The future quantified

Futures,Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 305–322, 1998Pergamon 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved

Printed in Great Britain0016–3287/98 $19.00+ 0.00

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THE FUTURE QUANTIFIED

David Mercer

The results reported in this paper demonstrate that the qualitative (group)research and quantitative (individual) survey techniques that have beendeveloped now offer a viable means for mapping current expectations and thepossible future directions these will take. Sensible use of these should providegovernments, and large organisations in general, with a powerful new set oftools for positively managing the future. In terms of the issues themselves, thegroup which emerged most strongly from the quantified responses of the indi-viduals are those which might be seen as relating to the ‘green’ environment.On the other hand, our qualitative groups looked upon these key issues as rep-resenting matters of survival for humanity as a whole. Such a focus on survivalmay seem selfish, but it can also be seen as altruistic not concerned with per-sonal survival. It also represents a sound, rational approach to long-term plan-ning, where the respondents focused instead on how governments might posi-tively, and safely, manage all the long-term issues threatening the future ofhumankind. If we move away from ‘green’ issues, it is also clear that even indi-viduals recognize the globalisation of issues in particular the globalisation ofbusiness, the possibility of a global financial crash and the (threat of) dominationby Pacific Rim countries. At the opposite end of the spectrum are worries aboutthe significant problems faced by the underclasses—and, in turn, the significantthreat these present to society as a whole. In general though, apart from techno-logical issues, the emphasis was—across almost all areas—on survival in theface of events ranging down from catastrophes to mere crises and stresses! 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved

The most frequently reported work ‘on the future’ has been that of individual futurolog-ists—usually reporting their own subjective viewpoints, based upon their readings of other

David Mercer is Senior Lecturer, Open University Business School, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA,UK. (Tel.: + 44 1908-232165; fax: + 44 1908-655898; e-mail: [email protected]).

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The future quantified: D Mercer

commentators but not upon direct primary research. The quantified outcomes describedin this paper are, on the other hand, the result from the development of progressivelymore rigorous research techniques for investigating the longer-term future. This was orig-inally as part of the ‘Millennium Project’ and now of ‘The Futures Observatory’, both runby the Open University School of Business (OUBS) in conjunction with the StrategicPlanning Society. This overall programme of research has so far lasted more than half adecade. Where previous papers1,2 have looked at the qualitative stages of this research,this paper reports the results of the first fully quantitative stages of the work.

Background-expectations theory

Although the techniques involved have emerged from experience gained in previousstages,1,2 the key underlying assumptions behind latest stages of the research may be saidto have originated with one of the favourite theories of the later monetarists; rationalexpectations.3 Taking this concept further,4 and applying it in a more general sense, ourevidence is that much of society now looks to such ‘expectations’—to set the context forwhat will actually happen in the future. These expectations are the outcomes which theyare persuaded will inevitably happen given certain inputs. Our basic assumption, there-fore, is that if enough people put their weight behind the same ‘expectations’, and theinputs are observed to happen, they will adjust their behaviour to take account of whatis expected; and, accordingly, the expected outcomes will occur! This process might bedescribed as ‘self-fulfilling expectations’.

Overall, then, the research set out to describe the future which will come about asa result of current expectations.2,4

It is based, in the first instance, upon three broad assumptions which have onlybecome viable in recent years:

1. The future of humanity, in the developed nations at least, is no longer generally con-strained by significant shortages of resource. This is still a controversial assumption,where much of the developing world suffers from severe shortages and even in thedeveloped world bottlenecks can result in local shortages, but—as may be seen fromthe detailed findings of research reported elsewhere5–9—it has now become a justifiedone for much of the activity taking place in the economically advanced countries.

2. Accordingly, that future is now being progressively determined by social decisions,taken not just by a few leaders but by millions of their citizens, taking billions of smalldecisions as part of their daily lives. Thus, to a large extent our lives are no longernecessarily ruled only by the inflexible logic of the economics of scarcity or the dic-tates of political ideology, but are more typically decided by our own actions.

3. The general, longer-term, framework within which these specific, individual decisionsis taken is largely provided by the individuals’ expectations of what the future holdsfor them. Every man, and woman, has free will, and now has the power to expressthis; he or she will ultimately make their own decision. But a major influence on thatdecision—and often the most important influence—is what they expect the future tobe, and hence how it will generally determine the ultimate outcome of their ownsmall decision.

In the specific context of this research, this naturally leads to the most important assump-tion:

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1. If you can measure these ‘expectations’ as to future developments, to a large extentyou can establish the most likely form of that future. Even if you can just determinethe expectations of the opinion-leaders, as our research did, you can still gauge, withsome degree of accuracy, the major elements currently shaping the future.

Prior qualitative research

The key research technique used in our prior, qualitative research, was based upon thatwe have developed for simpler scenario forecasting.10–12 In the context of these ‘simplerscenarios’—simpler in the sense that they are suitable for use by a wider range of organis-ations—this process comprises five main steps; all taken by the managers wishing toinvestigate the future of their organisations:

1. Decide The Drivers For Change;2. Bring Drivers Together Into A Viable Framework;3. Produce Initial (Seven To Nine) Mini-Scenarios;4. Reduce To Two To Three Scenarios;5. Write The Scenarios.

The great advantage of such a scenario-based approach is that it widens the view of thefuture—as we wished to do in this global research—where many other techniques (evenincluding Delphi) tend to narrow it as part of their focusing on ‘key issues’. In this ‘global’research, however, the first two steps were undertaken exclusively by our participantsand the last two exclusively by ourselves. In the case of step 3 there was an overlap.

The simplest technique we have come to recommend for usage in such scenarioforecasting is based on a combination of the traditional focus group,13,14 with scenarioforecasting,15–17 using the now almost universal availability of Post-it Notes. It is a verysimple technique which may be used to support any form of planning process. In linewith our objectives of simplicity and ease-of-use, it requires only a conference room witha bare wall and copious supplies of 3M Post-it Notes. It was, thus, ideal as the mainvehicle for our qualitative research.1,2,18 This involved managers and professionals fromsome 200 organisations; drawn equally from OUBS MBA students, Strategic PlanningSociety members and those of the Demos think-tank.

The output was a framework of 162 factors, or key events, which were then usedas the basis for the quantification questionnaire.

Quantification research—method

The stage of the research reported here was the first quantification of the project. It useda mail survey.

Sample

As such, it was based upon a sample of 300 students studying with the Open UniversityBusiness School (OUBS). We have previously found19,20 that—due to the large numbersof students and the generally representative nature of the organisations, typically multina-tionals, from which they come—their responses typically give a sound guide to those of

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the management populations in those organisations; though as a sample of individualsthey are biased towards UK citizenship. More important, in terms of possible skew, theyare typically male members of a wealthier and better educated minority; though, as theresearch examines their expectations about future developments in general rather thantheir personal needs and wants, we believe that this may not significantly affect theresults.

A high response rate, 165 responses (55% of the sample), was achieved—eventhough the questionnaire was relatively long and complex for a mail survey.

Questionnaire

Apart from a limited number of general ‘demographic’ questions, the questionnaire com-prised 162 questions—one for each of the factors, key events, identified in the qualitativestages of the research. For each of these factors three pieces of information wererequested:

Probability of Occurrence. The participants were asked whether the event was ‘likely’(defined as greater than 50%), between 10 and 50% likely, and less than 10% likely.Probable Date. For those events which were likely the students were asked to choose,based in effect on a semantic differential,21 from a range of likely dates (2000, 2010,2020, 2030, 2050 + ) the one they thought most likely.Importance. For each factor they were asked to rate its importance, to society acrossthe world, in terms of a seven-point (1 to 7, very important) semantic differential22.It should be noted, however, that—for ease of comprehension—these measurementsare converted to a ten-point (0–9) scale throughout this paper.

Analysis was conducted using SPSS for Windows23 and Microsoft Excel.24

Results

The full results, condensed (also for ease of comprehension) into 70 composite categories,are shown in Appendix A. Results of the individual measurements are as follows.

Importance of events

There was a wide spread of levels of importance, down from an average of 9.0 (on ascale from 0 to 9), understandably recorded by ‘nuclear war’, to 1.8, for the ‘1000 channelsuperhighway’—which was (no doubt to the chagrin of the media moguls) judged trivial!

Not unexpectedly, the events judged to be the most important are those which wouldhave the most direct impact on the whole of humanity; including ‘global war’ (8.8),‘global water shortage’ (also 8.8) and ‘serious overpopulation’ (8.7). Fortunately, the mostcatastrophic of these are the least likely to occur (‘nuclear war’, 26% likely, ‘global war’,25%), though ‘serious overpopulation’ rates a high (79%) probability and must be con-sidered as the greatest threat.

Whilst there are great variations in terms of the individual events, if we examine thequartiles separately, shown in Table 1, there are no obvious overall patterns in terms ofimportance. Validating the general importance of the ‘dimensions’ detected by the earlier

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TABLE 1.

Quartile Mean importance Mean probability Mean date(of 162 factors overall) (on a scale of 0–9) (%)

1 7.8 65 20262 6.7 67 20213 5.8 65 20224 4.2 62 2025

qualitative work, only 15 events—of the 162 overall, can be considered to be genuinelyunimportant (that is, rating an importance of less than 5).

Reverting to an examination of the individual events, the most important are in gen-eral those relating to the environment (the first 17 factors fall into this category), as three-quarters of the first quartile (of 40 events in this quartile) also do. At the other extremeare the events seen as trivial (including ‘make your own media/TV’, 2.2, ‘domesticrobots’, 3.2, ‘global tourism for all’, 3.3, and ‘electronic books common’, 3.7)—some ofwhich may disappoint those promoting them as the key to personal satisfaction. In thesame region, however, are a group of events which are clearly not trivial for the wholeof humanity (such as ‘moon colony’, 3.5, ‘travel to the planets’, 4.0, ‘supersonic travelnormal’, 4.0, and ‘major new religions emerge’, 4.2). The respondents seemingly believedthese would have little impact on the wider future of global society (the specific ques-tion asked).

Probability of occurrence

If we look at the results from another direction, however, a clear pattern does emerge interms of the results by quartile (Table 2). Those events expected to occur earlier in thefuture are also seen to be more likely to occur. In this context, the most probable eventsmay be those which might be seen as the natural outcome of existing trends, and thisextrapolation clearly relates most directly to those in the short term. Top of the list is‘significant pollution’ (at 93%, in the year 2016, and also a high importance level of 8.2).But this bad news is countered by ‘electric/pollution free cars’ (also at 93% in the yearof 2016, and still of a relatively high importance of 6.8); and, best of all for some, ‘curefor aids’ (93% in 2017). As can be seen, however, there is no similar correlation withimportance; though this may be hidden by the trend noted above—of individuals down-rating the importance of ‘remote’ events.

Equally reassuring, at the other end of the scale is the low probability of ‘nuclearwar’ (at 26%), ‘global war’ (25%), and ‘end of government’ (23%).

TABLE 2.

Quartile Mean probability (%) Mean date Mean importance

1 85 2017 6.32 74 2021 6.03 61 2024 6.34 34 2031 5.8

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TABLE 3.

Issue/event Importance Possibility Mean date Index(0–9) (%) (AD) (importance ×

possibility)

Environmental crisis 8.1 86.7 2017 7.0Major global warming effects 8.2 77.1 2023 6.3Fossil fuel shortage 7.4 84.8 2027 6.3Control of personal (car) travel 6.6 88.0 2015 5.8Global water shortage 8.2 70.4 2023 5.7Globalisation of business 6.4 85.8 2015 5.5Global green technology 7.5 73.8 2028 5.5Significant underclass problems 6.8 78.7 2015 5.4Pacific Rim dominates world 7.3 75.0 2028 5.4Safe nuclear energy 7.4 70.7 2029 5.3Serious overpopulation 8.0 66.5 2029 5.3Cures for most diseases 7.3 71.5 2028 5.2Learning new skills 5.9 86.9 2013 5.1Global financial crash 7.6 66.5 2019 5.0

Index of likely importance

In order to simplify the rather complex picture which emerges, it is helpful to combinethe measures of importance and probability—simply by multiplying these together—togive an index of ‘likely importance’. In addition, Table 3 is based, in the first instance,on a reduction of the original 162 issues/events to a composite 70 factors which bestincorporate the range of topics. The results for all of these 70 factors are detailed inAppendix A. The picture is then simplified further, using the 80:20 Rule, by looking atjust the top 14 (on the basis of their ‘likely importance’—Table 3).

Dates of occurrence

Returning to the basic data, if we look at the date patterns (for those respondents whosee a greater than 50% chance of the event occurring), the reverse picture—in terms ofthe likelihood of future events—is seen (Table 4). Again, understandably, the events likelyto occur in the nearer future are seen as those much more likely to occur.

The largest projects are, perhaps realistically, assigned the longest dates. Examplesare ‘planetary colonies’ (2047) and ‘mining asteroids’ (2043); but also ‘no infectious dis-eases’ (2044) and ‘world government formed’ (2040). Most of these also have relativelylow probabilities (though still greater than 40%), but it is possible that this is a reflectionof this being a catch-all category; since this box on the questionnaire also took intoaccount the possibility of the event occurring after 2050.

TABLE 4.

Quartile Mean date Mean probability (%) Mean importance

1 2036 49 6.02 2026 63 6.53 2020 75 6.24 2014 80 5.8

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Once more, the lower end is defined by those projects which are seen to be alreadyunder way; for instance ‘redefining/learning new skills’ with a date of 2010 (and a 91%probability), though—interestingly—Germany is expected (with a 58% probability) todominate the EU by the same year (2010) and ‘changed marriage expectations’ evenearlier (at 2008)—though the importance of the latter is (at just 4.2) surprisingly low!

Factor analysis

When a variety of factor analyses were conducted, using SPSS for Windows, the factors—outside of those relating to technology—developed no overall patterns with obvious sig-nificance; the main variable which emerged was the future ‘orientation’ of the parti-cipants, how strongly individuals held views about the future in general. In the specificcase of the technological aspects, just a few groups consistently emerged as clearlyrelated:

Outer Space—including most of the (eight) aspects of travel and colonization of thesolar system, but also including ‘brain (computer) implants’, ‘wide use of virtualreality’, and ‘domestic robots’.Personal Contacts—an unexpected category covering ‘cure for AIDS’, ‘contact withaliens’ and ‘changed marriage expectations’!Communications—including most aspects such as ‘all communications mobile’ and‘telecomms effectively free’, but also ‘much cheaper air travel’ and ‘mandatory controlof car travel’Medical Cures—with ‘no infectious diseases’ and ‘cure for cancer’. A separate cate-gory, however, is that of ‘gene manipulation’ and ‘cloning of individuals’ and, lesspredictable, ‘unlimited computer power’.

If the other factors are forced—by progressively removing the topmost factors—into separ-ate categories, based on measurement of importance (the one factor measured across arange of values), it is possible to detect a number of related groupings.

The first set—Table 5—are, in general, ones which reflect catastrophic forces whichcould destabilize—or significantly alter the course—of humanity. As such, they are seento be important, but less likely to happen.

The next set, again shown in Table 6, are those which are less catastrophic butcould, also, signal significant developments; with matching probabilities.

The next group, Table 7, contains the more likely developments covering the fieldof social structures.

The final group (Table 8), again more likely, reflects the technological developmentswhich might reasonably be expected.

TABLE 5.

‘Group’ title Mean importance Mean probability (%) Mean date

Global crash 7.5 62 2024World government 6.5 61 2026Global environment 6.5 60 2027Wars 6.5 66 2022

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TABLE 6.


Global stresses 6.8 62 2024Regional stresses 6.2 54 2024Communal stresses 6.5 65 2021

TABLE 7.


Business crises 6.0 68 2018Value crises 6.6 74 2019Social crises 6.3 61 2024Environment crises 6.8 59 2026Personal lifestyles 6.0 68 2021

TABLE 8.


Science and medicine 6.3 79 2018Cures 5.8 70 2027Communications 5.2 68 2025Space dreams 3.3 63 2031

Although the various members of these groups have widely varying dates, the meandates for most of these groups is around three decades ahead—as it is overall.

Comparison with group potentials

In order to be certain of detecting all the factors—including some ‘wild-cards’25—theearlier (‘qualitative’) stage of the work involved a similar number of participants to that inthe quantified survey. Accordingly, although it must still be formally judged as qualitativeresearch, it is possible to compare the different sets of results in broad outline. In thiscontext, the key difference between the way the two groups were approached can besummarized in terms of the fact that the individuals were asked to report their own views,while the groups were asked to agree possible futures with other members of the group.

It also likely that the dynamics of group work—following the reported patternsexperienced in more conventional focus groups26—opened out the overall horizons. Theirindividual ideas were debated in a generally supportive climate—where this group sup-port allowed the participants to consider ideas which were rejected (presumably asunrealistic) by the individuals.

Comparison of results

For the purposes of this comparison, the ‘qualitative’ results were ‘quantified’ by twomeasures. The first was the number of groups, from a total of 16, which included a

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reference to the topic in their list of drivers. The second was the total number of mentions,where a topic was considered sufficiently important for different aspects to be reportedseparately. The detailed comparison is shown in Appendix B.

For many of the 50 composite factors (where such comparison was possible) the twosets of results were similar. For instance, employment was included by 12 groups (with38 mentions), compared with an individual importance rating of 7.2 (and a probabilityof 76%), global warming was included by 11 groups (with 20 mentions) against an indi-vidual importance rating of 8.3 (and a probability of 80%). At the other extreme, under-water colonies were included by four groups (with five mentions overall), compared withan individual importance rating of 3.7 (and 47% probability); and universal languagealso by four groups (and with five mentions), against 4.7 (and 43%).

There were, however, areas where the two diverged markedly. Thus, in terms ofapparent differences in perceived levels of importance, 11 groups included space travel,with 26 mentions, but this was given only a 4.0 importance rating by individuals; thoughit did have a probability of 70%. Equally, earth-bound travel was included by 12 groups(with 22 mentions) versus an individual importance rating of only 5.3 (though an 83%probability). The globalisation of society was reported by 12 groups (with no less than38 mentions in one form or another) but only 5.3 on the individual importance scale(and 32% probability), developments in religion were noted by 11 groups (albeit withonly 16 mentions overall), against a rating of 4.8 and a probability of 47%. In terms ofprobability, the individuals rated anarchy only 23% possible, though it was mentionedby all groups (with no less than 68 mentions), and cloning as 41% possible comparedwith inclusion by nine groups.

All of these divergences seemed to reflect underestimates of the importance of thesefactors by the individuals, who seemed to be less inclined to see the importance of (andlikelihood of) events which involved changes in the structures of society, or those thatwere remote from them (or their organization). Only two aspects, from the list of 50topics which could be directly compared in this way, seemed to be overestimated byindividuals; the cure of cancer was reported by only four groups but rated an 87% prob-ability with individuals, and the move of production to the Third World was mentionedby only two groups against an 84% likelihood as seen by individuals. In these cases itis possible that the groups also developed a more realistic, better-informed view on thebasis of their debate.

Discussion—the techniques

As might be expected, this is a very difficult area to research. In part this is due to thevery wide scope; ‘all human life is there’! In part it is a function of the inevitable degreeof uncertainty which is a feature of predicting any long-term developments: and, whilethis is a widely recognized problem, this does not make the work any easier. Accordingly,the views of the future which emerge, and which we document, must be viewed asspeculative. It would have been tedious to add this caveat to every prediction, so thiscaveat will not be repeated. Even so, it must be kept in mind, for it is a fundamental factof life when one is undertaking long-range planning.

On the other hand, one of the major achievements of the research programme overallhas been its apparent success in improving the potential accuracy of such forecasting.Only time will tell, for the whole picture is still subject to many possible disjunctions. It

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only takes one American President, waking up one morning so tired of life that he decidesto end it all in the most spectacular way possible, to ensure that all bets are off! Evenso, it is a fact that almost all important long-term decisions now ultimately emerge—consensually—from literally billions of small decisions made by all members of a popu-lation. Further, these decisions are (according to our research) primarily swayed by theexpectations of these participants (which we can now ‘measure’), means that the trendswe have detected are more credible than many previous predictions of the future.

Indeed, the new technique of using the quantitative individual data to plot currentexpectations, and that of the qualitative work with groups to indicate future directions,gives us the best map of the future. Governments who decide to journey towards thatfuture without consulting such a map may be considered to be unwise, and possibly unfitto govern.

The one very clear overall pattern which emerged was that the more remote an eventwas, either in terms of time (the far future) or social geography (the structural aspects ofsociety), the less certain it is seen to be. On the other hand, it would be incorrect to readinto this that such remote events are unlikely to occur, rather that as yet they are lesscertain as an outcome. In any case, this is a quite reasonable position for the individual totake. It is, after all, the reason a number of more sophisticated organisations use scenarioplanning—which deliberately explores alternative outcomes in order to allow for futureuncertainty—as their preferred approach to the future.

The individuals’ diffidence about these remote events may, however, pose a problemfor governments; where the key decisions facing them may relate to such long timescalesand socially remote goals. It becomes that much more difficult to take the populationwith them on the planned journey into that future. Remembering that it is the expectationsof the population which will determine the ultimate success, this poses a threat to anygovernment brave enough to attempt this—and, hence, one reason at least for the short-termism embraced by many governments!

Based on our research, however, we believe that this problem can be broken downinto a number of more manageable parts.

Inevitable outcomes

The outcomes of some of these issues are, subject to the usual overriding caveat aboutgrossly unpredictable events, completely predictable over the longer-term; though notover the short-term and the timescales for their ultimate occurrence will typically beuncertain. The classic example of such an issue is the colonization of space. The onlything which can stop this is the decline of civilization itself. Otherwise, history—especially that of the colonization of the Americas—tells us that we will continue to pushout our frontiers and space is—for the time being at least—the ‘final frontier’. What ismore, it no longer requires any significant technological breakthroughs. We may continueto develop ever more efficient technologies for colonizing space, as the new missionobjectives for NASA suggest, but we could already achieve this—albeit very expens-ively—with current technology. Our individual respondents gave these developments lowpriority, but our groups just as clearly indicated their future importance.

In the case of these ‘inevitable outcomes’, which represent a relatively high pro-portion of the remote events in question, government has no option, except to defer thekey decisions (which is too often the option chosen!). The most productive approach

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will, therefore, be to explain the inevitability of the outcome to their electorates who—our research indicates—already understand this.

The ‘pensions crisis’ falls into this category. But, if the problems caused by an agingpopulation are balanced by simply raising the age of retirement, this becomes a majoropportunity. The legalization of drugs, which was expected by the majority of our respon-dents, may also remove another ‘threat’; almost at the stroke of a pen. The emergenceof the old ‘Third World’ as a major economic and political challenger, and the corre-sponding (relative) decline of the West, may seem to offer much greater dangers; untilthis is welcomed as an opportunity for all rather than a threat to some. The same maybe just as true of the emergence of supra-national groupings, such as the EU.

In terms of ‘management actions’ even governments cannot influence the outcomeof such events. Using the research techniques we have developed, however, they willbe aware that this is the case; and will be able to direct resources towards amelioratingthe impacts, or building upon them, rather than wasting their effort ineffectually tryingto stop them happening.

Inevitable changes with unknown outcomes

Some issues are clearly likely to be impacted by significant changes; but the final outcomeis not yet predictable. The classical example here is that relating to the future of politicalparties. It is abundantly evident, from contemporary examples around the globe as muchas from our own research (even with individuals), that the current (Western) system ofparty politics cannot cope with the demands of modern (or, more accurately, post-modern) society. It is fatally flawed, as the growing importance of single issue politicsdemonstrates. As yet, though, no clear solution—which meets the needs of the widerpopulation (in terms of effective management of a range of such single issues)—has beenforthcoming. In this context, the techniques we have pioneered offer—at the quantifiedindividual level—the possibility of detecting these developments and—at the qualitativegroup level—some indication of the future directions of change. With this knowledge itshould be possible for government to, not least, admit that the changes are taking placeand then to most productively steer future developments (in expectations) towards posi-tive outcomes.

Into this category fall such issues as the seeming breakdown of the family. In fact,as far as we can detect, new—and possibly stronger—forms are already emerging: andit is the misguided attempts of governments to set the clock back (and adopt ‘familyvalues’, for instance) which are creating the tensions. In this context, one interestingoutcome of our on-going research seems to be that the greatest value of the Internet maybe its hidden function of keeping family and friends in touch when circumstances dispersethem; solving a major problem caused by our newly mobile society. Similarly, the prob-lems of the under-classes, and those posed by (related) crime, are often magnified byinappropriate responses to the new situations. Fortunately, the similar challenges posedby the emergence of more feminine values, and by the portfolios of lifestyles, seem tohave already been put behind us with a minimum of discomfort.

In the case of these changes, the maps of the future provided by our new techniqueswill enable governments to best influence the outcomes. The quantitative map will tellwhere they are starting from, and the qualitative one will show both the direction thefuture is likely to take and the most productive ways of influencing this.

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Unknown changes

There are also those (fortunately few) changes, for example to the structure of the com-munity, where even the nature of the changes is—as yet—ill-defined. We suspect some-thing is happening, but we do not yet know quite what. In these cases the (group) qualitat-ive element of our research may be the most useful; since it offers the best vehicle forexploring the genuinely unknown—that part of environmental analysis, described byAguilar27 as ‘undirected viewing’, which is most difficult to undertake. As another partof this exploratory process, as well as conditioning individuals to expect change, thismay be more widely undertaken as a ‘great debate’; such as we are currently undertakingwith Strategic Planning Society members.

Thus, for instance, the use of such techniques for exploring the new community,and personal, values which are emerging may offer a more productive approach thanthat, of something akin to nostalgia, which drives the main alternatives offered by thecommunitarians.

Finally, there are the genuinely ‘wild’ cards—the changes we do not even suspectare likely to happen. These may not, though, all be undetectable. Steinmuller28 describesan important sub-category, which he calls ‘creeping catastrophes’ and which account fora relatively large proportion of the surprises which we encounter, where the problem isthat we simply do not see them—even though they are already there for us to see if welook. Again, our group qualitative work2 has, if carried out on a large enough scale,proved successful in surfacing such hidden factors; when they become susceptible to thesame approaches as any other factors.

Again, therefore, the qualitative and quantitative maps may improve governments’ability to influence the future—though here it is the former which are likely to be muchmore important.

In fact, in our experience, these ‘creeping catastrophes’—once surfaced—typicallyprove to be more predictable than most future issues. A typical example is offered bythe coming ‘symbiosis with the computer’. This first emerged, from the group work, interms of the possibility of brain implants. Further investigations showed that the tech-nology behind these is already being developed, but—clearly—the social attitudes neces-sary to support the widespread adoption of such a radical development will take muchlonger. These further investigations, however, eventually led us in a different direction;to realize that, even without brain implants, symbiosis is already under way; using themuch humbler vehicle of the PC, in front of which most workers now spend their lives!

Most organisations, with the exception of just a few of the larger multinationals, willnot have the resources to influence future outcomes in the same way as governments.In this case, we would suggest that the most important aspect of our approach for smallerorganisations is for their managers to positively separate their long-range planning (basedon use of our techniques), which results in ‘robust strategies’ that protect them againstfuture uncertainties, from their traditional corporate strategy processes. When both ofthese have been developed separately, they are simply compared; and the shorter-term(corporate) strategy then ‘steered’ to compensate for future (robust) needs without impact-ing short-term performance. Indeed, in our experience to date with a number of organis-ations, the differences between the two sets of strategy have proved to require only mini-mal ‘steering’ changes in strategy. This aspect of our work is more fully described in the

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new book, Marketing Strategy: the Challenge of the External Environment,29 which pro-vides the basis for our revised MBA course in the field of long-range marketing/planning.

Discussion—the issues

The group of issues which emerged most strongly from the quantified responses of theindividuals are those which might be seen as relating to the ‘green’ environment. At afirst glance, therefore, this represents strong support for the ‘altruistic’ protection, ‘conser-vation’, of the natural environment; in line with the many similar reports in the popularmedia. This is where, however, our (qualitative) group work is important—for it provideda very different interpretation. Our groups placed much less stress on this aspect, andwere often almost dismissive of it. Instead, they looked upon the key issues as representingmaters of survival for humanity as a whole.

If, therefore, we accept this interpretation, all of the top 20% of factors—in the quant-ified results—can be seen to fall into this category. It was made even clearer in thecomments of the groups. Those who, for instance, placed emphasis on the colonizationof space did not generally stress the pushing back of frontiers, as might have beenexpected, but saw it primarily in terms of providing the ultimate ‘lifeboat’ for humankind.Thus, even if humanity across the Earth was totally destroyed—by a collision with acomet, say—there would still be colonies in existence which could guarantee the survivalof our species.

Such a focus on survival may seem selfish, but it—too—can be seen as altruistic;after all, it is not concerned with personal survival. It also represents a sound, rationalapproach to long-term planning. ‘Robust Strategies’,12,29 which we develop (for ourclients) to handle the long-term future of organisations, focus on precisely the same objec-tives; on survival (here of the organisation rather than the individual), rather than onshort-term optimization of performance.

This aspect is also highlighted by another interpretation we put on the less intenseconcentration of groups on the green issues themselves. They focused instead, wedecided, on how governments might positively, and safely, manage all the long-termissues threatening the future of humankind.

If we move away from ‘green’ issues, it is also clear that even individuals recognizethe globalisation of issues. In particular they include the globalisation of business, thepossibility of a global financial crash and the (threat of) domination by Pacific Rim coun-tries. At the opposite end of the spectrum are worries about the significant problems facedby the underclasses—and, in turn, the significant threat these present to society as awhole. In general though, apart from technological issues, the emphasis was—acrossalmost all areas—on survival; in the face of events ranging down from catastrophes tomere crises and stresses!

Conclusion

The techniques we have developed now offer a viable means for mapping current expec-tations and the possible future directions these will take. Sensible use of these shouldprovide governments, and large organisations in general, with a powerful new set of toolsfor positively managing the future. The focus, by groups as much as by individuals, on

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a survivable future represents a mature, responsible approach which governments couldproductively emulate.

Notes and references

1. Mercer, D., A New Qualitative Technique for Exploring the Future, Marketing Education Group (MEG)Conference, Warwick, 1996.

2. Mercer, D., Determining aggregated expectations of the future. Technological Forecasting and SocialChange, 1997, 55, 155–164.

3. Lucas, R. E., Some international evidence on output–inflation trade-off. American Economic Review, 1973,63, 326–334.

4. Mercer, D., A general hypothesis of aggregated expectations. Technological Forecasting and SocialChange, 1997, 55, 145–154.

5. Mercer, D., Predictable futures—the drivers for change. Futures, 1996, 28(9), 829–838.6. Mercer, D., The foreseeable future. Management Decision, 1996, 34(3), 55–61.7. Mercer, D., The Foreseeable Future—‘Millennium Project’ Qualitative Results, OR38 (Operational

Research Society) Conference, 1996.8. Mercer, D., The Predictable Future, BAM (British Academy of Management) Conference, 19969. Mercer, D., Predictable futures—the drivers for change, 5. Internationale Sommerakademie des Sekretariats

fur Zukunftsforschung, 1996.10. Mercer, D., Scenarios made easy. Long Range Planning, 1995, 28(4), 81–86.11. Mercer, D., Simpler scenarios. Management Decision, 1995, 33(4), 32–40.12. Mercer, D., Robust strategies in a day. Management Decision, 1997, 35(3), 219–223.13. Krueger, R. A., Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research. Sage, London, 1988.14. Goldman, A. E. and McDonald, S., The Group Depth Interview: Principles and Practice. Prentice-Hall,

Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1987.15. Wack, P., Scenarios: uncharted waters ahead. Harvard Business Review, 1985 (September–October)

139–150.16. Wack, P., Scenarios: shooting the rapids. Harvard Business Review, 1985 (November–December), 139–

150.17. Schwartz, P., The Art of the Long View. Doubleday, London, 1991.18. Mercer, D., Scenarios in use, EMAC (European Marketing Academy), 1995.19. Mercer, D., Marketing practices in the 1990s. Journal of Targeting, Measurement and Analysis for Market-

ing, 1996, 5(2), 175–181.20. Mercer, D., Industry scenarios—short termism revealed. Industrial Management and Data Systems, 1996,

96(8), 23–27.21. Osgood, E. C., Succi G. J. and Tannenbaum P. H., The Measurement of Meaning. Urbana, NY, 1957.22. Likert, R., A technique for the measurement of attitudes. Archives of Psychology, No. 140 (1932).23. Norusis, M. J., SPSS for Windows: Base System Users Guide (Release 6.0). SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, 1993.24. Microsoft, Microsoft Excel (Version 5.0). Microsoft, Seattle, 1993.25. Rockfellow, J. D., Wild cards: preparing for the ‘Big One’. The Futurist, 1994, (January–February), 14–19.26. Krueger, R. A., Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research. Sage, London, 1988.27. Aguilar, F. J., Scanning the Business Environment. Macmillan, London, 1967.28. Steinmuller, K., The future as wild card, 5. Internationale Sommerkademie des Sekretariats fur Zukunftsfor-

schung—Gelsenkirchen, 1996.29. Mercer, D, Marketing Strategy: The Challenge of the External Environment. Sage, London, 1998.

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Appendix A

Issue/event Importance Possibility Mean date Index(0–9) (%) (AD) (importance

× possibility)

TechnologyControl of personal (car) 6.6 88.0 2015 5.8travelCures for most diseases 7.3 71.5 2028 5.2Homeworking 5.6 83.8 2014 4.7Computing developments 5.2 82.5 2021 4.3Gene manipulation 5.9 69.5 2027 4.1Better air travel 4.4 84.1 2018 3.7Communications 4.5 78.8 2017 3.6developmentsSpace travel 4.1 79.3 2033 3.3Meteor/comet strikes earth 7.5 40.9 2033 3.1Domestic use of IT 3.4 77.3 2018 2.7Brain implants 4.4 62.2 2033 2.7Global tourism for all 3.4 64.6 2022 2.2Contact with aliens 6.1 35.4 2036 2.1Underwater colonies 3.7 47.0 2038 1.7Space colonies 3.4 45.1 2045 1.5Interplanetary trade 3.6 37.2 2045 1.3SocietySignificant underclass 6.8 78.7 2015 5.4problemsMajor pension/welfare crisis 6.2 75.6 2019 4.7Crime endemic 6.9 61.6 2019 4.3New community values 6.2 69.9 2021 4.3New personal values emerge 5.6 74.1 2017 4.2Portfolio of lifestyles 5.0 79.9 2017 4.0Notable rise in feminine 5.4 70.1 2014 3.8valuesAverage lifespan 100 + 5.8 64.6 2034 3.7Spread of fundamentalism 6.4 56.4 2019 3.6Drugs legalized 5.6 60.4 2018 3.4Universal bill of rights 5.7 60.4 2029 3.4Social breakdown 7.1 44.5 2026 3.1Changed marriage 4.0 74.1 2008 3.0expectationsDigitization of every medium 4.4 64.5 2018 2.8Resurgence of mass religion 4.5 42.4 2028 1.9

Continued overleaf

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× possibility)

EconomicsGlobalization of business 6.4 85.8 2015 5.5Global financial crash 7.6 66.5 2019 5.0Change from market forces 6.5 60.7 2020 4.0Multinationals dominate 6.3 60.1 2023 3.8Widespread unemployment 6.0 58.1 2022 3.5Global economy 6.3 53.5 2032 3.4Global labour market 5.3 47.6 2027 2.5EnvironmentEnvironmental crisis 8.1 86.7 2017 7.0Major global warming effects 8.2 77.1 2023 6.3Fossil fuel shortage 7.4 84.8 2027 6.3Global water shortage 8.2 70.4 2023 5.7Global green technology 7.5 73.8 2028 5.5Safe nuclear energy 7.4 70.7 2029 5.3Serious overpopulation 8.0 66.5 2029 5.3Risky nuclear proliferation 8.1 61.0 2019 4.9Mineral resources run out 7.8 62.8 2042 4.9Major global disaster 7.3 66.3 2018 4.8Widespread famine 7.9 60.0 2026 4.7Food for all 6.4 68.3 2025 4.3Major wars 8.5 44.3 2030 3.8Ozone layer disappears 8.3 36.6 2034 3.0EducationLearning new skills 5.9 86.9 2013 5.1Global mass education 6.0 69.5 2028 4.2Demise of traditional school 4.8 74.1 2022 3.6Universal language 4.6 43.3 2035 2.0PoliticalPacific Rim dominates world 7.3 75.0 2028 5.4Decline of nation states 6.3 68.3 2024 4.3Resurgence of nationalism 6.3 63.4 2019 4.0Supra-national government 6.3 62.8 2028 3.9Decline of USA 6.1 61.6 2021 3.8New world order 6.7 55.3 2032 3.7Third World dominates 6.1 56.7 2031 3.5politicsNew local power 5.6 62.2 2021 3.5European federation 6.0 52.7 2018 3.2Single global culture 6.2 45.5 2029 2.8

Continued opposite

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× possibility)

Rejection of political parties 6.2 44.5 2031 2.8Russian expansion 6.0 45.1 2024 2.7Full gender equality 5.5 43.0 2035 2.4City states dominate 5.2 40.9 2024 2.1economics

Appendix B

Issue/event Groups Mentions Group Impor- Possi- Individual MeanIndex tance bility Index date(groups × (0–9) (%) (importance (AD)mentions) × possibility)

Medical 15 43 6.5 7.5 80 6.0 2028advancesGenetic 12 22 2.6 7.8 87 6.8 2023engineeringCloning 9 15 1.4 6.2 41 2.5 2039New animals 6 8 0.5 4.3 65 2.8 2022Cancer cure 4 6 0.2 4.2 87 3.6 2023Medical 94 6.7 65 4.3 2022Better travel 12 22 2.6 5.3 83 4.4 2017Energy 11 24 2.6 7.5 80 6.0 2028developmentsSafe nuclear 7 9 0.6 7.7 60 4.6 2028energyTechnology 95 6.8 71 4.9 2022Homeworking 8 13 1.0 5.7 85 4.8 2012Artificial 7 10 0.7 5.3 83 4.4 2026intelligenceVirtual reality 7 9 0.6 4.2 90 3.8 2017Robots 6 7 0.4 3.2 78 2.5 2025IT Revolution 93 4.7 81 3.8 2018Space travel 11 26 2.9 4.0 71 2.8 2040Alien contact 6 16 1.0 6.0 35 2.1 2036Asteroid strike 7 11 0.8 7.5 41 3.1 2033Underwater 4 5 0.2 3.7 47 1.7 2038colonies

Continued overleaf

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Issue/event Groups Mentions Group Impor- Possi- Individual MeanIndex tance bility Index date(groups × (0–9) (%) (importance (AD)mentions) × possibility)

Space 58 2.5 71 1.8 2019Population 11 17 1.9 8.7 79 6.8 2030growthLife expectancy 10 16 1.6 5.8 65 3.8 2034upContraception up 7 14 1.0 7.7 73 5.6 2030Declining 8 10 0.8 7.7 48 3.7 2029populationPopulation 81 5.2 41 2.1 2024Food shortage 12 21 2.5 7.7 59 4.5 2025Food substitutes 8 15 1.2 7.3 65 4.8 2030Water shortage 6 10 0.6 8.8 59 5.2 2027Resources 67 5.2 41 2.1 2024Leisure time up 5 16 0.8 5.5 76 4.2 2017Distance 6 10 0.6 4.7 79 3.7 2018learning upUniversal 4 5 0.2 4.7 43 2.0 2035language

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The future quantified