The Guilt of Catiline

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Master's Teses Teses and Dissertations

1940

Te Guilt of Catiline

Tomas Edward Grin

Loyola University Chicago

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T F ~ GUILT OF CATILINE

BY

THOMP.S EDWARD GRIFFIN, S • J. , A.B.

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILL11ENT OF THE

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE D ~ G R E E OF MASTER OF ARTS IN

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY, CHICAGO •

.July, 1940 •••



VITA AUCTORIS

Thomas Edward Griffin, S.J. was born in New York City

on February 16, 1915. He received his elementary school

education at St. Benedict 's Parochial School. His high-

school course was pursued at Fordham Preparatory School

from 1928 to 1932. He entered the Society of Jesus a t

Wernersville, Pa. in 1932, and there pursued undergraduate

studies; he t ransferred to West Baden College of Loyola

University in 1936 and received his A.B. degree from Loyola

University, June 9, 1937, and entered the Loyola University

Graduate School in the Autumn of 1937 to begin the study for

the Master 's degree in Latin.



TPBLE OF CONTEl';TS

Chapter Tit le NO. of Pages

I . History of the Catilina.rian Conspiracy 12

II . Poli t ical Gangs at Rome 9

III . Cati l inets Guilt in the First Conspiracy 10

IV. The Evidence in Cicero for Catil inets Guilt 22

v. The Evidence For Catil ine•s Guilt in Sallust 18



CHAPTER I

History of the Catil inarian Conspiracy.

The f i r s t century B. c. marks what is

probably one of the most interest ing and exciting eras in

history, likewise one of the bloodi8st and most unfortunate.

For with the year 90 B.C. and the Social War, in which the

Ital ian al l ies were forced to resort to arms in a vain a t-

tempt to gain the franchise, came the f i r s t intimation that

the structure of the great Roman Republic was crumbling.

From the next blow Rome never ful ly recovered--the excesses

of the popular leaders .Marius and Cinna and the consequent

Civil War between Marius and Sulla. Sulla indeed was the

eventual victor, and he reaped a bloody revenge. There

followed in quick succession the insurrection in Spain under1

Setorius and the rebell ion at home of the consul Lepidus,

the revolt of the slaves under Spartacus, and the l a s t des

perate struggles between Pompey and Caesar, Brutus and Au-

gustus, Augustus and Antony, unti l at the batt le of Actium

in 31 B.C. of the glorious republic that was Rome there re

mained nothing but a shambles and a ruin. The conspiracy

of Catiline was another in the long series of catastrophies

that befel l the Roman sta te .

January 1, 65 B.C. was a day of marked

unrest even in the Rome of those turbulent times. Armed



1-1

bands of men swept through the s treets of the ci ty, and

there were rumors abroad of a plot to assasinate the consuls

at the inaugural ceremonies that day. Crassus, the wealthiest2

man in Rome, would then usurp the dictatorship, nominating

inturn as his magister eguitum the young and ambitious Caius

Julius Caesar. So the rumor ran. The time indeed was ripe

for such an attempt, for with Pompey and the army busily

engaged in far off Syria and Armenia, and the whole of I taly

ungarrisoned, there was at Rome no force capable of suppress-3

ing any such organized outbreak. At the las t moment, however,

the whole affa i r fe l l through because Crassus for some un-

known reason fai led to put in an appearance and Caesar was

consequently prevented from giving the appointed signal to4

the conspirators. ·what role Catiline played, whether he

was real ly the moving spi r i t behind the whole af fa i r or was

merely acting as the tool of Crassus and Caesar i s a question

that wil l l a te r command a more detailed treatment. At any

ra te , thus ended the fiasco known as the f i r s t or Minor Con-

spiracy of Cati l ine, so called because the second conspiracy

was a direct outgrowth of this ear l ier one.

Catiline had desired to run for the consul-

ship in 66 B.C., but was prevented from doing so because he

was unable to present himself as a candidate within the le -5

gitimate number of days, since he was under an indictment



1-2

for the maladministration of his province when propraetor in

Africa. Despite the clearest evidence against him, he was

f inal ly acquitted owing to the wholesale bribery and corrup-6

t ion of the jurors and the praevaricatio or collusion of

his accuser, the notorious P. Clodius Pulcher. Nothing

daunted, he.again sued for the consulship in 64 B. c., th is

time in company with c. Antonius, a man of scarcely bet ter

reputation than his own, and, i t i s alleged, with the ready

approbation and f inancial assistance of both Crassus and

Caesar. I t was, in fact , the fear inspired by t lus combinatio

that induced the Senate and the nobles to throw thei r support

to Cicero, Cati l inets r ival , much against their wil l , for

Cicero was a "novus homo" while Catiline was descended from

one of the ancient patr ician families of Rome, that of the

Sergii . Cicero and Antonius were elected consuls. Thereupon

Cicero promptly purchased the good-will of r..is colleagus and

a free hand in the management of affairs a t Rome by resigning

to .Antonius the rich province of Macedonia which had been

alloted to him, in place of the less lucrat ive province of

Gaul. Catil ine, however, disappointed in his hopes of gaining

by legit imate methods the power he desired, resolved upon a

desperate expedient. He formulated a plot to overthrow the

existing government and to mount the curule chair by blood

and the sword i f no other way was open to him.



1-3

With th is intention of using force, he

gathered about himself the worst elements in the ci ty . Cicero

in the Second Oration against Catiline, delivered to the

people in the forum on November 8, gives a detailed inventory

of the various groups that went to make up Catil inets follow

ing. In the f i r s t place, there were the wealthy who were7

submerged in debt and anxious for the Novae Tabulae or

repudiation of a l l debts; secondly, the office seekers, men

who wanted power and the chance to rule; thirdly, the veterans

of Sulla, t i red of fighting the soi l and looking for new

spoils and plunder; fourthly, the spendthrifts and bankrupts

for whom any change was for the better ; f i f t luy, the rabble

and r i f f - ra f f of the ci tyts slums, and, l a s t ly , Cati l ine 's

more intimate associates and friends, including the reckless

youths of the ci ty whom Catiline had personally seduced and

led astray. Among th is las t group was a certain Quintus

Curius, an ut ter ly untrustworthy individual, who to retain

the favor of his mistress Fulvia, fe l l to boasting of his

intended misdeeds. Fulvia in turn promptly reported her in

formation to Cicero, and the la t te r secured her as his agent

and spy.

Alarmed by the reports of the plot , Cicero8

convoked the Senate on October 21, 63 B.C. and informed them

that he had reason to know that an armed outbreak was planned



1-4

for the 27th. of tha t month. The following day, October 22

the Senate, a f t ~ r considering the statement of the consul,

passed the "ultimum Senatus Consultum" or, as it was termen,

the "Extreme Decree", charging the consuls to take care that

the commonwealth suffer no harm, conferring on them supreme

power and inaugurating a state of martial law. Levies were

l ikewise ordered throughoutitaly, and the consul Antonius9

and the praetor Metellus Celer were directed to take the

f ie ld against the insurgents, who, appeared in arms on October

27 at Faesulae in Etruria under Gaius Manlius, a veteran

centurion of Sulla and Cati l ine ' s second in command. !'rot

long after , Catil ine was arraigned under the Plautian law,

which was directed against acts of violence and breaches of

the peace. He realized his affa i rs were becoming desperate

and that he must act quickly.

On the night , then, of November 6, at the

home of Marcus Porcius Laeca in the st reet of the Scythe

makers, he assembled his principal associates. Firs t , he

pledged them to fa i th and secrecy, and then rehearsed in de

t a i l their two-fold plan---the firing of the city at several

strategic points and the simultaneous advance on thecity of

the army from Etruria under Manlius. According to the ac

count of Sallus t , the pledge was sealed by the drinking of a

bowl of human blood mixed with wine. Concerning this episode





1-6

The f i r s t of the Cati l ine orations i s , in

brief , an expose of Catiline and his plan, and a command to

the rebel leaders to depart from the ci ty . ~ ~ e n Cati l ine,

attempting a defense was howled down, he rushed from the11

place in a rage threatening to head the leaderless mob.

That night he fled the c i ty , pretending he was going into

exile a t Marseilles, but, in rea l i ty , he headed direct ly

for Faesulae and the camp of Manlius. On the following day,

Cicero assembled the people in the forum and delivered the

Second of his orations against Cati l ine, explaining to the

people why Catiline had departed from the ci ty , and begging

his accomplices ei ther to desis t from thei r revolutionary

attempts or to follow Catiline into exile .

Meanwhile at Rome the praetor , Publius

Cornelius Lentulus, who in the absence of Catil ine had as

sumed leadership of the conspirators, ha.d gathered together

a force considered suff ic ient for thei r purposes. I t was

agreed tha t when Catiline had reached the camp of Manlius a t12

Faesulae, Lucius Best ia , a tribune of the plebs, should

assemble the people in the forum with the intention of a t-

tacking and denouncing Cicero. This was to be the signal

for the others to carry out thei r various parts : Stat i l ius

and Gabinius with thei r followers were tof i re the ci ty at

twelve important points , and in the confusion that would in -



1-7

evitably resul t , Cethegus was to make his way to Cicero and

slay him.

Cicero, though well aware of the schemes

that were afoot, had unt i l this time been able to secure no

defini te and decisive evidence against Catiline and lus

followers. At this juncture, however, fortune played r ight

into his hands, placing in them the very evidence he needed.

There happened to be in the ci ty at this time certain envoys

of the A l l o b r o g e ~ , a tr ibe in Transalpine Gaul, who had come

to Rome to complain about the behavior of the i r governor.

These envoys were approached by one Publius Umbrenus, an

agent of Lentulus, in the hope of inducing them to join the13

conspiracy. In return for the redress of the i r grievances

and other substant ial rewards, they were, on thei r return, to

induce their people to revolt and to dispatch a squadron of

cavalry to swell the growing forces of Cati l ine at Faesulae.

The envoys, at this point, entertained

certain doubts regarding the feasibi l i ty of the whole scheme.

In the i r perplexity they laid the matter before thei r patron,

Fabius Songa, who, in turn, relayed his information to Cicero.

Here was Cicero's opportunity, and he decided to make the

most of i t . Summoning the envoys to himself, he bade them

continue negotiations with the conspirators, instructing them

at the same time to obtain i f possible written documents



1-8

attest ing the intentions of the followers of Catiline.

Lentulus, Cethegus and Stat i l ius fe l l headlong into the t rap.

oaths and pledges of fa i th were signed, sealed, and handed

to the envoys. Among the documents was a le t te r from Lentulus

to Catiline urging the l a t t e r to enl is t the aid of slaves.

By the evening of December 2 a l l their

arrangements were complete, ~ ~ d the Allobroges and the i r

escort, accompanied by Titus, Volturcius, one of the conspira

tors , stole s i lent ly out of the ci ty . As they crossed the

Mulvian bridge two miles north of Rome they were arrested by

the forces which Cicero had planted there for that purpose.

The Allobroges who were a party to the scheme quickly sub

mitted, and Volturcius af ter a br ief show of resistance quiet

ly followed the i r example. The le t te rs were seized and speed

i ly delivered to Cicero who declined to open them buX instead

called an immediate meeting of the Senate in the temple of

Concord, summoning thi ther Bethegus, Stat i l ius , and Gabinius.

He himself led in Lentulus by the hand. Volturcius, on the

promise of a pardon, consented to reveal a l l he knew concern

ing the conspirators and thei r plans, and lus testimony was

confirmed by that of the Allobroges. But the most damaging

evidence lay in the le t te rs . Each of the accused was con

fronted with his seal and forced to acknowledge it before the

thread was cut . The le t te rs which urged the Gallic t r ibe to



1-9

revolt were then read. The gui l t of the accused was too

manifest to be mistaken. By a unanimous vote Lentulus was

requested to resign his praetorship, and then he and the

other conspirators were ordered to be taken into custody.

This was the occasion of Cicero's third oration against

cat i l ine .

Meanwhile the freedmen and the dependents

of Lentulus were scouring the s t reets of the ci ty endeavor-

ing to rouse the art isans and the slaves to rescue him,

while Cethegus was sending messages to his followers to

gather arms and force the i r way to him. On hearing these

ports Cicero again convoked the Senate to demand what he

should do with the prisoners. Decimus Junius Silanus, the

consul-elect and therefore the f i r s t to speak, recommended

that they be put to death, but la ter , af ter the speech of

Caesar, he retracted this opinion in favor of the proposal

of Tiberius Nero who had merely advised that the guards be

re-

increased and the question reopened. Caesar, however, when

his turn came to speak, advised against departing from the

t radi t ions and customs of thei r forefathers by putting Roman

ci t izens to deaht without the people's consent. He proposed

instead that the accused be imprisoned for l i fe in the various14

municipal towns, and a l l the i r property confiscated. His

speech evidently made a profound impression for Cicero fe l t

obliged to r ise and deliver lris fourth and l a s t oration



1-10

against Cati l ine.

He told his l isteners that as far as he was

concerned, the simpler proposition was that of Caesar, namely,

l ife-imprisonment, but he commended the proposal of Silenus

on the ground that t rai tors to thei r country had forfei ted

their rights as ci t izens . The majority of the Senate, how-

ever, were s t i l l in favor of Caesar 's motion, when the stern

and unbending Cato rose to speak. He assailed with charac

t e r i s t ic vigor a l l half-way measures, and demanded, a.s the15

country's only salvation, the supreme penalty. His motion

prevailed and that same day the prisoners were le t down one

by one into the Tullianum, the ancient prison of the kings,

and strangled. On his way home Cicero addressed the anxious

and curious people in what was probably the briefest speech

of his career: nvixeruntn, nthey have l ived thei r l i fe" .

I t was a march of triumph for Cicero. Torchlights f lared in

every doorway, and on a l l sides he was acclaimed the father

and preserver of his country.

The execution of Lentulus end his fellows

broke the backbone of the conspiracy. A short time la ter in

a pitched bat t le a t Pis tor ia , some twenty miles from Faesulae,

the remnants of Cati l inets army were routed, but only at the

cost of a t e r r i f ic slaughter on both sides. Fighting val

iantly in the van of his troops, and surrounded by the bodies

of his foes, Cati l ine breathed his la s t , and the second



1-11

conspiracy was at an end.



1-12

NOTES TO CH..APTER I

1. Cf. Momsen, History of Rome, Vol. iv , chap. 1.

2. Suetonius, Vita J . Caesar, 1, 9

3. Plutarch, Life of Cicero; Sallust , Cat. xvi.

4. Jones, Francis L., "First Conspiracy of Catil ine", inClassical Journal, Vol.xxxiv, April1939, p.

5. Sallust , ££• c i t . , xvi i i

6. cr. Harper's Diet. Class. Antiquities, p.l309 ar t . TTPrae-varicat io"-- l i teral ly , a deviation from thest ra ight path; i t was a Latin term for theimproper conduct of a case on the part of aprosecutor in favor of the defendant or onthe part of a patronus to the detriment ofhis cl ient . The penalty was forfei ture ofthe r ight to prosecute, and to act as anadvocate.

7. Cicero, Cat. I I , chap. vi i i .

8. Cicero, Cat. I , i i i , 7.

9. Strachan-Davidson, Cicero and the Fall of the Roman

Republic, p. 122.

10. Sal lust , 2£.• c i t . , xxvii i .

11. Cicero, Pro Murena, chap. 25.

12. Sallust , .2l?.· c i t . , x l i i i

13. Sa1lust, 2£.· i l l_ . , x l

14. Sal lust , .2.£· i l l_ . , li15. Pl-utarch, Cato Minor, xxi i i , 1.



CHAPTER I I

Poli t ica l Gangs at Rome

Much that took place in the Rome of the f i r s t

century B. C., and, more part icular ly, much that concerns

the conspiracy of Catil ine is inexplicable without some

appreciation of the part played in Rome by the pol i t ical

gangs that harassed the l a s t years of the dying republic.

For i t would be a serious mistake to identify the mongrel

rabble that flocked af ter Catil ine (Clodius, Milo and, Sestius

with the glorious "Populi Romani" whose virtues and achieve-

ments Cicero never t i res of lauding. Indeed, the man vv-ho had1

inherited from Arpinum his f ierce patriotism and tender love

of Rome and his deep reverence and respect for her t radi t ions

and past glories never did himself greater violence than

when he addressed th is idel and corrupt mob with the proud

t i t l e of "Populi Romani". This must be understood, however,

not as a universal condemnation of the bulk of honest and

patr iot ic cit izens l iving inRome and

outside i t , but of thatnoisy portion of the populace which though small in number

dominated the popular assemblies, exercising an influence

out of a l l proportion to thei r numbers.

I t had been apparent, however, for some

time that the old Roman vir tues were practiced not in Rome

but outside it in the provinces which had but recently gained



2-1

the franchise. Furthermore, the city mob, though i t may have

included originally a small percentage of the honest and

upright ci t izens, had in the l a s t few years changed radical ly

in character. I t now included in i t s ranks large numbers of. 2

foreigners ignorant of Rome and her patriotic and poli t ical

t radit ions. For when Rome became the mistress of the world

she also became the melting-pot of the world, into which

flowed adventurers of every description t i l l it could be said

of her in the time of the empire that ninety percent of the3

resident population of Rome was of foreign extraction.

These strangers were, for the most part , slaves, but many of

them were freedmen who enjoyed the r ight to vote. Their

numbers were increased by the crowds of farmers who flocked

to Rome at this time either because they had been Marian

sympathizers and had been dispossessed of their land to make

way for the veterans of Sulla, or because they were unable

any longer to compete with slave labor. They preferred instead

to roam id le through the streets of Rome, whither they had

been lured by the promise of cheap food at the expense of the

s tate . In la ter years the soldiers of Sulla finding the l i fe

of colonial farmers uncongenial to the i r tastes drifted slowly

back to Rome.

I t seems, however, that the greatest single

contributing factor to the social and economic distress of the



2-2

city was the slave population. Though the number of slaves

at Rome can never be accurately determined, they seem beyond

a l l doubt to have formed a considerable part of the population.

pompey and Caesar alone are roughly estimated to have sent4

over a million human beings under the yoke. "long l ines of

chained prisoners from Germany, Gaul, and even Bri ta in" , says

I)Uruy, "were led to Rome. Utica and Egypt furnished blacks;

Numidia, swift runners; Alexandria, grammarians; Sidone and

cyprus, those in te l l igent , docile and corrupt Asiatics so

highly prized as house servants; Greece, her handsome boys

and gir ls ; Epirus and I l lyr ia , the most experienced shepherds;

Germany, Gaul and Thrace, the most savage gladiators; Cappa

dacia, the most patient laborers".

The resul t of this slavery was disastrous

for the moral and social as well as the economic l i fe of the

city. · The thr i f ty and hardy Roman for a l l his contempt for

oriental pomp and ease, fe l l a willing victim before the

seductive and talented slave of the East, often his superior

in culture and learning. Before long the slaves had gained

the ascendency in the greater par t of the professions. They

were the doctors and the teachers, the ar t is ts and the musi

cians, the tutors and the writers . The gladiators formed a

class apart and i t was but natural that men whose business i t

was to kil l-and be ki l led at the pleasure of a fickle mob



2-3

should contribute much to the disorder and confusion of the

ci ty . I t was, in fact , the custom to remove them from the

city in times of danger.

The greatest harm, however, wrought by the

slaves was that in Rome, as in a l l slave s ta tes , labor came

to bear the stigma of disgrace. The ordinary cit izen chose

to stand hungry and idle in the streets rather than work,

preferring to be fed, feasted, and entertained at the expense

of the s ta te , even when work was available, which was not

often the case, for the cheap slave labor forced them from

their jobs into the ranks of the unemployed. I t was impossi

ble to compete with slave labor especially when the slaves

were worked in gangs and hired out in groups by their ov.ners.

I t was th is l a s t evi l and i t s specific application to the

large scale plantation that emptied the rura l dis t r ic ts into

Rome. When the slave was no longer profitable he could be

conveniently granted his freedom, and cast off on the s tate .

Manumissions of this sort did much to swell the turbulent and

discontented elements of the ci ty .

All these evils might have been present a.nd

yet have worked no appreciable difference in the pol i t ica l

l i fe of the ci ty were i t not for one peculiar feature of

Roman pol i t ics--- the lack of permanent party organizations

at Rome. Voters followed a leader rather than a pol i t ica l



2-4

5principle. The appeal of any part icular candidate for office

lay not so much in any defini te pol i t ica l platform as in his

ownindividual and personal qualif icat ions. Str ict ly speak

ing, there were at Rome no r iva l pol i t ica l part ies as we

know them today. Though there were knights and nobles and

plebs and senators, yet i t was not a contest between knight

and senator for the consulship. The consulship, i t was under

stood, remained s t r ic t ly within the charmed circle of the

senatorial order, and rarely in the long history of the re

public was th is t radi t ion violated, notable exceptions were

Cicero and his fellow townsman Marius. Since the individual

then played so important a role in Roman pol i t ics , it was

essential that he should gather around himself as many ad-

herents as possible. For this purpose he was accustomed

to equip himself with a large and handsome retinue. A

favorable impression was thereby created and generally the

importance of the candidate and the strenght of his cause

could be gauged by the size of his escort .

There was, natural ly, among office seekers

a f ierce r ivalry to gain the favor and votes of the mob,

who, as a rule , sold thei r votes to the highest bidder.

Conditions, indeed, had not changed much in tb.e time of7

Juvenal, who termed the people's r ight of suffrage the

privilege of selling the i r votes. I t was when bribery and



2-5

corruption and the gentler methods of persuasion had failed

that the pol i t ical gangs demonstrated their unusual effect-

iveness. Every sword in the candidate's retinue came to

signify so many more votes, since the peaceful elements in

the community could usually be induced to vote as their more

desperate fellows indicated.

Coincident with the change in. the character

of the Roman mob, there appears on the stage of Roman poli t ics

8a new character whom Rolfe terms the "poli t ical bossn. He

divides the poli t ical boss into three types: the higher type,

of whom Marius, Sulla and Caesar are specimens; the lower

type who does not aspire to the higher offices, but who con

t rols the votes and i s able to "deliver the goods"; and,

"a middle type symbolized in Clodius and Milo, who attained

high office without r is ing to the lughest grades but who

pushed the fortunes of other men, or dragged down their

enemies". I t i s to this lower and middle type that we have

reference when we speak of the pol i t ical gangster. I t was

to be expected.that the urban rabble would fa l l under the

leadership of such men, who organized them into guilds and

pol i t ical clubs called sodalitates or collegia sodalacia •

These were, in fact , l i t t l e more than escort gangs. Origin

al ly , the collegia had comprised the various rel igious

brotherhoods and associations banded together in this manner





2-7

himself the f i r s t man in Rome, hardly dared a t one time to

venture out of his house for fear of Clodius and his gangsters,

They were harassing him a t the inst igat ion probably of Crassus,

pompey's bi t t e r r ival . I t was only af ter Milo with his own

band of hired assassins had engaged Clodius in a prolonged

series of brawls and s t ree t f ights that the assembly was able

to meet and pass the b i l l recalling Cicero. The senate on

th is occasion voted a sum of money to rebuild Cicero's house,

but Clodius and his gang drove off the workmen and burned

down the house of Cicero's brother next door.

After the departure of Crassus for the East,

a reconcil iat ion was effected between Pompey and Clodius.

When Milo, therefore, ran for the consulship in 52 B. C1•

much against the will of Pompey, Clodius had an added motive

for attacking him. Milo replied in kind by hiring several

r ival gangs and the war was on. Rome was the scene of one

r iot af ter another, and s t ree t fighting became the order of

the day. The elect ions, of course, were rendered impossible

so that th is s tate of anarchy might have continued indefini te

ly had i t not been for the memorable meeting between Clodius

and Milo on the Appian Way near Bovillae some ten miles from

Rome, when the swordsmen of Milo af te r an encounter in V ~ : h i c h

they came off victor ious, dragged the wounded Clodius from

a tavern into the road and murdered him.



2-8

Pandemonium broke loose in Rome when i t was

announced to the rabble that Clodius had been s la in. Tbey

besieged the senate house and heaping up the benches theylaid on th is improvised pyre the body of their idol, burning

the senate house to the ground in their gr ie f . Meanwhile

the gangs of Clodius, on the pretext of looking for Milo

and his fr iends, were busy burning and pillaging. At length,

to prevent further disorders, Pompey was recalled and made

sole consul, which was jus t what he desired. Since there

was no one a t Rome to hire them now, the gangs became super

fluous; so Rome sa t back to watch the struggle between Pompey

and Caesar who were playing for .much greater stakes th is time

and with armies instead of gangs.



2-9

NOTES TO c a ~ T E R I I

1. Cf. Boissier, Gaston, Ciceron et Ses Amis, p. 70.

2. Cf. Heitland, W. E., The Roman Republic, Vol. 3, p. 501.

3. Cf. Abbot, Roman Poli t ics, p. 144.

4. Cf. Harperts Classical Dictionary, ar t ic le , "servus",p . 1453.

5. Ibid.

6. Abbot, £2• c i t . , p.

7. Juvenal, Sat . ,x , 1, 77.

8. Rolfe, Cicero and F ~ s Influence, p. 21.

9. Cf. Harperts Classical Dictionary, art icles: ttsod.alacia"and "ambitus".

10. Heitland, ~ c i t . , pp. 146-178.

11. Marsh, Frank Burr, "The Gangster inRoman

Polit ics",in Classical Journal, Vol. xxvii i , Dec. 1932,p. 161.





- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~3-1

leader of this conspiracy was a notorious individual, by name,

Lucius Catil ina. The precise guil t of Catil ine, however, and

the exact blame that attaches to him for his share in the plot ,

is not quite so evident. Cicero, of course, has t r ied to

immortalize him as public enemy no. 1 in the rogues gallery

of the Roman Republic. On the one hand i t may be that Cati

l ine was not so black as he is generally painted; on the other

hand,_ perhaps, he was more so. I t i s our purpose to find out

whether and to what degree Catil ine may be acquitted or con

victed of the charges brought against him.

We shall have gone far in our efforts to

determine the precise gui l t of Catiline i f we can assign him

his r ightful role in the f i r s t conspiracy of 66 B. c. As is

evident, the crime of Catiline i s rendered more heinous and

his guil t more obvious i f we find that as early as 66 B. c.,

three years before the major conspiracy, Catil ine had already

led several unsuccessful attempts to overthrow the government.

On such a hypothesis the major conspiracy was not the result

of some sudden and desperate resolve, but the f rui t of three

years of scheming and planning. On the other hand, his guil t

is somewhat diminished i f we find, instead, that the plot of

66 B. c. which supposedly comprised the two attempts on Janu

ary 1, and February 5, was in a l l probabili ty not repeated on

February 5, as Sallust claims and secondly, that Catiline was



3-2

merely acting as the instrument of Crassus and Caesar, and

played, therefore, a rather minor role in the whole affair .

Both Cicero and Sallust give us very unsat

isfactory accounts of this f i r s t conspiracy. Sallust alone

of a l l the authorit ies makes any mention of a second attempt

on February 5. I f , as we intend to show, Crassus and Caesar

were the real leaders in this conspiracy, i t quite contradicts

what we know of Caesar and his established policies and me-

thods to say that he would risk a second failure so soon after

the f i rs t . Moreover, i f , as Mommsen claims, "from the passing

of the Gabinio-Manilian laws down to the return of Pompey2

there was perpetual conspiracy in Rome", i t would seem only

reasonable to adopt the conclusion of Professor E. G. Hardy,

who had given us probably the f inest treatment to date of this

vexing question, that i t i s well "in the complete absence of

a l l other mention of this second and more atrocious plot , to

dismiss i t as i rresponsible rumor carelessly repeated by3

Sallust" . The most convincing piece of evidence, however,

that this second attempt never took place is the fact that

Cicero in his account of the f i r s t conspiracy, at a moment

when he i s violently inveighing against Catiline and raking up

a l l sorts of charges against him both true and false, fai ls

to make even the sl ightest reference to this damaging b it of4

information.



3-3

The t ruth of the matter is that both Sallust

and Cicero are a t evident pains to avoid a ll mention of eras

sus and Caesar in connection with theaffair .

Sallust as an

avowed partisan of Caesar and the acknowledged recipient of

innumerable favors at his hands would naturally shrink from

introducing the name of his dead chief in so odious a venture.

Cicero for obvious reasons would not care to antagonize the

two greatest men in Rome at a time when his own position was

so precarious. For the orations against Catiline ~ ' e r e written,

i t must be recalled, some three years after the conspiracy

when the f i r s t burst of enthusiasm had subsided and a popu

la r reaction had se t in against Cicero for his share in the

execution of Lentulus and his fellows. Plutarch in his l i fe

of Caesar te l l s us expressly that Cicero "voluntarily over

looked and neglected the evidence against him (Caesar) for

fear of bis friends and power for i t was very evident to

everybody that i f Caesar was to be accused with the conspira

tors , they were more l ikely to be saved with him, than he to5

be punished with them".

Suetonius, however, had no such motives for

being ret icent , and in no uncertain terms he t e l l s us that

Caesar "venit in suspicionem conspirasse ~ Marco Crasso

consulari, ~ Publio Sulla e t L. ftntonio post designatioem

consulatus ambitus condemnatis, ut principio anni senatum



3-4

adorirentur, e t trucidatis guos placitum esset, dictaturam

crassus invaderet, opse ab ~ magister eguitum diceretur

constituague ad arbitrium~

publica Sullae e t Antonio QQg-6sulatus rest i tueretur". Unlike Sallust in his treatment of

this particular question, Suetonius immediately proceeds to

quote his authorities: "Meminerunt hujus conjurationis

Lanusius Geminus in historia, Marcus Bibulus in edict is , c.

curio pater in orationibus", and he adds that Cicero too had7

hinted as much in a l e t te r to Axius.

A good deal of mystery s t i l l attaches to this

f i r s t conspiracy. I f the affair were as simple as Cicero and

Sallust would have us believe, why were the conspirators never

brought to t ra i l , and why the seemingly tac i t agreement on a l l

sides that the matter be dropped as quickly and as quietly

as possible? VI'hen we conpare the account of Sallust with

what actually did transpire in Rome af ter the fai lure of the

conspiracy, we are faced vvith some very remarkable conclusions.

The story of the f i r s t conspiracy as told by Sallust is as

follows:

"Sed antea item conjuravere paucii contra rem publicamin quis Catilina fuit ; de qua verissime potero dicam.L. Tullo et M. Lepido consulibus P. ftntonius et P. Sulladesignati consules legibus ambitus interrogati poenasdederant •••••••••••••••• Erat eodem tempore Cn. Piso,adulescens nobilis , summae audaciae, egens, factiosus,quem ad purturbandam rem publicam inopia atque malimores stimulabant. Cum hoc Catilina et Antonius ci r -

ci ter nonas Decenbris consilio communicate parabant inCapitolio kalendis Januariis L. Cottam et L. Torquatum



3-5

consules interf icere, ips i fascibus correptis Pisonemcum exercitu ad obtinendas duas Hispanias mittere".8

cat i l ine and Antonius then were to ki l l the consuls Cotta

and Torquatus, and Piso was to be sent with an army into

Spain. The attempt was a miserable fiasco. But lo and be

hold, a few months la ter we find Torquatus actually defending9

cat i l ine against a charge of repetundae and Piso by a decree

of the Senate marching off to Spain with an army. Cicero is

our witness for the f i r s t statement in his speech in behalf

of Sulla, another of the conspirators:

"Quin etiam parens tuus, Torquate, consul reo de pecunJ.J.srepetundis Catilinae fu i t advocatus, improbo homini etsupplici , fortasse audaci et aliquando amico. CUi cum

adfuit post delatam ad eum primam illam conjurationem,indicavit se audisse aliquid non credidisse". 10

The second statement quoted above is t es t i -

fied by Sallust himself, who immediately after tel l ing us

that i t was part of the conspirators plan that Piso should

be sent to Spain with an army, has th is to say: "Postea Piso

in citeriorem Hispaniam auaestor pro praetore missus est

adnitente Grasso, quod eum infestum inimicum en. Pompeiocognoverat".l l In that l i t t l e sentence we have probably the

key to the whole f i r s t conspiracy. From i t we are able to

conclude to the moving spir i ts behind the whole affair ,

Crassus and Caesar, for Sallust seems not to have understood

that he could not cast suspicion on Crassus without at the



12same time implicating Caesar.

3-6

Crassus and Caesar had joined

forces out of fear of Pompey who, i t was expected, would

attempt to set up a military dictatorship on his return toRome from his br i l l iant campaigns in the East.

One move in the game of Crassus and Caesar

to checkFOmpey was to put in the consulship men l ike Catil ine

and Antonius whom they could manipulate without too much

diff icul ty . Another move was to send Piso, Pompey's deadly

enemy, to Spain with an army. That was the original plan of

the conspiracy and though i t f a i ~ e d miserably, s t i l l Crassus

was powerful enough and wealthy enough to force the Senate to

send Piso to Spain after a l l , and not only that , but to en

dow him with praetorian powers as well. This is confirmed

by Asconius in his commentary on Cicero's los t election speech

"In Toga Candida" in which Cicero makes the following- ,

statement: "Dico, P. c. super.iore nocte cu,1usdam hominis

nobilis et valde in hoc largi t ionis guaestu noti et cognit i

domum Catilinam et Antonium cum seguestribus suis convenissen •

.Asconius makes the following commentary:

"Aut c. Caesaris aut M. Crassi domum signif icat , eienim accerrimi ac potentissimi fuerunt Ciceronis re fragatores, cum pet i i t consulatum, quod ejus in diescivilem crescere dignitatem animadvertebant; et hocipse Cicero in expositione conciliorum suorum signif ica t . Sed ejus quoque conjurationis, quae Cotta etTorquato coss. ante annum quam haec dicerentur factaest a Catilina et Pisone, arguit M. Crassum auctorem

fuisse".l3



3-7

sal lust in lus attempt to clear Caesar's name of suspicion,

magnifies naturally Catil inets share in the proceedings. He

isprompted by no such consideration with regard to Crassus:

"Fuere item ea tempestate aui crederent M. LiciniumCrassum non ignarum ejus ~ C a t i l i n a e ) consi l i i fuisse,quia Cn. Pompeius invisus ips i magnum exercitum dictabat , cujusvis opes voluisse contra i l l ius potentiamcrescere, simul confisum, s i conjuratio valuisset ,faci le apud i l los principem se fore."l4

Caesar's connection with the conspiracy was

equally notorious. Caesar and Crassus ~ v e r e extremely anxious

at th is time to get thei r hands on Egypt, the r ichest country

in the East, and in the advent of trouble with Pompey an

invaluable base of operations. With men of the stamp of Cati

l ine and Antonius in the consulship, thei r scheme stood some

chance of real izat ion. What other uses they would have made

of Cati l ine we can only conjecture. We have a few indications,

however, in Titus Labienus who proposed the b i l l restoring the

election of the Chief Pontiff to the people instead of the

college of Pontiffs , and thereby secured the victory of Caesar

overhis

formidabler ivals

Catulusand Servilius. .Another

tool of Caesar and Crassus, the tribune Servilius Rullus was

employed to introduce a measure which i f carried would have

given them the power and the money and the armies they wanted.

I t was the famed Agrarian Law for the distr ibut ion of land to

the poor, the money to purchase the land being raised by the

sale of government property in nine different provinces. The



3-8

law was to be administered by ten commissioners invested with

military power for a space of five years. Caesar of course,

would head th is commission, only the measure was defeated by

the efforts of Cicero.

These facts are important as showing where

the balance of power lay in Rome, and what the relations must

necessarily have been between Crassus and Caesar on the one

side and Cati l ine on the other. Catil ine was clearly the

tool . I t was with the evident intention of making some such

use of him that Caesar as president of the commission tha t

was trying those accused of performing the wholesale e x e c u t i o n ~for Sulla a.llowed the res t to be condemned, but the most

16patently guil ty of a l l , Cati l ine, to be acquitted. Rome,

however, was not deceived. Later when the second conspiracy

was at i t s height, Mommsen te l l s us that ·nthe young men who

had taken up arms to ward off the incendiaries were exasper

ated against no one so much as against Caesar; on the f i f th

of December when he l e f t the Senate they pointed thei r swords

at his breast and he narrowly escaped with his l i fe evennow

on the same spot where the fa ta l blow fe l l on him seventeen

years afterwards; he did not again for a considerable time17

enter the senate house." At the t r i a l of the conspirators

when Caesar had spoken against the death penalty and made

a profound impression on his l is teners , Plutarch te l l s us



3-9

that "the f i r s t man who spoke against Caesar's notion was

catulus Lutatius. Cato followed and so vehemently urged in

his speech the strong suspicion about Caesar himself and so

f i l led the senate with anger and resolution that a decree was18

passed for the execution of the conspirators."

The hand of Caesar, l ike that of Crassus,

was too manifest to be mistaken. But a t the same time the

influence of Caesar l ike that of Crassus was powerful enough

to discourage any proceedings that might be taken against him.

Crassus, i t will be remembered, had been seriously implicated

by the testimony of Tarquinius. Though many believed in the

gui l t of Crassus s t i l l the testimony against him had been

stricken from the records and Tarquinius instead bundled off

19to prison. Even though Crassus was guil ty, it was considered

a much wiser and safer policy to propitiate re.ther than exas

perate him at such a cr is is . All t lus being true i t rnigbt

well be questioned with what amount of fairness , considering

the relat ive parts played by Catiline and the powerful com-

bination of Caesar and Crassus, the name of Catiline has come

to be attached to th is "First Conspiracy of Catiline". Clear-

ly he can have been no more than a minor and subordinate f i -

gure. I t is highly significant that Suetonius in his account

of the f i r s t conspiracy does not even mention the name of20

Cati l ine.





CHAPTER IV

The Evidence in Cicero for Ce.tiline's Guilt

In the present chapter our efforts will

be mainly confined to a consideration of the evidence ad-

vanced by Cicero, for and against the gui l t of Cati l ine, in

in his four famous orations. There i s question here of

Cati l ine 's gui l t with regard to the conspiracy i . e . precisely

how great or how l i t t l e blame attaches to him as a conspirator.

This will however necessarily entai l some discussion of the

fur ther question of Catil inets private l i fe and morals. Lit t l

need be said in behalf of the case presented by Cicero against

Cati l ine. We need only remark that so complete and masterful

was the task performed by Cicero that he has secured for

Catiline an immorte.li ty , which, questionable as i t i s , the

l a t t e r could never have achieved by his own efforts . I t is

an eloquent commentary on the sk i l l of Cicero, end a wonderful

t r ibute to his genius that succeeding generations have hardly

dared to question the judgment he pronounced against Cati l ine.

Amid a welter of facts , and detai ls and data incontest ible ,

Cicero has proved beyond a l l doubt that in the year 63 B. c.

there was a movement afoot in Rome against the government,

a conspiracy, i f you l ike , and that the leader of this move-

ment was Catil ine. I f one chooses to view Catiline solely

through the eyes of Cicero, the case is closed and Catiline



4-1

·was jus t about the worst wretch that has ever graced this

earth. But when Catiline i s viewed through the eyes of a

t tdrd person, a.nd the implied statement weighed and balanced

against the explici t , the case against him i s not quite so

obvious and te r r ib le . We see much at times in the very words

of Cicero that a t a f i r s t glance might escape us. We find

at times certain detai ls l e f t unexplained. Some of these

we shal l attempt to solve. For our explanation we claim,

not that i t i s the only one or the commonly accepted one or

the best possible one but merely, tha t , given the circumstan

ces, it i s a reasonable one and a quite plausible one. I t

i s in th is frame of mind that we now look at the four orations

delivered by Cicero when the conspiracy was a t i t s height.

The time of the composition a.nd delivery

of the four orations is of course extremely important. Had

they been written some f i f teen years or so after the cr is is

had passed and the conspiracy was no longer a l ive issue,

we should expect to find even Cicero less violent in his

denunciations of Cati l ine. As a matter of fact , the speeches

as we have them were not written t i l l some three years af te r

the conspiracy when i t was Cicero's avowed object to depict

Catiline in as lurid a l ight as possible. A reaction had set

in against Cicero, as has been already mentioned, for the part

he had played in putting the conspirators to death. These

speeches were, therefore, as much a defense of Cicerots own



4-2

policy as an arraigment of Catiline. I t must be apparent

that Cicero's best defense lay in emphasizing and elaborating

the gui l t of the conspirators. This was, of course, particular ly true of Catiline not only as leader of the opposition

but as the symbol of that whole side of Roman l i fe which

Cicero hated and condemned. For these reasons we must be

somewhat cautious and cr i t ical in our interpretation of what

Cicero has to say of Catil ine and attempt to estimate the

la t te r ' s guil t more by the content of what Cicero has to say

than the highly rhetorical manner in which he says i t .

At the precise time the f i r s t oration against

cat i l ine was delivered (Nov.s, 63 B. c. ) Cicero was striving

desperately to convince the authorities at Rome that this

conspiracy was to be taken seriously and that this Catiline

was in real i ty a dangerous character. Thelast point most of

them would have been quite willing to concede. Cicero faced

a much s t i f fer task, however, in the attempt to convince them

that Catil ine was a serious menace to the safety of the city

as a whole. His own words are a virtual admission of this

fact . nouamguam n2E. nul l i sunt in hoc ordine gui aut ~ ouae

imminent B2n videant aut ea guae vident dissimuent; gui spem

Catilinae mollibus sententiis ~ l l u e r u n t conjurationemque1

crescentem ~ credendo conroboraveruntn. Earlier in the

same speech he had confessed as much when he declared:



4-3

"Si te jam, Cati l ina, comprehendi, s i in terf ic i jussero,credo, er i t verendum mihi non potius hoc ornnes bbniserius a me quam quisquam crudelius factum esse dicat.Verum ego hoc quod non jam pridem factum esse oportuitcerta de causa nondum adducor u t faciam".2

The "certain reason " why Cicero did not dare to take any

definite steps against Catiline was the fact that these good

cit izens either did not as yet take Catil inets attempt at a

revolution aeriously, or else they were not disinclined to

view with an indulgent eye a scheme that in any way appeared

to challenge Pompey. In either case Catiline could not have

seemed to them the revolutionary abomination that Cicero

pretends; in fact , they were quite l ikely to welcome a move-

ment t r ~ t promised resistance to Pompey.

I t was only when the people realized that

the movement was directed against themselves that they took

any pains to suppress the conspiracy. For already the several

classes in Rome had begun to regret the excessive powers they

had themselves placed in Pompey's hands by the passage of the

Manilian and Gabinian laws. As Mommsen says: "never since

Rome stood had such powers been united in the hands of a singlE3

man." Pompey was now by reason of his victories over the

pirates and Mithradates vir tual commander of the Roman forces

on land and sea. Rome was consequently in a state of feverish

anxiety waiting to see what use the great soldier would make

of lus dictator ial powers when he grew t i red of making andunmaking monarchs in the East.



4-4

The aristocratic oligarchy in Rome feared

Pompey as a threat to their supremacy and the popular party

with which Pompey was presumably al l ied realized that i t now

had in Pompey an ally too powerful for i t s ovm good. The

senate and the optimates were willing to go any lengths in

their tolerat ion of Catiline i f only they might thereby off

set in some manner the advantages of Pompey. This is clearly

shown by the fact that they sent the quaestor Gnaeus Piso

with an army to Spain with praetoria:n powers, simply because

of the deadly enmity that was known .to exist between himself

and Pompey, although Piso was a notorious intimate of Catil ine4

and had been implicated with him in the f i r s t cdnspiracy.

I t must be apparent, then, that to convince

th is audience which might be inclined to t reat in somewhat

cavalier fashion the charges against Catiline, Cicero' was

forced to tax his resources to the i r utmost, and to leave

unsaid nothing that could be construed to Catil inets disad-

vantage. This is no unfair ref lect ion on Cicero, for in his

speech Pro Cluentio he himself expressly warns us against

accepting as his tor ical facts the charges he might chance to

urge against anyone, guided as he was by the exigencies and

the circumstances of each part icular case:

nsed errat vehementer, s i quis in orationibus nostr is ,quae in judici is habuimus, auctoritates nostras con

signatas se habere arbi t ratur . Omnes enim i l lae orationes causarum ac temporum sunt, non hominum ipsorum



4-5

aut patronorum. nam s i causae opsae pro se loquipossent, nemo adhiberet orationem."5

That we have interpreted these words in

the i r true sense, we quote in proof Professor E. G. Sihler

who writes in this connection, "He ( Clu 139) posi t ively

refeses within the sphere of his professional conduct or

procedure to be bound or constrained by any published ut ter -

ance of the past . An advocate cannot maintain genuine con

sistency in dealing with the shift ing and changeful cases

which he undertakes. He is necessarily (Clu 139) determined6

by the case in hand and by the circumstances attending it!!

Cicero himself, la te r on openly boasted that in this part icu

la r case he had thrown dust into the eyes of the jury. A

dist inction must be drawn between the genuine sinceri ty of

Cicero, the Roman patr iot and the occasional special pleading

of Cicero, the Roman lawyer and rhetorician. I t is our task

to get behind the rhetoric and the invective and to le t the

facts speak for themselves.

The f i r s t oration against Catiline i s to a

large extent an impassioned appeal to Catiline to leave the

ci ty . This is the motif and i t occurs time and time again

with singular insistence: "egredere aliqoamdo £X urbe, patent

Eortae, Erofisciscere ••••••• sin tu , quod te jamdudum hortor,

exieris •••••• exire ~ urbe jubet consul host em. interroga.s

me num in exsilium? nQg jubeo, sed s i ~ consulis, suadeo •••



4-6

••••••• guam ob ~ discede atque hunc mihi timorem reipe •••••

••••••• u a e ~ i ta s in t , Catilina, dubitas, s i emori aequo

animo !l2!2 potes, abire ••••••••• egredere~

urbe, Cati l ina,"and so on through the res t of the speech we find Cicero

begging, persuading and ultimately forcing Catil ine to leave7

the c i t .

Why was Cicero so anxious that Cati l ine

depart safely from the ci ty when he had already arraigned

him in sustained passages of invective as a desperado and

criminal whose freedom was a menace to the state? Why was

Catiline not summarily arrested and thrown into prison or at

leas t incapacitated in some way frum wreaking further harm

on the state? Certainly Cicero never dreamt for a moment

that his pleas to Catiline to abandon his ostensibly wicked

designs had made the s l ightest impression on him. Nor do

the reasons Cicero gives for not seizing Catiline and putting

him to death seem entirely sat isfactory. Neither the "customs

of their ancestors" nor the "laws regarding the punishment of

Roman Citizensn would have caused Cicero any serious scruples

as he himself admits, for; npersaepe etiam privat i in hac8

ll publica perniciosus civis mote multarunt," and as re -

gards punishing Roman ci t izens , why: "numguam in hac urbe9

oui 3! .!:..§.publica defecerunt civium jura tenuerunt.n He

did not hesi tate a few weeks la ter to put Lentulus, Cethegus,



4-7

Gabinius, Caeparius and Stat i l ius to death without a formal

t r i a l although they were Roman ci t izens and the law demanded10

i t . The third reason Cicero gives, "the odium of posterity"

might well have been a consideration with him, but we can be

sure that Cicero in his rec i ta l of the events would take good

care that no odium should ref lect upon himself. We should

expect hardly less of a man whose supreme ambition lay not

in the amassing of wealth or in the exercising of authority

but in the winning of admiration.

lf,'e cannot help suspecting, however, that

Cicero's real reason for not apprehending Catiline was the

simple fact that Catiline had not as_yet committed any overt

act that would jus t i fy such behaviour on Cicerots par t , or i fhe had, that Cicero had not clear evidence of the fact . This

would also explain the unexpected presence of Catiline in the

senate on th is part icular day for even Cicero does not appear

to ha.ve suspected him of such daring. But Ca.tiline knew and

Cicero knew that as long as the former could keep up a bold

front in the ci ty he was safe. I f , however, Catiline could

be driven out of the city he had no other recourse but to go

to the camp of Manlius and once he did the conspiracy was a

fa i t accompli and Cicero had won. Cicero had hinted as ·

much when he declared: "Nunc inte l l igo, s i i s te , .0J:!2. intendi t ,

in Manliana castra pervenerit , neminem tam stultum fore qui





13est ."

4-9

What conclusion are v;-e to draw? Not that

Catiline was not a conspirator for a conspirator he certainlywas but merely this conclusion that i f Cicero h ~ ~ ~ d to force

Catiline into open rebellion in order to convince the majority

of Rome to take the conspiracy seriously, then th is is hardly

in accord with the t radi t ional picture originated by Cicero

of a Catilinewith pall id face and bloodshot eyes who roamed

the s treets of Rome breathing incendia scelera, c a e d e s , ~ -r ic id ia , la t rocinia ,e tc . This of course does not exculpate

Cati l ine from the charge of conspiracy. I t does not lessen

his gui l t . I t merely gives us cause for pause. Either

Catiline was a much more clever individual than we have been

led to believe and i f he was, how explain his hesitancy, the

childish parade of- l ictors , the melodramatic speeches, drink

ing of blood, etc . - - -or else he was not entirely the monster

that Cicero has painted him. The point we are making is that

Cicero was designedly confusing two separate issues--he was

convincing his l i s teners of the heinousness of the conspiracy

with a rec i ta l of theheinousness of Catilinets private char

acter .

We are of course dealing here only with

Cati l ine 's gui l t in connection with the conspiracy, and i t

must be confessed that once he had proceeded to the camp of









-----------------------------------.4-=13

that he might secure Cati l inets aid in his quest for the con-

sulship.

"Hoc tempre, Catilinam competitorem nostrum defenderecogitamus; judices habemus quos voluimus, summa accusa-tor is voluntate. Spero, s i absolutus er i t , conjuncti-orem illum nobis fore in ratione pet i t ionis ; sin a l i t e raccideri t , humaniter feremus."20

Thus in this l e t t e r to Atticus we find Cicero, in the f i r s t

kno'vn reference he makes to Catil ine preparing i f need be to

bear manfully the loss of Cati l inets fr iendship. Some have

even believed that Cicero actually did defend Cati l ine, no-

table Fenestella, but most authori t ies seem inclined to adopt

the posit ion of Asconius, in his commentary on the In Toga

Candida:

"defensus est Cat i l ina, ut Fenestella t radi t , a M.

Cicerone quod ego ut addubitem haec ipsa Ciceronisoratio fac i t , maxirne quod i s nullam mentionem re ihabet, cum potueri t invidiam facere competit iori tamturpi ter adv'3rsus se coeunti. 11 21

I t seems evident at any rate that even Cicero had not always

regarded Catil ine as the t radi t ional bete noire of Rome.

The third and fourth Catilinarian in as fa r

as they direct ly affect Catiline add l i t t l e to the condem-

nation that Cicero ha0 already pronounced against him in the

f i r s t and second orations. The third orati(Jn delivered be-

fore the people on December 3 i s largely a narration of how

Cicero with the aid of the Allobroges had trapped the leaders

of the conspiracy in Rome. The fourth i s concernedwLth the



4-14

punishment that is to be inf l icted on them. We, therefore,

turn, our attention to the second oration delivered before

the people on November 9. I t is for the most part an ar-

raignment of Catil ine and his associates and contains the

famous catalogue of Cati l inets accomplices. I t was Cicero's

object to throw discredi t on Catiline and his movement by

holding up to ridicule the elements on which i t rested, and

in this he had succeeded. I t is interest ing to note however,

that a l l six classes mentioned by Cicero have some connection,

ei ther proximate or remote, with the universal evil of the

day--debt. Knights, senators, gamblers, bankrupts, spend

thr igts , paupers, id le rs , soldiers ,-- they ha1 but one thing

in common, the misery and the anxiety of the debtor. I t was

the promise of the Novae Tabulae and repudiation of debts

that drew them round the standard of Cati l ine. They were

a class whose allegiance was valuable neither to the optimates

nor the popular party. This would explain why they fared

badly at the hands of the two t radi t ional part ies and the i r

leaders, but would not on that account make this third party

a necessarily disreputable one, except in the eyes of i t s

enemies. The above classi f ica t ion of Cati l ine 's followers,

it must be remembered, is Cicero 's . Any disrepute lay not

in the fact that they ';,ere debtors bm that they were small

debtors. There was scarcely an eminent man of the day again-





4-16

a t a glance what a welcome contribution they v,·ould have ma.de

to the slender forces Cati l ine had at his disposal . Only a

few years previous these slaves had r isen under Sparts.cus and

had succeeded for a time in terr igying the whole Ital ian

peninsula while holding at bay the armies of several Roman

magistrates. They only fe l l before the superior might of24

Crassus and Pompey.

To the very end Catiline was adamant in his

refusal to enrol l slaves, despite the entreat ies of the other

leaders at Rome, part icularly Lentulus. The following is a

copy of the l e t te r which Lentulus sent C a t i l i ~ e , only to have

i t intercepted by Cicero:

TTQuis sim ex eo quem ad te misi cognosces.

in quanta calamitates is ,

et memineris teconsideres quae tuae rat iones postulent .ab omnibus, etiam ab infimis,n

and adds Sallust:

Fac cogites

virum esse- ~ . u x i l i urn petas

TTAd hoc mandata verbis dat; cum ab senatu hostis ju dicatus s i t , quo consil io servi t ia repudiet.n25

St i l l l a ter when Catiline was being besieged by the army

of Antonius and was in sore need of recrui ts , he s t i l l re-

fused the a.id of the slaves vvho flocked to him in large num-

bers. Sallust says:

nrnterea servi t ia repudiabat, cujus ini t io ad eum rnagnaecopiae concurrebant, opibus conjurationis f re tus , simulalienum suis rat ionibus existimans videri causam ci.viumcum servis fugi t iv is communicavisse.H26

That Catiline evidently considered his cause





4-18

ly a good one. We have no evidence, not even from the pen of

Cicero, that Catil ine did not sincerely believe in the cause

for which he was prepared to r isk everything. His actions onthis point at leas t , are surprisingly consistent. True, the

instruments he used were anything but respectable but Cat.iline

was a desperate man and he had recourse to such methods only

when he· saw that the legit imate approa.ches to his design were

closed to him. He had seen himself worsted time af ter time

by the equestrian monied interests and the influence they

could buy. For we must remember that Catil ine was defeated

in his quest for the consulship by only. a few votes that

had been marshalled against lurn by the equestrians and their

fr iends. I f Cati l ine is accused of importing voters into the

ci ty , the same is true of his enemies in a greater degree.

On that day many nobles and knights "who had never appeared

in the Campus Martius in their l ives came with set and anxious

faces to the voting booths followed by a procession of fr iends

and cl ients . The voting was very close b ~ t o n c e more money27

had overcome numbers."

Cicero, moreover, was subseauently proven

wrong in the slurs he cast on the morale of Cati l inets asso-

ciates and the i r loyalty to him. Cicero referr ing to them

had ostentatiously declared: "quibus ego !12!1 modo s i aciem

exercitus nostr i , verum etiam s i edictum praetor is ostendero,



4-19

28concident.n Cicero's grim l i t t l e joke was not without i t s

point f'or in his edict the praetor was accustomed to lay down

the laws he would observe in arranging the proceedings of the

regular courts for the coming year and in deciding cases not

covered by the twelve tables . Cicero thought that a joking

reference to i t s contents might be enough to discourage the

more timorous of Cati l ine ' s followers. He was wrong however

for they did fa l l eventually at the bat t le of Pistoria but

not at the praetor 's edic t . They wrote, in fact , the noblest

chapter in Cati l inets l i f e , for says Sallust :

"confecto proelio tum vero cerneres quanta audaciaquantaque animi vis fuisset in exercitu Catilinae.nam fere quem quisque vivos pugnando locum ceperat ,eum amissa anima corpore tegebat ••••••••• postremo exomni copia neque in proelio neque in fuga quisquam

civis ingenuus captus est ; i t a cuncti suae hostiumquevitae juxta perpercerant.n29

Ev'en before this t ime, when the senate had

pronounced Catiline and Manlius t ra i tors and had voted that

an army should be levied immediately to pursue Cati l ine, we

learn from Sallust : " ~ tanta multitudine negue praemio

inductus conjurationem patefacerat neque ~ castr is · Catilinae30

quisauam omnium discesserat . n I t might rea.dily be constru-

ed then as sometlung of a t r ibute to the character of Catil ine

as well as his associates that despite the fact that t.hey

were one and a l l heavily in debt, not one came forv.rard to

tes t i fy against Catiline and claim the promised rewards. For



4-20

the senate had voted various rewards at this time to anyone

volunteering information about the plot , to a slave, his

freedom and a hundred thousand sesterces, and to a free man,

with immunity from complicity, two hundred thousand sesterces.

31 The awards, however, went unclaimed. This is a_ rather

remarkable circumstance i f as Cicero te l l s us, Catil ine was

so universal an object of hate and his associates so utter ly

abandoned. I t is a fact that might have gone unmentioned.

I t does not make Catiline any less a conspirator but i t does

help toward giving us a fairer less distor ted and therefore

t ruer picture of that conspirator.





























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ing document of a l l . Says Manlius:

"Deos hominesque testamur, imperator nos arma neque cont ra patriam cepisse neque C!UO periculum a l i is facer emus,sed u t i corpora nostra ab injur ia tuta. forent qui mise r i egentes violent ia atque crudeli tate faenetatorumplerique patr iae sed omnes fama atque fortunis expertessumus. Neque cuiquam nostrum l i cu i t rnore maiorum legeu ti neque amisso patrimonio liberum corpus habere; tantasaevit ia faeneratorum atque praetoris fui t ." l9

Cicero 's joke about the "praetor 's edict" was af ter a l l not

quite so harmless.

I t is in th is same message that f inal ly

str ike upon what i s probably the best explanation of the true

genius cmd character of the conspiracy. ~ i 1 a n l i u s in ju.st if ica-

t ion for his taking up arms against the government appeals to

the t radi t ions and customs of their forefathers, who several

times took up arms and seceded from the l imits of the ci ty

when aroused by the arroga.nce of the magistrates.

"Saepe maiores nostrum miseri t i plebis Romanae decret issuis inopiae ejus opi tu la t i sunt, ac novissime memorianostra propter magnitudinem aeris al ieni volentibusomnibus bonis argentum aere solutum est . Saepe ipsaplebes aut dominandi studio permota aut superbia magistratuum armata a partibus secessit ."20

·Manlius appeals to the t radi t ions of thei r forefa.thers on

two counts, f i r s t , because of the great debt they had pa.ssed

a decree whereby si lver was paid in copper, end, secondly,

they had taken up arms and vithdrawn from the ci ty when thei r

rights were not respected. He i'.-as referring to the s e c e s ~ d o n

of the plebians who threatened to withdraw from the ci ty and





5-13

desirable thing. Some passing good he might have done but in

the end he would have brought no last ing benefit to Rome.

He would a t any rate have fal len before the superior :might

of ei ther Pompey, Crassus or Caesar.

We have now reached a stage in our invest i

gation of Cati l ine ' s gui l t when we can cal l a hal t and sum-

marize some of our conclusions. Enough of the evidence for

and against Catiline has been sif ted to enable us to pass

some sor t of judgment. Catiline did indeed plot against the

sta te . The evidence for th is fact , i f " ~ N e accept the evidence

of Cicero and Sallust , is overwhelming. But to condemn Cati

l ine categorically as the g r e a t ~ s t rogue in ancient t imes-

the ordinary procedure in our textbooks--is to stray in an

other direct ion equally as far from the t ru th . I t may be the

acceptable practice to paint Catiline in black for the sake of

impressing the youthful student but i t i!3 bad history and as

long as there i s question of t ru th then at least le t us ern-

ploy some shade of gray. The cause of Catiline, i t must be

remembered has never had a pleader before the t r ibunal of

history. We have seen how evilly he fared a t the hands of

Cicero. That Sallust t reated him no bet ter is perhaps the

surest proof that Catiline had broken with Caesar and the

popular party. For th is reason rd.s cause has never been heard

nfor a l l the authors of our historical sources were al l ied to



5-14

some degree with one party or the other, and natural ly did

not have a good word to say about Cati l ine or a program l ike

his. Cati l ine ' s own party, on the other hand, being composed

largely of the poorer classes and a few members of the upper

classes who were ei ther executed or silenced was completely21

inar t icula te ." The ·world has never heard any version of

Cati l inets story but the one which flows from the l ips of his

enemies.

One of the f i r s t conclusions VJe reached

regarding Catil ine was that his name has come to be falsely

attached to the f i r s t conspiracy. His part in this af fa i r

was entirely subordinated to those played by Caesar and eras-

sus. His gui l t , therefore , in this connection has been

unjustly and unfairly magnified. Plutarch in his l i fe of22

Cicero sins especially in this regard. This f i r s t conspir-

acy v ~ a s a simple bid for power by Crassus and Caesar and

though Cati l ine does seem to have some share in the proceed-

ings he does not deserve the obloquy that would attach to

him had he actually been planning an organized attack on the

government through three continuous years.

The next conclusion we reached was that we

had to be extremely cautious in accepting wholly without

question Cicero's testimony against Cati l ine. Cicero was

clear ly in this case a special pleader. In the language of



5-15

today "he was out to get Cati l ine." The speeches were

writ ten in the midst of a wave of intense popular reaction

against Cicero for his unorthodox execution of the conspira

tors when i t was to Cicerots evident advantage to paint in

as lur id as l ight as possible Cati l inets personal character.

For the same reason i t was necessary that the dangerous ele-

ments in the conspiracy should be highly colored and ·exagger

ated. One of the conclusions we reached here was that Cicero

cleverly manouvered Catil ine into a postion 1"1here the l a t te r

was forced to betray himself and leave the ci ty . No matter

what the designs of Cati l ine may have been unt i l then, i t

was now a simple task for Cicero to construe them into a

treasonous attempt on the s tate . Catiline could then be t rea t

ed as an avowed public enemy and an army dispatched against

him. Another conclusion we drew in th is section \.','as that

Catiline on the testimony of Cicero himself was not the to -

ta l ly wicked character that he has been painted in the popu

la r imagination.

In viewing the evidence presented by Sal lus t ,

a l ike decision must be rendered as in the case of Cicero.

Though Catiline stands to a l l appearances convicted s t i l l

enough evidence in his favor has been found to just ify a

fa i rer and more generous treatment than that accorded by

Sallust . For Sallust , too, was writing with a partisan bias .



5-16

I f he was to clear his patron 's name from gui l t in connection

with the conspiracy he necessari ly head to be severe in his

treatment of Cati l ine. He had a second motive for t reat ing

Catil ine harshly i f Catil ine and Caesar, the recognized lead

er of the popular party, had severed re la t ions . For Sal lus t

was the mouthpiece of the popular party. I t has even been

contended tha t Sallust had in mind ~ h e n he undertook· his

writings the glor i f ica t ion of the popular party and i t s a.ims.

Though Cati l ine may have had in mind nothing more treasonable

to the s ta te than an armed secession of his party from the

ci ty modeled on those of ear l ie r days, yet beca.use such a

movement would, a t best , be seriously inconvenient for the

two t radi t ional par t ies , the Optimates and the Populares,

these two tulited for the moment to crush him. Since Cicero

was the speaker for the Optimates cmd Sal lus t of the Populares,

it would be but natural tha t Cati l ine should suffer in the

te l l ing of the t a le , especially since a l l our known facts con

cerning the conspiracy derive from these two.

All these considerations would, we believe,

jus t i fy us in concluding tha t though Cati l ine did lead a

movement against the government, yet , his actions might well

demand a far more lenient interpretat ion than has generally

been put upon them. That his movement was badly timed and

his aims misdirected does not jus t i fy us in labeling him the



5-17

arch criminal of a l l t imes. Had he succeeded he might have

been a hero. Only a few years la te r the ~ r e a t Caesar actually

did carry into efect many of the reforms that Catil ine had

advocated.









The thesis, "The Guilt of Catiline, The Cati-

l inarian Conspiracy as Viewed by Cicero and Sallust",

written by Thomas Edward Griffin, S.J . , has been ac-

cepted by the Graduate School with reference to form,

and by the readers whose names appear below, with re-

ference to content. I t is , therefore,acoepted in par-

t ia l fulfil lment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts.

Father Walsh, S.J.

Father James J. Doyle, S.J.

September 11, 1940

September 12, 1940

Documents

The Guilt of Catiline