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The impact of collectivism on negotiation behaviour and its outcomes.
A perspective of collectivism as an individual factor.
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the impact of collectivism on negotiation behaviour and, consequently, on
the outcome in the customer/supplier negotiations. Most previous studies classified the
behaviour with a dichotomy perspective known as integrative/competitive behaviour or
wiw/win and win/lose negotiation. Additionally, the influence of cultural factors in the
negotiation process is already studied in the literature such as collectivism, but how affects the
collectivism as individual factor? This question is no longer studied. Taking it into account we
understand that negotiators classified as collectivistic will show more integrative behaviour and
its results will be better went two collectivistic negotiators are bargaining together.. We
proposed an experimental analysis to answer these questions. We have designed a
customer/supplier experiment when pairs of subjects are involved in a negotiation process
which was implemented in Costa Rica and France. Taking in consideration the relation between
negotiation outcomes and their negotiation behaviour, we report a behavioural analysis of
subjects.
Keywords: negotiation behaviour, outcome, collectivism
The impact of collectivism on negotiation behaviour and its outcomes.
A perspective of collectivism as an individual factor.
1. Introduction
Negotiations are critical business processes at both intra-organizational and inter-
organizational levels. In fact the literature highlights how the outcome of the negotiation
(content of the agreement and relationship created between participants) influences the
2
successful implementation of the negotiated relationship (Saorín, 2008a). Thus, it is understood
that a successful negotiation can be assessed, among others, depending on the results obtained
in terms of satisfaction (Weitz, 1981; Ganesan, 1993; Graham et al, 1994; Harwood, 2006;
Kale, 2010), profits (Pruitt and Lewis, 1975; Pruitt, 1981; Brett et al., 1998) and/or closing or
not the agreement (Rubin and Brown, 1975; Weiss, 1997; Tjosvold et al., 1999).
Also, while the various models of existing negotiation literature highlight the variety of
factors that influence the complex dynamics of the negotiations and consequently the outcome,
the need to consider the negotiation behaviour as the key factor is generally defended. Thus, it
is argued that the way in which negotiators communicate and act is the main determinant of the
outcome of the negotiations (Graham, 1985; Roure, 1997; Ghauri, 2003a, b; Saorín, 2008a, b;
Saorín et al., 2013).
However, although there are previous works focused on determining the type of
negotiation behaviour and/or its impact on the outcome, there are still many questions in this
regard. There are several previous studies analysing the impact of collectivism on the
negotiation behaviour in international negotiations. As we understand, however, those studies
entail a limitation: In the vast majority of previous works, the analysis is performed at the level
of the national culture, regardless of other variables that could affect behaviour, such as
organizational and family culture or personal factors (Salk and Yoko, 2000; Farh, Hackett and
Jiang, 2007).
Therefore, this work outlines the objective is to identify whether the effect of the individual
dimension of collectivism acts in the same way as its do as national cultural factor. Finally, as
an objective, we analyse the impact of the type of behaviour shown by the negotiation parties
on the outcome obtained in the interaction.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1. Negotiation tactics
3
Negotiation behaviour is defined among others, as the set of communicative actions or
tactics (verbal and nonverbal) that each negotiator addresses his counterpart (Rubin and Brown,
1975; Putnam, 1990; Adler et al, 1992; Rao and Schmidt, 1998; Saorín, 2008b). Thus,
negotiation literature distinguishes between integrative and competitive negotiation behaviour
depending on the orientation and tactics involved. From our point of view this framework of
dichotomous analysis is too limited to reach a deep understanding of the dynamics and
outcomes obtained in the negotiations. There are some attempts to break this traditional
approach that recognize the existence of negotiation behaviour of intermediate character,
although mainly at a theoretical level. As an exception we have Saorín’s proposal (2008b), who
develops a typology of behaviours within a continuum which distinguishes behaviours of
intermediate character, i.e., competition, attenuated competition, commitment and
collaboration (Figure 1).
Figure 1
There are works that have focused on proposing typologies of negotiation tactics, such as
the works of Lewicki and Robinson (1998), Bolman et al. (2000), Kim et al, (2005) and Adair
and Brett (2005). Thus, Lewicki and Robinson (1998) identified several classes of competitive
actions, grouped in five factors related to commercial negotiations: 1) Misrepresentation of
Information, 2) Traditional Competitive Bargaining, 3) Bluffing, 4) Manipulation of
Opponent’s Network, 5) Inappropriate Information Gathering.
Bolman et al. (2000), Kim et al, (2005) and Adair and Brett (2005), for their part, propose
the following integrative negotiation actions: 1) attempt to understand the other's needs; 2) seek
mutual satisfaction of negotiators; 3) ensure a positive and productive personal relationship; 4)
cooperate to obtain positive results from the parties; 5) free flow of information; 6) minimize
differences among the parties; 7) trust the position and information of other negotiators; and 8)
participation of all parties in the decision making process.
4
As can be observed, these are studies that have investigated a number of integrative or
competitive actions individually. However, in this paper we argue that along all negotiation
interactions different types of tactics coexist, of both integrative and competitive orientations.
Regarding tactics with competitive orientation, as indicated, we believe it necessary to
distinguish between two types of action: acceptable competitive and inappropriate competitive
actions. In this sense, we understand the former as those identified by Lewicki and Robinson
(1998) as the traditional competitive negotiation. As the name implies, these actions are
regularly used by the negotiator, and despite their competitive nature, their frequent use makes
them acceptable or better tolerated by the counterpart than other competitive actions, which we
call inappropriate competitive actions.
2.2. The negotiation behaviour and the outcome
Various indicators are found in the literature of negotiation in order to evaluate the
outcomes obtained in the interaction. Among others to be mentioned are the achievement or not
of an agreement, the profits of the participants, the individual and joint economic benefit or
satisfaction with the agreement or relationship established during negotiation. However, there
is some consensus in raising satisfaction as the one indicator of the outcome of the negotiation
that may be applied to any type of interaction (Ganesan, 1993).
Based on the integrative/competitive dichotomy, previous research has looked into the
relationship between the type of negotiating behaviour exhibited and the outcome reached. In
particular, it has been demonstrated that when integrative negotiating is used, win/win
agreements are easier to reach (i.e. Rubin and Brown 1975; Pruitt 1981; Adler et al. 1992;
Tjosvold et al. 1999; Munduate and Medina 2005). Evidence shows that integrative behaviour
enables mutual understanding, reduces uncertainties and creates a trust-based relationship
between the parties (Saorín 2006, 2008a).
In contrast, evidence shows that competitive behaviour makes it difficult to reach
5
agreements in negotiation processes (i.e. Lax and Sebenius 1986; Munduate and Medina 2005),
and if an agreement is reached, it will not be mutually satisfactory for all the parties involved,
which has the consequent negative effects on the correct development and performance of the
negotiated relationship (i.e. Rubin and Brown 1975; Ury et al. 1988; Weiss 1997; Tjosvold et
al. 1999)..
The non-agreement situation is also argued to be somewhat complex. The existence of a
possible agreement zone is a key factor to be analysed (O´Connor and Arnold, 2001; Munduate
et al., 2005a, b; Saorín, 2006). When an agreement is likely to be reached and due to how the
process has been developed the outcome is the non-agreement, this situation should be assessed
as a failure. However, when the parties realize that there is no possible agreement zone and they
decide not to reach any agreement, the (non-agreement) outcome should be assessed as a
success (O´Connor and Arnold, 2001; Munduate et al., 2005b; Saorín, 2006). According to
Neale and Bazerman (1992) in some situations is better not to achieve an agreement when the
interests of both parties are not satisfied (win/win outcome) due to its repercussions in the
future.
At this point, and based on the previous arguments, since in this paper we consider a
continuum of negotiation behaviours, we understand that the different types of behaviours
proposed will entail varying degrees of satisfaction. Specifically, we propose that:
Hypothesis 1: The more integrative the negotiation behaviour shown by the parties, the higher
the possibility of reaching mutually satisfactory agreements.
2.3. The impact of collectivism on negotiation behaviour
Given the key role played by the type of negotiation behaviour on the outcome of the
interaction, its determination emerges as a key issue to analyse. The literature shows the
diversity of factors that influence the negotiation dynamics. However, there are still many
questions about some of them. This is the case of collectivism, defined, as opposed to
6
individualism, as the concern of a person towards the group to which he or she feels connected.
By contrast, the degree of individualism is seen as the concern for taking care of oneself and
one's immediate environment.
For this reason, and trying to address in depth this issue, we wish to answer the following
questions in this paper: Does the collectivism as individual factor impact the negotiation
behaviour? How the collectivism impacts the negotiation behaviour? To this end, sharing the
argument and the perspective adopted by other authors, we consider it appropriate to consider
the collectivism dimension as an individual rather than cultural variable, as this approach allows
to isolate the effects of this dimension (Cai, Wilson and Drake, 2000; Drake, 2001 Cai and
Kink, 2002). Analysing the effect of collectivism on the negotiation behaviour, taking the
individual as the unit of analysis instead of part of a collective (national culture), we believe
will allow us to respond to non-conclusive results found in some studies of negotiation and
improve understanding of this relationship (individual collectivism-negotiation behaviour).
In the negotiation literature, the evidences provided in relation to the possible effect
collectivism may have on the behaviour are varied, in general, and in particular in negotiation
(i.e. Graham et al, 1988; Triandis, 1995; Cai and Fink, 2002; Servaes, 2003; Gesteland, 2006).
More specifically, these findings relate to the influence on, among others, the decision-making
process, the communication that may be established or directly to the type of behaviour most
likely to show (integrative versus competitive).
As we mention previously, most of the evidence of the effect of collectivism-individualism
on the negotiation behaviour is related to national culture. In this sense, we use the theoretical
framework of national collectivism to propose the possible effect of collectivism from an
individual perspective.
Thus, about the impact of collectivism on the type of negotiation behaviour, a wide range
of studies have concluded that people in collectivist cultures are less confrontational than people
7
of individualistic cultures. For example, Chua and Gudykunst (1987) compare students from
37 countries and in cases of participants "from high-context cultures (who are assumed to be
collectivists) these were found to be significantly less confrontational than students of low-
context cultures (who are assumed to be individualistic)" (Cai and Fink, 2002: 70).
According to Graham et al. (1994), who analyse a sample of 700 business people in eleven
different cultures from four Asian countries, four Anglo-Saxon countries and a Latin American
country, significant evidence was obtained for concluding that in cultures with higher
individualism, the trend is to use less "problem solving approach", which according to Walton
and McKersie (1965), Pruitt (1981) and Graham et al. (1994) are equivalent to integrative
behaviours. In their study of the American and Brazilian cultures, Volkema and Leme (2002)
coincide with this analysis, concluding that the latter have less competitive behaviour than
Americans and justify such behaviour by analysing the dimension of collectivism in Brazil,
which presents a more collectivist culture than that of the United States (Hofstede, 2001; House,
2004).
Thus, and according to the above arguments, we propose that even adopting an individual
instead of national cultural perspective in the analysis,
Hypothesis 2: The higher the collectivism of the individual, the greater the integrative
orientation of the negotiation behaviour shown.
3. Experimental design and procedures
In order to achieve the objectives of this work by analysing the proposed relationships,
an experiment simulating negotiation processes of the type buyer/seller or customer/supplier
was performed. Thus, a total of 9 experimental sessions were implemented in France and in
Costa Rica.
France and Costa Rica were chosen because of their differences in the level of national
collectivism, were France is considered an individualist society and Costa Rica a collectivistic
8
country (Hofstede, 2001).
A total of 126 students of Business Administration from both countries participated in
the experiment. Specifically, we obtained a balanced sample of 60 participants in France and
66 in Costa Rica. The names Buyer/Seller were used to define the roles adopted by the players
during the experiment, and the game is presented as a process of negotiation in which
participants had to interact.
The experiment consists of 8 rounds, in which the even-numbered rounds differ from
the odd-numbered rounds as detailed below. No participant knows the identity of his opponent
and all decisions are held in strict anonymity. Each pair forms a separate market consisting of
a Buyer and Seller.
The decision of the participants is to negotiate with the opponent the purchase or selling
price of three products in each of the rounds. The price at which a buyer (seller) buys (sells)
each of the three products gave him a final profit expressed in ECUs (Exchange Currency
Units).
The design of the experimental is based on the dilemma of Kelley (1966), which represents
a negotiation situation for three products. Each of the participants has since the beginning of
the experiment a paper leaf with the benefits chart taken directly from the study of Kelley
(1966).
Additionally, in four rounds the participants have the opportunity to send a message to
his counterpart. This is a closed message with a negotiating tactic described therein. A total of
ten messages are available. These messages are associated with negotiating tactics or actions
with different orientation. The list of messages is detailed below in Table 1.
Table 1.
We present the results across different behavioural variables already presented above to
determine the negotiation behaviour, such us the movement of prices and the tactics (messages)
9
selected by subjects
These variables were used to create the variable explaining the behaviour in negotiation,
defined according to the classification described in Saorín (2008b) and showing the continuum
of behavioural profiles linked with the theory (from 1 to 6).
According to the classification of Saorín (2008b), we classify the typology of subjects
in six categories attending to the different behaviours showed into the negotiation process.
The sessions were conducted in the laboratory of Experimental Economics of Dijon
(France) and in San Jose (Costa Rica). All participants were students of the respective centres
without any experience in similar games. All sessions were conducted following the standard
protocol in Experimental Economics. The decisions of the individuals were anonymous and
participants received an amount of cash at the end of the experiment in a confidential manner
based on the results obtained during the experiment.
At the end of the experiment a set of questions was implemented including the
Collectivism/Individualism psychological scales (Cai and Fink, 2002; Based on Hui and
Triandis, 1986) and Satisfaction of the outcome of negotiations (Graham et al., 1994).
4. Results
In this section we present the results for the experiment based on Kelley (1996) according with
the collected data for the implemented sessions. We present the results across different
behavioural variables already presented above to determine the negotiation behaviour, such us
the movement of prices and the tactics (messages) selected by subjects. These variables were
used to create the variable explaining the behaviour in negotiation, defined according to the
classification described in Saorín (2008b) and showing the continuum of behavioural profiles
linked with the theory (from 1 to 6). Once we have defined them, the behavioural variables are
going to explain the negotiation outcome though several scenarios, such us the monetary
10
outcome, the satisfaction outcome (Graham et al., 1994) and the fact that groups close or not
the negotiation process.
Assuming that groups can be formed by three categories according to the behaviour of
negotiation, we have groups formed by two integrative participants (Integrative groups), one
integrative and one competitive (Mixed groups) and two competitive individuals (Competitive
groups), with 17, 33 and 13 observations respectively. We classify the level of group
satisfaction according with these three categories.
Table 2.
The results from the table 2 allow us to answer the Hypothesis 1. We observe how the
composition of groups from a negotiation behaviour point of view has an impact on the group
satisfaction. Concretely, table 2 presents the average level of group satisfaction as we have
mentioned previously. The values critically decrease when we reduce the impact of integrative
behaviour in groups. Thus, integrative groups have on average, 4.78, while the value for mixed
groups is 4.77 and 4.09 for competitive groups. Implementing some non-parametrical tests we
are going to see if there exist some significant differences. Concretely, we use the Mann-
Whitney test to prove that there exist high significant differences when we compare integrative
groups with both and competitive and mixed groups. We argue that the fact to follow integrative
behaviour in the negotiation process reaches higher levels of group satisfaction as we propose
in the Hypothesis 1.
Taking in consideration that the mixed group is composed of integrative subjects and
competitive subjects, we analysed the individual satisfaction of both components of the mixed
groups. We obtain as result that the integrative subjects score 4.71 in satisfaction and the
competitive subjects score 4.83 in the same factor, but no significant difference was found
11
attending to the non-parametrical test (p-value = 0.1906). We can conclude that the satisfaction
of both participants was very similar inside this type of groups.
Attending to one of the main goals of the paper, we analyse the impact of individual
collectivism on the negotiation behaviour according with the Hypothesis 2. To this purpose, we
run three linear regressions with the behaviour of negotiators (from 1 to 6) as endogenous
variable according with Saorín (2008b) in table 3. The explanatory variables are Collectivism
as the degree of individual collectivism measure using the scale (Cai and Fink, 2002; Based on
Hui and Triandis, 1986), Gender, the Integrative price movement, the Integrative tactics and
Country. Note that the endogenous variable was formed taking in consideration the Integrative
price movement and the Integrative tactics according to the classification of Saorín (2008). The
Integrative price movement indicates (from 0 to 10) the positive deviation in prices from the
initial prices and the final price at the moment to close the negotiation. Integrative tactics takes
value 1 if the subject has chosen an integrative tactic.
Table 3
We have divided the sample across countries as we can observe in regressions (2) and
(3). The degree of collectivism matters for the whole sample (regression 1) as it has a positive
and significant impact (at 1%) on the negotiation behaviour. This effect still matters in the
sample collected in France and Costa Rica. Gender has significant effect and negatively related
with the endogenous variable for regression in all sample (1) and in France (2) and no effect
for Costa Rica (3). The impact of Integrative price movement is extremely related (at 1%) in all
the cases as it was used to create the negotiation behaviour. However, the use of integrative
tactics is positive and significant at 1% in all the regression excepting in regression (3). Finally
the country has significant effects for the whole sample.
12
Hypothesis 2 was validated through the regression showed in Table 3. The higher the
collectivism of the individual, the greater the integrative orientation of the negotiation
behaviour shown.
Furthermore we should pay attention to the impact of collectivism in the monetary
outcome from the negotiation process attending to the different countries. In this sense we
present Table 4 with the average profit across countries and degrees of collectivism. Note that
we have created the dichotomous variable of collectivism (High-collectivism and Low-
collectivism). A total of 70 observations we observe in High-collectivism (15 in France and 55
in Costa Rica), while 56 observations are taking in consideration for Low-collectivism (45 en
France and 11 in Costa Rica).
Table 4
Implementing again non-parametrical tests to analyse the significant differences across
countries and collectivism, we observe a high significant difference (1%) for the degree of
collectivism and the country to explain the level of profit in all sample. This result allows us to
confirm that the degree of collectivism has a crucial importance to explain the monetary
outcomes from the negotiation process, while the county has no impact in this sense.
Additionally to the satisfaction analysis reflected in Hypothesis 1 and 2, and the impact
of collectivism in the integrative behaviour of subjects, we can extend the statistical analysis to
the other two variables reflecting the outcome of the negotiation process, the capability to close
the negotiation and the profit obtained during the interaction process.
Attending to the theory in negotiation processes, the fact that participants close the
negotiation should be taken in consideration. Only 12 subjects (6 interaction groups) never close
the negotiation. In line with the categorization of the study we observe only two observations
in the integrative groups, four observations for the mixed groups and six observations for the
13
competitive groups. Thus, the 11% of subjects never close the negotiations in the integrative
groups, 6% for the mixed groups and 25% in competitive groups.
Finally, we present the profit obtained in the negotiation attending to different
explanatory variables to conclude the results section. Table 5 provides three linear regressions
with the profit obtained in the negotiation as endogenous variable. For the explanatory variable
we follow the previous results to explain the profit according to Gender, Country, Integrative
members, No-Close and Satisfaction (Graham et al., 1994).
Table 5
As we observe in Table 5 the whole sample is analysed in regression (1), while only the sample
for the each country is included in (2) and (3). Gender has impact on the three regressions. It
means that women obtained more profits than men in France, and less in Costa Rica.
The dichotomous variable of the country has effect for the total sample.
Integrative member’s is the unique variable that is not going to explain us the impact of the
integrative behaviour attending to the monetary outcomes of the negotiation... Additionally, not
closing the negotiation process is negatively related with profits in the three regressions.
Finally, the variable of satisfaction (Satisfaction) is positive and significantly related at 1% with
the outcome obtained in the interaction.
5. Conclusions
The results obtained in the experimental design implemented, have shown, once again,
that the negotiating behaviour displayed by the negotiators is the key determinant of the
outcome achieved in the interaction.
Thus, more specifically, the results show that the more integrative behaviour is
14
displayed by the negotiators, according to our definition, the greater the degree of perceived
satisfaction and the profit obtained are. These results therefore support the first hypothesis.
Regarding the Hypothesis 2 is demonstrated that collectivism is a key in determining the type
of negotiation behaviour factor. However, we understand, too, as a conclusion to emphasize,
the need to go deeper into the impact of collectivism as an individual factor on the determination
of the type of negotiation behaviour due to the results obtained at the country level. In this
sense, the evidence suggests that this factor, collectivism, although can be considered as a key
determinant of behaviour in negotiations, his analysis should be performed at the individual
level rather than being considered as a characteristic dimension of a national culture.
At the methodological level, this work has been a challenge to the application, for the
first time, the work of Kelley (1966) in an experimental setting, obtaining as a result,
conclusions of great interest to both business and academic level in order to achieve a better
understanding both the dynamics of the negotiations and their outcome.
This paper contributes to the understanding of the negotiation process and the effect of
collectivism on its results, especially in Central America that is a region little studied.
Specifically, the understanding of different negotiation behaviors along a continuum and
how the integrative actions produce better results in terms of satisfaction and profits has
implications at the business level, especially when companies are interested to create long term
relationships with customers and suppliers. In this sense, the challenge is to motivate
counterpart to maintain a win-win negotiation although this behavior means sacrificing short-
term profits for better future results.
Additionally, at the theoretical level, the treatment of collectivism from the individual
dimension has been little used in the literature, where the national dimension is predominant.
This approach allows the analysis of the influence of collectivism on negotiator behaviour
directly from a single source of information.
15
We understand that this work is a first step that can form the basis for future research.
Thus, we suggest that future research should deep in the determination of the type of negotiation
behaviour based on the continuum by Saorín (2008b) analysing and incorporating new variables
such as time pressure, power relations or the role played by the negotiator, among others. Also,
we feel it important that future work address the study of such relationships from a cross-
cultural approach and not just intracultural one.
Taking into account the theoretical review and the results of this research, the table 6
summarizes how findings contribute to close the gaps found in the literature.
Table 6
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Appendix I: Tables and Figures
Table 1. Categorization of the messages
Type of action Message
Integrative
1 “I'm interested that you are also satisfied with the results of the
negotiation”
2 “Product A/C is the most important to me” “The product has the
best margin for me is A\C”
3 “Let's talk about the three products as one package”
Inappropriate
competitive
4 “My price list goes from 7 to 9 (seller) / My price list only has
prices from 1 to 3 (buyer)“
5 “I have another client who wants to buy the whole stock of
products "/" I have another supplier that offers me better
conditions "( supplier phase, customer receiving offer)
6 “This is my last price, I do not accept counter-offers”
Acceptable
competitive
7 “Let’s negotiate product by product”
8 “That price would not be competitive in the market”
9 “Come on, let us close this! Let's leave it like this!”
Table 2. Group satisfaction and the type of the group
Average level of Group satisfaction
(std. dev.)
Integrative groups 4.73a, b
(0.29)
Mixed groups 4.77b, c
(1.28)
Competitive groups 4.09a, c
(1.36)
Mann Whitney test (p-values): a(0.0000), b(0.000), c(0. 0.5257).
Table 3. Linear regression to explain the impact collectivism on negotiation behaviour
(1) (2) (3)
All France Costa Rica
Collectivism 0.103*** 0.0865* 0.125***
(0.0295) (0.0449) (0.0394)
19
Gender -0.174*** -0.255*** -0.0961
(0.0613) (0.0837) (0.0913)
Integrative price movement 0.0971*** 0.0797*** 0.115***
(0.0106) (0.0147) (0.0155)
Integrative tactics 0.391*** 0.644*** 0.180
(0.138) (0.206) (0.185)
Country -0.201***
(0.0615)
Constant 3.526*** 3.406*** 3.478***
(0.0511) (0.0744) (0.0592)
Observations
R-squared 811 399 412
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Legend:
Collectivism: Is the degree of individual collectivism measured using the scale (Cai and Fink,
2002; Based on Hui and Triandis, 1986). (from 1 to 7, where 1 is less collectivist)
Gender: Dichotomical variable that takes value 1 if the gender is female.
Integrative price movement: Indicates the positive deviation in prices from the initial prices
and the final price at the moment to close the negotiation. (from 0 to 10)
Integrative tactics: Dichotomical variable that takes value 1 if the subject has chosen an
integrative tactic according to Table 1.
Country: Dichotomical variable that takes value 1 if the subject was realized the experiment
in France, and 0 if the subject was from Costa Rica.
Table 4. Average of profits across countries and degree of collectivism
Profits
(std. dev.)
France Costa Rica Total
High-Collectivism
1456.25a, c
(1215.68)
1956.10a, d
(909.37)
1691.81f
(1109.19)
Low-Collectivism
2081.34b, c
(861.31)
2044.69b, d
(861.88)
2063.16f
(860.16)
Total 1796.65e
(1122.49)
1995.60e
(888.11)
Mann-Whitney test (p-values): a(0.0011), b(0.9790), c(0.000), d(0.6171),
e(0.0071), f(0.0006)
Table 5. Linear regressions explaining the profit obtained in the negotiation
(1) (2) (3)
All France Costa Rica
Gender -81.07** 186.5*** -408.1***
(37.45) (53.15) (51.77)
20
Country 93.72**
(37.22)
Integrative members -4.013 -33.88 22.87
(39.59) (57.02) (51.73)
No-Close -2,080*** -2,087*** -2,178***
(35.75) (54.65) (45.84)
Satisfaction 146.7*** 123.5*** 151.7***
(10.98) (17.22) (13.44)
Constant 1,435*** 1,498*** 1,531***
(64.62) (91.22) (78.42)
Observations
R-squared 1,008 480 528
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Legend:
Gender: Dichotomical variable that takes value 1 if the gender is female.
Country: Dichotomical variable that takes value 1 if the subject was realized the experiment
in France, and 0 if the subject was from Costa Rica.
Integrative members: Represents the percentage of integrative subjects into the groups. Takes
value 1 if the group is formed for 0 integrative subjects, value 2 if at least there are 50% of
integrative subjects and value 3 if 100% of the group is composed by integrative subjects.
No-Close: Dichotomical variable that takes value 1 if the subject never closes the negotiation.
Satisfaction: Is the degree of satisfaction with the negotiation process measured using the
scale (Graham, Mintu & Rodgers, 1994). (from 1 to 7)
Table 6. Theoretical review gaps and findings
Theoretical review Literature gaps Findings
Hypothesis 1: The more
integrative the negotiation
behaviour shown by the
parties, the higher the
possibility of reaching
mutually satisfactory
agreements.
Use of a limited
dichotomous framework to
analyse the negotiation
behaviour.
Very little research has
considered Central
American countries as the
unit of analysis
The results were consistent
with the theoretical review,
even used the continuum of
negotiation behaviours.
Hypothesis 2: The higher the
collectivism of the
individual, the greater the
integrative orientation of the
negotiation behaviour
shown.
In the vast majority of
previous works, the analysis
of collectivism is performed
at the level of the national
culture, regardless its
individual factor dimension.
The evidence suggests that
the collectivism as
individual factor although
can be considered as a key
determinant of behaviour in
negotiations.
21
Figure 1. Negotiation behaviour continuum
Fuente: Saorín-Iborra (2008b)
Pure Integrative Behavior
Pure Competitive Behavior
Competition Attenuated Competition
Commitment Collaboration
Competitive Orientation Integrative Orientation