New Perspectives in South Asian History 18

The Ntw Perspectives in South Asian History rrrler publishes n>uriognphs and other writings on early modern, modern and contrmporat); history. The volumes in the s e r i n cover nrw ground ~rruss s bmad spectrum of uubjrits ~ i i i l l as cultural, environmental, medical, mli tary and polit~cal h~stury, and the historiss of '~narginalised' groups. It includes f r sh penipcctiw3 on more fanuliar fields as we11 JS interdisc:plinary and or~ginal work from all parts of South Asia It welcomes hiitorical contributions from socioIogy, anthropology and cultural studies.

Series Edilun

SANJOY BH ATTACHA RYA Lcturtr, The Wtllit~me Tnrsi Ccnrre fir rhe Hirtory af Mcdio'nc ur Urr iveni~y Cclllrgu London

PETER CA1N Professor 4 H~story, SAud oJ CuItural S~udic.c, Skt#cid Ndlam I hiversify

MARK HARRISON P~ojes~or, Hirtort 4 M t d ~ i ~ ~ e , and Direxlot, MiEll(ornr Unit .for the History oj- M~~:cLMP, Ut~iveni(y o j Oxjbrd

MlCH AEL WOKBOYS Director, Centrejot the His t o y o j Sriencr, Technology and Mcdicinp, and IWlkonre Ut t i t jo r the History r?fRf~d~cine, Universiry $Manthcrtr'r

Editorial Advisory Commiltee

Clive Dtwey Formrriy Reader, Driwrrmt)rr ojEconomis ~ n d Soriol H~rrory, U~wrr-

aty OJ Lcicesier

Peul Greenough Prof~ssor qf'firstory, l>irector, Crossing Borders R-ogrum, and

Direcol; Global Health Studiej hogrum, Uniuc.vsity I$ low4

Biswamg. Pati Rrtrdpr, ntpmtnrrnt o j History, Sri :n',rkdtrswwru Cullrge, ~ d h i I!t~iversity

Douglas M. Peers Associute P r o ~ j s a r cl,'History. Univrrsity Cu(yorar).

Peter Robb I+o-Dirccror dud ProjCssor ( f r h t . Hhrory qmIndia, Sihool IIJ' O r r ~ ~ n i d l

and Ajican Studies, Uriivrrsity 4Lundon

Tan Tai Yong Asrmate Pr&s:or u/ Hisror y, Nallorsal I !niwrsiiy 4'8t gopure

The Colonial City and the Challttlge of Modernity IJrhon Hegetnottics nnd Civic Contestarions in Bornhay City

19011-1 925

S.QNDIP HAZAREESINGH l71ilt Ferp.wn C'mtrcjvr Afrilrtn and Asiati StuLit,.r

T h e Oprtl U n i i r r s i t y

Orient Longman

ORlENT LONGMAN PRIVATE LIMITED

R*$'>i'"d o$ic 3-6-752 Hirnaydcriag~r, Hyderabad 500 029 (A P). l l t d a

?-mad. cogmeral@or~cnrlun~a~~ cum

Orhr O&cr Bangalore, Bhopd, Bhubaneshwar. l'hennai.

Ertiakulam. G~mahati, Hydtrabad,Jipur, KoUura, Luckno~v, Mumboi, New Delhl, Patna

O Orient Longmvl Private Linuted 2013 Firsr Publ~shed 2007

Scries cuver and boak dcsign 9 Orlent Longman Private Linutcli 2003,21105

.Map i m t ~ y ~ r l ~ l i c d 4 Sangam Bouks iIndia) P r l ~ t e Ltmited, Hyderabad

A ~ n t e d In 1md1.c ar Graphica Printers

Hyderabad

h h l ~ < h r d ky Orierit L o n p n Private Limited

3-6-752 H~mayatnagar, Hydrrabad 50V 029 [A.P.), lndla e-mlil: hydgeneral@urier~d~npnzn corn

E my mother Thm f ir all her lout and support and LO the loving Memory $m).-fothcr Kisso~frsirgk ( 1 909- 1994

The external boundary anJ coastline of Indla as depicted in the mlp in rhjs book is tltlther cnrrprt nor authenrrc

Corz tents

Arknnulredgcrnn~~j

hfup qf Bawl ha] List oj.4 bbr~uiatrons

Introduction

1. Colonial Modernism and the Flawed Paradigms of Urban Renewal The production ofsocial spnct. 111 a colonial port c i q

Corripetirlg colonirllisins: Urban ' imprweme~~t , development agencies and thc local colonial state

The politics of built forms: High d e s ~ p , s j ~ k hullding and the elu~ivenesj of town planning Empty suburbs, congested city streets: Transportation and the failure of suburban~satiun

2. War, Censorship and Civic Dissent: Bombay during the First World War

War and the rnil~tarisation of the city Censorship dnd propaganda: Communi;atlans. tlie pnbr!: and cinema P r ~ c e rIse9. war profit5 an4 poplihr disl-ontrnt Subvetslve list 1dtivr.s of the city: Hornman and the &)mbay Chrt ln~~le

3. Urban Confrontations: Gandhi, Hotnirnan, and the Material Test of Spiritual Politics Gandhi arid tllr cliallznge of Horniman's Boinbay Hartalc, strikes 2nd rht pcrsistrncr of nl~rcrial a~pirations

* vii *

S C

3- g c

-y:

7

E E-;.

r

0

-4

F z

s-L

57

m

C

rr

gg

g 1: ;.W

-

c

% z .:

3, 2

h

g<

5

25

2

2

4

P

$'5,+5

22

" E

E r,

"s

zz

G7

2 S

W

- 3

-2

.= 5 -- G

3

2 g< 2

L..

s3

cl

g7

5

-3

y

eZX

- 3

$z

zs

c$

2

rE

5.

t

pp

vs

g

G g

c,

3.

g.*

Q

~$

E~

~

5 F b$

g5

g

'C

KG

8

- -cg

?

-3 - J

5

-=

<

W.

25:

2

26

m

?

\

\ \

/

\

\

/

/

l\

\

\ \

/'

\

\

\ \

I \

I \

I t \

I \

\ I

', \

\ \

\

1 1 !

\ \ ! I

\

/ l E

m

Edge

: I

14.

Craw

fnrd

Mar

ket E

stat

e

we5

iem

Edg

e:

15

Man

hi K

dk

da

16

Syde

nham

Roa

d 1.

Co

laba

Red

arna

tion

', I7

N

avw

HiH

2.

W

odeh

ouse

R&

18.

Undn

a Su

eet

3.

Wel

lingt

on L

ines

19

. N

agpa

da

4.

Hom

by R

oad

20.

Pa

d R

md

(Cen

tral)

5 M

arin

ehne

s 21

Ea

st A

grip

ada

6

Prin

cess

SW

t 22

. Ca

nnau

ght R

& Es

tate

:

7 Bh

atwa

di

23.

Pa

d Ro

ad (N

orlh

em)

", 8.

5a

ndhu

rstR

oad

24.

Pare

l 9.

C

hwrp

aQ E

stal

e 25

. Sp

nng

Mild

10

Gam

dev~

Esta

te

; 26.

Rac

e Co

urse

11

La

min

gton

Rna

d 27

. D

adat

-Hin

du +

Paw

Co

hie

s ,'

12.

Agrip

ada

,.' 28

. M

alun

ga -

5 G

arde

ns &

me

' 13

. W

iil~n

gdon

Park

I

29

$ion

vm

t Trus

l bax

d m

the

map

of ;

916.

\

Adap

ted

from

: Sha

rada

Dw

ived

i and

Rah

d M

ehm

tra, B

umba

y: T

he C

ities

With

in.

AITUC ARAVP

AKIP

BB&CI Railway BEST Company

BISN BNNR BPSA BSF CP Do1 DP FP . FRJPS

GIP Railway GOB Go l Hi3 HMSO Jevons Papers J&HP JP LLP LSGP MP

Al!-l ndii Trades Union Congress Annual Report on Incban and Anglo- Vernacuhr Papers Published in the Bombay Presidency Annual Report on In&an Newspapers Pub- lished in the Bombay Presidency Bornbay,Darurl-a a i d Crnrral I n d i ~ n Railway Botnbay Electric Supply and Tr~nsways Company British Inha Steam Navigation Company Bornb~y N~tivc Newspaper Repott Bombay Polrce Secret Abstracts Bombay S w ~ r a j Party Conlidenti J Procee-hngs Deknce of India Development Proceedngs Financial Proceedings Fortnightly Report on the Internal Pnlitiral Situation in India Great lndlan Peninsula Railway Government of Rambay G o ~ r r n ~ ~ ~ e n t of India Home nepartmcnt Hex M3jest)"s Stationary Ofice Papers of Herbert Stanley Je\.ons Judclal and Home Proceedings Judicial Proceedugs London Labour Party Eucal Self-Government Proceedings Mr J i ~ a l Proceedin@

m.p.h. MSA N AI NMML

NMP OIOC

PP Procd. PS AF Pub. Pol. sus Spl. W KIPS

miles per hour Maharashtr~ St;itc A r c h ~ v e ~ . M u m h i N~tionaI Archives of India, New Ijclhi Nehru Mtb~l~orial Mil r run~ ~ r l d Librarv, NCw ljelhl Natiotlali>t Mullicipal I'drty

Oritntal ,und It~dia OfXcc Culleutlons, 13r1t- ish Library L o u d o ~ ~ Pen~nsular & C jrie~itdl Stcam Navig.~t~o:i Company Progressive Party Proceedings Political Secret Anni~al Film Public Political Secretary oi State for Irldl? Special Weekly Itcporti of thr I.l;reclor, Cr irjiirlal Intthgence, on the Politrcal Situation in Illdia

Uritish rule in India lasted just under two centuries, from 1737 to 1947. During this period, Bornb.3~ gradually r~nerged as the rrlost significant colonial port city in Asia. Established by the East lndia Company, the dev:.*.elopment of Bombay under British rule car1 to a large extent be sccn JS a process of dependent urbarlisn~, 1.e.. a situa- tion where "ths urban torrn exists as a channe! for the extraction of quantities of surplus €mm a rural and rrsource hinterland f[>r pur- poses of shipment to the major metropolitan centres."' Historically, depenrlrn t urbdnism was part of the broader expansion of the iapi- talist world e i o n ~ n l y . ~ From the sixteenth century, tha econolny gave rrsr to a systetn of port cities, dvjded her arch call^ between thc p w i n g irnpe1,i~l c:urs uf t11r ~na jvr European pnwers and the cnlo- riial cines of the territories into which thesc powers expanded. In turn, the rlsr of colonial c~rlcs oftell undcrnuncd rddrr iltic\ 181 thr region t h ~ t had been f u ~ ~ c t l o n a l l ~ c t u c i ~ l to mcient trade routes. Reforc the risc af Botttbay in western Indid, it was Surar. 300 kilo- metres to the north, that had served as the n q o r centre of io re~gn r r d e until t he mid-eighteenth century.

Crucial features oiBomhay's evolution as a c:ty 111 thc n~netcench century can be placed with~n the wider framework of dependent devzlopmrnt T h r nrioas phases ot'Bombap's growth occurrcd prj- inarily as a result of the wealth accurnuIatzd from the export trade i r l cotton and opium. At the sdme t~me, a dorninar~t urban class srruu- rure emerged from the alliance hrtwren F uropcan agrnsy houses ,~nd ellre Indian rncrchancj des1gnc.d to sccuz tight uornnund over the c h a ~ n s of rural l~bour cn~ployt.d 1,) c~>tton dnd oyiunl culti- vatlon in the nineteenth century. The onsec nf ~t:~nm-pmurrt.d ocen:)

' Uavid Harvey, SncialJurrict. arid !Itt, Cily (Oxlurd: Blackwc.11, 1981(j, 732. See lnlmanuel Wallrrstrin, T h e Capitalis! World .E~onc~ml~: E5says (Can~bridgr: Cdnlbl idgc UII~VCISIIY Press. 1979).

THE COLC>KIAL ('ITY A N I ) -1.1 I t C:HALLEWi;k O F MOPEKNI'TY

transport in the nlnetrenth uzntury rticarlt thc J r u l ~ t ~ c of Bombay shipbuilding and led to thc Jominanic oithe city's cxport trade by European-owned shipp~r~g sorrlpanlcs; while railways wcrr built and located strategically to link thc city w ~ t h the cotton growing areas of thc hinter1,and. Though the city did give birth to a co t to l~ textile ~rldustry pioneered by Indian entrepreneurs. \~icll indllstrial- isation occurrrri primarily A S [he rcsult of the growirlg su!~c~rilina-

t ~ o n of Indian merchant capital vls-i-vis foreign capital 111 thc cntton txport trade. Nor &d thc. piece guods produccd 111 Bonlhay posc J

serious challenge to Lancashire cotton rxports in the Indian horlir market. Strategically, B o m b ~ y also functioned as the urban power base for the expansion of Br~tish rule in westrrrl India and even beyond Indian shores, as the Govern~nent of Bomb~y took possw- slon of Aden to open up t r ~ d e with East Africa.

Colonial dependency relations also largely dictated the uneven articulation ofsocial space with111 che city. The spatial arrangrments over which the colonial state presidrd were not as r.~cially duahstlc as in other colonial cities. Nonuthelrss, ~t privileged a small area in the south of chr city-the Fort-as a Europeln social spxe , en- dowillg it wiih a dlscinctive, pla~lrled civic infrastri~aturc whicli included specially commissioned, arch~tecturally ~nllovative pub11 c builbngs. Beyond the Fort and the residential enclave of Malabar HjU 111 the south-west lay the 'Indian town' with its own class, caste and religious differentiations. I t attracted an increasing population of rnigranr workers to serve the expanding rieeds of commerce and industry as well as of a growing transport infrastructure. In the ab- sence of any real process of urban planning, the increasing appropri- ation of space for uornrncrcial and industrial functions devoted to the accurnul~tion of iapktal led to the confinement of the labour classes in che most coniested localities of the native town. Here, the attendant problems of lack of adequate housing and civic arncnitlcs advrrsrly impacted on the health ~ n d quality of Ilk of thc urban poor. The Bolnbay Municipal Corporation was controlled by an alliance of elite Indian and European businessnlen who wzrz unitud m resisting any calls for increased taxatior~ to fund un~versal, city- wide urban amenities, such as housing. water supply, drains md sewers. However, the outbreak of the plagpc cpidertiic in 1896, and its threat ro the city-S ~ a m m e r ~ i a l fortunes, led to a mnge oE urban improvement initiatives cenued on the new Uonlbay City Improvrment Trust, Indeed, a dscourje of 'improvement' became the

cornerstone of colofid attempts to d e h e 3 new phase in the wolu- tion of the city as a modern metropolis a t the onset of the twentieth century.

I t is this phase of Bombay's urban h~story, beginning on the eve of the twentieth centur). and lasting till the mid-1 920s. that this book is concerned with. During there years, Bombay WJS open to the promise of being transformed by the artefacts and ideas sten~rning from the 'second industrial Revolution' of the late nineteenth cm- tury. The city witnessed rhe arrival of the cinema and the rriotor car: new streets were built using improved methods; buildmp were con- smcted with new materials, such as reinforced cement concrete:

faster pr~nting presses led to the expansion of daily newspapers; and the introduction of electricicy promised to transform many aspects of everyday Lfe. Perhaps even more sigtllficant was the interest in a set of ideas also originating in response to the industrialising drives o f nineteenth-century Western Europe, but now given a new urg- ency by the experience of the First World War in which Bombay was a significant, participant. The demand for murlicipal democracy and civic rights, the interest in the concept of urban planning, the appeal of strikes, trade unionism and socialism-all combined to inject firsh life into local nationahst aspirations and campaigns. A f&us on this era [herefore provides a Sivlleiged vanrage for exploring how the city experienced the arrival of a particularly sig- nificant phase of 'modernity1--a phase in which ideas that radically challenged the capitalist/colonial world order first emerged.

The concept of modernity is, of course, de6nitionaUy highly con- tested. It has been the subject of intense debate across a wide range of &sciplines, particularlysince the emergence of 'postmodern' and 'postcolonial' perspectives. Marshall Berman, the most influential hstorian of ths concept, has defined modernity as an inherently contrahstory mode ot-experience1-fuU ofpromise and the potcn- tial for positive social change and human fulfilment, but at the samt

Perhaps a 'n~ode of urban experience'as his work demonstrates. Set: Marrhall Berrnan. A11 That Is Solid lWelts into .d i r : The Experience Modernity (London: Verso, 1983). This is J view shared by other prominent urban theorists, nota- bly Henri Lrfrbvrz and D a d Warvey. Indeed, if n~odernity ultimately expands to other sltes beyond the urban (effectively ;urnlng into 'modernisa- don",, the city nonetheless remains the prlrnary space i t shapes and occupies and where therefore it is most ~ntenrely Ilved.

Bombay d~rring the First WrrlJ I[ >r THE COL0,NIAL CITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF MODERNlrY

recruiting operations, but the final decision rested with the Govern-. Irlerlt of India. As the war entered its fourth year, however, Delhi was under increasing pressure from the Itld~a Office to "practice economy in every possible d~rcction."'" In an attempt to break through the colonial state's indecision, Vernon forwarded to the Secretary to the Government for Inha a detailed and practical plan of action. It was couched in the new language of advertising: "Ar present there is no means of bringing home to the averagc Indian maners essential to his individual welfare . . . he thus blls . . . victim to the sedition monger and can . . . never see the right side of the question.. . . Why not consider the claims of the Knernatograph which can mould his ideas?"

Reahng as a veritable paean of self-publicity, the action plan then went on to enumerate a list of colonial concerns which f lms produced by the company would help address. Featurd at the top of the list were "Home Rule Agitation" and "War Recruitment for both combatant and non-combatant forcer", fbUowed by other 'problems' such as public health, agricultu= and investment. Given below is an extract from what was clearly intended as the most persuasive part of the lengthy document, titled "Synopsis for the Recruiting Film":

Show some Recruits (young marching with Recru~hng Sargea~lr to the Recruibng Office, a Poster should be hanPng up where they mcet, and also at Rccru~t~ng Office (with a view to fandiarising the Poster) and money beitig glven to them.

Show rhe huc containing the usual Paraphernalia of cooking pots, the viUage Pig, a Goat, and the Byle [sic] stabled In the House--then the Recruit's expression of surprise when he sees a Model Barrack Roum and its orderliness and cl~nrll~~less.

Show him discarding [his duty Dhotie and Coat and receiving his k B e , Khaki and fine boors che like of which he h a nevrr worn before.

Now show recruits undcrga~ng training. Show Cavalry Mznoeuvres. Artillery at Practlc-builhng a Pontoon.

Show h ~ m drawing h~s rations and feed~ng on better i ~ o d th~n he has ever had before.

Show htm at Games and Polo and Part). swanking through the Bazaar carrying aU before him-here the glad eye from a couple of Damsrls would appeal to the Don Juan s p ~ r ~ r In most of thetr manly bosoms, thc

' l w GOB, FP. January-]uric 1'91'8.385

Charnwrs spurn the attention of 4 Ulv~lran hut art. v~s~b ly attracted by rhc S~ldiclrs."~

Vcrnnl~ tion costs ranlme of

d ~ d however warrl o t ' ~ "heavy" initial outlay on produu- though it were willing to "furnish estimates for A L'rog- ' F~lms which it would bc ncieqsary to produce." 111 the

end. this turrlrd out to be the chnch~ng t~c+tr)r In the decision over the issue. Uniizr unprecedented financ~nl xrutiny from the ind~a Ofice, the Governnlent of Indla would rlot, in the end, relc6jsc funds to be spent on a product whose pojjibilities ic had not yct quite grasped. Vernon's b ~ d failed because it ~nvolved spel~dltlg large sums of money and also because it was probably roo imaginative ibr the conservative mindset of colonial officialdom. M oreover, the immediate issue of cht recruitment: of more Indian solders fell by the wayside when the war came to an end in Noven~bet 19 3 8.

Wit1 Risths, War Projts and Populur Discontent

O n 4 August, the day Britain dccldrcd war on Germany, a bdg nl' flour was selling for Rs 13 in Bombay city. Within a fewdays, the price had gone up to Rs 15.'" Even more spectacularly, the prlcr of a packet of sugar incteased by over 50 per cent-from Rs 10 to Rs 16; while the prict-s of tinned provisions of various kinds dou- bled.": Meat rose by about h annas a pound, while the cost of more basic items of popular consumption, such as rice and potatoes, ~nunehatcly spiralled. A city character~sed by high levels ofpovcrry rapidly descended into a state of panic. While the increases drasti- cally affected popular consumption of even the most basic food

I necessities. the well-to-do attempted to purchase several months'

I supplies in the belief that stocks were about to run out.") Mean- while, newspapers received letters of complaint alleging that shop- keepers were refusing to serve customcrF lirlless they agreed to "pav high prlits without ~ornplaining." '~~

' l " GoI, HD (Pub. Pol.), A Procd., 110s. 148-59, F e b r u q 1918. ' l ' "Letter on Price Rim", T ~ n r e ~ oJ India, 14 August 19 14 .

"Uotnbay Prices", Bombay Chrunrclr, 7 August 1914. 1 1 " '46 m~n~rtration M Keporr q t t k e ~Llunicipal Cornrnissiot~urjor thc C I I ~ ~{Bornbayfnr

r h ~ yror 1914-1.?,pc, i (Bo~ltb~y, 1Y15), 11. """ShupkrrFm and Profiteering", Tirner ofindia, 15 A c g ~ ~ s t 14 l 4

THE C0LONI.U CITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF MODERNITY

In view of the immediate rise in freight and insurance rates, the Bombay collector of custonls hail allowed a "reasonablr" increase to shopkeepers on imported goods.115 The Bombay government, however, soon felt that retailers were talung undue advantage. Fear- ing food riots, it issued a t~otification that the basic necessities of life should not be sold above certain pricer, wh~ch the government would itself fm in consultation with a comrnittec of eminent citl- zens.ll6 Through the streets of the city, a bataki (drum) was beaten, proclaiming that any retailer who rarsed prices above the fixed level would be subject to prose~ution."~ Willingdon was congratulated by the viceroy for having "given a lead to other local governments" on this issue, especially as there w a s n o "justifiable reason for an enhancement of the prices of the necessari~ of life for the poorer classes."11n The commercial clases, however, were imn~ediately alarmed. The Times of India voiced their concerrl that "the regula- tion of prices beyond those fixed by supply and demand is a danger- ous thing and very likeiy to defeat its own ~bject .""~

Evidence h m the sweet, however, suggests the ineffectiveness of the government order. Millhands rneeung at Jacob's Circle corn- pared prices charged by Bania food grain retailers for cereals and pulses with those at the two cheap grain shops whlch had been estab- lished by the municipality within the premises of some of the cot- ton mills. They found that the Banias were chargng three aIlnas more--9 c o m p a ~ d to 6 for the same quantity-which was well in excess of the price Gxed by the authorities. They also observed the superior quahty of the mill shops' grain and demanded the setting up of shops in all the mills of the city, which might also compel re- tailers to reduce their prices. lZO Moreover, in addition to the unher- dded rise in prices, the war also c o h n t e d the urban worhng classes with an irnrnedate breakdown of their customary method of obtain- ing goods. The cotton mills' management practice of withholding

' l 5 "Bombay and the War: Conditions the City", Times of lndla . 23 October 19i4.

l ' " Administration Report, Rfuniopal Commirsivn~r. 1914-1 5 , I 1 . ' " "Bombay and the War: Conditions In the City ". Tinla cflndia, 23 October

1914. ll%ardingc to Wifllngdon. 10 August 1914, WlUmgdon Papers. "9 "Regulatiol~ of Prices", Times of lndin, 30 Seytcnlber 191 4. 120 GoB,CP, 1916,3.

Bontbny dwr~ng the First World War

six to eight weeks' wages In arrears meant tha t the millhands were in a state of chronic jndcbtcdness to Marwarj and Pathan rnoneylend- ers. Thry were generally compelled to purchase food and urhcr basic provis~ons on credit from Bniiia and other petty shopkeepers. With the outbreak of war, Inany shopkecpers now refi~secl to pro- vide goods on credit.'"

The exodus fro111 the city of a largc nun-iber of M~rwari money- lenders, who feared an irnrrlirlent attack from the Emden. fiirthcr added to the iniUhatldsY problems; whlle rents, too, immediatrly shot up.'22 Young labour organisations, such AS the Kaingar Hltvardhak Sabha, urged the Bombay government to exercise strong pressiiru on large employers of labour to set up cheap stores that would pro- vide workers with the basic necessities of life. l'' T h e outbreak of war also led to the laying off of a large number of railway workers and lower-grade clerks, employed by some of the city's 1;lrgr.s~ private firms.['4 It1 September, a number of cotton mlUs, such as Greaves Cotton & Co., introduced short-tlmrt work, whlch resulted in a substantial reduct 1011 In the millhands' wages. The following month, the workers informed management that they would with- draw their labour udess they were given guarantees of at ]cast

twenty-two days' work and a restoration o i thelr September wages in full. When the management resporlded by stating that "work~ng the mills full-time was not profitabIr under present condit~ons", the millhands resolved o n a day of action: A crowd of men, women and children marched from Pare1 to the mill agents' o&cts in Forbes Street, Fort. En route, they shared their grievances with curious citi- zens, showing for the first time perhaps an appreciation of the 1In;-

portance of cultivating public opinion. Under the present condjtiotls, they explained, eighteen days' work did not provide them with a living wage. A deputation of tnillhands was granted an interview by the agents,and eventually on agreement was reached on the Sep- tember wages though not on short-time work.'25

1 2 ' " M ~ l l h ~ n d s a!ld the WJ~.', Bombay Chrotrilr.. 27 August 1914; "The l 'rul- lenl of the Factory Labourrr". Urmbuy Chronlr-lt.. 12 May 141 6.

12' " U o l n b ~ ~ Marwari Meeting", 7'rmes ojlndia, 16 Novenlber I Y 14; GOB, C:C 19I6.

l?' "Millhartds ~ n d the War", 8dmh.1y Chrornirle, 27 Aupsr 19 1 4. 'l4 Col, FRIPS, l st fortnight, September 191 4.

"Millhands Protest". T ima of India, IS Octobcr 1914.

THE COLONIAL CITY AND T H E CHALLENGE OF M O D E R N I n Bombay during the First World War

In many respects, this sjtuac~atl was not unlque to Bombay. In the predominantly work~ng-class East End of London, for instance, food prices rose by 16 per cent by the end of the first week of the war alone, causing high levels oi ecotlomic hardship to the urban poor.jZ6 Compared to Bontb~y, there were, of course, stronger de- mands here tiorrl trade un~onisn and sosial~sts for stringent price controls by the government. Paradoxically+ the Bombay govern- ment: acted well before the British Horrlr author~ties on the issue of price control. Crucially, however, the Willingdon administration failed to set up any effective mechanisms to monitor and enforce price levels. Nor was it prepared to intervene in relation to food shortages and the non-obtention of goods, which rapidly became the more important issues for the worhng classes. War condtjons do, of course, invariably lead to a substantial reduction in civilian consumption in so far as important sectors of economic production are redirected to serve military requirements. This was the case as much in London as in Bombay. However, one crucial dfference in the experience of wartime sacrifices appears to have been in the contrasting levels of sacrifice sharing between classer in the two c ~ t - ies. In Britain, the government was initially reluctant to move on price controls. In London's East End, food prices had by December 191 5 climbed to 46 per cent above their August 1 91 4 level, and had doubled by early 1918. However, a wide range of popular organisa- tions-local trades' councils, the Co-operative movement, the re- cently formed War Emergency Workers National Comut tee and pro-labour newspapers, such as the Daily Hertrlkurged workers to take d t a n t action in defence of their living stdrldards while conti- nuing to demand stronger government price contr~ls. '~' The spring of 191 5 saw a massive wave of strikes against rising prices, whlch culminated in demands for higher wages. Since the East End was one of the centres of food and armaments' production, industrial mil- itancy seemed t o pose a serious threat to the war effort.

The government encouraged employers to concede wage rises: Tate's Sugar Refinery workers, for instance, obtained an immediate 12.5 per cent rise. Although the July 191 5 Munitions of War Act

Julla Bush, Behind the h e r : Eat End Labour, 19 1 4 I Y 19 (London: Merlin Press, t984), 39-40.

12' Ibid., 39 ,4344 .

rendered strikes in the munitions industries Illegal, workers received, in return, guarantees that wage level5 wvuld be nlaintained in the face of cost of living increases and that prvfits would be restrlctrd. As prices continued to escalate, food rhortagrs and rationing had become common by 1917. Only then did thc government ~nove to impose the stringent price controls which soc1a1ists had brei~ de- manding from the early days of the conflict. Local food control committees were set up to enforce the new regulations on prIce3 and distribution. Crucially, the labour movement undertook to shadow the official committees by maintaining its own independ- ent food vigdance committees in several parts of the East End. This task was rendered somewhat easier by the fact that by 1918, thcre was an 80 per cent increase in the nurnbrr of trade uniot~ists in east London since the start of the war.128

In London, direct pressure Emn~ the popular classes, whose local

organisations were gaining in strength and tnilitan~y~ ccott~pelled ~ncreasirlg government intervention to limit the decline in workers' living standards. The British state, particularly during the crisis years

of 1916-18, appears to have perceived the advantages of a higher degree of internal social cohesion in the interests of war efficiency. I t thus increasingly intervened in workers' issues, acting as mediator between capital and labour. The colonial state, on the other hand, had somewhat different priorities. Its main purpose was to obtain men,materials, foodstuffs and supplies as rapidly and cheaply as pos- sible from irs I n l a n colony. Indetd, the Government of India's Army Department became both a substantial and a privileged pur- chaser and consumer of Indian produce and goods. Moreover, the war massively reinforced the prevailing tendency for both internal and external demand to increase at a faster rate than the production of food grain~. '~~Jowari and Bajri cereal grains were essential items of food consumption for thc working classes lin Bombay. As the city's population grew, deficiencies in supply fro111 the Deccan were ordinarily met by interprovincial imports from Panjab. Throughout the war ycars, however, the colonial government restricted inter- provincl.11 g r ~ r n movements so as to rnainrain its own privileged

' 2 H Ibld., 1 12,43, S>, 103. 12' K. L. Dutta, Rrporr on ;})c Enyrrrry rnro lhc Krrr Prirrr an India (Calcutta:

Supcrjnrendet~t Governlriel~t Pr~nt lng. 1913). b l .

.- I.. .

THE COLONIAL CITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF MODERNITY

consumer position in the market. Indeed, by 191 8 it had purchased Panjabi foodgrains worth L 4 0 million sterling, causing a depletion in stocks and largely contributing to the doubling in the price of cereals in Bombay ciry.13"

A similar pattern existed in the availability of rice-another basic item of popular consumption. Here again, the city experienced shortages throughout this period, which were generally attributed both to the spectacular increase in freight rates and to the govern- ment's wikngness to pay over-the-odds prices for Burma rice.13' In effect, the colonial state was engaged in a situation of unequal com- petition with the urban popular classes over access to basic food re- sources. As in Britain, food shortages created an ideal climate for the growth of speculation and profiteering. Large wholesale opera- tors, such as grain and cloth merchants, anticipating the arrival of wer more desperate times, began to hoard supplies in the expecta- tion of mahng huge p r o f i t s ~ f f e r ~ n g an example which many smaller retailers invariably found hard to r e5 i~ t . l~~ Indeed, merchants and traders made "immense moneyM-both from wartime specula- tion in scarce commohties and from trading in strategic raw rnate- rids required by the military.133 It was this rapid accession to wealth of many 'middhng' merchants that fuelled their post-war ambitions to become politically influential via the nationalist movement; especially as they were aggrieved by the considerable enhancement in income tax imposed by the colonial state during these years. War thus intensified the arbitrariness of colonial talungs born Inda, while also creating new opportunities for Bombay's dominant class factions. While merchants were accumulating unprecedented wealth, the setting up of the Indian Munitions Board, combined with the curtailment of imported cotton articles, provided industrialists with new levers for the expansion of production. As a result, the war years witnessed a redistribution of wealth in favour of the dominant classes in Bombay city.

l''' A . D. D. Gordon, Businessmen and Politics: Rising Nationalism and a Modern is - ing Economy in Bombay, 191 1& 1933 {Delhl: Manohar, 1978), 32; GOB, CP, 1919,32.

13' The decrease in commercial shipping pushed up freight rates from 12 shd- lings per ton in 1914 to 325 shillings in 1917. Gordon, Businessmen and Poli- t i ~ ~ , 33; GoI, FRIPS, 1st fortnight, February 1918,40.

'32 GoI, FRIPS, 1st fortnight, August 191 5. 133 GoI, WRPSI, December 1917,lO.

Bombay during the First World Wur

The Bombay cotton textile industry now became a primary source for military khaki clothes and by mid-1 9 16, short-time work- ing in the cotton mills had come to an end. By disrupting interna- tional trade, and in particular Lancashire piece goods exports to India, war conditions provided the textile industry with new opportunities for import substitution, in addition to a substantial military market.134 Industrialists' pwfits rose to unprecedented lev- els. Dividends paid to shareholders increased from 6 per cent in 191 4 to over 30 per cent in 191 7. In 1920, sixtee11 mills were able to pay 100 per cent or more on all shares; in contrast, during the first three years of the war, the index of rnillworkers' real wages fell by 14 points, the result of a policy of keeping workers' wage rises well below the Ievel of intlation."15

A substantial proportion of the war profits made by industrialists and merchants went into land transactions-into the acquisition of land developed for residential purposes by the City Improvement Trust and of undeveloped land which was bought and kept idle. In 191 7, rhe Trust reported that "all previous records" had been beaten in terms of the "number and value of plots disposed of", largely as a result of "the accumulation of war profits in Bombay."'" At the same time, speculative purchases led to the spiralling of land values: the price of a square yard of land in Malabar Hill, for instance, rose from Rs 8-15 in 1916 to Rs 109 in 1919. Even the northern sub- urbs witnessed a staggering increase-the price of an acre shooting up from Rs 200-1,500 to Rs 5,00&25,000 during the same period.13' Rents followed this upward movement, more than dou- bling on average over the war year~.~~Vonsequently, the prospects

'" Chandavarkar, Orcqins of lndurtrial Capitalism, 252 , l" judlth Brown, "War and the Colonial Relationship: Britain, India and the

War of 1934-18", in &r and Socie!~ ed. M. R. D. Foot (London: Elek, 1973), 98; Dick Kooiman, "Bombay Communists and the 1924 Textile Strike", Economic and Political Weekly l S , no. 25, 1980,1224; Cordon, Busi-

i nmmen and Politics, 32.

I 13' City of Bombay In~provcmcnt Trust, Admifiistration Report, March 191 7, l . Chari, "History of Bombay", 13.

i 13"he official view from the Bombay Government's Uepartnient of Statistics, I

i that rents had only increased by an average of 18 per cent in [he city, was regarded as a gross underestimation. "Food Prices in Bnnlbay", Bombay Chronicle, 22 May 1918.