The Demarcation between Philosophy and Science «The Demarcation between Philosophy and Science» by Gustavo Fernández Díez Source: Croatian Journal of Philosophy (Croatian Journal of Philosophy), issue: 29 / 2010, pages: 131146, on www.ceeol.com .
Croatian Journal of Philosophy, issue: 29 / 2010 — The Demarcation
between Philosophy and
Scienceby Gustavo Fernández Díez
The Demarcation between Philosophy and Science GUSTAVO FERNÁNDEZ
DÍEZ Facultad de Filosofía, Universidad de Murcia
This paper is based on a criterion recently proposed by Richard
Fumer- ton for demarcating philosophy of mind and cognitive
science. I suggest to extend it to a demarcation criterion between
philosophy and science in general, and put it in the context of the
historical changes of boundaries between the philosophical and the
scientifi c fi eld. I point to a number of philosophical claims and
approaches that have been made utterly obso- lete by the
advancement of science, and conjecture that a similar thing may
happen in the future with today’s philosophy of mind: under the
supposition that cognitive science manages to progress very
successfully in a certain direction, our concepts for mental states
could change, and the type of philosophical interest we put in
them, thus reshaping the whole debate on the subject.
Keywords: Richard Fumerton, demarcation criterion, philosophy (of
mind), (cognitive) science, intimate pain, clinical pain
1. Fumerton’s demarcation criterion The purpose of this paper is to
present a new demarcation criterion between philosophy and science.
This criterion is directly inspired in a recent proposal by Richard
Fumerton, concerning the division bet- ween philosophy of mind and
cognitive science. My suggestion is that we take the criterion
which Fumerton has advanced for distinguishing between philosophy
and science in the area of the study of mind, and extend it into a
global criterion for distinguishing between philosophy and science
in general.
My interest in this criterion does not come, no need to say, from a
desire to dismiss philosophy as less valuable or worthwhile than
sci- ence. Neither I intend to prevent any professional
philosopher, or pro- fessional scientist, from dealing with matters
outside their current ex-
132 G. F. Díez, The Demarcation between Philosophy and
Science
pertise. I believe that both science and philosophy are important
parts of human knowledge as a whole, and that it is inevitable and
benefi cial that philosophers and scientists cooperate with each
other, mix with each other, and occasionally interchange roles. If
I think the demar- cation between philosophy and science may be of
some interest it is because it may help us to know more about what
philosophy is, about what science is, and perhaps it may even
provide some clarifi cation with respect to concrete philosophical
problems.
Fumerton’s original proposal appeared in his article “Render Unto
Philosophy that Which Is Philosophy’s”, published in 2007, in an
issue of the Midwest Studies in Philosophy devoted to “Philosophy
and the Empirical”. Fumerton focused his attention on philosophy of
mind, and more in particular, on his “desire to clearly demarcate
philosophy of mind from cognitive science” (Fumerton 2007, 67). As
a means to do this, he put forward a suggestion which, I believe,
constitutes one of the most interesting contributions in recent
times to the philosophical ‘argumentative tool kit’:
“I suggest that (...) we imagine the development of a utopian
neural sci- ence with an eye to discovering what questions are left
unanswered even after wildly successful empirical research. By
proceeding this way, we may discover those questions that are in
the province of philosophy” (Fumerton 2007, 58).
Although Fumerton, at least in that article, does not consider the
pos- sibility of applying such a suggestion to other areas of
philosophy, and indeed all of the paper is circumscribed to the
discussion of philosophy of mind only, there is an obvious way in
which his criterion can be widened for the comparison between
philosophy as a whole and science as a whole. In order to do so, we
only have to drop the specifi c reference to the ‘neural’ science,
and add that the scientifi c research might be empirical ‘or
mathematical’, so as to cover philosophical expectations over
logical and mathematical challenges (which so prominent were, for
instance, at the beginning of the 20th century):
Imagine the development of a utopian science with an eye to discov-
ering what questions are left unanswered even after wildly success-
ful empirical or mathematical research. By proceeding this way, we
may discover those questions that are in the province of philoso-
phy.
2. The demarcation problem The problem of the demarcation between
science and non-science has led to much philosophical discussion
since the early 20th century. Vari- ous criteria have been proposed
for it: verifi ability of sentences (Car- nap 1936, 420–421),
falsifi ability of theories (Popper 1962, 36–37), exis- tence of a
puzzle-solving tradition (Kuhn 1970, 4–10), progressiveness of the
research programme (Lakatos 1970, 118), among many others.
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G. F. Díez, The Demarcation between Philosophy and Science
133
It has also been argued that the problem is too complex to be
solved by one single criterion (Bunge 1982, 372; Derksen 1993, 17),
and most re- cent proposals rely on multi criteria approaches
(Kitcher 1982, 30–54; Bunge 1983, 223–228; Derksen 1993; 2001; Ruse
1996, 300–306; Mah- ner 2007, 523–536; Hansson 2008, §4.6).
For instance, Mario Bunge’s model is based on an integrating pic-
ture of the so-called ‘epistemic fi elds’, composite entities
consisting of several ingredients: a social community, an
underlying philosophy, a background of accepted knowledge, a
collection of distinctive problems and methods, etc. Each of these
elements leads to particular differences depending on whether the
fi eld has a scientifi c or a non-scientifi c status (Bunge 1983,
197–200, 223–228; Mahner 2007, 523–536, 544–567). In any case,
opinion surveys show that most philosophers of science do not
believe that an adequate criterion or set of criteria which solves
the demarcation problem has yet been found (Mahner 2007,
515).
Fumerton’s demarcation criterion differs from the majority of the
proposed criteria in two respects: fi rst, it focuses on the status
of ques- tions, instead of that of propositions, theories, research
programmes, etc (Siitonen 1984 is another example of approach to
the demarcation of science from the point of view of problems and
problem-stating). Sec- ond, it is not intended to demarcate science
from non-science, but phi- losophy from science, and that implies a
change of perspective. Indeed, the idea behind Fumerton’s criterion
is to single out a specifi c aspect or attribute of philosophy
which marks its difference from science. In the extended version
that I have just outlined, such an attribute is that true
philosophical problems cannot—supposedly—be solved or expect- ed to
be solved by empirical or mathematical research. In the original
version this reduces to the claim that problems in the philosophy
of mind cannot—supposedly—be solved or expected to be solved by em-
pirical research.
Hence our criterion does not prima facie stand as a proposed char-
acterization of science, but of philosophy (in the original
version, to philosophy of mind only). And because of this it will
only be relevant to the science demarcation problem in a rather
tangential way, in respect to the differences between science and
one particular unscientifi c item, namely philosophy. However, it
is clear that as much as Fumerton’s criterion is fair, or correct,
any complete and adequate defi nition of sci- ence, and any
complete and adequate defi nition of philosophy should contain it,
or have it as a consequence. A somewhat similar criterion, the fact
of having “mostly conceptual methods”, has been frequently pointed
out as a major difference, not only of philosophy, but of hu-
manities in general, in opposition to science (Mahner 2007,
542).
Another salient feature of Fumerton’s criterion is that it seems to
be subject to a certain temporal relativity. This applies equally
to the extended and the original version, although Fumerton’s own
under- standing of how his criterion works seems to be a rather
static one: “I
134 G. F. Díez, The Demarcation between Philosophy and
Science
want to urge that (...) we render unto philosophy the fundamental
epis- temological and ontological questions that empirical science
never will and never could answer” (Fumerton 2007, 56, my italics;
and similarly in 61, 67). However, it must be pointed out that our
expectations that a given philosophical problem be solved by
scientifi c research can change quite dramatically over time. And
indeed history teaches us that such expectations have changed, as I
will try to show with a few examples in the following
sections.
3. A bit of historical perspective We have to recall that the
frontiers between philosophy and science have varied considerably
over history. The most remarkable example is that of natural
philosophy, which included all natural sciences up to well beyond
the rise of modern science in the 16th and 17th centuries.
Indeed, in 1686 Isaac Newton entitled his life masterpiece Math-
ematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, making it clear from the
beginning that he considered the book a genuine philosophical
contri- bution: “therefore our present work sets forth mathematical
principles of natural philosophy. For the basic problem of
philosophy seems to be to discover the forces of nature from the
phenomena of motions and then to demonstrate the other phenomena
from these forces (...) phi- losophers have hitherto made trial of
nature in vain. But I hope that the principles set down here will
shed some light on either this mode of philosophizing or some truer
one” (Preface to the First Edition). One hundred years later, Kant
wrote his Metaphysical Foundations of Nat- ural Science (1786). And
still in 1817, Hegel devoted an important part of his Encyclopedia
of the Philosophical Sciences to the ‘Philosophy of Nature’,
including ‘Mechanics’, ‘Physics’ and ‘Organic Physics’.
As is well-known, many of the views at one time held by the classic
philosophers in the area of natural philosophy, were completely
dis- credited later on by the advancement of science. Thus,
Pythagoras was said to have heard the “music of the spheres”
produced by the motion of celestial bodies (Iamblichus, Life of
Pythagoras, XV; Plato, Republic, Book 10, 616b–617d). Plato
suggested that the four elements (earth, air, fi re and water) were
made up from the regular polyhedra: the hexa- hedron, the
octahedron, the tetrahedron and the icosahedron, respec- tively
(Timaeus, 54b–55c, adapted to today’s terminology). Aristotle
strongly opposed to the heliocentric system (On the Heavens, Book
2, 296b6–297a26); and considered that “the soul is the cause or
source of the living body” (whether “plant, man or beast”),
including “the original source of local movement: the power of
locomotion (...) sensation (...) growth and decay” (On the Soul,
Book 2, 414b33, 415b9–28).
Descartes described the heart as a hot container, in which drops of
blood quickly heat up and expand, thus producing blood fl ow. He
was so strikingly confi dent of this theory, that according to him
it followed “as necessarily from the very arrangement of the parts,
which may be
G. F. Díez, The Demarcation between Philosophy and Science
135
observed in the heart by the eye alone, and from the heat which may
be felt with the fi ngers, and from the nature of the blood as
learned from experience, as does the motion of a clock from the
power, the situation, and shape of its counter-weights and wheels”
(Discourse on the Method, Part 5, AT 6, 50; and a similar
description of heart in Treatise of Man, AT 11, 123–6, Description
of the Human Body, AT 11, 227–45, and The Passions of the Soul, AT
11, 331–4).
Kant formulated a ‘metaphysical demonstration’ that “matter can be
compressed to infi nity” and “is divisible to infi nity”
(Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences, Ch. 2, Propositions
3 and 4). And Hegel provided a philosophical defi nition of medical
illness as an organ that “establishes itself for itself and
persists in its particular activity against the activity of the
whole” (Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, §371).
Of course these ‘philosophical contributions’ look today utterly
out- dated and obsolete: no one dares any more to address plant
growth, the compression of matter, or the concept of disease, by
means of conceptual elucidation alone. Although these questions
were at a time regarded as true philosophical problems, later on
they turned out to be answered, or at least substantially
enlightened, by the progress of empirical sci- ence. And what is
more: once they were successfully addressed by the experimental
method, they emerged away from philosophy, to grow apart into
specialized disciplines. As a result, the whole of natural phi-
losophy, after having belonged to the philosophy curricula for a
vastly long period, ceased to be included in it.
In the words of a historian of science, “it was in the 19th century
that the modern disciplines of chemistry, physics, mathematics,
biol- ogy and the earth sciences, as well as the social sciences,
assumed their more or less contemporary form and simultaneously
reshaped the in- stitutional landscape of science. (...) Certainly
by the fi nal third of the 19th century, one could speak
legitimately, that is, in a modern sense, of “science”,
“scientists”, and the disciplines of science. These new la- bels
and categories refl ected the fact that science had both delimited
it- self more fully from philosophy, theology, and other types of
traditional learning and culture and differentiated itself
internally into increas- ingly specialized regions of knowledge”
(David Cahan 2003, 4).
A similar thing may be said about social sciences, most of which
also emerged from philosophy, leaving behind many claims which were
later made obsolete. We will only recall here John Stuart Mill’s
dis- sociation of economic production and distribution, on the
assumption that “The laws and conditions of the production of
wealth, partake of the character of physical truths. There is
nothing optional or arbitrary in them” whereas “It is not so with
the Distribution of Wealth. That is a matter of human institution
solely” (Principles of Political Economy, Book 2, Chapter 1, §1,
199–200). Of course such a view is nowadays completely
abandoned.
136 G. F. Díez, The Demarcation between Philosophy and
Science
4. The case of formal logic It could be argued that even if the
subject matter of philosophy un- derwent important changes in the
past, its typical method (i.e., con- ceptual analysis) has remained
essentially unchanged. But the fact is that many of the issues that
were addressed at a time by means of philosophical thinking, lie
today in the side of the sciences; and that as a consequence of
such transfer, many of the conclusions that were once extracted by
theoretical reasoning alone, have become untenable.
According to the same line of argument, the method of philoso- phy
should be distinguished as well from that of mathematics. This is
particularly relevant to understand the case of logic, another
estab- lished philosophical discipline which—or at least an
important part of which—became at one time scientifi c. And not to
join the empirical sciences this time, but mathematics.
Indeed, the work of Frege and other thinkers at the end of the 19th
century represented a revolutionary step forward with respect to
the previous logicians: the analysis of proposition as
subject-predicate (the only one known to Aristotle or Kant) was
overcome, quantifi ers and the logic of relations were introduced,
predicate logic was unifi ed with propositional logic, second-order
logic was delimited from them, etc. None of these improvements was
derived from new evidence, but from philosophical insight alone,
combined with the adoption of the math- ematical style in a
particularly conspicuous way. As a result, a sub- stantial part of
the discipline (the so-called ‘formal’ or ‘mathematical logic’)
reshaped into a mature scientifi c subject, which is studied today
in most mathematics departments around the world.
Formal logic has adopted since then a neat mathematical format:
symbolic, highly sophisticated, interconnected with other branches
of mathematics. And what is more important: a format which enables
the obtention of conclusive results in the form of proved theorems.
These aspects, even more enhanced as the discipline has continued
grow- ing, mark the difference between what had been for centuries
a philo- sophical branch, and the new scientifi c discipline that
emerged from it. Meanwhile, other parts of logic have remained in a
more obscure pre-scientifi c stage, namely philosophy of language
and the so-called ‘philosophy of logic’. The fragment of logic
which stopped being philo- sophical was just the mathematical part,
much in the same way as the whole of natural philosophy had ceased
to be philosophical long earlier, when it was embraced by the
experimental method.
Along this transfer, many other philosophical claims were also
shown to be untenable. Thus Leibniz dreamt of a mechanical decision
procedure for the whole of human reasoning (the ‘Universal
Character- istic’), so that “when there are disputes among persons,
we can simply say: Let us calculate [calculemus], without further
ado, to see who is right” (The Art of Discovery, 51, and similarly
in On the Universal Sci- ence: Characteristic, 17–19, and Preface
to the General Science, 14–15).
G. F. Díez, The Demarcation between Philosophy and Science
137
As is well known such a dream was shown impossible by Church’s Un-
decidability Theorem, in 1936.
Kant endorsed the 3-dimensional euclidean geometry of his time as
“a science which determines the properties of space synthetically,
and yet a priori” (Critique of Pure Reason, B40), without
suspecting the range of n-dimensional non-euclidean geometrical
systems yet to appear, and the use that physics would make of them.
That same phi- losopher, Professor of Logic at Königsberg,
considered that there were no occasion for new celebrated logicians
or discoveries in logic (Logic, Introduction, §2), 79 years before
Frege’s Begriffsschrift.
Frege himself relied in the so-called ‘comprehension principle’ as
a purely logical law, and built over it his programme for
establishing that arithmetic is part of logic (“Function and
Concept”, 26; Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Volume 1, Preface, 138),
only a few years before Rus- sell proved that it leads to
contradiction. David Hilbert presented as an axiom his conviction
“of the solvability of every mathematical problem” (1900, 412;
1917, 1113; 1925, 200–201), only to be virtually refued soon
afterwards by Gödel’s incompleteness theorems (ironically enough,
Hil- bert repeated his claim in his 1930 Königsberg radio address,
the very day after Gödel, who was also at Königsberg attending a
Philosophical Congress, announced work in progress which would lead
to the incom- pleteness results, cf. Thiele 2003, 10). And
Wittgenstein coined his dic- tum that “there can never be surprises
in logic” (Tractatus, 6.125), just 10 years before those same
epoch-making theorems by Gödel.
Many of these expectations, no matter how wrong they turned out,
had however an extremely valuable motivating effect. Thus, it was
Frege’s desire to establish that arithmetic is part of logic which
led him to make his monumental revision of logic in the fi rst
place (Begriffss- chrift, Preface, 5–6). And Hilbert’s formalist
conception of mathematics represented no doubt a decisive stimulus
on the birth of proof theory and metatheoretical studies.
5. Some conclusions We have just seen that many of the questions
that were once treated as philosophical, changed their status at
some point in history, to become part of the sciences. The
boundaries between science and philosophy have not remained
unaltered over the centuries. And hence we have some reason to
believe that the same might happen again in the future, i.e., that
new sciences can spring out from today’s philosophical resear- ch.
The ‘province of philosophy’ has a perimeter which varies over
time: it has varied in the past, and it may continue to do so in
the time to come.
We have also seen that many of the views that were held (sometimes
quite strongly) by philosophers regarding those questions, were
later on ruthlessly overthrown by the advancement of science.
Hence, we have some reason to believe that the same might happen as
well with
138 G. F. Díez, The Demarcation between Philosophy and
Science
some of the views that are currently being held and discussed
today, inside that territory which today is perceived to be the
‘philosophical territory’. In other words: we have some reason to
believe that some of the views that are held and discussed today in
the present philosophi- cal fi eld, may end up being, in a more or
less distant future, completely dismissed by the science to
come.
Coming back to Fumerton’s demarcation criterion, it is worthy re-
marking that it is based on an appeal to the power of our imagina-
tion. Indeed, it requires us to try to imagine possible ways in
which our questions could be answered by science in a utopian
future: if we fi nd it very diffi cult to fi gure out how that can
be possible, we might say that those questions lie—still—in the
province of philosophy; otherwise, we might suspect that those
questions have been absorbed by science, or are in the process of
being absorbed by science.
But our power of imagination applied in this way is not absolute:
it is context-dependent, time-dependent, and dependent on the
subject’s background. Our imagination power is relative to the
particular cir- cumstances of the person who imagines. The kind of
things that we are able to imagine today is completely different
from the kind of things that Plato in his time could imagine; or
Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, etc. Actually, many of the things that
we positively know today, were sim- ply unimaginable for
them.
It should not come to a surprise, then, that the application of
Fum- erton’s criterion does not yield an absolute result, permanent
over time, but only a relative one, temporally limited. In other
words: the whole validity of Fumerton’s criterion is temporally
limited. Just as a house appraisal is valid for a limited period of
time only. Which is not a fl aw of house appraisals, but a virtue,
given that the value of houses do change over time. The important
thing is that at the time the house appraisal is made, it turns out
to be informative and useful.
Similarly, given that the boundaries between science and philoso-
phy change over time, it is only a virtue of Fumerton’s criterion
that its application adapts to the circumstances in a fl exible
way. The im- portant thing is that at the time it is applied, it
turns out to be of some use.
For similar reasons, it should not come to a surprise that the
appli- cation of the criterion, even by contemporaneous persons,
yields differ- ent results. If such is the case, then the
confrontation of the different imagined scenarios may be an
interesting and enriching task.
I shall devote the last three sections of this paper to the
application of Fumerton’s criterion to a particular case study. One
of those which motivated Fumerton to formulate his criterion in the
fi rst place, and hence, one which falls under the scope of the
original, non-extended version of his criterion. The question is
that of the incorrigibility of fi rst-person ascription of pain. As
a matter of fact, as we are going to see, the conclusions that I
draw from this case, and his, are completely different.
G. F. Díez, The Demarcation between Philosophy and Science
139
6. A case study David Armstrong argued years ago that “no
introspective awareness can be logically guaranteed to be free from
mistake”; from which he concluded that “once it has been admitted
that I can be wrong about my current inner states, then we must
allow the possibility that some- body else (for example, a brain
technician) reaches a true belief about my inner state when I reach
a false one” (“Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?”, Armstrong
1963, 129).
Fumerton disputes this view, and applying his criterion, reaches
the conclusion that there is no imaginable way in which pain
self-ascrip- tion incorrigibility may be ever turned down by
empirical science: “if we imagine the scientist in question
monitoring his own brain state as he introspects a stabbing pain,
it seems just obvious that when he can’t fi nd the expected brain
state he will have no alternative but to reject his theory or to
construe as fl awed some other aspect of the monitoring that is
supposed to reveal the brain states” (Fumerton 2007, 59–60). Hence,
according to Fumerton, the incorrigibility of pain self-ascription
is one of the philosophical “questions that empirical science never
will and never could answer” (ibid., 56, 60).
However, if the scientist is introspecting a stabbing pain and yet
cannot fi nd the expected brain state, then he would probably not
say that his empirical research has been so “wildly successful”,
which is what Fumerton’s demarcation criterion required in the fi
rst place. In- stead, in such a scenario we would be rather
inclined to say, as Fumer- ton rightly indicates, that it is the
brain monitoring theory the one to blame. But perhaps Fumerton has
not been imaginative enough in ad- dressing this matter, and we can
make an effort of imagination some- what stronger.
I would like to suggest an alternative scenario in which it simply
never happens that a person feels pain without the monitor refl
ecting it. That is to say, an scenario in which empirical research
on pain brain detecting has been so “successful”, that a 100%
reliable monitoring sys- tem has come to be produced. We can even
add that such a machine is relatively easy to manufacture, and has
come to be cheaply sold in su- perstores, so that thousands of
people test its realibility in their homes every day, as a sort of
peculiar console game. Out of those vastly gen- eralised tests, it
becomes clear that the monitor never fails to detect occurring
pain, unles it is a broken or defective unit.
Of course this sounds as a very remote hypothesis, but we can imag-
ine it. Even then, it could not be said that empirical research had
dis- proven the incorrigibility of pain self-ascription, but merely
provided an auxiliary way of refl ecting it. Indeed, such a way
which would al- ways be regarded as subsidiary to the fi rst-person
authority itself.
But let us go on then to an even more sophisticated imaginary hy-
pothesis. One which I shall call the ‘corrigibility scenario’. Let
us sup- pose now that:
140 G. F. Díez, The Demarcation between Philosophy and
Science
(1) there is a pain detecting brain monitoring machine; (2) such a
machine is cheaply sold in superstores so that everyone can
try it; (3) that machine actually fails to detect occurrent pain,
although only
in a very small percentage of cases; (4) those cases (putting aside
defective units and the like), turn out
to correspond exactly to either a particular genetic alteration, or
a sort of hypnotic state.
Furthermore, we shall assume that the genetic alteration results in
some pain experiences not being refl ected in the monitor; and that
the hypnotic states have the doubly misleading effect of: (a) some
cases of monitor displayed pains passing completely unfelt by the
subject, un- der the infl uence of the hypnotizer; and (b) some
cases of stabbing pain induced by the hypnotizer, not appearing in
the monitors at all. And that the presence of the genetic
alteration is identifi able by means of a genetic analysis, whereas
that of the hypnotic state is in turn verifi - able scanning the
brains waves by means of an EEG. So that, in this scenario, the
only two exceptions to the reliability of the pain monitor are both
exactly identifi able independently of the monitor failure.
Finally, let us suppose that in this so-called ‘corrigibility
scenario’ the pain detecting monitors enable us to classify pain
(when detected) into sharp categories, as well as to measure its
degree by means of a precise numerical scale. Let us further
suppose that the scientifi c the- ory behind them provides a
detailed explanation of all the underlying biological processes,
for both the cases where the monitors detect the existing pain and
the two specifi c cases where they fail to do it and why they do
so. And that the monitors have been very largely tested with an
overwhelming success, in which the few instances of reported
failure have always turned out to correspond to either the genetic
alteration or the hypnotic state just pointed.
Again, all this is very speculative and hypothetical. But that was
precisely the point of Fumerton’s criterion: to place ourselves in
the kind of most wildly successful science scenario that we can
imagine, and see what are the consequences that we can draw from
it. What are then the consequences that we could draw from the
‘corrigibility scenario’ that I have just depicted? What would it
happen to our con- ception of pain, if were we to live in such a
world for a suffi ciently long time?
7. ‘Intimate pain’ versus ‘clinical pain’ I think a likely
consequence of this latter scenario would be that the very word
‘pain’ ended up splitting into two different meanings: one for our
present every-day sense, which could be denoted as ‘introspective’
or ‘intimate pain’, and another one for its scientifi c monitorable
coun- terpart, which could in turn get to be known as ‘monitor
detectable’ or ‘clinical pain’.
G. F. Díez, The Demarcation between Philosophy and Science
141
Of course we would continue to use the word ‘pain’ with the present
every-day sense in all kinds of every-day situations, and we would
not normally admit that our self-ascription of pain was challenged
or put into question by anyone. But being aware of the existence of
the pain detector and its effi cacy outside the two anomalous
exceptions, in case of doubt about the origin, nature or exact
degree of our pain, we would use it. And should the monitor not
detect the pain we are feeling, we would go on to pass the two
supplementary tests, relative to the genetic and the state of
consciousness alterations.
The two meanings of ‘pain’ could then co-exist quite peacefully:
the every-day meaning (intimate pain), for every-day situations,
and the scientifi c sophisticated meaning (clinical pain), for
serious investiga- tion, medical or otherwise. Even the laws could
change so as to allow the use of the pain detector, together with
the two supplementary tests, in order to determine whether a car
accident victim is really suffering from cervical pain, or just
pretending it.
As a consequence of the failure of detecting intimate pain in the
two mentioned cases, the terms ‘intimate pain’ and ‘clinical pain’
would not be coextensional. Some instances of pain would only be
‘intimate’ but not ‘clinical’ (namely, pain suffered by genetically
altered and hypno- tized subjects), and some instances of pain
would only be ‘clinical’ but not ‘intimate’ (namely, pain suffered
by subjects hypnotized into not noticing it). Intimate pain
self-ascription would remain to be incorri- gible, but clinical
pain self-ascription will not. And the point is that, under such
circumstances as those depicted in this scenario, the theo- retical
interest in the notion of intimate pain would probably decline in
favour of its scientifi c, more elaborated counterpart
The distinction I am suggesting does not have much sense in our
world as we know it today, because the pain detecting monitors with
the particular properties described simply do not exist. Nor are
there exactly the two cases of unmonitorable pain referred to. The
distinction only helps us to imagine how it would be to live in a
world in which a pain detector of the type described had been
invented. It is just an ex- ample of what could happen if empirical
research about pain gets to be ‘wildly successful’ in one (very)
particular way.
The distinction between intimate and clinical pain does not
coincide with the common distinction between somatic and
psychosomatic pain. In our corrigibility scenario, psychosomatic
pain (pain without physical cause) would be detectable and
measurable by the brain monitors just as much as somatic pain,
except in the two exceptional cases described. Hence both somatic
and psychosomatic pain would be considered ‘clini- cal pains’ in
the full sense. And exactly the same applies to all types of
‘misleading pain’, which are not caused by the body part which
hurts (such as left arm pain during a heart attack, phantom pains
after am- putations, or chronic pain syndromes produced by
pathologies of the nervous system).
142 G. F. Díez, The Demarcation between Philosophy and
Science
Our distinction is closer to, but still does not coincide, with the
dis- tinction between pain as a mental property and the pain as a
physical property (neurological, biological or otherwise) which
would constitute its counterpart. Indeed, it is normally assumed
that these two proper- ties should be coextensive, at least in the
sense that “if you experi- ence pain at a time, you must
instantiate a certain physical property at the time” (Kim 1998,
7–8). Whereas in our corrigibility scenario, as we have remarked,
there are well-defi ned cases in which the clinical and the
intimate pain do not appear together.
Finally, our distinction does not exactly coincide either with the
usual distinction between cognitive (or representative) and
non-cogni- tive (or expressive) uses of pain, as refl ected in
statements such as: “when philosophers have considered sentences
like ‘I am in pain now’, they have been misled by their ambiguity
between their noncognitive use, where the question of intellectual
mistake does not come up but equally there is no question of
cognition, and their autobiographical use, where there is no doubt
cognitive certainty but simply an empiri- cal certainty” (Armstrong
1963, 131); or: “there are two main threads the common-sense
conception of pain ... ambiguity embedded in our ordinary concept
of pain”: “pain as something in a body part ... [which] favours an
understanding of pains as if they were the objects of our per-
ceptions” and “pain as subjective experience ... [and as such]
private, subjective, self-intimating, and the source of
incorrigible knowledge” (Aydede 2008, §1, §1.3 and §1.2
respectively).
The reason is, again, that in such a distinction an overall coinci-
dence is normally postulated between the instances to which the two
uses of the word apply, while in the concrete circumstances or our
rec- reated scenario we positively ascertain that intimate and
clinical pain do not always appear together.
8. Changes in our philosophical interests The fact that in our
imaginary scenario the two meanings of the word ‘pain’ (the
common-sense ordinary one, and its sophisticated scientifi c
counterpart) are not coextensive, does not have to be seen as
derived from some sort of mysterious gap between the physical
kingdom and the mental kingdom. It can be simply regarded as a
consequence of the fact that one of the terms is much more
sophisticated than the other. The same has often happened in the
history of philosophy and science with other common-sense terms, at
the time they have been replaced for theoretical purposes by a more
sophisticated one.
Thus, we continue to use today the common-sense acceptation of
‘movement’ with a meaning which, according to present science,
could by no means be said to coincide exactly with its scientifi c
counterpart. For example, when I am about to take a picture of
somebody and ask her ‘not to move’, I am completely ignoring many
basic facts about the exact meaning of the word ‘movement’ in
physics, such as the Earth’s rotation on its axis at a giddy speed
to start with.
G. F. Díez, The Demarcation between Philosophy and Science
143
In fact these two meanings of ‘movement’ behave quite in the same
way as the two meanings for ‘pain’ which I have just described in
the so-called ‘corrigibility scenario’. They are roughly, but not
completely, coincident. The ordinary common-sense one is
chronologically much older than its scientifi c counterpart, but it
has been maintained with- out important changes after the
appearance of the latter, for ordinary, everyday life uses.
To be sure, historically there was a period of tension between the
two, by the time the scientifi c sense began to incorporate aspects
which collided with the intuitive sense: “a common objection to the
Coper- nican/Galilean/Newtoninan claim that we humans and the
ground we stand on, are constantly moving eastwards at something
close to 1.000 miles per hour was that our subjective impressions
are wholly incompatible with our being engaged in any motion of
such an extreme and unprecedented character ... This reaction is
entirely understand- able, given the default or domain-central
prototypes of motion common among people at the time” (Paul
Churchland 2007, 163). That period of tension was in due time
overcome, and today the two meanings of the word co-exist in
peace.
The philosophical interest in ‘movement’, however, did not remain
indifferent to that change. We have already seen how the whole of
natural philosophy greatly declined after the birth of modern
science. Today’s philosophical interest in movement is much more
lateral, cir- cumscribed to the so-called ‘philosophy of physics’
and requiring highly specialized background knowledge of this
science (and similarly with other parts of the old natural
philosophy, reconverted today into ‘phi- losophy of chemistry’,
‘philosophy of biology’, etc). The kind of concep- tual analysis
based on common-sense observation and on the idiosyn- crasies of
the common-sense meaning of the word, completely lost the
importance and topicality that it had had. The rise of the
scientifi c counterpart of the term, and of the theory behind it,
had the effect of completely changing our philosophical interests
on the matter.
What I am suggesting is that something similar could happen in the
scenario I have just described, or another one with a similar
degree of singularity. Hence, where Fumerton proclaims that the
scientifi c study of the brain will hardly get to be crucial for
“the study of the mind that interests us” (ibid, 59, his italics),
we could add ‘that interests us now’. Because as I have tried to
shown, if we place ourselves in some of the utopian scenarios that
Fumerton’s criterion requires us to imagine, our current
philosophical interests about mental concepts may undergo radical
changes. Just as it happened in the past with other topics, that
once were the centre of philosophical attention.
In fact the whole of philosophy of mind is itself a relatively
recent philosophical discipline. Its problems are not ‘eternal’ in
the sense of having been at the centre of the philosophical debate
since its origin, as it happens with other philosophical problems,
such as the difference between good and evil, or the nature of
aesthetic judgments. In fact,
144 G. F. Díez, The Demarcation between Philosophy and
Science
the typical syllabus of philosophy of mind starts with Descartes
(Kenny 1989; Rosenthal 1991; Heil 1998; Chalmers 2002). Before him,
the cen- tral problems of philosophy of mind had not aroused much
attention: “Descartes was the fi rst to formulate complete dualism,
that sharp dis- tinction between soul and body, mind and matter,
which afterwards be- came so general a belief and so important a
philosophy. Before his day, and among many afterwards, the soul was
regarded as of the nature of air or fi re; mind and matter differed
more in degree than in kind” (Wil- liam Dampier, A History of
Science, 136).
Scientifi c and technological changes bring about changes in our
con- cepts, and in our intellectual interests. Often these changes
in meaning do not affect our every-day use, but they are present
only for theoretical purposes. Just as we do not care about the
scientifi c concept of ‘move- ment’, until we start theorizing or
philosophizing about movement. But if such a transformation ever
takes place in the fi eld of philosophy of mind, then many of our
present views about mind and mental states might become, if not
untenable, at least as outdated or obsolete as the philosophical
proposals of the past that we have recalled earlier in this paper.
And it is Fumerton’s demarcation criterion between philosophy and
science which teaches us that.1
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<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>
/NOR
<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>
/SVE
<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>
>> >> setdistillerparams << /HWResolution [2400
2400] /PageSize [612.000 792.000] >> setpagedevice