The Great enterpriseSovereignty and Historiography

in Modern Korea

Henry H. em

The GreaT enTerprise

AsiA-­PAcific Culture, Politics, and Society

Editors:­Rey­Chow,­Michael­Dutton,­H.­D.­Harootunian,­­and­Rosalind­C.­Morris

The

Great enterpriseSovereignty and Historiography

in Modern Korea

Henry H. em

Duke universiTy press

Durham anD LonDon

2013

© 2013 Duke universiTy press

All rights reservedPrinted in the United States of America on acid- free paper ♾Designed by C. H. WestmorelandTypeset in Whitman with Franklin Gothic display by Tseng Information Systems, Inc.Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication DataEm, Henry.The great enterprise : sovereignty and historiography in modern Korea / Henry H. Em.p. cm.—(Asia-Pacific)Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 978-0-8223-5357-7 (cloth : alk. paper)ISBN 978-0-8223-5372-0 (pbk. : alk. paper)1. Korea—Historiography. 2. Sovereignty. 3. International relations. I. Title. II. Series: Asia-Pacific.DS905.7.E44 2013951.90072—dc232012033723

이 저서는­2007년도 정부(교육과학기술부)의 재원으로

한국학중앙연구원의 지원을 받아 수행된 연구임(Aks-­2007-­cd-­4001)This­work­was­published­with­a­publication­subsidy­awarded­by­the­­Academy­of­Korean­Studies­Grant,­which­is­funded­by­the­Korean­­government­(MOEHRd,­Basic­Research­Fund).

For Sue K. Em, Mike M. Em, Noh Ock- shin, and Oh Jae- shik

ConTenTs

Acknowledgments ix

Introduction 1

PARt­i.­Sovereignty­ 1.­Sovereignty­and­Imperialism 21­ 2.­Imperialism­and­Nationalism 53

PARt­ii.­History Writing­ 3.­Nationalizing­Korea’s­Past 87­ 4.­Universalizing­Korea’s­Past 114­ 5.­Divided­Sovereignty­and­South­Korean­Historiography 138

Appendix 1. Names and Vital Dates 161Appendix 2. Character List 165Notes 171Bibliography 229Index 247

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This­book­has­taken­a­long­time­to­write,­and­over­the­years­it­has­evolved­in­directions­I­did­not­foresee.­After­an­initial­effort­at­historicizing­Korean­nationalism­and­nationalist­historiography,­it­became­clear­to­me­that­my­study­of­modern­Korean­historiography­would­have­to­provide­a­more­com-prehensive­account­of­the­relationship­between­imperialism­and­national-ism.­That­realization­led­me­to­focus­on­sovereignty­and­the­sovereign­sub-ject­(chuch’e)­as­concepts­and­associated­practices­that­were­transformed­by­Euro-­American­imperialism.­It­took­a­long­time­to­figure­out­how­sover-eignty,­and­the­assumed­equality­that­one­gains­by­becoming­“sovereign,”­became­as­foundational­as­the­concept­of­nation­(minjok)­to­the­project­of­modernity­and­history­writing­in­Korea.­ In­the­early­1980s,­just­out­of­college,­I­spent­nine­months­in­the­Phil-ippines­working­on­human­rights­issues.­It­was­there­that­I­received­my­education­in­anti-­imperialist­revolutionary­movements.­Several­years­later,­from­another­eighteen­months­working­on­human­rights­and­labor­issues­at­ the­Urban­ Industrial­ Mission­ in­ Inchŏn,­South­Korea,­ I­ learned­how­the­experience­of­partition­and­the­Korean­War­continue­to­reverberate­powerfully­for­so­many.­Those­experiences­also­taught­me­that­the­sense­of­individual­agency­emerges­from­communities­of­solidarity.­I­am­grateful­to­Patricia­Patterson­and­Michael­Hahm­for­those­life-­changing­experiences.­ I­could­not­have­imagined­a­book­project­like­this­without­the­training­I­received­from­my­teachers­at­the­University­of­Chicago.­Starting­as­an­undergraduate,­I­learned­from­Tetsuo­Najita­and­Harry­Harootunian­how­historians­can­and­should­pose­questions­about­ideas­that­seem­natural­and­commonsensical.­I­am­grateful­to­Tets­and­Harry­for­turning­my­interests­to­history­and­to­critical­modes­of­history­writing.­A­graduate­seminar­on­nationalism­taught­by­Prasenjit­Duara­shaped­my­early­work­on­national-ism­and­nationalist­historiography.­My­greatest­debt­is­to­Bruce­Cumings,­my­friend­and­teacher,­whose­scholarship­and­political­stance­have­inspired­my­work­over­these­many­years.

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­ I­first­presented­my­work­on­nationalism­and­nationalist­historiography­at­a­conference­organized­by­Gi-­Wook­Shin­and­Michael­Robinson.­That­was­an­important­conference­for­me,­and­in­the­course­of­preparing­my­article­for­their­edited­volume,­Colonial Modernity in Korea,­I­was­forced­to­grapple­with­myriad­questions­regarding­the­modernity­of­the­nation­form.­John­Duncan,­my­friend,­colleague,­and­mentor­at­uclA,­willingly­engaged­me­in­many­hours­of­conversation­about­Korean­history­and­historiogra-phy.­John­helped­me­to­sharpen­my­argument,­and­I­remain­deeply­grateful­for­his­incomparable­generosity.­ In­the­early­1990s,­Choi­Jang-­jip­introduced­me­to­the­debates­over­his-tory­ following­ liberation­ in­1945.­My­debts­to­Professor­Choi­continued­when­I­returned­to­Korea­as­a­Fulbright­Senior­Scholar,­and­again­in­2007–8,­when­I­taught­in­the­Department­of­Korean­History­at­Korea­Univer-sity.­It­was­with­his­support­that­I­was­able­to­organize­an­international­conference­on­the­colonial­period,­affording­me­the­opportunity­to­learn­from­a­remarkable­group­of­scholars­working­on­the­colonial­period,­in-cluding­Micah­Auerback,­Takashi­Fujitani,­Todd­Henry,­Ken­Kawashima,­Helen­Lee,­Jinhee­Lee,­John­Lie,­Serk­bae­Suh,­Jun­Uchida,­Janet­Poole,­and­Theodore­Jun­Yoo.­I­am­grateful­to­the­many­colleagues­at­Korea­Uni-versity­from­whom­I­learned­a­great­deal,­especially­Professors­Cho­Kwang­and­Kang­Man-­gil,­who­allowed­me­to­sit­in­on­their­lectures­and­seminars­on­Korean­historiography.­ In­1998­Kim­Dong-­choon­invited­me­to­present­my­work­on­Sin­Ch’ae-­ho­and­postnationalism­at­Yŏksa­munje­yŏn’guso.­That­provided­the­occasion­for­conversations­over­the­years­with­Korean­historians­of­my­generation,­especially­Park­Chan-­seung.­ In­2000­Alain­Delissen­ invited­me­to­Paris­to­spend­a­month­at­the­Centre­de­Recherches­sur­la­Corée,­EHEss.­I­am­grateful­to­Alain­and­Koen­de­Ceuster­for­their­comments­and­questions­on­the­papers­I­presented­on­Sin­Ch’ae-­ho­and­Paek­Nam-­un.­In­2007,­as­part­of­the­Oxford­History­of­Historical­Writing­project,­Axel­Schneider­invited­me­to­a­conference­at­Leiden­University­on­the­writing­of­history­in­twentieth-­century­East­Asia.­That­provided­the­occasion­for­me­to­map­out­certain­trajectories­in­history­writing­in­modern­Korea.­In­2009­Jae-­Jung­Suh­invited­me­to­sAis-­Johns­Hopkins­University­for­a­workshop­on­my­book­manuscript.­As­the­invited­respondent,­Stefan­Tanaka­provided­valuable­comments­and­counsel.­In­2010­Andre­Schmid­invited­me­to­the­University­of­Toronto­for­another­workshop,­and­I­received­very­helpful­

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comments­from­Janet­Poole­and­Ken­Kawashima.­Andre­shares­my­interest­in­Korean­historiography,­and­his­careful­reading­and­critique­of­my­manu-script­were­immensely­helpful.­ I­would­ like­ to­ thank­ the­Academy­of­Korean­Studies­ for­providing­a­publication­subsidy.­None­of­the­chapters­in­this­book­is­a­reprint­of­earlier­publications,­but­materials­from­earlier­publications­have­been­incorpo-rated­ into­ various­ chapters.­ Those­ earlier­ publications­ include­ “‘Over-coming’­Korea’s­Division:­Narrative­Strategies­in­Recent­South­Korean­His-toriography,”­positions: east asia cultures critique­1,­no.­2­(1993);­“Minjok­as­a­Modern­and­Democratic­Construct:­Sin­Ch’ae-­ho’s­Historiography,”­Colo-nial Modernity in Korea,­ed.­Gi-­Wook­Shin­and­Michael­E.­Robinson­(Cam-bridge:­Harvard­University­Asia­Center,­1999);­and­“Historians­and­History­Writing­in­Modern­Korea,”­Oxford History of Historical Writing:­vol.­5,­His-torical Writing Since 1945,­ed.­Axel­Schneider­and­Daniel­Woolf­(New­York:­Oxford­University­Press,­2011).­ I­am­happy­for­this­opportunity­to­acknowledge­other­friends­and­col-leagues­not­yet­mentioned­and­with­whom­I­have­worked,­who­encouraged­and­helped­me­over­the­years:­Charles­Armstrong,­Robert­Buswell,­Cho­Eun-­su,­Choe­Min,­Chungmoo­Choi,­Michael­Chwe,­Alexis­Dudden,­Han­Suk-­Jung,­Yukiko­Hanawa,­Marty­Hart-­Landsberg,­Heo­Eun,­Theodore­Q.­Hughes,­Im­Chong-­myong,­Rebecca­Karl,­Kwak­Jun-­Hyeok,­Jo­Gye-­Won,­Jung­Tae­Hern,­Elaine­Kim,­Kyung-­Hyun­Kim,­Lee­Beom-­jae,­Lee­Jin-­Han,­Lee­Jung-­Shin,­Timothy­S.­Lee,­Lydia­Liu,­Abé­Mark­Nornes,­Seung-Deuk­Oak,­Se-­Mi­Oh,­Leslie­Pincus,­Elizabeth­Shim,­Ryu­Si-­hyun,­J.­T.­Takagi,­Meredith­ Jung-­En­ Woo,­ Lisa­ Yoneyama,­ Marilyn­ Young,­ and­ Jonathan­Zwicker.­ I­could­not­have­finished­this­book­without­the­support­of­a­truly­won-derful­group­of­friends­who­read­parts­of­the­manuscript,­suggested­fur-ther­readings,­and­provided­critical­comments.­To­Christine­Hong,­Monica­Kim,­Suzy­Kim,­Namhee­Lee,­Jae-­Jung­Suh,­and­Youngju­Ryu,­thank­you.­My­editors­at­Duke­University­Press­were­adept­and­unfailingly­supportive.­Two­anonymous­readers­provided­extraordinarily­precise­and­knowledge-able­critiques.­As­for­mistakes­and­shortcomings,­those­remain­my­respon-sibility.­To­Grace­Kyoungwon­Em,­and­to­Changbin­and­Aerie,­who­grew­up­waiting­for­this­book­to­be­published,­I­can­finally­say:­it’s­done.­Thank­you­for­your­love­and­patience.­With­gratitude,­I­dedicate­this­book­to­both­Kyoungwon’s­parents­and­mine.

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In­an­essay­published­in­Tongkwang­in­September­1932,­Kim­Ki-­rim­called­on­“Miss­Korea”­to­cut­her­hair.­“Someone­once­described­the­modern­as­the­era­of­the­3S’s­(sports,­speed,­sex),­but­I­will­instead­call­the­first­thirty­years­of­our­century­ the­era­of­ the­ short­hair.­As­ typified­by­ ‘Nora,’­ the­‘Bob’­ (short­haircut)­ is­ the­ultimate­ symbol­of­ liberation­and­of­women­venturing­outside.­.­.­.­Cutting­your­hair­announces­your­departure­from­that­‘harem’­to­which­you­have­been­shackled­for­thousands­of­years;­it­is­the­sign­that­you­have­come­out­under­the­blue­sky.”1­In­Kim’s­discourse­on­ modernity,­ he­ set­ aside­ the­ purportedly­ familiar­ characterization­ of­modernity­as­sports,­speed,­and­sex­to­focus­on­bobbed­hair,­feminists­as­typified­by­Henrik­Ibsen’s­Nora,­and­women­of­status­venturing­outside­in­daytime­unconstrained­by­marriage­and­motherhood.­Indeed­by­the­1930s­one­could­have­seen­in­colonial­Korea­baseball­games,­beauty­pageants,­exhibitions,­display­windows­fronting­the­new­department­stores,­street-cars,­street­lights,­and­cafés­that­enabled­crowd­watching.­Starting­about­a­decade­earlier,­Kim’s­readers­would­have­seen­and­felt­not­just­the­rapidity­of­change­in­the­physical,­spatial,­and­cultural­ordering­of­colonial­Seoul,­a­constantly­self-­negating­temporal­dynamic,­but­also­the­increasing­rate­of­change­ itself.­As­ for­ sex,­Kim­began­his­essay­by­acknowledging­ that­in­Korea­in­the­1930s­the­bob­haircut­was­still­associated­with­(feminine)­eroticism,­along­with­bright­red­ lipstick,­ the­side­glance­(kyŏnnuntchil),­and­other­vulgar­practices­that­belonged­to­the­world­of­café­waitresses­and­dance­girls­in­The Threepenny Opera.2­He­imagined­that­if­he­were­to­sug-gest­to­a­coed,­“Go­on,­why­don’t­you­cut­your­hair?,”­she­might­turn­red­in­the­face,­furious,­as­though­he­had­damaged­her­dignity.­ In­addressing­young­Korean­women­(“Miss­Korea”),­Kim­tried­to­substi-tute­those­still­prevalent­associations­by­drawing­contrasts­he­defined­in­terms­of­temporality­and­civilization­as­measured­by­the­status­of­women:­women­shackled­for­past­millennia­in­contrast­to­liberated­women­of­the­twentieth­ century.­ He­ granted­ that­ their­ neatly­ braided­ hair­ was,­ well,­neat.­But­tied­to­that­neatly­braided­hair­hung­“the­dreams­of­a­backward­

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feudal­era.”­He­wanted­“Miss­Korea”­to­look­at­her­sisters­in­China­who­had­kicked­away­the­barbaric­custom­of­foot­binding:­Look­at­their­strong­legs­running­to­the­anti-­imperialist­front­(“t’ado­XXjuŭi­ro­Xsŏn­ŭl­talryŏ”).3­He­urged­“Miss­Korea”­to­look­at­their­short­hair,­and­he­ended­his­essay­with­the­question,­“Deep­in­your­heart,­don’t­you­want­to­defend­the­Bob­cut­that­is­so­vilified?”­By­titling­his­essay­“‘Miss­Korea’­Cut­Your­Hair,”­Kim­was­able­to­address­young­Korean­women­as­if­they­stood­on­the­world’s­stage,­on­view­as­in­beauty­pageants­that­are­consciously­organized­for­both­national­and­international­audiences.­His­agitation­for­Korean­women­to­liberate­themselves­and­to­participate­in­(colonial­Korea’s)­social­and­politi-cal­life,­offered­in­a­pedagogic­tone­and­without­reference­to­patriarchy,­was­a­common­rhetorical­strategy­for­male­writers­who­were­asked,­fre-quently,­to­write­about­women­and­women’s­issues­in­colonial­Korea­in­the­late­1920s­and­early­1930s.­ Published­without­attribution,­Kim­Ki-­rim’s­essay­was­the­third­of­three­essays­ on­ Korean­ women­ and­ short­ hair,­ coming­ after­ an­ essay­ by­ Kim­Hwal-­lan,­a­professor­and­vice­principal­at­Ewha­(Women’s)­College,­and­a­second­essay­by­“K.­Y.,”­a­student­at­“X­Women’s­School”­who­had­cut­her­hair.­Until­1939­Ewha­College­was­the­only­women’s­college­in­colo-nial­Korea,­and­in­her­essay­Kim­Hwal-­lan­noted­that­Ewha­College­had­two­or­three­students­with­short­hair.4­She­equated­short­hair­with­conve-nience­and­predicted­that­the­number­of­students­with­short­hair­would­“naturally”­increase­over­time.­Kim­Hwal-­lan,­who­had­received­her­Ph.D.­in­education­from­Columbia­University­in­1931,­let­it­be­known­that­she­neither­ encouraged­ her­ students­ from­ cutting­ their­ hair­ nor­ prevented­them­from­doing­so.­K.­Y.­had­more­to­say­in­her­essay.­She­began­with­the­declaration­that­she­had­gained­many­things­after­she­cut­her­hair.­She­noted,­however,­that­people­who­voiced­all­kinds­of­opinions­about­the­bob­haircut­did­so­only­from­a­third­person’s­perspective.­She­also­noted­that­she­could­not­shake­off­the­feeling­that­men,­whether­they­argued­for­or­against­the­bob,­continued­to­look­at­women­as­visual­objects­for­their­plea-sure­and­enjoyment.­ A­point­of­departure­for­this­book­is­Kim­Ki-­rim’s­observation­that­the­twentieth­century­was­the­era­of­the­short­haircut:­that­the­cutting­of­hair­signified­the­triumph­of­reason­over­unreason,­the­realization­of­individual­autonomy,­and­the­emergence­of­the­modern­political­subject­that­estab-lished­ the­ anti-­imperialist­ front.­ Kim­ Ki-­rim’s­ exhortation­ arose­ from­ a­

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romantic­infatuation­that­is­the­subject­of­this­book,­a­“romance­of­sov-ereignty,”­according­to­Achille­Mbembe,­that­articulates­“a­certain­idea­of­the­political,­the­community,­[and]­the­subject.”­It­was­(and­is)­a­romance­that­“rests­on­the­belief­that­the­subject­is­the­master­and­the­controlling­author­of­his­or­her­own­meaning­.­.­.­[and­on­the­belief­that]­the­exercise­of­sovereignty,­in­turn,­consists­in­society’s­capacity­for­self-­creation.”5­As­K.­Y.­observed,­sovereignty­as­pedagogy­also­sought­to­reproduce­gender,­racial,­class,­and­civilizational­hierarchies­and­was­complicit­with­power.­Still,­K.­Y.­made­it­clear­that­she­liked­her­hair­short:­“In­truth,­I­like­it.­It­was­when­I­cut­my­hair­that­I­learned­something­about­[the­power­of]­so-cial­conventions,­and­people’s­emotions­and­rationality.”6­The­general­aim­of­this­book­is­to­examine­this­truth­and­the­pleasures­that­derive­from­the­idea­of­being­sovereign,­possessing­a­subjective­will­(chuch’esŏng)­capable­of­reconstituting­life,­language,­and­labor.­This­book­examines­the­historicity­of­sovereignty­(chukwŏn),­its­complicity­with­power,­and­its­creative,­pro-ductive­capacity,­and­also­the­conventions,­rationalities,­and­subjectivities­that­sovereignty­elicited.­ Part­I­focuses­on­the­historicity­of­sovereignty:­how­sovereignty­func-tioned­as­pedagogy­for­imperialism­and­colonialism­and­how­it­became­the­paramount­signifier­for­Korea’s­modern­era,­productive­of­desire­and­sub-jectivity.­Chapter­1­examines­sovereignty­as­a­legal­concept­that­structures­the­modern­nation-­state­and­relations­between­empires­and­nation-­states.­Sovereignty­was­not­fully­articulated­by­the­Peace­of­Westphalia­and­then­extended­to­Europe’s­periphery.­The­European­conception­of­sovereignty—that­is,­equal­sovereignty—has­a­more­complicated­history.­Sovereignty­and­international­law­were­improvised­out­of­the­colonial­encounter­and­given­various­articulations­by­European­colonizers­in­conditions­of­hege-monic­contestation­with­other­colonial­powers­to­declare­who­was­sover-eign,­who­was­not,­and­why.7­That­is­to­say,­colonialism­was­central­to­the­constitution­of­sovereignty,­and­one­specific­aim­of­this­book­is­to­explore­the­historicity­of­sovereignty­in­modern­Korea­and­its­deep­complicity­with­both­Japanese­and­Euro-­American­empires­and­colonial­projects.­ As­a­history­of­historical­writing­in­modern­Korea,­part­II­examines­sov-ereignty’s­ creative,­ productive­ power,­ calling­ on­ Korean­ historians­ who­would­privilege­and­deploy,­for­their­own­purposes,­the­concept­of­equal­sovereignty­as­the­condition­for­rewriting­Korea’s­past.­Korean­historians­did­the­imagining,­but­it­was­sovereignty­that­made­it­possible­to­imagine­

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the­Korean­ethnic­nation­(minjok)­and­to­imagine­it­as­a­self-­same­unity­that­evolved­(or­developed)­through­linear­time.­As­nationalist­historians­ren-dered­the­ethnic­nation­as­the­sovereign­subject­(chuch’e)­of­Korean­history,­they­located­Korea­in­global­time­and­helped­create­a­democratic­logic,­lim-ited­by­national­boundaries,­that­invited­all­Koreans—male­and­female,­old­and­young,­high-­born­and­of­low­status—to­become­sovereign­subjects­of­national­history.­ To­recognize­sovereignty’s­complicity­with­imperialism­and­colonialism,­it­should­be­recalled­that­Japanese­authorities­had­forced­King­Kojong­to­issue­a­royal­decree­(tanbalryŏng)­that­ordered­all­adult­men­to­cut­off­their­topknots.8­Before­the­royal­decree­was­issued­on­December­30,­1895,­Yu­Kil-­chun,­the­home­minister,­flanked­by­Japanese­troops,­had­pressured­King­Kojong­and­the­crown­prince­to­have­their­own­topknots­cut.9­For­most­adult­men­in­late­nineteenth-­century­Korea­and­China,­the­cutting­of­hair­was­associated­with­humiliation­and­violence­against­the­body,­sev-ering­one’s­ ties­ to­parents,­ ancestors,­ and­a­civilizational­order.10­ In­ the­decades­before­and­after­the­turn­of­the­twentieth­century,­one’s­hair­and­clothes­became­intensely­visible­signs­of­political­and­cultural­allegiance.­Outraged­by­the­topknot­decree,­from­January­to­April­1896­local­literati­led­Righteous­Armies­in­armed­insurrection­against­officials­who­enforced­the­topknot­decree.­For­the­Japanese,­ the­avowed­objectives­behind­the­topknot­order­had­to­do­with­hygiene­and­with­convenience­while­working.­In­the­royal­decree,­however,­published­by­the­Home­Office,­King­Kojong­associated­topknot­cutting­with­the­goal­of­achieving­equal­standing­in­the­nation-­state­system:­“We,­ in­cutting­Our­hair,­are­setting­an­example­to­Our­subjects.­Do­you,­the­multitude,­identify­yourselves­with­Our­design,­and­cause­to­be­accomplished­the­great­enterprise­[taeŏp]­of­establishing­equality­with­the­nations­of­the­earth.”11­Cutting­the­topknot­made­mani-fest­one’s­decision­to­reject­the­“cruelty”­and­“backwardness”­that­differen-tiated­Korea­from­the­civilized­nations­of­the­world.­The­discarded­topknot­signaled­a­severing­of­the­future­from­the­past,­because­the­past­could­no­longer­be­instructive­for­action­in­the­present.­The­topknot­order­was­one­among­many­acts­of­undoing­in­late­nineteenth-­century­Korea,­and­it­was­Euro-­American­imperialism,­with­sovereignty­functioning­both­as­politi-cal­power­and­police­power,­which­equated­such­acts­of­deterritorializa-tion­and­reterritorialization­with­the­great­enterprise­of­embracing­West-ern­civilization­and­attaining­equal­standing­with­other­sovereign­nations.

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­ The­great­enterprise,­to­be­carried­out­by­Koreans,­required­that­kind­of­definitive­severing­so­that­Korea­could­stand­autonomous­and­free,­as­an­equal.12­Thus­there­is­no­irony­in­the­fact­that­Japanese­authorities­had­to­force­sovereignty­on­King­Kojong.­Sovereignty­and­international­law­were­more­than­just­complicit­in­imperialist­projects.­King­Kojong’s­declaration­of­independence­from­China­on­January­7,­1895,­forced­on­him­by­Inoue­Kaoru,­laid­the­legal­basis­for­increasing­Japan’s­control­over­Korea.13­As­a­reminder­of­that­which­existed­prior­to­sovereignty­and­precolonial­his-tory,­chapter­1­explains­why­the­state-­ness­of­Chosŏn­Korea­was­not­marred­in­the­eyes­of­the­Chosŏn­scholar-­officials­by­their­monarch’s­subordinate­ritual­status­to­the­Ming­emperor­or,­by­the­eighteenth­century,­even­to­the­Qing­(Manchu)­emperor.­To­be­sure,­Ming-­Chosŏn­and­Qing-­Chosŏn­relations­were­neither­predetermined­nor­static,­and­the­notion­of­Chosŏn­Korea­as­a­model­ tributary­obscures­periods­of­ severe­ tension­and­con-flict,­for­example,­during­early­Ming-­Chosŏn­relations­(especially­between­1408­and­1433),­when­the­Chinese­imperial­court­demanded­human­trib-ute­(girls­for­the­imperial­harem­and­boys­to­be­eunuchs),­or­during­early­Qing-­Chosŏn­relations­when­Manchu­armies­twice­invaded­Korea,­in­1627­and­1636,­to­force­the­Korean­court­to­accept­vassal­status.14­The­Manchu­invasion­of­1636­was­especially­devastating,­and­submission­to­the­Qing­was­humiliating;­for­many­years­after­1636­Chosŏn­officials­kept­using­the­Ming­ calendar­ in­ internal­ documents,­ and­ they­ never­ adopted­ Manchu­clothing­or­hairstyle.­But­tribute­bought­noninterference,­and­for­much­of­its­history­Chosŏn­Korea­successfully­maintained­its­autonomy­as­well­as­trade­relations­by­way­of­this­ritually­subordinate­relationship­to­China.­Moreover,­when­relations­with­the­imperial­court­improved,­the­Chosŏn­literati­could­argue­that­it­was­Korea’s­inclusion­in­a­China-­centered­world,­and­their­own­fierce­commitment­to­the­basic­categories­that­defined­that­world­in­terms­of­inner­and­outer,­civilization­and­barbarism­(hwa­and­yi)­that­endowed­Chosŏn­with­its­distinctive­and­civilized­state-­ness.­That­is­to­say,­it­was­often­through­engagement­with­that­China-­centered­world­that­Chosŏn­scholar-­officials­imagined­Korean­civilization­(soChunghwa)­realiz-ing­its­full­potentiality,­its­cosmic­meaning.­ The­importance­and­value­for­the­Chosŏn­court­of­receiving­investiture­from­the­Ming­or­Qing­imperial­court­revolved­around­domestic­politics,­and­the­Chosŏn­court­time­and­again­displayed­a­multifaceted­persona­in­its­relations­with­China;­for­much­of­the­Chosŏn­period,­Korean­scholar-­

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officials­could­readily­acknowledge­that­a­central­facet­of­the­state-­ness­of­Chosŏn­Korea­derived­from­its­subordinate­inclusion­in­a­China-­centered­tributary­system,­and­at­the­same­time­identify­Tan’gun,­who­stood­out-side­the­Chinese­genealogy,­as­the­progenitor­of­the­Korean­state.­Korea’s­China-­centered­sovereignty­was­not­absolute­sovereignty,­and­certainly­not­equal­sovereignty.­ Its­ rituals­and­protocols­were­very­different­ from­the­rituals­and­protocols­of­post-­Westphalian­sovereignty­based­on­the­notion­of­equal,­separate,­and­indivisible­authority­and­identity.­In­the­late­nine-teenth­century,­King­Kojong’s­default­ strategy­was­ to­utilize­ to­best­ad-vantage­ the­protocols­of­ the­China-­centered­ tributary­system­as­well­as­the­protocols­of­ the­sovereignty-­based­nation-­state­system.­It­was­hege-monic­contestation—specifically­Japan’s­victory­over­China­in­the­Sino-­Japanese­War—that­provided­the­occasion­to­eliminate­this­ambiguity,­as­well­as­the­space­for­maneuver­that­ it­had­afforded.­While­Inoue­Kaoru­might­have­forced­King­Kojong’s­“declaration­of­independence,”­the­king­and­the­greater­part­of­reform-­minded­officials­should­be­seen­as­coauthors­of­the­Independence­Oath­taken­at­the­Royal­Ancestral­Temple.­Chapter­1­presents­historical­substantiation­of­ this­claim­and­prepares­ the­ground­for­discussion­of­the­relationship­between­imperialism­and­nationalism­by­looking­at­the­relationship­between­authorship­(a­claim­of­sovereignty)­and­ritual­action.­ In­the­sense­that­the­king’s­ritual­performance­on­January­7,­1895,­was­doubly­prescribed­ (not­ just­by­ ritual­manuals­dating­back­centuries­but­also­by­Inoue­Kaoru),­it­could­be­said­that­King­Kojong—as­Chosŏn­Korea’s­supreme­sacerdotal­authority,­its­monarch­and­bearer­of­the­dynastic­mis-sion­and­Heaven’s­mandate­(ch’ŏnmyŏng)—was,­and­was­not,­the­author­of­his­actions.­It­was­understood­by­all­that­only­King­Kojong’s­taking­the­Oath­before­his­ancestors­could­make­Korea’s­independence­(from­China)­inviolable.­It­is­in­that­sense­of­King­Kojong­as­coauthor­of­his­own­ritual­performance­that­chapter­2­takes­up­the­question­of­how­sovereignty­as­a­nation­form­could­be­replicated­across­the­globe,­chiefly­among­and­by­newly­emerging­bourgeoisies,­for­Benedict­Anderson­“the­first­classes­to­achieve­solidarities­on­an­essentially­imagined­basis.”15­ Chapter­2­begins­with­the­argument­that­before­the­Sino-­Japanese­War,­and­before­King­Kojong’s­declaration­of­Korea’s­“independence,”­material­and­discursive­conditions­already­existed­within­Korea­that­would­allow­for­the­dissemination­of­not­just­the­idea­of­national­sovereignty­but­also­

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the­presumption­that­recognition­of­Korea’s­sovereignty­by­the­Western­im-perial­powers­was­a­necessary­condition­for­avoiding­colonization.­Toward­this­end,­intellectuals­like­Yun­Ch’i-­ho­took­it­for­granted­that­Korea­had­to­demonstrate­commitment­to­European­civilization,­as­measured­by­spe-cific­“reforms”­of­political,­economic,­and­cultural­institutions­and­prac-tices­ (such­ as­ sumptuary­ laws),­ and­ also­ to­ participate­ in­ international­events­such­as­the­Columbian­Exposition­in­Chicago­in­1893.­The­problem,­as­Yun­saw­it,­was­that­Korea’s­commitment­to­the­great­enterprise­was­as­second-­rate­and­dismal­as­the­Korea­Exhibit,­so­much­so­that­he­found­him-self­unable­to­walk­away­from­it.­ To­the­extent­that­the­Korea­Exhibit­at­the­Columbian­Exposition­func-tioned­for­Yun­as­a­synecdoche­of­Korea’s­abjection,­it­is­possible­to­under-stand­the­sadness­as­well­as­genocidal­contempt­that­Yun­felt­at­the­sight­of­Native­Americans­in­the­American­West­congregating­around­railroad­sta-tions­along­the­Central­Pacific­Railroad:­“Indians­were­seen­at­almost­every­station.­Some­of­them­painted­their­ faces­red­and­most­had­red­or­blue­blankets­wrapped­around­their­bodies.­A­sad­and­somewhat­contemptible­sight:­sad­because­of­their­past­history,­but­contemptible­because­of­the­inability­to­improve­their­condition.­A­race­that­fails,­from­voluntary­lazi-ness­and­ignorance,­to­avail­itself­of­the­advantages­of­civilization­brought­so­close­ to­ its­reach­ isn’t­worthwhile­ to­ live.”16­Yun,­a­progenitor­of­ the­Korean­ (Christian)­ bourgeois­ class­ that­ would­ emerge­ under­ Japanese­colonial­rule,­saw­Native­Americans­in­terms­of­a­visual­regime­that­paral-leled­the­objectifying­and­disciplining­operations­of­discourses­on­“civili-zation.”­ If­Native­Americans­did­not­avail­ themselves­of­Euro-­American­civilization—if­they­voluntarily­chose­to­live­in­ignorance­and­“degraded­humanity”—then­they­did­not­deserve­to­live.­For­Yun,­the­decision­to­em-brace­Euro-­American­civilization­was,­in­itself,­proof­of­a­people’s­capacity­for­rationality­and­autonomy.­His­privileging­of­freedom,­and­ruminations­on­why­certain­populations­do­not­deserve­ to­ live,­point­ to­not­ just­ the­inclusionary­pretensions­of­liberal­theory­and­the­exclusionary­effects­of­liberal­practices,­but­also­to­liberalism’s­essential­link­to­imperialism­and­colonialism.17­His­privileging­of­ freedom­also­points­ to­ the­centrality­of­violence­in­the­constitution­of­(Christian)­liberal-­bourgeois­subjectivity­in­early­twentieth-­century­Korea­and­its­permutations­through­the­colonial­period­down­to­postcolonial­anticommunist­South­Korea.18­ It­must­be­said­that­the­violence­of­sovereignty­was­very­productive.­In­

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language,­sovereignty­as­a­form­of­command­prompted­Korean­intellectu-als,­as­writers,­historians,­and­translators,­to­produce­new­meanings­and­new­narratives­through­semantic­innovation.­In­the­translation­of­sover-eignty­in­its­nation­form,­chapter­2­focuses­on­the­unavoidable­accommo-dation­to­Euro-­American­modernity­and­on­semantic­innovation­through­both­productive­imagination­and­the­legislative­rationality­of­capitalist­sov-ereignty.19­Attention­paid­to­the­legislative­rationality­of­capitalist­sover-eignty­goes­against­the­grain­of­scholarship­that­wants­to­portray­moder-nity­and­nation­in­Korea­as­Korea’s­own­creation,­with­Korean­intellectuals­selecting,­translating,­and­thereby­creating­their­own­modernity­from­the­Western­archive.­If­that­were­the­case,­the­modernity­thus­created­would­be­sovereign­to­Korea,­dynamic,­and­ongoing:­Korea’s­modernity­as­an­incom-plete­project­that­is­both­particular­and­universal.­Historians­would­then­have­a­firm­basis­for­writing­the­history­of­Korea’s­modernity­untainted­by­imperialism­and­colonialism;­historians­need­only­take­due­account­of­the­historical­and­political­context­and­“the­limitations­of­his­time.”­This­kind­of­scholarship­(also)­emerges­from­desire­created­by­sovereignty­itself.­ In­terms­of­language,­it­was­the­translation­of­capitalist­sovereignty­in­the­late­nineteenth­century­that­produced­the­diachronic­identity­of­national­language­ (kuk’ŏ),­ discernible­ in­ the­ poetry­ (hyangga)­of­ the­ Silla­ period­down­to­the­language­of­scholar-­officials­in­late­nineteenth-­century­Seoul.­“The­Korean­language”­came­to­be­imagined­as­singular,­a­unity­even­in­its­great­variations­over­space­and­time.­In­analyzing­this­process­of­trans-lation,­in­the­literal­sense,­chapter­2­draws­attention­to­the­radical­trans-formations­in­language­and­political­economy,­transformations­that­were­overdetermined­by­the­legislative­rationality­of­capitalist­sovereignty.­One­key­example­is­the­word­for­economy­used­today­in­China,­Japan,­and­Korea:­經濟­ (C:­ jingji,­ J:­keizai,­K:­ kyŏngje).­The­ lexical­unit­ kyŏngje­was­a­ con-traction­of­kyŏngse jemin­(經世濟民):­to­govern­the­world­and­relieve­the­people.­That­is­to­say,­prior­to­the­nineteenth­century,­kyŏngje­referred­to­a­political­economy­that­was­necessarily­and­overtly­moral,­a­moral­economy­structured­on­obligation­to­the­people’s­welfare.­When­Japanese­intellectu-als­translated­economy­as­keizai,­however,­they­associated­keizai­with­pro-duction,­consumption,­and­the­wealth­of­nations,­an­intellectual­approach­that­linked­public­interest­with­competition­and­the­pursuit­of­private­gain.­With­kyŏngje­rendered­as­economy,­the­extraction­of­profit­would­appear­as­a­series­of­relations­of­exchange­rather­than­tribute­extracted­through­

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political­domination:­the­people,­as­workers­and­producers,­became­au-tonomous­and­“free”­in­their­poverty­and­propertylessness.­Like­capitalism,­then,­the­term­kyŏngje­could­(and­did)­take­a­purely­economic­form.­ In­ the­ late­ nineteenth­ century,­ Japanese­ intellectuals­ also­ created­ a­series­of­neologisms­in­the­course­of­translating­from­European­languages,­including­the­word­for­nation,­minzoku­(K:­minjok).­It­is­important­to­note­that­words­like­minjok­([ethnic]­nation)­were­incorporated­into­Korean­as­it­was­being­nationalized.­In­other­words,­the­nationalization­of­the­Korean­language­occurred­within­a­profoundly­transnational,­translingual­context.­Christian­missionaries,­ especially­Protestant­missionaries,­helped­ trans-form­the­Korean­alphabet­into­an­icon­of­Korea­and­an­icon­for­the­Korean­nation.­They­inspired­and­trained­many­prominent­Korean­linguists­and­grammarians,­including­the­brilliant­linguist­Chu­Si-­gyŏng.­Missionaries­sought­and­obtained­international­recognition­for­the­scientific­value­of­the­Korean­alphabet.­They­promoted­respect­for­and­standardization­of­the­Korean­vernacular­and­fostered­a­spirit­of­protecting­the­Korean­script.20­It­was­within­this­context­that­vernacular­Korean­written­with­King­Sejong’s­alphabet­ (created­ in­ 1443)­ was­ elevated­ to­ the­ status­ of­ national­ script­(kungmun),­while­literary­(classical)­Chinese­was­demoted­to­mere­Chinese­writing.­But­while­international­recognition­given­to­Korean­writing­might­seem­to­pay­homage­to­Korean­genius,­as­Rey­Chow­has­argued,­homage­to­the­West­has­long­been­paid­in­the­form­of­what­seems­to­be­its­opposite21:­in­this­case,­the­radical­insistence­on­kungmun­(Korean­written­vernacu-lar­as­the­national­script).­In­that­sense,­it­was­capitalist­sovereignty­that­promoted­Korea’s­distinction­from­China­and­standardization­of­language­practices­and­populations,­with­Korean­and­Koreans­constituted­as­distinct­units­that­identify­each­other.­ Although­ Japanese­ authorities­ saw­ King­ Kojong’s­ declaration­ of­ sov-ereignty­as­a­necessary­step­toward­the­imposition­of­a­protectorate­and­eventual­annexation,­to­justify­colonization­they­also­had­to­explain­why­Korea­was­never­really­sovereign­and­never­really­capable­of­maintaining­“the­sovereignty­Japan­had­obtained­for­Korea.”­Chapter­3,­which­begins­part­II­of­this­book,­shows­how,­out­of­ancient­ruins,­the­Japanese­colo-nial­state­constructed­an­explanation­for­why­colonization­was­necessary.­Soon­after­annexation­the­Japanese­colonial­state­poured­money,­expertise,­and­ concrete­ to­ restore­ Sŏkkuram,­ an­ astonishingly­ beautiful­ Buddhist­statue­seated­within­a­man-­made­stone­grotto­“discovered”­by­a­Japanese­

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mailman.­The­Japanese­colonial­state­also­restored­a­number­of­Buddhist­temples­near­Kyŏngju­and­breathlessly­extolled­Sŏkkuram­and­the­Bud-dhist­ art­ and­architecture­of­ the­Silla­period­as­ the­ “culmination­of­ the­religion­and­the­art­of­the­Orient.”22­The­pedagogic­lesson­had­to­do­with­Japan’s­self-­designated­role­as­curator­for­Asia’s­art­and­a­colonial­lesson­on­temporality.­Sŏkkuram­and­the­art­and­architecture­of­the­Silla­period­rep-resented­the­apex­of­Korean­cultural­history,­brilliant­artistic­achievements­which­stood­in­stark­contrast­to­the­squalor­of­Korea’s­present.­The­story­of­Sŏkkuram—its­creation­and­subsequent­slide­into­obscurity­and­ruin—was­the­sad­story­of­Korea:­a­beautiful­and­brilliant­cultural­past­that­was­as­much­Asian­as­Korean,­followed­by­a­long­downward­slide.­The­colonial­authorities­did­not­just­teach­Koreans­about­their­past;­they­had­to­restore­it­for­them.­ Ultimately­colonial­rule­depended­on­coercive­power:­the­power­to­sup-press­ protest­ and­ armed­ resistance.­ But­ Japanese­ colonialism­ could­ not­have­been­sustained­with­just­coercive­power.­To­establish­sufficient­hege-mony,­Japanese­colonialism­had­to­be,­above­all,­a­pedagogic­endeavor­in­which­the­colonized­would­come­to­recognize­the­relative­superiority­of­the­colonizer.­Restoring­Sŏkkuram­to­its­former­glory­was­part­of­that­peda-gogic­effort,­teaching­about­the­world­and­Korea’s­place­in­it­as­defined­by­Japan­and­the­West.­In­this­colonizing­project,­the­Japanese­colonial­state­drew­heavily­on­Euro-­American­colonial­practices.­Like­the­British­in­India­and­Americans­in­the­Philippines,­the­Japanese­allocated­money­and­exper-tise­to­carry­out­excavations­and­surveys,­to­study­Korea’s­past,­and­to­re-store­some­cultural­sites­(but­not­others)­in­order­to­establish­the­categories­and­narrative­strategies­by­which­Korea­and­Koreans­would­be­understood.­Thus­there­was­a­proliferation­of­(competing)­discourses­on­Korean­identity­that­emanated­from­the­Japanese­colonial­state­as­well­as­Korean­nationalist­intellectuals­and­organizations.­In­this­competition,­the­Japanese­colonial­state­was­more­successful­in­terms­of­producing­detailed­studies­of­Korean­art,­customs,­ language,­ religion,­and­history.23­For­ the­ Japanese­colonial­state,­ the­goal­of­transforming­colonial­Korea­for­ its­strategic­ends­went­hand­in­hand­with­the­work­of­transforming­peasants­into­Chōsenjin­(Kore-ans).­The­logic­of­its­racist­colonial­policy­compelled­the­Japanese­colonial­state­to­reconstitute­(disparate)­Korean­identities­into­a­homogeneous­Chō-senjin­that­became­both­a­bureaucratic­and­a­derogatory­classification­for­all­Koreans­regardless­of­gender,­regional­origin,­or­class­background.

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­ Contrary­ to­ conventional­ nationalist­ accounts­ which­ argue­ that­ Japa-nese­ colonial­ authorities­ pursued­ a­ consistent­ and­ systematic­ policy­ of­eradicating­Korean­identity,­we­should­see­that­the­Japanese­colonial­state­actually­endeavored­to­produce­Koreans­as­subjects,­subjects­in­the­sense­of­being­under­the­authority­of­the­Japanese­emperor­and­in­the­sense­of­having­a­separate­and­inferior­subjectivity.­This­in­turn­led­to­a­bifurcated­discourse,­because­Korean­nationalist­historians,­in­competition­with­the­Japanese­colonial­state,­were­engaged­in­the­project­of­recovering­or­pro-ducing­an­autonomous­and­sovereign­Korean­subjectivity.­Nationalist­his-torians­would­find­evidence­of­this­subjectivity­in­history,­but­in­necessarily­incomplete­or­disfigured­form;­for­nationalist­historians,­only­political­in-dependence­could­render­possible­the­full­realization­of­true­(sovereign)­Korean­subjectivity.­Although­the­power­of­the­repressive­and­ideological­apparatuses­of­the­Japanese­colonial­state­far­surpassed­that­of­the­Korean­nationalist­movement,­Korean­intellectuals­were­more­than­capable­of­en-suring­that­the­discourse­on­national­and­individual­sovereignty­remained­a­contested­field­throughout­the­colonial­period.­ I­do­not­mean­to­present­a­simple­binary­between­Korean­nationalists­and­the­Japanese­colonial­state.­The­history­outlined­in­this­book­has­to­do­with­competing­nationalisms,­and­readers­should­be­aware­that­Japanese­settlers­and­their­organizations,­although­I­do­not­discuss­them,­were­also­very­much­involved­in­producing­knowledge­about­Korea.­This­is­pointed­out­by­Jun­Uchida,­who­cautions­against­simple­identification­of­Japanese­settlers­with­the­Japanese­colonial­state.­Japanese­settlers­were­“brokers­of­ empire”­ in­ the­ sense­ that,­ as­ nonstate­ actors,­ they­ participated­ and­intervened­ in­ the­ colonial­ project­ in­ complex­ ways­ that­ complemented­but­also­complicated­ the­government-­general’s­ rule.24­Thus,­and­as­ sug-gested­by­K.­Y.’s­and­Kim­Ki-­rim’s­essays­on­the­bob,­any­“Korean”­subjec-tivity­created­under­such­conditions­had­to­assume­“a­world­of­synchronic­temporality”—that­ is,­baseball­games,­beauty­pageants,­exhibitions,­dis-play­windows­in­the­new­department­stores,­as­well­as­history­writing,­all­understood­in­synchronic­“world”­time,­and­subjectivity­itself­constituted­by­“historical­identification­and­spatial­proximity.”25­ Colonial­ historians,­ for­ their­ part,­ represented­ Japan’s­ annexation­ of­Korea­also­as­a­restoration.­Based­on­his­reading­of­the­eighth-­century­texts­Kojiki­and­Nihon shoki,­Kume­Kunitake­suggested­that­Japan­before­Jinmu­(the­mythical­first­emperor)­was­a­thalassocracy­encompassing­Kyūshū,­the­

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Korean­peninsula,­and­southeastern­China.26­Such­narratives­would­de-pict­colonization­of­Korea­as­the­restoration­of­Japanese­rule,­Japan­having­ruled­southern­Korea­in­ancient­times.­Colonial­historians­also­suggested­that­Japanese­and­Koreans­were­descended­from­common­ancestors.­Such­narratives,­however,­created­anxiety­for­colonialists­as­well­as­anticolonial­Korean­nationalists,­an­anxiety­over­sameness­or­lack­of­essential­differ-ence­ between­ colonizer­ and­ colonized.­ Colonialist­ historiography­ came­into­its­fullness­with­narrative­strategies­that­could­affirm­sameness­while­asserting­ colonial­ difference­ and­ colonial­ hierarchy,­ which­ were­ main-tained­through­narratives­about­absence,­lack,­and­temporality.­Colonial-ist­historiography­argued­that­external­forces—Chinese,­Manchurian,­and­Japanese—had­determined­Korea’s­historical­development­from­its­very­beginnings.­ Factionalism­ was­ deeply­ ingrained­ in­ the­ Korean­ political­culture,­as­evidenced­by­successive­purges­of­literati­and­factional­strife­during­the­Chosŏn­period,­preventing­the­emergence­of­a­unified­politi-cal­will.­Korean­society­prior­to­annexation­had­been­utterly­stagnant.­In­other­words,­Koreans­were­not­and­could­not­become­sovereign­subjects­of­their­own­history.­ Of­these,­stagnation­theory­was­perhaps­most­effective­in­establishing­colonial­difference­in­terms­of­temporality.­Drawing­on­the­authority­of­the­social­sciences,­specifically­Karl­Bücher’s­theories­on­nonmarket­eco-nomics,­Fukuda­Tokuzō­argued­that­ feudalism­and­private­ownership­of­land­had­failed­to­emerge­in­Korea,­and­thus­the­level­of­development­in­late­ nineteenth-­century­ Korea­ was­ comparable­ to­ that­ in­ tenth-­century­Fujiwara­Japan.­Based­on­a­twenty-­day­trip­to­Korea­in­1902,­Fukuda­was­able­to­conclude­that­Koreans­“who­lack­the­courageous­warrior­spirit­that­our­nation­[minzoku]­represents”­must­look­to­Japan,­while­the­Japanese­have­no­choice­but­to­“acknowledge­the­weight­of­our­appointed­task,­a­natural­fate­and­duty­of­a­powerful­and­superior­culture­to­assimilate­Korea­and­Koreans­by­sweeping­away­their­utterly­corrupt­and­decayed­national­particularity.”27­It­was­against­the­assertion­of­superiority­based­on­tem-poral­ difference—a­ thousand-­year­ gap­ between­ Japan­ and­ Korea—that­Paek­Nam-­un­wrote­Chōsen shakai keizaishi­(1933)­and­Chōsen hōken shakai keizaishi­(1937).28­Paek’s­aim­was­to­show­that­Korean­society­and­economy­had­developed­in­accordance­with­universal­stages­of­development­and­as­a­result­of­socioeconomic­forces­internal­to­Korea,­that­is,­Koreans­as­sov-ereign­subjects­of­their­own­history,­a­history­that­was­as­universal­in­its­development­as­that­of­Europe­or­Japan.

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­ Focusing­on­Paek­Nam-­un,­chapter­4­examines­history­writing­as­it­be-came­an­academic­discipline­in­colonial­Korea.­Among­Korean­historians­trained­at­Japanese­universities,­especially­Waseda­and­later­Keijō­Imperial­University­ in­ colonial­ Seoul,­ many­ adopted­ the­ narrative­ framework­ of­colonialist­historiography,­specifically­Mansenshi,­a­Manchuria-­Korea­spa-tial­conception­that­negated­Korea’s­historical­sovereignty­by­presenting­history­as­a­movement,­in­waves,­into­Korea,­and­more­generally­that­of­Oriental­history­(tōyōshi),­which­presented­Japan­as­uniquely­capable,­in­contrast­to­moribund­places­like­Korea­and­China­that­were­saddled­with­debilitating­customs­and­a­long­troubled­past.­As­Stefan­Tanaka­has­shown,­tōyōshi­provided­justification­for­Japan’s­imperial­expansion,29­and­histo-rians­like­Yi­Pyŏng-­do,­the­central­figure­in­positivist­and­critical-­textual­historiography,­conceded­a­great­deal­to­tōyōshi,­to­its­status­as­objective,­academic,­and­uniquely­legitimating­historical­scholarship.­Thus,­contem-poraneous­with­Paek­Nam-­un’s­work,­the­1930s­saw­Korean­historians­co-alescing­around­three­competing­schools:­nationalist­historiography­as­it­emerged­ in­the­first­decade­of­ the­twentieth­century,­ its­claims,­central­themes,­and­narrative­strategy­outlined­by­Sin­Ch’ae-­ho;­socioeconomic­(Marxist)­historiography,­with­Paek­Nam-­un­situating­Korean­history­in­world­history,­and­Korean­history­unfolding­in­accordance­with­historical­laws­(and­thus­a­historiography­“that­does­not­know­despair”);­and­positiv-ist­historiography,­as­represented­by­Yi­Pyŏng-­do­and­the­Chindan­Society,­that­aimed­for­an­objective,­academic­approach­to­history­writing.­ There­are­a­number­of­problems­with­a­typology­such­as­this.­Much­of­modern­Korean­historiography­does­not­fit­neatly­ into­ these­categories,­and­the­categories­themselves­distort­as­much­as­they­explain.­But­this­ty-pology­does­offer­a­useful­starting­point­for­understanding­how­a­majority­of­South­Korean­historians,­until­quite­recently,­thought­about­their­intel-lectual­genealogy,­ their­ relationship­ to­certain­modes­of­historical­writ-ing,­and­their­political­and­ideological­stance.­Once­the­Japanese­Empire­collapsed­in­1945,­the­commitment­to­objectivity­on­the­part­of­positivist­historians­appeared­as­little­more­than­complicity­with­colonialism.­Many­of­the­historians­who­had­privileged­objectivity­had­participated­actively­in­institutions­established­by­the­Japanese­colonial­state­and­had­helped­produce­ colonial­ narratives­ under­ the­ banner­ of­ academic­ rigor.­ In­ the­months­following­liberation­(August­15,­1945),­it­was­Marxist­intellectuals­like­Paek­Nam-­un­who­were­energized,­and­they­began­laying­the­founda-tions­for­postcolonial­Korea’s­higher­academic­institutions.­The­day­after­

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Japan’s­surrender,­Paek­began­organizing­the­Chosŏn­haksulwŏn­(Korean­Academy­of­Sciences),­welcoming­leading­progressive­scholars­across­the­disciplines,­from­engineering­to­literature,­science,­and­art.­But­the­parti-tion­of­Korea­and­U.S.­military­occupation­below­the­38th­parallel­stopped­this­process.­In­August­1946,­when­the­U.S.­Army­Military­Government­in­Korea­(usAMgik)­announced­its­plan­to­merge­Keijō­Imperial­University­with­nine­existing­professional­schools­to­form­Seoul­National­University,­Paek­was­vocal­in­his­criticism­of­the­plan:­university­faculty­would­have­little­autonomy­from­the­usAMgik’s­Department­of­Education,­and­aca-demics­who­had­actively­collaborated­in­support­of­the­Japanese­Empire­would­be­included­in­the­faculty.­With­conservatives­in­control­of­the­De-partment­of­Education,­however,­the­Korean­historians­appointed­to­the­faculty­of­Seoul­National­University­were­mostly­Chindan­Society­mem-bers,­including­Yi­Pyŏng-­do.­As­U.S.­occupation­forces­prepared­to­create­a­separate­anticommunist­state­in­southern­Korea,­many­Marxist­intellectu-als,­including­Paek,­went­north,­pushed­by­anticommunist­repression­and­pulled­by­offers­of­employment­and­opportunity­to­take­important­roles­in­the­national­democratic­revolution­under­way­on­the­other­side­of­the­38th­parallel.­ Chapter­5­presents­a­brief­outline­of­how­positivist­historiography­came­to­be­reconstituted­as­nationalist­historiography­after­1945.­In­1961­Yi­Ki-­baek­published­Kuksa sillon­(A­New­History­of­Korea),­written­as­a­history­textbook­that­ incorporated­the­narrative­of­kŭndaehwa­(modernization).­Echoing­W.­W.­Rostow’s­emphasis­on­the­importance­of­creating­new­so-cial­ groups—intellectuals,­ merchants,­ and­military­ personnel—for­eco-nomic­development­ in­ the­Third­World,30­Yi­ attributed­dynastic­ change­and­historical­progress­in­Korean­history­to­the­emergence­of­new­social­classes.­ In­ thus­ adopting­ modernization­ theory­ promoted­ by­ American­academics­and­advisors,­Kuksa sillon­presented­a­non-­Marxist­postcolonial­narrative­that­was­anti-­Japanese­but­uncritical­of­American­intervention.­This­ renovation­of­ the­ textual-­critical­ tradition,­ in­ the­ form­of­modern-ization­narratives,­quickly­became­the­dominant­mode­of­history­writing­in­the­context­of­the­cold­war.­Chapter­5­makes­the­observation­that­the­question­of­neocolonialism­(the­United­States­in­South­Korea),­suppressed­by­the­anticommunist­state,­came­to­be­sublimated­through­developmen-tal­time:­South­Korea­was­developing­with­American­assistance­but­also­by­using­ its­own­sources­of­modernity.­The­bulk­of­chapter­5,­however,­

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focuses­on­how­and­why­Marxist­historiography­of­the­1930s­was­recon-figured­as­nationalist­historiography­in­the­1970s­and­1980s.­Because­Paek­Nam-­un­went­to­North­Korea­in­1948,­historians­in­South­Korea­could­not­cite­his­work,­and­the­only­way­to­integrate­and­engage­his­work­was­by­casting­him­as­a­nationalist­historian.­Through­their­empirical­studies­of­land­tenure,­growth­of­commerce­(merchant­capital),­and­the­development­of­a­commodity-­monetary­economy­in­the­latter­half­of­Chosŏn,­Kim­Yong-­sŏp­and­Kang­Man-­gil­revived­and­confirmed­Paek’s­disclosure­of­the­inter-nal­dynamic­underlying­Korea’s­historical­development,­with­class­struggle­central­to­that­process.­ Under­a­nationalist­canopy,­then,­Kim­Yong-­sŏp­and­Kang­Man-­gil­re-established­ intellectual­ links­ to­a­ form­of­history­writing­ that­had­been­suppressed­in­South­Korea­after­the­Korean­War.­Their­view­of­history­was­based­on­an­anticolonial,­oppositional­nationalism,­and­their­historiogra-phy­contributed­greatly­to­understanding­the­dynamic­nature­of­Korea’s­social­and­economic­development­ in­ late­Chosŏn.­ In­this­ limited­sense,­Kim­and­Kang­shared­common­ground­with­nationalist­historians­who­pre-ferred­modernization­theory;­their­common­agenda­was­to­write­a­Korea-­centered­history.­But­the­implications­of­their­historical­narrative­could­not­be­more­different.­For­modernization­historians,­the­origins­of­Korea’s­modernity­were­to­be­found­in­the­cultural­and­scientific­developments­in­the­eighteenth­century­and­traced­forward­to­Westernized­and­Western-izing­elites­of­the­nineteenth­century­and­to­the­noncommunist­national-ists­in­the­twentieth­century­who­would­eventually­establish­South­Korea.­Kim,­along­with­Kang,­laid­the­basis­for­the­argument­that­there­were­two­possible­paths­to­modernity:­a­relatively­more­egalitarian­and­autonomous­path­from­below,­with­peasant­rebellions­providing­the­main­impetus­for­progressive­change,­and­a­more­exploitative,­dependent­path­from­above,­led­by­elites­who­would­ultimately­capitulate­to­imperialist­demands­start-ing­in­the­late­nineteenth­century.­ Kim­and­Kang­located­the­Westernized­and­Westernizing­elites­within­a­historical­trajectory­that­had­roots­in­the­cultural­and­political­world­of­the­landed­class­in­the­late­Chosŏn­period,­whose­modernization­efforts­from­ the­ late­ nineteenth­ century­ to­ the­ present­ reflected­ their­ narrow­class­interests,­and­for­that­reason­tended­toward­dependency­on­outside­powers,­that­is,­collaboration­with­the­Japanese­in­the­colonial­period­and­with­the­Americans­after­1945.­This­was­a­trajectory­that­paved­the­way­

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for­Korea’s­colonization­by­Japan,­formation­of­separate­states­in­1948,­and­dictatorship­and­dependent­capitalist­development­in­South­Korea.­This­re-visionist­historical­narrative­found­a­broad­audience­with­the­publication­in­1979­of­Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi insik­(Korean­History­before­and­after­Lib-eration),­edited­by­the­courageous­intellectual­and­journalist­Song­Kŏn-­ho.­This­book­presented­a­powerful­account­of­how­1945­marked­the­beginning­of­the­most­horrific­chapter­in­modern­Korean­history.­It­exposed­the­in-glorious­origins­of­the­South­Korean­state­and­negated­cold­war­historiog-raphy­by­positing­as­nationalist­the­resistance­to­the­un-­sponsored­separate­elections­in­1948­on­which­South­Korea­claims­its­legal­basis.­ It­was­ the­people’s­ uprising­ in­ the­city­of­Kwangju­ in­ 1980,­however,­and­the­massacre­perpetrated­by­South­Korean­troops­that­finally­broke­the­South­Korean­government’s­ideological­hegemony.­The­magnitude­of­the­state­violence­drove­students­and­intellectuals­to­search­for­the­struc-tural­and­historical­origins­of­South­Korea’s­dictatorship.­Drawing­on­his-torical­narratives­like­those­in­Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi insik,­through­minjung­(people’s)­art,­minjung­theology,­and­protest­music­and­performance,­stu-dents­and­intellectuals­sought­to­constitute­the­minjung­(the­subaltern)­as­a­national­and­nationalist­subject,­a­subjectivity­that­could­be­an­alterna-tive­to­and­autonomous­from­nationalist­narratives­authorized­by­either­the­North­Korean­or­the­South­Korean­state.­For­Kang­Man-­gil,­the­historian’s­most­pressing­task­was­to­write­a­history­of­modern­Korea­from­a­perspec-tive­unfettered­by­“the­structure­of­division.”­Such­a­perspective­is­acces-sible,­Kang­argued,­when­historians­understand­the­political­struggles­of­the­immediate­postliberation­period­not­simply­as­the­denouement­of­the­colonial­experience­but­also­as­a­struggle­to­overcome­national­division.­ Since­ the­ 1980s,­ then,­ nationalist­ historiography­ in­ South­ Korea­ has­been­associated­with­ leftist­politics.­ In­ the­ last­decade­of­ the­ twentieth­century,­with­the­collapse­of­socialist­states­in­Eastern­Europe­and­the­dis-solution­of­the­Soviet­Union,­what­might­be­called­postnationalist­histo-riography­ began­ to­ gain­ ground­ in­South­ Korea.­Weary­of­ nationalism’s­totalizing­power,­a­number­of­literary­critics,­along­with­historians­outside­the­field­of­Korean­studies,­drew­on­postcolonial­theory­and­took­aim­at­much­of­modern­Korean­historiography­(that­is,­not­just­nationalist­histo-riography),­among­other­things­for­its­fixation­on­narratives­of­linear­de-velopment.­But­the­principal­target­was­nationalist­historiography­for­its­erasure­of­plurality,­complexity,­and­difference.­In­an­interesting­twist,­the­

inTroDuCTion 17

so-­called­New­Right­welcomed­scholarship­inspired­by­postcolonial­theory­for­its­refusal­to­narrate­the­colonial­period­as­the­Manichaean­struggle­of­a­colonizing­Japan­that­was­racist­and­exploitative,­opposed­by­a­resisting­and­enduring­people,­or­nation­(minjung, minjok).­With­this,­the­New­Right­turned­to­criticism­of­nationalism­in­general,­and­nationalist­historiogra-phy­of­the­1980s­in­particular,­attacking­nationalist­historiography­for­ques-tioning­South­Korea’s­legitimacy.­ In­Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi chaeinsik­(Reexamination­of­Korean­History­be-fore­and­after­Liberation),­published­in­February­2006­with­enthusiastic­coverage­from­conservative­dailies­like­the­Chosŏn ilbo,­the­editors­charged­that­leftist-­nationalist­historiography,­as­epitomized­by­Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi insik,­was­responsible­for­the­“dangerously­distorted”­historical­perspec-tive­held­by­a­sizable­segment­of­the­public­(mostly­the­younger­generation)­as­well­as­by­the­left-­leaning­Roh­Moo-­hyun­administration.­Compiled­by­four­scholars­identified­with­postmodern­theory­and­the­New­Right,­the­title­of­this­two-­volume­anthology­deliberately­evoked­Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi insik,­signaling­the­editors’­intention­of­restoring­balance­to­the­historical­understanding­of­colonial­and­postcolonial­history.­The­editors­of­Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi chaeinsik­argued­that­the­leftist-­nationalist­historiography­of­the­1980s­had­achieved­near­hegemony­in­politics,­in­spite­of­later­research­that­should­have­corrected­such­a­skewed­view.­They­argued­that­leftist-­nationalist­historiography­remained­entrenched,­discouraging­the­publi-cation­of­more­“objective”­scholarship.31­The­New­Right­welcomed­post-colonial­critiques­of­nationalism­and­nationalist­historiography­as­a­way­to­reassert­the­sovereignty­of­the­individual­(!)­and­to­reaffirm­the­sovereignty­of­South­Korea­and­the­legitimacy­of­its­anticommunist­legacy.­ As­intensely­anticommunist­as­the­Old­Right­but­also­fiercely­liberal­in­terms­of­their­commitment­to­individual­freedoms­and­market­capitalism,­the­New­Right­accommodated­postcolonial­scholarship­as­a­tactical­move,­while­their­strategic­target­was­leftist-­nationalist­historiography­and­its­po-litical­expression.­As­Bruce­Cumings­points­out,­what­the­New­Right­saw­as­a­“dangerously­distorted”­historical­perspective­appeared­time­and­again­in­classified­reports­authored­by­American­military­and­intelligence­officers­who­were­critical­of­U.S.­policy­ toward­Korea.32­ It­should­also­be­noted­that­a­number­of­contributors­to­Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi chaeinsik,­either­im-plicitly­or­explicitly,­took­issue­with­the­kind­of­universalism­assumed­by­the­editors­of­Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi chaeinsik—a­universalism­identified­as­

inTroDuCTion18

“civilization”33—based­on­triumphalist­notions­of­progress­and­neoliberal­values­that­conveniently­separated­the­present­from­histories­of­violence,­expropriation,­exploitation,­and­control.­While­it­is­evident­that­there­is­no­longer­an­“outside”­to­the­logics­of­global­capitalism,­it­is­also­evident­from­the­history­of­history­writing­presented­in­this­book­that­global­capitalism­creates­surpluses­that­refuse­to­be­disciplined­or­regimented—specifically,­knowledge,­experience,­and­subjectivity,­surpluses­that­constitute­a­form­of­wealth­to­which­not­just­intellectuals­but­the­multitude­also­has­access.­As­Michael­Hardt­and­Antonio­Negri­have­argued,­the­poor­revolt­not­be-cause­they­have­nothing­to­lose,­but­because­they­are­rich:­“Deprivation­.­.­.­may­breed­anger,­indignation,­and­antagonism,­but­revolt­arises­only­on­the­basis­of­wealth,­that­is,­a­surplus­of­intelligence,­experience,­knowl-edges,­and­desire­.­.­.­not­because­the­poor­are­empty­and­excluded­from­wealth­but­because­they­are­included­in­the­circuits­of­production­and­full­of­potential,­which­always­exceeds­what­capital­ and­ the­global­political­body­can­expropriate­and­control.”34­In­other­words,­the­great­enterprise­of­sovereignty­was­potent­fiction,­a­fiction­that­became­a­head­over­heels­romance­that­allowed­for­the­production­of­the­language­and­the­coordi-nates­for­the­critique­of­sovereignty’s­complicity­with­power.­Sovereignty­provided­the­conceptual­language­for­writing­national­histories,­but­it­also­constituted­the­site­for­the­continuous­production­of­oppositional­subjec-tivities­and­political­alternatives.

noTes

Introduction

­ 1.­Sŭpotssŭ,­sŭpidŭ,­and­saeksŭ,­along­with­the­explanation­for­the­bob­haircut,­are­ in­ parentheses­ in­ the­ original.­ Other­ foreign­ words­ like­ Nora,­ the Bob,­ and­harem­are­in­quotation­marks.­Kim­Ki-­rim­was­a­modernist­poet­and­literary­critic.­His­essay­“‘Missŭ­Koria’­tanbal­hasio”­(“Miss­Korea,”­Cut­Your­Hair)­appeared­in­Tongkwang,­no.­37­(September­1932)­without­attribution.­ 2.­The­text­refers­to­sŏppun tchari ka’gŭk,­Kurt­Weil­and­Bertolt­Brecht’s­Die Drei-groschenoper,­first­performed­in­Berlin­in­1928.­ 3.­X’s­were­inserted­to­avoid­censorship.­The­Kwantung­Army­had­seized­Man-churia­in­September­1931­and­invaded­Shanghai­in­January­1932.­Thus­when­Kim­Ki-­rim­wrote­the­essay­anti-­imperialism­had­taken­precedence­in­Chinese­politics.­ 4.­Established­in­1886­by­Mary­Scranton,­Ehwa­began­as­a­mission­school­for­girls.­In­the­early­1930s­Ewha­College­admitted­about­a­hundred­students­each­year.­Of­the­thirty-­seven­faculty­members,­twenty-­one­were­Korean.­Kim­Hwal-­lan­was­a­graduate­of­Ewha,­and­in­1922­she­helped­organize­the­Korean­ywcA.­Yun­Ch’i-­ho,­who­founded­the­yMcA­in­Korea,­was­her­mentor.­She­was­also­a­member­of­the­Kŭnŭhoe,­a­nationalist­women’s­organization­founded­in­1927.­But­she­resigned­soon­afterward,­unwilling­to­work­with­women­who­were­Marxists­and­socialists.­Kim­Hwal-­lan,­“Na­nŭn­tanbal­ŭl­irrŏkkye­ponda,”­Tongkwang,­no.­37­(September­1932).­See­also­Ihwa­Yŏksagwan,­Ewha Old and New: 110 Years of History (1886–1996)­(Seoul:­Ewha­Woman’s­University­Press,­2005),­and­Insook­Kwon,­“Feminists­Navi-gating­the­Shoals­of­Nationalism­and­Collaboration:­The­Post-­Colonial­Korean­De-bate­over­How­to­Remember­Kim­Hwal-­lan,”­Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies­27,­no.­1­(2006).­ 5.­Achille­Mbembe,­“Necropolitics,”­Public Culture­15,­no.­1­(2003),­13.­I­thank­Alexis­Dudden­for­referring­me­to­this­article.­ 6.­K.­Y.,­“Tanbalhan­kamsang,”­Tongkwang,­no.­37­(September­1932).­ 7.­ On­ the­ historical­ relationship­ between­ imperialism­ and­ international­ law,­see­Antony­Anghie,­Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law­(Cambridge:­Cambridge­University­Press,­2004).­See­also­Martti­Koskenniemi,­The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870–1960­(Cam-bridge:­Cambridge­University­Press,­2001).­ 8.­There­were­other,­less­dramatic­changes­to­sumptuary­laws,­for­example,­laws­that­regulated­the­length­of­the­pipe­and­the­length­and­width­of­the­sleeves.­ 9.­According­to­Hwang­Hyŏn,­King­Kojong­turned­to­Chŏng­Pyŏng-­ha,­an­official­who­was­born­in­the­nonaristocratic­chungin­class,­and­told­him­to­cut­the­topknot.­

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Yu­Kil-­jun­cut­the­crown­prince’s­hair.­Cited­in­Lee­Kwang-­rin­(Yi­Kwang-­rin),­Yu Kil- chun­(Seoul:­Tonga­ilbosa,­1992),­122–23.­ 10.­Across­East­Asia,­writers­wrote­about­hair.­In­Lu­Xun’s­“Toufa­de­gushi”­(A­Story­about­Hair,­1920),­ for­example,­a­student­cut­his­queue­when­he­went­to­Japan­to­study.­Upon­his­return­to­China­he­purchased­a­fake­queue­in­Shanghai.­But­it­was­1910,­and­he­was­ridiculed­for­wearing­a­fake­queue.­He­took­off­the­queue­and­put­on­a­Western­suit.­He­was­jeered­in­the­streets.­He­put­on­the­long­Chinese­gown,­and­he­was­still­ridiculed.­The­protagonist­in­the­story,­N,­finally­lashed­out­at­his­tormentors­with­his­cane,­after­which­he­was­left­alone.­N­says,­“It­[hitting­others]­made­me­feel­sorrowful.”­In­an­essay­published­in­1935,­Lu­Xun­revealed­that­“Toufa”­was­autobiographical.­See­Evan­Shan­Chou,­“‘A­Story­about­Hair’:­A­Curious­Mirror­of­Lu­Xun’s­Pre-­Republican­Years,”­Journal of Asian Studies­66,­no.­2­(2007).­ 11.­In­the­English­translation­released­by­the­Home­Office­and­signed­by­Yu­Kil-­chun,­taeŏp­was­translated­as­“the­great­work.”­Cited­in­Isabella­L.­Bird,­Korea and Her Neighbors­(1897;­Boston:­KPI,­1985),­363.­The­phrase­“Our­subjects”­(sinmin)­is­actually­a­compound­that­refers­to­two­groups:­“subjects”­or­officials­(sin),­and­the­rest­(min,­or­people).­For­the­Korean­text,­see­Kojong sillok,­33-­kwŏn,­32-­nyŏn­(1895),­11/15.­Kuksa­pyŏnch’an­wiwŏnhoe­(National­Institute­of­Korean­History):­http://sillok.history.go.kr/main/main.jsp.­For­Kojong sillok,­as­with­other­annals­in­the­Chosŏn wangjo sillok­(Annals­of­the­Chosŏn­Dynasty),­the­citation­begins­with­the­ruler’s­temple­name­identifying­the­record­(sillok),­followed­by­volume­num-ber­(kwŏn),­the­reign­year­(nyŏn)­with­the­Common­Era­year­in­parentheses,­the­month­and­day­by­lunar­calendar,­and­when­necessary­the­entry’s­location­on­the­page.­November­15­by­the­lunar­calendar,­32nd­year­of­Kojong’s­reign,­was­Decem-ber­30,­1895,­in­the­Gregorian­calendar.­ 12.­The­best­work­on­this­period­is­Andre­Schmid’s­Korea between Empires, 1895–1919­(New­York:­Columbia­University­Press,­2002).­ 13.­Regarding­Japanese­use­of­international­law­to­legitimate­Japan’s­empire,­see­Alexis­Dudden,­Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power­(Honolulu:­Uni-versity­of­Hawaii­Press,­2004).­ 14.­Human­tribute­began­during­the­Yüan­dynasty.­The­number­of­children­req-uisitioned­was­small,­and­ they­were­ taken­on­an­ irregular­basis.­The­girls­were­selected­from­daughters­of­low-­to­middle-­grade­officials.­Donald­N.­Clark,­“Sino-­Korean­Tributary­Relations­under­the­Ming,”­The Ming Dynasty, 1398–1644,­part­2,­ed.­Denis­Twitchett­and­Frederick­W.­Mote,­The Cambridge History of China,­vol.­8­(Cambridge:­Cambridge­University­Press,­1998).­ 15.­ Benedict­ Anderson,­ Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism­(London:­Verso,­1983),­77.­ 16.­Yun­Ch’i-­ho,­Yun Ch’i- ho ilgi­(Seoul:­Kuksa­py’ŏnchan­wiwŏnhoe,­1973–1989),­entry­for­October­14,­1893,­3:187–88.­ 17.­See­Uday­Singh­Mehta,­Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth Century British Liberal Thought­(Chicago:­University­of­Chicago­Press,­1999).

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­ 18.­My­argument­here­has­an­affinity­to­the­historical­trajectories­suggested­by­Kim­Yong-­sŏp.­See­below,­and­note­30­in­chapter­2.­ 19.­See­note­60­in­chapter­2,­my­reference­to­Paul­Ricoeur’s­The Rule of Metaphor: Multi- disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning of Language­(Toronto:­University­of­Toronto­Press,­1975).­ 20.­See­Ross­King,­“Western­Protestant­Missionaries­and­the­Origins­of­Korean­Language­Modernization,”­Journal of International and Area Studies­11,­no.­3­(2004).­ 21.­Rey­Chow,­Women and Modernity: The Politics of Reading between East and West­(Minneapolis:­University­of­Minnesota­Press,­1991),­xv.­ 22.­The­Sŏkkuram­is­one­of­South­Korea’s­national­treasures­and­recognized­by­unEscO­as­a­World­Heritage­site.­It­was­constructed­in­the­mid-­eighth­century­on­Mt.­T’oham­near­Kyŏngju.­ 23.­See­Hyung­Il­Pai,­Constructing “Korean” Origins: A Critical Review of Archae-ology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State- Formation Theories­ (Cam-bridge:­Harvard­University­Asia­Center,­2000).­ 24.­See­Jun­Uchida,­Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945­ (Cambridge:­ Harvard­ University­ Asia­ Center,­ 2011).­ See­ also­ Uchida­ Jun,­“Ch’ongnyŏkjŏn­sigi­chae-­Chosŏn­Ilbonin­ŭi­‘NaeSŏn­Ilch’e’­chŏngchaek­e­taehan­hyŏmnyŏk,”­Asea yŏn’gu­51,­no.­1­(2008),­and­Micah­Auerback,­“‘Ch’in-­Il­Pulgyo’­yŏksahak­ŭi­chae’go:­Chosŏn­Pulgyodan­kwa­1920-­nyŏndae­Chosŏn­esŏ­ŭi­sŭngryŏ­kyŏlhon­e­taehan­nonjaeng,”­Asea yŏn’gu­51,­no.­3­(2008).­ 25.­See­Rebecca­Karl,­Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century­(Durham:­Duke­University­Press,­2002),­5–7.­ 26.­See­Kume­Kunitake,­“Nihon­fukuin­no­enkaku,”­Shigakkai zasshi­1­(December­1889),­and­also­Stefan­Tanaka,­Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History­(Berkeley:­University­of­California­Press,­1993),­71–75.­ 27.­Fukuda­Tokuzō,­“Kankoku­no­keizai­soshiki­to­keizai­tani,”­Keizaigaku kenkyū,­(Tokyo:­Dōbunkan,­1904),­147.­My­English­translation­is­based­on­Yi­Ch’ŏl-­sŏng’s­Korean­language­translation.­See­Yi­Ch’ŏl-­sŏng,­“Singminjisigi­yŏksainsik­kwa­yŏk-sasŏsul,”­Han’guksa­23­(Seoul:­Han’gilsa,­1994),­129.­See­also­Owen­Miller,­“The­Idea­of­Stagnation­in­Korean­Historiography,”­Korean Histories­2,­no.­1­(2010):­4–5.­ 28.­Both­were­written­ in­ Japanese­and­published­ in­ Japan­ to­avoid­ the­more­stringent­censorship­laws­in­colonial­Korea.­ 29.­Tanaka,­Japan’s Orient.­ 30.­W.­W.­Rostow,­A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy­(New­York:­Harper­and­Brothers,­1957),­and­The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non- Communist Manifesto­(Cambridge:­Cambridge­University­Press,­1960).­See­also­Tae-­gyun­Park,­“Differ-ent­Roads,­Common­Destination:­Economic­Discourses­in­South­Korea­During­the­1950s,”­Modern Asian Studies­39,­no.­3­(2005).­ 31.­See­Pak­Chi-­hyang­et­al.,­eds.,­Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi chaeinsik,­vols.­1­and­2­(Seoul:­Ch’aek­Sesang,­2006).­ 32.­Bruce­Cumings,­“The­Korea­War:­What­Is­It­That­We­Are­Remembering­to­Forget?,”­Ruptured Histories: War, Memory, and the Post–Cold War in Asia,­ed.­Sheila­

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Miyoshi­ Jager­ and­ Rana­ Mitter­ (Cambridge:­ Harvard­ University­ Press,­ 2007),­283–84.­ 33.­Pak­et­al.,­“Taedam,”­Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi chaeinsik,­vol.­2.­ 34.­Michael­Hardt­and­Antonio­Negri,­Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire­(New­York:­Penguin­Books,­2004),­212.

1.­Sovereignty­and­Imperialism

­ 1.­The­source­of­this­chapter’s­epigraph,­Carl­Schmitt’s­1933­lecture,­was­repub-lished­ in­Positionen und Begriffe­ and­cited­ in­G.­L.­Ulmen’s­ introduction­to­Carl­Schmitt,­The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Euro-paeum­(New­York:­Telos­Press,­2003),­18–19.­ 2.­The­official­English­translation­quoted­here­suitably­makes­use­of­the­royal­“We.”­For­the­Korean­text,­see­Kojong sillok,­32-­kwŏn,­31-­nyŏn­(1894),­12/12,­first­article.­Kuksa­pyŏnch’an­wiwŏnhoe:­http://sillok.history.go.kr/main/main.jsp.­The­thirty-­first­year­of­Kojong’s­reign­was­1894.­But­December­12­(1894)­by­the­lunar­calendar­was­January­7,­1895,­in­the­Gregorian­calendar.­ 3.­Isabella­L.­Bird,­Korea and Her Neighbours­(1897;­Boston:­kPi,­1985),­247.­ 4.­Grand­sacrificial­rites­(chongmyo cherye)­were­conducted­each­year­in­Janu-ary,­April,­July,­and­October.­Special­rites­were­also­performed­on­auspicious­occa-sions­or­difficult­times.­The­Hall­of­Eternal­Peace­(yŏngnyŏngjŏn),­ located­about­fifty­meters­southwest­of­the­Main­Hall­(chŏngjŏn),­is­smaller­and­houses­the­spirit­tablets­of­the­four­ancestors­of­King­T’aejo,­short-­reigned­kings,­queens,­and­con-sorts.­Both­the­Main­Hall­and­the­Hall­of­Eternal­Peace­stand­on­two-­tiered­stone­terraces,­each­enclosed­by­a­square­wall.­Great­offerings­at­the­Altars­of­Land­and­Harvest­(sajikdan)­were­conducted­three­times­a­year.­ 5.­In­the­Oath,­King­Kojong­used­the­term­kukka:­“Only­as­an­independent­ruler­can­We­make­our­country­[a- kukka]­strong.”­The­term­kukka­referred­directly­to­the­dynastic­state­and­was­used­long­before­the­nineteenth­century.­Mid-­Chosŏn­thinkers­like­Yi­I­(pen­name­Yulgok,­1536–84),­for­example,­used­the­term­to­de-note­ the­dynastic­ state,­ as­ in­ ch’ung ŏ kukka­ (loyalty­ to­ the­dynastic­ state).­See­Martina­Deuchler,­“The­Practice­of­Confucianism:­Ritual­and­Order­in­Chosŏn­Dy-nasty­Korea,”­Rethinking Confucianism: Past and Present in China,­Japan,­Korea,­and Vietnam,­ed.­Benjamin­A.­Elman,­John­B.­Duncan,­and­Herman­Ooms­(Los­Ange-les:­uclA­Asian­Pacific­Monograph­Series,­2002).­ 6.­It­should­be­noted,­however,­that­for­scholars­like­Chŏng­Yag-­yong­(1762–1836)­there­was­a­fundamental­distinction­to­be­made­between­the­Royal­Ancestral­Temple­and­the­sajikdan:­unlike­the­Royal­Ancestral­Temple,­which­served­as­a­shrine­to­the­spirits­of­deceased­ancestors,­the­sajikdan­was­a­shrine­to­heavenly­deities.­Thus,­un-like­the­Royal­Ancestral­Temple,­the­sajikdan­is­a­shrine­with­a­transcendent­status:­the­Altars­of­Land­and­Grain­do­not­belong­to­a­particular­dynasty,­and­they­should­not­be­torn­down­or­replaced­when­a­new­dynasty­comes­to­power.­See­Kŭm­Chang-­t’ae,­“Tasan­ŭi­sajikje­wa­ch’eje­kojŭng,”­Chongkyohak yŏn’gu­16­(1997).