The Concept of Nature - Unknown

8/13/2019 The Concept of Nature - Unknown

1/565


2/565

Project Gutenberg's

The Concept of Nature

by

Alfred North Whitehead

This eBook is for the use of anylmost no restrictions whatsoevee-use it under the terms of the

with this eBook or online at www


3/565

Title: The Concept of NatureThe Tarner Lectures Deliv

Author: Alfred North WhiteheadRelease Date: July 16, 2006 [EBoLanguage: EnglishCharacter set encoding: ISO-8859

** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENB

Produced by Janet Kegg, Laura WiDistributed Proofreading Team at

Special characters This file uses theollowing special characters:

f these do not display, you might try


4/565

another font or browser, or use the ISO-8859-1 or ASCII text version of thisebook.

Printer errors Two printer errors havebeen corrected: On page 51 the wordsight has been changed to touch assuggested by the sense; and on page 180he word universely has been changedo inversely. These are marked in the

ext by mouse-hovers.
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#err2http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#err1


5/565

The Concept of

NATURE

The TarnerLectures

Delivered in


6/565

Trinity College

November 1919

Alfred North Whitehead

PREFACE

The contents of this book were

originally delivered at Trinity College ihe autumn of 1919 as the inaugural

course of Tarner lectures. The Tarner ectureship is an occasional office


7/565

ounded by the liberality of Mr EdwardTarner. The duty of each of thesuccessive holders of the post will be todeliver a course on the Philosophy ohe Sciences and the Relations or Want

of Relations between the different

Departments of Knowledge. Thepresent book embodies the endeavour ohe first lecturer of the series to fulfil hisask.

The chapters retain their original lectureorm and remain as delivered with the

exception of minor changes designed toemove obscurities of expression. Theecture form has the advantage o

suggesting an audience with a definite

mental background which it is the


8/565

purpose of the lecture to modify in aspecific way. In the presentation of anovel outlook with wide ramifications asingle line of communications fropremises to conclusions is not sufficientor intelligibility. Your audience will

construe whatever you say intoconformity with their pre-existingoutlook. For this reason the first twochapters and the last two chapters areessential for intelligibility though theyhardly add to the formal completeness ohe exposition. Their function is to

prevent the reader from bolting up sideracks in pursuit of misunderstandings.The same reason dictates my avoidanceof the existing technical terminology ophilosophy. The modern natural


9/565

philosophy is shot through and througwith the fallacy of bifurcation which isdiscussed in the second chapter of thiswork. Accordingly all its technical termsn some subtle way presuppose a

misunderstanding of my thesis. It is

perhaps as well to state explicitly that ihe reader indulges in the facile vice obifurcation not a word of what I havehere written will be intelligible.

The last two chapters do not properlybelong to the special course.

Chapter VIII is a lecture delivered in thespring of 1920 before the ChemicalSociety of the students of the ImperialCollege of Science and Technology. Ithas been appended here as conveniently
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#CHAPTER_VIII


10/565


11/565

mproved and others have been set in anew light. On the other hand importantpoints of the previous work have beeomitted where I have had nothing freso say about them. On the whole,

whereas the former work based itsel

chiefly on ideas directly drawn frommathematical physics, the present book keeps closer to certain fields ophilosophy and physics to the exclusioof mathematics. The two works meet iheir discussions of some details o

space and time.

am not conscious that I have in any wayaltered my views. Some developmentshave been made. Those that are capable

of a non-mathematical exposition have


12/565


13/565

be lacking in appreciation of the value ohis recent work on general relativitywhich has the high merit of firstdisclosing the way in whicmathematical physics should proceed ihe light of the principle of relativity.

But in my judgment he has cramped thedevelopment of his brilliantmathematical method in the narrowbounds of a very doubtful philosophy.

The object of the present volume and ots predecessor is to lay the basis of a

natural philosophy which is thenecessary presupposition of aeorganised specu lative physics. The

general assimilation of space and timewhich dominates the constructive thought


14/565

can claim the independent support oMinkowski from the side of science andalso of succeeding relativists, while ohe side of philosophers it was, I

believe, one theme of Prof. AlexandersGifford lectures delivered some few

ears ago but not yet published. He alsosummarised his conclusions on thisquestion in a lecture to the AristotelianSociety in the July of 1918. Since thepublication of An Enquiry concerninhe Principles of Natural Knowledge

have had the advantage of reading Mr

C. D. Broads Perception, Physics, and eality [Camb. Univ. Press, 1914]. Thisvaluable book has assisted me in mydiscussion in Chapter II , though I aunaware as to how far Mr Broad would
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#CHAPTER_II


15/565

assent to any of my arguments as therestated.

t remains for me to thank the staff of theUniversity Press, its compositors, itsproof-readers, its clerks, and its

managing officials, not only for theechnical excellence of their work, butor the way they have co-operated so aso secure my convenience.

A. N. W.

MPERIAL COLLEGE OF SCIENCE

AND TECHNOLOGY.pril , 1920.


16/565

CO NTENTS

1. CHAP. PAGE

1. NATURE A ND THOUGHT 12. THEORIES OF T HE

BIFURCATION OF NA TURE 263. TIM E 494. THE METHOD OF E XTENSIVE

ABSTRACTION 745. SPACE AND MOTION 996. CONGRUENCE 1207. OBJECTS 1438. SUMMARY 1649. THE ULTIMATE PHYSICAL

CONCEPTS 18510. NOTE: On the Greek Concept of a

Point 197
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#NOTE1http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#CHAPTER_IXhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#CHAPTER_VIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#Page_120http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#CHAPTER_Vhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#Page_99http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#CHAPTER_IVhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#CHAPTER_IIIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#Page_49http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#Page_49http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#CHAPTER_IIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#Page_26http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#CHAPTER_Ihttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#CHAPTER_Ihttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#CHAPTER_Ihttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#Page_197http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#NOTE1http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#Page_185http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#CHAPTER_IXhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#Page_164http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#CHAPTER_VIIIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#Page_143http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#CHAPTER_VIIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#Page_120http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#CHAPTER_VIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#Page_99http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#CHAPTER_Vhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#Page_74http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#CHAPTER_IVhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#Page_49http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#CHAPTER_IIIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#Page_26http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#CHAPTER_IIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#Page_1http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#CHAPTER_I


17/565

11. NOTE: On Significance and InfiniteEvents 197

12. INDEX 199
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#Page_199http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#INDEXhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#Page_197http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#NOTE2


18/565

THE CONCEPT

OF NATURE

CHAPTER I - NATUREAND THOUGHT

The subject-matter of the Tarner lecturess defined by the founder to be the

Philosophy of the Sciences and theRelations or Want of Relations betweenhe different Departments o

Knowledge. It is fitting at the firstecture of this new foundation to dwell

or a few moments on the intentions o


19/565

he donor as expressed in this definition;and I do so the more willingly as I shallhereby be enabled to introduce theopics to which the present course is to

be devoted.

We are justified, I think, in taking thesecond clause of the definition as in partexplanatory of the earlier clause. Whats the philosophy of the sciences? It is

not a bad answer to say that it is thestudy of the relations between thedifferent departments of knowledge.Then with admirable solicitude for the

reedom of learning there is inserted ihe definition after the word relationshe phrase or want of relations. A

disproof of relations between sciences


20/565

would in itself constitute a philosophy ohe sciences. But we could not dispense

either with the earlier or the later clause.t is not every relation between sciences

which enters into their philosophy. For example biology and physics areconnected by the use of the microscope.Still, I may safely assert that a technicaldescription of the uses of the microscopen biology is not part of the philosophy

of the sciences. Again, you cannotabandon the later clause of thedefinition; namely that referring to theelations between the sciences, without

abandoning the explicit reference to adeal in the absence of which philosophy

must languish from lack of intrinsicnterest. That ideal is the attainment o


21/565

some unifying concept which will set iassigned relationships within itself allhat there is for knowledge, for feeling,

and for emotion. That far off ideal is themotive power of philosophic research;and claims allegiance even as you expelt. The philosophic pluralist is a strictogician; the Hegelian thrives o

contradictions by the help of hisabsolute; the Mohammedan divine bows

before the creative will of Allah; and thepragmatist will swallow anything soong as it works.

The mention of these vast systems and ohe age-long controversies from whichey spring, warns us to concentrate. Our ask is the simpler one of the philosophy


22/565

of the sciences. Now a science hasalready a certain unity which is the veryeason why that body of knowledge has

been instinctively recognised as forminga science. The philosophy of a science ishe endeavour to express explicitly those

unifying characteristics which pervadehat complex of thoughts and make it to

be a science. The philosophy of thesciencesconceived as one subjectis

he endeavour to exhibit all sciences asone science, orin case of defeatthedisproof of such a possibility.

Again I will make a further simplification, and confine attention tohe natural sciences, that is, to the

sciences whose subject-matter is nature.


23/565

By postulating a common subject-matter or this group of sciences a unifying

philosophy of natural science has beehereby presupposed.

What do we mean by nature? We haveo discuss the philosophy of natural

science. Natural science is the scienceof nature. ButWhat is nature?

ature is that which we observe iperception through the senses. In thissense-perception we are aware osomething which is not thought and

which is self-contained for thought. Thisproperty of being self-contained for hought lies at the base of natural

science. It means that nature can behought of as a closed system whose


24/565

mutual relations do not require theexpression of the fact that they arehought about.

Thus in a sense nature is independent ohought. By this statement nometaphysical pronouncement is intended.What I mean is that we can think aboutnature without thinking about thought. Ishall say that then we are thinking

homogeneously about nature.Of course it is possible to think of naturen conjunction with thought about the fact

hat nature is thought about. In such acase I shall say that we are thinkingheterogeneously about nature. In fact

during the last few minutes we have


25/565

been thinking heterogeneously aboutnature. Natural science is exclusivelyconcerned with homogeneous thoughtsabout nature.

But sense-perception has in it an elementwhich is not thought. It is a difficultpsychological question whether sense-perception involves thought; and if itdoes involve thought, what is the kind o

hought which it necessarily involves.ote that it has been stated above thatsense-perception is an awareness osomething which is not thought. Namely,

nature is not thought. But this is adifferent question, namely that the fact osense-perception has a factor which isnot thought. I call this factor sense-


26/565

awareness. Accord ingly the doctrinehat natural science is exclusively

concerned with homogeneous thoughtsabout nature does not immediately carrywith it the conclusion that naturalscience is not concerned with sense-awareness.

However, I do assert this further statement; namely, that though natural

science is concerned with nature whics the terminus of sense-perception, it isnot concerned with the sense-awarenesstself.

repeat the main line of this argument,and expand it in certain directions.

Thought about nature is different fro


27/565

he sense-perception of nature. Hencehe fact of sense-perception has angredient or factor which is not thought.call this ingredient sense-awareness. It

s indifferent to my argument whether sense-perception has or has not thoughtas another ingredient. If sense-perception does not involve thought, thesense-awareness and sense-perceptioare identical. But the something

perceived is perceived as an entitywhich is the terminus of the sense-awareness, something which for thoughts beyond the fact of that sense-

awareness. Also the somethingperceived certainly does not contaiother sense-awarenesses which aredifferent from the sense-awareness


28/565

which is an ingredient in that perception.Accordingly nature as disclosed isense-perception is self-contained asagainst sense-awareness, in addition tobeing self-contained as against thought. Iwill also express this self-containednessof nature by saying that nature is closedo mind.

This closure of nature does not carry

with it any metaphysical doctrine of thedisjunction of nature and mind. It meanshat in sense-perception nature is

disclosed as a complex of entities whose

mutual relations are expressible ihought without reference to mind, thats, without reference either to sense-

awareness or to thought. Furthermore, I


29/565

do not wish to be understood asmplying that sense-awareness andhought are the only activities which areo be ascribed to mind. Also I am not

denying that there are relations of naturalentities to mind or minds other thabeing the termini of the sense-awarenesses of minds. Accordingly Iwill extend the meaning of the termshomogeneous thoughts and

heterogeneous thoughts which havealready been introduced. We arehinking homogeneously about nature

when we are thinking about it withouthinking about thought or about sense-

awareness, and we are thinkingheterogeneously about nature when we

are thinking about it in conjunction wit


30/565

hinking either about thought or aboutsense-awareness or about both.

also take the homogeneity of thoughtabout nature as excluding any referenceo moral or aesthetic values whose

apprehension is vivid in proportion toself-conscious activity. The values onature are perhaps the key to themetaphysical synthesis of existence. But

such a synthesis is exactly what I am notattempting. I am concerned exclusivelywith the generalisations of widest scopewhich can be effected respecting that

which is known to us as the directdeliverance of sense-awareness.

have said that nature is disclosed isense-perception as a complex o


31/565

entities. It is worth considering what wemean by an entity in this connexion.Entity is simply the Latin equivalentor thing unless some arbitrary

distinction is drawn between the wordsor technical purposes. All thought has to

be about things. We can gain some ideaof this necessity of things for thought byexamination of the structure of aproposition.

Let us suppose that a proposition isbeing communicated by an expositor to aecipient. Such a proposition is

composed of phrases; some of thesephrases may be demonstrative and othersmay be descriptive.


32/565

By a demonstrative phrase I mean aphrase which makes the recipient awareof an entity in a way which isndependent of the particular

demonstrative phrase. You willunderstand that I am here usingdemonstration in the non-logical sense,

namely in the sense in which a lecturer demonstrates by the aid of a frog and amicroscope the circulation of the blood

or an elementary class of medicalstudents. I will call such demonstratiospeculative demonstration,emembering Hamlets use of the wordspeculation when he says,

There is no speculation in those eyes.

Thus a demonstrative phrase


33/565

demonstrates an entity speculatively. Itmay happen that the expositor has meantsome other entitynamely, the phrasedemonstrates to him an entity which isdiverse from the entity which itdemonstrates to the recipient. In thatcase there is confusion; for there are twodiverse propositions, namely theproposition for the expositor and theproposition for the recipient. I put this

possibility aside as irrelevant for our discussion, though in practice it may bedifficult for two persons to concur in theconsideration of exactly the sameproposition, or even for one person tohave determined exactly the propositiowhich he is considering.


34/565

Again the demonstrative phrase may failo demonstrate any entity. In that casehere is no proposition for the recipient.

think that we may assume (perhapsashly) that the expositor knows what he

means.

A demonstrative phrase is a gesture. It isnot itself a constituent of the proposition,but the entity which it demonstrates is

such a constituent. You may quarrel witha demonstrative phrase as in some wayobnoxious to you; but if it demonstrateshe right entity, the proposition is

unaffected though your taste may beoffended. This suggestiveness of thephraseology is part of the literary qualityof the sentence which conveys the


35/565

proposition. This is because a sentencedirectly conveys one proposition, whilen its phraseology it suggests a penumbra

of other propositions charged witemotional value. We are now talking of he one proposition directly conveyed i

any phraseology.

This doctrine is obscured by the fact thatn most cases what is in form a mere part

of the demonstrative gesture is in fact apart of the proposition which it isdesired directly to convey. In such acase we will call the phraseology of the

proposition elliptical. In ordinaryntercourse the phraseology of nearly all

propositions is elliptical.

Let us take some examples. Suppose that


36/565

he expositor is in London, say iRegents Park and in Bedford College,he great womens college which is

situated in that park. He is speaking ihe college hall and he says,

This college building iscommodious.

The phrase this college building is a

demonstrative phrase. Now suppose theecipient answers,

This is not a college building, it is

the lion-house in the Zoo.

Then, provided that the expositorsoriginal proposi tion has not bee

couched in elliptical phraseology, the


37/565

expositor sticks to his originalproposition when he replies,

Anyhow, it is commodious.

ote that the recipients answer acceptshe speculative demonstration of the

phrase This college building. He doesnot say, What do you mean? Heaccepts the phrase as demonstrating aentity, but declares that same entity to behe lion-house in the Zoo. In his reply,he expositor in his turn recognises the

success of his original gesture as a

speculative demonstration, and waiveshe question of the suitability of its mode

of suggestiveness with an anyhow. Buthe is now in a position to repeat theoriginal proposition with the aid of a


38/565

demonstrative gesture robbed of anysuggestiveness, suitable or unsuitable,by saying,

It is commodious.

The it of this final statementpresupposes that thought has seized ohe entity as a bare objective for

consideration.

We confine ourselves to entitiesdisclosed in sense-awareness. The entitys so disclosed as a relatum in the

complex which is nature. It dawns on aobserver because of its relations; but its an objective for thought in its ow

bare individuality. Thought cannotproceed otherwise; namely, it cannot


39/565

proceed without the ideal bare itwhich is speculatively demonstrated.This setting up of the entity as a bareobjective does not ascribe to it aexistence apart from the complex iwhich it has been found by sense-perception. The it for thought isessentially a relatum for sense-awareness.

The chances are that the dialogue as tohe college building takes another form.Whatever the expositor originallymeant, he almost certainly now takes his

ormer statement as couched in ellipticalphraseology, and assumes that he wasmeaning,

This is a college building and is


40/565

commodious.

Here the demonstrative phrase or the

gesture, which demonstrates the itwhich is commodious, has now beeeduced to this; and the attenuated

phrase, under the circumstances in whict is uttered, is sufficient for the purpose

of correct demonstration. This brings outhe point that the verbal form is never the

whole phraseology of the proposition;his phraseology also includes thegeneral circumstances of its production.Thus the aim of a demonstrative phrase

s to exhibit a definite it as a bareobjective for thought; but the moduoperandi of a demonstrative phrase is toproduce an awareness of the entity as a


41/565

particular relatum in an auxiliarycomplex, chosen merely for the sake ohe speculative demonstration andrrelevant to the proposition. For

example, in the above dialogue, collegesand buildings, as related to the itspeculatively demonstrated by thephrase this college building, set thatit in an auxiliary complex which isrrelevant to the proposition

It is commodious.

Of course in language every phrase is

nvariably highly elliptical. Accordinglyhe sentence

This college building iscommodious


42/565

means probably

This college building is

commodious as a college building.

But it will be found that in the abovediscussion we can replacecommodious by commodious as a

college building without altering our conclusion; though we can guess that theecipient, who thought he was in theion-house of the Zoo, would be lessikely to assent to.

Anyhow, it is commodious as acollege building.

A more obvious instance of elliptical

phraseology arises if the expositor


43/565

should address the recipient with theemark,

That criminal is your friend.

The recipient might answer,

He is my friend and you areinsulting.

Here the recipient assumes that thephrase That criminal is elliptical andnot merely demonstrative. In fact, puredemonstration is impossible though it is

he ideal of thought. This practicalmpossibility of pure demonstration is adifficulty which arises in thecommunication of thought and in the

etention of thought. Namely, a


44/565

proposition about a particular factor inature can neither be expressed to othersnor retained for repeated consideratiowithout the aid of auxiliary complexeswhich are irrelevant to it.

now pass to descriptive phrases. Theexpositor says,

A college in Regents Park iscommodious.

The recipient knows Regents Park well.The phrase A college in Regents Park

s descriptive for him. If its phraseologys not elliptical, which in ordinary life itcertainly will be in some way or other,his proposition simply means,


45/565

There is an entity which is acollege building in Regents Park and is commodious.

f the recipient rejoins,

The lion-house in the Zoo is theonly commodious building inRegents Park,

he now contradicts the expositor, on theassumption that a lion-house in a Zoo isnot a college building.

Thus whereas in the first dialogue theecipient merely quarrelled with theexpositor without contradicting him, ihis dialogue he contradicts him. Thus a

descriptive phrase is part of the


46/565

proposition which it helps to express,whereas a demonstrative phrase is notpart of the proposition which it helps toexpress.

Again the expositor might be standing iGreen Parkwhere there are no collegebuildingsand say,

This college building iscommodious.

Probably no proposition will beeceived by the recipient because the

demonstrative phrase,This college building

has failed to demonstrate owing to the


47/565

absence of the background of sense-awareness which it presupposes.

But if the expositor had said,

A college building in Green Park is commodious,

he recipient would have received aproposition, but a false one.

Language is usually ambiguous and it isash to make general assertions as to its

meanings. But phrases which commence

with this or that are usuallydemonstrative, whereas phrases whiccommence with the or a are oftendescriptive. In studying the theory o

propositional expression it is important


48/565

o remember the wide differencebetween the analogous modest wordsthis and that on the one hand and a

and the on the other hand. The sentence

The college building in RegentsPark is commodious

means, according to the analysis firstmade by Bertrand Russell, theproposition,

There is an entity which (i) is acollege building in Regents Park

and (ii) is commodious and (iii) issuch that any college building inRegents Park is identical with it.

The descriptive character of the phrase


49/565

The college building in Regents Parks thus evident. Also the proposition is

denied by the denial of any one of itshree component clauses or by the denial

of any combination of the componentclauses. If we had substituted GreePark for Regents Park a falseproposition would have resulted. Alsohe erection of a second college i

Regents Park would make the

proposition false, though in ordinary lifecommon sense would politely treat it asmerely ambiguous.

The Iliad for a classical scholar isusually a demonstrative phrase; for itdemonstrates to him a well-knowpoem. But for the majority of mankind


50/565

he phrase is descriptive, namely, it issynonymous with The poem named theliad.

ames may be either demonstrative or descriptive phrases. For exampleHomer is for us a descriptive phrase,

namely, the word with some slightdifference in suggestiveness means Theman who wrote the Iliad.

This discussion illustrates that thoughtplaces before itself bare objectives,entities as we call them, which the

hinking clothes by expressing their mutual relations. Sense-awarenessdiscloses fact with factors which are theentities for thought. The separatedistinction of an entity in thought is not a


51/565

metaphysical assertion, but a method oprocedure necessary for the finiteexpression of individual propositions.Apart from entities there could be noinite truths; they are the means by whiche infinitude of irrelevance is kept out

of thought.

To sum up: the termini for thought areentities, primarily with bare

ndividuality, secondarily withproperties and relations ascribed to then the procedure of thought; the terminior sense-awareness are factors in the

act of nature, primarily relata and onlysecondarily discriminated as distinctndividualities.


52/565

o characteristic of nature which ismmediately posited for knowledge by

sense-awareness can be explained. It ismpenetrable by thought, in the sense thatts peculiar essential character whic

enters into experience by sense-awareness is for thought merely theguardian of its individuality as a bareentity. Thus for thought red is merely adefinite entity, though for awareness

red has the content of its individuality.The transition from the red of awareness to the red of thought isaccompanied by a definite loss ocontent, namely by the transition from theactor red to the entity red. This lossn the transition to thought is

compensated by the fact that thought is


53/565

communicable whereas sense-awarenesss incommunicable.

Thus there are three components in our knowledge of nature, namely, fact,actors, and entities. Fact is the

undifferentiated terminus of sense-awareness; factors are termini of sense-awareness, differentiated as elements oact; entities are factors in their functio

as the termini of thought. The entitieshus spoken of are natural entities.Thought is wider than nature, so thathere are entities for thought which are

not natural entities.

When we speak of nature as a compleof related entities, the complex is factas an entity for thought, to whose bare


54/565

ndividuality is ascribed the property oembracing in its complexity the naturalentities. It is our business to analyse thisconception and in the course of theanalysis space and time should appear.Evidently the relations holding betweenatural entities are themselves naturalentities, namely they are also factors oact, there for sense-awareness.

Accordingly the structure of the natural

complex can never be completed ihought, just as the factors of fact canever be exhausted in sense-awareness.Unexhaustiveness is an essentialcharacter of our knowledge of nature.Also nature does not exhaust the matter or thought, namely there are thoughts

which would not occur in any


55/565

homogeneous thinking about nature.

The question as to whether sense-

perception involves thought is largelyverbal. If sense-perception involves acognition of individuality abstractedrom the actual position of the entity as aactor in fact, then it undoubtedly doesnvolve thought. But if it is conceived as

sense-awareness of a factor in fact

competent to evoke emotion andpurposeful action without further cognition, then it does not involvehought. In such a case the terminus o

he sense-awareness is something for mind, but nothing for thought. The sense-perception of some lower forms of lifemay be conjectured to approximate to


56/565

his character habitually. Alsooccasionally our own sense-perception moments when thought-activity has

been lulled to quiescence is not far of he attainment of this ideal limit.

The process of discrimination in sense-awareness has two distinct sides. Theres the discrimination of fact into parts,

and the discrimination of any part of fact

as exhibiting relations to entities whicare not parts of fact though they arengredients in it. Namely the immediateact for awareness is the whole

occurrence of nature. It is nature as aevent present for sense-awareness, andessentially passing. There is no holdingnature still and looking at it. We cannot


57/565

edouble our efforts to improve our knowledge of the terminus of our presentsense-awareness; it is our subsequentopportunity in subsequent sense-awareness which gains the benefit of our good resolution. Thus the ultimate factor sense-awareness is an event. This

whole event is discriminated by us intopartial events. We are aware of an eventwhich is our bodily life, of an event

which is the course of nature within thisoom, and of a vaguely perceivedaggregate of other partial events. This ishe discrimination in sense-awareness oact into parts.

shall use the term part in thearbitrarily limited sense of an event


58/565

which is part of the whole fact disclosedn awareness.

Sense-awareness also yields to us other actors in nature which are not events.

For example, sky-blue is seen as situatedn a certain event. This relation o

situation requires further discussiowhich is postponed to a later lecture. Mypresent point is that sky-blue is found i

nature with a definite implication ievents, but is not an event itself.Accordingly in addition to events, thereare other factors in nature directly

disclosed to us in sense-awareness. Theconception in thought of all the factors inature as distinct entities with definitenatural relations is what I have i


59/565

another place [1] called thediversification of nature.

1] Cf. Enquiry .

There is one general conclusion to bedrawn from the foregoing discussion. Its that the first task of a philosophy o

science should be some generalclassification of the entities disclosed tous in sense-perception.

Among the examples of entities iaddition to events which we have used

or the purpose of illustration are thebuildings of Bedford College, Homer,and sky-blue. Evidently these are verydifferent sorts of things; and it is likelyhat statements which are made about
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#FNanchor_1_1http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#Footnote_1_1


60/565

one kind of entity will not be true aboutother kinds. If human thought proceededwith the orderly method which abstractogic would suggest to it, we might gourther and say that a classification o

natural entities should be the first step iscience itself. Perhaps you will benclined to reply that this classificatio

has already been effected, and thatscience is concerned with the adventures

of material entities in space and time.

The history of the doctrine of matter haset to be written. It is the history of the

nfluence of Greek philosophy oscience. That influence has issued in oneong misconception of the metaphysical

status of natural entities. The entity has


61/565

been separated from the factor which ishe terminus of sense-awareness. It has

become the substratum for that factor,and the factor has been degraded into aattribute of the entity. In this way adistinction has been imported into naturewhich is in truth no distinction at all. Anatural entity is merely a factor of fact,considered in itself. Its disconnexiorom the complex of fact is a mere

abstraction. It is not the substratum of theactor, but the very factor itself as baredn thought. Thus what is a mere

procedure of mind in the translation osense-awareness into discursiveknowledge has been transmuted into aundamental character of nature. In this

way matter has emerged as being the


62/565

metaphysical substratum of itsproperties, and the course of nature isnterpreted as the history of matter.

Plato and Aristotle found Greek thoughtpreoccupied with the quest for thesimple substances in terms of which thecourse of events could be expressed. Wemay formulate this state of mind in thequestion, What is nature made of? The

answers which their genius gave to thisquestion, and more particularly theconcepts which underlay the terms iwhich they framed their answers, have

determined the unquestionedpresuppositions as to time, space andmatter which have reigned in science.

n Plato the forms of thought are more


63/565

luid than in Aristotle, and therefore, as Iventure to think, the more valuable.Their importance consists in theevidence they yield of cultivated thoughtabout nature before it had been forcednto a uniform mould by the longradition of scientific philosophy. For

example in the Timaeus there is apresupposition, somewhat vaguelyexpressed, of a distinction between the

general becoming of nature and themeasurable time of nature. In a later ecture I have to distinguish betwee

what I call the passage of nature andparticular time-systems which exhibitcertain characteristics of that passage. Iwill not go so far as to claim Plato idirect support of this doctrine, but I do


64/565

hink that the sections of the Timaeuswhich deal with time become clearer imy distinction is admitted.

This is however a digression. I am nowconcerned with the origin of thescientific doctrine of matter in Greek hought. In the Timaeus Plato asserts thatnature is made of fire and earth with air and water as intermediate between them,

so that as fire is to air so is air to water,and as air is to water so is water toearth. He also suggests a molecular hypothesis for these four elements. I

his hypothesis everything depends ohe shape of the atoms; for earth it is

cubical and for fire it is pyramidal. To-day physicists are again discussing the


65/565

structure of the atom, and its shape is noslight factor in that structure. Platosguesses read much more fantasticallyhan does Aristotles systematic

analysis; but in some ways they are morevaluable. The main outline of his ideass comparable with that of moder

science. It embodies concepts which anyheory of natural philosophy must retai

and in some sense must explain.

Aristotle asked the fundamentalquestion, What do we mean bysubstance? Here the reaction betwee

his philosophy and his logic workedvery unfortunately. In his logic, theundamental type of affirmative

proposition is the attribution of apredicate to a subject. Accordingly,


66/565

amid the many current uses of the ter substance which he analyses, he

emphasises its meaning as the ultimatesubstratum which is no longer predicated of anything else.

The unquestioned acceptance of theAristotelian logic has led to an ingrainedendency to postulate a substratum for

whatever is disclosed in sense-

awareness, namely, to look below whatwe are aware of for the substance in thesense of the concrete thing. This is theorigin of the modern scientific concept

of matter and of ether, namely they arehe outcome of this insistent habit o

postulation.

Accordingly ether has been invented by


67/565

modern science as the substratum of theevents which are spread through spaceand time beyond the reach of ordinaryponderable matter. Personally, I think hat predication is a muddled notio

confusing many different relations under a convenient common form of speech.For example, I hold that the relation ogreen to a blade of grass is entirelydifferent from the relation of green to

he event which is the life history of thatblade for some short period, and isdifferent from the relation of the blade tohat event. In a sense I call the event the

situation of the green, and in another sense it is the situation of the blade.Thus in one sense the blade is acharacter or property which can be


68/565

predicated of the situation, and ianother sense the green is a character or property of the same event which is alsots situation. In this way the predicatio

of properties veils radically differentelations between entities.

Accordingly substance, which is acorrelative term to predication, sharesn the ambiguity. If we are to look for

substance anywhere, I should find it ievents which are in some sense theultimate substance of nature.

Matter, in its modern scientific sense, isa return to the Ionian effort to find ispace and time some stuff whiccomposes nature. It has a more refinedsignification than the early guesses at


69/565

earth and water by reason of a certaivague association with the Aristoteliandea of substance.

Earth, water, air, fire, and matter, andinally ether are related in direct

succession so far as concerns their postulated characters of ultimatesubstrata of nature. They bear witness tohe undying vitality of Greek philosophy

n its search for the ultimate entitieswhich are the factors of the factdisclosed in sense-awareness. Thissearch is the origin of science.

The succession of ideas starting from thecrude guesses of the early Ioniahinkers and ending in the nineteent


70/565

century ether reminds us that thescientific doctrine of matter is really ahybrid through which philosophy passedon its way to the refined Aristotelianconcept of substance and to whicscience returned as it reacted againstphilosophic abstractions. Earth, fire, andwater in the Ionic philosophy and theshaped elements in the Timaeus arcomparable to the matter and ether o

modern scientific doctrine. Butsubstance represents the finalphilosophic concept of the substratuwhich underlies any attribute. Matter (ihe scientific sense) is already in space

and time. Thus matter represents theefusal to think away spatial andemporal characteristics and to arrive at


71/565

he bare concept of an individual entity.t is this refusal which has caused the

muddle of importing the mere procedureof thought into the fact of nature. Theentity, bared of all characteristics excepthose of space and time, has acquired a

physical status as the ultimate texture onature; so that the course of nature isconceived as being merely the fortunesof matter in its adventure through space.

Thus the origin of the doctrine of matter s the outcome of uncritical acceptance

of space and time as external conditions

or natural existence. By this I do notmean that any doubt should be thrown oacts of space and time as ingredients i

nature. What I do mean is the


72/565

unconscious presupposition of space andime as being that within which nature is

set. This is exactly the sort of presupposition which tinges thought iany reaction against the subtlety ophilosophical criticism. My theory of theormation of the scientific doctrine o

matter is that first philosophyllegitimately transformed the bare

entity, which is simply an abstraction

necessary for the method of thought, intohe metaphysical substratum of theseactors in nature which in various senses

are assigned to entities as theirattributes; and that, as a second step,scientists (including philosophers whowere scientists) in conscious or unconscious ignoration of philosophy


73/565

presupposed this substratum, quasubstratum for attributes, as neverthelessn time and space.

This is surely a muddle. The wholebeing of substance is as a substratum for attributes. Thus time and space shouldbe attributes of the substance. This theypalpably are not, if the matter be thesubstance of nature, since it is

mpossible to express spatio-temporalruths without having recourse toelations involving relata other than bits

of matter. I waive this point however,

and come to another. It is not thesubstance which is in space, but theattributes. What we find in space are theed of the rose and the smell of the


74/565

asmine and the noise of cannon. Wehave all told our dentists where our oothache is. Thus space is not a relatio

between substances, but betweeattributes.

Thus even if you admit that the adherentsof substance can be allowed to conceivesubstance as matter, it is a fraud to slipsubstance into space on the plea that

space expresses relations betweesubstances. On the face of it space hasnothing to do with substances, but onlywith their attributes. What I mean is, that

f you chooseas I think wronglytoconstrue our experience of nature as aawareness of the attributes osubstances, we are by this theory


75/565

precluded from finding any analogousdirect relations between substances asdisclosed in our experience. What we doind are relations between the attributes

of substances. Thus if matter is lookedon as substance in space, the space iwhich it finds itself has very little to dowith the space of our experience.

The above argument has been expressed

n terms of the relational theory of space.But if space be absolutenamely, if ithave a being independent of things in itthe course of the argument is hardly

changed. For things in space must have acertain fundamental relation to spacewhich we will call occupation. Thus theobjection that it is the attributes whic


76/565

are observed as related to space, stillholds.

The scientific doctrine of matter is heldn conjunction with an absolute theory oime. The same arguments apply to theelations between matter and time as

apply to the relations between space andmatter. There is however (in the currentphilosophy) a difference in the

connexions of space with matter frohose of time with matter, which I willproceed to explain.

Space is not merely an ordering omaterial entities so that any one entitybears certain relations to other materialentities. The occupation of spacempresses a certain character on eac


77/565

material entity in itself. By reason of itsoccupation of space matter hasextension. By reason of its extensioeach bit of matter is divisible into parts,and each part is a numerically distinctentity from every other such part.Accordingly it would seem that everymaterial entity is not really one entity. Its an essential multiplicity of entities.

There seems to be no stopping this

dissociation of matter into multiplicitiesshort of finding each ultimate entityoccupying one individual point. Thisessential multiplicity of material entitiess certainly not what is meant by science,

nor does it correspond to anythingdisclosed in sense-awareness. It isabsolutely necessary that at a certai


78/565

stage in this dissociation of matter a haltshould be called, and that the materialentities thus obtained should be treatedas units. The stage of arrest may bearbitrary or may be set by thecharacteristics of nature; but alleasoning in science ultimately drops its

space-analysis and poses to itself theproblem, Here is one material entity,what is happening to it as a unit entity?

Yet this material entity is still retainingts extension, and as thus extended is amere multiplicity. Thus there is anessential atomic property in naturewhich is independent of the dissociatioof extension. There is something whicn itself is one, and which is more thahe logical aggregate of entities


79/565

occupying points within the volumewhich the unit occupies. Indeed we maywell be sceptical as to these ultimateentities at points, and doubt whether here are any such entities at all. They

have the suspicious character that we aredriven to accept them by abstract logicand not by observed fact.

Time (in the current philosophy) does

not exert the same disintegrating effecton matter which occupies it. If matter occupies a duration of time, the wholematter occupies every part of that

duration. Thus the connexion betweematter and time differs from theconnexion between matter and space asexpressed in current scientific


80/565

philosophy. There is obviously a greater difficulty in conceiving time as theoutcome of relations between differentbits of matter than there is in theanalogous conception of space. At annstant distinct volumes of space are

occupied by distinct bits of matter.Accordingly there is so far no intrinsicdifficulty in conceiving that space ismerely the resultant of relations betwee

he bits of matter. But in the one-dimensional time the same bit of matter occupies different portions of time.Accordingly time would have to beexpressible in terms of the relations of abit of matter with itself. My own view isa belief in the relational theory both ospace and of time, and of disbelief in the


81/565

current form of the relational theory ospace which exhibits bits of matter ashe relata for spatial relations. The trueelata are events. The distinction which I

have just pointed out between time andspace in their connexion with matter makes it evident that any assimilation oime and space cannot proceed along theraditional line of taking matter as aundamental element in space-formation.

The philosophy of nature took a wrongurn during its development by Greek hought. This erroneous presuppositio

s vague and fluid in Platos TimaeusThe general groundwork of the thought isstill uncommitted and can be construedas merely lacking due explanation and


82/565

he guarding emphasis. But in Aristotlesexposition the current conceptions werehardened and made definite so as toproduce a faulty analysis of the relatiobetween the matter and the form onature as disclosed in sense-awareness.n this phrase the term matter is not

used in its scientific sense.

will conclude by guarding mysel

against a misapprehension. It is evidenthat the current doctrine of matter enshrines some fundamental law onature. Any simple illustration will

exemplify what I mean. For example, ia museum some specimen is lockedsecurely in a glass case. It stays there for ears: it loses its colour, and perhaps


83/565

alls to pieces. But it is the samespecimen; and the same chemicalelements and the same quantities of thoseelements are present within the case athe end as were present at the beginning.

Again the engineer and the astronomer deal with the motions of realper manences in nature. Any theory onature which for one moment loses sightof these great basic facts of experience

s simply silly. But it is permissible topoint out that the scientific expression ohese facts has become entangled in a

maze of doubtful metaphysics; and that,when we remove the metaphysics andstart afresh on an unprejudiced survey onature, a new light is thrown on manyundamental concepts which dominate


84/565

science and guide the progress oesearch.


85/565

CHAPTER II - THEORIESOF THE BIFURCATION

OF NATURE

n my previous lecture I criticised the

concept of matter as the substance whoseattributes we perceive. This way ohinking of matter is, I think, the

historical reason for its introduction into

science, and is still the vague view of itat the background of our thoughts whicmakes the current scientific doctrineappear so obvious. Namely we conceiveourselves as perceiving attributes ohings, and bits of matter are the things

whose attributes we perceive.


86/565

n the seventeenth century the sweetsimplicity of this aspect of matter eceived a rude shock. The transmissio

doctrines of science were then iprocess of elaboration and by the end ohe century were unquestioned, thougheir particular forms have since bee

modified. The establishment of theseransmission theories marks a turning

point in the relation between science and

philosophy. The doctrines to which I amespecially alluding are the theories oight and sound. I have no doubt that theheories had been vaguely floating about

before as obvious suggestions ocommon sense; for nothing in thought isever completely new. But at that epochhey were systematised and made exact,


87/565

and their complete consequences wereuthlessly deduced. It is the

establishment of this procedure of takinghe consequences seriously which markshe real discovery of a theory.

Systematic doctrines of light and soundas being something proceeding from theemitting bodies were definitelyestablished, and in particular theconnexion of light with colour was laid

bare by Newton.

The result completely destroyed thesimplicity of the substance and

attribute theory of perception. What wesee depends on the light entering the eye.Furthermore we do not even perceivewhat enters the eye. The things


88/565

ransmitted are waves oras Newtohoughtminute particles, and the things

seen are colours. Locke met thisdifficulty by a theory of primary andsecondary qualities. Namely, there aresome attributes of the matter which wedo perceive. These are the primaryqualities, and there are other thingswhich we perceive, such as colours,which are not attributes of matter, but

are perceived by us as if they were sucattributes. These are the secondaryqualities of matter.

Why should we perceive secondaryqualities? It seems an extremelyunfortunate arrangement that we shouldperceive a lot of things that are not there.


89/565

Yet this is what the theory of secondaryqualities in fact comes to. There is noweigning in philosophy and in science a

apathetic acquiescence in the conclusiohat no coherent account can be given o

nature as it is disclosed to us in sense-awareness, without dragging in itselations to mind. The modern account o

nature is not, as it should be, merely aaccount of what the mind knows o

nature; but it is also confused with aaccount of what nature does to the mind.The result has been disastrous both toscience and to philosophy, but chiefly tophilosophy. It has transformed the grandquestion of the relations between natureand mind into the petty form of thenteraction between the human body and


90/565

mind.

Berkeleys polemic against matter was

based on this confusion introduced byhe transmission theory of light. He

advocated, rightly as I think, theabandonment of the doctrine of matter its present form. He had however

nothing to put in its place except a theoryof the relation of finite minds to the

divine mind.But we are endeavouring in theseectures to limit ourselves to nature itsel

and not to travel beyond entities whicare disclosed in sense-awareness.

Percipience in itself is taken for granted.We consider indeed conditions for


91/565

percipience, but only so far as thoseconditions are among the disclosures operception. We leave to metaphysics thesynthesis of the knower and the known.Some further explanation and defence ohis position is necessary, if the line o

argument of these lectures is to becomprehensible.

The immediate thesis for discussion is

hat any metaphysical interpretation is allegitimate importation into thephilosophy of natural science. By ametaphysical interpretation I mean any

discussion of the how (beyond nature)and of the why (beyond nature) ohought and sense-awareness. In the

philosophy of science we seek the


92/565

general notions which apply to nature,namely, to what we are aware of inperception. It is the philosophy of thehing perceived, and it should not be

confused with the metaphysics of realityof which the scope embraces botperceiver and perceived. No perplexityconcerning the object of knowledge cabe solved by saying that there is a mindknowing it [2] .

2] Cf. Enquiry , preface.

n other words, the ground taken is this:

sense-awareness is an awareness osomething. What then is the generalcharacter of that something of which weare aware? We do not ask about thepercipient or about the process, but
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#FNanchor_2_2http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#Footnote_2_2


93/565

about the perceived. I emphasise thispoint because discussions on thephilosophy of science are usuallyextremely metaphysicalin my opinion,o the great detriment of the subject.

The recourse to metaphysics is likehrowing a match into the powder

magazine. It blows up the whole arena.This is exactly what scientific

philosophers do when they are drivento a corner and convicted oncoherence. They at once drag in the

mind and talk of entities in the mind or

out of the mind as the case may be. For natural philosophy everything perceiveds in nature. We may not pick and

choose. For us the red glow of the sunset


94/565

should be as much part of nature as arehe molecules and electric waves by

which men of science would explain thephenomenon. It is for natural philosophyo analyse how these various elements o

nature are connected.

n making this demand I conceive myselas adopting our immediate instinctiveattitude towards perceptual knowledge

which is only abandoned under thenfluence of theory. We are instinctivelywilling to believe that by due attention,more can be found in nature than that

which is observed at first sight. But wewill not be content with less. What weask from the philosophy of science issome account of the coherence of things


95/565

perceptively known.

This means a refusal to countenance any

heory of psychic additions to the objectknown in perception. For example, whats given in perception is the green grass.

This is an object which we know as angredient in nature. The theory o

psychic additions would treat thegreenness as a psychic additio

urnished by the perceiving mind, andwould leave to nature merely themolecules and the radiant energy whicnfluence the mind towards that

perception. My argument is that thisdragging in of the mind as makingadditions of its own to the thing positedor knowledge by sense-awareness is


96/565

merely a way of shirking the problem onatural philosophy. That problem is todiscuss the relations inter se of thingsknown, abstracted from the bare fact thathey are known. Natural philosophy

should never ask, what is in the mindand what is in nature. To do so is aconfession that it has failed to expresselations between things perceptively

known, namely to express those natural

elations whose expression is naturalphilosophy. It may be that the task is toohard for us, that the relations are toocomplex and too various for our apprehension, or are too trivial to beworth the trouble of exposition. It isndeed true that we have gone but a very

small way in the adequate formulation o


97/565

such relations. But at least do not let usendeavour to conceal failure under aheory of the byplay of the perceiving

mind.

What I am essentially protesting againsts the bifurcation of nature into two

systems of reality, which, in so far ashey are real, are real in different senses.

One reality would be the entities such as

electrons which are the study ospeculative physics. This would be theeality which is there for knowledge;

although on this theory it is never known.

For what is known is the other sort oeality, which is the byplay of the mind.

Thus there would be two natures, one ishe conjecture and the other is the dream.


98/565

Another way of phrasing this theorywhich I am arguing against is tobifurcate nature into two divisions,namely into the nature apprehended iawareness and the nature which is thecause of awareness. The nature which ishe fact apprehended in awareness holds

within it the greenness of the trees, thesong of the birds, the warmth of the sun,he hardness of the chairs, and the feel o

he velvet. The nature which is the causeof awareness is the conjectured systeof molecules and electrons which soaffects the mind as to produce theawareness of apparent nature. Themeeting point of these two natures is themind, the causal nature being influentand the apparent nature being effluent.


99/565

There are four questions which at oncesuggest themselves for discussion iconnexion with this bifurcation theory onature. They concern (i) causality, (ii)ime, (iii) space, and (iv) delusions.

These questions are not really separable.They merely constitute four distinctstarting points from which to enter upohe discussion of the theory.

Causal nature is the influence on themind which is the cause of the effluenceof apparent nature from the mind. Thisconception of causal nature is not to be

confused with the distinct conception oone part of nature as being the cause oanother part. For example, the burning ohe fire and the passage of heat from it


100/565

hrough intervening space is the cause ohe body, its nerves and its brain,unctioning in certain ways. But this is

not an action of nature on the mind. It isan interaction within nature. Thecausation involved in this interaction iscausation in a different sense from thenfluence of this system of bodilynteractions within nature on the alie

mind which thereupon perceives redness

and warmth.

The bifurcation theory is an attempt toexhibit natural science as a

nvestigation of the cause of the fact oknowledge. Namely, it is an attempt toexhibit apparent nature as an effluentrom the mind because of causal nature.


101/565

The whole notion is partly based on themplicit assumption that the mind ca

only know that which it has itselproduced and retains in some sensewithin itself, though it requires aexterior reason both as originating andas determining the character of itsactivity. But in considering knowledgewe should wipe out all these spatialmetaphors, such as within the mind and

without the mind. Knowledge isultimate. There can be no explanation ohe why of knowledge; we can only

describe the what of knowledge.amely we can analyse the content and

ts internal relations, but we cannotexplain why there is knowledge. Thuscausal nature is a metaphysical chimera;


102/565


103/565

body. Unless we produce the all-embracing relations, we are faced with abifurcated nature; namely, warmth andedness on one side, and molecules,

electrons and ether on the other side.Then the two factors are explained asbeing respectively the cause and theminds reaction to the cause.

Time and space would appear to

provide these all-embracing relationswhich the advocates of the philosophy ohe unity of nature require. The

perceived redness of the fire and the

warmth are definitely related in time andn space to the molecules of the fire andhe molecules of the body.

t is hardly more than a pardonable


104/565

exaggeration to say that thedetermination of the meaning of natureeduces itself principally to the

discussion of the character of time andhe character of space. In succeedingectures I shall explain my own view oime and space. I shall endeavour to

show that they are abstractions fromore concrete elements of nature,namely, from events. The discussion o

he details of the process of abstractiowill exhibit time and space asnterconnected, and will finally lead uso the sort of connexions between their

measurements which occur in themodern theory of electromagneticelativity. But this is anticipating our

subsequent line of development. At


105/565

present I wish to consider how theordinary views of time and space help,or fail to help, in unifying our conceptioof nature.

First, consider the absolute theories oime and space. We are to consider each,

namely both time and space, to be aseparate and independent system oentities, each system known to us i

tself and for itself concurrently with our knowledge of the events of nature. Times the ordered succession of durationlessnstants; and these instants are known to

us merely as the relata in the serialelation which is the time-orderingelation, and the time-ordering relatios merely known to us as relating the


106/565

nstants. Namely, the relation and thenstants are jointly known to us in our

apprehension of time, each implying theother.

This is the absolute theory of time.Frankly, I confess that it seems to me tobe very unplausible. I cannot in my owknowledge find anything correspondingo the bare time of the absolute theory.

Time is known to me as an abstractionrom the passage of events. Theundamental fact which renders this

abstraction possible is the passing o

nature, its development, its creativeadvance, and combined with this fact isanother characteristic of nature, namelyhe extensive relation between events.


107/565

These two facts, namely the passage oevents and the extension of events over each other, are in my opinion thequalities from which time and spaceoriginate as abstractions. But this isanticipating my own later speculations.

Meanwhile, returning to the absoluteheory, we are to suppose that time is

known to us independently of any events

n time. What happens in time occupiesime. This relation of events to the timeoccupied, namely this relation ooccupation, is a fundamental relation o

nature to time. Thus the theory requireshat we are aware of two fundamentalelations, the time-ordering relatio

between instants, and the time-


108/565

occupation relation between instants oime and states of nature which happen athose instants.

There are two considerations which lendpowerful support to the reigning theoryof absolute time. In the first place timeextends beyond nature. Our thoughts aren time. Accordingly it seems impossibleo derive time merely from relations

between elements of nature. For in thatcase temporal relations could not relatehoughts. Thus, to use a metaphor, time

would apparently have deeper roots i

eality than has nature. For we camagine thoughts related in time without

any perception of nature. For examplewe can imagine one of Miltons angels


109/565

with thoughts succeeding each other iime, who does not happen to have

noticed that the Almighty has createdspace and set therein a materialuniverse. As a matter of fact I think thatMilton set space on the same absoluteevel as time. But that need not disturbhe illustration. In the second place it is

difficult to derive the true serialcharacter of time from the relative

heory. Each instant is irrevocable. It canever recur by the very character oime. But if on the relative theory anstant of time is simply the state o

nature at that time, and the time-orderingelation is simply the relation betwee

such states, then the irrevocableness oime would seem to mean that an actual


110/565

state of all nature can never return. Iadmit it seems unlikely that there shouldever be such a recurrence down to thesmallest particular. But extremeunlikeliness is not the point. Our gnorance is so abysmal that our udgments of likeliness and unlikeliness

of future events hardly count. The realpoint is that the exact recurrence of astate of nature seems merely unlikely,

while the recurrence of an instant of timeviolates our whole concept of time-order. The instants of time which havepassed, are passed, and can never beagain.

Any alternative theory of time musteckon with these two considerations


111/565

which are buttresses of the absoluteheory. But I will not now continue their

discussion.

The absolute theory of space isanalogous to the corresponding theory oime, but the reasons for its maintenance

are weaker. Space, on this theory, is asystem of extensionless points which arehe relata in space-ordering relations

which can technically be com bined intoone relation. This relation does notarrange the points in one linear seriesanalogously to the simple method of the

ime-ordering relation for instants. Theessential logical characteristics of thiselation from which all the properties o

space spring are expressed by


112/565

mathematicians in the axioms ogeometry. From these axioms [3] aramed by modern mathematicians the

whole science of geometry can bededuced by the strictest logicaleasoning. The details of these axioms

do not now concern us. The points andhe relations are jointly known to us i

our apprehension of space, eacmplying the other. What happens in

space, occupies space. This relation ooccupation is not usually stated for events but for objects. For example,Pompeys statue would be said tooccupy space, but not the event whicwas the assassination of Julius Caesar.n this I think that ordinary usage is

unfortunate, and I hold that the relations
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#Footnote_3_3


113/565

of events to space and to time are in allespects analogous. But here I antruding my own opinions which are to

be discussed in subsequent lectures.Thus the theory of absolute spaceequires that we are aware of twoundamental relations, the space-

ordering relation, which holds betweepoints, and the space-occupation relatiobetween points of space and material

objects.

3] Cf. (for example) ProjectiveGeometry by Veblen and Young, vol. i.

1910, vol. ii. 1917, Ginn and Company,Boston, U.S.A.

This theory lacks the two main supportsof the corresponding theory of absolute
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18835/18835-h/18835-h.htm#FNanchor_3_3


114/565

ime. In the first place space does notextend beyond nature in the sense thatime seems to do. Our thoughts do not

seem to occupy space in quite the samentimate way in which they occupy time.

For example, I have been thinking in aoom, and to that extent my thoughts aren space. But it seems nonsense to ask

how much volume of the room theyoccupied, whether it was a cubic foot or

a cubic inch; whereas the same thoughtsoccupy a determinate duration of time,say, from eleven to twelve on a certaindate.

Thus whereas the relations of a relativeheory of time are required to relatehoughts, it does not seem so obvious


115/565

hat the relations of a relative theory ospace are required to relate them. Theconnexion of thought with space seemso have a certain character ondirectness which appears to be lackingn the connexion of thought with time.

Again the irrevocableness of time doesnot seem to have any parallel for space.Space, on the relative theory, is the

outcome of certain relations betweeobjects commonly said to be in space;and whenever there are the objects, soelated, there is the space. No difficulty

seems to arise like that of thenconvenient instants of time whic

might conceivably turn up again whewe thought that we had done with them.


116/565

The absolute theory of space is not nowgenerally popular. The knowledge obare space, as a system of entitiesknown to us in itself and for itselndependently of our knowledge of the

events in nature, does not seem tocorrespond to anything in our experience. Space, like time, wouldappear to be an abstraction from events.According to my own theory it only

differentiates itself from time at asomewhat developed stage of theabstractive process. The more usual wayof expressing the relational theory ospace would be to consider space as aabstraction from the relations betweematerial objects.


117/565

Suppose now we assume absolute timeand absolute space. What bearing hashis assumption on the concept of nature

as bifurcated into causal nature andapparent nature? Undoubtedly theseparation between the two natures isnow greatly mitigated. We can providehem with two systems of relations i

common; for both natures can bepresumed to occupy the same space and

he same time. The theory now is this:Causal events occupy certain periods ohe absolute time and occupy certai

positions of the absolute space. Theseevents influence a mind which thereupoperceives certain apparent events whicoccupy certain periods in the absoluteime and occupy certain positions of the


118/565

absolute space; and the periods andpositions occupied by the apparentevents bear a determinate relation to theperiods and positions occupied by thecausal events.

Furthermore definite causal eventsproduce for the mind definite apparentevents. Delusions are apparent eventswhich appear in temporal periods and

spatial positions without the interventioof these causal events which are proper or influencing of the mind to their

perception.

The whole theory is perfectly logical. Ihese discussions we cannot hope to

drive an unsound theory to a logicalcontradiction. A reasoner, apart from


119/565

mere slips, only involves himself in acontradiction when he is shying at aeductio ad absurdum . The substantialeason for rejecting a philosophicalheory is the absurdum to which iteduces us. In the case of the philosophy

of natural science the absurdum canonly be that our perceptual knowledgehas not the character assigned to it by theheory. If our opponent affirms that his

knowledge has that character, we canonlyafter making doubly sure that weunderstand each otheragree to differ.Accordingly the first duty of aexpositor in stating a theory in which hedisbelieves is to exhibit it as logical. Its not there where his trouble lies.


120/565

Let me summarise the previously statedobjections to this theory of nature. In theirst place it seeks for the cause of the

knowledge of the thing known instead oseeking for the character of the thingknown: secondly it assumes aknowledge of time in itself apart froevents related in time: thirdly it assumesa knowledge of space in itself apart froevents related in space. There are i

addition to these objections other flawsn the theory.

Some light is thrown on the artificial

status of causal nature in this theory byasking, why causal nature is presumed tooccupy time and space. This reallyaises the fundamental question as to


121/565

what characteristics causal nature shouldhave in common with apparent nature.Whyon this theoryshould the causewhich influences the mind to perceptiohave any characteristics in common withe effluent apparent nature? I

particular, why should it be in space?Why should it be in time? And moregenerally, What do we know about mindwhich would allow us to infer any

particular characteristics of a causewhich should influence mind toparticular effects?

The transcendence of time beyond naturegives some slight reason for presuminghat causal nature should occupy time.

For if the mind occupies periods of time,


122/565

here would seem to be some vagueeason for assuming that influencing

causes occupy the same periods of time,or at least, occupy periods which arestrictly related to the mental periods. Butf the mind does not occupy volumes o

space, there seems to be no reason whycausal nature should occupy anyvolumes of space. Thus space wouldseem to be merely apparent in the same

sense as apparent nature is merelyapparent. Accordingly if science iseally investigating causes whic

operate on the mind, it would seem to beentirely on the wrong tack in presuminghat the causes which it is seeking for

have spatial relations. Furthermore theres nothing else in our knowledge


123/565

analogous to these causes whicnfluence the mind to perception.

Accordingly, beyond the rashlypresumed fact that they occupy time,here is really no ground by which we

can determine any point of their character. They must remain for ever unknown.

ow I assume as an axiom that science

s not a fairy tale. It is not engaged idecking out unknowable entities witarbitrary and fantastic properties. Whathen is it that science is doing, granting

hat it is effecting something omportance? My answer is that it is

determining the character of thingsknown, namely the character of apparent


124/565

nature. But we may drop the ter apparent; for there is but one nature,

namely the nature which is before us iperceptual knowledge. The characterswhich science discerns in nature aresubtle characters, not obvious at firstsight. They are relations of relations andcharacters of characters. But for all their subtlety they are stamped with a certaisimplicity which makes their

consideration essential in unravelling thecomplex relations between characters omore perceptive insistence.

The fact that the bifurcation of naturento causal and apparent components

does not express what we mean by our knowledge is brought before us when we


125/565

ealise our thoughts in any discussion ohe causes of our perceptions. For

example, the fire is burning and we see aed coal. This is explained in science byadiant energy from the coal entering our

eyes. But in seeking for such aexplanation we are not asking what arehe sort of occurrences which are fittedo cause a mind to see red. The chain o

causation is entirely different. The mind

s cut out altogether. The real questions, When red is found in nature, whatelse is found there also? Namely we areasking for an analysis of theaccompaniments in nature of thediscovery of red in nature. In asubsequent lecture I shall expand thisine of thought. I simply draw attentio


126/565

o it here in order to point out that thewave-theory of light has not beeadopted because waves are just the sortof things which ought to make a mindperceive colours. This is no part of theevidence which has ever been adducedor the wave-theory, yet on the causalheory of perception, it is really the onlyelevant part. In other words, science is

not discussing the causes of knowledge,

but the coherence of knowledge. Theunderstanding which is sought byscience is an understanding of relationswithin nature.

So far I have discussed the bifurcation onature in connexion with the theories oabsolute time and of absolute space. My


127/565

eason has been that the introduction ohe relational theories only weakens the

case for bifurcation, and I wished todiscuss this case on its strongestgrounds.

For instance, suppose we adopt theelational theory of space. Then the

space in which apparent nature is set ishe expression of certain relations

between the apparent objects. It is a setof apparent relations between apparentelata. Apparent nature is the dream, andhe apparent relations of space are

dream relations, and the space is thedream space. Similarly the space iwhich causal nature is set is theexpression of certain relations betwee


128/565

he causal objects. It is the expression ocertain facts about the causal activitywhich is going on behind the scenes.Accordingly causal space belongs to adifferent order of reality to apparentspace. Hence there is no pointwiseconnexion between the two and it ismeaningless to say that the molecules ohe grass are in any place which has a

determinate spatial relation to the place

occupied by the grass which we see.This conclusion is very paradoxical andmakes nonsense of all scientificphraseology. The case is even worse iwe admit the relativity of time. For thesame arguments apply, and break up timento the dream time and causal time

which belong to different orders o


129/565

eality.

have however been discussing a

extreme form of the bifurcation theory. Its, as I think, the most defensible form.

But its very definiteness makes it themore evidently obnoxious to criticism.The intermediate form allows that thenature we are discussing is always thenature directly known, and so far it

ejects the bifurcation theory. But itholds that there are psychic additions tonature as thus known, and that theseadditions are in no proper sense part o

nature. For example, we perceive theed billiard ball at its proper time, in its

proper place, with its proper motion,with its proper hardness, and with its


130/565

proper inertia. But its redness and itswarmth, and the sound of the click as acannon is made off it are psychicadditions, namely, secondary qualitieswhich are only the minds way operceiving nature. This is not only thevaguely prevalent theory, but is, Ibelieve, the historical form of thebifurcation theory in so far as it isderived from philosophy. I shall call it

he theory of psychic additions.

This theory of psychic additions is asound common-sense theory which lays

mmense stress on the obvious reality oime, space, solidity and inertia, but

distrusts the minor artistic additions ocolour, warmth and sound.


131/565

The theory is the outcome of common-sense in retreat. It aros

Documents

The Concept of Nature - Unknown