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Truth and Knowledge K.Sri Ram Assignment#6: The Empirico-Transcendental Conundrum in Habermas' Knowledge and Human Interest ord count: !" !6 ! Foucault while talking about the history of knowledge credits K be the one who marks the turn in modern episteme that eventually lead to the op epistemic gap that gave rise to the idea of man being the subject of an empirico transcendental doublet where man becomes both the knowing subject and object of knowledge . Moving away from the classical age man no more remains at the locus centre of human knowledge. This dethroning of man problemati!es the position of modern episteme where man becomes the object of study of empirical sciences whil simultaneously being a transcendental subject who is the receiver of all such kn analytic of finitude that Foucault talks about identifies man being limited by v which also serve as possibilities for ac"uiring knowledge. This parado# adds on predicament of man whom with all his human limitations while being an object i transcendental subject of knowledge. Foucault while setting the stage for the di of man which he refers to as $the death of man% puts forth the condition of man up in a vicious binary of being the empirical object and the transcendental subj knowledge in the modern episteme &Foucault '(() *+,-) /. Kant distinguishes apriori from aposteriory as forms of knowled where the subject is in brief unable to access a thing in itself. The empirico conundrum lies in Kant%s theory of knowledge where a synthesis happens between t and the object that produces any kind of knowledge. Kant does not tackle the pro crops with self reflection where the subject reflecting upon his own consciousne the empirical object and a transcendental subject in the process. 0f one follows further the reflecting subject will be caught in an infinite regress of subject ' 0n 1egel%s theory of knowledge the notion of the mind perceivi itself is referred to as self consciousness where the act of self reflection its transcendental e#perience. The subject and the object are constantly in a dialec 2#cluding all titles and references. ' 3r.Michael 3usche Lectures on Habermas.

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Truth and Knowledge K.Sri RamAssignment#6: The Empirico-Transcendental Conundrum in Habermas' Knowledge and Human Interest Word count: 1,416[footnoteRef:2] [2: Excluding all titles and references.]

Foucault while talking about the history of knowledge credits Kant to be the one who marks the turn in modern episteme that eventually lead to the opening up the epistemic gap that gave rise to the idea of man being the subject of an empirico transcendental doublet where man becomes both the knowing subject and object of human knowledge . Moving away from the classical age, man no more remains at the locus or the centre of human knowledge. This dethroning of man problematizes the position of man in the modern episteme where man becomes the object of study of empirical sciences while simultaneously being a transcendental subject who is the receiver of all such knowledge. The analytic of finitude that Foucault talks about identifies man being limited by various forces which also serve as possibilities for acquiring knowledge. This paradox adds on to the predicament of man, whom with all his human limitations while being an object is also the transcendental subject of knowledge. Foucault while setting the stage for the disappearance of man which he refers to as the death of man puts forth the condition of man being caught up in a vicious binary of being the empirical object and the transcendental subject of knowledge in the modern episteme (Foucault 2005, 347-51).Kant distinguishes apriori from aposteriory as forms of knowledge where the subject is in brief, unable to access a thing in itself. The empirico transcendental conundrum lies in Kants theory of knowledge where a synthesis happens between the subject and the object that produces any kind of knowledge. Kant does not tackle the problem that crops with self reflection where the subject reflecting upon his own consciousness becomes the empirical object and a transcendental subject in the process. If one follows Kants idea further, the reflecting subject will be caught in an infinite regress of subject object relations.[footnoteRef:3] [3: Dr.Michael Dusche, Lectures on Habermas.]

In Hegels theory of knowledge, the notion of the mind perceiving itself is referred to as self consciousness where the act of self reflection itself becomes a transcendental experience. The subject and the object are constantly in a dialectical relationship involved in a negation of the negation through which knowledge is produced.[footnoteRef:4] The observing consciousness of the human subject sublates itself in the act of self reflection where the contemplating subject becomes transcendental and the subjects consciousness becomes an empirical object of study. Hegelian notion of Geist as an alienated spirit can be considered to be the transcendental subject which is not free from dialectical relationships but is in the process of seeking freedom from it. [4: Manoj, Tutorial Lectures on Habermas.]

According to Habermas reading of Marx, Marx places reflection on par with instrumental action. To Marx, reflection is conceived as a mode of production or labour (Habermas 1972, 44).[footnoteRef:5] Marx inverts the Hegelian idea of Geist materialising itself in nature and states that nature becomes aware of itself in man through the process of labour. Man becomes the empirical site where nature manifests itself in the subjective nature of man. Industry becomes the process of synthesis between man and nature through which knowledge is produced. Marx calls labour a condition of human existence that is independent of all forms of society, a perpetual necessity of nature in order to mediate the material exchange between man and nature, in other words , human life (27). The transcendental view point of manipulating nature through labour provides the ground for experience to be organized and reality being objectified (44).Industry or in other words labour becomes the transcendental subject in Marx where labour is historicised which is engaged with the manipulation of instruments in nature, which is conceived to be having a particular teleology (27). [5: In the remainder of the essay, all the page numbers referring to the text will be given in brackets at the end of sentences.]

Comte proposes three stages in the history of knowledge which guides his theory of knowledge by upholding the belief of positivist sciences that all knowledge can be reduced to objective facts or empirical evidence (71). Perception and observation are the basic methods of enquiry for gaining empirical knowledge of objects in the world. The conundrum can be spotted in the positivist sciences which seek to define objects in the world but get caught in the process as science itself needs to be defined in relation with the objects of the world that it seeks to define (74). The field of phenomena becomes the object of study for positivist sciences. The positivistic claim of universally putting the relative in place of absolute in a way falls back to Kant as the guiding principle of positivist interpretation of causal theories fall in to the realm of metaphysics as scientific knowledge is not the knowledge of ultimate origins (75,78,79). The paradox with positivism is that only through metaphysical concepts; positivism can make sense of itself (80). Habermas critique of positivism is that its theories can be falsified as demonstrated by applying the theory to itself, which fails in the case of positivism while seeking to copy reality (79, 87).Following Comte, Mach looks at the subject as an object and rejects the Hegelian notion of the self and the other where the world is conceived to be an infinite proposition which can be tested by theory.[footnoteRef:6]According to Mach, the objectivity of knowledge cannot be understood from the perspective of the knowing subject but can only be derived from the object domain (86). Habermas calls Machs project to be a copying process where knowledge is produced through the synthesis between the perceiving objects and perceived objects (87). Mach could not properly justify his theory concerning reflection that goes beyond the realm of science, including itself (87). Mach says, Reflection can abolish itself [] only by granting science a legitimate object domain (88). He suggests that a prior knowledge is required for man to perceive science and in turn science is engaged in the empirical study of man. [6: Dr.Michael Dusche, Lectures on Habermas.]

Peirces logic of inquiry is founded on the belief that by having enough information and exerting adequate thought, one can arrive at a definite conclusion like any other would under favourable conditions. He combines realism with transcendental philosophy and turns it in to the inquiry of logic (111). Peirce says [] every question [has] a true answer, a final conclusion, to which the opinion of every man is constantly gravitating (93). The conundrum in Peirce lies in his proposition that knowledge is grounded in the way of life. As opposed to Positivism, Pierces logic of inquiry falls between formal and transcendental logic while trying to extend the structure of logic to knowledge under empirical conditions (94). This implies that knowledge as a description of reality cannot be detached from the knowing subject. Reality itself becomes a transcendental concept where it can exist independent of actual knowing (95). He employs three types of logical inferences namely induction, deduction and abduction as types of logical inquiry and states that the beginning and ending of the chain of reasoning cannot be clearly perceived. He says, There are neither fundamental propositions that qualify as principles once and for all, without being justified by other propositions that are immediately certain and unaffected by our interpretations (97). This is the conundrum in Pierce where no matter how far one retraces ones inferences, one remains caught in the compass of interpretations (98). Similarly the conundrum in Konrad Lorenzs evolutionary epistemology can be spotted, where man perceives nature through evolution and nature manifests itself in the site of man where man becomes the transcendental subject.In Diltheys theory of understanding expression, he classifies hermeneutic understanding in to three classes of life expressions among which linguistic expression can be totally detached from real life context (163). The vicious empirico transcendental circle in Dilthey can be recognised when he says that the dilemma of cultural sciences is due to the hermeneutic circle that designates cultural sciences (171). The analysis between symbols and objects uses metalinguistic statements to describe an object language. But these linguistic objects can also be viewed as experiential data which gives the objects held by cultural sciences a double status (171). The circular development while combining linguistic analysis with experience, the interpretive process involved would be caught in a vicious circle (171). Man gets caught between the disciplines of culture sciences and natural sciences in a hermeneutic circle while trying to arrive at an understanding or consensus.[footnoteRef:7] [7: Ibid.]

Bibliography:Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things. Routledge, 2005.Habermas, Jurgen. Knowledge and Human Interests. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972.Dusche, Michael. Lecture notes. 2014.

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