The History of Missile Defenses, Space Weapons, and Arms Control Issues

Dr. Clay Moltz

Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Monterey Institute of International StudiesJune 2005

Overview

• “Why don’t we have defenses?” (Reagan, 1979)

• Difficulty of defense (vs. offensive)• Limits of technology• Still, $122 billion spent (1957-99) on

ballistic missile defenses• About $45 billion spent under the Bush

administration to date

Outline of My Remarks

• Brief history of U.S. missile defenses and space connection, including SDI

• 1990s and shift from TMD to NMD

• Today’s technical challenges

• International issues and trade-offs

Space History and Weapons Issues

• U.S.-Soviet assumptions about space weapons in 1950s

• U.S. Military Programs:– Nike Zeus (1955-61)– Project Defender and BAMBI (1958-68)– Dyna-Soar (X-20)(late 1950s-1963)

• Secretary of State Dean Rusk (1962): “There is an increasing danger that outer space will become man’s newest battle-field.”

Generations of Nike Missiles

“Bluegill” Test during the Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962

Trade-Offs Facing U.S./Soviet Decisionmakers in the 1960s

• No civilian manned programs• Very limited commercial applications• Serious problems for military satellites in

LEO• Possible battles in space spilling over to

Earth• “Claiming” of Moon by U.S. or USSR• Likely nuclear tests in space by China,

France, and UK

Result: Restraint in Space

• U.S. Defense Secretary Neil McElroy (1958): “We should not spend hundreds of millions of dollars …pending general confirmatory indications that we know what we are doing.”

• Decision made to militarize space, but to halt weaponization (passive reconnaissance, sensors, and communications only)

Space Treaty Developments (1963-72)

• Partial Test Ban Treaty (October 1963)

• U.N. Space Resolution (December 1963)

• Outer Space Treaty (1967)

• ABM Treaty (1972)

• Bulk of space spending in U.S. shifted to civilian programs and passive military programs

Apollo Lunar Mission

Skylab

Nuclear-Tipped Spartan Missile used in Safeguard System

Changing Views of Defense(late 1970s)

• Rise of Soviet threat (heavy SS-18s with MIRVs)

• Soviet ASAT tests and invasion of Afghanistan

• Technological changes (beginning of computer and sensor revolution)

• Role of U.S. laboratories in promoting defenses (Edward Teller)

The Strategic Defense Initiative (1983)

• Goal: defense against full-scale Soviet attack

• Use of advanced space sensors and tracking

• New options in “boost” phase defenses

• Possible use of space-based rail guns, lasers, and kinetic kill vehicles

• Reagan’s goal of eventual elimination of nuclear weapons

SDI’s Demise

• Technological limitations (mirror size, launch access, laser problems, “absentee” problem, space debris); also high cost

• Democratic Congress and ABM Treaty• Changes in Soviet policies, decline of

threat• SDI becomes GPALS under Bush I (Global

Protection Against Limited Strikes)

Mir Space Station

Space Shuttle

LACROSSE Radar-Imaging Satellite

Gulf War (1991)

• Mistaken lessons about theater missile defenses (TMD)

• Patriot failure in 41 of 42 interception attempts

• Still, Congress rushes to embrace new TMD technologies

• 1994 Congress and Defend America Act calls for National Missile Defense (NMD)

Early 1990s: Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Programs

• Focus on short-range to medium-range missiles in forward-deployed locations

• Patriot follow-ons (PAC III)—now being deployed

• Navy Theater Wide system (Aegis ships)—now deployed

• Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)

Sea-based Interception

Shift to National Missile Defense (NMD) in late 1990s

• Rumsfeld Commission Report (July 1998)• North Korean test of Taepo’dong I missile

(August 1998)• Tests by Pakistan, India, and Iran• Passage of National Missile Defense Act

(July 1999)• Limited NMD plans by Clinton

Administration—fear of 2000 elections

Clinton’s National Missile Defense (NMD) Plans

• Goal of limited defense against missile attacks by “rogue” states

• Defense of whole territory of the United States, including Alaska and Hawaii

• Capability of defeating 20-30 incoming missiles (not 1,000s)

• Test program; but decided not to deploy under his administration

Bush’s Missile Defense Strategy

• Air Force’s “Vision 2020” and Rumsfeld II report (Jan. 2001) identify U.S. space vulnerabilities

• ABM Treaty: outdated and irrelevant

• Better to deploy imperfect missile defenses, than to wait for attack

• No mention of nuclear elimination as a goal

• Belief in “technological determinism”

Current U.S. Space/MD Policies • Pursue defensive and offensive options

– Deploy near-term MD, research space-based options

– Consider ASATs/space weapons for space “denial”

• Goal: Post-Cold War freedom to investigate all options (given low risk)

• New civilian pledge for Moon/Mars missions (funding? policy conflicts?)

Components of Space-Based Lasers

Critics of Bush Approach

• Where is the threat?

• Costs vs. other priorities

• Negative international implications

• Commercial impact?

• Belief that treaties can be effective

International Perspectives

• U.N. resolutions on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)

• Chinese/Russian proposals at Conference on Disarmament in Geneva

• But international negotiations frozen for past several years

International Space Station

U.S. Military Perspectives of Space Defenses

• Supporters: weaponization likely inevitable– Better to be first

– Possible use of space for defense and rapid strike (“rods from God”)

• Critics: space defenses not needed, might not work– Might stimulate countermeasures and space debris

– Technical hurdles

– Power problems

– Maintenance problems (and costs)

Possible Alternatives to Space-Based Weapons

• Revival of old notion of “pop-up” defenses using new power-projection capabilities

• Reusable space plane or fast drone

• Hypersonic weapons

• “Non-offensive” (passive) defenses– Decoys, maneuverability, ready-to-launch

spares, use of non-space resources

Milstar

Congressional Politics

• Range of Perspectives– Space hawks (KE ASAT and space-based

weapons)– Space doves and “Space Preservation Act of

2002”– Majority: less vocal “moderates”

• MD supported, but some space weapons (SBIRS Low and Space-Based Laser) cut

• Future impact of U.S. budget deficit?

SBIRs

Communications Satellite

Conclusion

• Limited MD moving ahead slowly

• Air Force calling for space weapons, but none yet deployed

• Congress is undecided (public unaware)

• More consideration needed of effects on:– space commerce;– passive military uses of space; and– scientific and manned space activities