The Cuban Missile Crisis

CHST 540May 26, 2005

American Policy Towards Cuba

1960: US reduces Cuban sugar quota, then imposes embargo; Cuba nationalizes all US holdingsJanuary 1961: diplomatic relations severedApril 1961: Bay of Pigs invasion; US imposes embargoJanuary 1962: at US urging, Cuba expelled from Organization of American States (OAS)

Cuban-Soviet TiesCuba turns to the USSR

Cuba had not been granted entrance to the Warsaw Pact

Agreed to Operation Anadyr to deter US and to strengthen “moral defense” of sovereignty

Castro & Khrushchev, 1960

CIA Assessments‘The Military Build-up in Cuba’ (NIE of Sept. 19, 1962)misjudged Khrushchev’s will to gamblemissed crucial evidence of deployment of Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles to Cuba failed to link construction of SAM anti-aircraft sites and presence of Soviet combat forces to deployment of ballistic missiles

Khrushchev’s GamblePolicy of bluff?

Deterrent (to American invasion)?

Balancing move?

The Crisis BeginsOctober 14, 1962: first evidence of Soviet MRBM sites in Cuba (PSALM)EX-COMM (Executive Committee of NSC) meetsArmed forces readiness raised to unprecedented DEFCON 2October 22, 1962: Kennedy goes public

Role of Intelligence: ImageryNational Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC), headed by Arthur Lundahl

U-2 reconnaissance flights

Imint: MRBM Launch Site 1

Imint: Close-ups of Missile Sites

Close-up of missile transporters and missile-ready tents

Close-up of missile preparation area (taken from altitude of 250 feet)

Role of Intelligence: HumanKGB Colonel Oleg PenkovskyRun jointly by the CIA and SIS (MI6)‘Ironbark’ reportsArrested by Soviets in Sept. 1962; later executed

Resolution of the CrisisOctober 28, 1962: Khrushchev ordered construction work stopped on installations in Cuba; missiles to be dismantled, packed up and shipped back to USSRKhrushchev dropped demand that US withdraw missiles from Turkey

Excerpt from a post-crisis report

Soviet IntelligenceHighly skilled at security and surveillance within their totalitarian systemKhrushchev acts as own intelligence analyst; rejects professionalization of intelligenceKGB fails to influence policy-makingSoviet intelligence fails to grasp sophistication of US technology

American IntelligenceAnalysis still weak and flawed at timesFar greater ability than Soviet intelligence to influence policy-makingFar more technically sophisticated than Soviets (U-2, etc.)

For further info:

James G. Blight, Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Frank Cass, 1998)David Alvarez, ‘American Signals Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis’ Intelligence and National Security 15:1 (2000) 169-77.A.V. Fursenko, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (W.W. Norton, 1997)