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This article was downloaded by: [Dalhousie University] On: 04 October 2014, At: 01:12 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Ethics & Behavior Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hebh20 The Burdensome Enterprise of Animal Research Kenneth J. Shapiro Published online: 08 Jan 2010. To cite this article: Kenneth J. Shapiro (1997) The Burdensome Enterprise of Animal Research, Ethics & Behavior, 7:2, 188-192, DOI: 10.1207/s15327019eb0702_11 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327019eb0702_11 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan,

The Burdensome Enterprise of Animal Research

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This article was downloaded by: [Dalhousie University]On: 04 October 2014, At: 01:12Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK

Ethics & BehaviorPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hebh20

The Burdensome Enterprise ofAnimal ResearchKenneth J. ShapiroPublished online: 08 Jan 2010.

To cite this article: Kenneth J. Shapiro (1997) The Burdensome Enterprise of AnimalResearch, Ethics & Behavior, 7:2, 188-192, DOI: 10.1207/s15327019eb0702_11

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327019eb0702_11

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all theinformation (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness,or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and viewsexpressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, andare not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of theContent should not be relied upon and should be independently verified withprimary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for anylosses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages,and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly orindirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of theContent.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan,

sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone isexpressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found athttp://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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coherency of the research requires expert judgment. In other words, a scientifically acceptable protocol may be denied in the face of inadequate support.

In summary, although the ACUC should not be antagonistic toward research, it ought to take a "show me" attitude toward the process of justification. The existence on the committee of different views on animal research should be seen as serving to advance this ethically demanding process.

REFERENCES

Chovaz, C., McLachlan, R., Deny, P., & Cummings, A. (1994). Psychosocial functioning following temporal lobedomy: Influence of seizure control and learned helplessness. Seizure, 3, 171-176.

Gluck, J. P., & Kubacki, S. (1991). Animals in biomedical research: The undermining effect of the rhetoric of the besieged. Ethics and B e b i o r , 1, 157-173.

Rollin, B. E. (1989). The unheeded cry: Animal consciousness, animal pain and science. New York: Oxford University Press.

Seligman, M. E. P. (1975). Helplessness: On depression, development and death. San Francisco: Freeman.

Seligman. M. E. P., & Maier, S. F. (1967). Failure to escape traumatic shock. Journal of Erperimental Psychology, 74, 1-9.

Shenk, Z., Foley, F., LaRocca, N., &Smith, C. (1995). Psychologic predictors of depression in multiple sclerosis. Journal of Neurologic Rehabilitation, 9, 15-23.

The Burdensome Enterprise of Animal Research

Kenneth J. Shapiro

Before turning to possible applications of the two major contemporary theories relevant to the ethical issues raised by this dispute, a few comments about the frame, language, and demographics employed in the vignette are pertinent.

Framing discussants' recourse to the offer of a recommendation to the Institu- tional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) is a considerable limitation.

Simian is an "expert," whereas Savem is "a self-described 'animal welfare activist."' The implications of this asymmetry are misleading because, more than "self-described," many scientists are identified professionally as animal advocates through their full-time employment by animal welfare organizations. Furthermore, several organizations consist exclusively of member-scientists who are less "ada- mant" than informed and committed to changes in animal-based research. The phenomenal growth of the burgeoning field of animal welfare science is evidenced

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by the attendance of about 1,000 scientists at the recent Second Congress on Alternatives and Animal Use in the Life Sciences.

A final prefatory comment: The gender assignment in the vignette is misleading. Savem is a man, whereas the great preponderance of animal welfare activists (70% to 80%) are women; Simian is a woman, whereas women only recently have begun to approach parity with men in biological and psychological research settings. An emerging feminist ethic of caring builds its critique of invasive animal research on its being male-dominated and ideologically patriarchal (Donovan & Adams, 1996).

Relevant contemporary debate in moral philosophy centers on the question of the moral considerability of nonhuman animals. What are the attributes that constitute the classes of beings to whom we properly owe moral consideration? Both Regan's rights (1983) and Singer's utilitarian (1975) theory extend human moral obligation to nonhuman animals.

Arguing that (some) individual nonhuman animals have inherent value, being subjects of a life and having interests, Regan's deontological (first principles) theory extends certain species-appropriate rights to them. As constitutive of the concept of rights, these rights have preemptive power and exist independent of consideration of the well-being of the group.

Complementing Regan's valorizing of the individual, Singer's consequentialist theory holds that to judge what is good requires the application of a rational calculus of costs and benefits to the entire group, both those human and nonhuman animals affected. Both Regan and Singer interpreted their respective ethics to imply a prohibition against the preponderance of contemporary biomedical and psychologi- cal research. (For a review of the considerable literature in moral philosophy generated in response to their theories, and for different interpretations of their applications, see Pluhar, 1995).

Few, if any, governmental regulations or professional guidelines in the United States directly employ the language of rights. This is the case despite the fact that a recent poll of the general public found that nearly half (47%) of Americans believe animals "are just like humans in all important ways" (Balzar, 1993, p. 30). Furthermore, a recent survey of psychologists found that 62.1% and 44.4% believe that animal research involving pain or death to nonhuman primates and rats, respectively, is unjustified whether or not offset by benefits (Plous, 1996).

However, although not employing the language of rights, many policies include provisions that are more consistent with Regan than with Singer because most include a list, albeit short, of research procedures prohibited irrespective of any possible benefits. Heim (1978), a British psychologist referred to these procedures that are unacceptable on their face as "intrinsically objectionable" (p. 8).

Although others do not, Heim included inescapable pain in her list of examples of such procedures. The "sense of learned helplessness" that Simian intends to induce involves subjecting animals to inescapable pain. It now generally is agreed that the procedure is aparticularly potent stressor, even when induced through "mild electric shocks."

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As originally formulated in a series of studies involving substantial (cf. mild) levels of shock delivered to dogs, learned helplessness was offered as a model of depression (Seligman & Maier, 1967). Subsequently, Seligman presented a refor- mulated theory of depression that emphasized a cognitive rather than a behavioristic (learned) etiology of depression (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1987). In contrast to learning theory, which is based largely on animal research, the new theory builds on human-based research in social psychology (attribution theory). However, following this abandonment of the original paradigm as a model of human depression, the experimental procedure continued to be utilized simply as one of many available ways of stressing animals. Such repackaging is a common provenance for animal models (Shapiro, 1997).

Savem could argue that the proposed study violates the individual rights of the animal subjects because it involves an intrinsically objectionable procedure. In doing so he would have strong support from rights theory; moderate public and professional support, according to attitude surveys; but only modest support from current regulations and guidelines.

If the language employed in the vignette describing his beliefs is any indication, Savem is more likely to argue his case against Simian on utilitarian grounds than on rights grounds. Both relevant federal enabling legislation and professional guidelines also use consequentialist language, commonly referring to balancing costs and benefits.

However, should Savem present his utilitarian-based views to the IACUC mandated by the Animal Welfare Act (as amended in 1985), he is unlikely to receive a sympathetic hearing. The constitution of the typical committee is a problem: 'When nine of ten committee members either receive funding or are involved in some capacity with animal research, there is tremendous conflict of interest" (Brody, 1989, p. 428). Beyond this use of raw political control by vested interests, to effect utilitarian criteria "[IACUC] committees require little more than a per- functory claim to research value to justify extensive animal harm" (Dresser, 1993, p. 141). More specifically, Brody found, "the existing federal scheme accepts, as a sweeping premise rather than as a judgment to be made on a case-by-case basis, that the anticipated benefits of animal research outweigh the ethical costs" (p. 425).

What information should Savem oblige Simian to provide to assure that any equitably constituted body properly assesses a proposed study? To assess costs to the animals requires the use of a scale of invasiveness (suffering and harm). To this end, Simian should provide detailed description of relevant procedures, housing, and disposition. Of several existing scales, the only one developed exclusively to score psychological experiments scores a procedure that produces the harmful condition learned helplessness, at least at the penultimate level of invasiveness (4 on a 5-point scale; Shapiro & Field, 1988).

Simian also should show that she has searched the literature for alternatives that replace animals, reduce the number of animals used, or refine the procedures to lessen the suffering involved (the three Rs; Russell & Burch, 1992). For example,

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a human-based alternative paradigm, or even the proposed paradigm using less sophisticated species (rats vs. primates), might arguably be considered alternatives within the concept of the three Rs.

Also relevant to the costs side, Simian must verify that her training is adequate to perform the specific procedures involved. Is she competent in the psychology and physiology of both rats and nonhuman primates?

On the benefits side, Simian should provide a detailed description of prospective gains, either in enhanced understanding or more effective treatment. Because an experiment by its very nature has indeterminate results, both with respect to the hypothesis and any eventual applications, supplemental information also should be provided. If Simian has done related studies, what have its benefits been? These can be assayed in two ways: citation analysis and survey. How often is the investigator's earlier research in the same subject areacited. What, if any, treatment advances have resulted from it? Are those providing treatment aware of, and utilizing, the results of this research. Plous (1996) found that 92.2% of mental health providers indicate they never, rarely, or only occasionally use findings from animal research. Shapiro (1997) found that specialists in the treatment of eating disorders have virtually no knowledge of animal models of eating disorders. They do not read journals that cite such studies, and, in any case, the citation levels of selected animal models of eating disorders are generally lower than that of the average study cited in Science Citation Index.

If this list of demands seems onerous, the burden is justifiably on the investigator. Although in a prosecutorial setting, an individual is innocent until proven guilty, here permission is sought to inflict certain suffering, harm, death, or some combi- nation of these outcomes on "innocents" in circumstances in which there is only a prospect of benefits for others. The burden is on Simian to show that she will not violate the rights of other (here, nonhuman animal) individuals, or, at the very least, that the proposed procedures or their outcomes are not intrinsically objectionable; and that the likely benefits will outweigh the costs. It also may seem unfair or even incoherent to apply two distinct ethics. However, that there are two major theories reflects the fact that our system of jurisprudence and ethics is built on a blend of concerns for the individual and for society as a whole. Although certain inviolate individual rights have preemptive power, in constructive tension with that concern actions can be justified in terms of the greater good for the greater number-non- human animals included.

REFERENCES

Abramson, L., Seligman, M., & Teasdale, I. (1987). Learned helplessness in humans: Critique and reformulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 49-74.

Balzar, I. (1993, December 25). Creatws great-And equal? Los Angeles Times, pp. 1,30,31. Brody, M. (1989). Animal research: A call for legislative reform requiring ethical merit review. Harvard

Environmental Lmv Review, 13,423-477.

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Donovan J., & Adams, C. (Eds.). (1996). Beyondanimal rights: A feminist caring ethic for the treatment of animals. New York: Continuum.

Dresser, R. (1993). Animal care committees: Between the scientific community and the government. In E. K. Hicks (Ed.), Science and the human-animal relationship (pp. 135-143). Amsterdam: SISWO.

Heim, A. (1978). The proper shuty of psychology. Paper presented to the PsychoIogy Section of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Cambridge, UK.

Plous, S. (1996). Attitudes toward the use of animals in psychoIogical research and education. American Psychologist, 51, 1167-1 180.

Pluhar, E. (1995). Beyondprejudice: Themoralsignijicance of human andnonhuman animals. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Regan, T. (1983). The cme for animal rights. Berkeley: University of California Press. Russell, W., & Butch, R. (1992). The principles of humane experimental technique. South Mimms,

England: Universities Federation for A n i i Welfare. Seligman, M., & Maier, S. (1967). Failure to escape traumatic shock. Journal of Experimental

Psychology, 74, 1-9. Shapiro, K. (1997). Animal models of humanpsychology: Critique of science, ethics, andpolicy. Seattle,

WA: Hogrefe and Huber. Shapiro, K., & Field, P. (1988). A new invasiveness scale: Its role in reducing animal distress. Humane

Innovations and Alternatives in A n i d Experimentation, 2, 4 3 4 . Singer, P. (1975). Animal liberation: A new ethic for our treatment of animals. New York: Avon.

NOTES

This section of the journal features a fictionalized case vignette that embodies one or more important and complex ethical dilemmas with professional or public policy overtones. Each case is accompanied by two or more independently crafted com- mentaries of approximately 1,000 words by experts with diverse backgrounds and perspectives. Readers are invited to submit cases and brief follow-up commentaries that raise new and important issues.

Requests for reprints of the Forum section should be sent to the Editor, Gerald P. Koocher, Department of Psychiatry, Children's Hospital, 300 Longwood Ave- nue, Boston, MA 021 15.

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