The EU Approach towards Bosnia and Herzegovina

7/29/2019 The EU Approach towards Bosnia and Herzegovina

1/3

blogs.lse.ac.uk http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblo g/2012/08/08/eu-approach-to -bo snia-and-herzegovina/

By Crade l CC-BY-SA via Wikimed ia Co mmo ns

The EUs approach towards Bosnia and Herzegovina has

been an inconsistent and insufficient mechanism for

encouraging the stabilisation of the country.he EU has attempted to push forward essential reforms for the stabilisation of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, presenting them as conditions for progress towards EU accession. However,

this Europeanisation approach has not produced the expected results. Nikolaos Tzifakis

investigates the causes of EU policy failure in Bosnia and claims that the EU has not

managed to deal successfully with three main challenges: adjusting the process to the

needs of an ethnically divided state; preserving the credibility of accession conditionality;

and conveying the proper message on how to comply with EU rules.

The reform process has stalled in Bosnia and Herzegovina during recent years and provocative actions

have endangered even the progress made so f ar. The EU has not managed to deal successf ully with t hef ollowing three challenges:

1) Adjusting the process to the needs of an ethnically

divided post-war state

The EU underestimated the implications o f the f act that

Bosnia is an ethnically divided country in which there are not

one, but three different cost-benefit calculations concerning

EU membership. While all three ethnic groups rhetorically

embrace the European perspective of their country, they are

not eager to sacrifice much of their hold on power fo r thesake of EU accession to the same extent. Moreover, given

that the views and expectations of the three ethnic groups

diverge over the countrys political organisation, the gains

and losses from most reforms are not equally distributed

among them. To the extent that mos t o f the prescribed

refo rms necessitate the transf er of authority along diff erent

policy domains f rom the cantons and the entities to the level

of state institutions, they coincide with the Bosniak demands

and are viewed with suspicion by the other two communities.

The image of the EU as a biased partner is aggravated by the f act that its prescriptions f or Bosnia have

at times extended to domains where there is no acquis communautaire (e.g. constitutional reform) or

where the corresponding national practices o f the EU member-states diverge substantially (e.g. police

ref orm). Altogether, the perceived partiality and low legitimacy of EU-inspired policies substantially raise

the political cost of compliance and challenge the level of support of the corresponding societies to EU

accession.

2) Preserving the credibility of accession conditionality

The credibility o f the EUs accession conditionality has been severely weakened f or several reasons.

First of all, the Bosnians do not believe that they have a credible short -t erm membership perspective.

They understand that t here is not much appetite in the EU f or new entrants and they are aware of their

count rys st ructural problems. Theref ore, the time lag in EU conditionality is acute. While Brussels

demands f rom Bosnia structural changes that are outside the countrys const itutional f ramework, it has

very litt le to of f er instantly as a reward. Furthermore, the EU has f requently sent contradictory signals to

Bosnia. The High Representat ive and EU Special Representative (HR/EUSR), the European Commission
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/?p=5189#Authorhttp://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/08/08/eu-approach-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/08/08/eu-approach-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/08/08/eu-approach-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/05/03/bosnia-and-herzegovina-eu-accession/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/?p=5189#Authorhttp://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/08/08/eu-approach-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/


2/3

(EC) and the EU member-states have occasionally expressed divergent views on the importance of

certain ref orms. Admittedly, the EUs ambivalence and lack of unity undermines its credibility and, thus ,

the Bosnian leaders are of f ered the possibility o f picking and choos ing where and how to comply. Last,

but no t least , the credibility o f EU conditionality has received a blow f rom the way the EU has

mismanaged its gate-keeping authority over the process of Bosnias accession. While Brussels

conditioned every step towards membership on the implementation of specific reforms, it repeatedly

retreated on the scope of its demands to settle f or cosmetic changes.

3) Conveying the proper messages on how to comply with EU rules

In terms of social learning, the Bosnians have had the opportunity to come in greater contact with EU

acto rs (i.e., the HR/EUSR, European Union Police Miss ion, EUFOR/Althea, European Union Monitoring

Mission, and the EC) than any other aspiring member-state. Though the EU has adopted a large array of

respons ibilities in Bosnia, this has not been ref lected at all in the impact of its po licies on the local

leaders perception of European norms and values. The Bosnians have indeed learnt how not to comply

with EU rules. The HR/EUSR rule of Bosnia as an international protectorate was inst rumental until 2006

in the adoption of several important ref orms. However, the Bosnian elites adopted a passive attitude

towards their count rys problems. They learnt that their countrys progress towards accession did not

necessitate consensus-building or compromise solutions. The international community could eventually

assume any political cost s on their behalf .

The HR/EUSR has subsequently diminished its role in Bosnias governance in order to promote local

ownership and increased accountability of the ref orms. Nevertheless, once the Bosnians were given

greater responsibility over their countrys destiny, they quickly discovered that the EU was divided and

anxious to observe and reward even minimal compliance. Hence, the Bosnians learned that if they were

persistent enough, the EU would eventually not insist on its requirements. In addition, the EU has

advanced most reforms under extra- institut ional emergency procedures undermining the Bosnian

authorities appreciation of democratic procedures. Theref ore, the Bosnians have not been acquainted

with the mechanisms of compliance.

To conclude, Europeanisation is an insuf f icient mechanism for t he stabilisation o f Bosnia. Compliancewith EU inst ructions requires constant interethnic consensus and similar levels o f support f or

membership in the EU in all the ethnic communities. Furthermore, accession conditionality is not very

ef f icient beyond the limits of the acquis communautaire and it is devoid of any sticks to compel

compliance or deter intransigence. In addition, accession rewards are remote and cannot instantly

compensate f or the adaptation cost s of refo rms.

The faltering of the EU approach towards Bosnia is also owed to the mismanagement of

Europeanisation policies. The EU has repeatedly failed to pronounce a single common position and the

Bosnians have viewed the EU retreating f rom its initial demands on several occasions. Therefore, the

latter have learnt that EU conditionality can be disregarded. The EU should not simply consider enriching

its po licies of conditionality with some more carrots and sticks. It has to ref lect on how to make theBosnians take the Europeanisat ion process and its associated policies more serious ly. Otherwise, the

so f ar negative track record of EU policies to wards Bosnia might turn into a legacy that is too heavy to

overcome.

For a longer fully-documented version of the article see Nikolaos T zif akis (2012). Bosnias slow

Europeanisation. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 13(2), 131-148.

Please read our comments policy before commenting.

Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP European Politics and

Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.

Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/N3pKrZ

_________________________________________
http://bit.ly/N3pKrZhttp://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/about/comments-policy/http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/15705854.2012.675649


3/3

About the author

Nikolaos Tzifakis- University of Peloponnese

Dr. Nikolaos T zif akis (PhD Lancaster University) is Lecturer o f Internat ional Relations in

the Department of Political Science and International Relations of the University o f

Peloponnese. He has research interest s in International Relations theory, contemporary

developments in the Balkans and EU external policies. His edited book International

Politics in Times of Change was published in 2012 by Springer.

Related pos ts:

1. Turkey may now be on t he road to joining the EU, but it also should question whether membership

is st ill is in the count rys interest .

2. How Argentinas provincial governments operated, af ter t he countrys debt default in 1998, has

many possible lessons for Greece now

3. EU and international support f or Bosnia and Herzegovina must go hand in hand with f urther

internal reforms
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/05/03/bosnia-and-herzegovina-eu-accession/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/05/24/argentina-greece-lesson/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/06/12/turkey-eu-accession/http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=DlRwE9qGaV4C&dq=International+Politics+in+Times+of+Change&source=gbs_navlinks_s

Documents

The EU Approach towards Bosnia and Herzegovina