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INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT INTEL COSTA RICA Within Intel’s competitive environment, speed and continual product improvement were the critical factors driving its decisions to expand and upgrade its production capabilities. In contrast to Intel’s relatively more capital intensive initial fabrication plant (fab) facilities where the silicon chips are created, Intel’s decision on locating new ATP capacity, where the two-step chip process is completed, was driven slightly more by assured access to a highly trainable and technical, yet low-cost, workforce. The workforce could participate in successive revamping and upgrading of the ATP as the marketplace dictated new performance requirements every 18 months. Intel’s location selection apparently was influenced also by government incentives, in some measure because its investment decisions were made even before specific product demand levels could be forecasted with confidence. Firm- specific concessions and financial incentives were somewhat more important in locating the capital-intensive fab plants than for ATPs. In contrast, ATP location decisions relied relatively more on workforce and human resource-related consid- erations, such as availability of qualified engineers and employee turnover. Intel’s Interactive Site Selection Process Intel engaged in an ongoing process of continually evaluating possible fab and ATP sites among its investment alternatives. The company maintained a fluid list of possible host countries for new ATPs, which was actively updated and revised as competitive circumstances and Intel’s perceptions of its needs changed. In early 1996, executive management specifically decided to pursue a site for a new ATP, requiring 400,000 square feet and employing an initial workforce of 2,000 to assemble and test the new line of Pentium® microprocessors. Intel convened a team of experts composed primarily of people who had significant experience in site selection, including the Vice President for Site Selection, as well as other senior executives and staff from several functional areas within the company. For nearly two years prior to this decision to select a new ATP site, Costa Rica’s national promotion agency had been targeting and actively approaching large, U.S.- based electronics companies. In the late 1980s, CINDE (la Coalición Costarricense de Initiativas para el Desarrollo) specifically decided to focus its efforts rather than to spread its limited resources. Given Costa Rica’s high-level technical knowledge and yet relatively low labor costs, as well as an abundance of bilingual citizens, CINDE decided Costa Rica might be well suited to the needs of the growing global electronics industry. In 1993, CINDE began courting Intel. The last meeting together was held a few months before the location search for a new ATP was formalized. However, by that time CINDE had already increased its focus on Intel, establishing a project team of three senior-most CINDE officials, each focused exclusively on attracting Intel through discrete functional area assignments, such as legal regu- lation, free trade zone issues, human resources, education, real estate, and so forth. The first stage of Intel’s formal process began when Intel team members validated first-level considerations using basic desk research to eliminate candidates from the long list of countries. In addition to Costa Rica, at this point the list included: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Puerto Rico, Singapore, Taiwan (province of China) and Thailand. While not formally ranked, the various criteria weighed at this first stage included generally the following considerations:

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  • INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT INTEL COSTA RICA

    Within Intels competitive environment, speed and continual product improvement were the critical factors driving its decisions to expand and upgrade its production capabilities. In contrast to Intels relatively more capital intensive initial fabrication plant (fab) facilities where the silicon chips are created, Intels decision on locating new Atp capacity, where the two-step chip process is completed, was driven slightly more by assured access to a highly trainable and technical, yet low-cost, workforce. the workforce could participate in successive revamping and upgrading of the Atp as the marketplace dictated new performance requirements every 18 months. Intels location selection apparently was influenced also by government incentives, in some measure because its investment decisions were made even before specific product demand levels could be forecasted with confidence. Firm-specific concessions and financial incentives were somewhat more important in locating the capital-intensive fab plants than for Atps. In contrast, Atp location decisions relied relatively more on workforce and human resource-related consid-erations, such as availability of qualified engineers and employee turnover.

    Intels Interactive Site Selection Process

    Intel engaged in an ongoing process of continually evaluating possible fab and Atp sites among its investment alternatives. the company maintained a fluid list of possible host countries for new Atps, which was actively updated and revised as competitive circumstances and Intels perceptions of its needs changed. In early 1996, executive management specifically decided to pursue a site for a new Atp, requiring 400,000 square feet and employing an initial workforce of 2,000 to assemble and test the new line of pentium microprocessors. Intel convened a team of experts composed primarily of people who had significant experience in site selection, including the vice president for site selection, as well as other senior executives and staff from several functional areas within the company.

    For nearly two years prior to this decision to select a new Atp site, Costa ricas national promotion agency had been targeting and actively approaching large, U.s.-based electronics companies. In the late 1980s, CInDe (la Coalicin Costarricense de Initiativas para el Desarrollo) specifically decided to focus its efforts rather than to spread its limited resources. given Costa ricas high-level technical knowledge and yet relatively low labor costs, as well as an abundance of bilingual citizens, CInDe decided Costa rica might be well suited to the needs of the growing global electronics industry. In 1993, CInDe began courting Intel. the last meeting together was held a few months before the location search for a new Atp was formalized. However, by that time CInDe had already increased its focus on Intel, establishing a project team of three senior-most CInDe officials, each focused exclusively on attracting Intel through discrete functional area assignments, such as legal regu-lation, free trade zone issues, human resources, education, real estate, and so forth.

    the first stage of Intels formal process began when Intel team members validated first-level considerations using basic desk research to eliminate candidates from the long list of countries. In addition to Costa rica, at this point the list included: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, mexico, puerto rico, singapore, taiwan (province of China) and thailand. While not formally ranked, the various criteria weighed at this first stage included generally the following considerations: