The Great Migration of 1971 I Exodus

8/3/2019 The Great Migration of 1971 I Exodus

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The Great Migration of 1971: I: ExodusAuthor(s): Partha N. MukherjiReviewed work(s):Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 9, No. 9 (Mar. 2, 1974), pp. 365-369Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4363448 .

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SPECIALARTICLES

T h e G r e a t Migration o f 1 9 7 11-ExodusPartha N Mukherji

This is an exploratory study of the evacuees who left East Bengal after the imposition of martiallaw on March 25, 1971, and sought refuge in India. According to official statistics, by the second weekof December 1971 about 6.8 million evacuees had been housed in camps and another 3.1 million werestaying with friends and relatives. As many as 827 state camps and 19 Central camnps accommodatedone of the largest migrant movements in history.This three-part study concentrates on those w'io were temporarily settled at the Chandpara andBokchora camps in the district of 24-Parganas in We;t Bengal. Part I deals with the socio-economic back-ground of the evacuees, the events leading to their upe'ootment and the trek to sanctuary. Part II willexamine the organisational set-up of the camps, the relatiotns between hosts and guests in and around thecamps and the adaptive capacities of the evacuees in their new environment. Part 111 will deal with themigration back to Bangladesh and the manner in wh ch it was achieved.[I am thankful to the Department of Sociology, University of Delhi, for having given me a smallgrant and duty leave for my field work. I am also th2nkful to I P S Uberoi and to Andre Beteille forhaving taken a helpful interest in my work. My thaiks also to the members of the Sociological ResearchColloquiium seminar. I am most grateful to Jayapra ash Narayan, the Bangladesh Legation in Calcutta,Abhoy Ashram, A P Sinha, and the Ministry of Labo-4r and Rehabilitation, all of whom gave nme nvalu-able help in doing my field work.]

THE time available for this study wasappromimately ix weeks, which includednot only the period of field work butalso the ti-me for the organisat-ionofresearch. The period of field work in-cluded ten days in Bangladesh of whichfive were spent in a village in theinterior of Jessore district.Since the investigation had to beconducted by me single-handed, I hadto move in such a way that the da aI would collect from a few personsin an ocean of ten million would ne-vertheless make some sense with refer-ence to the problem I was investigat-ing. I selected the Bongaon region ofWest Bengal for two reasons. Bongaonbeing one of the towns nearest to theborder would have received evacuieesright from the beginning of the im-migrant movement. Secondly, the libe-ration of Bangladesh would inevitablyregister its first impact in these campsimmediately close to the border.The next stage of selection left littlechoice and offered little difficulty. Idecided to work in the two camps whichwere under the relief jurisdiction ofthe Abhoy Ashram,my hosts. This solv-ed the problem regarding my bona-fides as a genuine researcher and helpedestablish rapport without any difficultywith the people in the camps. Thesecamps were Chandpara Camp Nutmbei2 and Bokchora, both located in the

Bongaon sub-division of the 24-Parga-nas district.In each of these camps I tried tolocate specific villages in Bangladesh.I had decided to concentrate on onevillage from each camp. While this waspossible in Chandpara, where I selectedthe village of Mullakandi in Faridpurdistrict, this was not possible in Bok-chora. So I did what I thought wasthe closest approximation o this, namely,I interviewed people from villages whichformed a very close cluster in theChhianobboi Cram region of Jessoredistrict.Such a mode of selection of respond-ents served a dual purpose. Not onlywould they provide information rele-vant to rural Bangladesh but also relat-ing to their status as evacuees. It maybe countered that such a mode of se-lection could have led to a biasedunderstanding of the evacuee situation.This 'problem was tackled by the tech-nique of group interviews. Detailedinterviews were conducted with theaid of an interview guide. The questionswere mostly open-ended and only suit-able cues were suggested to clarify thequestions when necessary. This left themain respondent and the group auidi-ence a lot of leexvav to consider an(lrespond consensually to the various as-pects of the problem. The process ofconsensuial understancdig also enabled

me to observe and note the variousslants to the discussion (whenever sucha discussion took place), from which aresultant emerged. It also enabled meto intervene whenever I felt that therewas some obstacle in the consensualprocess. Hence, the interviews not onlyyielded responses to questions, butenabled me tcorecord the entire processof response.

Fortuitously, the field work (whichwas conducted immediately after theliberation in the third and fourth weeksof December 1971) was happily timedat least in one very important respect- the evacuees spoke frankly and freelyon several topics about which at anyother time they would have felt inhi-bited.Finally, the limitations of an explo-ratory study should not be underesti-mated. I had not gone to the fieldpreparedl to study a problem whichhad been worked out fully in termsof its theoretical implications. I didnot have any clear anticipations of thekind of sociologically relevant empiri-cal reality that I was likely to encount-er. Hence it was like visiting an un-charted field.

THE GUESiOf the two camps that I studied I

was able to do a base-line survey only365


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March 2, 1974 ECONOMIC AND POLITIGAL WEEKLYTABLE 1: PATTERN OF EMIGRATION OFTHE EVACUEES ENCAMPED IN CHAND-PARA 2 AS ON DECEMBER 20, 1971District Villages TownsJessore 33 2Khulna 35 -Faridpur 14 2Barisal 6 1Kushtia - 1Total 88 6for Chandpara 2 camp with the helpof one of the camp inmates. Chand-para had evacuees from five districtsof East Bengal - Jessore, Khulna,Faridpur, Barisal and Kushtia - cover-ing a relatively wide area in what isnow Bangladesh. These evacuees camefrom as many as 88 villages and sixtowns (see Table 1).Assuming that the relatively better-off immigrants would have either stayedwith their kdnsmen and friends or im-provised their own shelters at placeshaving better advantage, the economiccondition of the campers, we canreasonably accept, represented, by andlarge, the poorer strata of the immigrantpopulation.However, how representative suchdata would be of the respective regionsis a matter of conjecture. It is certainlynot a representative samnpleof the vil-lages/towns from where Chandparacampers came, nor does it includeMuslim inhabitants of the same regions.And yet perhaps some knowledge ofthe socio-economic background of theevacuees in this camp is not altogetherirrelevant.Table 2 shows that an oveiwhelm-ingly large percentage of the Chand-para campers owned some land of theirown (90.1 per cent). Of those who ownedland of their own, again an overwlhelm-ingly large percentage were ownercultivators or owner cultivators-cum-shareeroppers (90.7 per cent). Only 9.3per cent were either in a position togive land for sharecropping or werecompelled to do so. Nearly 69.3 percent of those who owned land, ownedand/or cultivated more than one acre.The pattern of landownership doesnot necessarily indicate the real econo-mic status of the group. For, quite afew in addition to owning land (for noland at all), engaged in petty andmedium scale rural-based trade andbusiness. Indirect evidence indicatingthis was adduced from statements oflosses incurred as a consequence oflooting of shops (see Table 3).At least 16.4 per cent of thea-pers

in Chandpara had engaged in some kindof trade or commerce. 85.6 per centof these traders have been owners and/or cultivators of land upto five acres.Hence it would appear that there wasa tendency amongst these small land-owners to supplement their inbcomebytrade.A glance at the distribution of cattlewealth clearly indicates that a verylarge percentage of those who posses-sed land also owned some cattle (79.4per cent) and that the cattle wealthincreased along with an increase inlandownership and/or cultivation.

The point I am trying to pursue issimply that the evacuees in the campshad strong rural roots and most ofthem had some economic stake whichthey had left behind. At the level ofqualitative assessment, the same im-pression was gathered for both thecamps. If we add to the above indi-cators the fact that these regions inBangladesh are rich in numerous varie-ties of fruits and vegetables, and infish and poultry, some idea of the eco-fiomic background of the people I metcan be understood.

Whatever the reliability of the datafor the regions of Jessore and Khulna,I for one would be extremely cuiriousto know the pattern of landholdingsamong the Muslim ancdHindu cornmu-nities in the overall landownership pat-tern of the twoi districts in general.More specifically, I would suspect that

the economic status of Hindus in termsof landownership, especially in Hindupopulated areas, was higher than thatof the Muslims.Another point that I would like tomention is that all the evacuees in thesetwo camps were Hindus. There wasnot a single Muslim family in the twocamps with a total population of 17,500.The camp populations were almostwholly scheduled caste, the largestnumber were Namasudras followed byRishis and Pods.

UPROOTMENTI shall confine myself to the patternof uprootment in the two regions ofEast Bengal, namely the Manirampur-Abhoynagar region of Jessore and theGopalgunj region of Faridpur. The des-cription that follows is a reconstruction

of events reported by the interviewees.The more general details will perhapsfind corroboration from informationculled from other media of communi-cation, whilst for the more specific de-tails of locale and region, we have torely on the statements of the inter-viewees. However, there was a remark-able amount of consistency regardingthese details in separate group inter-views, which leads to an increasedcredibility of the information collected.It will be recalled that in the Jessoreregion the Pakistan army met with un-expected resistance, keeping it confinedin the cantonment for three days fromMarch 26, 1971. Between March

TABLE 2: PATTERN OF LANDOWNERSHIP AND CULTIVATION IN EAST BENGAL OFTHE EVACUEES IN CHANDPARA 2. (numbers)

Land Own Land Own Land Own Land Total+ Give + Do ShareLand for CroppingShare Crop-ping(PerUpto cent)

1 acre 106 - - 106(30.7)More than1 and upto2 acres 62 2 8 72 (20.8)More than2 and upto5 acres 89 15 20 124 (35.9)More than5 adn upto10 acres 16 10 7 33 (9.6)More than10 and upto15 acres 3 1 - 4 (1.2)More than15 acres 2 4 - 6(1.8)Total 278 32 35 345(per cent) (80.6) (9.3) (10.1) (100)No land, no cultivation 34Grand Total 379

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY March 2, 197A1TAixLE 3: STA1-EMENTlS CLAIMING LosSES SUS1AINED DUE 10o LOOTING OFSI-IOPS, By LANDO(W,7NERSHIP (numbers)

Land Shops Looted of the AmnountofRs 1)00- 501- 1001- 2001- 3000+ Total500 1000 2000 3000(per-

c'enlt)No land(N =34) 1 2 - 1 1 5 (8.2)Upto 1 acre(N (106) 3 3 6 5 5 22(35.5)More than 1awll Upto 2 acres(N=72) 2 1 2 3 10 (16.1)More than 2all(1 Upto 5 acires(N= 124) 1 1 8 1 5 16 (25.8)More than 5andI Upto 10 acr-es(N 33) 1 - - 1 6 8 (12.8)More than 10aii(l Upto 15 acires(N = 4)More than1.5 acires(N=6) - _I _ _ 1 1(1.6)Total 8 7 16 11 20 62(per Cent) (12.8) (11.3) (25.8) (17.8) (32.3) (100)

(Total N'=379)7 and 24, the nationalist movement wasso intense that black flags flutteredfrom almost all housetops in Jessore.When the East Pakistan Rifles andEast Bengal Regiment iuittinied(onMarch 25 and reversed the directionof their guns, the Pakistan army wastruly perplexed by the massive popui-lar support against it. Almost all Ben-galis, Hindus and Muslims alike, ralliedround the Bengali soldiers and othervolunteers and contributed generouslywith mainly cooked food, fruits andeggs. A nationalist suib-divisional offi-cer summoned the people of the regionto join in the liberation struiggle. Theresponse was heartening and since thearea had a large Hindu poptulation,thegroup which banded round himiicon-consisted of a large proportion ofHindus. The 'Bibaril* Mtuslimsonitheoutskirts of Jessore anid inside the toNvn,whose role had been identified asagainst the nationalist mnovement, fella prey to the frenzied violence of thisliberation group. It seems many BihariMutslim faimiilies had to pay wvith theirlives for hiaving identified with thePakistanii authorities.

This event is being isolated andsimplified for the purposes of thisanalysis witlh a view to understanding

All non-Bernali Mtuslims are covere(d1w) this blanket appellation. Ifow-everi, it is truie that most 'Bihari'Mtislimis we're from the state of Biharin Idclia.

the massive influx of IHindu refugeesinto India. For, soon after the armyr-egainied omplete suipremnacy,he oh-jective of flushing out the Hindusbecame a definite policy of the officialmachinery, the Bihari Muslims playinga dominant role in it. It was widelycirculated in that region that Hindushad killed Muslims in large numbersand this propaganda caught up withthe Bengali Muslims as well, especiallythe more fanatical elements. It is inthe context of this backdrop of eventsthat we have to understand the uproot-ment of Hindus, at least from theJessore region.I must give a brief description ofof the two regions of Jessore and Copal-ganj. The district of Jessore is clha-racterised by a number of tlhicklypopulated Hindu pockets. ChchianobboiCram (literally, "Ninety-Six Villages")and "Egaro Khan" (literally, "Elevenin Number") are two such pockets.They are supposed to be clusters of96 and 11 villages, respectively with aHindu population only. That is wlhythese areas, particularly the forlmer,had acquired appellations like "Clhcbot-to Hindustan" (Little Hindustan) and"Pakistaner Hindustan" (Pakistan'sHindustan). However, on the outskirtsof ChchianobboiGram there are villageswith mixed populations of Hindtis andMuslims. In contrast, the Gopalganjregion in the district of Faridpur, has

a clearly mixed population. But sinceSheikh Mujibur Rahman's village is inthe Gopalganj region, it is an AwamiLeague stronghold.Having declared martial law, thestate legitimised its use of force tocontrol the 'disruptive' elements of thestate. By barring the majority party(Awami League) and characterising itsleadership as traitors, it could convictany of them on charges of treason. Thisthrew the Awami League orgariisationinto complete disarray. Subsequently,the other nationalist parties, the Na-tional Awami Party (Bhashani group)and the National Awami Party (Muzaf-fer group) also had to operate undercover. Sweeping powers were givento the army and the civil authorities touse force as they deemed fit. Theopportunity was not lost to use theHindus as scapegoats for rationalisa-tions of cdeviantbehaviour of the Muis-lim Bengalis. Hinduis were projectedas the corrtupting influience and theAwami League as their prey, for bothhad the objective of' destroying Pakis-tan. Such an ideology found favourwith the dominant fanatic minoritieseverywhere, who having lost thebattle of the ballot, were happily poisedfor the battle of bullets.It is In the context of these swiftlymoving political events, that the exodusof the Hindus from Chchianobboi Gramhasto be perceived. It is interesting tonote that Chchianobboi Gram itself did-ot face the ordeal of mass killingsor abductions; rather the Hindutis onthe fringe villages set the alarm. Ittestifies to the high level of integrationof such a large population, that theywere able to take decisions about theentire cluster of 96 villages with apopulation estimated at nearly 1.4million. Several meetings were heldin Mashihati, Sundali and Panchbariaschoo(ls, where the leaders of theIHindui ommunity got together, assessedthe developments, and deliberatedluponpossible courses of action. They ruledout any collective resistance as theyknew that to challenge the might ofthe army with an unarmed populationwould be an exercise in futility. Whenthe fringe market of Dhakuria waslooted and burnt, and the houses ofthe Hindus of Champakona looted forthe second time in quick succession,that the Hindus from the adjoiningareas came into Chchianobboi Cram.And when even the . well-meaningMuslim neighbours expressed inabilityto give them any security or moral

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March 2, 1974 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLYsupport because of danger to themselveson that account, the Hindu leadersdecided that everyone would leave onthe same day. It seems likely that theanticipated wrath of the kinsmen ofthe Bihari Muslim;s killed in Jessoreweighed heavily on their minds. Thussometime around the first or secondweek of April 1971 (presumably the5th) began the four column deep, eightmile long, exodus with every fanmilytaking whatever it could at the shortestnotice imaginable.Many evacuees testify tlhat therewere sympathetic Muslim Bengalis inthe fringe villagyesand all along theflight line, some of whom even shedtears at their plight, helplessly witness-ing a tragedv of such dimensions. Manysuch Muslims provided shelter andgave them security during their flight.However, the evacuees, without excep-tion, were at a complete loss to explainthe behaviouir of many Muslim Ben-gali neighbours, with whom their rela-tions had always been cordial, indulg-ing in indiscriminate loot of whateverthey could lay their hands on, fromcattle to cooking utensils to metalcrockery. The more discreet vied witheach other to assume charge of theproperty during the absence of theowner-friend neighbour. This appearedto have been a universal phenomenon.(The exodus must have had a tremendousdemonstration effect both on those whowanted the country to be rid ofHindus, and on the Hindus themselves.)

The flight Xwas characterised bystray incidents of anti-social elernentstrying to loot or abduct women. Thatis why the women were put in themiddle columns flanked on both sidesby males. A number of volunteers,youths from the Awami League andschool teachers, served as Pathachalaks(guides). They rendered invaluableservice to the scared refugees. In thishuman flood, husbands got separatedfrom wives, and parents lost track ofchildren, but the evacuees took care ofsuch problems and the volunteers triedto be of help in such matters.At a place called Baghachora, theyhad their first encounter Nvith thenewly constituted Peace Committeewhich had set up a picket there. ThleCommittee collected Re oine, per head,Rs five per bicycle and Rs ten perbullock cart, and disarmed theni ofanything with the remotest suggestionof lethal value, including agriculturi.alimplements and bamboo staffs.The four day flight covering about

TABLE 4: DLisTRIBUTION OF CATTLE WEALTHI AMONG TIHE EVACUEES OFCHANDPARA 2

Land Cattle (in units*)l-2-- '2-4 4+ Total

(percent)Upto 1 acreIN= 106) 45 15 2 62 (22.6)1-2(N = 72) 45 15 1 61 (22.3)2-5(N= 124) 45 46 21 112 (40.9)5-10(N =33) 10 13 7 30 (10-9)

(N=4) 1 2 3 (1.1)15? (-0N=6) 2 4 6(22)Total 145 92 37 274(per cent) (52.9) (33.6) (13.5) (100)* Cow or bUlflock or 3 goats=1 uinit. C'alf = i' unit.36 miles on foot, was not a direction-less movement of the masses. Therewas always a group of leaders decidingthe suitability of halting points, arrang-ing with the local leaders for the secu-rity of tlhe emigrants, and providingrelief to persons who needed it, to theextent that this was possible.WVhilehe retaliation in jessore wasswift and the evacuation wholesale andabrupt, the Copalgani region being anAwami League stronghold and becauseof its defensible position, did not faceany intervention for some time. T'heMukti Bahini (Liberation Army) hadestablished a training centre and waspreparing for -a showdown with thePakistan army. The fear that the armyreprisals on them would be all the moresevere due to the hospitality accordedtd the Mukti Bahini, prompted someMuslim Bengali elders to meet theMtislim Leagtue leacder (also a Bengali)wlho had earlier suffered a crushingdefeat at the polls but who was nowenijoying the protection of the army.The leader assured them that if theywere able to remove the Mukti Bahinifrom there they would be safe or elsedanger was imminent. The Mukti Ba-hini iTn deference to the wishes of thepeople, withdrew to some unknownplace. This was to let loose a strategyof terrorism.In the first week of May, the armnymade its first appearance. The soldierscame on a gunboat, stationed it atManikda station at three am and thenmarched on to Gopalgani at seven a m(a distance of one mile), looted thebank, destroyed the Awami Leagueoffices and set fire to the houses of theparty supporters. They burnt the near-by Boltola Hat (biweekly market), se-

ven miles from. Gopalganj. Thereafter,they split into small grouipsof ten andvisited nearby villages, shooting, andburning houses indiscriminately.The visits of gunboats and the in-discriminate shooting in which Hinduatid Awami League settlements werethe favourite targets, became a frequentoccuirrence. For instance, the people ofMullalkandi had to leave their villageby eight anii for the paddy fields withtheir women and children and withfood for the day. They kept themsel-ves submerged under paddy standing

3 feet high, in knee-deep mud water,and returned homneonly after dusk.They would then hold a meeting withthe village leadership and take stockof the situation. They kept on playingthis terrifying hide-and-seek game fora fortnight. It was only when theneighbouring Muslims of Nijra villageexpressed helplessness in giving themsecurity and some of them turnedRazakars and directed the army tovillages and homes which had to bedestroyed, and when the neighbouiringvillage of Tentulia was burnt andmachine gunned, that they decided toleave for-India - a decision made col-lectively for the entire village.They trekked 150 miles, crossingthree rivers (Madhumati, Nabogangaand Kapathakka)to reach India in tendays. Once again the same patternof looting by the Muslims of the neigh-bouring village(s) was reported.The central point to be noted is thatthe uprootment of the Hindus was notsporadic. The decision to emigrate wascollective, taken by the leadership of

the Hindu community. This decision,again, was taken only when the Mus-368


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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WIEKLY March 2, 1974lim comnmunitywas compelled to de-link its ties or comnmon social bondswith the Hindus. This observation ac-quires added importance in view oftne fact that in the case of at least onie-village that I visited, where Hindu-Muslim ties were strong, the villagetide(d over the stori in spite of similarkinds of terrorism by the Razakars andthe armny. Also there were many in-stances of Hindus in predominantlyMuslim villages remaining undisturbed.This gives rise to certain basic ques-

tions like: (a) Is such a delinkingofties between the two commnunitiesresultonlyof the state'scoercivepower,and so is the case mentioned aboveexceptional? (b) Do these happen-ings also providea basis for studyingthe natureof social integrationbetweenthe two communities?Finally,it is clear that the policy ofthe martial aw governmentwas to up-ioot the Hindus, not to eliminate orexterminatehem,andin this they seern-ed to have succeededadmirably.

However, it needs to be underscoredthat my respondents were all Hindusand their manner of uprootment is onlyrelevant to two small regions. It doesnot include the situation faced by theuprooted Muslims, nor does it includethe Bengali Muslim - Bengali Hinduinteraction in contexts different fromthose described above. Therefore cau-tion should be exercised not to extendthe generalisations beyond the boun-daries of this study.(To be Continued)

O n 'Welfarismn v s 'RadicalismX i n PlanningPranab K Bardhan

In a polity like ours, the planner cannot be a mere technical adviser. He is an integral part ofthe,

political process. In his capacity as a planner, he has two basic options. One is the easy way out ofessentially playing the game as the politicians want hin to and of providing: them the opportunity to wraptheir designs with the respectability of his technical expertise. The other option is ultimately that ofexposure.The planner can translate the radical slogans of the political lead.ership into concrete programmes,sharply differentiate them from assorted gimmicks (like nationalisation), leave little scope for endogenousfailures to be blamed on weather gods, Arab sheikhs or CIA agents, and in general spell out the hardchoices and unpleasant policy implications in clear corcrete details easily recognisable by the public, sothat the next time around it is slightly more difficutltfor the leaders to get away with the slogans, or tounanimously approve of the Plan in the party or in caNnet meetings and -then merrily go about flouting itspriorities when it comes to action on detailed programmes.

Such a planner's tenure may be necessarily brief, but he should uttilise this time towards buildingpressure groups for the constituency of the uzzorganisedpoor. Effective redistribution cannot come fromvoluntary abdication by the top, it has to be bargained for, and, if ner,essary, grabbed by the bottom.There is no substitute for the countervailing power of massive organisatikn of the poor.On the long and arduous road towards that go.7l, the planner's mc y only be a didactic role, raisingthe level of public edtcation and consciousness and improving the ability of the poor to see through theempty slogans dished out by the rich.

TIHE coldl days of Decemnber nd Janii-ary in Delhi this year became particular-ly bitter as one sadly watched the bizarreantics and rituals of the cannibalistictribe of economists and assortedjournalists over the Draft Fifth Five-Year Plan. The level of public discussionreached an all-time low. One couldcriticise the Plan only at the risk of in-viting volleys of slander from the pressof the ruling party and of its variouslackeys. Agents of MacNamara orother supernational (or 'supernatural)authorities wetreunearthed and charact-ers were merrily assassinatedaccompani-lackeys. Agents of McNamara orsocialism. While the critics of thePlan were mostly at the receiving endof the vicious public attacks, they in turnwere often blaming the planners for themanuirous failures of the other branchesof the government. None of them wasprepared to provide a fully workecl-out

anidviable alternative schemneand therewere some wvho,wvhile being quitegenerous in their admiration for somneof the earlier Plans and their architects,w-ere indiscriminately miaking unchari-tal)le remarksabout a Plan wvhichn itsbasic structure is not all that differentfrom those earlier Plans.If one brushes asidle all the frothyrhetoric, the venom of personal animosi-ties and the mumbo-jumbo of more-socialist-than-thou commitments, onewould find that there are a few substan-tive issues regarding the basic approach.to redistributive planning which needmulch more serious debate. One such.isstie relates to the desirability andifeasibility of redistribution through inas-sive programmes of direct transfers tothe poor in the form of provisions ofessential consumer goods (public and.private), welfare services and mainlyernployinent-gencrating public projects.

Those wvho support such transfer pro-grammes as a crucial part of whatshould be the l)asic strategy of planningare essentially extending the liberal-Fabian idea of a Welfare State in thecontext of a very poor country likeours; fre(luently they find allies in theadvocates of Gandhian programmes ofruiraldevelopment. Needless to say, thesupporters of these programmes encom-pass a much larger set of people thanthose adhering to liberal or Gandhianideas of welfare socialism. As oppos-ed to these ideas stands the currentplanning orthodoxy in India by whichthe steel-cement-fertiliser-power-trans-port comiiplexorms the core of thePlan and various welfare and essentiallyemiploymiient-genieratingrogrammes re-main at the periphery. Both sidesemphasise the need for curbing luxuryconstumnptionnd both are by and largeagreedl on the prior political postulates

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The Great Migration of 1971 I Exodus