Varieties of Realism: Thucydides and Machiavelli …ocean.otr.usm.edu/~w416373/PS 331/Thucydides and...Varieties of Realism: Thucydides and Machiavelli Steven Forde University of North

Varieties of Realism: Thucydides and Machiavelli

Steven Forde

The Journal of Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2. (May, 1992), pp. 372-393.

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Steven Forde University of North Texas

Realists have dominated the postwar study of international politics, but they have not always taken seriously the problems of realism as a moral theory. One such problem is the difficulty of reconciling realism with devotion to ethics in any sphere, including domestic politics. This problem was taken seriously by two originators of the realist school, Thucydides and Machiavelli. I explore the thought of these two authors with special attention to their views of the relation of international realism to general ethical skepticism and to domestic politics in particular. Exam- ining their respective views of international realism, of the origin of societies, of the overall relation between justice and amoral necessity, I conclude that while for Machiavelli international realism is only a part of a more general ethical skepticism, Thucydides tries to manage a difficult if not tragic tension between the requirements of international realism and domestic morality.

R e a l i s m has been called "probably the most distinguished school of thought in the history of international relations" (Hoffmann 1988, 6). Its distinguished character derives not only from the fact that it has dominated the study of international relations for some 50 years,' but from a heritage which reaches back to ancient Greece. Contemporary realists pride themselves on this heritage but rarely explore its roots seriously. One reason for this is that the first realists belonged more to the realm of political philosophy than to political science as it is understood today, and the dominant contemporary form of realism is self-consciously "~cientific."~ Nevertheless, there is much to be gained by looking at the founders of the realist tradition, precisely because their concerns are philosophical and normative, as well as scientific.

Work on this paper was made possible in part by a grant from the John M. Olin Foundation. Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the International Studies Association convention and at the Southwestern Social Science Association convention. The author wishes to thank John Charvet and Clifford Orwin, the discussants on those two occasions, for their helpful comments and suggestions.

Its hegemony has been seriously challenged only in the last 10 or 15years. See Ashley (1984); Hoffmann (1988, 3); Keohane (1986, 4, 9); Nardin (1988).

I am thinking of the structural realists, or "neorealists." See Ashley (1981, 1984); Keohane (1986, 14-16); Waltz (1986, 1959). Gilpin (1986, 304), disputes the label "scientific" but see also page 307.

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS,VOI.54, No. 2, May 1992 O 1992 by the University of Texas Press

373 Varieties of Realism: Thucydides and Machiavelli

For realism, which may be broadly defined as skepticism regarding the applicability of ethical norms to international politics, is in part a moral theory. Some recent challenges to realism charge that contemporary realists are insufficiently aware of the consequences of their position as a moral theory. For example, while a r m i n g the primacy of force over justice in international politics, most realists still want to apply moral judgment to selected aspects of interstate relations3 Perhaps more importantly, while endorsing the suspension of ethical norms in international politics, they implic- itly cling to those norms in domestic politics, without considering that international and domestic realism may be linked, if not inseparable. It may be that morality cannot be completely discounted in one sphere of human relations without losing its force e l~ewhere .~ Whether or not modern realism in general is guilty of overlooking these problem^,^ they are problems that were treated with the utmost seriousness by two of the founders of the realist tradition, Thucydides and Machiavelli.

This essay is an attempt to recover part of the theoretical argument of realism as it is seen in these two thinkers, with special emphasis on the moral implications of realism. Thucydides and Machiavelli confront realism as a general moral theory, and take very seriously its implications for domestic as well as international politics. For both, international realism rests on an analysis of the role of "necessity": ethical duties are suspended by the necessities states confront in international affairs. These necessities are partly "structural" and partly rooted in human nature, and, for both Thucydides and Machiavelli, are exacting enough to excuse imperialism. Necessities of this character and magnitude cannot easily leave room for any duties among states, and cannot easily be limited to international affairs. Moreover, they prove for both Thucydides and Machiavelli to be only one aspect of a necessity more broadly characteristic of the human condition. This opens the pros- pect of a realism which is skeptical of moral principal altogether.

I propose to examine the role of necessity in these two authors as a way of uncovering the fundamentals of the realist argument in general. Part of my thesis is that while both Thucydides and Machiavelli hold to a rather extreme realism in international affairs, they differ on the issue of general ethical skepticism. Here, I believe Machiavelli is more thorough or extreme, his international realism being only part of a thoroughgoing ethical realism, while Thucydides tries to defend the theoretically more difficult position that international realism need not entail universal moral skepticism. Hence

A small but representative sample: Gilpin (1986, 321); Herz (1951, chaps. 4, 5); the final sections of Morgenthau (1978).

This argument is presented by Beitz (1979, 15, 179). See also Figgis (1956, 82-84). The problem of domestic and international morality is not a problem that Reinhold Niebuhr

was insensitive to, nor even Hans Morgenthau. See Niebuhr ([I9321 1960, chaps. 1 ,2 ,4 ; [I9441 1960); Morgenthau (1978); Smith (1986); also Herz (1951, 147); Meinecke ([I9241 1984, 6).

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the study of these authors promises to illuminate the connection, slighted by modern realism, between international realism and general moral skepticism, while the contrast between them might yield a suggestion on how the connection might be broken-that is, how international realism might be prevented from turning into immoralism tout court.

With this in mind, I propose first to outline the arguments for international realism in Thucydides and Machiavelli, as seen in their analyses of the "causes of war" and of imperialism. We may then look at their respective views of the origins of society, which open the possibility of a broader ethical realism. Finally, a general review of the relation of justice and necessity in Thucydides and Machiavelli will reveal the exact scope of their realism, and shed light on the nature of realism as a moral theory.

I. THE CAUSES OF WARAND THE FOUNDATIONSOF REALISM

Thucydides' view of the causes of war is reflected in his account of the origins of a particular war, the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides' famous assessment is that the Peloponnesian War was made inevitable by "the growth of Athenian power, which inspired fear in the Lacedaemonians and compelled them to go to war."6 Legally or technically the Spartans, or their allies, are the "aggressors," being first to break the peace treaty between themselves and the Athenians (2.1-2; cf. 1.81, 7.18), but Thucydides' reference to compulsion or necessity (anagke) absolves them of moral blame.: The Spartans are "compelled to violate the treaty because of a shift in the balance of power that has placed them in jeopardy. The necessity identified by Thucydides belongs wholly to the world of power-political calculation-a real though not immediate threat that justifies preemptive attack. This con- clusion is not sanctioned by the conventional moral perspective but represents the sort of thinking that has made the balance of power a staple of realist thoughLs

Thucydides 1.23. For convenience I will refer to Thucydides' work as the History,though it was given no title that has come down to us. Translations from Thucydides will be my own, unless otherwise noted. 'Connor (1984, 32n31) notes, properly, that anagke does not convey a philosophically deter-

ministic meaning here. Nevertheless, a strong enough compulsion is clearly intended to bear the point I am making. This is the same kind of compulsion that the Athenians use to excuse their imperialism at 1.75. See also de Ste. Croix (1972, 61-62).

It is dangerous of course to generalize about "the conventional moral perspective." But the impermissibility of preemptive strikes in situations like these is a view shared by authors as diverse as Franciscus Vitoria (cited in Pangle 1977, 325), Hugo Grotius ([1625] 1925, 2.1, 2.20, 2.22), and Michael Walzer (1977, chap. 5), of the Medieval, early modern, and modem "just war" schools respectively. It is also relevant to note that the Spartans themselves feel guilty about having started the war, despite the exculpation Thucydides offers them (7.18).

Concerning the balance of power in realist thought, see Morgenthau (1978, 173); Waltz (1986b);Wight (1978, chap. 16). For other realist arguments in favor of preemptive war in the


Moralists might admit this much but still attempt to moralize the cause of the war by shifting responsibility from Sparta to Athens. After all, it is primarily Athenian imperialism that has put the Spartans in jeopardy. The Athenians assert however that imperialism is justified under necessities of its own. This, the limit form of the argument for international realism, lies at the center of both Machiavelli's and Thucydides' investigations of realism.

The Athenians present the most explicit and extreme arguments for realism in Thucydides, and one of the most important purposes of his work is to investigate their validity. Taken as a whole, his History corroborates them.g Its account of ancient times shows conquest and submission to be the way of the world (1.1-21; v. section 11, below). The widespread consensus before the war concerning its inevitability seems to reflect a dominant realist view (Kiechle 1963). The timid and moralistic Spartans prove to have been just as guilty of imperialism as the Athenians (Strauss 1977, 191-92). Finally, Thucydides himself asserts that the Athenians' subjects had only themselves to blame for their subjection, since they did nothing to prevent Athenian domination when they could (1.99; cf. 1.69, 4.61). The impulse to dominate may be thwarted by power, but not by morality.

The Athenian argument in behalf of their imperialism appeals to necessities rooted both in the structure of international politics and in human nature. Before the war, they maintain that circumstances compelled them toward imperialism, "primarily through fear, then honor, and finally self- interest" (1.75). "Fear" is the only one of these clearly linked to the structural "security dilemma" of international politics. The Athenians seem to identify it as the primary compulsion here because they are speaking of the origins of their empire in the struggle against Persian conquest. Fear rooted in self- preservation is also the least controversial compulsion on which to base a realist argument against justice in international politics. But in recapitulating a few moments later, the Athenians place honor at the head of the list (1.76). For they also like to regard their empire as a product of their love of honor, and so it is. Fear of the Persians may explain why they accepted leadership of the Greeks, but not entirely why they later subjugated them. Fear may similarly explain why the Athenians decline to free their subjects now-they might seek revenge (1.75.4-5)-but it is not an adequate explanation of Athenian imperialism as such.

name of the balance of power, see David Hume's essay "Of the Balance of Power" (in Hume [I7411 1985), especially 338-39; Aron (1966, 121, 130, 584). Hume and Aron, it might be noted, suggest that the ancient Greek cities were motivated in their foreign policies as much by "emu- lation" (Hume [1741] 1985, 334) or "amour-propre"(Aron 1966, 144), as by strict security calcu- lations.

See Bury ([1909] 1958, 143-45); Forde (1989, 46-47); Romilly (1963, 98, 210, 291, 307, 313); Schwartz [1919] 1969, 137) As we shall see, this does not mean that Thucydides endorses the Athenian position in every respect.

376 Steven Forde

Fear or the security dilemma is never advanced in Thucydides as an adequate explanation of imperialism in and of itself (cf. Garst 1989). "Compul- sions" such as self-interest and honor, rooted in human nature, are necessary to account for the general law that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" (to borrow the poetic translation of Crawley, 5.89; cf. 1.76.2). Yet this is the proposition that Thucydides' History as a whole sup- ports. A general law of the expansion of power, driven by honor and self- interest as well as fear, makes for a much more virulent realism than one based simply on fear or the structural security dilemma. It makes the possibility of any common good in international politics much more remote.

The realist position, especially as exemplified by the Athenians in the Me- lian dialogue, has been attacked by contemporary authors on the grounds that the necessities or compulsions it is based on are not permissible grounds for overcoming justice: choices or alternatives are always present, and the road of conquest and slaughter is never truly forced upon a state (Hoffmann 1981, 15; Walzer 1977, 8-10). The Athenian argument on Melos indeed does not require the slaughter that took place there, nor does it deny that there are alternatives in the sense that Athens could have decided to attack at some other time. But the Athenians do insist that the impulse of power to dominate is a universal necessity (5.105). It may not have the immediate force of a natural principle like gravitation, but its operation is comparably irresist- ible. Their argument is stated as a law of political behavior: no state with sufficient power will ever resist the impulse to rule its weaker neighbors (1.76, 5.105). Hence no state can be blamed for succumbing to this impulse. With regard to more narrow circumstances like those on Melos, the Atheni- ans maintain above all that it is the powerful who are sole judges of what they desire or their security requires. From their judgment there is in the nature of the case no appeal. Whatever else we may think of the fate of the Melians, it does demonstrate the truth of this principle.

The contemporary objection, if it is to have any effect on policy choices, in fact must presume the applicability of moral principles to international politics. This is what the Athenians deny. They profess the view that justice ob- tains among those who are equal in power (5.89); but justice based simply on equivalent power is of course not justice at all. When the Melians protest that the presence of Athenian troops does not sort well with the notion of a free debate, the Athenians reply in effect that the troops serve precisely to clarify the issue (5.86-87). The balance of forces is the foundation or beginning of every realistic discussion of international politics, never the point at issue. The Melians attempt likewise to argue that fair or just treatment of the weak represents a common good in international society, inasmuch as all may benefit from such treatment in the long run (5.90). But the Athenians reply that it is precisely for the long-term benefit of their empire that they have


come to Melos. In any case, they remind the Melians, their concern must be with the present. The immediate situation, and every situation in the future, will be defined by the balance of forces and the desires of the stronger. In this case, the "common good is limited to achieving the inevitable out- come-Athenian domination-with a minimum of violence (5.90-93). Thus confined by the realist premise that the balance of forces wholly defines its context, the common good has virtually no moral content.

Like Thucydides, Machiavelli begins with the causes of war to move to an exoneration of imperialism. Concerning the impulse to conquer, he says simply that "it is a very natural and ordinary thing to desire to acquire, and always, when men do it who can, they will be praised or not blamed. . . ."lo Machiavelli exonerates imperialism on the grounds of simple ambition, but he regards either ambition or fear and the security dilemma as sufficient to justify it." His general dictum is that "war may not be avoided but is de- ferred to the advantage of others" (The Prince, 12-13). As the ancient Ro- mans knew, threats are always imminent or forming on the horizon. The prudent state therefore attacks preemptively, at a time of its choosing, rather than waiting for the enemy. Just as good doctors recognize tumors when they are small and excise them early, the Romans forestalled threats before they became too powerful or too near (12). Thus, they subjugated ever-widening circles of territory until no threats remained. The Romans conquered the world out of self-defense.

Machiavelli's analysis of international necessity extends the plea of self- defense to what would otherwise be called aggressive war, even to imperialism. It eliminates the distinction between just and unjust war, inasmuch as that distinction is based upon the difference between aggression and defense. Moreover, the comparison to medicine indicates that Machiavelli considers his a "scientific" approach to international politics.12 Self-defense mandates imperialism because the physician Machiavelli can certify that threats are inevitable, making preemptive attack rational and justifiable. As with the Athenian argument, however, this necessity is not necessarily immediate. Only in the long term are threats "inevitable"; but only by acting on the long-term view can the survival of the state be guaranteed. A state

lo Machiavelli The Prince ([I5131 1985, 14). Further citations of this work will be given in the text by chapter or page number, where convenient.

'l Thus, the Discourses begins with the security dilemma or structural necessity but emphasizes much more consistently the simple love of glory that motivated Roman conquests. See Discourses (1.1, 1.6, 2.1, 273; 2.19, 336); cf. also "Tercets on Ambition" (736, 739), and Hulliung (1983, x, 225). It is now generally accepted that The Prince and the Discourses present substan- tially the same teaching: see Geerken (1976); also Gilbert (1939); Macaulay ([I8271 1852, 29); Strauss (1969, chap. 1).

On this and other aspects of Machiavelli's "political science," see Mansfield (1981).

378 Steven Forde

may renounce expansion and survive, even for "eight hundred years," l3 but in order to do so it must also be lucky. And the goal of political science in Machiavelli's view is to take man's fate out of the hands of chance, or to conquer fortune. The Romans attacked first and left nothing to chance. Accord- ing to Machiavelli, the international environment not only justifies but de- mands this response from prudent states.

Thus, Machiavelli draws an imperative out of realism that distinguishes him from the modern realists who consider themselves most "scientific." Machiavelli's science, as has often been noted, is normative, although far from moral in the conventional sense. Contemporary political science con- ceives of itself as limited to means, leaving ends-purposes, values-to the determination of political practitioners. Machiavelli's science extends also to ends, to the claim that all goals of state policy must be subordinated to survival or longevity, and the means to it, power. Other goals-moral, ideo-logical, or otherwise-which interfere with this goal, are excluded. Machiavelli, like modern realism, is guided by a concept of the "national interest." Modern realism has notorious difficulty defining this concept, a difficulty Machiavelli would trace largely to its refusal to be sufficiently judgmental about the varying goals nations assign themselves. l4 Machiavelli's realism insists that states be guided exclusively by the need to conform to the necessities of international politics.

Machiavelli's realism is not simply descriptive, but also transformative. Unlike contemporary realism, it is not based on an assumption that states or statesmen act rationally; to the contrary, it represents an attempt to improve on what Machiavelli regards as the woefully defective rationality of the states of his day. Machiavelli wants to make princes, states, and the world in general more "Machiavellian" than they actually are (Mansfield 1981, 296; Mindle 1985). This distinguishes him not only from many contemporary realists, but from Thucydides. In Thucydides, the Athenians may wish to make the Melians better realists, hnd one Athenian makes the argument that Ath- ens must expand endlessly or face ruin (Alcibiades, 6.18); but there is nothing like Machiavelli's development of the realist argument into a universal imperialist imperative. Though both Thucydides and Machiavelli show that realism is more closely wedded to imperialism than is usually admitted today, Thucydides does not go even as far as his Athenians in endorsing this imperial impulse.

l3 This is the duration Machiavelli assigns to the nonexpansionist constitution of Sparta at Discourses 11.2. 109). See also 1.5.6. Henceforth I will cite the Discourses in the text wherever

\ ,

possible, by book, chapter, and, ifappropriate, page number. l4 On this general problem of realism, see Robert Tucker's (1952) critical review of Hans Mor-

genthau. Morgenthau of course was nothing if not judgmental concerning nations' foreign policies. Still, his judgment would be regarded by Machiavelli as at least partially that of a moralist. See also note 3 and text. "Neorealists" encounter a contrary problem when behaviorism forces them to accept nations' views of their own interests uncritically.


The arguments outlined earlier constitute only a part of the realism of Thucydides and Machiavelli. Their concern with a realism that goes beyond international politics is demonstrated by one of the most striking formal sim- ilarities between them, their shared interest in the origins of political society and its moral beliefs. Both Thucydides and Machiavelli give accounts of a prepolitical state, where necessity is sovereign in human affairs. As with Hobbes's elaboration of the "state of nature," the effect of these accounts is to suggest the conventionality of all moral codes and to point in the direction of general ethical realism.

Machiavelli's' view of the rise of political society is exemplified in his re- flections on the act of founding. Political orders are for Machiavelli the crea- tions of founders, "armed prophets" for whom violence is as necessary as faith and persuasion (The Prince, chap. 6; cf. Discourses 1.9, 3.30). The inti- mate connection between violence and founding in Machiavelli's presentation corresponds to the view that pditical and moral orders are artificial, grounded in the will and force of the founder rather than the natural or divine order that he pretends to be authorized by. It has been argued that Machiavelli gave credence to the divine mission of Moses (Pocock 1975, 171), but the whole thrust of his presentation is rather to assimilate Moses to all other founders (contrast The Prince 22-23 with 24, and with Discourses 3.30, 486; v. Newel1 1987, 613). "Founding" is fundamentally unjust or crim- inal from the point of view of every established order (The Prince, 23) and succeeds only by the violation of the moral rules it seeks to put in place. Moreover, violence, meaning extralegal and "extramoral" violence, is needed to maintain as well as found political orders. Some interpreters maintain that Machiavelli preserves the sanctity of moral principle within domestic politics or once the founding act is complete,15 but Machiavelli's presentation as a whole does not support such a distinction.16 When he asserts that all political or religious orders must be periodically returned to their original principles, he means that the experience of the founding, especially the violence or terror of the founding, must be periodically relived to keep men's devotion to the common good alive.'' The dictum that good arms are the necessary and sufficient condition of good laws reflects the same view (The Prince chap. 12, 48; cf. Discourses 1.4)-laws are a facade of

l5 This argument has been made in several different forms. See for example Berlin (1972, 191); Burnham (1943, 49); Geerken (1976, 367); Skinner (1978, 134-37); Wolin (1960).

l6 For this argument see, e.g., Butterfield (1960); Hulliung (1983, 104); Mansfield (1981, 295); Pitkin (1984, 5); Strauss (1969).

l7 Discourses (3.1, esp. 388). See also 3.22 (467) and Strauss (1969, 166). The restoration of the Christian religion is a conspicuous exception to this in Machiavelli's discussion. But it is the inherently defective nature of Christianity that makes it an exception; the closer to its pacific principles it gets, the more corrupting it becomes (389; cf. Hulliung 1983, 66). See also 2.2.

380 Steven Forde

justice put upon the rule of force (Hulliung 1983, 142). Machiavelli's view may be fairly summarized by saying that justice depends for its existence and maintenance on injustice, law on force, the human on the bestial (Strauss 1969, 255, 271; Wood 1972, 51). Machiavelli separates the political and the ethical, as is often said, making politics autonomous. But while politics for Machiavelli is independent of ethics, ethics is not independent of politics.

The precept that morality is dependent on immorality might be attributed to Thucydides as well, on the basis of his account of the rise of politics out of the prepolitical condition. The "archaeology" with which he opens his His- tory (1.1-21) has long been recognized as quite realist in its portrayal of early times.ls Thucydides seems to go out of his way to illustrate the absence of moral order in early life. Early peoples lived in chronic poverty and insecur- ity. Wealth, power, and self-interest were almost the only basis of human relations, and events were governed by the seemingly universal principle that the weak submit to be strong. The formation of early cities is ascribed in the archaeology purely to self-interest, the weak bowing to their rulers out of fear or in hopes of gain, enabling the strong to subjugate others in turn (1.8, 9). Attack and dispossession, by piracy or other means, seem to be regarded by early peoples, and by Thucydides, as simply the way of the world (1.2.1, 2; 1.5; Pouncey 1980, 49). Even the aspiration toward moral human relations seems to be lacking in early times. Though wealth and stability gradually develop in Greece, they owe their progress to force, domination, and the love of gain (1.8.3).

This account of the rise of political society seems to point toward a thoroughly immoral understanding of its nature and foundations. This however is not what we find in Thucydides' History as a whole, nor is it entirely true of the archaeology. In the archaeology, Thucydides identifies a few distinctly ethical advances made by the Greeks as they emerged from their barbaric past (1.6). First came a more luxurious and settled life, allowing the Greeks to go about unarmed in daily life. Then, following the lead of the Spartans, the Greeks turned away from ostentatious uses of wealth and established a more austere equality between rich and poor. If the first advance reflects growing trust as well as security, the second, embodying egalitarian self- restraint, is even more important, as it brings Greek political community out of the mold of dominance and servitude that was the principle of the early cities.lg This model is said now to be the norm in Greece, and, we might say,

l8 Karl Reinhardt (1966, 190) asserts that the archaeology represents a "transvaluation of values" when compared to earlier moral conceptions. See also Bruell(1974, 15); Grene (1950, 57); Kiechle (1963,295); Palmer (1989,374); Pouncey (1980, chap. 3); Woodhead (1970, 12-13).

l9 1.8. On the importance of this development see also Forde (1989, 48); Grene (1950, 55); Thibaudet (1922, 164-65). For partially different views of it, see Pouncey (1980, 53); Schwartz ([1919] 1969, 169-70).


signifies the Greek discovery of political life proper. Though that life rests upon a foundation built originally by greed and aggression, it represents something qualitatively different, a genuine ethical achievement.

Thucydides' admiration of the ethical advance he sees in Greek politics distances him from the most extreme kind of realism, and even has repercus- sions, as we shall see, on his attitude toward international realism. Since Thucydides is so well-known as a realist, the passages in his History that embody an ethical perspective are often passed over. The passage just dis- cussed is one of these. Another, and one of the most striking, is Thucydides' lament for the slaughter at the small town of Mycalessus (7.30). This lament reflects a principle of humanity next to which the deed can be called "barbaric" in the moral sense (7.30). Broader portraits of nobility and of the moral fabric of society are found in Thucydides' descriptions of the breakdown of social order during the plague at Athens and the civil war at Corcyra (2.51- 53, 3.81-83). Thucydides' language in portraying these episodes reflects dis- approval, if not horror, at their destruction of every generous quality in men, and of the moral bonds that hold communities together (Edmunds 1975; Or- win 1988).

For Thucydides there is a moral, or humane, or perhaps simply "human" dimension to politics, a dimension which transcends the "realist" side of political life, and in some sense is to be preferred to it.20 This is a side of Thucydides' outlook to which nothing properly corresponds in Machiavelli. There are no passages in Machiavelli that answer to the tone of moral horror in Thucydides' description of civil war. For Machiavelli, men and politics must simply adapt themselves to political realism, and there is no "lament" for those who fail to do so. As a Florentine and an Italian patriot, he is greatly chagrined at the prostration of his native city and province; but even when writing as a Florentine, Machiavelli details the cruelest scenes of factious strife in his native city with cold detachment, if not amusement or glee.21 He wishes Florence, and Italy, to become Machiavellians: to become strong, not moral or compassionate.

The extreme character of Machiavelli's realism is seen above all in this imperative to be strong. In Machiavelli's hands, it brings about a reordering of the political community that is incompatible with the traditional moral

20 "Das Menschliche" is the term Reinhardt settles on for this side of Thucydides (1966, 207, 211, 217); Strauss speaks of "the human or the humane," which transcends power politics (1977, 145; cf. 150). Paul Shorey argued on the other side that Thucydides' silence on the ethical dimension of such episodes as the Melian dialogue points to complete cynicism (1893, 66, 86). Bury ([1909] 1958, 143-45), and Schwartz ([1903] 1950, 40-41) also believed Thucydides to be a "Machiavellian." The interpretive consensus has now moved strongly away from this view, and I believe that the passages singled out in the text show Thucydides' ethical concern clearly enough. See also Romilly (1963, 339).

Florentine Histories (6 et passim); cf. Gilbert (1972, 80). As we shall see, when writing about Florence in the Discourses, he adopts an outright contemptuous tone.

Steven Forde

understanding of it. Machiavelli chooses the ancient republic of Rome as his political model for the reason that only Rome was properly adapted to the necessities of international politics (Discourses 1.1, 1.6; The Prince, chap. 3). This is the sole justification he offers for the major outlines of the Roman regime, a justification extended most significantly to its endemic class conflict (1.3-6). A prominent strain of interpretation would find something akin to Thucydides' ethical outlook in Machiavelli's praise of republics, which is thought to reflect a genuine, if pagan, ethic (Berlin 1972, 169; Hulliung 1983, 6; cf. Croce 1945, 60), or something like the communitarian ideal of the classics (Germino 1979, 39; Macaulay [I8271 1852; Pitkin 1984, chap. 4; Pocock 1975, chap. 7). But his emphatic endorsement of class conflict separates Machiavelli widely from the moral-communitarian tradition of repub- licanism, pagan or otherwise, and from Thucydides. The model of moral- political life adumbrated in Thucydides' archaeology is predicated precisely upon the overcoming of class conflict. Sparta and Venice are for Machiavelli the counter-models to Rome in part because they embody the traditional value of ethically based community solidarity (Discourses 1.2,5-6). Machia-velli rejects this ideal because such communities in his view are too weak to master international politics. Were it not for the necessity to expand, Machiavelli says, he would indeed recommend a model like Sparta or Ven- ice, where there is "true political life."22 Machiavelli's Rome to the contrary is not so much a community as a delicate balance of power between hostile factions. Machiavelli has no difficulty even in using Rome's class conflict as a model for the balance of forces in war (Discourses 3.11;cf. Mindle 1985, 219; Wood 1967, 170). Machiavelli's Rome is founded not on consensus about the fundamental principles of justice and the regime, but on a struggle over them. This is precisely what allowed the regime to adapt with time (cf. Mansfield 1981, 302); but when one of the classes finally triumphed, in the time of Caesar, the republic was finished.

Machiavelli and Thucydides share the realist view that amoral necessity overwhelms justice in the relations among states, and that in a more general sense justice or morality is founded by or dependent upon injustice. Thucydides, who holds to an ethical ideal of political community, is nevertheless acutely aware that these realist precepts threaten the possibility of any ethical ideal. This is reflected in the striking fact that Thucydides' most explicit remarks about the humane and moral dimension of politics are found in some of his most frightful tableaux. In the plague, in civil war, at

"11 uero uivere politico," Discourses (1.6, see also 1.25, 176); Guicciardini (1965, 68, 72); Skinner (1978, 182). On the significance of Venice in the discourse of Machiavelli's day, see Pocock (1975, chaps. 7-9); Skinner (1978, chap. 6).


Mycalessus, Thucydides draws our attention to the ethical or humane only, it seems, to demonstrate the sovereignty of realist necessity over it. We might best clarify Thucydides' understanding of the ethical dimension of politics therefore by exploring it, as he seems to bid us, in its conflict with necessity.

The archaeology is paradigmatic. Necessity, greed, and ambition are presented as pervasive and primordial, while ethical community appears only after these have built up sufficient wealth and stability. Justice and humanity are luxuries so to speak, predicated upon the escape from necessity. The plague at Athens and the civil wars at Corcyra demonstrate how vulnerable to necessity they remain. The necessities of the plague were natural in origin while those of the civil war were man-made; in both cases, Thucydides emphasizes both the recurring nature of the phenomena (2.48.3; 3.82.2), and the devastating effect they had on human decency. In the civil war, ethical standards were not only destroyed, but replaced by their murderous and fanatical opposites (3.82.3-8, 83). In both plague and civil war, Thucydides emphasizes that virtue was aggressioely destroyed by the prevailing conditions. The most virtuous tended the sick during the plague, and so caught the disease most quickly (2.51); in the civil war, they were most likely to exercise restraint or to eschew partisanship, making them preferred targets of all factions (3.82.8).

These episodes teach a sobering, realist lesson. Just as the emergence of civilization and its ethical achievements presupposed escape from necessity, its preservation presupposes at least some continued insulation from necessity (cf. Palmer 1982, 833). Necessity appears to be the more natural or elemental force, and it is not simply unsupportive, but actively hostile, to justice. In its paradigmatic or harshest forms, it is unconditionally opposed to, and unconditionally stronger than, humane civilization. In the paradigmatic cases, virtue or humanity prove not to be bulwarks against necessity, but fragile flowers that require protection from it (Onvin 1988, 837). This protection is never completely secure. Indeed, plague and civil war are not the only instances of the conflict between justice and necessity in Thucydides; this conflict permeates the whole of the History through the themes of war and imperialism. Here, necessity overshadows legal and moral factors in the origins of the Peloponnesian War, while the Athenian thesis that amoral necessities supplant justice in international relations is vindicated. These things constitute Thucydides' international realism. But they do not represent his final word on the subject.

The Athenians enjoy immense success by conforming themselves in realist fashion to international necessity. But their success proves remark- ably fragile in the long run, for reasons that have to do with the connection between international realism and domestic politics. Athens lost the Peloponnesian War, not for lack of military power, but for lack of internal

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cohesion. She defeated herself through years of factious rivalry (2.65.6-13, 8.63-98), that is, through a modified form of the moral breakdown that con- vulsed Corcyra. This faction may be traced partly to the simple pressure of war, but more significantly to Athenian realism itself. The primacy of self- interest over justice, proclaimed for a generation or more as the basis of the city's policy, came eventually to infect the city's domestic life When the community declares itself free from moral restraints in international politics, in- dividuals conclude eventually that those restraints have no claim upon them either.

This insight represents the most important qualification of Thucydides' realism. The Melians may be fools for thinking that justice can prevail in the face of Athenian might, but Thucydides shows the Athenians to be equally blind to the consequences of living wholly by the law of power. Realism embodies a fundamental truth about the conflict between the necessities of international politics and justice, but frank and wholesale conformity to those necessities undermines and ultimately dissolves the bonds of the community. For Thucydides, this jeopardizes not only the realist imperative to survive, but the humane achievement that the city embodies as well. Nor can the gap between the two ever be closed. Thucydides' realism culminates in the pessimistic or tragic view that there is an inescapable and irresolvable tension between immoral necessity and the ethical possibilities of politics.

I v JUSTICE AND NECESSITY-MACHIAVELLI

Machiavelli believes that the tension between morality and necessity can and should be resolved-in favor of necessity. Machiavelli transforms both virtue and the ideal of political community so as to make them conform wholly with realist necessity, though this removes their traditional moral content (Manent 1977, 10, 32; Meinecke [I9241 1984, 37, 40; Wood 1967, 166-70). What is revolutionary about Machiavelli is not his discovery of immoral political necessity-Thucydides and others have been fully aware of this-but his insistence that the political world be made over in its image. It has been argued that interpreters who try to moralize Machiavelli are guilty of underestimating the importance of imperialism in his thinking (Hulliung 1983, chap. 1).The same could be said with greater effect I believe regarding Machiavelli's analysis of the role of necessity-his teaching on imperialism is only one consequence of his general analysis of political necessity.

Properly managed, the influence of necessity is wholly salutary for Machiavelli. His precept is that men "never do good unless necessity drives

That the immoral thrust of Athenian imperialism is the underlying cause of Athens' demise has been argued before. See Adkins (1960, 235); Forde (1986, 1989,37, 149-51); Grene (1950, 31232);Strauss (1977, 193-94). White (1984)makes a similar claim, though on a linguistic plane (see especially chap. 3, 70-71, 82). See also Isocrates On the Peace ([ca. 355 B.c.]1929, 64, 75-77,95-96, 101-105). For different views, see Bury ([1909] 1958, 127, 142); Pouncey (1980).


them to it" (1.3, 112). In the first chapter of the Discourses Machiavelli says that although a founder might choose a sterile site to force his citizens to industry, good laws will compel industry even in a fertile place (1.1, 102- 103).Thus, laws create virtue by imitating the operation of natural necessity. The Roman patricians, who seemed so gentle immediately after the expul- sion of the Tarquins, began to "vomit forth against the plebs the poison hid in their hearts" as soon as they no longer feared the Tarquins' return (1.3, 112). The creation of the plebeian tribunate replicated the necessity the Tarquins had imposed on the nobles, thus establishing the balance of power that Machiavelli praises so highly in the Roman regime. Inaugurating the modern, institutional approach to politics, Machiavelli takes the view that this balance served the common good by imposing restraint out of "necessity," rather than morality, on both nobles and plebs. For Machiavelli, this is a paradigmatic case of laws making men good by compulsion (cf. 3.1, 389- 90). In parallel fashion, Machiavelli condemns the largely modern practice of building fortresses, primarily on the grounds that fortresses lead rulers to believe they are immune from the necessity to rule well-a belief which he implies will cause them inevitably to rule badly (2.24).

For Thucydides, the fact that necessity dictates international immortality is a problem if not a tragedy because it ultimately threatens the moral basis, and thus the integrity, of the community. For Machiavelli to the contrary, external necessity and the realism it dictates is the community's salvation. Imperialism is ultimately the undoing of Machiavelli's Rome, as it was of Thucydides' Athens-but only because Rome's success eventually relieved all external pressure on the city. When survival was no longer at stake, the Romans began to choose bad leaders-as Machiavelli says any republic will, absent the pressure of necessity (Discourses 1.3, 123; 1.18, 162; 2.22, 344; 3.16, 453; Art of War, 623). The secret of Roman virtue altogether is nothing more mysterious than a proper reliance on necessity. Part of the reason why states must be periodically brought back to the founding experience is to revive the sense of necessity, of vulnerability, which makes men good (Discourses 3 .1) . If a city should be unfortunate enough to find itself in a tranquil situation, and its leaders unwise enough not to compensate for this, idleness will inevitably cause it to degenerate (1.6, 123; cf. 2.25). For Machiavelli, the thing to be feared in politics is insulation from necessity, not exposure to it.

This point is illustrated negatively for Machiavelli by the example of Florence, which in the Discourses is the archetype of a weak and corrupt republic. The first chapter of the Discourses suggests that Florence's fate was sealed by its defective foundation. Whereas the city of Rome was free at its birth, Florence was dependent (1.l ) ,and cities that have not been free from the beginning rarely amount to anything (1.49).What is striking however, is the understanding of "freedom" Machiavelli employs here. Free cities, he

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explains, include those founded by natives of a place driven together out of a need to defend themselves, or by foreigners driven from their homelands by plague, famine, or war (1.1, 102). Florence by contrast was founded under the suzerainty of Rome, in the time of Sulla or of Octavian (101-102; cf Florentine Histories, 53-54), in either case benefiting from a Pax Romana. Florence was dependent upon the umbrella of Rome's arms, while free cities are founded in "plague, famine, or war." In Machiavelli's view, a "free" foundation is one that exposes a city to the undiluted necessities of the world and compels it to fend for itself.

This is the experience that Florence lacked at its birth, leaving the city with a continuing inability to recognize or to cope with necessity. The Ro- mans recognized what necessity required and were wise enough to submit to it even when the results were distasteful to them, for example when tem- porary weakness forced them to allow their Latin subjects to take up arms in their own behalf (1.38). When confronted with a parallel situation, Florence feebly vacillates (id.). While not powerful enough to have their way, neither can the Florentines bring themselves to submit to the necessity that con- fronts them (cf. 2.15, 3.43). If freedom teaches a city the virtue of submission to necessity, the contrary vice consists in denying or attempting to escape it.

False hope of escaping necessity is the typical vice of weak states, especially modern states. For Machiavelli, Christianity is partly responsible for this vice. Christianity is the religion both of weakness and of false hope. It is the ground of the absurd modem spirit of ambizioso ozio: while not strong enough to quench the ambition of princes and states, it is strong enough to make them pursue those ambitions badly (Discourses, Bk. 1, preface). It prevents the inculcation of an adequate military spirit, and it prevents adequate knowledge of the ways of the world. It tends to view defeats that are due to military impotence as "miraculous" or owing to "sin" (The Prince, chaps. 3, 12). In both domestic and international politics, Machiavelli asserts that Christianity gives men up as "prey to the wicked by making them pas- sive.% Even more archly, he claims that this passivity causes Christian priests to become thoroughly corrupt, since the only punishment they might fear is one they do not believe in (3.1, 389). Christianity is a fortress, seem- ing to remove the compulsion rulers of all sorts are under to rule well. It breaks the link Machiavelli finds so healthy between politics and necessity (Manent 1977, 34).

In one passage in the Discourses, Machiavelli attributes to "moral philosophers" the view that man's nobility would never have been perfected were it not for necessity (3.12, 440). Whatever those philosophers might have

"Discourses (2.2,278);6.Art of War (623). Any religion badly used might of course have this effect. See Mansfield (1979, 357-58).


thought about necessity as an incentive to virtue, they would not have en- dorsed Machiavelli's view of the outright dependence of virtue upon it. In the traditional understanding, moral virtue and nobility fundamentally pre- suppose freedom. For Machiavelli, virtue is nothing but conformity to necessity. To be sure, freedom is important in Machiavelli too. Cities are manifestly free to ignore the promptings of necessity, and court disaster. There is also an ideal of freedom, understood as mastery of the world rather than submission to it-the freedom enjoyed by the greatest states, statesmen, and founders. But this freedom and this mastery come from anticipat- ing necessity, conforming to it in advance, certainly not from escaping it (e.g., Discourses 1.38, 1.51, 3.16). As Machiavelli indicates, a prince may conquer Fortuna-but only by conforming to her ways (The Prince, chap. 25; cf. Pitkin 1984, 150).

Thucydides and Machiavelli share a realism in international politics that is more extreme than the realism of most if not all of the authors who in the past several decades have regarded themselves as realists. In the analysis of Thucydides and Machiavelli, the notion that power prevails over justice in international politics points not simply toward realism but toward imperialism. Still, their views represent two very different directions that the realist argument can take. In both cases, necessity is the agent that overcomes moral obligation, necessity found both in the structure of international politics and in human nature. Though this necessity is stringent enough to over- come justice, it is not deterministic in a strong sense. Machiavelli finds that most states do not follow it adequately, and Thucydides desires statesmen to resist its force as much as possible.

The most important difference between the two, I have argued, is found in the fact that Machiavelli's realism extends to a denial of moral principles altogether, while Thucydides seeks to preserve the moral achievement that can be found in political community. Since that achievement is threatened by all sorts of necessity, in particular the necessities of international politics, anything that insulates the community from the harsh realities of international relations, or mitigates the pressure of international necessity on it, must be regarded favorably by the Thucydidean statesman. Machiavelli, having freed himself from every restraint of this kind, revels in necessity, revels in war, and unabashedly proposes the goal of mastering the international environment through violence and imperialism. Unlike Thucydides, or the realists of today, Machiavelli does not cherish international peace and stability; he disdains even the balance of power. His prince thrives on international anarchy and mchtpolitik. It is unthinkable that a Thucydidean

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statesman should take this attitude or advocate "mastery" of the world in the Machiavellian manner.

Despite their differences, both Thucydides and Machiavelli would en- dorse the criticism that modem realists who want freedom from moral restraint in foreign policy without considering the implications this has for domestic and individual justice, are slighting one of the most important problems of realism. Final stock might be taken of this problem and of the realism of Thucydides and Machiavelli in general by considering briefly the phenomenon of hypocrisy.

When Thucydides notes that the "truest reason" for the Peloponnesian War-the realist reason-was the least spoken of, he points to a problem that dogs realism and realists to the present day. The Spartans were forced to start the war out of a fear grounded in the unfavorable balance of power. Though conscious of this motivation, they do not make the realist argument in their own behalf that Thucydides opens up for them. For the amoral ar-guments of realism are not generally considered presentable in public and are scarcely admissible in the privacy of the Spartans' c o n ~ c i e n c e . ~ ~ So in- stead, the Spartans allege such "injustices" as ancient Athenian impieties or incidents which are clearly not treaty violations (1.126-27, 139). These charges are hypocritical in the sense that they mask the Spartans' motives; but Spartan hypocrisy does not end here. Sparta has in the past been imper- ialistic, yet denounces the Athenian empire; Sparta proclaims moral motives but acts on the basis of self-interest (e.g., 3.68, 4.19). This hypocrisy may be viewed as either laughable or repugnant, but as readers of Thucydides we must realize that it is the common way of states. States are forced by realist necessity to violate moral principle from time to time but generally refuse to admit to others, or even to themselves, that they are doing so. All the while they excoriate others for doing likewise. The Athenians, with their frank es- pousal of a realist creed, disdain hypocrisy; but the fate this honesty brings them forces us to reassess its merits. Athens' self-destruction shows that hypocrisy has the virtue at least of insulating the political community somewhat from the corrosive effects of realist necessity. Thucydides' History as a whole gives us a certain appreciation of the function hypocrisy as a shield for community morality. One might say that this hypocrisy is the homage that virtue pays to vice.

American realists of the past two generations have occasionally displayed exasperation at the resistance of democratic politics to their policy recom- mendations (e.g., Morgenthau I19511 1982). This resistance comes partly from the naive democratic belief that moral principles can and should apply

%ASnoted earlier, the Spartans act on the realist motivation but feel guilty about it (7.18). See also de Ste. Croix (1972, 58).


in international relations as they do in domestic politics. Thucydides' analysis suggests however that this resistance is not simply "naive," and exasperation at it reflects a failure to grasp one of the most important problems of realism. Communities resist realism partly out of a need to protect their moral consensus. A Thucydidean statesman, in consideration of this, would unquestionably indulge national hypocrisy to a degree, but would also minimize the realism of his policy, since hypocrisy cannot conceal every immorality. Moreover, the power of those passages in his History where the ethical outlook comes most to the fore indicates that for Thucydides realism should be tempered not only for expediency's sake-for the long-term survival of the community-but out of an independent moral concern. Though hypocrisy helps, moderation appears as the most important part of Thucy- dides' imperfect solution to the moral problem of realism.

Machiavelli regards any such tempering of realism as an unwarranted sacrifice of security. He naturally has no hesitation in recommending that statesmen conceal the realism of their policies through hypocrisy and thoroughgoing deceit, practiced not only against outsiders but fellow-citizens, in republican and autocratic regimes alike (The Prince, chap. 18; Discourses 1.13-14, 47, 48). It is true that he seeks to transform political culture to make it more realist and such deception less necessary. Nevertheless, like Thucydides he regards the need for hypocrisy as permanent. Popular faith in some version of traditional morality is a permanent requisite for social order and corresponds in addition to a universal (and self-interested) longing of the weak to be treated mildly by the strong (Discourses 1.2, 107). As Machiavelli says, a prince will always be judged (and given popular support) in accord- ance with traditional morality, regardless of the requirements of political ne- cessityZ6 Despite the merits of the realist position, neither Machiavelli nor Thucydides expect it ever to be widely accepted.

What is distinctive in Machiavelli's realism is that it makes security and strength the sovereign goals of politics and regards the most immoderate foreign ambitions, as well as a corresponding transformation of virtue, as the sole means of achieving them. Logically or philosophically, however, these means are prior to the end. Machiavelli's extreme realism does not stem from a new and more urgent assessment of the threats states face in international politics so much as it does from a determination that the moral ideals that would interfere with realism are chimeras. With these removed, security and strength remain the only true goals of political organization, and a political science devoted unremittingly to their service suggests itself naturally enough. The pivotal issue of realism, the pivotal issue between

26 The Prince (chap. 15). Chapters 15 through 19 of The Prince as a section deal with this realist quandry (see Orwin 1978).

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Machiavelli and Thucydides, concerns the status and nature of the ethical principles that might limit it. The varieties of realism seen in Thucydides and Machiavelli rest on differing views of this issue more than on anything to emerge from study of international politics apart from it.

Manuscript submitted 3 May 1991 Final manuscript received 2 August 1991

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Steven Forde is assistant professor of political science, University of North Texas, Denton, TX 76203-5338.

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Varieties of Realism: Thucydides and MachiavelliSteven FordeThe Journal of Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2. (May, 1992), pp. 372-393.Stable URL:


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[Footnotes]

1 The Poverty of NeorealismRichard K. AshleyInternational Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2. (Spring, 1984), pp. 225-286.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28198421%2938%3A2%3C225%3ATPON%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q

2 Political Realism and Human InterestsRichard K. AshleyInternational Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, Symposium in Honor of Hans J. Morgenthau. (Jun.,1981), pp. 204-236.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8833%28198106%2925%3A2%3C204%3APRAHI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L

2 The Poverty of NeorealismRichard K. AshleyInternational Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2. (Spring, 1984), pp. 225-286.Stable URL:


11 Machiavelli Studies since 1969John H. GeerkenJournal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 37, No. 2. (Apr. - Jun., 1976), pp. 351-368.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-5037%28197604%2F06%2937%3A2%3C351%3AMSS1%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J

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NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.

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11 The Humanist Concept of the Prince and the Prince of MachiavelliFelix GilbertThe Journal of Modern History, Vol. 11, No. 4. (Dec., 1939), pp. 449-483.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193912%2911%3A4%3C449%3ATHCOTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A

12 Machiavelli's Political ScienceHarvey C. Mansfield, Jr.The American Political Science Review, Vol. 75, No. 2. (Jun., 1981), pp. 293-305.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28198106%2975%3A2%3C293%3AMPS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G

14 Review: Professor Morgenthau's Theory of Political "Realism"Reviewed Work(s):

In Defense of the National Interest; A Critical Study of American Foreign Policy by Hans J.Morgenthau

Robert W. TuckerThe American Political Science Review, Vol. 46, No. 1. (Mar., 1952), pp. 214-224.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28195203%2946%3A1%3C214%3APMTOP%22%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2

15 Machiavelli Studies since 1969John H. GeerkenJournal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 37, No. 2. (Apr. - Jun., 1976), pp. 351-368.Stable URL:


16 Machiavelli's Political ScienceHarvey C. Mansfield, Jr.The American Political Science Review, Vol. 75, No. 2. (Jun., 1981), pp. 293-305.Stable URL:





http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193912%2911%3A4%3C449%3ATHCOTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A&origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28198106%2975%3A2%3C293%3AMPS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G&origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28195203%2946%3A1%3C214%3APMTOP%22%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2&origin=JSTOR-pdf



18 Thucydides' View of Athenian ImperialismChristopher BruellThe American Political Science Review, Vol. 68, No. 1. (Mar., 1974), pp. 11-17.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28197403%2968%3A1%3C11%3ATVOAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N

18 Machiavellian virtù and Thucydidean aret#: Traditional Virtue and Political Wisdom inThucydidesMichael PalmerThe Review of Politics, Vol. 51, No. 3. (Summer, 1989), pp. 365-385.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6705%28198922%2951%3A3%3C365%3AMVATAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3

23 Thucydides on the Causes of Athenian ImperialismSteven FordeThe American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 2. (Jun., 1986), pp. 433-448.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28198606%2980%3A2%3C433%3ATOTCOA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W

26 Machiavelli's Unchristian CharityClifford OrwinThe American Political Science Review, Vol. 72, No. 4. (Dec., 1978), pp. 1217-1228.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28197812%2972%3A4%3C1217%3AMUC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23

References

Political Realism and Human InterestsRichard K. AshleyInternational Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, Symposium in Honor of Hans J. Morgenthau. (Jun.,1981), pp. 204-236.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8833%28198106%2925%3A2%3C204%3APRAHI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L




http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28197403%2968%3A1%3C11%3ATVOAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N&origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6705%28198922%2951%3A3%3C365%3AMVATAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3&origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28198606%2980%3A2%3C433%3ATOTCOA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W&origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28197812%2972%3A4%3C1217%3AMUC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23&origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8833%28198106%2925%3A2%3C204%3APRAHI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L&origin=JSTOR-pdf

The Poverty of NeorealismRichard K. AshleyInternational Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2. (Spring, 1984), pp. 225-286.Stable URL:


Thucydides' View of Athenian ImperialismChristopher BruellThe American Political Science Review, Vol. 68, No. 1. (Mar., 1974), pp. 11-17.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28197403%2968%3A1%3C11%3ATVOAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N

Thucydides' Ethics as Reflected in the Description of Stasis (3.82-83)Lowell EdmundsHarvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 79. (1975), pp. 73-92.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0073-0688%281975%2979%3C73%3ATEARIT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X

Thucydides on the Causes of Athenian ImperialismSteven FordeThe American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 2. (Jun., 1986), pp. 433-448.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28198606%2980%3A2%3C433%3ATOTCOA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W

Thucydides and NeorealismDaniel GarstInternational Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Mar., 1989), pp. 3-27.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8833%28198903%2933%3A1%3C3%3ATAN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X

Machiavelli Studies since 1969John H. GeerkenJournal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 37, No. 2. (Apr. - Jun., 1976), pp. 351-368.Stable URL:






http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28197403%2968%3A1%3C11%3ATVOAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N&origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0073-0688%281975%2979%3C73%3ATEARIT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X&origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28198606%2980%3A2%3C433%3ATOTCOA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W&origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8833%28198903%2933%3A1%3C3%3ATAN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X&origin=JSTOR-pdf


The Humanist Concept of the Prince and the Prince of MachiavelliFelix GilbertThe Journal of Modern History, Vol. 11, No. 4. (Dec., 1939), pp. 449-483.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193912%2911%3A4%3C449%3ATHCOTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A

Machiavelli's Political ScienceHarvey C. Mansfield, Jr.The American Political Science Review, Vol. 75, No. 2. (Jun., 1981), pp. 293-305.Stable URL:


Machiavelli's RealismGrant B. MindleThe Review of Politics, Vol. 47, No. 2. (Apr., 1985), pp. 212-230.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6705%28198504%2947%3A2%3C212%3AMR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

How Original is Machiavelli?: A Consideration of Skinner's Interpretation of Virtue andFortuneW. R. NewellPolitical Theory, Vol. 15, No. 4. (Nov., 1987), pp. 612-634.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0090-5917%28198711%2915%3A4%3C612%3AHOIMAC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G

Machiavelli's Unchristian CharityClifford OrwinThe American Political Science Review, Vol. 72, No. 4. (Dec., 1978), pp. 1217-1228.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28197812%2972%3A4%3C1217%3AMUC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23

Stasis and Plague: Thucydides on the Dissolution of SocietyClifford OrwinThe Journal of Politics, Vol. 50, No. 4. (Nov., 1988), pp. 831-847.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3816%28198811%2950%3A4%3C831%3ASAPTOT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K




http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28193912%2911%3A4%3C449%3ATHCOTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A&origin=JSTOR-pdf


http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6705%28198504%2947%3A2%3C212%3AMR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C&origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0090-5917%28198711%2915%3A4%3C612%3AHOIMAC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G&origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28197812%2972%3A4%3C1217%3AMUC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23&origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3816%28198811%2950%3A4%3C831%3ASAPTOT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K&origin=JSTOR-pdf

Love of Glory and the Common GoodMichael PalmerThe American Political Science Review, Vol. 76, No. 4. (Dec., 1982), pp. 825-836.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28198212%2976%3A4%3C825%3ALOGATC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q

Machiavellian virtù and Thucydidean aret#: Traditional Virtue and Political Wisdom inThucydidesMichael PalmerThe Review of Politics, Vol. 51, No. 3. (Summer, 1989), pp. 365-385.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6705%28198922%2951%3A3%3C365%3AMVATAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3

Review: Professor Morgenthau's Theory of Political "Realism"Reviewed Work(s):

In Defense of the National Interest; A Critical Study of American Foreign Policy by Hans J.Morgenthau

Robert W. TuckerThe American Political Science Review, Vol. 46, No. 1. (Mar., 1952), pp. 214-224.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28195203%2946%3A1%3C214%3APMTOP%22%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2




http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28198212%2976%3A4%3C825%3ALOGATC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q&origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6705%28198922%2951%3A3%3C365%3AMVATAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3&origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28195203%2946%3A1%3C214%3APMTOP%22%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2&origin=JSTOR-pdf

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Varieties of Realism: Thucydides and Machiavelli …ocean.otr.usm.edu/~w416373/PS 331/Thucydides and...Varieties of Realism: Thucydides and Machiavelli Steven Forde University of North