Managerial Ownership is 43.87 with the standard deviation of 217.20.
This indicates that the 43% of ownership is Managerial ownership from the selected sample of
the Australian Mining Industry
ISSN: 2289-4519 Page 27
Correlation Analysis
Table 3: Correlation analysis
ROA Concentrate
ownership
Foreign
ownership
Institutional
ownership
Managerial
ownership
ROA 1
Concentrate ownership 0.058047 1
Foreign ownership 0.213627** 0.299852 1
Institutional ownership -0.31784 -0.49633** -0.365772** 1
Managerial ownership 0.172379** -0.094291 0.167839** 0.016401 1
According to Table 3 above, Concentrate ownership (independent variable) has a
positive insignificant relationship with ROA (dependent variable) with a Pearson Correlation
value of 0.05 and probability value of 0.36. This research findings are similar with the findings
of AL-Najjar (2015); Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002); Zakaria, Purhanuddin and Palanimally
(2014) and Raji (2012). While opposite findings have found by Claessens and Djankov (1999);
Din and Javid (2011) and Kiruri, (2013) which argue that as the number of block holder
increase within the company, the company performance fall while if the number decrease the
performance rises. Foreign Ownership (independent variable) has a positive significant
relationship with ROA (dependent variable) with a Pearson Correlation value of 0.21 and
probability value of 0.00. The result of this study is similar to the results concluded by
Mang’unyi (2011) and Kiruri (2013) finding which concludes that higher foreign ownership in
a company leads to higher profitability while lower foreign ownership leads to lower
performance. However, Aburime (n.d) and Lee (2008) have concluded contradicting findings.
Institutional Ownership (independent variable) has a positive insignificant
relationship with ROA (dependent variable) with a Pearson Correlation value of -0.31 and
probability value of 0.61. Duggal and Millar (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (2000)also found
similar findings from their study.However, this result is contradicted with Nesbitt (1994);
Smith (1996) and AL-Najjar (2015) findings. Mao (2015) also concludes that institutional
investors have more incentives and more competencies to involve in monitoring management
therefore enhancing firm performance. Managerial Ownership (independent variable) has a
positive significant relationship with ROA (dependent variable) with a Pearson Correlation
value of 0.17 and probability value of 0.00. Moreover, the findings of this study are similar
toMorck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988); Cheung, Fung and Tsai (2008) and Shleifer and Vishny
(1986). Opposite findings found by Wahla, Shah and Hussain (2015); and Ruan, Tian and Ma
(2011).
Table 4: Summary of correlation analysis results
Variables Results
Concentrate ownership Positive insignificant correlated with ROA
Foreign ownership Positive significant correlated with ROA
Institutional ownership Negative insignificant correlated with ROA
Managerial ownership Positive significant correlated with ROA
Multiple Regression Analysis
Table 5: Model fitness
Model R-squared Adj. R-squared F-Significance Durbin-Watson Statistics
1 0.531 0.392 0 1.522
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According to table 5, R-square value is 0.531 which shows that 53.1% of the variable
is relatively link with the ROA. The adjusted R-square is 0.392 signifies that this model is not
a good fit as the variation value is lower than 60% of range which should be at least for being
appropriate as mentioned in the study of Zygmont and Smith (2014). F significance value is
0.00 which means that overall model is significant. The Durbin Watson value is 1.522 which
shows that there’s no autocorrelation amongst the companies chosen for this study which lies
in range of 1.5 to 2.5 that abstaining from auto correlation as mentioned by Folarin and Hassan
(2015).
Table 6: Beta Coefficient of Return on Assets (ROA)
Model 1
Variable Β Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
CONSTANT 294.7281 104.4374 2.822055 0.0053
Managerial ownership 0.002584 0.005013
0.515435 0.6068
Concentrate ownership 0.11147
0.053942
-2.06655 0.0401
Institutional ownership 3.17005 9.25005 0.343008 0.732
Foreign ownership -0.036869 0.043541 -0.846753 0.3982
Dependent Variable: ROA
ROA = CONSTANT + β1managerial ownership
ROA = 294.7281+0.002584(managerial ownership)
In accordance to table mentioned above, the standardized beta coefficient value for
managerial ownership is 0.002 with a significant value of 0.606. This indicates that Managerial
Ownership has a positive insignificant impact on Return on Assets amongst the selected
sample studied for this study. Similar findings were concluded in the studies of KokWei et al.,
(2014); Sulong et al., (2013); Omran, Bolbol; Fatheldin (2008) and Din and Javid (2011)
where they explaining that managerial ownership which exceed the certain threshold destroys
the effect due to problem arise among manager and large block holders. The entrenchment
theory state that the mangers would use the company resource for their personal used, this will
eventually leading to the decrease in the firm’s performance (Din and Javid, 2011). This
finding contradicts with the agency theory that whenever managerial ownership increases, the
performance also increases and it was argue that as consequences, the managers and
shareholders will work hard and create better investment decisions; while the high managerial
ownership firms tend to performing well (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, this finding
is contradicting with Pathirawasam (2013) and Wahla, Shah and Hussain (2012) findings.
ROA = CONSTANT + β2Concentrate ownership
ROA = 294.7281+0.11147(Concentrate ownership)
ISSN: 2289-4519 Page 29
In accordance to table mentioned above, the standardized beta coefficient value for
concentrate ownership is 0.11 with a significant value of 0.04. This indicates that Managerial
Ownership has a positive significant impact on Return on Assets amongst the selected sample
studied for this study. However, this study concludes similarly to the studies of Chen (2012);
Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Scholten (2014). This was posits by Berle and Means (1932)
which state that as concentrate ownership alleviates the conflict interests between agents it
should have a positive effect on performance. While in Ahmed et al., (2012); Wahla, Shah and
Hussain (2012) study, they found an opposite findings.
ROA = CONSTANT + β3Institutional ownership
ROA = 294.7281+317005(Institutional ownership)
In accordance to table mentioned above, the standardized beta coefficient value for
Institutional Ownership is 3.17 with a significant value of 0.732. This indicates that
Institutional Ownership has a positive insignificant impact on Return on Assets amongst the
selected sample studied for this study. This findings contrast the property rights theory which
assumed that institutional ownership effectively help generating more profits (Wanjuguet al.,
2015).This finding are similar to the findings of Wanjuguet al. (2015);Agrawal and Knoeber
(1996) and Karpoff et al. (1996) which also find no such significant relationship. However,
Abdou (2003);Khamis, Hamdan and Elali (2015)andMasry (2016) found contradicting
findings. The insignificant result could be explain by the small amount of ownership held by
institutional even though it expected to enhance managerial monitoring, their effectiveness
may be hampered by insufficient representation in corporate board (Wanjuguet al., 2015).
However, the impact of institutional ownership on firm performance is still vague and need to
further discussion.
ROA = CONSTANT + β4Foreign ownership
ROA = 294.7281-0.03689(Foreign ownership)
In accordance to table mentioned above, the standardized beta coefficient value for
Foreign Ownership is -0.03 with a significant value of 0.398. This indicates that Institutional
Ownership has a negative insignificant impact on Return on Assets amongst the selected
sample studied for this study. Similar outcomes were generated from the studies of Wei et al.
(2005); Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) and Unite and Sullivan (2003) which
are contradicted with Gurbuz and Aybars (2010);Azzam, Fouad, Ghosh (2013) and Omran,
Bolbol, and Fatheldin (2008) findings. However a negative coefficient of the ROA significance
level could be explained by several reasons like the involvement of foreign ownership made
the company occur an incremental capabilities for examples giving or sending the staff for
training and introducing novel cutting-edge technology which increase the expenses and
balanced the beneficial effects of foreign ownership in the short term (Shen, Lu, & Wu, 2009).
Then, the presence of foreign ownership also introduced foreign experts and procedures such
as barrier in difference language and culture which become obstacles for the local or
management to cooperate with them (Rokhim & Susanto, 2013)
5. CONCLUSION
The agency theory concludes that if the agents reduce the conflict amongst them it can
prevent from affecting the ownership structure that leads to the bad situation of the firm
(Brailsford, Oliver and Pua, 1999). This research tests the hypotheses which are concern
regarding the impact of ownership structure on firm performance. The findings conclude that
the distribution of equity ownership within the firm has significant impact only on
concentrate ownership. While institutional ownership, foreign ownership and managerial
ISSN: 2289-4519 Page 30
ownership makes no contribution to the profitability of selected sample companies in
Bombay stock exchange (BSE). The lack of consensus from empirical research isn't
surprising because performance depend on the ownership pattern applied and sometimes
relying on the national institutional (Gitundu et al., 2016).
The study provides a heading light for the future researchers to investigate different
variables that aren’t adopted in this study. There many other else variables such as return on
investment, Tobin Q, return on equity, size and leverage which can be used to investigate and
discover various factors of ownership structure which affecting the company’s performance
that registered in Bombay Stock Exchange. Moreover, in future research the managerial,
institutional and foreign ownership which is found insignificant in this study can be readopted.
Then the future researcher also recommend to use larger sample size since this research has
only used 50 listed companies in 3 sectors of Bombay Stock Exchange like study done by
Kaopoulos and Lazaretou (2006) where their study covers all sectors of Greek economy.
This study facing several limitations such as the study only covers three sectors of
BSE which cannot be a representative for the entire economies. However the most highlighted
limitation in this study is the availability of the data because the ownership structure data are
quietly limited in India as it was developing country. Next, the impact that has been intended
to be measured in short term which might not reflects the perfect outcomes as maybe the
performance of the companies could be impacted in long term. Moreover, the limited time
limitation has much influence this research scope which insufficient time to discover entire
sectors and the spending times on collecting data where only ROA independent variable that
used to measure the profitability. Lastly, a minimal sample size was selected due to non-
availability of financial data for the companies registered in BSE.
The further researchers are encouraged to conduct a research with more wide
approach by conducting research which covers entire sectors and countries to check the
similarity that found in this research. Furthermore, a comparative study also can be made in
order to checking the deviation and ownership structure behavior in different industries.
Therefore the future researchers are advised to use different industries with the same
framework to investigate the impact which might be different due to the difference in the
nature of the industry. While another framework with more different ownership structure
options can be designed and test to see more aligned results. Future researchers are
recommending taking larger sample size as this study only used 50 selected firms. The result
will be more accurate and better if the sample size is increase. Besides that future researchers
advise to lengthen the period of sample size by using more than 5 years. Lastly, future
researchers are encouraged to expand the coverage of the sample in various countries since
different country will have different result
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