The Doctrine of State Immunity Republic Vs

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY REPUBLIC VS. SANDOVAL220 SCRA 124 (1993)

FACTS:

By reason of the Mendiola massacre, wherein 12 rallyists died in their quest for “genuine agrarian reform”, President Aquino issued Administrative Order No.11 which created the Citizen’s Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation for the disorders, death and casualties that took place.

The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the deceased and other victims of Mendiola incident to be compensated by the government.

Due to the recommendation, petitioners filed a formal letter of demand for compensation from the government to which the latter did not take heed. The group then instituted an action for damages against the Republic of the Philippines together with military officers and personnel involved in Mendiola incident.

Respondent Judge Sandoval dismissed the complaint as against the Republic of the Philippines on the basis that there was no waver by the state. Hence, the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the State by virtue of the administrative order waived its immunity from suit?

HELD:

NO. Firstly, recommendation made by the commission does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the state. In effect, the same shall only serve as a cause of action on the event that any party decides to litigate his or her claim. The commission is merely a preliminary venue.

Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have said or done, the same are not tantamount to the state having waived its immunity from suit.

The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply in this case, as when the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the state nor the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the state in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants.

The correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949).

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY FESTEJO VS. FERNANDO94 PHIL 504 (1954)

FACTS:

Plaintiff Carmen Festejo filed an action against defendant Isaias Fernando, Director of Bureau of Public Works for unlawfully taking possession of portions of her three parcels of land and causing the construction of irrigation canal without obtaining right of way and without her consent or knowledge.

The lower court ruled in favor of plaintiff Festejo. On appeal, defendant Fernando invoked his being a public officer of the government of the Philippines and thus, enjoys immunity from suit and should be absolved from liability for damages.

ISSUE: May defendant invoke immunity from suit?

HELD:

NO. Ordinarily, the officer or employee committing the tort is answerable for whatever injury.

personally liable and may be sued as any other citizen and held

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITYSECTION 3, ARTICLE XVI, 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION U.S.A VS. GUINTO(G.R. NO. 76607 FEBRUARY 26, 1990)

CRUZ, J. FACTS:

In the first case, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the base.

In the second case, private respondents filed a complaint for damages against private petitioners for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station.

In the third case, private respondent, who was employed as a barracks boy in a U.S. Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners, officers of the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators. He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed.

In the fourth case, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the private petitioners, for injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them.

These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented. It is now contesting the denial of its motions by the respondent judges.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Doctrine of State Immunity is not applicable thereby making the State liable

HELD:

NO. While suable, the petitioners are nevertheless not liable. It is obvious that the claim for damages cannot be allowed on the strength of the evidence, which have been carefully examined.

The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them - between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in Western Europe.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity, as in the cases at bar. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts.

The private respondents invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the government liable if it acts through a special agent. The argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground that since the officers are designated "special agents," the United States government should be liable for their torts.

There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability and liability and a misconception that the two terms are synonymous. Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may be held liable under this rule only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms of consent. Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if he is so denominated, as in the case at bar. No less important, the said provision appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the Philippine government and not to foreign governments impleaded in our courts.

The complaints against the petitioners in the court below were aptly dismissed.

Cases:

Case: U.S.A vs. Guinto

Topic: The Doctrine of State Immunity

Facts:

There are four cases filed that involve the question of the immunity of the United States from the jurisdiction of the Philippines.

First case, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the base.

Second case, private respondents filed a complaint for damages against private petitioners for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station.

Third case, private respondent, who was employed as a barracks boy in a U.S. Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners, officers of the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators.

Fourth case, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the private petitioners, for injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants.

These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented. It is

now contesting the denial of its motions by the respondent judges.

Issue:

Whether or not the Doctrine of State Immunity is not applicable?

Held:

NO. While suable, the petitioners are nevertheless not liable. It is obvious that the claim for damages cannot be allowed on the strength of the evidence, which have been carefully examined. The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts.

Case: Meritt (Plaintiff) vs. Government of the Philippines Islands (Defendant)


Facts:

The plaintiff while riding his motorcycle was hit by an ambulance owned by the Philippine General Hospital.

Act. No. 2457 was enacted by the Philippine Legislature Authorizing the Plaintiff to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney General of said Islands to appear in said suit.

A suit was then filed before the CFI of Manila, which fixed the responsibility for the collision solely on the ambulance driver and determined the amount of damages to be awarded to Merritt.

Both parties appealed from the decision, plaintiff Merritt as to the amount of damages and defendant in rendering the amount against the government.

Issue:

Whether or not the Government of the Philippines, waived its immunity from suit as well as conceded its liability when it enacted Act. No. 2457?

Held:

NO. By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to the plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.

The Government of the Philippines Islands is only liable, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. The special agent acts in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

Case: Amigable vs. Cuenca

Topic: The Doctrine of State Immunitty

Facts:

The petitioner is the registered owner of a lot covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title, where no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.

Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot that had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General (Nicolas Cuenca), who disallowed it.

Amigable then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca. The petitioner also sought the payment of compensatory damages for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages, attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. The Government had not given its consent to be sued.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the Government?

Held:

YES. Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit. This doctrine cannot be used in perpetrating injustice to a citizen. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked.

Thus, the plaintiff is entitles thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken p to the time that payment is made by the government. The government should pay for the attorney’s fee, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court.

U.S. vs. RUIZ

136 SCRA 487 (1985)

DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

FACTS:The USA had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the military bases agreement between the Philippines and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US for the construction of wharves in said base that was merely awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.

ISSUE:Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.HELD:The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they

are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietory acts. The result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates the exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the project are integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US and Philippines, indisputably, a function of the government of highest order, they are not utilized for, nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR, ET AL.54 SCRA 84 (1973)DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

FACTS:

On July 7, 1969, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation and against petitioner confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40.The award is for the satisfaction of a judgment against the Philippine Government. On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo Villasor issued an Order declaring the decision final and executory. Villasor directed the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City as well as Manila to execute said decision. The Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served Notices of Garnishment with several Banks, specially on Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP. Petitioner, on certiorari, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Judge Villasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of the AFP, hence the notices and garnishment are null and void.ISSUE:

Is the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor valid? HELD:

What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. The State may not be sued without its consent. A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the

power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since the government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law

PNB V. PABALAN83 SCRA 595 (1978)DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITYFACTS:Judgment was rendered against respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA). Judge Javier Pabalan issued a writ of execution followed thereafter by a notice of garnishment of the funds of PVTA. The full amount mentioned in such writ is P12, 724.66. Philippine National Bank allege that such funds are public in character, thus, the doctrine of non-suability of a state is applicable.ISSUE:Is the respondent exempt from garnishment by virtue of the doctrine of non-suability of a state?HELD:It is well-settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. Petitioner cannot set bar to the garnishment for funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued, as is the case of PVTA, are not exempt from garnishment.


BUREAU OF PRINTING VS. BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

FACTS:

Bureau of Printing Employees Association filed a case against herein petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, and Mariano Ledesma. The complaint alleged that Salvador and Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing, particularly the members of the complaining association, in the exercise of their right to self-organization, and by discriminating in regard to hiring and tenure of their employment in order to discourage them from pursuing their union activities. Answering the complaint, Salvador and Ledesma denied the charges, and contended that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Bureau of Printing cannot be sued?

HELD:

NO. As a government office without any juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued.

The Bureau of Printing is an instrumentality of the government. It operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary. It is designed to meet the printing needs of the government. It is primarily a service bureau. It is obviously not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit. It has no corporate existence. Its appropriations are provided for in the budget. It is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations.

Any suit, action or proceeding against the Bureau of Printing would actually be a suit, action or proceeding

against the government itself. The government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection.


MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC. VS.

CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE

FACTS:

Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad consigned to Mobil Philippines. The Customs Arrastre later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment. Mobil Philippines Exploration Inc.filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered cases plus other damages.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being a person under the law, defendants cannot be sued. After the plaintiff opposed the motion, the court dismissed the complaint on the ground that neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of Customs is suable. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court the order of dismissal and contends that not all government entities are immune from suit and the defendant is discharging propriety functions and as such, can be sue by private individuals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Customs Arrastre Service or the Bureau of Customs be sued?

HELD:

NO. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the operations of arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and a necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary. The Bureau of Customs has no personality of its own apart from that of the government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines, and penalties. To this function, arrastre is a necessary incident. Although said arrastre function is deemed proprietary, it is necessarily an incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity granted as to the end should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.


MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION VS. JUDGE FIRME

FACTS:

It was recalled that on December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeep, a gravel and sand truck, and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union which was driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeep including Banina, Sr. died. The heirs of Banina, Sr. instituted a complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the passenger jeep. However, the aforesaid defendant filed a third party complaint against the petitioner and the driver of the dump truck of the petitioner.

Thereafter, the private respondents amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular employee Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as defendants. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the state, prescription of cause of action, and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeep as the proximate cause of the collision.

The trial court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs, and defendants Municipality of san Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs. The complaint against the driver and the owner of the passenger jeep was dismissed.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new trial. However, respondent judge issued another order denying the motion for reconsideration of the order for having been filed out of time. Hence, this petition seeks the nullification or modification of the proceedings and orders issued by the respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme.

ISSUE:

Whether the municipality is liable for the tort committed by its employee?

HELD:

NO. The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver acting in behalf of the municipality is performing governmental or proprietary functions. It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the state merely gives the claimants the right to show the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was inflicted or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimants cannot recover.

In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that he was on his way to Naguilan River to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of the San Fernando municipal street.In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.

After careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, we arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger, tragic and deplorable though, it may be imposed on the municipality no duty to pay the monetary compensation.

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The Doctrine of State Immunity Republic Vs