The Evolution of Public Understanding of Science %28LSERO Version%29.Doc

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Martin W. Bauer

The evolution of public understanding ofscience - discourse and comparativeevidenceArticle (Accepted version)(Refereed)

Original citation:Bauer, Martin W. (2009) The evolution of public understanding of science - discourse andcomparative evidence. Science, technology and society, 14 (2). pp. 221-240. ISSN 0971-7218

DOI: 10.1177/097172180901400202

2009 SAGE Publications

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1

TheEvolutionofPublicUnderstandingofScience

DiscourseandComparativeEvidence

MartinWBauer

LondonSchoolofEconomics,InstituteofSocialPsychology;

[email protected]

PapersubmittedtothejournalScience,TechnologyandSociety[6000words]

Abstract

PublicUnderstandingofScience(PUS)isafieldofactivityandanareaofsocialresearch.

Theevolutionof this fieldcomprisesboth thechangingdiscourseand thesubstantive

evidenceof

achanging

public

understanding.

i

In

the

first

part,

Iwill

present

ashort

account on how the discourse of PUS moved from Literacy, via PUS, to Sciencein

Society.Thisislessastoryofprogress,butoneoffalsepolemicsandthemultiplication

ofconcerns. Inthesecondpart, IwillshowsomeempiricalevidenceonhowPUShas

changedbydrawingonmassmediadataandlargescalecomparativesurveyevidence.I

concludebystressingthattheScienceSociety relationship isvariableboth indistance

betweenscienceandthewidersocietyandinthequalityofthisrelationship.

Socialpsychology

comes

to

this

field

of

societal

interest

not

by

conversion

from

anatural

sciencelabbench,butfromafocusoncommonsense,itsprocesses,structuresandfunctions.

Commonsensetakes inspiration frommanysources,andduringthe20th

centurysciencehas

become a very important, if not the most important inspiration of common sense. Thus the

problemofpublicunderstandingofsciencehingesonunderstandingcommonsense.
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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2

Like any social phenomenon, the public understanding of science is a matter of factual

description,butalsoofsocietaldiscourse.Theworldweliveandtakeforgrantedasnaturalis

raisedandsustainedthroughcommunication(seeLuckmann,1995).

Inaddressingtheevolutionofpublicunderstandingofscience(inshortPUS)Imustjuggletwo

balls:in

the

one

hand,

the

evolution

of

the

discourse,

in

the

other

the

empirical

evidence

of

changes inpublicunderstanding. Iwillendwithsomespeculationson the futureof research

intopublicunderstandingofscience. Iam inthesituationofanepidemiologistwho isasked:

arepeoplemoredepressedin2000thanwewerein1900?Heorsheispainfullyawarethatthe

definitionofdepressionhaschanged,andthatanychangeintherateofdepressionmightonly

reflectthechangeofdefinition.Itislikescoringagamewheretherulesfrequentlychange.

1.Evolution

of

discourse

Theacademic discussionsof publicunderstanding of science are increasingly reviewed. Iwill

basemystorylargelyonourrecentaccount(seeBauer,Allum&Miller,2007),mainlybasedon

theBritishexperienceoverthepast25+years:fromLiteracy,toPUS,toScienceinSociety.Each

of these phases is moved by a polemic, attributing a particular deficit, and encouraging

particular research questions and forms of interventions. Contrary to the rhetoric of

polemicists, this is not a narrativeof progress,butone of multiplicationofdiscourses. What

might look likeachronology in table1simply shows the relativeageofdiscourses; the later

doesnotentirelysupersedetheformer.

Scienceliteracy

Theideaofscientificliteracyseesscienceasanextensionofthequestforreading,writingand

numeracy.Furthermore, inademocracypeoplemakepoliticaldecisions;however,thepublic

voicecanonlybeeffectiveifcitizenscommandrelevantknowledge.Thus,ignorance,scientific

likepolitical,onlybreedsalienation,demagogyandextremism.

The literacy ideaattributesaknowledgedeficittothepublic.Thisdeficitmodelofthepublic

callsfor

increased

efforts

in

science

education.

However,

it

also

plays

into

the

hands

of

technocraticattitudesamongdecisionmakers:anignorantpublicisnotqualifiedtotakepartin

decisions.

An influential concept of science literacy includes four elements: (a) knowledge of basic

textbookfactsofscience, (b)anunderstandingofmethodssuchasprobabilityreasoningand

experimentaldesign,(c)anappreciationofthepositiveoutcomesofscienceandtechnologyfor


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science, and (d) the rejection of superstitious beliefs such as astrology or numerology. This

became the basis of the biannual science indicator surveys of the US National Science

Foundation(NSF)fromthelate1970sonwards.

Table 1: Different paradigms, problems and solutions

Period Attribution Strategy

Diagnosis Research

ScienceLiteracy Publicdeficit Measurementofliteracy

Knowledge Education

1960s1980s

PublicUnderstanding

Public

deficit

Know

xattitude

Attitudes Attitudechange

19851990s Education

PublicRelations

ScienceinSociety Trustdeficit Participation

Expertdeficit Deliberation

1990s present Notionsofpublic

Crisisofconfidence Angelsmediators

Impactevaluation

The measurement of factual knowledge is the key problem of this paradigm. Knowledge is

measured by quizlike items. Respondents are asked to decide whether a statement of a

scientificfactistrue,falseorwhethertheydontknow.Someoftheseitemshavetravelledfar

acrosstheglobe,andhitthenewsheadlines.

Criticshavearguedthattheessenceofscienceismethodandnotfacts.Thereforeawarenessof

issueslikeuncertainty,peerreviewing,thesettlingofscientificcontroversies,andreplicationof

experimentsshouldbereflectedintheassessmentofliteracy.

Since the 1970s many countries have undertaken audits of adult scientific literacy: USA,

Canada,China,

Brazil,

India,

Korea,

Japan,

Bulgaria,

Switzerland,

Britain,

Germany

and

France

andEUgenerallythroughEUROBAROMETER.Theanalysisofthesedataremainsproblematic.A

possible problem of any comparison remains the fairness of the indicator. Countries have

differentsciencebases,andliteracyreflectsthesesciencebases.Theissueofunbiasedliteracy

measuresdeservesmoreattention(seeRaza,Singh&Dutt,2002).

3


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Thecritiqueofthe literacyideafocusesonseveral issues.Whyshouldsciencedeservespecial

attention? What about flowerbinding? What about history,accountancy or law? Arguments

aboundforthesocietalsignificanceofothersthanscientificknowledge.Thecasefor science

literacyhasrecentlyseenarenaissancewiththeOECDefforts(seePISA,2006).Its2006survey

in70+countriesassessedtheperformanceonscienceandmathematicsamongthepopulation

inprimary

education.

This

is

likely

to

reopen

the

debate

on

adult

literacy.

PublicUnderstandingofScience

Inthesecondhalfofthe1980s,newconcernsemergeunderthetitlepublicunderstandingof

science.This transition ismarkedby the influential reportof theRoyalSocietyofLondonof

1985.Like theprevious literacyphase, thediagnosis isthatofapublicdeficit.However,now

attitudestoscienceareforegrounded.Thepublicdoesnotshowsufficientsupportforscience;

andthis isofconcerntoscientific institutions.TheRoyalSocietytooktheviewofmanyof its

membersandassumedthatbetterknowledgewillbethedriverofpositiveattitudes;hencethe

axiom:the

more

you

know,

the

more

you

love

it.

This research agenda moved away from knowledge to that of attitudes. The concern for

scientific literacycarriedovertotesttheexpectation themoreyouknow,themoreyou love

it.However,theemphasisshiftedfromathresholdmeasuretothatofacontinuum:oneisnot

literateor illiterate,butmoreor lessknowledgeable.Andthecorrelationbetweenknowledge

andattitudebecomesthemainfocusofresearch.Buttheexpectationthatbetterknowledge

drives positive attitudes is not confirmed. Although overall there may be some relation, on

controversialissuesthereisnocorrelationatall.Wellandlesswellinformedcitizensaretobe

foundoneithersideofthecontroversy.Socialpsychology,thoughnottheRoyalSociety,knows

forsometimethatknowledgeitnotadriverofattitude,butaqualityindex:attitudes,whether

positiveor

negative,

that

are

based

on

knowledge

are

held

more

strongly

and

thus

resist

change.Wellinformedandlesswellinformedcitizensmakeuptheirmindsdifferently,butdo

notnecessarilycometodifferentconclusions.

PUS research extended its concepts, methods and data. Attitudes to science may be part of

general political sophistication, a public resource not specific to science. The polemic over

public deficits also stimulated complementary data streams, such as qualitative discourse

analysesandmassmediamonitoring,whichreveallongtermtrendssuchasthemedicalisation

ofsciencenewsoverthelast30years(seeBauer,1998).

PUShadarationalistandarealistagenda.Fortherationalist,attitudesarisefrominformation

processingwitharationalcore. It isassumedthat ifpeoplehadallthe information,andwere

ableto

understand

probabilities,

they

would

be

more

supportive

of

science.

The

battle

for

the

publicisabattleformindswithmoreinformationandthecorrectstatisticalreasoning(i.e.risk

perception).

Fortherealist,attitudesareemotionalrelationswiththeworld.Howemotionsmayrelateto

rationality is a vexing question. Realists understand emotions with the logic of advertising.

Thus, the battle for the public mind becomes a battle for hearts. How to attract public


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5

attention?Theissuebecomesoneofsexingupevidence.Thepublicistheconsumerwhoisbe

seduced.Inthislog,thereislittledifferencebetweenscientificnewsandwashingpowder.

The critique of PUS again focused on the deficit models of knowledge or attitude: Negative

attitudesareneitheranexpressionof lackofknowledgenorofgoodjudgment.However,the

attribution of a publicdeficitexpresses the timidity or even institutional neuroticism (Brian

Wynne),the

diffuse

anxieties

and

condescendence

of

scientific

actors

vis

vis

the

public.

The

publicdeficitmodelis infactaselffulfillingprophecy:thepublic,apriorideficient,cannotbe

trusted.Mistrustonthepartofscientificactorswillbepaidback inkindwithpublicmistrust.

Negativepublicattitudesthenconfirmtheassumptionamongscientists:thepublicisnottobe

trusted.Thiscircularitycalledforsoulsearchingamongscientificactors.

ScienceinandofSociety

ScienceinSociety reversed the deficit idea: not with the public, but with the scientific

institutionsandtheiractorswhohavelostthetrustofthepublic.Evidenceofnegativeattitudes

toscience

during

the

BSE

crisis

(early

1990s),

the

debate

over

GM

food

(late

1990s),

and

diverse

social research led to the diagnosis of a crisis of confidence in the famous House of Lords

report of 2000. Science and technology stand in a relationship with society. A crisis of trust

indicatesabreachofcontractthatneedspatchingup.Falseconceptionsofthepublicoperate

among scientists and in policymaking, i.e deficit concepts of the public; and thesemisguide

communicationeffortsandinterventionsandalienatethepublicstillfurther.

Many ScienceinSociety activists are committed action researchers who do not separate

analysis from intervention. The aim is to change science policy. This agenda, academically

grounded as it may be, often ends up as political consultancy. Advice is offered on how to

rebuild public trust. Public deliberation and participation is the Lords road to rebuild trust.

Eventmaking

is

advocated:

hearings,

citizen

juries,

deliberative

opinion

polling,

consensus

conferencing, tables rondes,scopingexercises, science festivals,andnationaldebatesand so

forth.Astheseeventsarecostlyandrequireknowhowtoorganise,theybecometheremitof

private angelsratherthancivilservantsoracademics. Angelsareageoldgobetweens,but

herenotbetweenheavenandearthbutbetweenadisenchantedpublicandtheinstitutionsof

science, industry and policy making. Thus, an industry emerges that exudes confidence by

apparentlyknowinghowtoovercomethiscrisisofpublictrust.

The ethos of public participation was soon complemented by an ethos of evaluation. In the

utilitarian spirit of modern politics sooner or later the question arises: and what do these

scienceeventsbring(effectiveness)?Whatistheirvalueformoney(efficiency)?Arethereany

unintendedconsequences

that

are

better

avoided?

Ironically,toevaluateparticipatorypolicymakersreturntotraditional ideasofpublic literacy

of science research, running the risk of the reinventing the wheel of literacy, attitudes,

interests, and media attention, albeit this time for a different car, namely the evaluation of

publicdeliberation.The reentryofPUSvia thebackdoorofevaluation research is ironicbut


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6

unavoidable.Ispendmuchofmypublicspeakingremindingpeopleofwhatwealreadyknowin

ordertoavoidtheinefficienciesofreinventionthewheel.

2.Evidence

of

change

in

public

understanding

Inthiscontext,assessingtheevidenceofchangesinPUSbecomeshighlyrelevant.Iwillpresent

twokindsofdatastreams.Firstly,there istheevidenceforchanges inthepublicattentionto

sciencetakeninmassmediamonitoringoveralongerperiodoftime.Secondly,Iwillreporton

large scale comparisons for scientific literacy, attitudes and interest, across very different

contextsandovertime,from1989to2005inEurope.

TheFigure1showsthecoverageofscienceandtechnology intheBritishpressbetween1946

and1992(seeBaueretal,2006).Thisisastudywecompletedinmid1990sandsinceseekto

update.Among

other

things

we

asked

ourselves

how

much

science

coverage

there

was,

and

howdoesnewsrelatetoscience,positivelyornegatively.Thefigureshowsthatthepresenceof

scienceinthepublicisnotaconstant,norisitsevaluation.

Therearetwokindsofintensityfigures:oneistheestimateofabsolutenumbersofarticles,the

otherrelativetothenewsspacewhichexpandedenormouslysincethe1940swhentherewas

paperrationing.Publicattentionpeakedintheearly1960s,declinedintothe1970s,andseems

to recover since. The moving average is like a heat indicator of science. The relative figures

clearlymarkthepeakintheearly1960s,whichasitseemshasnotbeenrecoveredsince.

Figure 1: Science and technology in the British Press, 19461992: intensity and

evaluation(source:Baueretal,2006).


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-6.00

-5.00

-4.00

-3.00

-2.00

-1.00

0.00

1.00

2.00

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

1946

1950

1954

1958

1962

1966

1970

1974

1978

1982

1986

1990

1994

meanevalsco

re

index

Evaluationequallyfluctuates;however,notentirelyparalleltonewsintensity.Onlyinthe1950s

doesmuch

news

also

mean

good

news.

Here

we

are

in

the

post

war

era

and

its

enthusiasm

for

atomsforpeaceandtherolloutofcivilnuclearpowerthatcarriespublicopinion. Inthe2nd

halfofthe1960s,theBritishpressturnsmorescepticalandremainsso,onlytorecoveratrend

towardsmorepositivetoneintothe1990s.Itmightwellbethatthisshowstheinfluenceofthe

RoyalSocietys1985appealtomorecoverageandmorepositivecoverageonthepartofthe

massmedia.

Figure 2: Intensity of Biotech news in the British Press, 19732002: intensity and

evaluation(source:Bauer,2007;Gaskell&Bauer,2006).

-0.8

-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

0.00

10.00

20.00

30.00

40.00

50.00

60.00

70.00

80.00

90.00

100.00

1 1 1

1

1 1

evaluationstd

index1999=100

Salience

UKeval-std

The Figure 2 shows what happened since the 1970s: biotechnology news (answering to

keywords like genetics, genes,cloning,biotechnologyetc.) ina singleBritish newspaper (see

bar chart). Coverage reaches its peak in 1999 with the Great Food Debate over genetically

7


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modifiedcropsandderivedfoodstuffs.Ourscoreshowsmorethan1600referencesinadaily

paper inoneyear.Thiswasanewsevent, thoughnotat the levelofwar (Iraq)or terrorism

(NorthernIreland;911inNewYork;or705inLondon).

The line graphic shows the tone of the news, deviating from the overall positive average. It

showshighly

positive

news

in

the

early

1980s,

then

with

rising

news

intensity

the

declining

enthusiasmofcommentary.After1996,withthearrivalofgmcropsandDollythesheep,the

newsbecomesrathererratic,butstaysoverallwithamorescepticaltone. Thesetwographics

suggestisthefollowing:

TheflowofsciencenewsinBritishsociety,andprobablyelsewhereisnotaconstant

Theevaluationtoneofsciencenewsisequallynotaconstant.

Negativenewsisnotanexpressionofantiscientificcomplex:overallsciencenewsand

geneticnews

do

not

run

in

parallel.

They

do

from

1946

to

the

1970s;

since

they

part

ways. General science news becomes more positive again; biotechnology news is

treatedmoresceptical.

Contrary toassumptionsofanaturalcycleofpublicattention,sciencenewsdoesnot

move from initiallynegativenewsandpublicoutcry tomoreconsiderateandpositive

newswithtime(e.g.Haldane,1925).Tothecontrary:initialhype,aswithnewgenetics,

giveslaterwaytomoreconsideredcoverage.

IndustrialandPostindustrialPUS

Letusnowturntotheevidenceofchangingpublicunderstandingofsciencethatemergesfrom

comparativesurveyresearch.Someyearsago(seeBaueretal,1994)wantedtoputtorestthe

debatesovertheknowledgeattitudemodeloftheRoyalSociety:themoreyouknow,themore

youloveit.Thiswasnotsomuchafalseobservation,butonethatwasnotuniversallyvalid.We

calledourmodelthepostindustrialmodelofPUS:asasocietymoveslongtheaxialtransition

froman industrialtoapostindustrialandknowledge intensiveeconomy,thedistributionand

relationbetweenpeoplesknowledge,theirinterestsandattitudestosciencefalldifferently.

Figure3:ThecorrelationbetweenknowledgeandattitudetoscienceacrossIndiaand

Europe(source:NCAER2004&Eurobarometer2005).


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y = -0.1172x21.0966x - 1.4524 +

R20.2196 =

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0

Know

Att

iA

ArecentcollaborationwithIndiancolleaguesallowsustothroughtestthisidea.Wearedealing

with large scale observations of knowledge and attitudes in very different socioeconomic

contexts:30,

000

interviews

in

23

Indian

states

and

32,

000

interviews

across

32

Europe

states

andbeyond.Thisdatabaseallowsustomeasureboth literacyandattitudesand relate these

twomeasuresasnationalindicators.

TheresultsconfirmwhatwasinitiallyobservedacrossEuropeinaglobalcontext.Movingalong

thescaleofeconomicdevelopment,asindicatedbyGDPpercapita,peoplearegenerallymore

knowledgeableofscience,notleastbecauseeducationisthekeydriverofscientificliteracyand

economicdevelopment. Ifwecompare literacy levelswithaggregateattitudestoscience(see

Figure 3: two attitude items combined: S&T make our lives more comfortable, easier, and

healthier;Scientists

should

be

allows

to

experiment

on

animals),

we

find

the

non

linear

relationshipwhichwepredicted.Indialiesgenerallyontheleftsideofthedevelopmentscale,

Europeontherighthandside.As IndianStatesmoveuptheknowledgescale,sodopositive

attitudes; while in Europe more knowledge comes together with more sceptical attitudes.

Overall we can model this with an inverted Ushape relationship between knowledge and

attitudes.Itseemsthatsomewhereonthisaxialtransitiontheinversionoccurs:belowacertain

level knowledge drives positive attitudes, beyond that point, knowledge drives sceptical

attitudestowardsscience.Thisisonlycrosssectionalevidence,comparingEuropeanandnon

Europeancontexts.AconclusivetestofthepostindustrialPUShypothesis,adynamicmodel,

requireslongitudinal

evidence

in

any

one

of

these

contexts.

Figure4: thecorrelationbetweenGDPandendorsing the mythof science (source:

Eurobarometer2005)

9y = -2E-05x + 3.5346

R2 = 0.53

2.40

2.60

2.80

3.00

3.20

3.40

3.60

3.80

4.00

scient

ificideology


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10

EUROBAROMETER 63.1 (2005) included four propositions, each one of them expressing a

philosophicalpostulateofscience.Peoplewereaskedtoagreeordisagreewitheachofthem:

science isomnipotent,partofthesolutionnottheproblem,willonedayprovideacomplete

worldpicture,andshouldhavefullautonomy.Statistically,theseitemsformaconsistentscale,

positioningpeople

with

regard

to

and

ideology

and

myth

of

science.

Byplottingtheaveragescoresofscientificideologywefindanegativecorrelationwithlevelof

socioeconomic development across Europe. As economic development and science literacy

increases, belief in scientific ideology decreases (correlation is r = 0.74). The negative

correlationbetweenknowledgeandthemythofsciencealsoholdsatthe individual level (no

shownhere).InEuropeancountrieslowontheGDPscale,thecorrelationbetweenknowledge

andmythofscience ispositive themore literatethemoreyousubscribetothe ideologyof

science.As

you

move

to

the

higher

end

the

GDP

scale,

this

correlation

becomes

ever

more

negative:themoreyouknow,thelesslikelyyousubscribetoaviewthatscienceisomnipotent,

alwayspartofthesolution,willofferacompleteworldpicture,andshouldhavenoconstraints.

Ouranalysisofthesamedataalsoshows(notshownhere),thattherejectionofanideologyof

sciencegoestogetherwithautilitarianviewofscience:itdependsontheconsequences,case

bycase?

These comparisons show that for once and with regard to public understanding of

science, the Royal Societys 1985 view is not universally true, but particular. The

operationalaxiom

the

more

you

know,

the

more

you

love

it

might

be

correct

in

the

context of a developing and industrial society. But in the knowledge intensive post

industrial context this is no longer the case, rather: familiarity might breed (some)

contempt[oratleastascepticalloyalty].


12/20

Furthermore, the educated publics of Europe are more and more sophisticated as to

theirimageofscience.Citizensarelessimpressedbyviewsofsciencewhichamountto

a modern myth of science. The more knowledgeable people are, the less they are

inclinedtoideologicalviewsofscience;theyassumeamoreutilitarianassessment.

Changesacross

Europe:

1989

to

2005

Whatistheevidenceoflongitudinalchange?IhaverecentlyembarkedtoconstructaEuropean

databaseofallcomparablesurveysofpublicunderstandingsincethe1970s.iiThisdatabasewill

allowus to lookat fourwavesofquestionsasked in12Europeancountries four times since

1989.Eachsurveycollected1000 interviewsacrossEU12andwehaveabout60comparable

questions.

Wecannowconstructagecohortsacross thesedifferentsurveys (technically speaking these

are quasicohorts because constructed expost). This means we regroup for each survey the

respondentsborn inaparticularperiodofEuropeanhistory.Acohort isdefinedasenteringa

systematthesametime.Thisgivesusavirtualviewofhistoricaldevelopmentsacrossdifferent

generationsandtheirexperiences.

We defined five cohort groups: Roaring 1920s, War&Crisis, Baby Boomers, Gen X and New

Order (seeappendix).Foreachofourvariablesknowledge, interestandattitudewecan

nowtracethevirtualtrajectorythroughfivegenerationsandcomparethesein12EUcountries.

Figure5:

Knowledge

of

science

and

generational

cohorts

(source:

Eurobarometer)

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

105

110

115

120

new ordergen XbabyboomCrisis&WarRoaring 20s

>19771963-761950-621930-49


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interestedinthemorerecentgenerations,astheycarrythetorchofthefuture.Theordering

between the countries seems to be rather different in GenerationX and New Order. For

exampleinItaly,thereisasignificantdeclineinscientificknowledgefromthegenerationofthe

1960s to that of the 1980s. In the UK, it seems that the Baby Boomers are the leaders in

scientific

literacy,

not

to

be

rivalled

by

later

generations.

Figure6:Interestinscienceandgenerationalcohorts(source:Eurobarometer)

'very interested in new scientific discoveries'

-0.60

-0.50

-0.40

-0.30

-0.20

-0.10

0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

new ordergen XbabyboomCrisis&WarRoaring 20s

>19771963-761950-621930-4919771963-761950-621930-49


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13

Portuguese are on a bumper ride, the New Order with less positive attitudes than their

predecessors.OntheotherhandtheFrenchare inseculardeclinewiththeirpositiveviewof

science,thewargenerationbeingthemostpositiveofall.

These data show us diverse trajectories of PUS across the Europe EU12 with the following

conclusions:

Data integration carries enormous potential to create indicators of cultural, inter

generationaldynamics.

Thisdynamicsislikelytobedifferentindifferentcontextswhichwouldsuggestthatwe

aretappingintoascientificculturewithaspecificdynamicthatneedstobeexplained.

Knowledgeisoverallincreasingacrossthegenerationsinallcontexts;whiletheliteracy

ofdifferentgenerationsrankorderdifferentlyacrossdifferentcountries.

Interest isconvergingacrossgenerations.Somecountriesshowsseculardecline,while

othersecularincreaseinscientificinterest.

Attitude to science shows very diverse intergenerational dynamics in the different

countries.

3.Mappingtosocietalconversationofscience:distancesand

topography

Thepaperendswithsomespeculationonwherethisallmightleadtoandcometogether.The

publicunderstandingof sciencealwayshadadoublenature. It ison theonehanda fieldof

activityofoutreachfromsciencetothepublic.Thisincludestraditionalactivitieslikelecturing,

writing popular books and organising science museums, to making radio and television


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14

programmes,tomorerecentsciencecentres,cafescientifique,andconsensusconferencesand

deliberativeforumsoncontroversialmatters. Itseemsthatthisfieldofactivityhasexpanded

considerably over the last 10 or more years, internationally. On the other hand, public

understanding of science is a small field of social scientific research full of common sense

speculations.

After

all,

it

is

rather

difficult

to

step

out

of

common

sense

and

to

be

scientific

aboutcommonsense.

Facedwiththetaskofdescribingtheevolutionofpublicunderstandingofscience,onefacesan

evolutionwithtwostrands:Firstly,theevolutionofdiscoursefromScienceLiteracytoScience

& Society with its polemic over the notion of public deficits; secondly, the evidence on

substantivechangesinthepublicsrelationtoscience.

The presence of science in public conversations, as indicated by media presence, is not a

constant. It comes in waves, one in the 1950s and 1960s, and again since the 1990s to the

present.

The survey evidence shows that the public understanding of science might be significantly

different inan industrialdevelopingcontextandaknowledgeintensivedevelopedcontext. In

thelattermoreknowledgedoesnotbringmoresupportforscience,ratherutilitarianscrutiny,

andanendtowidespreadbeliefsinideologyandmythsofwhatsciencemightbe.

Contrary to the tenants of the public deficit idea, I do not consider a sceptical public as a

problem,ratherasaresourcethatneedstobemaintainedandinvestedin.Thisisparticularly

importantasevermorescienceconducted intheprivatesector,withinacommercial logic. In

thiscontext,

acritical

public

is

an

asset

rather

than

aproblem

for

the

future

of

science

(see

Bauer,2008;Bauer&Gregory,2007).

Buttoestablishwhatproportionofthepubliciscriticalofscience,andtospreadworryabout

this, has not been my purpose today. My main point is to demonstrate the viability of

indicatorsofpublicunderstandingof science,both in thecontextof largescale international

comparisons,butalso longitudinallyover time.Such indicatorsare importanttomapoutthe

changingrelationsbetweenscienceandsociety,whichisbothahistoricalandaglobalvariable.

This is very much the future of survey research in PUS. Surveys are ultimately, despite their

reputationastheGoldStandardofsocialresearch,justsnapshotsintime.Ifweareseriously

interesteddynamicsandprocesses,weneedtoconsiderrepeatedmeasuresandadvocatethe

survivalofsuchmeasuresinatimeofshortmemoryandshiftingagendas,butwealsoneedto

consider complementary data streams such as media monitoring and discourse mappings

(Bauer,Shukla&Allum,2007).


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15

It might be informative to go back toa classical text in the sociology of knowledge by Fleck

(1935)onthe makingofascientific fact.Flecksuggestedan imageofconcentricspheresof

science,similartoaplanetarysystemofacentreandcirculatingperipheries(seefigure8).With

thiscoreperipherymodelofscience,Fleckintimatesthatanesotericcentreofscientificactivity

is

surrounded

by

concentric

exoteric

genres

of

public

communication

such

as

handbooks

and

textbooks, popular science productions, mass media coverage of science and everyday

conversations. As we move from the esoteric to the exoteric spheres, things get simplified,

moreconcrete,andmorecertain injudgement,exactlywhatoneexpectspopular science to

do:tellushowthingsareorhowtheyarenot,theknownknownsandtheknownunknowns!

Flecksclaimsthatscientistsdependontheseexotericcirclesnotonlyforsociallegitimacybut

also forepistemicreassurance. Publiccommunication istheelixirof lifeofscience.Thusthe

publicopinionofscienceisnotanepiphenomenonofscientificactivitythatcanbeconsidered

ordismissedatawhim.Tocontrary it isacrucialfeatureof itsoperationsandaconditionof

continuity.It

is

also

important

to

recognise

that

this

Eso

Exo

relationship

cannot

be

accounted

forasmutualdeficits.Firstand foremost, relationshipsarecharacterisedby relativedistance

andqualityofconversations.Andthistopographymustbeourresearchfocus.


17/20

Esoteric

core

Exoteric=PUS,publicopinion

Handbookcodification

Gradientof

Simplification

Iconicity,Concreteness

Certaintyofattitude&judgement

16

proliferation of scientific events. How do these events scale up from local activities to the

Figure8:concentricsphereofsciencecommunication(afterFleck,1935)

ThustheproblemofPUSresearchforthefuturewillbetomaptheesotericexotericdistanceof

the public conversation from science. To make this an informative exercise this must be an

internationalexercisebasedoncomparabledatastreams,likeEurobarometerhasachievedto

someextentacrossEurope.AtaconferenceinNovember2007attheRoyalSocietyinLondon,

an internationalteamofresearchersbeganto inventorytheexistingdatabasesandtoassess

theircomparability.

We

have

even

attempted

to

construct

aCultural

Indicator

of

Science

giving each country an index value similar to the Human Development Index (see Shukla &

Bauer,2007).Theideaofmeasuringaculturaldistancebetweenscienceandthepublic isnot

anentirelynew idea,butemerges fromdiscussionswith Indiancollagues (seeRaza,Singh&

Dutt,2002). Intimesuchmeasuresofdistancewillmakeusefultoolstoevaluatethecurrent

[controversialreception]

Pathofepistemic

legitimation

AEsoExodistancemetric? Politics

State

Economy

markets

citizens

education

consumers

Students


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17

ofrelationships,butdotheyreallyachievewhattheysetouttoachieve?This isaneminently

Likeotherrelationships,sciencesocietyisnotjustamatterofdistance,butalsooneofquality.

References

[for an extended list of references on the topic, see Bauer (2008) and Bauer, Allum & Miller

auer MW (2008) Survey research and the public understanding of science, in: M Bucchi & B

auer MW (2008) Paradigm change for Science Communication: Commercial Science needs a

auer MW (2007) The public career of genes trends in public sentiment from 1946 to 2002,

scientificcultureofthenationanditsconversations?Dotheyincreaseordecreasethescience

societydistance?Theseeventsaredesignedtodecreasedistanceandtocreateacertainquality

empirical question. Good intentions are no substitute for outcome monitoring. Like for any

strategicaction,

there

are

potential

unintended

negative

consequences

that

deserve

attention

(Weingart,2001).

Weneedtoexploreinsomedetailhowdifferentgroups,maybe inequidistancefromscience,

relate to its achievements and propositions. Here the analysis of generational cohorts in

differentcontextsmightbe theway forward.Knowledgematters,butdifferently indifferent

contexts.AhighlyeducatedpersoninIndia,TurkeyorBrazilmightrelatedifferentlytoscience

thanahighlyknowledgeablepersoninSweden,GermanyorItaly. Itwillbeakeyproblemfor

future

research

on

the

public

understanding

of

science

to

compare

the

social

representations

of

science across different milieus and historical contexts with all the available tools of social

researchandwiththenecessaryreserveofjudgment.

(2007)]

BTrench (eds) Handbook of Public Communication of Science and Technology, London,Routledge, p111-130.

BCritical Public, in: D Cheng, M Claessens, T Gascoigne, J Metcalfe, B Schiele, S Shi (eds)Science Communication in Social Context, New York, PCST/Springer, chapter 1, p7-25.

B

New Genetics and Society, 26,1, 29-45.

Bauer M (1998) The medicalisation of science news: from the rocket-scalpel to the gene-

meteorite complex, Social Science Information, 37, 731-751.


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Bauer MW, R Shukla & N Allum (2007) International indicators of science and the Public.Technical summary of the proceedings of an international workshop held at the Royal Society5/6 November 2007, London, LSE: http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/socialpsychology/events/seminars/2007-08/SummaryRoyalSocietyws2007_PUS.pdf

Bauer MW, N Allum, and S Miller (2007) What have we learnt from 25 years of PUS research

liberating and widening the agenda, Public Understanding of Science, 15,1, 1-17.

Bauer MW & J Gregory (2007) From journalism to corporate communication in post-warBritain, in: Bauer MW & M Bucchi (ed) Science, Journalism and Society: ScienceCommunication Between News and Public Relations, London, Routledge, p33-52

Bauer MW, Petkova K, P Boyadjieva, G Gornev (2006) Long-term trends in the representationsof science across the iron curtain: Britain and Bulgaria, 1946-95, Social Studies of Science, 36,1, 97-129

Bauer M, J Durant and G Evans (1994) European public perceptions of science, International

Journal of Public Opinion Research, 6, 2, 163-186

Fleck L (1979 [1935]) Entstehung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp.

Gaskell G & MW Bauer (eds) (2006) Genomic & Society. Legal, Ethical and Social Dimensions,London, Earthscan

Haldane JBS (1925) Daedalus, or Science and the Future, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner& Co.

Luckmann T (1995) Der kommunikative Aufbau der sozialen Welt und der

Sozialwissenschaften, Annali de Sociologia, 11, 45-71.

PISA, Programme for International Student Assessment (2006) Science Competencies for

Tomorrow's World, Paris, OECD

Raza, G, S Singh, and B Dutt (2002) Public, science and cultural distance, Science

Communicaiton, 23, 3, 292-309.

Shukla R & MW Bauer (2007) Science Culture Index Construction and Validation. A concept

paper; London & Delhi, LSE & NCAER.

Weingart P (2001) The loss of distance: science in transition, in: Allen GE and RM MacLoad

(eds)Science,HistoryandSocialActivism:atributetoEverettMendelsohn,Amsterdam,Kluver

AcademicPublishers,pp167184.


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Appendix

ThedefinitionandcharacterizationofagecohortsintheintegratedEurobarometerdatabase:

NewOrder,born>1977:this istheyoungestcohortofrespondents,growingupafter

theend

of

the

Cold

War

and

waking

up

to

the

rhetoric

of

the

new

world

order

and

the

finalvictoryofthecapitalistsstyleofeconomy,and livingthroughtherhetoricofanIT

andbiotech revolutionsofthe late20th

century.This isthegenerationofthePCand

interneteuphoriaof19952000.

GenerationXisthegenerationbornbetween1963and1976.Theyaretheoutcomeof

thebirthcontrol revolutionandgrowup through theoilcrisisof the1970s,and the

nuclearissuesofthe1980s,theantinuclearprotest,nucleararmamentdebatesandthe

StarWarsinitiative.

Babyboomers

are

born

between

1950

and

1962.

They

grow

up

in

the

optimism

and

modernisation drive of the postwar period. They witness the longest period of

economicprosperityinhistory.DuringthisperiodWesternsocietiesbecomesaffluent

and freeofmaterialconcerns.Thisgeneration istheprotestgenerationof the1970s,

with idealisticworldviews.Theyaremorescepticalwithregardtoprogressand its link

withscienceandtechnology.

War&crisiswerebornbetween1930and1949.ThisgenerationwitnessedWW2and

theformedtheimmediateafterwargenerationenteringtheColdWar.Thisgeneration

alsocarried

the

nuclear

enthusiasm

of

the

1950,

which

promised

ascientific

revolution

andenergytoocheaptometerintheatomicsociety.

The roaring 20s, finally is the generation born before 1930, growing up through the

buzzing period of the 1920s which ended in the big crash of 1929 and the economic

crisisthatfollowed.

iAn earlier version of this paper was presented as a public lecture on the occasion of the 20thanniversary of the

Science Day at the Spoleto Festival in Italy, 12 July 2005 sponsored by `Fondazione Sigma-Tau.iiThis is a project funded by the German data archive in Koln (GESIS) and integrates Eurobarometer surveys onperceptions of science from 1977 to 2005. The final database should be in the public domain later in 2009.

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