The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

8/6/2019 The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

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The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

* Scope of the Challenge

* Strengths and Weaknesses

* U.S. Nonproliferation Policy Issues

* Recent Developments

* Options for Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime

Scope of the Challenge

Nuclear weapons proliferation, whether by state or non-state actors, poses one of the greatest

threats to international security today. Iran's apparent efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, what

amounts to North Korean nuclear blackmail, and the revelation of the A.Q. Khan black market

nuclear network all underscore the far-from-remote possibility that a terrorist group or a so-

called rogue state will acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or materials for a dirty

bomb. In April 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama reignited global nonproliferation efforts

through a landmark speech in Prague and subsequent actions on the international stage.

The problem of nuclear proliferation is global, and any effective response must also be

multilateral. Nine states (China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United

Kingdom, and the United States) are known or believed to have nuclear weapons, and more than

thirty others (including Japan, Germany, and South Korea) have the technological ability to

quickly acquire them. Amid volatile energy costs, the accompanying push to expand nuclear

energy, growing concerns about the environmental impact of fossil fuels, and the continued

diffusion of scientific and technical knowledge, access to dual-use technologies seems destined

to grow.

The existing global nonproliferation regime is a highly developed example of international law.

Yet, despite some notable successes, existing multilateral institutions have failed to prevent

states such as India, Pakistan, and North Korea from "going nuclear," and seem equally ill-

equipped to check Iran (to say nothing of terrorist groups). The current arrangement must be

updated and reinforced if it is to effectively address today's proliferation threats, let alone pave

the way for "the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons."


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Strengths and Weaknesses

Overall assessment: Opportunity for a revitalized system

International instruments for combating nuclear proliferation were largely successful before

1991, but are proving unable to meet today's challenges. Although three states (India, Israel, andPakistan) are known or believed to have acquired nuclear weapons during the Cold War, for five

decades following the development of nuclear technology, only nine states have developedand

since 1945 none has usednuclear weapons.

However, arguably not a single known or suspected case of proliferation since the early 1990s

Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, or Syriawas deterred or reversed by the multilateral

institutions created for this purpose. Many recent nonproliferation success stories, such as

Libya's abandoning its nuclear program in 2003 and the accession of all of the Soviet successor

states except Russia to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as nonnuclear weapon states,

have been the result of direct government-to-government negotiations and pressure rather thanaction by global bodies.

In dealing with today's proliferation challenges, international organizations work in tandem with

ad hoc forums of interested parties, such as

the Six Party Talks on North Korea and

the P5+1 grouping on Iran.

But such forums have often proven inadequate to arrest the spread of nuclear technology, and

states such as Iran and North Korea continue to pursue nuclear capability, if not outright

weaponization. Given these trends, rising doubts about the sustainability of the nonproliferation

regime are no surprise.

But nonproliferation as an international issue has recently benefited from revived attention. The

United States and Russia signed a legally binding replacement agreement to the Strategic Arms

Reduction Treaty (START), which expired in December 2009. New START entered into force

in February 2011. President Obama has made nuclear issues a centerpiece of his international

agenda, convening a high-level Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010, dedicating serious

political effort to strengthen the NPT at the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review in May

2010, and building consensus in the UN Security Council for a fourth round of economic

sanctions against Iran. The Obama administration has also pledged to win U.S. Senate

ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and reduce the role of nuclear

weapons in U.S. defense doctrine. Yet even with these renewed efforts, major challenges and

threats remain, namely with regard to Iran and North Korea.


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Major weakness in the global nonproliferation regime include:

* Incomplete coverage

* Inadequate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms

* Gaps in the legal regime

* Inadequate regulation of dual-use technologies

* Failure of NWS to meet disarmament commitments

* Lack of legitimacy: NNWS often do not fully accept the NPT, UNSCR 1540, and other key

elements of the nonproliferation regime

Establishing a normative and legal framework: Fairly comprehensive, but with significant gaps

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is the core component of the global nonproliferationregime, and establishes a comprehensive, legally binding framework based on three principles:

(1) states without nuclear weapons as of 1967a year before the treaty opened for signature

agree not to acquire them;

(2) the five states known to have tested nuclear weapons as of 1967the nuclear weapon states

(NWS)agree to not assist other states in acquiring them and to move toward eventual

disarmament; and

(3) nonnuclear weapon states (NNWS) are guaranteed access to civilian nuclear technology.

NNWS are subject to safeguards to ensure that materials and technology from civilian activities

are not diverted to weapons programs. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the

implementing body for the NPT, monitoring compliance with the treaty and assisting NNWS in

developing civilian technology. Although the scope and mandate of the NPT and the IAEA are

relatively broad, there is a critical gap in coverage: 190 states are party to the treaty, but three of

the world's nine nuclear powersIndia, Israel, and Pakistanhave never joined, and a fourth

North Koreawithdrew in 2003. Thus, even if enforcement of the existing regime were not an

issue (see below), nearly half of the world's nuclear-armed states are excluded from its

provisions.

By design, the NPT does not address proliferation by nonstate actors. After the September 11

attacks, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540, a legally binding instrument

requiring all UN member states to enact and enforce measures to prevent nonstate actors from

acquiring WMD. Many states in the General Assembly, however, have argued that the Security

Council did not have the authority to impose a binding resolution in this area. Partly as a result,

some states have resisted cooperation with the 1540 Committee established to oversee


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implementation of the resolution. Likewise, a legally binding Convention on Nuclear Terrorism,

which defines nuclear terrorism and requires international cooperation to prevent and punish

such acts, had only forty-eight parties as of 2008.

Moreover, two important elements of the nonproliferation regime have never come into effect,

largely because of resistance by the United States and other nuclear weapon states. TheComprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996 has been signed by 178 countries but

cannot enter into force until all forty-four states with significant military or civilian nuclear

capacity ratify it. China, India, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States have not yet done so.

Efforts to conclude a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) to ban the production of weapons-

grade material have also stalled. The United States has been criticized for blocking progress on

both issues, but the Obama administration has signaled that it will move to again ask the Senate's

advice and consent on ratification of the CTBT (the body rejected the treaty in 1999) and to

revive negotiations on an FMCT with verification measures.

A review of the NPT in 2010 concluded with modest success. The final document recommitssignatories to the principles of the treaty, provides some specific action plans for nonproliferation

and disarmament, and calls for the elimination of nuclear weapons from the Middle East through

the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the region. The need for unanimous

agreement resulted in some U.S. initiatives, such as stronger verification requirements, being

eliminated from the final document.

Preventing proliferation by state actors: Poor record on compliance since 1990

Despite the broad legal coverage of the NPT, a string of failures since the early 1990s have

highlighted the ineffectiveness of existing nonproliferation instruments to deter would-be nuclearweapon states. In theory, the IAEA can refer countries that do not comply with the NPT to the

UN Security Council, which in turn can impose sanctions or other punitive measures. In practice,

however, political calculations have often caused deadlock at the Security Council, enabling

nuclear rogues such as Iran to defy successive, fairly weak UN sanctions resolutions with virtual

impunity.

Another problem is the lack of adequate verification and enforcement mechanisms available to

the IAEA, whose budget, intelligence capabilities, and technological resources fall far short of

what would be needed to detect, prevent, or punish NPT violations. In 2010, the IAEA's

inspections budget was approximately $164 million. Not surprisingly, even discounting nuclearfacilities the IAEA does not have access to, such as those in Iran and North Korea, nuclear

materials have reached the black market from installations under IAEA safeguards, namely, from

several in Pakistan. One positive step has been the adoption of IAEA Additional Protocols,

which strengthen the agency's inspections mandate by eighty-nine countries, including all five

recognized nuclear weapon states and as of 2009, India. Nonetheless, more than half of all NPT

member statesincluding Syria and Iran (which has ratified but not implemented the protocol)


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have yet to agree to the toughened inspections regime. A review of the NPT in 2010 failed to

reach consensus on U.S. efforts to make the Additional Protocol mandatory.

Other multilateral, informal organizations also play a role in implementing and enforcing the

NPT, notably the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Made up of forty-six advanced nuclear states,

the NSG prohibits the transfer of civilian nuclear materials or technology to states outside theNPT, or those that do not fully comply with IAEA safeguards. However, the NSG's export bans

are not legally binding, and members (including the United States, Russia, and China) have taken

advantage of the weakness of the NSG regime to pursue civilian nuclear projects with non-NPT

members.

Interdicting illicit nuclear transfers: Some progress since 2001

In addition to legal frameworks, several multilateral initiatives have been created in recent years

to improve international coordination in preventing nuclear terrorism. The Global Initiative to

Combat Nuclear Terrorism, launched in 2006, seeks to coordinate international efforts to detect,investigate, and respond to proliferation by nonstate actors.

One goal is to develop a comprehensive detection mechanism to monitor trafficking in nuclear

material and related financial transactions. The U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),

established in 2003, today involves more than ninety countries in developing best practices, joint

training exercises, and information-sharing activities to improve multilateral interdiction efforts.

Although often cited as a flexible approach to coordinating the international response to

proliferation, PSI does not grant any legal authority for ship-boarding or interdiction beyond the

UN Law of the Sea treaty and various bilateral agreements, and India and China, which do not

participate in PSI, have questioned the legality of its interdictions. PSI also cannot interdict ships

of nonmember states unless master consents to being boarded are allowed, such as Iran and

Pakistan. Whether the 2003 interdiction of a ship supplying nuclear materials to Libya was the

direct result of PSI activities, for example, is still disputed.

Analysts have also criticized the PSI for being a club of developed economies and not addressing

the problem of increasing independence among a growing number of developing countries and

nonstate actors from the controls enacted by the traditional supporters of the nuclear

establishment. Others have pointed out that the initiative is limited by having neither an

independent budget nor coordinating mechanisms, and does not provide a legal framework in

which to lock in long-term, verifiable, and irreversible member state commitments.

Securing fissile material: Significant progress since the 1990s, but incomplete

Possibly the most successful element of the nonproliferation regime has been the effort to secure

so-called loose nukes and fissile material throughout the former Soviet Union. This is critical

given that some 135 nuclear facilities worldwide use highly enriched uranium (HEU) as fuel


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enough HEU to create some 400 nuclear weapons. If terrorist or criminal groups were able to

buy or steal even a small portion of this material, they could use it to construct (PDF) a crude

nuclear weapon or dirty bomb.

The United States and Russia have led this effort since 1991. By 2008, some 75 percent of sites

in the former Soviet Union with weapons-usable nuclear material had been secured. U.S.-fundedefforts such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Global Threat Reduction

Initiative, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism have been complemented by

other multilateral initiatives, such as the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of WMD,

which has provided funding and technical assistance to secure nuclear facilities, repatriate fissile

material to origin countries, and promote international cooperation to counter proliferation.

The Obama administration brought additional attention to this issue, pledging to secure all

vulnerable nuclear weapons materials by 2014 and convening in 2010 a high level Nuclear

Security Summit. The summit yielded tangible results, with Ukraine announcing that it would

get rid of all its Soviet-era highly enriched uranium, and five other countries stating intentions toconvert their research reactors to run on low-enriched uranium, which is less dangerous. The

next summit is scheduled for 2012 in Seoul.

Oversight of civilian nuclear programs and dual-use technologies: Inadequate monitoring and

verification mechanisms

Some analysts note that the NPT, which guarantees states' rights to develop civilian nuclear

technology, enables a peaceful path to proliferation through fuel cycle activities. Many of the

processes used to produce civilian nuclear power can be converted to military ends. As noted, the

IAEA does not have the capacity to adequately monitor every nuclear site. Iran has almostcertainly used its civilian program as a cover for illicit weapons activities. The challenge of

monitoring and verifying NPT safeguards will probably only increase as more countries look to

nuclear power to offset volatile energy prices and reduce reliance on carbon-based fuels.

Disarmament: Not enough action toward nuclear disarmament by NWS

The five recognized nuclear weapon states have committed under the NPT to pursue in good

faith nuclear disarmament and a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The NPT does not

specify an end-date for achieving disarmament. Although almost everyone believes that

complete disarmament or even nuclear disarmament remains a distant goal, the record of NWS

on pursuing nuclear disarmament is mixed.

At the 1995 NPT Review Conference, in return for agreement from the nonnuclear weapon states

to extend the treaty indefinitely, the United States and other nuclear powers reaffirmed their

commitment to nuclear disarmament. But despite major cuts in the numbers of U.S. and Russian

operationally deployed nuclear warheads, both countries still retain massive stockpiles that

account for more than 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons. Many NNWS have repeatedly


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called for the NWS to make even deeper reductions in their arsenals and argued that the NWS

foot-dragging is undermining the legitimacy of the NPT. This perceived failure to make progress

toward disarmament has been one factor in the unwillingness of many UN members to support

sanctions against Iran for NPT violations, which many developing countries see as a justifiable

even admirableresponse to the hypocrisy of the nuclear weapon states. Recently, the NWS

have recommitted themselves to disarmament, particularly in the New Strategic Arms Reduction

Treaty (New START) and the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

U.S. Nonproliferation Policy Issues

The United States deserves both praise and criticism for its recent policies on nonproliferation.

On one hand, since the Cold War, the United States has been at the forefront of efforts to secure

nuclear material and facilities worldwide, spending more than any other country through

programs such as Cooperative Threat Reduction and the Proliferation Security Initiative.However, efforts to reduce and reverse the spread of nuclear weapons technology took up only a

small part of the resources devoted to nuclear weapons and defense under the Bush

administration. According to an independent analysis, the entire 2008 U.S. budget for programs

to secure nuclear material around the world was only $250 millionless than the cost of one day

of the Iraq war.

After September 11, the Bush administration led the world in creating international normative

and legal frameworks to address the threat of nuclear proliferation by nonstate actors, supporting

the passage of UNSCR 1540 and the Nuclear Terrorism Convention (which the United States has

signed but not ratified). On the other hand, the administration did not support efforts to broadenconstraints on states' nuclear weapons programs, refusing, for example, to accept verification

measures as part of any treaty banning the production of fissile material, and failing to push for

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification. President Bush did call for, and achieved, a

65 percent reduction in U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons. But the Bush

administration's position on missile defense (among other issues) hampered bilateral negotiations

with Russia and contributed to the failure to extend the seminal U.S.-Russia Strategic Arms

Reduction Treaty (START) before its expiration at the end of 2009. The much weaker 2002

Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) requires the countries to dismantlenot destroy

only a portion of their warheads. The United States and Russia have signed and ratified a

treaty to replace STARTNew STARTwhich limits both countries to 1,550 operationallydeployed nuclear weapons. It entered into force in February 2011.

By contrast, President Obama laid out his vision for a new nonproliferation strategy in Prague

in April 2009, where he reaffirmed "America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a

world without nuclear weapons." In doing so, he pledged that the United States would reduce the

role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. national security strategy, negotiate a new START treaty


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with Russia, pursue U.S. ratification of the CTBT, strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty (NPT) with increased resources and authority for international inspectors, work toward

building a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation and an international fuel bank, and create

a new international effort to secure vulnerable material globally within four years. The April

2010 Nuclear Posture Review identifies nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation as urgent

threats, necessitating a U.S. nuclear policy focused on rebuilding the nuclear nonproliferation

regime through international efforts.

Despite President Obama's shift in tone from the Bush administration, several nonproliferation

issues continue to spark debate in the United States.

Recent Developments

Iran

* In June 2010, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution that again calls on

Iran to cease its uranium enrichment and imposes additional sanctions on the country. While the

resolution was not passed unanimously, it reflects growing consensus among the permanent five

members of the security council on the need to respond to Iran's intransigence.

* In October 2010, the United States and the European Union invited Iran to reopen

negotiations on its nuclear program, offering an overseas uranium processing deal less favorable

to Tehran than the one that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei rejected in 2009. Iran accepted the offer of

renewed talks, while also announcing that it would begin uranium enrichment at its Bushehr

reactor. Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, China, Russia, France, Britain, and Germany) met

for two days in early December 2010, but failed to reach any agreements about Tehran's nuclear

program. January 2011 talks in Istanbul, Turkey were similarly unsuccessful.

* Pakistan has also ramped up its production of nuclear bombs, nuclear delivery systems, and

fissile material. In February 2011, non-govermental experts estimated that Pakistan's nuclear

arsenal has almost doubled since 2007, now totaling around one hundred nuclear weapons and

Pakistan is suspected of building a new plutonium reactor.

Options for Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime

Recent trends have brought the nuclear nonproliferation regime to a moment of grave crisis. The

regime is under siege from both rogue states and nonstate actors, and its core bargain between

the nuclear haves and have-nots continues to erode. Bolstering international restraints on the

world's deadliest weapons will require the United States and its international partners to adopt

realistic, concrete steps to strengthen and close gaps in existing treaty regimes, institutions, and

partnerships.


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In the near term, the United States and its partners should consider the following steps:

Increasing the IAEA budget and reforming the safeguards, security, and personnel systems

* The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the globe's technical agency in charge

of ensuring that countries maintain safeguards on their peaceful nuclear programs. Safeguardshelp deter a country from diverting nuclear technology and materials from peaceful to military

programs. The major concern is that safeguards capabilities have not kept up with the increased

use of nuclear power and the projected expansion of nuclear power to many counties. In the

words of the Bush administration's head of the National Nuclear Security Administration,

"safeguards equipment is outdated and personnel preparedness declining as the agency failed to

replace retiring experts with new hires."

The IAEA provides services on improving nuclear security in order to prevent nuclear and

radiological materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. In 2008, the Eminent Persons

Commission advised the IAEA director general that the agency needs to substantially increase itsbudget for safeguards and security work. The IAEA, however, needs member states to commit to

place the agency on a sustainable funding path. It also needs to reform its personnel rules to

allow experts to stay in one type of job for longer than seven years and for highly qualified

senior personnel to stay employed beyond the mandatory retirement age of sixty-two.

Increasing national and international efforts to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into

force and boost funding to the CTBT Preparatory Commission to continue to improve the

international monitoring system

* The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is specifically linked to the overall

nonproliferation regime, and entry into force would strengthen the norm against proliferation of

nuclear weapons and make it more difficult for states to have confidence that nuclear weapons

would work without testing. For the CTBT to enter into force, forty-four nuclear-capable states

must ratify it. If the United States ratifies, it can then apply more leverage to the remaining

holdout states to do the same.

Nonratifying states include China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea,

Pakistan, as well as the United States. In a February 2010 speech, Vice President Biden

reaffirmed U.S. commitment to ratify the treaty. The United States will need allied states to reach

out and apply diplomatic pressure to holdout states to help secure entry into force. To ensure the

requisite technical support for the treaty, the United States and its allies need to provide enough

funding and other technical resources to the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) and Preparatory

Commission. Such support will improve the global monitoring system that is designed to detect

relatively low yield nuclear tests throughout the world.


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Negotiating new, emboldened nuclear arms control treaties

* The United States and Russia replaced the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with

the New START treaty. Successful negotiation and ratification of this agreement improved theoverall condition of U.S.-Russia relations, possibly making it easier to work together on other

multilateral efforts (such as ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy, preventing further

proliferation to additional states, and implementing global best security practices on nuclear

weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials). The New START agreement preserves many of

the best elements of its predecessor, such as information exchange, predictability, and

permanence in reductions, verification, and transparency. But the United States and Russia must

also look ahead to deeper nuclear reductions and focus on broader issues of contention, including

missile defense and advanced conventional weapons.

In the longer term, the United States and its international partners should consider the followingsteps:

Reforming and strengthening the NPT by creating automatic or binding UNSC mechanisms

* Rights in the NPT come with responsibilities. Nuclear weapon states have the responsibility

to ensure access to peaceful nuclear technologies, and the recipient states need to show that they

can manage nuclear power safely and securely. Although Iran has cited its inalienable right

under the NPT to access peaceful nuclear technologies, including dual-use enrichment

technologies, it has not met its responsibility to ensure adequate safeguards on its peaceful

nuclear program. It has also not provided enough transparency into suspected nuclear weapons

development activities to assure the world that it is meeting its responsibility to not acquire

nuclear weapons. North Korea left the NPT under the Article X supreme national interests

clause, but it did so while under suspicion of developing nuclear weapons. Moreover, it never

placed its nuclear program under safeguards.

Although amending the NPT is admittedly a difficult task, states should commit to

strengthening the interpretation and application of the treaty's rules. In particular, the UN

Security Council should require that any state in violation of its safeguards agreement should

suspend the suspect activity until the violation is resolved. The Security Council should also

require any state in violation of its safeguards agreement that wants to leave the NPT to return

nuclear technologies and materials obtained while a member to countries of origin. In addition,

the Security Council should call for a special inspection in any country that has violated its

safeguards commitment and is under suspicion of having a nuclear weapons program. Nuclear

weapon states have a special responsibility to reaffirm their commitment to pursue nuclear

disarmament. They need to demonstrate what concrete actions they have taken and intend to take

on the disarmament front. The 2010 NPT Review Conference provided an opportunity for treaty


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signatories to recommit themselves to a world free of nuclear weapons; however, U.S. efforts to

include language on stronger verification measures in the final document failed.

Determining whether to institutionalize PSI

* In his April 2009 Prague speech, President Obama advocated that the world should "cometogether to turn efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative...into a durable institution."

The purported benefits of creating a formal institution out of PSI are still being debated. For

example, turning the PSI from an informal cooperation agreement into an organization with a

secretariat and a budget has the potential to increase its resource endowment and expand its

reach. Institutionalizing the initiative may also help clarify commitments and increase

operational transparency, making it easier to evaluate performance and measure progress.

Bringing the PSI under UN aegis, some analysts have argued, could boost its international

legitimacy and appeal to China, India, and Middle Eastern states, whose cooperation in policing

the nuclear trade market remains important. One way to put PSI on a firmer institutional footing

without folding into an explicitly formalized institution would be to strengthen its legalfoundation. This would place interdiction on grounds consistent with international law.

Creating a global alliance against nuclear terrorism

* The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, while non-nuclear, renewed fears of

catastrophic nuclear terrorism. In response, the United States and partner countries have revived

or initiated international efforts to counter this threat. In particular, the G8 countries in 2002

launched the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass

Destruction, in which the United States committed to spend at least $10 billion over ten years,

and other partners pledged to match that sum. In 2004, the United States formed the GlobalThreat Reduction Initiative, which was an umbrella program including several programs to

secure and reduce fissile materials as well as radioactive materials. Russia is a major partner in

this initiative. In 2006, Russia and the United States joined forces again when then President

Bush and then Russian President Putin began the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,

which as of early 2010 had about eighty countries voluntarily taking part in sharing intelligence

on nuclear terrorist threats as well as pledging to work toward better security practices over

nuclear and other radioactive materials.

These programs and initiatives have achieved significant results, but more committed and

coordinated global efforts are needed. The challenge for the new U.S. administration is to urgecountries to meet their financial and resource commitments pledged under these programs and to

increase funding and personnel to ensure that President Obama's goal of securing all vulnerable

nuclear material can be achieved by 2014. The Nuclear Security Summit, held in Washington,

DC, in 2010, is a solid step in this direction. The next summit is scheduled for 2012.


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Developing a system of layered nuclear fuel assurances

* The spread of nuclear fuel making facilities under a single state's control can increases the

risk of diversion of peaceful nuclear technologies into weapons programs. Issuing an edict to

prohibit this activity runs into the barriers of state sovereignty and the "inalienable right" to

pursue peaceful nuclear programs. States have built fuel making facilities for reasons ofsatisfying national pride, developing a latent weapons capability, and trying to make a profit. To

take away or at least to reduce the economic rationale for these facilities, several fuel assurance

programs have been proposed. Many of these proposals were studied decades ago. Concerns

about proliferation in response to Iran's nuclear program have prompted a dusting off of these

proposals or a dressing up with more incentives. The important point is that the nuclear fuel

market has worked effectively and there is no reason to expect it to fail in the foreseeable future

especially with the expansion plans of the established nuclear fuel producers.

To further strengthen nonproliferation, it makes sense to offer a layered system of fuel

assurances that would be available to any country that is in compliance with its safeguardscommitments. The first layer would be the existing market in which a handful of major

producers have been meeting customers' needs. The second layer would consist of political

commitments and insurance policies that would form in effect a virtual fuel bank to back up the

existing market. The final layer would consist of an actual fuel bank containing sufficient fuel or

low enriched uranium that can be readily converted to fuel. Such a bank should contain at least

enough fuel or enriched uranium to supply the needs of a few large power reactors over a two to

three year period. Even with this layered approach, certain countries may still decide to pursue

new fuel making endeavors, but a robust layered fuel system will at least expose that these

countries are doing such activities for other than economic reasons.

These recommendations reflect the views of Stewart M. Patrick, director of the program on

international institutions and global governance.


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Idiosycratic Factor:In 1953 President Eisenhower proposed the establishment of the Atoms forPeace program to share nuclear technology with other states for peacefulapplications. This program also recognized that effective controls had to be

placed on peaceful nuclear trade to ensure against its use for militarypurposes. Following the Atoms for Peace speech, the United States amendedits Atomic Energy Act and led the effort to establish the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system. Beginning in1955, the U.S. entered into agreements for cooperation with other countriesto share in the research and power applications of the atom.The basic philosophy of the Atoms for Peace program rested on twoprinciples. The first was that countries should have a right to enjoy thepeaceful benefits of nuclear energy and that governments should encourageand facilitate international commerce in nuclear materials, equipment, andtechnology in order to promote global economic development and welfare.

The second was that states that desired the benefits of peaceful applicationsof nuclear energy must make effective commitments not to misuse thattechnology for non-peaceful purposes and to accept adequate verification ofthose commitments.8These same two principles formed the basis of the NPT. Indeed, the NPTstrengthened and expanded the nonproliferation side of the equation in twoimportant respects. While the Atoms for Peace program made internationalcooperation dependent on certain nonproliferation assurances, theseassurances were not comprehensive. No renunciation of nuclear weapons ornuclear explosives in general was required as a condition of export, and nocommitment to verify the peaceful character of all nuclear activities wasrequired. The NPT, on the other hand, reflected the conviction that to enjoythe benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, a country's commitmentsmust be complete and comprehensive. Hence, Articles II and III of the NPTobligate non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty to forgo themanufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives andto accept safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities. In return, ArticleIV of the Treaty reaffirms the right of all parties to develop and use nuclearenergy in conformity with their nonproliferation obligations and binds allparties to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials,and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclearenergy. Article IV also requires that parties in a position to do so cooperatein contributing to the further development of the applications of nuclearenergy for peaceful purposes.ReaganWhile the world's attention remains riveted on the unsteady course of strategic and theater armscontrol, concern for the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons has been decisively upstaged. 1With the inauguration of Ronald Reagan and the subsequent decision to devote the bulk of


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American foreign policy energy to East-West competition, this more immediate threat to peaceand stability now has become a side issue.

During his campaign, President Reagan spurred some controversy by proclaiming that horizontalnuclear proliferation was "none of our business." In office, however, the President has retreated

from this position. Indeed, the President announced that nonproliferation is a "fundamentalnational security objective." 2 Similarly, Undersecretary of State Richard Kennedy recentlydeclared that "there can be no more dangerous possibility in the world than further proliferationof nuclear weapons." 3 Still, in the last three years there has been a radical redirection ofAmerican foreign policy and a much lower priority for nonproliferation. 4

The present administration is committed of reversing the foreign nonpoliferation policy practicedby the United States during the years 1974-80, a policy set in motion by the dramatic events ofMay 1974, when India detonated a nuclear explosive. 5 The Reagan Administration's approachthreatens the progress made in the aftermath of 1974, and erodes the internationalnonproliferation regime.

The policies of the Reagan administration manifest a general disregard for nonproliferation. TheLondon Economist observed that "the Reagan Administration policy looks less like a show ofsensible flexibility than like ...

CHALLENGES FACING THE NONPROLIFERATIONREGIME AND POSSIBLE NEW DIRECTIONSAlthough the nonproliferation regime has been largely effective in limitingthe spread of nuclear weapons, many experts and observers believe that theend of the Cold War has accelerated the risks of proliferation and that thecurrent nonproliferation system needs to be strengthened. They haveexpressed concern that certain countries that possess nuclear weapons, fissilematerials or sensitive nuclear technologies that can produce weapons-usablematerials might transfer them to other states or to terrorist organizations. TheGovernment of Pakistan has admitted that A.Q. Khan, the former head of theKhan Research Laboratory, has transferred enrichment technology to NorthKorea, Iran and Libya, as well as nuclear weapons technology to Libya.Some experts also believe that, although the NPT has generally worked wellsince it went into effect in the 1970s, several legal loopholes have becomeapparent, which have allowed some states to abuse the Treaty by using it asa cover to obtain nuclear material that could subsequently be used to developnuclear weapons. They believe that Iran and Iraq both joined the NPT inorder to reap the rewards promised by Article IV of the Treaty, whileseeking to develop covertly a nuclear weapons capability.Under the NPT, a non-nuclear weapons state is free to acquire enrichmentand reprocessing plants so long as such states conform to the provisions ofArticle II not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or nuclearexplosive devices and Article III to place all of their peaceful nuclearactivities under IAEA safeguards. Many experts fear that, under the NPT,states such as Iran have acquired the technology needed to produce separated


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plutonium or highly enriched uranium and that, once having acquired theseweapons-usable materials, they could withdraw from the Treaty on 90-daysnotice and develop nuclear weapons without violating the NPT.Thus in recent years attention has largely focused on the risks ofproliferation associated with the spread of enrichment and reprocessing

facilities and the weapons-usable materials that they produce. This problemhas led to a number of proposals to discourage the spread of enrichment andreprocessing capabilities. These have included calls by the Director Generalof the IAEA, Mohammed El Baradei, urging states to place enrichment andreprocessing facilities under some form of multinational control and12proposals to improve international nuclear fuel assurances as an inducementto states to refrain from acquiring and operating enrichment plants.Further, in a speech on February 11, 2004 at the National DefenseUniversity, President Bush proposed two new initiatives designed to addressthis specific problem. Specifically he proposed that (a) the members of the

Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessingequipment and technologies to any state that does not already possess fullscale,functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants and (b) the world'sleading nuclear exporters should ensure that states have reliable access atreasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors in order to discourage the spreadof enrichment and reprocessing facilities.Since then, the U.S. had been engaged with other suppliers and the IAEA indiscussing the challenges of assuring fuel services to those states thatforeswear enrichment and reprocessing.For example, at the 2005 IAEA General Conference the U.S. Secretary ofEnergy announced that the U.S. intended to establish a strategic reservebased on 17.4 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) that would be blendeddown to help qualified states deal with any disruptions in supply from theirnuclear fuel suppliers, provided that these qualified states are fulfilling theirnonproliferation obligations.Subsequently, six states, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, the UKand the U.S. made a proposal at the June 2006 IAEA Board of GovernorsMeeting that offers improved fuel assurances in order to discouragecountries from building enrichment and reprocessing facilities.In addition, at its meeting in July 2006 the G-8 group of nations issued astatement in support of establishing improved fuel assurances in order todiscourage the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies. In particular, itsupported the six-nation proposal submitted to the IAEA Board ofGovernors in June 2006.Lastly in February 2006 the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) proposed amajor new initiative, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) aimedat the development, demonstration and deployment of advanced separationsand burner reactor systems. The initiative has several important features:13 The demonstration of new separation techniques for recycling nuclear


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fuel that would allow the U.S. to close its fuel cycle and to developsomewhat more proliferation-resistant technologies by avoiding thepresence of separated plutonium. In this connection, the U.S. nuclearservices firm, EnergySolutions has acquired many BNFL employeesas well as BNFLs technologies in modern fuel reprocessing and

waste treatment and is seeking to offer an alternative to the MOX fuelcycles without separating pure plutonium. Similarly AREVACOGEMA,Inc. is also offering the prospect of treatment recyclingplants with no separated plutonium. The advancement of the nuclear waste management program withinthe United States by coupling these new separation techniques withadvanced recycling reactors with the objective of reducing the volumeof waste per reactor that would have to be disposed of in YuccaMountain. The program is specifically intended to remove the need tofollow the Yucca Mountain Project with several additional geologicalrepositories. It assumes work will continue that is devoted to

completing the Yucca Mountain Project. The establishment of a new international nuclear fuel assuranceregime in order to discourage the spread of enrichment andreprocessing facilities. A major long-term aspect of this objective is aproposal that those supplier states with industrial enrichment and fuelrecycling capabilities should work to provide so-called cradle-tograveservices to states that agree to refrain from acquiringenrichment and reprocessing facilities. Under this approach thesupplier states would lease enriched uranium to consumer nations andwould accept the return of the resultant spent fuel for recycling.Under the proposal contained in GNEP, achievement of this goal willtake some time since such cradle-to-grave services would be put intoplace only after the proposed advanced recycling technologies havebeen proven and have become operational.The pursuit of GNEP is a major policy and technical goal of theAdministration of President Bush. However, fulfilling the promise of GNEPis a long-term endeavor that will require commitment across severalAdministrations. The U.S. ability to fulfill this long-term promise could beaided by a strengthened U.S. civil nuclear infrastructure. In the short-term,14the U.S. and world is looking to expand the peaceful use of nuclear energyin the civilian sector.Iran: Options for the Next PresidencyThrse DelpechAll the major actors of the Iranian crisis seem to be on hold until the U.S. November 2008elections.Whether Iran will be the major foreign policy issue of the next U.S. administration is debatable;1Russia,Afghanistan, Pakistan, or East Asia may well present bigger challenges in the coming years. Butmuch is at


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stake in Iran. It has presented an outstanding nuclear issue since the 2002 revelation of itsclandestine program(a program that shakes the confi dence of Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf States)and thediscovery of its violation of its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA).2Iran also represents a signifi cant long-term problem to regional and global security: its growingregional influence (especially in Iraq); its role as oil and gas supplier; its presence in Lebanon andAfghanistan; and itsability to plan terrorist attacks in the region and beyond all make Iran a very special case at thebeginning ofthe twenty-fi rst century. Whether Iran continues to challenge the international system, declaringthat Israelshould be wiped off the map3 and encouraging suicide attacks, or becomes a more reasonablepartner will

make a considerable diff erence in the years and decades to come.Whatever the expectations might be, the prospects for political change in Iran are slim: civilsocietyfaces increasing governmental repression, while religious conservatives tighten their grip onpower, pushingaside both veterans who helped found the Islamic regime thirty years ago and reform-mindedpoliticiansaccused of being disloyal to the revolution.4 Th e results of Irans March 2008 elections confirmed the conservativeconsolidation of power;5 the relationship between the Supreme Leader and the president may bemore intimate than most observers believe; and the growing power of the military andparamilitary forcessince 2005 does not provide grounds for optimism. Th e Iranian economy is essentially driven bythe price ofoil while basic investments are not made; although criticism of economic management iswidespread in Iranfrom both hardline and pragmatic conservatives, it has produced little change so far (however,the currentsharp decline in oil prices would allow additional international pressure to work, since the onlylegitimacyof the regime since 2005 is the improvement of the economy). Finally, it may be worth recallingthat eventhe reputedly less diffi cult interlocutorsthe so-called pragmatists, such as Hashemi Rafsanjaniwould


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IRAN: OPTIONS FOR THE NEXT PRESIDENCYstill adopt an uncompromising policy on the nuclear program.6If this analysis is sound, what can be inferred?First, the West makes constant mistakes regarding Iran, and this must be recognized: the Islamicrevolution

was not on the Wests radar screen in 1979; Mohammad Khatami was not expected to win thepresidencyin 1997; Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was unknown before his 2005 election andaft erwardwasnotexpected to make a real diff erence. Recurring and unfulfi lled hopes that Iran will adopt a morecooperativebehavior for social and economic reasons surface again and again in Western capitals. Suchmistakes areunderstandable: Iran is both complex and opaque, playing erratic games, and hopes are notentirely unfounded:young people in Iran have enormous expectations and are avid for change, and Iran is far from

achieving its development potential.7 It has huge unfulfi lled economic needs. One day, realitywill perhapsprevail over rhetoric and ideology. But there is little that we can do to make this happen underthe presentpolitical confi guration. It is dangerous to build a policy on mistakes refl ecting our wishestriumph of reformover revolutionary spirit, irresistible power of Irans society aspirations, Tehrans reconciliationwith the Westrather than coming to grips with reality.Second, measure Irans infl uence in the Middle East, the Gulf, Lebanon, Gaza; its agreementswith Syria;its presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia; and its role in Iraq. Saudi Arabia is probably theGulf countrymost worried about Tehran, although Riyadh has expressed little publicly so far on the subject.Th e Iranian nuclearprogram also casts a shadow over Egypt and Turkey. Egypt is preoccupied by Tehran extendingits sphereof infl uence with the bomb and afraid to be drawn into a confl ict between Iran and some of thesmaller Gulfstates. Turkey, for all its ambiguous policy concerning Tehran,8 will never accept a hegemonicIran that throwsits weight around thanks to nuclear weaponry. Nor will it accept a Middle East with only twonuclear powers:Israel and Iran. Concerning Iraq, an unpredicted consequence of the war is Tehrans growing influence there.At a time when his own citizens are fi ghting infl ation, Ahmadinejad announced a billion-dollarreconstructionloan during his state visit to Iraq in March 2008. He also said foreign forces should leave Iraqimmediately,


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or safety mechanisms that Tehran has in mind. Th is will greatly increase the fear that somethingmight gowrong inadvertently or, in a time of crisis, possible misunderstandingsthe very situationnuclear expertsdread. Realism would therefore counsel to ask the following questions: What could be expected

from Tehranwith the bomb, taking into account what it already does without it? And are the risks tolerable?President-electBarack Obama answered the last question with a clear no.Fourth, we must understand the real conditions of a deal with Tehran. If Iran, as the December2007National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) contends,10 is to be considered a country where decisionsare guided bya cost-benefi t approach, a possible solution would be to off er yet more signifi cant economicand security incentivesto get a better response on the nuclear program. But this hypothesis is not warranted by facts.

UnlessTehran faces a situation of extreme danger (as in 2003, for instance, when U.S. forces enteredBaghdad), themargin available for eff ective negotiationas opposed to discussions allowing Iran to gain timeis slim. At nopoint since 2003 did the Iranian negotiators, even under Khatami, ask for more or diff erenteconomic and securityincentives.11 With the Europeans, the negotiations centered on the nuclear issue, even thougheconomicand security discussions took place. Iran turned down the Russian proposal one day aft er it wasmade; it didnot even contemplate the off er presented in August 2005 by the Europeans, and refused fairlyquickly thosepresented in June 2006 and in July 2008 by Javier Solana on behalf of France, Britain, Germany,Russia, China,and the United States.12 One can always contend that not enough has been off ered. But is ittrue? Would anyother off er of the same kind, or even more substantial, make any diff erence? Th e Europeanexperience duringfi ve years of negotiations teaches the following: the only attainable deal with Iran would be toaccept Iraniannuclear weapons and get some restraint in Iraq, Lebanon, and/or Afghanistan, a deal that willor will notbeimplemented once Iran has nuclear weapons. Would that be a good dealor even an acceptableone?Fift h, acknowledge that even if a deal with Iran is possible, the potential discontinuities thatcould derailcooperation are plenty. Iran might not be seriously interested in cooperation for political reasons.Having in


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mind the domestic situation more than the international scene, the current regimes survivalseems to rest onthe exploitation of crises and international isolation. Th e victory of the Iranian conservatives isnot conduciveto more cooperation with the West: it would ruin the very system the leadership tries to preserve,

while anexternal enemy may explain economic failure, bolster nationalism, and prevent political change.Even whennegotiations took place in a better environment (i.e., in 2003 and 2004), their goal seem to havebeen gainingtime unimpeded rather than developing cooperation. Th is is at least what experience suggests.13Finally, evenpartial cooperation may be derailed by constant changes in language and behavior. It makessurprises almostcertain in the course of any negotiating process. If Iran has learned a few things from NorthKorea,14 one of

them is that non-linear behavior is deeply disturbing for Western diplomacy and deeplyconfusing for Westernstrategists.Sixth, continuing to try to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran remains the only sensible option. We canpursuethis in various ways.10. The December 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate did not only present a reevaluationof the Iranian nuclear program(the weaponization part would have been halted in the fall 2003), it also took a position onsome political aspects of the crisis,namely that the leadership could be infl uenced by external powers.11. In particular, contrary to some assertions, Tehran made clear that it would never believesecurity assurances offered by eitherthe Europeans or even by the United States.12. The very day the offer was made, activities were resuming at both Isfahan and Natanz,signaling Irans refusal to suspend itsconversion and enrichment activities.13. A number of offi cial Iranian statements make the point that what was needed withnegotiations was time. For instance, inDecember 2004, Iranian nuclear negotiator Sirus Nasseri said: They [the Iranian authorities]needed to gain time to see certainprojects going through unimpeded. Shargh newspaper, December 56, 2004.14. Iran has received from North Korea ballistic missile technology and components and mayhave shared nuclear technologywith Pyongyang.8Sanctions. UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1803 contains more sanctions that hurt theIranianregime,15 but measures adopted so far are unlikely to produce signifi cant divisions or evendiscussions within


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the Iranian leadership.16 Another UNSC resolution that is more substantial on refi ned productscould produceresults. Is it realistic? No, particularly aft er the crisis in Georgia. Concerning China, it isdoubtful that Beijingwould oppose a proposal already agreed by Moscow. And Beijing may also be willing to

embrace more responsibilityfor upholding nonproliferation norms. But an agreement on refi ned products would be the mostdiffi cult to achieve (just below the impossible ban on energy exports), because Beijing is Iransnumber onetrade partner, particularly interested in energy: Sinopec, Chinas largest oil refi ner, hasconcluded a multimillion-dollar deal in addition to the deal of the century for natural gas from Irans North Pars gas field. In sum,sanctions are still worth trying, even on an essentially European/U.S. front, particularly asIranian authoritiesface internal pressure, but without too many illusions concerning Russian and Chinese

contributions.A deal. Th ere remains the stubborn notion that more incentives would somehow produce thedesiredresults. Th e analysis above suggests that this may be wrong. Th e worst option for the nextpresident would beto start another negotiation with Iran. It would give him a bad start in his foreign policy (failure:see NorthKorea), and it would produce only one assured result: giving more time to Irans nuclearprogram. However,if a new round of negotiation is decided by the next administration, as seems likely, the worst-case scenariowould be to do it alone (as opposed to doing it with allies), to allow an open-ended discussion (asopposed toa time-bound one), and to take time to start it (as opposed to doing it right away).Press for political change in Iran. Th is is an excellent idea that lacks concrete content andstrategy. It soundsnice to recommend a policy slowly compelling the leadership to transcend the ideological gapsthat havealienated it from large sections of its population.17 Th e problem is simply how to achieve thisresult. ExperiencedIranians recognize that they frequently do not understand themselves how the political powerworksin their own country. So how could we? As a matter of fact, external pressure on Iran has beenvery limited.For instance, in 2004 and 2005, the policy vis--vis Iran was one of great caution, in order not toallow theconservatives to use external pressure in the presidential electoral campaign. And the result was MahmoudAhmadinejad, an ultraconservative. Th is should not prevent eff orts to address Iranian civilsociety, which


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remains the fi rst victim of the repressive and ineff ective policy conducted by Tehran: if Iransuff ers whileits neighbors benefi t from peaceful nuclear cooperation, the regime should be increasingly hard-pressed toexplain why. Th ree decades aft er the Islamic revolution, economic challenges may lead Iran to

seek practicalsolutions, abandon ideology, and meet the most important expectations of its population:containing infl ationand developing employment. But can these goals be attained before the bomb is built? Whowould be ready tobet on that?Th e military option. If the scenario of military strikes is excluded, it will not necessarily meanthan internationalpressure will stop, as the follow-up of the 2007 U.S. NIE has shown.18 UNSC Resolution 1803was stilladopted in March 2008, with more sanctions and only one abstention (Indonesia). But with this

importantoption off the table, Iran will feel free to continue defying the international community in someway, shape,or form, particularly if eff ective sanctions are not adopted (see the earlier point on refi nedproducts). Iransnuclear military program will go on. Th e world may well have to decideand the West inparticular, its reluctancenotwithstandingwhether it prefers a nuclear-armed Iran or a military operation. It is doubtfulthat theAmerican people will allow another military operation at a time when so much is going wrong inAfghanistan,Pakistan, and Iraq.19 Th at said, if a military action means trouble for months or even years, anIranian bomb15. The measures extend travel and fi nancial curbs on named individuals and companies.16. The sanctions adopted so far have an impact on the economy but no effect on policy.17. Ray Takeyh, Re-imagining US-Iranian Relations, Survival 44 (Autumn 2002), p. 24.18. The NIE was widely interpreted as a way of effectively taking U.S. military action off thetable.19. Senator John McCain is famous for having declared, There is only one thing worse thanmilitary action against Iran and thatIRAN: OPTIONS FOR THE NEXT PRESIDENCY NUCLEAR CHALLENGES AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE NEXT U.S.ADMINISTRATION9would certainly mean trouble for decades. Th erefore, it makes a lot of sense to think twicebefore the choice ismade. If there is one region where deterrence should not be tested, it is the Middle East. And Iranhas to worry aswell, because if it goes nuclear, not only conventional but also nuclear military buildups will takeplace in the


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region, essentially as a counter-reaction to its provocative policy.ConclusionTh ere are situations in which no good option is available. Iran is one such situation today. Irandefi es bothcontainment and engagement, two approaches that are easy to advocate but diffi cult to carry out.

And deterrenceis not easy with a country that encourages suicide attacks. Under these circumstances, failing tomake adecision is tempting, but is hardly a policy. Time is not on our side: Iran had assembled hundredsof advancedcentrifuges by November 2008,20 refl ecting its intention to speed up uranium enrichment, and fissile materialsremain the most important missing link of its nuclear military program.21 Th e most importantpoint for thenext administration is to decide quicklywith the European allies in the fi rst placehow bestto prevent Iran

from getting the bomb, avoiding the adoption of a comprehensive agenda that will only allowTehran to gainmore time.IsContentsIntroduction: The 9/11 Commission Report and Long-StandingContradictions in U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan and South Asia . . . . . . . . . 1Squaring the Circle: Antiterrorism Cooperation with a Prime Source ofNuclear Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Congressional Concerns and Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission:Hard Choices or the SameChoices? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Past as Prologue: Pakistan and the Recurrent Dilemma of Conflicting U.S.Policy Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Indias 1974 Nuclear Test and the Beginning of the U.S. Policy Dilemma . . 7Key Role of Congress in Shaping Basic U.S. Nuclear NonproliferationPolicy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Alternating U.S. Policy Priorities Towards Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Failed Efforts to Reconcile U.S. Cold War and NuclearProliferation Objectives: The 1985 Pressler Amendment and the1990 Aid Cutoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10India and Pakistans May 1998 Nuclear Tests and the Decline ofSanctions as a U.S. Nonproliferation Policy Approach . . . . . . . . . . . 10U.S. Policy Reversal After 9/11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Details on Pakistans Proliferation Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12The A.Q. Khan Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Other Nuclear Suppliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Intelligence Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Pakistans Absence in U.S. Intelligence Reports on Proliferation . . . . . . . . 19Transfers to Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20


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Transfers to Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Transfers to North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Role of A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani Government and Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Khans Motives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Pakistani Government Response to U.S. Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Pakistani Military Role? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Bush Administration Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30Issues Concerning the Viability of the Musharraf Government As aLong-Term U.S. Security Partner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Near-Term U.S. Security Needs Versus Longer Term HumanRights and Democracy Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Succession Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Policy Discussion: More Constraints Than Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Option 1 De Facto Acceptance of Pakistans Nuclear Activities andNon-Cooperation on the A.Q. Khan Issue on Condition ofMaximum Counterterrorism Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Option 2 Emphasize Multilateral Nonproliferation Strategies . . . . . . . . 40Proliferation Security Initative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40Strengthened International Regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41Expanded Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program . . . . . . . . . 42Option 3 Condition High Value Assistance on Access to A.Q. Khan . . 43Key Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43Potentially Risky Test of Wills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44F-16 Fighter Aircraft Sale and the India-Pakistan Confrontation . . . . 44Congressional Role and Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45Option 4 Reimposition of Nuclear Nonproliferation Sanctions . . . . . . . 46Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Documents

The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime