The Christian Democrats of Venezuela

The Christian Democrats of VenezuelaAuthor(s): Franklin TugwellSource: Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Apr., 1965), pp. 245-267Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of MiamiStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/165149 .

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FRANKLIN TUGWELL Graduate Student Institute of Latin American Studies Columbia University

THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS OF VENEZUELA

EPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT in Venezuela is in its infancy. Experience with the techniques of political competition within a democratic framework has until recently been almost non-

existent. Yet the vigor and determination with which strides toward economic development and political legitimation are being executed suggest that perhaps the nation may be able to accomplish the task of

creating a stable and effective polity without the sacrifice of respect for human dignity that has been so commonplace elsewhere. Political

parties have had a key role in this process; they have, in effect, been instruments of transition.

This essay analyzes the evolution and growth of one of these parties-the Christian Democratic party-an organization which, ranking second in size only to R6mulo Betancourt's Accion Demo- cratica, stands today in a pivotal position in the nation's distribution of political power.

A STUDENT GROUP

As is the case with all of the major parties in Venezuela, the origin of the Christian Democratic party can be traced to the students at the Central University of Caracas who, in the decade before the death of the dictator Juan Vicente G6mez, felt the impulse of modernization and began to agitate for the replacement of the traditional political and social forms that characterized their nation.'

1 John D. Martz, "Acci6n Democri'tica of Venezuela" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Uni- versity of North Carolina, 1963), Ch. I.

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JOURNAL OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES

The bulk of student agitation was amorphous and negativistic; the demand for change was not accompanied by constructive suggestions. With time, however-and for some, the taste of exile-the young political leaders that rose from the student ranks began to seek out doctrinal solutions. Some turned to Marxism. Still another group turned to a traditional institution, the Catholic Church, to find justification for their acts and answers to their questions. It was from this group that came the students who were to be the founders of the Christian Democratic movement of Venezuela.

In 1934 an International Congress for Catholic Youth was held in Rome. The theme was Christian Democracy. To this gathering went a number of students whose names would later be famous in their respective countries. From Chile came Eduardo Frei Montalva; from Peru, Mario Polar; and from Uruguay, Venancio Flores. From Venezuela came eighteen-year-old Rafael Caldera Rodriguez. All of these dele-

gates pledged to found Christian Democratic parties in their own countries when they returned.2

Conditions in Venezuela, however, did not permit the immediate fulfillment of this pledge. It was not until the death of G6mez, on De- cember 17, 1935, that purposeful political action became possible. Just a month after this event, the students of the Central University made known to Gomez' more docile successor, Eleazar L6pez Contreras, their demands for greater popular participation in the political process. L6pez Contreras, though under pressure from conservatives, responded to the student riots by proclaiming, in February, 1936, a Reform Program. The relaxation in restrictions which followed encouraged the development of independent political groups.3

Meanwhile, a rift was developing in the ranks of the students. The head of the student organization, the Federaci6n de Estudiantes de Venezuela (FEV), J6vito Villalba, took an anti-clerical stand on several issues and he was backed by a majority of the students. Unable to accept this, a group of religiously oriented students led by Rafael Caldera, broke from the FEV in early 1936 and founded a separate student or-

ganization, the Union Nacional Estudiantil (UNE). This group was

basically conservative in political orientation; the students who founded it were reacting against the radicalism of the FEV. They were far from bitter traditionalists, however, and they supported wholeheartedly the

2 Manael Vicente Magallanes, Partidos politicos venezolanos (Caracas: Tip. Vargas, 1960), p. 151.

3 Martz, unpubl. diss., p. 24.

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relaxation of authoritarianism which L6pez Contreras, in his first year, was permitting.4

Soon after the UNE was founded, its charter members took ad- vantage of the new freedom and founded a political organization, which they called Acci6n Electoral. Though limited in scope to the Federal District, Accion Electoral succeeded in electing to Congress two Depu- ties, Rafael Caldera and Pedro Jose Lara Pefa. It also elected three members, Lorenzo Fernandez, Martin Perez Matos, and Silvio Gutierrez, to the Caracas Municipal Council.5

Of the elected representatives of Acci6n Electoral, one of the most reform-minded was Rafael Caldera-by this time just twenty-one years old-who, in addition to his political activities, was working for his doctorate in Political Science at the Central University.6 As a Deputy, Caldera served in the Labor Office (1936-38) and helped write the progressive labor code which was part of L6pez Contreras' Reform Pro- gram. It included such measures as guarantees of the eight-hour day, of freedom to organize, and of the right to strike.7

The period of political freedom did not last long, however. Fright- ened by the mounting popular pressure, L6pez Contreras gave in to the reactionaries and cracked down on opposition groups.8 Because of its conservative bias, the Catholic political movement, its name changed to Acci6n Nacional, was not molested. Nevertheless, for reasons that.are not clear, it soon began to disintegrate. Before long, all of those elected to office by the party, except Caldera and Fernandez, gravitated to other groups.9 Caldera himself continued to serve in the government, re- elected as a Deputy from Yaracuy in 1941. After he received an ap- pointment in the Central University as Professor of Social and Labor Law in 1943, his political activities decreased. He left the government in 1944.10

The disappearance of Acci6n Nacional marked the termination of the first phase of the development of the Christian Democratic move-

4 Magallanes, Partidos politicos, p. 151. The founders of the UNE were Rafael Caldera R., Pedro Jos6 Lara Pefia, Lorenzo Fernandez, Eduardo L6pez de Ceballos, Miguel Angel Landaez, Victor Gim6nez Landinez, and Francisco Alfonso Ravard.

5 Ibid. 6 Julio Cardenas Ramirez (ed.), Diccionario biogrdfico de Venezuela (Madrid:

Garrido Mezquito y Co., 1953), p. 210. He received his degree in 1939. 7 Rafael Caldera, "Venezuela on Election Eve," Commonweal, XLIV (Oct. 4,

1946), 590-2. 8 John D. Martz, "The Generation of '28: The Genesis of Venezuelan Political

Democracy," Journal of Inter-American Studies, VI (January 1964), 27. 9 Magallanes, Partidos politicos, p. 152. 10 See Ramirez, op. cit., p. 210.

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ment in Venezuela. An assessment of this early period is difficult because of the conflicting nature of the information available. Some conclusions, however, are possible.

There is no doubt that the founders of the UNE and then of the small Lopecista political party were groping for some kind of highly Christian, non-Marxist solution to the economic and social tensions that troubled the nation. It also seems clear that the Christian Democratic doctrine, as it is known today, was not developed enough at this point in Venezuela so that it could provide a useful framework for political orientation. In traditional Venezuelan terms, a reliance upon a Catholic justification in the political realm signalled the stand of a conservative, not a moderate reformist. The result was confusion, both in the minds of the youthful leaders, and among those who gave them backing. The whole movement, as it sprouted and then rapidly disintegrated, was so laced with conservative thought that it was unable to distinguish itself from the holding operation against modernization that was carried on by the two presidents who followed G6mez.

COPEI: THE BEGINNINGS

When revolution came to Venezuela in October of 1945, under the

leadership of Acci6n Democratica, Rafael Caldera-now politically un- attached, though still the leading exponent of the Christian Democratic idea-welcomed it. In fact, before the coup itself Caldera and several of his friends were in touch with AD and knew, though in a general way, that it was coming. After the coup, Caldera placed enough confidence in the new regime to join the government as Attorney General. He remained in this post for six months. 1

As soon as the new junta had consolidated its position, it promul- gated an electoral law for the selection of a constituent assembly, and it decreed the establishment of freedom of speech.'2 The result was an immediate proliferation of political groups.

One of these groups was a Christian Democratic organization called Comite de Organizaci6n Politica Electoral Independiente. Its initials, COPEI (sometimes spelled Copey), remain a part of the party's formal name today. Created on Sunday, January 13, 1946, in a ceremony in

11 The source of this information is an interview with Rafael Caldera obtained by Dr. Robert J. Alexander on July 28, 1947, key points of which have been made available, through the generosity of Dr. Alexander, to the present writer. Henceforth such inter- views will be cited in the form: Interview Alexander-Caldera, July 28, 1947.


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front of five hundred people in the Plaza Candelaria in Caracas, it was not a political party in the strict sense of the word, but merely an electoral committee formed to participate in the constituent assembly elections that were scheduled. 3

The political orientation of the new organization-in the beginning anyway-is less difficult to determine than that of its predecessor. Above all, copeyanos were Catholic, though they consistently rejected the label "confessional." Secondly, they favored the enaction of the moderate reform measures which the several Papal "social" Encyclicals had declared permissible and compatible with Catholicism. As Caldera put it at the time:

COPEI is a group which is clearly and definitely progressive. We uphold and defend the social encyclicals; support laws which favor the workers and above all seek a far- reaching reform so that the Venezuelan proletariat may enjoy a more human condition of existence.14

Most important of all, however-and forming the greatest change from the earlier phase-the Venezuelan Christian Democrats were now dedicated to establishing a broad popular foundation, chiefly through the

well-publicized advocacy of welfare measures.'5 On the whole, COPEI's

political orientation, as put forth by its leaders in 1946, had a definite reformist tinge.

A great deal of caution is warranted, however, in such measure- ment exercises. At the time of the creation of COPEI Venezuela was involved in a simultaneous process of revolution and reaction; there was little chance for intermediary positions-especially ones as little under- stood as was Christian Democracy at that time-to survive and flourish.

COPEI was formed as a party of the opposition. The main conten- tion between its founders and the government related to AD's attitude toward the Church. Two main points were at issue: Church-state relations, and the legal standing of private (religious) education. Caldera charged that AD was anti-clerical; he was probably correct. He also charged that AD took a strongly "sectarian position toward private education," noting that a decree (#321) of the Revolutionary Junta favored public over private schools. In one of his bitterest complaints, the

13 Magallanes, Partidos politicos, pp. 152-5. Caldera was still Attorney General when he joined COPEI. He did not resign until April 13, 1946. The reasons for his resignation should be evident from what follows.

14 Caldera, "Venezuela ... " p. 592. 15 Martz, unpubl. diss., pp. 115-6.

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leader of COPEI pointed out that AD had collaborated with Commu- nists in demanding the enforcement of Decree 321, and "in this demon- stration, besides hurling defiance at COPEI, including the present writer, they shouted all sorts of insults against the Church, religion, the saints, illustrious and charitable bishops and the teaching orders."16

As expected, AD won an overwhelming majority in the elections of 1946 but the Christian Democrats did win enough votes to make themselves felt at the constituent assembly, which is more than any of the other parties accomplished. The bulk of the support for COPEI came from the traditionalist and highly Catholic states of Tachira, M6rida, and Trujillo.

TABLE I

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTION OF 194617

Party Votes % Delegates AD 1,100,000 80 137 COPEI 180,000 13 19 URD 54,000 3 2 PCV 52,000 3 2

The most important result of the election was that it established the Christian Democratic party as the chief constitutional opponent to AD. From this point on, the party attracted the nation's conservative

groups like a sponge. Though located ideologically near the center of the

political spectrum, it was nevertheless the farthest to the right of the

strong parties. Hereafter its following grew steadily more conservative, and its reputation moved steadily to the right.'8

As the campaign for the election of a president to serve under the new constitution got under way, the Christian Democrats took approxi- mately the same stand that they had in 1946: in the balance of values, negative criticism of AD's religious policy and of its civil conduct far outweighed moderate reform proposals. The copeyanos claimed that AD's Marxist orientation, by provoking class struggle and enmity, was a source of social disorder, while only Christian Democracy offered a solution that was in keeping with social peace.

16 Caldera, "Venezuela .. .," p. 592. 17 Table from Elections Factbook: Venezuela (Washington, D. C.: Operations

and Policy Research, Inc., 1963), p. 17; and from Edwin Lieuwen, Venezuela (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1962), p. 273. URD stands for Union Republi- cana Democratica; PCV for Partido Comunista de Venezuela.


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It was in the campaign period prior to the 1947 elections that COPEI's first official organ El Grdfico (later renamed COPEI) was established. It was published under the direction of Miguel Angel Lan- daez, one of the original founders of the party. In Venezuela the opening of an official publication is considered to be a symbol of maturation of a political group."9

Though not expecting to win against the widely admired figure of R6mulo Gallegos, the Christian Democrats decided to contest the presidency with a token candidate-another indispensable symbol of a mature party. Caldera was chosen for this role.

The election results showed a substantial increase in strength for COPEI, the party's percentage of the total rising, while AD's decreased somewhat.

TABLE II

NATIONAL ELECTIONS OF 194720

Party Presidency % Congress % Senators Deputies AD 74 71 38 83 COPEI 22 20 4 21

There is little doubt that COPEI, in the 1945-8 period, became a catchall for groups and individuals in reaction against the revolution that AD was promulgating. This time, however, the Christian Demo- cratic movement did not lose its identity in its effort to organize, as it did in its earlier stage of development.

In March, 1948, just three months after the election, COPEI held its first national convention. At this meeting the electoral committee was changed into a formal political party and given a permanent organization.21

COUNTER-REVOLUTION

Because the Christian Democrats had assumed the role of chief critics of AD, they were widely suspected of collaborating with the armed forces in executing the coup that broke the back of AD's revolutionary program on November 24, 1948. The bulk of the evidence, however, supports the conclusion that COPEI was not a c6llaborator in the coup, although as a party it was the least offensive to the conspirators.

19 Magallanes, Partidos politicos, p. 154. 20 Lieuwen, Venezuela, p. 76. 21 Magallanes, op. cit., p. 154.

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As early as July, 1947, Rafael Caldera stated in an interview that he hoped that AD would not be overthrown, but would last, giving his party a chance to mature and win through an honest electoral victory.22 In an effort to allay the suspicions that sprang up at the time of the coup, COPEI issued a communique disclaiming any participation in it.

The fact that COPEI was "loyal" in its opposition to AD is more than a tactical detail; it is a sign of doctrinal consistency as well as of jelling idealism. A political interest group is not a party in the modem, democratic sense of the word unless it is willing to accept the system of which it is a part. It must accept, also, the legitimacy of an opposing group. At a time of rapid social and economic change, in which there is often very little overlap of group values, such a willingness to work within the system is rare indeed. Too often, schismatic interests are so intense that they seek to circumvent institutional compromisory proce- dures. If too much of the polity is composed of such unintegrated frag- ments, the legitimacy necessary for non-violent development just does not exist; there is no "civil polity." Instead there is raw competition that is dependent upon the use of force.

Of all the Venezuelan democratic parties, COPEI was treated with the least harshness during the stagnant and authoritarian decade that followed the November coup. During the first four years-before the murder of Delgado Chalbaud in 1950-the Christian Democrats assumed an attitude of passive cooperation with government and they were rarely molested. El Grafico was suspended several times, and in 1949 its editor was arrested, but this was mild fare compared to that received by the other major parties.23

In the period between the murder of Delgado Chalbaud and the fraudulent constituent assembly election of 1952, the attitudes of the leaders of COPEI hardened against the dictatorship, and by the summer of 1952, the party was frankly in opposition.24 When the assembly met in 1953, the Christian Democrats joined with the Uni6n Republi- cana Democratica (URD) in refusing to attend. Thereafter, conditions worsened. By 1954, COPEI, though the only legal party, was no longer able to carry on its activities openly.25

While Perez Jimenez' secret police enforced a specious "stability"

22 Interview Alexander-Caldera, July 28, 1947. 23 Magallanes, Partidos politicos, p. 155, 24 Interview Alexander-Valmore Acevedo Amaya, COPEI student leader, July 23,

1952. 25 Interview Alexander-Caldera, June 25, 1954.

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upon Venezuelan politics, and while the dictator himself accepted gifts from the United States, COPEI's leaders in exile joined those of the other parties in a conspiracy to re-establish representative government. On August 21, 1957, Rafael Caldera was arrested and jailed. He was released on December 24, and, after a short stay with the Papal Nuncio, he left the country. When he arrived in New York on January 18, the rebellion was already under way, led by an underground organization that was the fruit of inter-party cooperation.26

A NEW ERA

The decade of dictatorship between 1948 and 1958 acted as a

catalyst upon Venezuelan political development. In exile, the nation's leaders reviewed their mistakes and planned for the future. They decided to act together for the restoration of representative democracy. Further- more, they agreed to do their best to maintain the system itself by forming a coalition government to keep order and prevent partisan competition from leading the nation back to dictatorship.

Just as important as the consensus about the political framework was the common agreement that the Venezuelan polity could not develop while the nation was bound back by feudal economic and social structures. A simple holding action against the progress of modernization could no longer be tolerated.

A new era had come to Venezuela-this much was clear as the party leaders stepped out of their airplanes and turned to the tasks of reconstituting their organizations.

COPEI itself underwent a considerable evolution during the years of dictatorship. Certainly one cause of this was the direct impact upon the personalities of the party members of the experience of rightist authoritarian rule. Perhaps most important, however, was the influence of the rapidly developing leftist Christian thought in Latin America, especially as it emanated from Chile. An International Christian Democratic Congress was held in Santiago in 1955; a conference of Christian Democrats of the Caribbean was held in Caracas in 1961; and later the same year the Third World Christian Democratic Confer- ence was held in Santiago.27 At these conferences delegates discussed in depth the implications for political action that thinkers of various

26 Interview Alexander-Caldera, March 27, 1958. 27 Congresos internacionales Democrata-Cristianos (Santiago: Editorial del Pacifico,

1957), passim. See also Rafael Caldera, "The Christian Democratic Idea," America, CVII (April 7, 1962), 12.

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countries were sifting from the basic doctrines of Christianity as they had been interpreted by the Papal "social" Encyclicals.28

More and more after 1958 COPEI representatives have spoken of their party as the "Venezuelan expression of Christian Democracy." And, in fact, the basic issues dealt with in party platforms have reflected this new image.

Christian Democrats feel that they represent the only valid alternative to traditional capitalism and totalitarian communism, both of which they feel are materialistic and offer no spiritual support to the human being. They espouse directed social and economic change, with the concomitant state intervention, but they firmly maintain that democracy is the only type of political organization that does not sacrifice basic human values. Expansion of education, on all levels, and massive agrarian reform are also part of their program.29

Reflecting the consolidation of its doctrine, the statements of COPEI representatives after 1958 make a startling contrast with the somewhat negativistic preoccupation with Church-state relations which marked the earlier stages of the party's development. Caldera's own words provide an excellent example of this:

Today, as Latin America stands at a dramatic fork in the road of history, Christian Democrats are spokesmen for the distress-and the hopes-of millions of Latin Americans. The social dilemmas of our continent cannot be solved by half- hearted reforms, nor can we wait until a gradual revolution brings the social justice that our masses demand with increas- ing vehemence.30

Old images, however, are not easily discarded, and COPEI has had to work assiduously to change the impression of many Venezuelans that it is a reactionary and Church-dominated organization. Again in Caldera's words:

Christian Democrat parties are not confessional. Among their members are citizens of many religious faiths and even agnostics. For all of them Christianity is a source of inspira- tion and a stimulus to new approaches to the service of man-

28 See Anne J. Fremantle, The Papal Encyclicals in Their Historical Context (New York: New American Library, 1956); and Rev. Gerald C. Treacy (ed.), Five Great Encyclicals (New York: The Paulist Press, 1944).

29 See Informe Final, III Conferencia Mundial Democrata Cristiana (Santiago: Organizaci6n Dem6crata Cristiana, 27-30 de Julio, 1961), passim.

30 Caldera, "The Christian .. .," p. 13.

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kind. It most certainly is not an ecclesiastical discipline to be imposed upon political parties.31

As might be expected, this change in the character of COPEI, perhaps best described as a change from a moderately conservative Catholic interest group to a developing Christian Democratic party in the international sense of the word, was not immediately or unanimously accepted by all of the party's members. In the first few years of reconstruction, a residue of moderatism persisted on the state and local levels, as it does, to a much lesser extent, today. In yet another wing of the party, however-the youth movement-an opposite tendency has also been visible. Of the two, the latter has steadily grown more dominant and the center of gravity of the party has moved slowly to the left. Caught between strong pressures from the national party leaders above, and from the militant youth below, parochial sentiment has declined.

A MODERN PARTY STRUCTURE

Interestingly enough, as it stands today COPEI's organizational structure is quite similar to that of its democratic rivals, AD and URD. As in these other parties, the distribution of power and responsibility is somewhat different in practice than it is in the party statutes.32

At the theoretical top of the party structure is the National Convention. This is an annual meeting of delegates from regional and functional organizations, of members of other executive bodies of the party, and of national Senators and Deputies that the party has placed in office. Composed of about five hundred members, the Convention decides upon party rules and policies, elects the National Committee of the party, and decides who will be electoral candidates.

For most purposes, the strongest organ of the party is the National Committee, which is in charge of the everyday direction of the organization. It has the power to appoint and remove party officials, begin disciplinary action, organize the publication of the party organ, "postu- late" candidates for public office, and call the National Convention itself into session. Numbering about twenty members, the Committee

31 Ibid., p. 15. 32 See Estatutos, Partido Social-Cristiano COPEI (party pamphlet, no place or

publisher, 1961). The rendering of the party structure here given, unless otherwise stated, is the same as that decided upon in the III National Convention (March 22, 1948) as modified subsequently in the VII National Convention (October 5, 1958) and in VIII National Convention (April 12, 1960).

255




has the power, also, to ask any public official that was elected by the party to resign his post.

Party activities on the regional level are directed by regional conventions and regional committees. Although these organizations do enjoy some autonomy-their influence seems to be substantial in the selection of regional and municipal candidates for election-they are themselves created by the National Committee and they are responsible for forwarding party policy as it is formulated on the national level.

At the bottom of the organizational structure are the organismos de base, best described by the English word "clubs," which are set up in every village or locality where there are enough members to warrant it. It is interesting to note that the party has founded two study centers principally to advance the spread and development of Christian Democratic doctrine. They are the Luigi Sturzo Institute, and the Institute of Christian Democratic Formation.

The financial support needed for party activities comes from several sources, both on the regional and national levels. As far as the present writer can determine, the bulk of funds comes from

salary-percentage contributions that are required of all members holding elected or appointive positions in the government obtained by means of party activities or patronage. Of key importance in this connection are the National Senators and Deputies.

The second major source of funds is money obtained through gifts-for example, from foreign and domestic industries-and fund-

raising activities for campaigns. Last, and probably least in quantity, is money taken by regional organizations as dues from members and then requisitioned by the national organization.

As auxiliaries to its formal party structure, COPEI also sponsors a number of specialized, or "functional" organizations. These include the Fraccion Parlamentaria, the Frente de Trabajadores Copeyanos (FTC), the Frente Campesino, the Fracci6n Femenina, and the Juventud Revolucionaria Copeyana (JRC).33 The first of these, the Fracci6n Parlamentaria, functions as a legislative caucus, the member-

ship consisting of all copeyano Senators and Deputies. It also super- vises the publication of important political statements made by these

33 Information about the sizes and workings of the functional organizations of COPEI has, unfortunately, been discovered only in meager and unsatisfactory amounts. This is particularly unfortunate because these organizations appear to provide excellent measuring rods of the depth and tenacity of party roots in the political culture.

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representatives, thus facilitating internal communication of the party position on critical legislative questions.34

The Frente Campesino, as its name suggests, is the functional unit devoted to organizing peasant support for the party. As far as the present writer can determine, this consists of between one-third and one-half of the total membership. The Frente Campesino, however, does not wield the influence in the party that its numbers would indicate, chiefly because of the dispersed nature of the peasant community. Actually, it forms a sub-unit within the Venezuela-wide National Peasant Confederation.

Only recently has COPEI developed a following of significance in the Venezuelan labor movement. Given the conservative leanings of the party's earlier stages, this is not difficult to understand. Prior to 1959 COPEI concentrated its attention upon the creation of a separate Christian trade union movement. In 1959, however, this attempt was abandoned in favor of penetration of the existing labor confederation (CTV).35 One of the main obstacles retarding COPEI recruitment among the workers has been the lack of competent leaders who are not already militant comunistas or adecos. This weakness in the trade unions has been the object of special attention, however, and there are indications that party growth in that sector has recently begun to accelerate.36

Christian Democratic accomplishments in the Venezuelan youth movement, in contrast to labor, are a source of intense pride to party leaders. A common reply to a question about the composition of the party's supporters is: "COPEI is the party of the youth." This pride is reinforced by the fact that the national youth movement has been a sort of political barometer for the nation, as well as by the fact that more than half of the Venezuelan population is under nineteen years of age.

The increase in size and influence of the JRC (Juventud Revolu- cionaria Copeyano) has been so marked since the fall of Perez Jimenez that it appears as though the group has become a sort of engine for the

party, driving it forward, while at the same time exerting a strong influence on its doctrine.

The manifestos of the JRC express the same basic ideas as those

34 See, for example, Rafael Caldera, Defensa de la Constitutionalidad (Caracas: Publicaciones de la Fracci6n Parlamentaria de COPEI, #4, 1962).

35 Interview Alexander-Acevedo, February 12, 1964. 36 Interview Author-Valmore Acevedo Amaya, March 17, 1964.

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of the party as a whole, but they are more intense, activist, and radical. The students consider themselves unequivocally to be the vanguard of the "lucha de la democracia cristiana." They have devoted a special effort to repudiating the party's reputation of "confessional" ties with the Venezuelan clergy; they constantly. stress their belief in freedom of religion and in a strictly apolitical Church.37 The students are also more aggressive in their demands for agrarian reform. Their fundamental belief in the maintenance of the democratic system has been verified by the fact that they have been quick to form counter-demon- strations against extremists.38

On the whole, then, COPEI is carefully and efficiently organized; there is a spirit of militancy-especially among the students-and heavy emphasis is placed upon doctrinal consistency in the ranks.

Although progressive and moderatist wings exist, the tensions between them do not appear to be nearly as marked as the generational conflicts that have racked AD.

THE CHALLENGE OF UNITY

The three major democratic parties of Venezuela-AD, COPEI, and URD-after cooperating to oust Perez Jimenez, returned to legal life in 1958, convinced of the need for the creation of a coalition

government that would permit a return to stability and promote the

legitimation of the democratic political process. They feared that party competition, if permitted to run free, would become destructive as it had in 1948; that it would turn to channels that were outside of the

representative framework, thus opening the way for the re-establishment of rightist dictatorship.39

The parties also agreed that state action in the promotion of social and economic reforms was of primary importance, both to build the foundation of a modern state and to prevent interest groups from

leaving the institutional structure out of the raw desperation of their members for the necessities of life. As Arturo Uslar Pietri put it, the time had come for "la construccion de un pais."40

In an atmosphere of constant civil disturbance, the parties turned

37 See Manifesto de la Juventud Revolucionaria Copeyana (Caracas: Partido Social Cristiano COPEI, 1961), as a good example.

38 Hispanic American Report, XIII (Stanford, California: Hispanic American Society, 1961), 708.

39 Interview Alexander-Ceferino Medina Castillo, September 10, 1961. 40 See Arturo Uslar Pietri, "Venezuela: la construccion de un pais," Cuadernos

(Paris: November, 1962), pp. 24-28.

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their attention to preparations for the election which the head of the provisional government, Wolfgang Larrazabal, had solemnly promised. In March COPEI and URD came out in favor of a presidential candidate of "national unity" who would represent all of the major democratic parties. AD, however, after much delay, would not agree to the proposal, and by the end of the summer each of the parties had chosen its own candidate: Caldera for COPEI, R6mulo Betancourt for AD, and Wolfgang Larrazabal for URD. Sentiment in favor of a compro- mise of some sort remained strong, though, and on the last day of October, 1958, each of the parties signed an agreement to conduct a campaign of "mutual respect," and, if the winner, to form a coalition government.41

A few weeks before the election the Christian Democrats were backed by two tiny parties, Integraci6n Republicana, which was formed by a group of centrist professional people, and the Partido Socialista de Trabajadores. At the same time, Larrazabal gathered behind him, in addition to URD, a second centrist party-called Movimiento Electoral Nacional Independiente-and the Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV).

The election results substantiate the claim made by the leaders of COPEI that their party was "left out," so to speak, in a spirited competition between Larrazabal and Betancourt. COPEI's support remained highly regional in nature, coming from the Andean states of Taichira, Merida, and Trujillo, as well as from Barinas and Amazonas (territories).

Table III


Party Presidency % Congress % Senators Deputies AD 49.1 49.5 32 73 URD 30.6 26.8 11 33 COPEI 16.6 15.2 6 20 PCV 3.5 6.2 2 7

Immediately after the election, Betancourt set about forming a coalition government. In February, 1959, after meetings with all parties, he announced his cabinet: it would include two representatives of AD, three of COPEI, and two of URD; eight were listed as independents.

41 See Martz, unpubl. diss., p. 221. 42 Lieuwen, Venezuela, p. 104; Martz, unpubl. diss., p. 225; and Elections Fact-

book, pp. 15-20.

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The three copeyanos were Victor Gimenez Landinez as Minister of Agriculture; Lorenzo Fernaindez as Minister of Development, and Andres Aguilar as Minister of Justice.43

The immensity of the difficulties faced by the new regime was obvious to everyone in this early period, and the spirit of solidarity continued strong. Civil strife was rampant, coup-scares were constantly recurring, and the job of economic reconstruction was complicated by the beginning of a depression.44 In this atmosphere of crisis, Betancourt did his best to reconcile his differences with the Christian Democrats. He backed Rafael Caldera's bid for the position of President of the Chamber of Deputies, and on inauguration day he promised to work out a modus vivendli with the Vatican on the position of the Church in Venezuela.45

THE RIFTING PROCESS

The breakup of the coalition began in less than a year when an izquierdista faction in AD defected and went into opposition. Appar- ently, the main cause of the split was youthful dissatisfaction with the

speed-or lack of it-at which Betancourt enacted basic reforms, combined with personal conflicts and tensions.46

The second rift in the coalition began in 1959 when URD

complained that it should receive representation in the cabinet proportional to its electoral strength-which it clarly had not. The party also criticized the government for not pushing reforms fast enough. Friction mounted, and in the fall of 1960, URD formally left the

government. Its cabinet positions were filled by independents, and it settled down to a policy of harsh criticism of the government.

Throughout the first two years of coalition rule the political atmosphere remained tense. Violence-including an attempt upon Betancourt's life-remained an everyday occurrence. Because of this, the government felt justified in using its prerogative to keep the constitutional guarantees of civil liberties suspended most of the time. The

suspension of guarantees, however, required the approval of Congress within ten days; for this, Betancourt relied heavily on the support of

43 Hispanic American Report, XII, 99. Note that the PCV was formally omitted from the coalition arrangement.

44 The depression is generally conceded to have been the result of the world oil glut that was triggered by the Suez Crisis of 1956-57.

45 Hispanic American Report, XII, 35; 98. 46 Martz, unpubl. diss., Ch. V. The extremist group was shortly named the

Movimiento Izquierdista Revolucionaria (MIR).

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COPEI. He also depended upon COPEI support for his idealistic and forceful foreign policy.

Betancourt's Congressional dependence upon the Christian Demo- crats, however, did not reach its peak until early in 1962 when the third major rift in the coalition occurred. This was the AD-ars defection that was finalized when Rauil Ramos Gimenez held a convention of his own parallel to the regular AD meeting. This split in the coalition

might have been more serious if it had come earlier, for it left the

government with legislative control only in the Senate. In the Chamber, the coalition was outvoted by an extremist alliance. This opened the

way for congressional obstructionism.47 By the time that the rift occurred, however, most of the essential reform legislation had already been passed, and the obstructionism was not able to undermine

government effectiveness seriously.48

It was not until the summer of 1962 that the first signs of trouble

appeared between the two remaining partners of the coalition. The immediate cause of the friction between COPEI and AD was the

repressive measures that Betancourt felt compelled to take against extremists. During the spring and summer of 1962, terrorism mounted, and two major revolts were attempted. The government's reaction to these events was harsh. Opposition Deputies who were implicated were

immediately arrested, police raided the PCV and MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria) printing establishments, general censor-

ship was imposed, and there were many rumors of government prison tortures. At the time of the first revolt, the regime ordered the sus-

pension of MIR and the PCV, and in October, after repeated warnings, it asked the Supreme Court to outlaw both of them.

These actions provoked a storm of criticism from all members of the opposition. The threat to outlaw the two extremist parties was

especially unpopular because it would result in the restoration of the coalition majority in Congress.49 COPEI, with its eye on the coming elections, was understandably reluctant to share in the government's unpopularity. At the same time, in view of the ensuing, crisis, the party leaders felt that the maintenance of unity was especially important.

Rafael Caldera sought a solution to this contradiction of interests

by going on television to explain COPEI's position to the public. He

47 Hispanic American Report, XV, 238. 48 Martz, op. cit., p. 255. 49 Hispanic American Report, XV, 525.

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explained that the only real solution to the problem of terrorism and violence would be found in meaningful economic, social, and political development. He then warned that, although COPEI felt the suspension of guarantees to be justified under the circumstances, the party would have no hesitation in ceasing to support the government if it took measures that COPEI felt were illegal and unjustified.50 With this clarification of views to purify the air, tensions within the coalition subsided-at least for the time being.

As the elections of 1963 approached, the Christian Democrats again took a stand in favor of the selection of a single, bipartisan, presidential candidate. Realizing that there was little chance that AD would consider Caldera-or, indeed, any copeyano-to fill the position, they focused their attention upon the prospect of an adeco or an independent chosen by AD and COPEI in consultation.

In July, the AD convention met and, deciding to ignore COPEI's call for unity, chose Rauil Leoni as its candidate. This decision angered the copeyanos, and Caldera stated that the choice of Leoni placed the AD party interests above those of the nation. On August 26, Caldera was formally nominated by the Christian Democrats.51

As the campaign opened, extremist terrorism became more and more frequent. In September the integrated guerrilla organization Fuer- zas Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional (FALN) declared that it would do its best to prevent the election from taking place at all. Because of the

mounting violence, military leaders brought pressure to bear upon Betancourt to tighten security measures. They even presented a program to him, "Operaci6n Repuiblica," calling for mobilization of 10,000 National Guardsmen and 8,000 policemen.52

On September 29, a number of National Guardsmen were brutally murdered, and the President ordered a crackdown. Among other

repressive measures, he had three PCV and three MIR Deputies placed under house arrest. According to the Constitution, this act required the ratification of the Standing Committee of Congress within ninety-six hours or the Deputies had to be released. The opposition parties were so outraged by the arrests that they refused to meet on the Committee, and a quorum was impossible without them. Faced with pressure

50 Caldera, Defensa, passim. 51 The New York Times, August 28, 1963. 52 Hispanic American Report, XVI, 885, 978.

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from the military, Betancourt decided, at the end of the ninety-six hours, that he would detain the Deputies past the time limit.53

Betancourt's decision caused a major crisis within the ranks of

COPEI, for the party had stated on nation-wide television that it would not hesitate to leave the government if the Constitution were violated.

Moreover, the order to continue the detention of the Deputies required the approval of the Minister of Justice-a copeyano. There was an

all-night party meeting to decide whether to support the government, and it was finally decided that COPEI would "reluctantly" do so.54. Whether or not Betancourt's move was necessary, it tried to the farthest limit Christian Democratic loyalty. From this time to the election, which delivered to Leoni his victory, COPEI continued its "reluctant" support of government policy.

The preparation of COPEI's campaign platform was made difficult

by the fact that the party was forced to campaign against a government in which it had participated freely for five years. In several key areas, such as agriculture and justice, COPEI was able to say little or nothing because it held the respective ministries involved. This is probably one reason why the party was so anxious to run a coalition candidate with AD.

COPEI tried to resolve this problem in two main ways. First, it made cl-ar in its campaign that it had participated in the government in order to protect the fundamental institutions of the democratic

system, and not only to promote its short-run interests. Second, it stressed heavily its claim to be the most determined and effective

counter-weight to communism, while making sure to emphasize the

progressive nature of Christian Democratic doctrine.

The election results showed a decline in AD strength from the 1958 figure of forty-nine per cent of the presidential ballots, to

thirty-three per cent, while COPEI registered an increase from sixteen

per cent to twenty. Though the Christian Democrats remained strong in the Andean states, their support was more evenly distributed than it had been in past elections.

53 Ibid. 54 Interview Author-Janusz Sleszynski, Director of Center of Christian Democratic

Action, New York, March 18, 1964.

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Table IV


Party % Total Vote Senators Deputies AD 32.81 21 65 COPEI 20.19 9 40 URD 18.88 7 31 Ind.* 16.08 3 20 FDP** 9.43 4 16

50 179 *Ind. Independiente

**FDP - Fuerza Democratica Popular. Two splinter parties omitted from table.

In terms of legislative representation, AD received less than enough for a majority in either house. COPEI, now the second strongest party in Venezuela, won enough to provide AD with majorities in both houses.

The question now was, would the coalition remain intact?

THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION

There is little doubt that the Christian Democratic party of Venezuela benefited from its participation as the minor partner of a coalition government. To begin with, it was able to see that the policies upon which it was in complete agreement with AD were executed as

efficiently as possible. This was an administrative avenue, the best example of which is provided by the agrarian reform program for which Minister of Agriculture Victor Gimenez Landinez-a copeyano-had responsibility.

Secondly, in so far as its support was valuable to AD, COPEI could exert pressure upon its partner in favor of those interests upon which there was no-or merely tangential-consensus between them. An excellent example of this is provided by the dispute over Venezuelan relations with the Soviet Union. Three times in the course of three

years COPEI was able to deter AD from establishing relations with the Soviet Union by stating clearly that it would withdraw from the coalition if they were.56 In each case, AD chose to give up the possible economic benefits that it felt such recognition would bring.

Not only was COPEI able to profit from its coalition experience, but it was able to do so without incurring many of the usual disadvan-

tages that accompany political responsibility. The party was able to

55 Table based upon official reports as given in El Nacional on December 13, 1963, and January 15, 1964.

56 See Hispanic American Report, XIV, passim.

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exert its influence and see many of its interests promoted without bearing the brunt of criticism for its policies. It participated in an effective government without coming under heavy attack; it was able to shelter itself, so to speak, behind AD, taking partial credit for the really immense achievements of the regime, and at the same time

avoiding extensive involvement in the continuous barrage of charges and counter-charges that AD was forced to endure from the swelling, irresponsible, opposition.

It is worthwhile noting, also, that the Christian Democrats were not the only ones to benefit from the experience of coalition government. For, in so far as the democratic system was supported and given a chance to establish itself, Venezuela as a whole gained from the experiment in cooperation.

CONCLUSION AND PROSPECT

The Christian Democratic party remained in coalition with AD for five years because of a very special set of circumstances. One of these was the steadfast determination on the part of the party's leaders that the democratic system should be given a chance to work in Venezuela. This was enlightened self-interest. A second and equally important circumstance was the unusual consensus of values that existed between a Christian Democracy traveling leftward and an Aprismo traveling centerward.

Still another circumstance that can be considered "special" is the internal coherence of COPEI, which prevented rival status seekers from

leading segments of the party into opposition under personal banners. This can be explained partly by the fact that the leadership of the

party, at least until the early 1960's, was about on a par with its more

aggressive youth in terms of doctrinal evolution.

A final circumstance-one which must be considered apart from those discussed up to this point-was the personality of R6mulo Betancourt, whose determination that Venezuela should have at least one chance at representative government led him to do things in behalf of "nation" that would hardly have occurred, to men of lesser vision acting simply in behalf of "party."

COPEI held an Extraordinary National Convention on February 27-29, 1964. At this meeting 500 delegates approved the decision of a

political committee to adopt a new policy line, to be entitled Autonomia de Accion (AA). According to the new line, COPEI would not participate in the Leoni government, and would negotiate specific points of

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policy with all democratic parties.57 The decision reached by the Convention terminated several weeks of discussion between the Christian Democrats and AD on the subject of coalition. At these talks COPEI demanded both real political influence and bureaucratic representation proportional to its now electoral mandate. In return AD offered COPEI "various state governorships," and three cabinet seats, to be chosen from the Ministries of' Development, Communication, Justice, and Foreign Relations. The Ministry of Agriculture was pointedly not offered.58 Accordingly, on the day of Leoni's inauguration, the Christian Democratic Ministers resigned, and the party left the coalition.

The reasons for this decision are numerous. The principal one relates to COPEI's purpose as a political party. When the Christian Democrats first entered the coalition, AD had a congressional majority that would have enabled it to institute its program without their help. By joining, they gained whatever influence they could exert upon policy as a sort of surplus-and in doing so they were able to give protection to the democratic process itself, which they valued highly.

When AD lost its congressional majority through a series of splits, even though the basic programs had passed, COPEI still maintained an influence disproportionate to its electoral strength. For a period, it could provide the critical extra votes, and after the coalition itself lost its majority, AD desperately needed any support it could muster against the swelling volume of invective and violence.

In the 1963 election, however, AD did not win a majority. It is thus entirely dependent upon the legislative cooperation of other

parties for the passage of its program. This places COPEI, as AD's past ally, in an extremely strong bargaining position-a position it would be partially compromising by joining the government and thus

giving AD an advance assurance of its cooperation.

Under such conditions, COPEI could be expected to join the

government only if the promise of influence were greater than it would be from a position of external negotiation. Three of fifteen cabinet seats-with the Ministry of Agriculture excluded-certainly did not hold out this promise. The retention of Agriculture by AD was especially important because it was through its leadership of the massive and suc- cessful agrarian reform program that COPEI had been able to increase substantially its prestige among the Venezuelan rural population.

57 Unpublished party announcement. 58 Interview Author-Ram6n Yllaramendy, COPEI party official, April 17, 1964.

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There are other important considerations. The Christian Democrats have set a larger goal for themselves than that of winning influence during the Leoni presidency. They want to win the election of 1968, and they are confident that they can do so.59 Since they felt restricted in the campaign of 1963 because they had participated in the government, they are anxious to avoid the same restriction in the future.

The reasons presented so far to explain COPEI's abstention from the coalition reveal a concern on the part of the party with the direct promotion of its political power. This should not be taken to mean that the party's interest in the democratic process and its preservation has become diluted. On the contrary, the party's prime goal-victory in 1968-is completely dependent upon the functioning of the system. What has become diluted is the intensity of the fear of immediate destruction of representative government. In short, the credibility of the threat of a return to rightist dictatorship, as COPEI sees it, has now passed below the threshold; competition, though not entirely unre- strained, is again permissible. In the words of a leader of COPEI: "We feel that the Venezuelan democracy is becoming stabilized."60

The Christian Democrats, then, have proclaimed their independence. Political currents in Venezuela, however, have already begun to force them to reconsider their position. Specifically, they strongly fear that URD will be able to negotiate a return to the government, thus setting itself up, with enough votes to provide Leoni with a legislative majority, in the same position that COPEI has just abandoned. Such a coalition would undermine entirely COPEI's leverage over AD. In an attempt to accomplish this, URD's leader, J6vito Villalba, has tried to dissect out of his organization the extremist elements. At the time of this writing, he has succeeded to the extent that he has entered-amid a wail of "opportunism" charges-into negotiations with Leoni.

Apprehensively, the Christian Democrats are biding their time. To try and prevent the URD-AD coalition from occurring, they have stated that they are willing to cooperate with AD in Congress so that Leoni is not obliged to deal with URD.

What the outcome of this maneuvering will be, lies in the realm of conjecture; so does the validity of the assumption that underlies it. This is that the democratic process has consolidated enough to warrant the termination of national unity government and the return to the strongly centrifugal forces of unrepressed interest struggle.

59 Ibid. 60 Interview Author-Acevedo and Yllaramendy, April 17, 1964.

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Documents

The Christian Democrats of Venezuela