THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE PENTEKONTAETIA · CHRONOLOGY OF THE PENTEKONTAETIA 69 I. NAXOS The first majordifficulty faced by mostchronologies is the dating ofthe Naxian revolt. Thucydides

Classical Quarterly 36 i 68-851986 Printed in Great Britain 68

THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE PENTEKONTAETIA

Thetruechronologyof thePentekontaetiais difficult, perhapsimpossible,to establishconclusively.Theeventsbetween477 and432 wereofthegreatestpossibleimportance:theseyearssaw the creationof the Athenian empire and a precipitousdecline inSpartiatemanpower,’drasticpolitical realignmentsinvolving nearly every stateinHellas, and military activity oftenrising to a crescendoscarcelymatchedat thepeakof thePeloponnesianWar. Indeed,onemight stronglyarguethat the fifty-odd yearsprior to 432 had a substantiallygreaterhistorical significancethanthe threedecadesof warwhichfollowed, aswell asagreaterdegreeofpolitical andmilitary drama.Butthe Pentekontaetialacks the unifying historical narrativeof a Herodotus,let alonea Thucydides,and this onedeficiencyhascausedeventsof the utmostsignificancetofade into near obscurity. There is scarcelya singlepolitical or military occurrenceduring theFifty Yearswhich canbe datedto closerthan a yearor two, andin somecases,proposeddateshaverangedover the betterpart of a decade.With no firmchronologicalframework,historical analysisdegeneratesinto guessworkand speculation, especiallyif eventhe relativeorderofeventsis in dispute.In cognizanceof thisneed,this paperseeksto presentportionsof a newchronologyof the Pentekontaetia,onediffering in severalvery significant featuresfromthosepreviously suggested.2Theseverely limited nature of the available evidence precludesany hope of firmlyestablishingthevalidity of anyonedatingschemeoverits rivals; thebestwe canhopefor is plausibility.

Weighingrelativeplausibility becomesparticularly significantwhen analysingandcomparingour sources.Thucydides’accountof the Pentekontaetiais very brief andsketchy,but it is the best which we possessnonethe less,having beenwritten by asober,critical, andnearcontemporaneoushistorian.Therefore,we will beginwith theworkinghypothesisthat its contentasdistinct from our own overlaidinterpretationis essentiallycorrect, with the existenceof errorsand fortuitoustextual corruptionsto beacceptedonly asalast resort.Oursubsidiarysourceswill bejudgedona case-by-caseandcategory-by-categorybasis;for example,Diodorus’ accountsofeventswill beheld to carry weight, theparticulararchonyear which hechoseto place them under,virtually noneat all.3

Therewere over5000 Spartiatesof military ageat thetime of the battleof Plataiain 479Herod.9.28, while in the life-or-deathstruggleat Mantineasixty-oneyearslater, therewereonly about4200 LakedaimomantroopspresentThuc. 5.68,of whomatmostperhapshalf- or2000-2500- wereSpartiatesThuc.4.38givesus aroughindication that typically lessthanhalfof aLakedaimonianforce in this erawasSpartiate.

The majormodernchronologieswhich this paperwill makereferenceto are thoseof TheAthenian Tribute Lists, Vol. 1 by B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregorCambridge,Mass.,1939; A Historical Commentaryon Thucydides,Vol. 1 by A. W. GommeOxford, 1945; andP. Deane, Thucydides’Dates, 465-431Ontario, 1972. In addition, lesscomprehensivechronological analysesof thePentekontaetiahave recentlybeenpresentedinA. French,TheAthenianHalf-CenturySydney,1972;M. P. Milton, Historia281979, 257-75;andJ. H. Schreiner,SymbolaeOsloenses511976, 19-63and 52 1977, 19-38.

Diodorus’ chronologicalblunders- arising from his ill-consideredandvery lazyattemptto fit thetopicalnarrativesof his sourcesinto theannalisticframework of hisown history- areso notoriousthat we will illustrate them by a singleexamplefrom this period.The single archonyearof 471/0is givenoverwholly to the narrativeof the latter yearsof Themistokles,from theorigins of his downfallbecauseof associationwith Pausanias,throughhis travelsaroundGreeceandMolossiaandhiseventualflight to Persia,to his eventualdeathwhichPlutarch,Them. 31plausiblyplacesin thelate 450s- a spanof perhapstwenty years!Diod. 11.54-9.

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CHRONOLOGY OF THE PENTEKONTAETIA 69

I. NAXOS

Thefirst majordifficulty facedby mostchronologiesis thedatingof theNaxianrevolt.Thucydidestells us of Naxos’ revolt and subjugationand follows this by a longdigressioninto Athens’ increasinglyharshtreatmentof her allies. Next we are toldof Kimon’s greatvictory over a powerfulPersianfleet at the Eurymedon.Sometimelater come the Thasianrevolt and the Atheniandisasterat Drabeskos,during anattemptto coloniseEnneaHodoi, nearAmphipolis. Next,we learnthat thebesiegedThasiansappealedfor and were secretlypromisedSpartansupport,but that thissupportwas preventedby the occurrenceof a greatearthquakeand helot revolt atSparta,leaving Thasosto surrenderin the third yearof its siege.Finally, Thucydidestells us thattheSpartansrequestedandreceivedanAtheniancontingentunderKimonto assist them in their war against the resistinghelots, but soondismissedit out offear, causingthe angryAtheniansto breakoff their Spartanalliance and form ananti-Spartancoalition with Argos and Thessaly.4All major modernchronologiesacceptthis sequenceof events.5

Our problemsarisefrom a later referencein Thucydides.At 1.137 we aretold thatThemistokies,while fleeingtoPersia,passedtheAthenianfleet besiegingNaxos.Then,uponhis arrival at Ephesosandoncehehadreceivedmoneyfromhis friendsin Greecewith which to rewardhis obliging sea-captain,he travelledinland and sent a letterto King Artaxerxes, ‘who hadjust come to the throne’ vewati aaLltuovTa; andBabylonian records prove that Artaxerxes succeededhis father Xerxes in lateDecember465.6 Thucydides’ account implies only a very short interval betweenThemistokles’ arrival in Ephesosand his attemptto contactArtaxerxes,and suchaconclusionis stronglysupportedby the circumstances:Themistokleswas fleeing anAtheniandeath-sentence,and every weekhedelayedin Athenian-controlledEphesosincreasedthe likelihood of his detectionand capture.Thesea-captain,too, would nothavebeencontentto remainwith his fugitive passengerfor anygreatlength of time,therebyputtinghis own neckin the noose;his desirewould havebeento receivehisgold and clear out as soon as possible,just like Themistokles.A priori, we wouldbelieve that Themistokles’ stay in Ephesoslasted no more than a month or two atmost; five or six monthsseemshighly unlikely, and the ten or twenty monthsorlongerdemandedby some chronologies,downright impossible.7Now if we assume

Thuc. 1.98-102.Schreiner1976 and1977 is theonly dissenter,but his highly unusualandrathererratic

analysisis basedon a fundamentaldisbelief in Thucydides’veracity e.g. [1976], 37, whichconsequentlyforces him into a heavy reliance on Diodorusand other secondarysources,supplementedby his own guesswork.Asmightbeexpected,this leadsto thecreationofanalmostunrecognisablechronologyfor theeventsof theFifty Years.

6 A Babylonianlegal text is datedto themonthsof Kislimu of the21styearof Xerxes465,which beganon December17, while news of Artaxerxes’accessionhad reachedEgypt by 2January464. Cf. M. E. White, ‘Some Agiad dates’, JHS 84 1964, 140-52, especiallyp.142n. 13.

Deane1972, 10-11 convincinglyarguesthecasefor a short stay atEphesos.Of our otherchronologies,ATL iii.l60 datesNaxosto 470, implying a stayof five years in Ephesos,whileGommemakesno attempt to dateNaxos,sayingthat Artaxerxes’accessiondate ‘createsgreatdifficulties’. In the most recentdiscussionof theproblem,Milton 1979, 26 1-2 arguesthat adelay of threeor four monthsis reasonablewhile Themistokles’friends were sendinghim thecash,and,if interruptedby winter, eight or ninemonths;this is marginallypossible.But whenMilton attemptsto salvagehisown chronologyby usingthisto arguethatThucydidesbelievedthesiegeof NaxosendedasearlyasAutumn466,hisargumentbeginsto breakdowncompletely.Xerxesdiedin December465, andevenif ThemistokleshadpassedNaxos neartheendof the


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that Themistoklessent his letterasearlyas January464 andallow severalweeksforhis prior journey inland, his meetingswith the local Persianofficials, etc., he stillcannothavepassedNaxoson his voyagemuch earlier than Septemberor October465 with this timeof year possiblyaccountingfor theserious stormencounteredenroute. Unless we are willing to convict Thucydidesof a factual error or such agross- andillogical - misrepresentationofthefactsthat it amountstothesamething,this conclusivelyproves that the Naxos revolt occurredin or at any rateextendedinto late summer465.

But a dateof 465 for the Naxianrevolt createsseverestrainsfor the remainderofthechronologicalsequenceoutlinedabove.First,althoughthedatingoftheearthquakeand helot rebellion at Spartais not completely certain, the task of reconcilingtheavailablepossibilitieswith a Naxianrevolt in 465 rangesfrom the implausibleto theimpossible. Pausaniasdatesthe earthquakeand uprising to the year of the 79thOlympiad,when Archimedeswas Archonat Athens, namely464/3; and Diodorusfor what it is worth datestheclosely associatedThasianrevolt to that sameyear,althoughhespells thenameof theAthenianArchonasArchedemides.8Plutarchseemsto opposethisdate,sayingthat theearthquakeoccurredin thefourth year ofthe reignof King Archidamos,which would seemingly place it in 466/5 sinceArchidamosprobablycameto the thronein 469/8;but this latterdateis far from certain,and evenif we accept it, the ambiguity of ancientdating practices allows us to reconcilePlutarch’sstatementwith the unambiguousdategiven by Pausanias.9

If we acceptthis464/3datingoftheearthquakelet alonethelesslikely earlierdates,the eventsof the precedingtwo years are forced into implausiblecompression.Asmentionedabove,Thucydides’accountof theseyearsseeminglyplacesthebattle oftheEurymedonaftertheNaxianrevolt,theThasianrevoltsometimeafterEurymedon,and the earthquakeat Spartaafter the first few battles of theThasianrevolt. If asarguedabovethe Naxianrevolt was still in full swingduring Autumn465, thentheEurymedoncampaigncould not have taken place during that year; to believeotherwisewould force us to concludeeitherthat it occurredas a lightning ‘end run’to Pisidiaduring the lastfew weeksof goodsailingweatherin 465 which seemshighlyunlikely,’0 or that Kimon sailed out to the Eurymedonwhile powerful Naxoswasstill holding out in his rear which seemsequally unlikely, especiallysincesuch areconstructionseeminglycontradictsThucydides.’1But if we place the Eurymedonin 464, thenwe areforcedto believethat thebattleand thecampaignwhich precededit, along with the Thasian revolt and the earthquake at Sparta, all took place withinthe thirteenor fourteenmonthsbetweenthebeginningof good sailingweatherin 464and the end of the 464/3 Athenian political year. This is possible, but ratherunpalatable.

466 sailing season,this would still imply a stayof at least fifteen or sixteenmonthsatEphesos,violating Milton’s own plausibility argument. Paus.4.24.5;Diod. 11.70.

First, it is possiblethat theSpartanpolitical yearin which Archidamoscameto thethronewould have beenconsideredas the last year of the reign of his predecessorLeotychidas; andtheslight displacementbetweentheSpartanpolitical year andtheAthenianarchonyearmightpossiblyaccountfor anotheryearof the discrepancy,if the successiontook placeduring theoverlap.However, it seemsrathermorelikely that the 469/8 successiondate- which is basedon severalquestionablearguments- is in error.

10 Deane1972, 11-12 is forced into this conclusionin orderto accommodateEurymedonin his chronology; all of theothermain chronologiesconsiderthis possibility highly unlikely.

1 Thucydidesmentionsthebattleof theEurymedonafterhedescribesthesurrenderofNaxos;by the orthodox‘strict chronology’ view, this correspondsto absolutechronologicalsequence,andeven suchan opponentof the orthodoxcaseas Deane1972, 12 accepts this argumentwithout question.



Thesedifficulties arecompoundedwhenwe considerthepersonalexploitsofKimon.Kimon is known to havebeentheAtheniancommanderbothat theEurymedonandat Thasos.Furthermore,we arealsotold by Thucydidesthat thesiegeofThasoslastedinto its third year,and accordingto Plutarch,Kimon remainedthecommanderuntilthe end, being the one who capturedthe city.’2 Plutarch also tells us that uponreturningto Athens Kimon was put on trial for his refusalto invade Macedoniainthe aftermathof theThasianvictory, and managedonly with difficulty to securehisacquittal.’3 Now unlesswe assumethat theEurymedoncampaignand theoutbreakof theThasianrevolt occurredduring the samesummerwhich seemsvery unlikely,and is suggestedby no majorchronology,Thasos’surrendercannothavecomeanyearlier than 461. Since the political reformsof Ephialtesat Athensare datedto thearchonyear 462/1,14and wereclose in time to Kimon’s returnfrom assistingSpartaat Mount Ithome,15we are againforced to acceptan almostimpossiblecompressionof events,namelythat thecapitulationof Thasos,Kimon’s returnto Athensand trial,Sparta’srequestforAthenianaid,Kimon’s expeditionto Sparta,thepolitical reformsof Ephialtes,and the Spartandismissalof the Athenianforce all took place withinthe first six or sevenmonthsof 461

But the third and most compelling indication that somethingis wrong, veryseriouslywrong, with the interpretativeframework of Thucydides’ Pentekontaetiawhich we havebuilt up abovecomesfrom the dating of the Athenian disasteratDrabeskos.Thucydidessaysthat Drabeskostookplace twenty-eightyearsbeforethesuccessfulfoundingof Amphipolisnear the samesite, and it seemsclearthat he hasexactarchonyearsin mind.17A scholiastto Aeschines,apparentlyfollowing theAethis,placesthe foundationofAmphipolis in thearchonshipof Euthymenes,namely437/6,andfor whatit isworth thisis supportedby Diodorus;18 thisdatingplacesDrabeskosin thearchonyear465/4,and indeed this dateor one in the two precedingarchonyearsis supportedby the scholion.’9 But ThucydidesplacesDrabeskosat aroundthe sametime as the initial Athenianvictories over the rebelliousThasiansand theinvestmentofthecity ofThasoswhichmakesexcellentsense.2°Thisseeminglyforcesus into the impossibleposition of believing that a sequenceof eventsincludingtheEurymedoncampaign, the Athenian-Thasiandisputeover Thrakian markets, theThasianrevolt, and the first few battlesof theThasianwar all fell within the threeor four monthsof good sailing weatherprecedingthe mid-Juneend of the 465/4

12 Plut. Kimon 12-14;Thuc. 1.100-101.13 Plut. Kimon 14-15.14 Aristotle, AM. Const.25 datesthem to thearchonshipof Konon,namely462/1, andsince

we would expectaccuratedatesfor constitutional reformsfrom a constitutionalhistory, thisis almost universally accepted,even though the accountinvolves Themistokles long sinceostracisedby 462/1 as a leadingparticipant.

15 will temporarily begthechicken-and-eggquestionof whetherit wasEphialtes’ reformswhich forced Kimon to return from Spartaor Kimon’s humiliating return which createdthepolitical climateleadingto thereforms.Cf. J. R. Cole, GRBS151974,369-85for a good recentthough partisandiscussionof theissue.

16 Even to placeall of these eventswithin a single year- as Deaneis forced to do in hischronology- seemsvery improbable.

17 So Gomme1945, i.390, secondedby Milton 1979, 258.1 Sch. to Aesch.2.31; Diod. 32.3. Actually, since Diodorus’ accountof thefoundationof

Amphipolis is containedin a single short sentenceunconnectedto theother eventsincluded inthe year,it is probablybasedon his good chronologicalsourceandcorrect.Cf. Meiggs1972,453.

19 The scholiastlists a disasterwhich befell anAthenianattempt atcolonisationundoubtedlyDrabeskosin theArchonshipof Lysikrates; this is apparentlyan error either for Lysistratos467/6, Lysanias466/5, or Lysitheos465/4. 20 Thuc. 1.100.


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Athenianpolitical year.Our desperateattemptsto constructa plausiblechronologyseemto havebeencrushedbetweenthe rock of a Naxianrevolt still continuing inAutumn 465 and the hardplace of a Drabeskiandisasterfalling during the 465/4Athenianpolitical year:2’ the time requiredfor the Eurymedoncampaignappearstohavebeensqueezedout of existence.

Yet perhapsthis very difficulty may serveas a signpostto the truth. Perhapsthebattle of the Eurymedonprecededratherthan followed the revolt of Naxos,and soshouldnot bejammedinto the few shortmonthsbetweenNaxosand Drabeskos.Atfirst sight, this suggestionmight seemoutrageous,for it apparentlyviolates thechronologypresentedby Thucydides,ourbasicsource;butupon re-examination,andusing a slightly different understandingof Thucydides’meaning,this maynot be thecase.

Thucydidesmentionstherevolt of Naxosin the contextof a passagedescribingaseriesof increasinglyharshand oppressiveAthenian actionstowards the individualcitiesunderherpower.22First theAthenianstakeEion, occupiedby thePersians.Afterthat,Skyrosis attacked,anislandnotoriousfor itspiracy.Thenextvictim is Karystos,apparentlydespisedby the other Greeksfor its Medising during Xerxes’ invasion.Finally, the AtheniansattackNaxos, an ally, simply becauseit wishesto leave thealliance.Thucydidesis describingan evolution in Athenian policy as muchas he isdescribinga year-by-yearsequenceof campaigns.At first, theAtheniansattackonlycities held by thePersians;next, they extendtheir attacksto cities which arelawlessandtroublesome,suchas Skyros;later, they turn on cities suchas Karystos, whichsimply havebadreputations,forcing themto join theLeague;finally, in a watershedact, they violatethe spirit of theDeliancharterandsubjugateoneof their own allies,Naxos,for seekingto leavetheLeague.Thucydidesfollows his mentionof Naxosbysayingthat its subjugationwasfollowedby thatof all theremainingallies, in theorderwhichcircumstancesdictated.He expandson this generalstatement,devotinga fullparagraphto the reasonsfor these later revolts and the correspondingAthenianvictories,which, following inevitably,stepby steptransformeda DelianLeagueoffreeequalsinto an Athenian empire of cowed subordinates.This lengthy and generaldigressioninto the later decadesof the Fifty Yearsshould serveto emphasisethetopical rather than strictly chronologicalnature of this segmentof Thucydides’Pentekontaetia,and suggeststhe very real possibility that Thucydidesmay be‘anticipating’ theNaxianrevoltaswell, violatingthestrict sequenceofeventsin orderto emphasiseacontinuousprocessof Leagueevolution.23In fact, if Thucydideshadchancedto mention by nameany of the later revolts which he vaguely alludesto,modernscholarsmight havefruitlesslyworkedto placeaSamianor Mytileneanrevoltin the early460s.

If we tentatively acceptthe possibility that the Eurymedonmay haveprecededNaxos, then our entire picture of the period becomesclear; not only are theaforementionedchronologicalinconsistenciesremoved,but the sequenceof eventsbecomesmuchmore plausibleandeasierto understand.The Eurymedoncampaign

21 Milton 1979attemptsto evadethis trapby arguingthatThucydidesbelievedThemistoklespassedNaxosin Autumn466,but asdiscussedaboveinn. 7, this would imply asojournof fifteenor twentymonthsin Ephesos,which violatesMilton’s own standardsof plausibility.

22 Thuc. 1.98-9.Underthis interpretation,the 1eraraia introducingthe Eurymedoncampaignwould

ambiguouslybe in referenceto any of the Athenianactionsdescribedin 1.97- perhapsthesubjugationof Karystos- ratherthan the lasteventsdescribedin 1.97-8,namelythe surrenderof Naxosandthe later subjugationof all Athens’ remainingallies.



was fought against a very powerful Persian fleet numberinghundredsof ships,24probablythe strongestnavaleffort of the GreatKing sinceSalamisand Mykale; itmay haverepresentedalong-preparedPersiancounteroffensiveaimedat reversingtheresultsof thePersianWars.If so,thenit would bevery badlyout of placeduring464or 463, the first few yearsof Artaxerxes’ reign,whenDiodorus tells us aswe mightexpect Artaxerxes was devoting all his efforts to reorganisinghis empire andsuppressingthe unrestand minor revolts which had brokenout after the murderofhis father.On the other hand,if we placeit earlier, possibly at the beginningof the465 campaigningseason,we may speculatethat its disastrousfailure over 200 shipslost contributedto thepolitical climate which led to Xerxes’ murderby Artabanes,one of his highestcourt officials.2’

Similarly, Naxos’ decisionto terminateits membershipin the DelianLeaguehasbeenalmostuniversallyascribedby modernscholarsto its beliefthatthe Leaguewasno longernecessary,that its burdensomenavalcontributionwas no longerjustifiedby the benefitsof Leagueprotectionagainstan ebbingPersianthreatthis is clearlyThucydides’ implication. Yet such a view makes absolutelyno senseif Naxos’secessioncameafew shortmonthsbeforethestrongestPersiannavalthrustin adecadeand a half. It would havetakenthe Persiansconsiderabletime to mobilise a fleet ofseveralhundredPhoenicianships,and bringthe force to Pisidia,togetherwith a largeland army - witness the years of preparationrequired for Xerxes’ invasion- andalmostcertainlyduringthis timeword of themassivepreparationswouldhavereachedGreece.26It would havebeenvery strangeindeed for Naxos to havechosenthismomentof heighteningtensionto forfeit the powerful protectionof a Leaguefleettotalling probably 300 or more triremes.27But on the other hand, once Kimon’spre-emptivethrusttotheEurymedonhadachievedbrilliant success,and200 Phoenicianshipswere capturedor sunk, the Persianthreatmight have appeareddestroyedfora generation.In this context, a Naxian decision to forgo the now unnecessaryprotectionof the Leaguemakesperfect sense,and indeedmight be expected.Thisfurtherstrengthensthecasefor placing the Eurymedonsoon beforeNaxos, in either466, or more likely early 465.

II. MOUNT ITHOME

Thenext importanthistoricalcrux - thequestionof the lengthof thesiegeof MountIthome- isnot reallywithin theprovinceofthispaper;nonewideaswill bepresented.But sincethenatureof thecruxand themost likely meansof its resolutionareclosely

24 Thuc. 1.100claimsthat theAthenianscapturedor destroyedtheentire Phoenicianfleet of200 ships.Ephorussomewhatmore plausiblyputsthe total Persianfleet at 350 and the shipslost at 200, and along with several other secondarysourcescontainsa much more detailedaccountof thecampaignthanThucydides’single sentence;for thesereasons,Thucydides’figuresshould not automaticallybe preferred. Theseaccountsof the Eurymedonare contained inPlutarch,Kimon 12-13andDiod. 11.60-62,thoughthelatter conflatestheEurymedoncampaignwith Kimon’s muchlater campaignin Cyprus,just prior to thePeaceof Kallias.

Diod. 11.69.26 Justas happenedin 397 Xen. Hell. 3.4.1.27 Duringthe first yearof theEgyptianexpedition,therewere200 Leagueshipsin Egypt, and

probablyatleast 100or moredeployedagainstAiginatheAiginetanfleet, renownedfor its navalexcellence,was heavily defeatedin agreat sea-battle,andoverseventyAiginetan vesselswerecaptured:Thuc. 1.104-5.DuringtheSamosrevolt adecadeor two later, Athens,Samos,Chios,andLesbosdeployedatotal of 265 warshipsin theareaThuc. 1.115-17.


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connectedto the ideas of this paper, a short summaryof the issues involved iswarranted.

In 1.102,ThucydidesmentionsKimon’s ill-fated expeditionto assistthe Spartansagainstthe rebelsat Mount Ithome,andtheSpartandismissalof theAthenianforce.We are told that this leads to a rupture of the alliance, and the formation of anopposingAthenianalliance with Argos and Thessaly,both hostile to Sparta. In thefollowing chapter,Thucydidestells us that the Messeniansat Mount Ithome,unableto prolong their resistance,finally surrenderedunderterms in the tenthyear of therebellionand werepromptlyrelocatedby theAtheniansto Naupaktos,whichAthenshad recently captured from the Ozolian Lokrians. After this, we are told of theMegarian-Korinthianborder dispute,and Megara’sconsequentadherenceto theDelian League,andin thenext few chapters,thebeginningof the Leagueexpeditionto Egyptandthe fighting of theFirst PeloponnesianWar.Thelong-debatedquestionis whetherThucydides’mentionof theendof thehelot revolt is in exactchronologicalorder,i.e. whetherthe Megarianalliance cameafter theend of the revolt andhenceseeminglysome ten yearsafter the earthquake,or whetherThucydidesis violatingstrict chronologyand ‘anticipating’ theendof the revolt in orderto maintaintheflowof his topical treatment.28

Put in suchterms,thechoiceis forced,with thefirst possibilityruled out: we knowthat thebeginningof theEgyptianexpeditioncannothavecomeas lateas454 whichis what a ten-yearhelot revolt beginningin 464/3- or equivalently,soon after theThasIanrevolt - would force us to conclude.However, there are two fall-backversionsof this first possibility. Wecansupposethat Thucydidesis simply mistaken,eitherin his figure for the lengthof thewar, in his suggestionthat the startof thewarfollowed theThasianrevolt, or somewhereelsein hischronologyof theseyears:29 thisis obviouslypossible,but asmentionedearlier, we shouldacceptsuchan argument-whichinvolvesimpugningthebasicaccuracyof our main source- only asalast resort.A second,more brutally simple approachis to argueawaythe figure of tenyearsasbeinga corruptionof thetext, andto replacethe numberby whateverothernumbersuits one’s chronologicalframework,emendingdekatoi to tetartoi, hektoi or evenpemptoiasthefancy strikesus ;30 this is thefavouredapproachamongthosescholarswho wish to preservea belief in Thucydides’ exactly sequentiallychronologicalapproachto thePentekontaetia.Theonly difficulty with suchan emendationis thatit hasnojustification,asidefromthedubiousbenefitof allowingus to stampas‘solved’oneof thelong list of Pentekontaetianchronologicalpuzzles,theothersof whicharenotso vulnerableto solutionby eraser.And in somesense,it hasless thannone,sinceDiodorusalmostcertainlybasedon Ephorus3’alsostatesthat thehelot revolt lasted

28 Cf. Deane1972, 22-30for a long discussionof the argumentsinvolved, which stronglyaffirms thesecondpossibility; Gomme1945, i.401-1 1 andATL 1949, iii.162-8 presentthecontrary,moreorthodoxview.

29 Forexample,French1971, 46 n. 63 mentionsthesuggestionthat thehelot uprisingbeganseveralyearsbefore theThasianrevolt andwasmerely intensifiedby theearthquakeatSparta.Gomme1945,407-8 lists severalotherversionscontradictingThucydides.

° Gomme1945, i.404 arguesfor six years,ATL 1949, iii. 163-4 supportsfour years,andD. M. Lewis, Historia 21954, 415-16holdsout for five. Someof thesesuggestionsasto howa corruptionmight haveoccurredare ingenious,but the very numberof different suggestionsweakensthestrengthof theargument,andthethoroughrefutationof Deane1972, 22-30isvery convincing.

31 Died. 11.64.4. Accordingto him, therebellion lastedten years,while Thucydidessaysitlastedinto its tenth year; but this is a very naturalmistakefor a third-handsourcesuch asDiodorus to make,evenif his numberdoesultimatelyderivefrom Thucydides.



tenyears,provingthatany‘corruption’ in Thucydides’manuscriptmusthaveenteredin Classicaltimes, an improbablyearly stage.32

Thealternativepossibility, that Thucydidessimply jumpedaheadchronologicallyin order to tell us the eventualoutcomeof the helot revolt before returningto hissequentialnarrative,seemsmuch less far-fetched.33More decisively,it accordsmuchbetterwith thegeneralpatternof events.Sparta’sstriking lack of participationin theFirst PeloponnesianWar is explainedby hercontinuingpreoccupationwith thesiegeof the still-resisting Messenianson Mount Ithome and the smoulderingembersofhelot rebellionswhich such a defiantstrongholdmight kindle. Even more obviously,an Atheniancaptureof Naupaktos- which Thucydidesplacesjust prior to the fallof MountIthome- would seemveryimplausiblebeforeTanagra,whenthehinterlandof thecity would haveremainedcompletelyoutsideof Athens’ influence or control;while afterOinophyta- andtheAthenianconquestof Boiotia,Phokis,andLokris - itwould follow naturally. In fact, Diodorusexplicitly statesthat TolmidescapturedNaupaktosand settledthedefendersof Mount Ithomein it during his voyagearoundthePeloponnese,which both heand Thucydidesplacesoonafter Myronides’ victoryat Oinophyta.34

32 Gomme1945, i.403 very properly graspsthis nettle, admitting that ‘all our otherauthorities,beginning with Ephorus,say that the war lastednine yearsor ten, as a roundnumber’.

It is important to realisethat althoughaccidentalcorruptions,numericalor otherwise,couldoccurat any time in history, they aremuchless likely to have occurredin classicaltimes. Thisis becausethe chances of a textual corruption surviving uncorrectedand propagatingareinversely related to the number of independentcopies of the manuscriptin existenceandcirculating.SoonafterThucydides’history was‘published’ i.e. copiedout in largenumbersandgenerallycirculated,every significantpublic or private library would havehadits owncopyofsuchan important andinfluential work. After this unlesstheoriginal scribehadmadean errorin all his copies,textualcorruptionscouldnot havewidely enteredthetradition againuntil theMiddle Ages or later, when thedestructionof thegreatlibrary atAlexandria and mostothermajor repositoriesof classicalmanuscriptshad drastically reducedthe numberof survivingcopies. For Ephorus’ figure to be based on a corruption in Thucydides would compoundimprobabilities:we mustboth assumethat Ephoruschancedto usea corrupttext andthat thissametextalsobecamethebasisfor all our survivingmanuscriptsof Thucydides.This is extremelyunlikely.

° Theorthodoxview, thatThucydidesmaintainedstrict chronologicalsequencingthroughoutthePentekontaetia,is statedcanonicallyandprovidedwith somejustification by Gomme1945,391-2,one of its strongestadvocates:‘we mustseehow farour otherevidence... is reconcilablewith Thucydides’narrative,keepingas our guideone fact,namely that hegives his eventsinstrict chronologicalsequenceasheconceivesit’. Yet in thefootnoteto thisvery sentence,Gommeadmits that ‘On the other hand,thefact or theprobability that the excursusis an unfinishedessay,allowsapossibledisruptionof thechronologicalorder,which Thucydideswould laterhaveput right. That is, we mayadmit a greaterlikelihood of errorhere thanin hismain narrative’.It is difficult to understandwhy Gomme’sbelief in an increasedchanceof chronologicalerroris matchedby his absolutedisbeliefin the possibility of chronologicalambiguitywhich,afterall, onewould naturallyexpectin anunfinisheddraft ofanessaydescribingan interwovenpatternof events.Later, whenThucydides’accountof theFiveYears’ Truceseemsto violateGomme’ssound historical common sense,Gommechoosesagain to postulatea fortuitous corruptionof thetext, rather than simplechronologicalambiguity p. 325.

Diod. 11.84; Thuc. 1.108. Gomnie1945, 304 arguesthat sinceThucydides’ accountoftheperiplousof Tolmidesfails to mentionNaupaktos,Diodorus’ account‘deservesno credence’.But Thucydides’ many very significant omissions in his unfinished Pentekontaetia- whichGomme1945, 365-70 himself lists at length anddiscusses- should make suchan argumentfrom silence a very weak one, especiallyabouta town whosecaptureThucydideshad alreadyreferredto earlier. Furthermore,a scholiastto Pausanias1.27.5 and Aeschines2.75 addsthenamesof other townscaptured,andGommeapparentlybelievesthem p. 320.


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III. THE OSTRACISM OF KIMON

The final historical crux to bediscussedrelatesto the story of Kimon’s early returnfrom ostracism.Theancientevidencethat Kimon was recalledfrom exile beforetheendof histen-yeartermis overwhelming,yetto acceptthis fact leadstofatal difficultieswith all existing chronologies.First, let us review the evidencerelating to Kimon’sexile and return.

AccordingtoPlutarch,Kimon wasostracisedin theaftermathof Sparta’sdismissalof theAthenianforceat Ithome,andtheAthenianbreakwith Spartawhichresulted;35this makesexcellentsense,accordswell with thecompletepolitical ascendancyof theEphialtes-Periklesfaction, and hasbeenacceptedby all modernscholars.Plutarchfollows this descriptionby statingthat just before the battle of Tanagra, Kimonattemptedto returnin orderto supportAthensin her hourofdangeranddemonstratethat hisphilolaconismdid notdiminish his patrioticloyalty; buthis requestwasdeniedby theBoule, undertheinfluenceof Perikles’ friends,andhewassentaway.However,we arenext told that sometime after thebattlethe Atheniansbecamefearful of aPeloponnesianinvasion,andrecalledKimon, hopingthathewould beableto arrangea peacewith Sparta- Perikleshimself proposedthe specialmotion. Plutarchplacesthis remarkableoccurrencein the immediateaftermathof the battle, andmotivatesit by theAtheniandefeatand fearsof a Spartaninvasionthe following spring;but thisis totally out of characterwith Athens’ spirit and behaviourat this time,36 andprobablyrepresentsPlutarch’sown rationalisation.In any event,we aretold that assoon asKimon returnedhearrangeda peacetreatybetweenAthensand Sparta,andtookafleet of200 shipstoCyprustofight thePersians.Plutarchaddsthat somewritersclaimthat Periklesdid not agreeto supportKimon’s recalluntil Kimon hadpromisedto sail to Cyprus immediatelyupon his return, rather than remainin Athensandconstitutea political threatto Perikles.

The other evidencefor Kimon’s recall is also very strong, butmuch less detailed.A fragmentof Theopompusquotedby a scholiastto Aristides saysthat Kimon wasrecalledin thefifth year of his ostracismin order to arrangea quick peacebetweenAthensand Sparta,and did so Aristides saysthat Kimon was recalledbeforetheendof his ostracism,but is unspecificaboutthedate.38NeposwritesthatKimon wasrecalledin the fifth year of his ostracism,andarrangedapeacebetweenAthensandSparta.3°Andocidessays that Kimon wasrecalled fromexile in order to makepeacewith Spartaand did so thoughnearlyall of Andocides’ historical details are - asusual- confused.4°

Given suchan overwhelmingweight of evidence,it seemscertainthat theremustbe sometruth to suchan unusualstory. The detail that it was Perikleshimself whoproposedthe specialmotion necessaryfor the recall of his arch-rival is especiallysupportive:suchanunlikely fact is noteasily invented.However,theproblemswhichariseif we acceptthestory arevery considerable.

First, accordingto all accounts,Kimon madepeacewith Spartavery soon after

For this and thefollowing, cf. Plut. Kimon 15-18,Per. 9.3-10.5.36 The losses at Tanagrawere heavy on both sides, and afterwards the outnumbered

Peloponnesiansretreatedhome. Sixty-two dayslater, the Atheniansinvaded Boiotia, werevictorious atOinophyta,andconqueredBoiotia, Phokis,and Lokns; soon afterwardsAiginasurrenderedto Athens,andTolmidesraidedthePeloponnese,burningtheSpartandockyards:Thuc. 1.108.

Scholiastto Aristides 46.158.13. 38 Aristides46.158.13.Nepos, Cimon 3.3. 40 Andocides3.3.



he returned,accordingto Diodorus,a five-year peacetreaty.4’ Yet the only peacementionedby Thucydidesin this period is the Five Years’ Truce,which all majorchronologiesdateto around451 thoughGomme[1945], 325 permitshimselfa whiff

of doubt. SinceKimon wasostracisedaround461,this would anyway havebeenthelast year of his exile; recalling him at this latedatemakeslittle sense,andconflictswith the strongtradition that he wasrecalledin thefifth yearof his ostracism.

Furthermore,Plutarchmakesit very clear that his sourcessay Kimon sailed toCyprusagainstthePersiansdirectly uponhis recall,yetagainwe interpretThucydidesto meanthat theCyprusexpeditiontookplacearound451 also,just after thesigningof the FiveYears’ Truce.The samedifficulties apply.

But our greatestproblemlies in understandingthemotivationof Perikles,Kimon’sarch-rival, yetthemanwho movedhis recall.Plutarchtells us that Perikles’ associateshadblockedKimon’s attemptto returnduring Tanagra,at a momentofgreatnationaldanger.Yet during theperiodfrom thebattleof Tanagradown to Kimon’s expeditionto Cyprus,the onlypossibleeventwhich couldhaveoccasionedthe extraordinaryreturnof an ostracisedleadersuch as Kimon was the Egyptian disaster.The aftermathofTanagrawouldnot haveforcedhisreturn: Tanagrawasatacticaldraw,andastrategicvictory for Athens. Oinophyta, coming sixty-two days later, could not havebeenresponsible,for it was a great victory. And in the aftermathof thesetwo battles,Atheniansuccessandconfidencereachedunprecedentedheights,as Boiotia, Phokis,andLokris wereconquered,Aigina forcedinto surrender,andtheSpartanhomelanditself raidedby Tolmides. Thucydideswould havebeencertainto mention anygreatcatastropheduring theseyears,yetexceptfor Egypt he is silent. None of our othersourcesrevealsanysignificant Atheniandefeat during this period, exceptfor Egypt.Yet Kimon’s recall constitutesone of the only two known casesin Athenianhistorywhen a man ostracisedwas recalledbefore his ten yearsof exile had ended,and theother caseoccurredduring the Persianinvasion of Greeceitself. Only a dangertoAthensof the greatestpossiblemagnitudecould havepromptedsuchan action. Thecompletedestructionof the enormousAthenianexpeditionaryforce to Egypt is theperfect candidate.

Egypt is the perfectcandidatein all ways except one. As currently interpreted,Thucydides’chronologyseemsto ruleout anypossibilitythatKimon’s recallfollowedtheEgyptiandisaster:Thucydidesappearsto placetheFive Years’Trucewith SpartaandKimon’s expeditionto Cyprusthreeor moreyearsafterEgypt, while our sourcesfor Kimon’s recall all agreethat theseeventstook placeimmediatelyafter Kimon’sreturn thoughonly Plutarch’sdetailedaccountmentionsCyprus.

The only meansof resolving this dilemma is an extremeone. We must concludethat,justasin thecaseoftheNaxianrevoltandin thecaseofthe fall ofMount Ithome,Thucydidesis anticipating the final defeat in Egypt, causing confusion for laterhistorians by onceagain breaking strict chronologicalsequencingin his rough,unfinishedsketchof the Pentekontaetia.42

Thissuggestionis actuallynot so outrageousas it might seem.Thucydidesopensthekey passagedealingwith theEgyptiandisasterby describingArtaxerxes’attemptto draw off the Atheniansfrom Egypt by sending Megabazusto Greecewith goldintendedto buy aPeloponnesianinvasionof Attica; aftersometime hadgoneby andthis strategyhadachievedno results,Megabazuswas recalled.Next, we aretold thattheGreat King sent a different Megabazusto Egypt with a very large army; the

41 Diod. 11.86.1. 42 Cf. Gomme’sadmission,quotedinn. 33 above.


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Egyptiansand their Greekallies weredefeatedin battle and shutup on the islandofProsopitis,which wasthenbesiegedfor eighteenmonthsandfinally captured,leadingto thedestructionof theAthenianexpeditionaryforce. It is obviousthat the eventsbeingdescribed- Megabazus’dispatch,his long, unsuccessfulattemptsat bribery,hisrecall, the preparationof a large army of invasion which probably occurredsimultaneouslywithMegabazus’activities,a campaignwhichdefeatedtheEgyptiansand bottled up the Greekson Prosopitis,and the eighteenmonthsof siege whichfollowed - musthavetakena considerablelengthoftime, probablythreeyearsat least.Yet if we cling to thenotion that every word and phraseof Thucydidesis in strictchronologicalorder,we are forced to concludethat nothingof political or militarysignificance took place in Greece during the three or four campaigningseasonsoverlappedby theseEgyptiandevelopments- a highly implausibleconclusiongiventhedensityof battlesand campaignsbothbeforeand afterwards.43More plausibly,we shouldconsiderthepossibilitythat thefirst partof thesummaryof Egyptianeventschapters109-10 is a recapitulationwith respectto the eventsof the precedingchapterson Greeceso French[1971], 58 n. 99, that the last part is an anticipationwith respectto the following chapterson Greeceas was suggestedabove,or verylikely that both arethecase.

A final nuggetof supportfor the possibility of a chronologicaldigressionmay begleanedfrom Ctesias.His accountprovides many additionaldetails of the Egyptiancampaignthough some of his naval strengths seemnot to tally with those ofThucydides,andaccordingto him, theexecutionof therebels’leaderInaros- whichThucydidesmentionsbutdoesnotexplicitlydatejustafterthefall ofProsopitis- tookplace five years after the end of the rebellion and under somewhatdifferentcircumstances.44Given Thucydides’extremebrevity, andhis failure to put achronological contextto Inaros’betrayalandexecution,we haveno reasonto doubtCtesias’versionespeciallyconsideringhis accessto Persiansources;andyet toacceptCtesiasis to admit that Thucydides,for no apparentreasonother than theconvenienceoffinishing off thestory of Inaros,jumped five yearspastthe endof the revolt in onesentence,beforereturningto thedestructionoftheAthenianrelief squadrona fewshortdaysor weeksafter theendof the revolt in thenext.45Suchlapsesinto chronologicalambiguity arenot in the leastsurprisingin abriefhistorical sketch,let alonea rough,unfinishedone;Thucydideshasnothingto answerfor. But this exampleshouldserveas a potent rejoinder to thosewho argue that Thucydidesmanagedto achievethesuperhumantask of keepingevery phrase of his Pentekontaetiasketch in strictchronologicalorder,a task which he neverevenclaimedto be attempting.46And if

Thuc. 1.108, 111. Ctesias,36.French1971, 60 n. 107 believesCtesias’ accounton this point, andviews Thucydides’

five-yeardigressionasan ‘understandablelapsefromstrict chronologicalreporting’,but heseemsnot to realisetheextremesignificanceof this conclusion:asingledemonstratedexceptionto anallegedabsoluteprinciple proves that the principle is not absolute,and greatly increasesthelikelihood that otherexceptionsmaybe found.Yet Frenchequivocateson the Mount Ithomecrux, weighing the unlikely possibility that Thucydides’dekatoiconfirmedby Diodorusis acorruptionagainstthe‘difficult assumption’thatThucydidesviolatedan ‘established.. . principleof narration’ by a chronologicaldigression;and Frenchdoesso without even referring to theexecutionof Inaros,which is almost an exactparallel, evenin lengthof time.

AlthoughGomme1945, i.321-2 discussesthediscrepanciesbetweenThucydides’accountof the disasterin Egypt andthat of Ctesiaswhich in many wayshe prefers,he uncharacteristically nevermakesexplicit the chronologicaldivergences,and thestrongimplication of theThucydideandigression.

46 Thucydides’criticism of Hellanicus’ earlier history of thePentekontaetia1.97.2asbeing‘not accurate’ ot’,K &KpLthc - in contrastto his own - is often used to argueeven cited as



Thucydidesmight for convenience’sakeviolatestrict chronologyto describeInaros’end,thereis little reasonto believethat hecould not have‘anticipated’ the end oftheEgyptian expeditionaswell.

If weacceptthis hypothesis,nearlyall thedifficulties with our existingchronologicalframeworkare eliminated.Upon thedestructionof the Egyptianexpedition,Kimonwas recalledfrom ostracism,both becauseof his outstandingmilitary recordandbecauseof thehopethat hecould arrangea trucewith SpartaandthePeloponnesianswhichwould allow Athensto concentrateall herresourcesandeffort againstPersia.47Returning in 454,48 Kimon quickly arrangeda five-year ‘non-aggressionpact’, withunarguedproof that thePentekontaetiawill follow absolutelystrict chronologye.g.cf. Gomme[1945], i.361-2, but this is merely an implication; and even if it weretrue, Thucydideswouldpresumablybe contrastingthe excursusas he intendedit to bewhen completeand polishedwith Hellanicus’poorexistingversion.

I follow Meiggs1972, 103-8andothersin believingThucydideswhenherepeatedlyimpliesthat virtually theentire Delian Leagueexpeditionaryforce of 200 shipsremainedin Egypt untiltheend, and waslost. If 200 or more ships- someAthenianand someallied - were lost, thenit is likely that mostordinaryAthenians,upon learning of the disaster,expectedanyweek tosee an enormousandvictorious Persianfleet approachthe Piraeus,just as they were latertofeel afterSicily Thuc.8.1.Thesefearswereunwarranted:theAthenianforceshadbeendefeatedby Persianengineeringandlandattackin one caseandby surprisein theother;but the‘papertiger’ natureof Persiannavalpowerwould nothavebecomeapparentfor sometime - thebarefactwasthat ahugefractionof the standingDelian Leaguefleet hadbeenannihilatedata stroke.

The abovereasoningis merelyweakened,not destroyed,if lossesin Egypt cameto no morethan 100 shipsasmany scholarsbelieve. Moreover,thefoundationsof this more orthodoxreconstructionareratherimplausible.Underit, wemustassumethattheAthenianskeptno morethanfifty or sixty shipsor less in Egypt after thefirst yearorso of theexpeditione.g.Gomme[1945], i.321-3. Greeknavalexcellencewashigh, andtheAthenianswerenotoriously reckless,but eventhey wouldhavebalkedatthenotion of leavingsucha smallfleet to maintaincontinualcontrolof theseas- an absolutenecessity- so farfrom homeandso closeto Phoenicia,Persia’sprincipal naval centre. CallisthenesPlut. Kimon 13.4-5 viewed Perikles’ short sail to thesouth-westerncoastof Asia Minor with a merefifty shipsasanact of notabledaring;howwouldhehave viewed the ideaof keepingsucha small expeditionaryforce within a few days’ sail ofPhoeniciafor five or six years,winter andsummer?

48 The eight yearsbetweentheapparentdateof thereformsof Ephialtes462/1 andthedateof the Five Years’ Truce 454/3 do presentsome difficulty if we are to believe that Kimonreturnedin thefifth yearof his ostracism;however,they canbe accommodated.If Kimon haddepartedfor Spartain earlySpring 461, andhis absencealongwith severalthousandmembersof themore conservativeAthenianhoplite classallowed Ephialtes quickly to gain politicalascendancy,thenthereformscould haveoccurredneartheendof the462/1 Athenianpoliticalyear. Kimon mayhaveremainedin Spartafor sevenoreightmonths,hopingto achievea victoryand return in triumph to Athenswith a consequentlygreaterchanceof reversingEphialtes’constitutional changes;the accountsof our sourcesare vague enough to leave open thepossibility that he remainedin Spartaover the first winter. Therefore,his ‘dismissal’ whateverthe circumstancesandreturn to Athensmaywell havecome too late for thefirst round of theostracismvoteof461/0,comingin thesixth prytanysometimein DecemberorJanuary,leavinghim to spendthenexttwelve monthscarryingtheburdenof failureatIthomeandunsuccessfullyattemptingto overturn Ephialtes’reformsPlut. Kimon 15. His ostracismmight havecomethenext year, with the preliminary vote in the sixth prytany and the final decision Kimon orEphialtesin theeighth Arist. AM. Const.43.5; Philochorus,FGrHist 328 F 30. The secondvote would have forced Kimon to leaveAttica within ten days,puttinghis departurewithin afew weeksof theend of the460/59Athenianpolitical year; for this reason,459/8might havebeentraditionally recordedas the first full yearof his ostracism.This would placehis recallin thepolitical year455/4,thefifth of his exile; if hehadreturnedin earlysummer454, it mighthave takenhim a month ortwo to arrangetheFive Years’ Trucewith Sparta,placingit in thenext political year454/3asrequired.A numberofassumptionsarerequiredto producetheabovechain of reasoning,but all are ratherplausible.This reconstructionwould alsoexplain howKimon returnedfrom MountIthomeapparentlysometime beforethebeginning oftheEgyptianexpedition, yet returnedto Athens in thefifth year of his exile but sometime after theend ofthat six-yearexpedition.


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theSpartans,49andsailedforCypruswith ahastilyorganisedAthenianandallied forcein orderto forestalla fearedPersianadvanceinto theAegean.Aside fromthedifficultywith the standardinterpretationof the text of Thucydides,this patternof eventsisreasonableandrealistic,andseveraladditionalpiecesof evidencemay beadducedtosupportit.

First, the truce arrangedbetweenAthens and Spartawas of remarkablyshortduration- five years- andhencemakesmuch moresenseasa ‘breathingspace’afterthe Egyptiandisasterthan as anythingelse.

Second,Diodorus’ accountof the Cypruscampaign- one of the fullest in detail -

closely connectsthecampaignwith the Egyptian disaster.Furthermore,the Persiancommandersidentified are the sameasthose in Egypt, and this would be naturalifastheAtheniansmayhavefearedtheywerepreparinganoffensiveinto Greekwatersafter their greatvictory in Egypt.’°

Third, after describing the enormousAtheniandisasterin Egypt, Thucydidesfollows with the accountsof minor Athenianoperationsin Thessalyand Sikyon. ‘

It seemsvery unlikely that theAthenianswould haveundertakenthesein thewakeof Egypt5’ i.e. if theseoperationsactuallydid chronologicallyfollow the final defeatin Egypt, while they fit in perfectlywith thepatternof widespreadAthenianthrustsprior to the disaster.

Fourth, the evidence of Argos’ thirty-year peace treaty with Sparta actuallysupportsratherthan weakensthe casefor an earlier datefor the FiveYears’ Truce.A referencein Thucydidesallows us to date the Argive pact to 451/0, and this hasoften beenusedto arguethat the Atheniantreatymusthavebeenmadearoundthissametime; but this seemsunlikely. A long-termpeacetreatyextendingfor thirty yearsseemsa far from natural partner to a brief five-year ‘intermission’ agreement.Moreover,Argos’ notoriouslydeephostility to Spartamakesit very unlikely that shewould haveaccepteda thirty-yearpeacein theabsenceof acatastrophicdefeat;53andif Athenshadbeenforcedto sign a separatepeacewith Spartaaround454/3andhadwithdrawn from thestruggle,Spartamight haveusedthe opportunityto dealArgossuch a defeatonemight speculatethat this wasSparta’smain benefit from the truce.

Fifth, if Kimon’scampaignin Cyprushadoccurredearlierthancurrentchronologiessuggest,beginning say in summer454 or spring 453 ratherthan summer450, thenthePeaceof Kalliaswhich followed shouldalsobeplacedearlierthanis now believed,perhapsin 452 or 451 ratherthanin 449.Thiswould placePerikies’citizenshipdecree

4 A cynicmight arguethat Sparta’sleaderswould neverhavegrantedAthenssucha respite,despitetheir friendshipwith Kimon and their public conunitmentsto pan-Hellenicsolidarityagainstthebarbarian;and suchsuspicionis very warranted.But in theabove chronology,thelong helot rebellionwould havecometo anend in its tenth year- 455/4 - perhapsonly five orsix months before,andexhaustedSpartacould herselfusea breathingspacefree from majormilitary threat. It is also possiblethat Spartahopedto usethefive yearsto deala crushingblowto Argive power,andthis mayhaveresultedin thethirty-year peacetreatywhich Argos signedin 451/0 seetext below.

50 Cf. n. 47 above.‘ Thuc. 1.111.52 Meiggs 1972, 110-11 andn. 1 understandablyfinds theseadventuristicenterpriseshighly

peculiar in the aftermathof Egypt andhe even venturesto speculatethat they ‘may evenhavecome a little earlierthanthe capitulationon Prosopitis’,addingin a footnotethat ‘Thucydidesseemsnot to have beenrigorouslychronologicalin his accountof theEgyptianexpedition’ !;but this extremelyimportantidea is nevercarriedto its logical conclusionor extendedto otherchronologicalcruxes.

‘ The only previoustimethat Argoshadconsideredsucha lengthy peacetreaty with Spartawasafterher manpowerhadbeenmassacredby KleomenesHerod.6.79-83,7.149-50.



of451/0shortlyafter thePeaceratherthan ayearor two beforeit. ‘4 Suchan orderingis more plausible,sincePeriklesand the other Athenianleadersmust certainly haverealisedthat the decreewould havea very negativelong-termimpact on Athens’citizenpopulationandhencehermanpowerresources,andit would havebeena very

strangealmostsuicidalmeasureto takebeforeKimon’s victoriesin Cyprusand thesigningof thePeacewith PersiahadremovedthePersianmilitary threat.Underexactlythe samereasoning,the enormousexpenditureson the Parthenonand Propylaia-

amountingto the bulk of the Delian Leaguei.e. Athenianreservefund - mustobviouslyhavefollowedratherthanprecededpeacewith Persia.Yettheseextraordinaryexpendituresareusuallydatedto 450/49,"and this is almostimpossibleto reconcile

* with a Cypruscampaignbeginningin 450 or evenworse450/49asin most currentchronologies.68We are forced to believe that a Cyprian campaignof considerablelength, the undoubtedlylong negotiationsresulting in the first Hellenic-Persian

* peacein which Kallias’ travel time to and from Susaalonemust havecome to sixor sevenmonths,Perikles’ diplomatic manoeuvringrelating to the abortivePanHellenic Congress,and thesubsequentunilateralAtheniandecisionto spendherandher allies’ military reservefund on public works - that all this canbefitted into thefourteen or fifteen monthsbetweenthe beginningof the 450 sailing seasonand theendofthe450/49politicalyear.’7Thisis totally implausible,evenif for no otherreasonthan that a leaderof Perikles’ ability would neverhavespenthis military reservefundwhile the ink on a permanentpeacetreatywith Persiawasonly threeor four monthsdry, andits securitycompletelyuntested.A Peaceof Kallias signedin 452 is far easierto accept.58

Sixth, Kimon had half-foreignancestoryhis motherwas a Thrakianprincess.58This fact makesit extremelyunlikely that Perikies’ citizenship decreeof 451/0waspassedbeforeKimon’sdeathin themiddle oftheCypruscampaign.RemovingAthens’greatestliving military herofrom the citizenshiprosterwould havebeengoing toofar evenfor anenrageddemos,andKimon’s friendswould havefought themanoeuvreto the bitter end. The citizenshipdecreewould standout in all later sourcesas the

Arist. Ath. Const.26.3 datesthedecreeto the archonshipof Antidotos, namely451/0.Fordiscussionsof the dating and natureof the StrasbourgPapyruswhich containsa

scholiast’scommentaryon Demosthenes22.l3f.,mentioningthe expenditures,cf. ATL1949,iii.28l andMeiggs1972,515-18,bothofwhich supportthe 450/49dating,andGomme1956,ii.28-33, who questionsthesearguments.The main restorationsof thedecreeare convenientlycollectedand translatedin C. W. Fornara,Archaic Timesto theEndof thePeloponnesianWarCambridge,1983,95-7.

56 ATL 1949, iii,281 placesthebeginningof Kimon’s campaignin Spring450, andthePeaceof Kallias a yearlater in thefirst half of 449; Deane1972, 61-3andFrench1971, 64 n. 119and65 n. 123 bothsupportthis, theformerdiscussingthevariousotherideasproposed.Gomme1945, i.409-l0 displacesboth datesby a year,putting theCyprus campaignin Summer449andthePeacein Spring448asis notedin theprecedingfootnote,Gommerefusesto credit theusualdateof the StrasbourgPapyrus.Meiggs1972, 124-8 recognisesthe ‘crowding’ whichsuchchronologieswould require,andmuch moreconsistentlyplacesthe Cypruscampaignin451 andthe Peaceof Kallias in 449.

So Meiggs1972, 124-8.58 Undermy reconstruction,the missingtributequotalist of 449/8should not be explained

by any rather improbable remission of tribute in the year following the Peace,but as aconsequenceof thePerikleanbuilding programmebeguna couple of yearslater andpaid forby thealliedtribute.Sinceall incoming tributeof that yearwasdirectly usedto financebuildingconstruction,therewas no surplusphoros to bestoredwith theGoddess,and henceno tributequotawaspaid. Formy argumentson the ‘surplus’ natureof thetribute, cf. R. K. Unz, ‘Thesurplusof theAthenianphoros’to appearin GRBS.

Plut. Kimon 4.1. The contextmakesit clearthat theclaim is not simply a standardpoliticalslander.


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final culmination of the political struggle betweenKimon and Perikles.Even if aspecialexceptionto thedecreehad beenmadefor a heroof Kimon’s stature,this factwould havebeennotedby somesourceperhapsasthefirst stageof thereconciliationwithPerikleswhichled toKimon’s returnfrom ostracism,justasthespecialexceptionmadefor Perikles’own illegitimatesonPerikleswas noted.6°Yet accordingto existingchronologies,Kimon was leadingtheAtheniangrandbattlefleetto Cyprusjust asorafter! the AthenianAssembly was blithely abolishing his citizenship. Such anabsurditycan be safely ruled out, if only becauseof the grist this remarkablestorywouldhaveprovidedfor themoralisticmills of PlutarchandotherwritersCarthage’streatmentof Hannibalwould seemsaintlyby comparison.

Finally, Diodorusactuallylists theFive Years’Truceunder454/3, andasSchreinernotes,this is probablyoneof the few timeswhena Diodoreandatecarriessignificantweight.6’ The Truce is mentioned in a single short sentencedirectly followingDiodorus’ namingof theyear’sAthenianarchonandRomanconsuls;it is completelyunconnectedwith the year’s events’- a long hodge-podgeof Sicilian history - orthose of the year before, and is very likely taken directly from Diodorus’ goodchronologicalsource.6’

For thesereasons,thecasefor placingthe recall of Kimon and thesigning of theFiveYears’ Truce in thedirectaftermathof Egypt seemscompelling.

In all of these chronological puzzles- Naxos, Mount Ithome, and Kimon’sostracism- thesimple assumptionthat Thucydides’narrativeis notuniversallystrictin its chronology is sufficient to allow resolution. Such a hypothesisseemsnotimplausible, and leadsto a far morerealisticpatternof eventsthanthat producedbyorthodoxchronologicalreconstructions,which furthermorerequire us to postulateoneor more unlikely textual ‘corruptions’ in order to avoid outright contradiction.Thucydides,thoughan outstandinghistorian,wasmerelyhuman,andit seemsrathercontrived to expect absoluteand unambiguouschronologicalrectitude out of hisPentekontaetia,an unfinishedhistorical sketchso manifestly rough and incompletethat it makesno mentionwhatsoeverof the Peaceof Kallias, arguably the singlemost significant eventduring the Fifty Years, and an evolutionarywatershedin thedevelopmentof theAthenianEmpire.63

StanfordUniversity RON K. UNZ

60 Plut. Per. 37.61 Schreiner1976, 26 andn. 17.62 Diodorus’evidenceappealsto Gomme1945, i.325-6,andheconsiderssuggestinganother

textualcorruption in Thucydidesto reconcileit, but eventuallydecidesto follow thebulk of thescholarshipandreject the date. Meiggs1972, 453 points to this date of Diodorusas one ofa numberof suchdateswhich Diodorusprobablyobtainedfrom a chronologicalhandbook;ineachcase,thedatingis brief - usuallyjust ashort sentence- andstandsoutsidetheflow or ratherthe whirlpool of Diodorus’ main narrativethough naturallyit is sometimesdifficult to judgewhethersomeborderlinecasesfall into this categoryor not. Meiggs saysthat datessuchasthese‘are morelikely to be right than wrong’ which is somethingof an understatement,sinceeachof thethreeor four clear-cutcaseswhich we can independentlycheck turns out to be exactlycorrect;however,Meiggs assertsthat we shouldflatly reject the454/3datefor the Five Years’Truce where the signsof Diodorus’ havinguseda chronologicalsourceareperhapsstrongestof all. Meiggs’ obvious reasonfor this inconsistencyis to safeguardhis own chronologicalframework.

63 Cf. Meiggs1972,129-51 for a lengthyandthoroughdiscussionofthelikelihood andtermsof thePeaceofKallias, whichfirmly concludesthatthePeacedid in factexist. Thucydides’silenceis seenasstrangeandembarrassing,andoneof thestrongestargumentsin the handsof doubtersof the Peace. Meiggs bravely admits that ‘no convincingexplanationhas been given’ forThucydides’omissionof the Peaceandthat ‘the best that can be offered. . .is apalliative’ p.



APPENDIX AOutline of SuggestedChronologicalScheme,466-449

Thefollowing chronologicalchartmay help to summarisethe ideasof this paper,andconvenientlydisplay the suggestedpatternof interlocking events.Not all thedateslisted aredefendedin the text; some, followed by questionmarks,are more or lesscrudeguesses.But thechart is meantto demonstratethat thedatessuggestedby thispaperare consistentwith eachother, and can be madeto accordwith virtually alltheotherestablisheddatesof this period.AppendixB summarisesthesuggesteddatesof the threemain existingchronologiesfor thepurposesof comparison.

SuggestedChronology,466-449

Key: E = Early; M = Mid; L = Late; s = Spring; S = Summer; A = Autumn;W = Winter; Italic type = Attested.

466 or E 465 Battle of theEurymedon.465 Revolt of Naxos.L Dec. 465 Artaxerxescomesto throne.s? 464 Thasosrevolts.E 464 Colony at EnneaHodoi founded.464 Disasterat Drabeskosin 464/3.464 Thasosappealsto Sparta.464/3 Earthquakeat Sparta;beginningof thegreat helot rebellion.E? 462 Thasoscapitulatesin third year of revolt.462? Kimon returnsto Athensand is puton trial; acquitted.Es?461 Kimon leadsexpeditionto assistSpartaat Mount Ithome.ES?461 Reformsof Ephialtesin 462/1.LA or W? 461 Kimon returns from Spartaeffectively too late for 6th prytany

ostracismvote.460 Kimon unsuccessfullytries to reversethe reformsof Ephialtesand

regainpolitical dominanceat Athens.460 Athensbreaksalliancewith Sparta,allies with ArgosandThessaly.460 Megarajoins the Athenianalliance.s 459 LargeAthenianexpeditionvotedto Cyprus.s 459 Ostracismof Kimon after 2nd-stagevote in 8th prytany.S 459 Athenianexpeditionat Cyprussails to Egypt, assistsrevolt.S 459 AthensattacksPeloponnesiansat Halieis andKekryphaleia.

* 459/8 First full yearof Kimon’s ostracism.LS 459 War with Aigina breaksout.LS 459 Korinth attemptsto take advantageof Athens’ military over-

extension,attacksin Megarid but is defeated;somecasualtiesoccur in samesummeras Cyprus/EgyptandAigina.

L 459? PhokiansattackDoris.Es 458 Spartansmarchto Phokis, quickly overawePhokians.

140: theunfinishednatureof thePentekontaetiaand indeedtheentirehistory is the principalone cited. Gonune1945, 331-5, 364-70hadroughly the sameopinion.

I wish to acknowledgethehelpful commentsof E. Badian,JohnBarron, andan anonymousrefereeonanearlierdraftof thispaper,thoughnaturallynoneof themshouldbeheldresponsiblefor sucherrorsasremain,nor for theviewspresented.I alsowish to thankHarvardUniversity,the Winston Churchill Foundation,andthe NationalScienceFoundation for their financialsupport duringthepreparationof this paper.


84 RON K.UNZ

s 458 Tanagra;attemptedreturn of Kimon blockedby Perikles.ES 458 Oinophyta.458 Athenian conquest of Boiotia, Phokis, and Lokris under

Myronides.ES458 Surrenderof Aigina after nine monthsof siege.457? Periplousof Tolmides.456 MegabazusinvadesEgypt with large army, defeats rebels and

Atheniansin the field.A 456 Siegeof Prosopitisbegins.456? Athenianexpeditionsto Thessaly,attackon Sikyon.456/5?? Othernavalraids by Tolmides,conflatedwith periplousby Diod.s 454? Helotrevoltendsin tenthyear;Messeniansaresettledat Naupaktos

by Tolmides.s 454 Drainingof watersaroundProsopitisprobablya few weeksbefore

the low water point of the Nile in June;destructionof Leagueexpeditionaryforce in sixth year and after eighteenmonthsofsiege.

s 454 Destructionof the Athenian relief squadron;a few shipsescape,carryingword of thedisasterto Athens.

s 454 Kimon recalledinfifth full year of exile.s 454 League treasury transferredfrom Delos to Athens becauseof

Persiannavalthreatmovecomesafter455/4 tribute collection.S 454 Kimon arrangesFiveYears’Trucein 454/3,sailstoCyprusthree

yearsafter Athens’ expeditionsto Thessalyand Sikyon.L 454 Cyprus campaign;Athens defeats Persian forces coming from

victory in Egypt, re-establishesmilitary balancewith Persia.March 453 First tribute quotapaid to Athena.E 453?? Negotiationsleadingto Peaceof Kallias begine.g.Kallias leaves

for Susa.L 453 or 452?? Peaceof Kallias ratified by Athenians.451?? PerikleslaunchesPan-HellenicCongressproposal.451/0 Atheniancitizenshiprestricted.450/49 Athens authorisesliquidation of Leaguereservefund to pay for

constructionof Parthenon,Propylaia.449/8 Missing tributequotalist; no surplustributestoredthatyearunder

Goddess’sprotectionhenceno quotapaymentsinceit was allspenton public works.

APPENDIX BSamplingof DetailedExisting ChronologiesDeane[1972], 136-7 8

Event Deane Gomme ATL

NaxosEurymedonThasosrebelsAthenianriposteColony at EnneaHodoiDrabeskos

465 ? 470465 ? 4694.64 ES/LS 465 MS 465464 - LS465s464 - A465464 LS 465 EW 465/4

/



Thasosappealsto Sparta 464 - W 465/4Earthquakeat Sparta,helotsrise 464 465/4 464Thasoscapitulates 462/1 463/2 463/2SpartarequestsAthenianaid 462/1 462? 462Atheniansdismissedat Ithome 462/1 462/1 462Athenianalliance with Argos, Thessaly 462/1 462/1 462/1MegaraleavesSparta,joins Athens 461? - s 460Athenianfleet to Cyprusand Phóinike 460 ? 461/0Egyptianexpeditionbegins 461/0 ? s 460Megabazusin Sparta 457/6 457/6 457/6Halieis andKekryphaleia 456? ? s 460War with Aigina begins 456? ? s 460KorinthiansinvadeMegarid; defeated Jul. 456? ? A 460Long walls begun 456? ? W 460/59Siegeof Prosopitisbegins Jan. 455 ? A 456Helots’ revolt ends 455/4 460/59? 461?PhokiansattackDoris 455/4? 458/7? S 459SpartansattackPhokians 454 - 459/8Tanagra 454 ES457? June458?Oinophyta 454 ES 457? Aug. 458?Long Walls completed 454 LS 457? W 458/7Aigina surrenders 454 457/6 s 457Oinoe 454 457/6? s 457Tolmides’ raids aroundthePeloponnese 454 456/5 S 457Siegeof Prosopitisends June454 ? S 454Athenianrelief squadrondestroyed 454 ? S 454Athenianexpeditionto Thessaly 454 7 454Perikles’ Korinthian Gulf expedition 454 ? S 454Threeyearsfree of hostilitiesbegin 454 - -

Five Years’Truce A/W 451 ? 451Kimon’s expeditionto Cyprus 450 450/49? s 450Kimon’s death 450 - S 450Restrictionof Atheniancitizenship 451/0 451/0 451/0Reservefund spenton public works 450/49 N.A. 450/49Peaceof Kallias signed E 449 449 E 449Perikles’ Pan-HellenicCongress s/S 449 ? s/S 449Missing tribute quotalist; no 449/8 449/8 449/8

tributedemandedby Athens becauseof Peace

I


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THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE PENTEKONTAETIA · CHRONOLOGY OF THE PENTEKONTAETIA 69 I. NAXOS The first majordifficulty faced by mostchronologies is the dating ofthe Naxian revolt. Thucydides