8€

Editor' s note

Newest OdysseyNobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz fears that we are on the cusp of a double-dip global recession because global aggregate

demand is lacking.

Jacques Attali, founder of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, recently lamented that Europe has

grown to be a “strange animal” — a union with a central bank and single currency, but without a ministry of finance to

coordinate fiscal and tax policies across independent sovereign states.

Economist Nouriel Roubini argues that Greece’s sovereign debt crisis is only “the tip of the iceberg.

It is obvious that the current economic crisis has hit all countries. It is, however, particularly painful for the weaker econo-

mies, consequently for the most countries in the region.

In this era of global economic crisis, when all political and economic analysts underline risks prevalent in the global sphere,

The Bridge adopts an optimistic stance.

It is a chance to build links across the Mediterranean, creating a new sense of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and

Balkans: Kosovo, the Middle East, policies in the Balkans, Greek-Turkish relations, EU enlargement, and raised subjects

ranging from climate change to green growth and development.

What about the EU?

EU’s neighbourhood includes countries which will one day become members, as well as its other immediate and close

neighbours around the Mediterranean, and in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe. The cooperation with these countries

aims at dovetailing their policies with those of the EU in trade, environmental and business regulation, energy, communica-

tions, education, training and immigration while providing support for infrastructure. By helping reform their economies,

create security and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, the EU also helps to make life safer within its own borders.

In this issue of The Bridge, we try to reveal the challenges and the opportunities that this turbulent era is creating.We try out

to find out the window of opportunity-that is now open-and to use it in order to catch up the major changes.

It is a matter of effective doing, a doing which will create opportunities.

Corporate Responsibility assured underAA1000 International Standard

PUBL

I

O TE’s 2009 Corporate Responsibility Report, which has just been published, is externally assured under the international AA1000 Ac-countAbility Principles Standard. This is the fifth annual review of OTE’s economic, social and environmental activities.

OTE's 2009 CR Report is one of the first by a Greek company to apply the AA1000 AccountAbility Principles Standard and develop its approach in terms of its three principles, namely inclusivity, materiality and responsiveness.

For the first time, the 2009 CR report was subject to external assurance by Deloitte, providing additional validity and valuable feedback on OTE’s ap-proach and constantly evolving performance on CR issues.

As a result, the report was also upgraded to GRI G3 B+ rating. For the last four years, OTE has been applying to its CR report the G3 guidelines of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), while the last two it was rated at B level. Also, since 2008, OTE has also been included in the FTSE4Good Index.

On this occasion, OTE’s Corporate Communications Director, Mrs Deppie Tzimea, commented: “Despite the tough times, due to the major economic crisis, we move forward with actions rather than words, based on a specific plan & targets, while our commitment for responsible action in favor of all stakeholders remains unchanged. The external assurance of our 2009 CR re-port under the international AA1000 standard is a result of systematic efforts and constant development of our programme, which is an integral part of OTE’s business plan."

The report details OTE's contribution to sustainable development through its “Building Ties” programme - in the marketplace, with employees, with society and for the environment. However, this year, on top of that, OTE at-tempts to inform and motivate all stakeholders towards a more responsible attitude by suggesting simple ways through which anyone can help society and the environment. In special supplements, included in the report, OTE Group employees give simple advice on how to surf the internet safely, how to recycle properly, how to be “green” at work etc.

Both the report and the videos related to the supplements are available on-line at the microsite

http://www.ote.gr/cr2009/

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A quarterly review on European integrationSE Europe & the SE Mediterranean

Upcoming Events

cover story 36 - 37

Thanos TriantafyllouEU renewable energy policy

cover story 16 - 17

cover story 18 - 19

Balkan Express-NEWS

www.bridge-mag.com

cover story 30 - 31

Thanos Triantafyllou Israel-Palestine talks

cover story 20 - 24

Alexandros ArvanitakisRoadmap to EU

EU-Albania relations

Kostas A. LavdasCrisis management &

political rhetoric in Greece

cover story 8 - 9

Stavros Kourtalis & Gerasimos TsourapasA step in the right direction

cover story 14 - 15

cover story 10 - 13

Dimitris DroutsasPracticing foreing policy

in times of economic crisis

contents

To manage a socio-economic crisis

in a politically sound manner, you need to

come to terms with three sets of issues.

First, you need to know, however vaguely,

what brought it about. Second, you need to

have a more or less clear view of objectives

and priorities. Finally, you will have to try to

penetrate the cognitive and sociocultural

context of the crisis in question.

Back to basics. Modern economic

and social life is dominated by complex

and intricate organizations. Perhaps para-

doxically, this complicates things when it

comes to crises. As Charles Perrow so bril-

liantly argued, even slight mishaps within

these massive and intricate infrastructures

can rapidly escalate in unforeseen ways.

And as far as ‘crises’ are concerned, the very

terminology needs examining. Arjen Boin

and Paul ’t Hart have shown that we need

to abandon the notion that crises are events

that are neatly delineated in time and space.

We need, instead, to treat crises as extended

periods of high threat, high uncertainty, and

high politics that disrupt a wide range of so-

cial, political, and organizational processes.

In short, crises are dynamic and chaotic pro-

cesses, not discrete events sequenced neatly

on a linear time scale.

On to Greece. What happened in the

last couple of years? To begin with, the

fundamentals of the Greek economy did

not change between 2009 and 2010. What

did change, was the way in which the pro-

longed crisis – because that’s what it was

– was dealt with. A textbook application

of Naomi Klein’s ‘shock doctrin’ (i.e., using

a phase of collective vulnerability as a win-

dow of opportunity to usher in change) got

out of hand. The point is rather simple. As

Robert Putnam explained a few years ago,

the politics of international negotiations can

usefully be conceived as a two-level game.

At the national level, interest groups pursue

their goals and politicians seek power by

forming coalitions among those groups. At

the international level, governments seek

to maximize their ability to satisfy their

own coalitions, while pursuing objectibves

which appear to correspond to perceptions

of ‘national interest’. Neither of the two

games can be ignored by national politi-

cians, so long as their countries remain both

interdependent and ‘sovereign’. Problem is,

each of these national politicians appears

at both game boards simultaneously. Give

too much attention to the national game,

By Kostas A. Lavdas

8 9

and the international gets side-tracked. And

vice versa. In short, while the government

in Athens, preoccupied with the domestic

game board, was busy trying to persuade

the public that things looked ugly and big

change was needed, governments in places

like Stockholm, Paris and Berlin were busy

finding ways to safeguard their banks,

whose lending to Latvia, Greece and other

EU states presaged trouble.

Still, there is a window of opportunity

that is now open – even if the actors that

actually did the job of opening it are not the

ones the governments in Athens or Riga

would have us believe. We need to use this

window, in order to curb some of the struc-

tural constraints on large-scale reform while

at the same time reassuring Greek citizens

that national democratic accountability is

not a thing of the past. The point, then, is to

use the current juncture in order to achieve

two distinct but closely linked objectives.

First, we need to privatize and liberalize,

deep and fast. Second, we need to remain

steadily fixed in the absolute necessity – for

a small state with an open economy and a

precarious geopolitical position – of the ex-

istence of a capable public sector and pow-

erful regulatory agencies.

Not all the interests – domestic and

transnational – that have been involved

in opening (and attempting to exploit) the

‘window of opportunity’ will be happy with

this combination of strategic objectives. Yet

it is the combination that is crucial. Its attain-

ment and sustainability will depend on par-

ticular policy coalitions. In what way a new

politics could construct a coalition between

entrepreneurs, professional strata and quali-

fied public servants, and whether a majori-

tarian government could be the medium

of such a coalition, are questions to which

it would be difficult to attempt a confident

answer in the present situation. These, how-

ever, are the questions that matter.

Kostas A. Lavdas is the Professor of Political

Science at the University of Crete.

cover story

Many see something of a contradic-

tion in the phrase “foreign policy in times of

economic hardship”.

The first thing that comes to mind is that

the one thing – economic hardship – pre-

cludes the other: the practice of foreign pol-

icy. In other words, conditions of economic

hardship place limits not only on economic

activities, but also on range of movement in

the international arena.

There are those who take this thought

further. They say that under these condi-

tions “we must first put our house in order”,

and only then make fresh forays into foreign

policy. They say that right now “we are at a

disadvantage in terms of international pow-

er interrelations”, and thus we must leave

things as they are if we are to avoid having to

back down due to our position of weakness.

They are intimidated. And they want to

keep themselves to themselves.

Prime Minister Papandreou’s govern-

ment took office in October 2009. The num-

bers we faced were harsh: a deficit of over

13% and public debt of over 110%. Apart

from the financial debt, we were facing a

competitiveness deficit. And most of all,

there was our credibility deficit in interna-

tional markets. The “spreads” – a word now

in the working vocabulary of every Greek

– jumped higher from one day to the next,

enabling speculators to siphon off national

revenues.

So we had to act – and fast. We started

with a huge effort to restore financial health

– with the aim of cutting the deficit from

about 14% in 2009, to under 3% by 2014 –

and reduce the debt as a proportion of GDP

after 2013. In 2010, we will cut the deficit by

5.5 percentage points, from 13.6% to 8.1%

of GDP.

To do this, we had to take very harsh

measures for the greek society, for every

greek citizen. But we have already seen

encouraging results: in the first 5 months,

the deficit fell by 40% year-on-year, rev-

enues increased, and expenditure has been

reduced significantly. So we are well within

the framework of the goals we set, and we

have yet to begin implementing many of

the new measures passed by the Hellenic

Parliament.

In the context of this effort, our foreign

policy has a special mission: to create more

opportunities for our country. In a truly glo-

balized economic and political system, the

winners are those who are most fully inte-

grated into that system – not those who

are isolated from it. Opportunities come to

those who dare to open up, not to those who

close themselves off.

That is why we ourselves are taking

initiatives and supporting the efforts of third

parties who are promoting an environment

of stability and prosperity in our wider re-

gion, which includes the Balkans, the East-

ern Mediterranean and the Middle East, the

Black Sea and the Caucasus.

In the Balkans, Greece was once the

principal advocate for our northern neigh-

bours’ regional integration into and acces-

sion to the European Union. In word and

indeed. With initiatives that led to what is

today the South East European Cooperation

Process. With the drawing up of the Thes-

By Dimitris Droutsas

10 11

saloniki Agenda in 2003; an Agenda that is

still the core of the European Union’s policy

on the Balkans. With the promotion of in-

vestments in every sector of the economy;

investments that have created tens of thou-

sands of jobs in Balkan economies. With

the promotion of the Southeast European

Energy Community.

And we are returning to this policy to-

day. The announcement of our new initiative

– Agenda 2014 – was among the govern-

ment’s first actions, and Agenda 2014 is

aimed at reinvigorating the European per-

spectives of all the countries in the region.

2014 is a very important year, it is one

hundred years from the beginning of the

First World War, and we think that we have

to remind to the public opinion what the

European Union is all about. It is the most

successful peace project and we think that

it can guarantee peace and stability for all

the countries of the western Balkans. This

is the aim of our Agenda 2014, we want to

promote the accession of all the western

Balkans countries and put this subject higher

on the European agenda. We want to say to

the peoples of the countries of the western

Balkans that the future, their future, lies

within the European Union.

In the Eastern Mediterranean and the

Middle East, Greece has a special place and

role that derive from our geopolitical posi-

tion and our traditionally very good relations

with the Arab world. We are utilizing this

store of trust to launch new cooperation on a

broad range of issues; cooperation with new

partners and old friends.

But in this region there are two open

wounds that have been festering for years

now. Two situations – unique unto them-

selves – that generate instability. And until

we resolve these situations, they will block

the whole region’s course toward real peace

and lasting prosperity.

The first is the Middle East issue, in all

its aspects. We recently experienced yet

another flare-up. This one arose from the

ongoing humanitarian crisis created by the

blockade on Gaza. Greece and its partners

reacted responsibly, trying to safeguard

the fragile peace process while also guar-

anteeing the flow of humanitarian aid. But

we must confront the root of the problem.

In Greece, we place great hope in the prox-

imity talks and we fully support them. The

solution can be none other than that already

described by the international community: A

solution based on two states that will coex-

ist in security and stability.

The second major issue is Cyprus. We

cannot close our eyes to the flagrantly unjust

and illegal state of affairs that has persisted

for 36 years now. In Cyprus – a member state

of the European Union – there are Turk-

ish occupation troops to this day. There is a

great wall – a wall of shame; the last wall in

Europe – separating the Cypriot people and

holding them back from their joint European

future. And Turkey bears a heavy responsi-

bility for this. The position of Greece is a very

wellknown one, we want a Cypriot solution.

We must leave Greek Cypriots and Turkish

cover story

Cypriots to decide on their joint future in the

European union, to decide without external

pressure or any kind of artificial deadlines.

We also want a European solution, meaning

that the Republic of Cyprus is an EU member

state and so after the solution will be found

the country must be able to function ef-

ficiently within the European Union. That is

why we always say that when negotiating,

when dealing with the settlement, we must

fully respect the “acquis communautaire”.

In the Black Sea region, Hellenism has

deep historical roots. On the first of this

month, Greece assumed the Chairmanship

of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation

(BSEC), presenting an ambitious agenda.

Our priorities are focused on green develop-

ment, renewable energy sources, and the

promotion of two major projects that will

benefit all the peoples in the region: the

Black Sea ring road and the development of

maritime links.

When speaking of the Black Sea re-

gion, I cannot but refer to the neighbouring

Caucasus, a critical zone of interests that in

future will be of increasing importance to

the European Union and its member states

– if for no other reason than the energy cor-

ridors that will criss-cross the region. And

here there are issues that touch upon justifi-

able sensitivities, but that nevertheless need

to be dealt with to the benefit – first and

foremost – of the peoples of the Caucasus.

Greece is pursuing the humble role, if you

will, of the honest broker. I think that our re-

cent Chairmanship of the OSCE left a legacy

that will be of some use in confronting the

issues plaguing this region.

How analogous to all this is the current

state of affairs in the European Union? What

does the economic crisis mean for the future

of the European Union? Or is this, perhaps,

an opportunity?

After a long – and for some partners,

painful – debate, we concluded on an in-

stitutional mechanism that will support

the European Union for the foreseeable fu-

ture. After much compromise, we ended up

with the Lisbon Treaty, which establishes an

inter-institutional balance that we all hope

will enable the European Union to play its

rightful role in the international arena. It

was for this reason, after all, that the Lisbon

Treaty endowed the EU with a new foreign

policy tool: the position of High Represen-

tative for Foreign Affairs and the European

External Action Service, which we are now

building up.

And the member states entrusted new

responsibilities to these new institutions. We

put it into their hands to deal with certain

very important matters. And we did this

based on our acceptance of one fundamen-

tal thought: that the interests of the member

states are also the interests of the Union. So,

when the Union’s institutions speak, they

do so in the name of the 27 member states,

who will be greater in number tomorrow.

They express this common interest. Indeed,

the leaders of the new EU institutions cre-

ated by the Lisbon Treaty have taken on no

12 13

small responsibilities. They have to rise to

the trust that we have put in them. Other-

wise, the leaders of these institutions and

these institutions themselves will find their

credibility compromised, perhaps beyond

redemption.

It was at this historic stage in European

integration that we were hit by the global

economic crisis. We feel the repercussions

in our national economies and, by exten-

sion, in our societies, which are witnessing

the collapse of fundamental covenants that

had been in place long enough to be taken

for granted; to be seen as a social acquis. The

shortcomings in global financial governance

– shortcomings that we now all agree ex-

ist – have reached the point, according to

some, of threatening our common currency:

the euro.

Faced with this challenge, the European

Union rose to the occasion and replied in a

coordinated manner. It acknowledged that

the challenge was and is a common chal-

lenge. It answered to the volatility of mar-

kets by announcing and institutionalizing a

support mechanism, from which of course

Greece benefited.

But I think the most important thing is

that in the global dialogue that has begun

on confronting the shortcomings of global

financial governance, the EU is speaking

with one single voice. From Brussels – in

the name of the 27 member states and the

EU – the President of the Council and the

President of the Commission sent a single

message to the G-20 meeting in Toronto.

Was that not a genuine expression of

truly common EU foreign policy? I maintain

the hope that perhaps as a result of this crisis

the European Union will once again find its

stride on the path to its original goal: A great

and strong Europe with a discrete and im-

portant position in the international system.

The international system without a

strong Europe is simply a system without

equilibrium. The world needs Europe. But

Europe, too, must open itself up to the world.

This means two things:

First, that we must complete the

Union’s enlargement. There can be no “black

hole” in the single European space of secu-

rity, justice and prosperity to which we as-

pire. The countries of Southeast Europe are

waiting on Europe’s doorstep. We can’t leave

them outside any longer.

Second, that we need to sustain the

momentum of the Union’s political deepen-

ing. Lisbon is a station, but not the terminus.

And if something good can come out of this

crisis, let it be this: the realization that we are

better fortified against the challenges of our

times when we have more Europe, not less.

Dimitris Droutsas is Alternate Minister of

Foreign Affairs

cover story

''In the European Union's [EU] latest

effort to deal a blow to irregular migration

across its southern borders, Frontex (estab-

lished in 2005 as the European Agency for

the Management of Operational Coopera-

tion at the External Borders of the Member

States of the European Union) will inaugu-

rate its first Operational Office in Piraeus,

Greece, on 1 August 2010.

Centrally located in Greece's largest sea-

port and one of South-East Europe's major

transport hubs, the new Piraeus Operational

Office will be in charge of coordinating Fron-

tex's actions across Eastern Mediterranean

countries (Greece, Italy, Cyprus and Malta),

as was decided at a Madrid EU summit in

May 2009.

Neither the decision to add to Frontex's

institutional capacities nor the particular

choice of Piraeus should come as a surprise;

since as early as 1999, at the European Coun-

cil meeting in Tampere, Finland, the EU has

striven to develop a proactive migration

policy, of which the fight against irregular

migration constitutes a central pillar.

Two years ago, based upon the 2004

Hague programme that had aimed for the

creation of a common EU immigration and

asylum policy, the Council of Ministers ad-

opted the so-called 'Return Directive', stan-

dardising procedures regulating the return

of illegally staying third-country nationals.

More recently, in May 2009, the European

Parliament adopted a directive on imposing

sanctions for employers who hire irregular

migrants.                                        

The choice of Frontex's Operational Of-

fice location also makes perfect sense, given

that the latest Frontex Annual Risk Analysis

argues that, by 2010, 75% of total illegal EU

border crossings take place through Greece.

In fact, it has been argued that tackling

the 'Eastern Mediterranean' route (crossing

Turkey to eastern Greece, southern Bulgaria

or Cyprus) constitutes one of the Agency's

top priorities, given that migration waves

have slowed down in the two other major

routes, the Central Mediterranean (Northern

Africa to Italy and Malta) and Western Afri-

can (Western African countries to Spain via

the Canary Islands) ones.

To what extent does the inauguration of

a new Operational Office in Greece merit op-

timism in the fight against irregular migra-

tion? On the one hand, the numbers seem

to agree that the new Office will most likely

augment Frontex's already successful role:

according to its Deputy Executive Director

Gil Arias-Fernandez, a 33% reduction in to-

tal illegal entry detentions (from 166,000 to

106,000) has already been registered.

A drop also took place in terms of sea

border arrests between Greece and Turkey,

from 56,000 (in 2008) to 49,000 (in 2009).

Land border arrests between the two coun-

tries were also decreased, from 14,000 to

10,000 under the same time period.

Across the Mediterranean basin, a num-

ber of bilateral agreements (such as the one

signed between Italy and Libya, Spain and

Senegal, and so on) have also helped stem

the tide of arrivals: in West Africa, only

five detentions took place in the first three

months of 2010, as opposed to a staggering

31,700 detentions during 2006.

The above numbers, however, hide the

much more sober picture of immigration

waves in South-Eastern Europe: the absence

of a working agreement on immigration

prevention and control between Greece and

Turkey (only recently have political steps

been taken towards the activation of the

2001 bilateral Re-Admission Protocol) has

helped encourage Eastern Mediterranean

immigration as other routes have been more

effectively patrolled.

By Stavros Kourtalis

& Gerasimos Tsourapas

14 15

European NGOs continue to lament the

lack of reliable quantitative data on irregular

immigration, which, in turn, help promote

unfounded stories on 'floods of illegal im-

migrants', on the loss of jobs to immigrants,

or on exorbitantly heavy strains on public

services. At the same time, Frontex has been

frequently confronted with accusations of

human rights violations, especially in its

treatment of asylum seekers who attempt to

enter the EU.

The creation of a new Operational Office

in Piraeus and the strengthening of Frontex

in general needs, thus, to be accompanied

by a number of other political efforts, both

on the national and the European level that

would enable the Agency to acquire the en-

hanced role it seeks.

Firstly, the European Commission should

work closely with national policymakers

towards the creation of standardised data-

bases on migration across the continent, in

the hope of generating more reliable esti-

mates. A more accurate numerical portrayal

of irregular migration in Europe would also

aid in the visibility of Frontex's efforts and, in

the long term, in increased social awareness

across the EU member states.

Lastly, the positive effects that bilateral

readmission agreements between EU mem-

ber states and neighbouring countries have

had on curbing migration waves suggest

that such agreements should continue being

forged between countries of origin (such as

Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, etc.) and EU

countries of transit.

All things considered, the new Opera-

tional Office should, indeed, be considered

a significant step in enhancing Frontex's

role in South-Eastern Europe and dealing a

significant blow to irregular migration in the

Mediterranean. At the same time, however,

it should serve to remind us of the political

and administrative gaps that remain to be

bridged, before we can truly talk of an effi-

cient, proactive, pan-European immigration

strategy.''

Stavros Kourtalis and Gerasimos

Tsourapas are researchers at the Hellenic

Centre for European Studies (EKEM)

cover story

In these times of economic imbal-

ance and financial insecurity the energy

matter becomes more and more important

in particular for the weak economies of the

planet. Especially for the “countries of crisis”

(Portugal Italy Greece Spain) the energy sec-

tor is crucial in enabling their economies to

overcome the current difficulties and return

to high growth rates through the assurance

of continuous and sustainable energy supply.

Despite the important steps towards

the synchronization of the electricity sector

of the past years, the electricity supply gap

is widening as major planned power sector

capacity additions are delayed. In parallel,

competition for private investment required

for new energy infrastructure is fierce. Con-

tinuing concerns over energy security and

high import dependence have highlighted

the importance of efficiency improvement

and supply diversification. The role of green

energy technologies (i.e. renewables and

energy efficiency) to address these problems

is crucial. They provide unique development

opportunities and under the right conditions

and safeguards they are main vehicles for

achieving environmental targets while they

contribute to the security of supply. Renew-

able energy sector attracts investments in

short time period that, under the appropri-

ate support framework, offer secured capital

returns for long time, and create significant

job opportunities.

The acceleration of green investments

in the region is an urgent need, especially

taking into account that the EU has estab-

lished an overall target of 20% share of RES

in energy consumption by 2020, as well as

specific national ones for each EU member

state, as part of the Climate Action Package

20-20-20 by 2020.

Developments are needed in the energy

sector, particularly in the oil industry - where

skyrocketing prices are having a drastic ef-

fect on the economies of most countries

- and the continually growing threat of cli-

mate change has now made it obvious that a

transition to new energy sources, which are

less polluting and more secure, is vital. The

most promising proposal for this transition

is the use of renewable energy sources (RES),

which can reduce greenhouse gas emissions

and pollution using local and decentralized

sources. At the same time, we now real-

ize that we cannot keep increasing energy

production to cover our needs, but that we

By Thanos Triantafyllou

16 17

must manage energy in a rational way and

improve our energy efficiency. Investments

in these sectors contribute to the protection

of the environment, the security of energy

supply and long-term development while

functioning simultaneously as a magnet for

innovation, providing export opportunities.

Status and perspectives of RES

Renewable energies such as wind

power, solar energy, hydropower and bio-

mass can play a major role in tackling the

twin challenge of energy security and global

warming because they are not depletable

and produce less greenhouse-gas emissions

than fossil fuels.

Since the energy crises of the 1970s,

several industrial nations have launched

programmes to develop renewable energy

solutions, but the return of low oil prices

prevented renewable energies from picking

up on a large commercial scale.

Despite the significant utilization of hy-

dro power plants only limited portion of the

total potential is not utilized. In the recent

years there has been extensive modern-

ization of existing large and small plants

through funds provided by international

institutions. In almost all of these countries

an extensive program for further develop-

ment of the sector and in particular of small

hydro power plants has already started with

sometimes significant results.

Wind energy has significant potential

in several countries of the region; however

there is currently no significant capacity.

However, there is already great interest from

investors in investigating the potential and

developing projects that is supported by

recent legislative reforms to promote wind

energy in some countries.

Another important renewable source of

energy in the region is biomass, but the cur-

rent utilization is almost entirely restricted

to the traditional uses for cooking and space

heating. Significant support will be needed

to promote modern utilization of biomass

for space heating, electricity generation and

combined heat and power production.

Solar energy is abundant in the region

and can be used most cost-effectively for

water heating. Solar photovoltaic (PV) in-

stallations, whether at the household level

or for centralized applications require sig-

nificant support measures given the high

capital cost of the systems.

Finally, there is important potential for

low-temperature geothermal resources that

can be used for heating as well as electricity

production in some of the countries.

We do face two energy challenges: on

the one hand, to ensure secure and sufficient

energy and, on the other, the sustainable

management of the environmental impacts

of the production, conversion and use of en-

ergy. These challenges are not insurmount-

able. If we all take greater responsibility for

our actions, basing our energy decisions on

best practice, we can ensure a clean, intel-

ligent and competitive energy future.

cover story

EU-Western Balkans High Level

Meeting in Serajevo

The EU-Western Balkans High Level

Meeting, organized on the 2nd of June, in

Sarajevo by the Spanish Presidency, marks

the 10th anniversary of the Zagreb Summit

of 25 November 2000, where EU launched

the Stabilization and Association Process

and the European perspective for Western

Balkans.

The EU and the west Balkan countries,

but also participants from US, Russia, Turkey,

OSCE, Council of Europe and NATO, wel-

comed the progress of the last decade that

brought the Balkans from war-torn times on

the road to prosperity.

The High Representative of the EU for

Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-

President of the Commission, Catherine Ash-

ton, and the Commissioner for Enlargement

and European Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan

Füle, welcomed the outcomes of the meet-

ing, stressing that the EU will support and

reaffirm the Balkans’ place in Europe and the

European perspective for the region.

The Director of OSCE's Conflict Preven-

tion Centre, Ambassador Herbert Salber,

stressed that “Making more use of the tools

that the OSCE provides would benefit the

countries of the Western Balkans”, inviting

in this way the participant countries to make

use of the OSCE tools to achieve more stabil-

ity on the basis of cooperative security.

The Annual Regional Meeting of

OSCE

On the 21st of June, was held the annual

regional meeting, hosted by Vienna-based

OSCE Secretariat's Conflict Prevention Cen-

tre. In cooperation with the OSCE Mission

to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the meeting

brought together Heads of OSCE Field Op-

erations from South-Eastern Europe, the

Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre,

Ambassador Herbert Salber.

The participants discussed present and

future work of OSCE Missions in the region

and the importance of cooperation and

partnership between the OSCE and EU in

South-Eastern Europe.

“Both organizations value democracy

and fundamental freedoms, values that are

shared by each of the countries we work in,”

said Ambassador Gary D. Robbins, Head of

the OSCE Mission to BiH. “The OSCE, with its

inclusive membership and its comprehen-

sive security concept, is the natural place for

dialogue and cooperation of all.”

All participants agreed that cooperation

between the two organizations is crucial for

stability in South-Eastern Europe.

18 19

Montenegro: the role of women in

the security sector

The Third OSCE Regional Meeting of

Women Parliamentarians was held in Cetin-

je of Montenegro, on the 22nd of June, in

order to strengthen the role and participa-

tion of women in the security sector.

Ambassador Paraschiva Badescu, the

Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro,

argued that "Although enormous strides

have been made over the last decades, the

continued under-representation of women

in governance structures requires specific

effective measures to promote gender bal-

ance in all legislative, judicial and executive

bodies, especially at the political and deci-

sion-making levels". Meeting participants

agreed that enhancing gender equality was

an important tool for conflict prevention and

the creation of sustainable peace. They also

noted that women played an important sta-

bilizing role in South-Eastern Europe during

the conflict and post-conflict period of the

last decade.

The meeting was held as part of the

10th Cetinje Parliamentary Forum, orga-

nized by the Parliament of Montenegro,

the OSCE Mission to Montenegro and the

United Nations Development Programme in

Montenegro on the occasion of the 10th

Anniversary of the adoption of UN Secu-

rity Council Resolution 1325 on women and

peace and security.

OSCE Presence supports

parliamentary oversight of security

services

The OSCE Presence in Albania an-

nounced on the 14th of July, in Tirana, that

it is providing assistance with the drafting of

a bill on parliamentary oversight of the intel-

ligence and security services.

A former expert member of the Intel-

ligence and Security Committee of the U.K.

parliament, together with OSCE staff were

authorized to provide recommendations

that would be submitted to the Chair and

the Committee members of all political par-

ties, members of institutions and civil soci-

ety, before the bill is drafted. The objective

is to help produce a first draft to strengthen

parliamentary procedure, regulating the

oversight of the parliament over the work of

the Intelligence and Security Services.

The support followed a request from the

Chairman of the National Security Commit-

tee of the National Assembly of Albania and

is part of the Presence's Parliamentary Sup-

port Project, funded by the Embassy of the

Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Anniversary of the signing of the

Ohrid Framework Agreement

On the 12th of August a joint statement

was issued in Skopje, by EU, NATO, OSCE

and UN, in order to mark the 9th anniver-

sary of the signing of the Ohrid Framework

Agreement.

According to the statement, the EU Spe-

cial Representative and Head of Delegation

of the EU, Erwan Fouéré, the NATO HQ Sko-

pje Commander and Senior Military Repre-

sentative David Humar, the Head of the OSCE

Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje Am-

bassador Jose-Luis Herrero and the United

States Ambassador Philip T. Reeker, on behalf

of the four organizations, recognized and

welcomed the positive progress the country

has made in improving interethnic relations

since the signature of the Ohrid Framework

Agreement. They also recognized, that the

Agreement and relevant constitutional pro-

visions remain indispensible to building a

peaceful, and cohesive multiethnic society,

verifying in this way their commitment to

the Ohrid Framework Agreement.

They also stressed the particular impor-

tance of adopting further measures in the

fields of equitable representation, decentral-

ization and education, noting, that further

efforts are needed in order to establish an

education system able to foster integration

and interethnic relations at all levels.

cover story

Albania formally applied for EU

membership in April 2009, but if its acces-

sion bid is to move forward it must tackle a

number of issues:  particularly political sta-

bility, economic reform and corruption.

Milestones

• 1992: EU and Albania sign Trade and Co-

operation Agreement. Albania becomes

eligible for funding under the EU's pre-

accession PHARE programme.

• 1993: Opening of first EU delegation in

Tirana.

• 1999: EU proposes new Stabilisation

and Association Process (SAP) for five

countries in South Eastern Europe, in-

cluding Albania.

• June 2000: Feira European Council

states that all SAP countries are 'poten-

tial candidates' for EU membership.

• Nov. 2000: Zagreb summit starts SAP for

Albania.

• Jan. 2003: Negotiations on Stabilisa-

tion and Association Agreement (SAA)

between EU and Albania officially

launched.

• June 2003: Thessaloniki Summit con-

firms that SAP countries may join EU

once they are ready for membership.

• June 2004:  Council adopts first Euro-

pean Partnership for Albania.

• June 2006: Signature of the SAA.

• Jan. 2008: EU visa facilitation agreement

with Albania enters into force.

• Jun. 2008: Commission presents road-

map identifying specific requirements

for visa liberalisation.

• 1 Apr. 2009: SAA enters into force.

• 1 Apr. 2009: Albania becomes official

member of NATO.

• 28 Apr. 2009: Albania submits applica-

tion for EU membership.

• 14 Apr. 2010:  Albania returns Com-

mission questionnaire on EU accession

preparations.

Policy Summary

After World War Two, Albania became

a communist state allied with the Soviet

Union and then China, before pursuing its

own form of autarchic socialism under the

dictatorship of Enver Hoxha.

Under Hoxha, Albania became one of

the most economically underdeveloped

countries in the world. In the early 1990s,

a multiparty democracy was established –

replacing decades of isolationist communist

rule.

Albania is bordered by Montenegro

and Kosovo to the north, the Former Yugo-

slav Republic of Macedonia to the east and

Greece to the south. It has a coastline on the

Adriatic Sea.

Ethnically, Albania is largely homog-

enous – over 95% of its 3.6 million inhab-

itants are ethnic Albanians. According to

estimates, roughly 70% of the population is

Muslim, 20% Albanian Orthodox and 10%

Roman Catholic. The average age in Albania

is just 29.

Despite undergoing a radical transfor-

mation since the communist era, Albania re-

mains a very poor country. A recent Eurostat

survey places it at the very bottom of Europe

in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

EU relations since 1990

In 1992, Albania became eligible for

funding through PHARE, the EU's main

financial instrument to assist Central and

Eastern European countries in the run-up

to the 2004 enlargement. In 2001, CARDS

replaced PHARE for the Western Balkan

countries.

Since 2007, Albania has been receiving

EU financial aid under the Instrument for

Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) for transition

assistance, institution building and cross-

border cooperation. IPA aid for 2008-2010

totals €245.1 million.

Roadmap to EUBy Alexandros Arvanitakis

EU-Albania relations

20 21

Albania's Stabilisation and Association

Agreement (SAA) entered into force on 1

April 2009. Albania officially joined NATO on

the same day.

In December 2009, the EU excluded Al-

bania from the first stage of its visa liberalisa-

tion scheme for Western Balkan citizens. On

27 May 2010, the European Commission ad-

opted proposals to lift the requirements for

Albanian citizens once the country satisfies

the remaining criteria – meaning that visas

could be lifted by autumn this year.

Issues

Albania became a potential candidate

country for EU accession at the Thessaloniki

EU summit in June 2003 and officially sub-

mitted its application for membership in

April 2009.

Once it has evaluated the responses to

a questionnaire aimed at determining Alba-

nia's readiness to join the EU, the European

Commission will issue an 'opinion'. If it is

positive and then endorsed by the EU Coun-

cil of Ministers, the country will acquire of-

ficial candidate status.

After Albania had officially requested to

join the European Union, EU foreign minis-

ters stated that they would return to the

country's application once national elections

had been completed in June 2009.

However, since the poll was held on 28

June 2009, the ruling Democratic Party of

Prime Minister Sali Berisha and the Social-

ist party of opposition leader Edi Rama have

kept accusing each other of fraud

Berisha's party prevailed in a very close

vote. Olli Rehn, the EU's enlargement com-

missioner at the time, said the country must

do better when staging elections in future,

citing campaign violence and procedural

violations.

In its observation report on the elec-

tions, the OSCE's Office for Democratic

Institutions and Human Rights stated that

the elections marked tangible progress for

Albania but the improvements were over-

shadowed by the ''politicisation of technical

aspects''.

While the elections met most OSCE

[Organisation for Security and Cooperation

in Europe] commitments, they did not ad-

here to the highest standards for democratic

elections and all the political parties must

work harder to respect the letter and pur-

pose of the law, the report concluded.

The Socialist Party, which controls near-

ly half the seats in parliament, proceeded

to boycott the assembly for several months

and thus block the passage of laws – many

of which are needed to align the country

with EU legislation.

Though the Socialists returned to the

legislature in February, they are refusing to

take part in parliamentary activities as their

demand that the votes be recounted was re-

jected by the assembly, which is dominated

by Berisha's coalition.

EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan

Füle has expressed concern about the lack

of political dialogue and recently warned Ti-

rana that such instability has no place in the

democratic politics of the EU.

Yet the Socialist Party is showing no

signs of letting up, calling for anti-govern-

ment demonstrations to ''accelerate the

end'' of Berisha’s government. In May, 200

protestors from the socialist camp – in-

cluding 22 members of parliament – even

started a hunger strike.

cover story

In response, Martin Schulz of the Eu-

ropean Parliament’s Socialist group and

Joseph Daul of the European People's Party

have urged Prime Minister Berisha and op-

position leader Rama to end the political

deadlock and avoid a suspension of Albania’s

EU accession process .

On 8 July 2010, the European Parliament

adopted a resolution urging the Albanian

government and the opposition to end the

ongoing political crisis. MEPs called on the

two factions "to take over responsibility and

to enter into a constructive dialogue" and

reiterated their "comprehensive support" for

Albania's EU membership bid.

Economic prospects

Albania, which was a closed, centrally-

planned state for almost fifty years, has been

making the difficult transition to a modern,

free-market economy since the early 1990s.

Between 2004 and 2008, macroeco-

nomic growth in Albania averaged around

6% and despite the global economic crisis,

it still recorded 3% growth in 2009. A fiscal

reform package was recently adopted with

the aim of reducing the grey economy and

attracting foreign investment.

Agriculture accounts for over half of em-

ployment in Albania but modern equipment

is seriously lacking, while energy shortages

and poor infrastructure mean that business

development and outside investment is

scarce.

The EU is Albania's main trading partner

but the gap between imports and exports

has produced a large trade deficit. EU funds

are being used to improve the national road

and rail networks, the poor state of which is

hampering economic growth.

Corruption and organised crime

In its most recent report on Albania, the

European Commission raised concerns about

the impartiality of the judiciary and said a

comprehensive reform strategy was needed.

The Commission criticised attempts by

the national executive to limit the indepen-

dence of the judiciary and raised concerns

about its impartiality, following the post-

ponement of certain high-level cases on

procedural grounds.

The government has implemented an

anti-corruption strategy and action plan

in line with the EU's European Partnership

initiative and efforts have been made to in-

crease transparency.

However, the Commission still stated

that corruption remains a problem in many

areas and has called for greater political will,

stronger institutional arrangements and

better inter-agency coordination to fight a

''culture of impunity''.

On a visit to Brussels on 14 April, Prime

Minister Sali Berisha declared that a number

of tough measures had been put in place

to crack down on corruption and organised

crime.

He claimed that corruption had been

eradicated and that foreign investors now

enjoyed simple procedures for starting busi-

nesses at an attractive flat tax rate of 10%.

Speaking to EurActiv in an exclusive in-

terview, Berisha also that the Albanian mafia

is now a thing of the past, as arrests have

been conducted across Western European

countries and more than 1,000 criminals

have been sent to jail.

Positions

In an April 2010 statement following a

meeting with Albanian Prime Minister Sali

Berisha, Permanent President of the Euro-

pean Council Herman Van Rompuy said:

''Prime Minister Berisha represents a country

that has made its political vision and ambi-

tion very clear. I would like to use this oppor-

tunity as well to reiterate my strong com-

mitment to the EU integration perspective

of the entire region of the Western Balkans.''

On a visit to Albania in March, EU En-

largement Commissioner Štefan Füle used

unusually tough language, warning Tirana

that a prolonged political stalemate would

harm the country's EU accession prospects.

22 23

''A fully functioning parliament is essen-

tial to a fully functioning democracy. If the

current political stalemate were to persist,

it could well prevent Albania from reach-

ing the political standards expected from

a country that has applied for EU member-

ship,'' he said.

Speaking to EurActiv in March, Füle

expressed concern about the ''stability of

democratic institutions and the lack of polit-

ical dialogue in the parliament''. Recognising

that considerable progress had been made

in recent years, he urged Albania to over-

come the impasse, adding that ''responsibil-

ity lies with both political parties – both the

ruling group and the opposition'.'

On a visit to Brussels on 14 April, Al-

banian Prime Minister Sali Berisha pleaded

the case for his country's EU accession and

provided numerous examples of tough mea-

sures imposed to crack down on organised

crime and corruption.

In an exclusive interview with EurActiv,

the prime minister said that his country was

now one of the safest in Europe following a

''zero tolerance'' crackdown on the Albanian

mafia, and economic growth had remained

steady despite the global crisis.

On 5 April,  Socialist opposition leader

Edi Rama called on Albanians to instigate

demonstrations against the ''bad govern-

ing'' of Prime Minister Berisha's ruling Dem-

ocratic Party.

''The time has come for a big popular

movement in order to accelerate the end of

this government, responsible for electoral

fraud, but also for other social and economic

injustices,'' he said. Rama, who is also mayor

of Tirana, urged citizens to protest against

''stolen votes'' and the ''ruining of the coun-

try's and each family's economy''.

Albanian Foreign Minister Ilir Meta con-

ceded that the political stalemate was not

''contributing'' to speeding up the country's

EU integration. In an interview with RFE/

RL, he accused Socialist leader Edi Rama of

making demands that run counter to the

country's constitution.

He declared that an inquiry commission,

which was only set up by votes from the

ruling party, had the legal stature to rule on

the controversy and accused the Socialists of

''damaging the country's image for the sake

of the personal agenda of their own party

chairman'.'

Speaking to EurActiv in March, Albanian

Ambassador to France Ylljet Aliçka claimed

that Albania is making steady progress on

adopting European standards and has a lot

to offer the EU.

''Corruption and organised crime re-

main a problem in Albania, but there is a

strong desire to tackle these issues and the

results are encouraging […] But we have to

speed up the pace of reform in economics,

infrastructure and tourism,'' he said, adding

that the country's administrative capacity is

''more mature'' than its political class.

Aliçka believes that Albania suffers from

an image problem in Europe and would in

fact bring many positive things to the EU:

''Religious tolerance, secularism, cultural di-

versity, tourism, young people, skilled work-

ers... Albania's energy resources are also

very important – only 20% are currently

exploited,'' he said.

cover story

Speaking on 8 July in the European Par-

liament, German MEP Doris Pack (European

People's Party) lamented the socialist oppo-

sition's boycott of the parliament and wants

the EU to use visa liberalisation as an incen-

tive for reform. 

"A continuation of the boycott is bad

for Albania and immobilises the approach

towards the European Union, because with-

out a functioning Parliament, the upcoming

reform laws cannot be adopted. The op-

position must stop poisoning the political

climate of the country with its irresponsible

acting. The citizens of Albania are fed up

with these political games. All they want is a

functioning parliament, which can build up

a new - European - future for the country,''

she stated.

''The European Parliament supports a

European perspective for Albania. If Albania

fulfills the criteria, Albanian citizens should

then be allowed to enter into the European

Union also without a visa. This would be an

important incentive for the necessary re-

forms," added Pack.

  After its observation mission for last

year's national elections, the OSCE's Of-

fice for Democratic Institutions and Human

Rights stated: ''The 28 June 2009 parlia-

mentary elections marked tangible progress

with regard to the voter registration and

identification process, the legal framework,

adopted in a consensual manner by the two

main parties, the voting, counting and the

adjudication of election disputes."

"These substantial improvements were

overshadowed by the politicisation of tech-

nical aspects of the process, including dur-

ing the vote count and tabulation, which

temporarily blocked the counting process in

some areas, as well as by violations observed

during the election campaign. These actions

of political parties undermined public con-

fidence in the election process," the state-

ment continued. 

In its April 2010 report on the state of

democracy in the country, the Madrid-based

European think-tank FRIDE concluded that

''Albania's democratic status still falls short

of European standards'' and that ''important

democratic deficits remain in the areas of

the rule of law, judicial independence, elec-

tions, media independence, and control over

corruption''.

The HYPERLINK "http://www.fride.org/

download/IP_Albania_ENG_ap10.pdf"

report calls for the strengthening of demo-

cratic institutions, promoting the respect of

the rule of law and the fight against corrup-

tion, dismantling the unlawful interconnec-

tions between business, media and politics,

closer monitoring by the international com-

munity of the developments in Albania and

further concerted action on the country's

democratic flaws.

''Our report uncovers some major chal-

lenges that both sides of the political divide

in Albania need to take seriously if the coun-

try is to deepen its democratic reforms and

move closer towards the EU,'' said FRIDE

director-general Richard Youngs.

EU official documentsEuropean Commission: Albania 2009 Progress Report (14 Oct. 2009)European Commission: Conclusions on Al-bania - Enlargement Strategy & Main Chal-lenges 2009-10 (14 Oct. 2009)European Commission: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010 (14 Oct. 2009)European Council: Decision on the Europe-an Partnership with Albania (18 Feb. 2008)European Council: EU-Albania visa facilita-tion agreement (19 Dec. 2007)

Alexandros Arvanitakis is a political

scientist

24 25

A quarterly review on European intergration S.E. Europe & the the S.E. Mediterranean

A quarterly review on European intergrationS.E. Europe & the the S.E. Mediterranean

The curtain rose on the latest act of

Balkan diplomacy: the advisory opinion of

the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the

legality of Kosovo’s proclamation of inde-

pendence in 2008 was announced at 15:00

CET on Thursday, July 22. Contrary to what

had many expected, the Court did not come

up with a Solomon’s judgment that might

prove equally (un)satisfactory for both sides;

rather, it produced a clear winner and a loser.

In its ruling the ICJ stated that the Feb-

ruary 2008 declaration of independence

by the Kosovo Assembly violated neither

the international legal order nor the United

Nation Security Council Resolution 1244. In

September 2008 the Court was asked by

the United Nations General Assembly to

give its advice on a question put forth by

Serbia, which inquired “whether the dec-

laration of independence by the provisional

self-ruling institutions of Kosovo was in line

with international law.” Resorting to the ICJ

was a shrewd diplomatic stroke by Belgrade,

through which it bought time and slowed

international momentum toward recogni-

tion of Kosovo for over two years. Pristina

and Belgrade are engaged in a battle on

the world stage to draw countries into their

respective camps. Ultimately, Serbia’s at-

tempt to outmaneuver Kosovo through the

ICJ laid in ruins, leading to one of the most

important victories of Kosovar Albanians in

the international arena.

The President of ICJ Hisashi Owada read

the decision according to which Kosovo’s

declaration of independence does not violate

international law in principle, since the latter

contains no prohibition of such kind. In this

light, he pointed to around 100 similar dec-

larations throughout world history, whose

legality has not been questioned. Further,

the Court’s decision read that the UN Char-

ter principle of territorial integrity applies to

inter-state relations, not secessions. With re-

gard to UN Security Council Resolution 1244,

the Court argued that it did not preclude any

sort of final status outcome, including inde-

pendence. The judgment did not mention

whether Kosovo’s secession was legal, or

whether other states could legally recognize

its independence. Rather, all it did was to

rule that international law does not prohibit

the declaration of independence.

The ICJ opinion can be summarized in

three main points:

1. Kosovo’s Declaration of independence

does not violate international law

2. Kosovo’s declaration of independence

does not violate UN Security Council

Resolution 1244

3. Independence does not violate the

Constitutional Framework for Provi-

sional Self-Government

Although not binding, the ICJ’s advisory

opinion bears significant political weight

and forms a turning point in the long-debat-

ed Kosovo issue, as it can be seen from the

reactions that it provoked both throughout

the region, as well as globally. Reactions of

the two parties concerned are indicative of

their attitudes and their future intentions.

Additionally, since each side is not made up

of one single subject, it is crucial to exam-

ine all basic actors that exercise a larger or

smaller influence within each side.

Reactions from Serbia

The advisory opinion of the ICJ came as

a slap in the face to the Serbian side. Opti-

mist statements of their leaders in the previ-

ous days notwithstanding, Serbs were very

disappointed to see that their own initiative

backfired, although it had initially been ex-

perienced as a victory, when pro-Albanian

countries at the UN General Assembly in

September 2008 failed to block the Serbian

proposal from proceeding to the ICJ.

Serbian president Boris Tadić described

the decision as harsh, but nevertheless tried

to downplay its impact by pointing out to

the rather vague distinction that ICJ itself

had made between the unilateral declara-

tion of independence and the right to se-

cede, claiming that the Court concentrated

on the technical nature of the former, while

it avoided to take positions on the latter,

by Bledar Feta

& Apostolis Karabairis,

EKEM/CSIS

26 27

which is of most substance. This distinction,

as well as the Court’s omission to rule on

the legal implication of the independence

declaration (as, for example, on whether

it produces statehood), has appeared in

the statements of other Serb officials, too,

and generated a debate about whether the

question to the ICJ was properly formulated

by the legal expert team. The government,

on its part, reaffirmed its resolution never

to recognize an independent Kosovar state

and reiterated its commitment to continue

fighting by political means. Furthermore, it

announced an extraordinary session to ex-

amine its next steps, above all seeking the

adoption of a favorable resolution at the UN

General Assembly.

Government parties came up with calls

for unity and renewed efforts but were also

supportive of the government and the Presi-

dent, despite the debacle. On the contrary,

opposition parties were highly critical: DSS

president Koštunica called for resignations,

while Nikolić’s SNS and Šešelj’s SRS de-

manded a harder line in the Kosovo issue,

since the current policy of concessions and

partnership with the West proved, as they

claimed, to be detrimental to Serbian na-

tional interests. On the other side, Jovanović

and Drašković, leaders of LDP and SPO re-

spectively who had previously endorsed

the idea of Serbia’s recognizing Kosovo as a

sovereign state, each applying their own ra-

tionale, found new grounds to support their

stance and invited more political parties in

the country to join them.

All the same, such revisionist approaches

remained marginal in the political spectrum,

while gaining only little support among the

circles of domestic liberal thinkers. The pre-

vailing mainstream opinion reads that the

official state policy vis-à-vis Kosovo should re-

main generally the same. This is, after all, what

the Kosovo Serb local leadership had asked for

immediately after the announcement of the

ICJ opinion. The head of the Kosovska Mitro-

vica periphery Radenko Nedeljković called

Belgrade not to give up fighting against the

recognition of the Kosovar state and his fel-

low Serbs in Kosovo to continue their boycott

of Kosovar institutions and retain their own

parallel ones.

Non-party actors’ reactions were less

visible in Serbia. No massive demonstra-

tions were observed either in Serbia proper

or in Kosovo. Even in Kosovska Mitrovica

the crowd remained quiet, unlike previous

times. High security measures taken by

KFOR were thus rendered needless. Obvi-

ously the prevailing feeling was disappoint-

ment rather than indignation, hence no one

burst out in dynamic actions.

The reaction of the usually talkative

Serb Patriarch Irinej was in the same wave-

length. He called the flock to join a special

service and pray for Kosovo. Carefully cho-

sen words made up a statement, which,

although partial, did not convey intolerance

or xenophobia.

In conclusion, initial Serb reactions to

ICJ’s decision show that no major shift is

expected to take place on Serbian policy as

far as the Kosovo issue is concerned. And this

is due to the salience attributed to it by the

right-wing parties and because advocating

a revised approach has become a taboo for

almost every Serb politician. Therefore, al-

beit with a weakened arsenal, Serbia seems

intent to remain on the same track. What

is most likely to change is the people that

occupy some key positions. There has been

increasing pressure that Serb Minister of

Foreign Affairs Vuk Jeremić is removed from

office, because he has been the champion of,

and directly responsible for the ICJ venture,

but also because he most objects to any pol-

icy update. In a broader aspect, the whole

government, along with the President of the

Republic, has been held responsible for the

heavy defeat. Fortunately for them, the gov-

ernmental coalition has remained united,

which is not given in such cases, but still

their image has been suffered and opposi-

tion has got a chance to morally discredit

them in front of the electorate on this all-

important issue.

As a consequence, many are those who

fear that Serbia again risks turning isolation-

ist and putting its European integration per-

spective at stake, not only because this per-

ceived national debacle is attributed to the

pro-Western block, but also because Serbian

citizens largely got disillusioned by the inter-

cover story

national community, and especially Western

nations, most of which stood against their

country with no serious reservation.

Reactions from Kosovo

The advisory opinion of the ICJ drew

immediate reactions from Kosovo and

Albanian-inhabited countries. Scattered

across Kosovo, Serbia, FYR of Macedonia and

Montenegro, Albanians followed intently

what was happening miles away in The

Hague. The decision has been interpreted as

a historical victory for the Albanian nation,

and also an argument that will add many

more recognizing states to the current list

of 69. Kosovars celebrated the verdict on the

streets of Pristina by hugging each other,

blowing the horns of their cars and waving

Kosovo’s flag, considering the decision a re-

sounding reaffirmation of the legitimacy of

their cause.

Kosovo officials described the long-

awaited opinion as a great victory in their

country’s struggle to be recognized as a

full and legitimate state, as the Court stated

clearly and explicitly in favor of Kosovo, an

unexpected outcome for the majority of the

Albanian population. Kosovo Prime Minister

Hashim Thaci reaffirmed his government’s

willingness for talks with Serbia over techni-

cal issues. According to him the “decision on

the declaration of independence has been

reconfirmed, legalized, and re-legitimized

by the ICJ’s opinion, offering an opportunity

to all countries that hesitated to recognize

Kosovo, to do so, as all the dilemmas have

been resolved”. The Minister of Foreign Af-

fairs Skender Hyseni made clear that any dis-

cussion with Serbia on practical matters of

mutual interest must be on an equal footing

and on a state-to-state basis. Kosovo lead-

ers desire engaging in negotiations that aim

to leave Kosovo an independent state with

its Serb-populated northern region part of

it. Diplomatic sources claim that discussion

between the two countries on decentraliza-

tion, cultural heritage and the northern part

of Kosovo can start later this year. July 22

was another blessed day for the Republic of

Kosovo and all her people, stated the coun-

try’s President Fatmir Sejdiu. The Kosovo

President called for more international rec-

ognitions, as the ruling eventually removes

all the doubts that countries that have not

recognized Kosovo yet may have had.

There is now more optimism in Pristina

that the nonbinding verdict, which comes

two years after the UN General Assembly re-

quested the opinion, will set the stage for a

renewed Kosovo push for more international

recognitions. The government in Pristina

desires to expand the current total of 69

recognitions to more than 100, thus dem-

onstrating the country’s legitimacy through

the majority of United Nation members. This

could provide a new impetus to Kosovo’s

regional cooperation and integration into

international organizations. It should, how-

ever, be noted that the increased number of

recognitions does not necessarily open the

way for Kosovo’s UN membership given the

opposition by China and Russia, two veto-

wielding members in the United Nation Se-

curity Council. Kosovo is expected to apply

for United Nations’ membership in 2011.

Kosovo Assembly has adopted a declara-

tion in support of the advisory opinion, stat-

ing that the historical decision will contribute

to peace and stability not only of the Republic

of Kosovo, but the whole region. Considering

the Court’s decision to be professional and

impartial, respecting at the same time Kosovo

citizen’s willingness for independence the dec-

laration call the European Union to find a mo-

dus vivendi on Kosovo issue while demands

from the reluctant countries to recognize the

new state. In clear contrast to Serbian views,

Kosovo officials believe that Kosovo does not

constitute a precedent in any other case in the

world. The Court’s opinion was closely tailored

to the unique circumstances of Kosovo; it was

not about other regions or states. Furthermore,

as far as the statements of Kosovo officials are

concerned, it has been clear that nothing in the

opinion given by the Court casts any doubt on

the statehood of the Republic of Kosovo, which

is an established fact.

The reaction from the political parties

was in the same wavelength. The IJC opinion

was considered from both government and

opposition parties as the best answer that

has been given thus far on the Kosovo’s right

as a legitimate, legal, consolidated and func-

tional state. Generally, there was a consensus

between them that the decision is righteous

international historical response to histori-

cal injustice that has been made to Kosovo.

In contrast to Kosovo’s officials, the Vete-

vendosje (self-determination) movement, a

popular nationalist civil society group, does

not share the same views. They accuse Kosovo

government and politicians of attributing

more importance to the formal attributes of

Kosovo independence and less to its territorial

integrity and genuine sovereignty. Veteven-

dosje thinks that the government’s celebra-

tory tones are not justified by the ICJ decision

since the latter did not rule on the substance

of Kosovo’s independence but rather on the

fact that the declaration is not illegal. More

have to be done for consolidating Kosovo

independence. The movement’s leader Albin

Kurti protests against the implementation

of the Ahtisaari plan as it does not provide

sovereignty to Kosovo but a ‘deepening parti-

tion’ giving Belgrade actually the opportunity

through decentralization to control every Ser-

bian populated territory.

28 29

Reactions from Banja Luka, Tirana,

Tetovo and the Presevo Valley

Every development in the Kosovo is-

sue unavoidably has an impact on Bosnian

Serbs, since it is often linked to the future of

Republika Srpska. With regards to ICJ’s advi-

sory opinion, Bosnian Serb leaders once more

aligned themselves with official Belgrade.

They accused the court of bias and politically

driven decision-making and reassured that

Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue its pol-

icy of non-recognition with regard to Kosovo.

To the question of whether the ICJ ruling will

affect Republika Srpska’s status vis-à-vis the

Bosnian state similar, Prime Minister Dodik

made it clear that Republika Srpska remains

an entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina ac-

cording to the Dayton Agreement. However,

Dodik did not dismiss the possibility of its self-

determination in the long run. Apart from his

intentions in the domestic scene, this state-

ment indicated support to the Serbian cause

but also served as a warning that insistence

on Kosovo’s independence may have far-

reaching spillover effects.

Swift was the reaction from Albania,

which is seen as the “mother country”. Im-

mediately after the decision the Albanian

Prime Minister, Sali Berisha, welcomed the

“historical” opinion. Berisha believes that

the Hague verdict makes a major contribu-

tion toward fresh relations between the

Serbs and the Albanians between, Tirana

and Belgrade as well as to help in the re-

lations between Pristina and Belgrade.

There is no doubt that after the unilateral

declaration of Kosovo’s independence Al-

bania has increased its efforts to cooper-

ate with region countries, especially with

the Albanian inhabited ones. Furthermore,

Albanians and Kosovars are against every

attempt of bargaining with territories. Ac-

cording to him, The Hague definitely puts

an end to this chapter and through Kosovo’s

independence the fluidity of the Albanians

in the Balkans comes to an end; it turns into

a settled issue and, thus, gets consolidated.

The Albanian Minister of Foreign Affairs

described the decision as a reconfirmation

of the unchangeable right of the citizens of

Kosovo for self-determination, contribut-

ing to stability in Kosovo, the region and

further. Albania expresses its full support

for the further affirmation of Kosovo across

the international arena. Opposition leader,

Edi Rama expressed great satisfaction with

the decision, stressing that Albanians are not

divided when it comes to Kosovo issue. All

political parties and institutions in Albania

also welcomed the Court’s decision.

For more than two decades, Kosovo and

the Kosovo issue have been in the center of

attention of the political and scientific circles

of the Albanian inhabited countries in the

area. The Albanian political parties in the

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

have an unchanged position towards the

Kosovo issue, which is: “Kosovo a sovereign

and independent state and an important

precondition for the stability of the region”.

They do not see nor treat the resolution of

the issue as a national problem of Albanians,

but as something that surpasses the national

boundaries and affects regional stability and

progress. Thus, the Democratic Union for In-

tegration, the largest Albanian political par-

ty in the country, considers the Court’s deci-

sion as a clear confirmation of the legality of

the creation of the new state; in addition, it

views its decision as endorsing the correct-

ness of the FYROM government’s earlier de-

cision to recognize Kosovo and to establish

diplomatic relations. For the leader of the

opposition Democratic Party of Albanians,

Menduh Thaci, the ICJ’s opinion constitutes

a fundamental act of the new historical

era that begins in the region. For Thaci the

decision is proof of the honorable Albanian

struggles for freedom and independence,

while at the same time constituting an

extraordinary contribution to peace and

stability in the region. Generally, Albanians

in FYROM view the decision as serving the

common good of the region and downplay

the Albanian nationalist element in it.

The political elite of Presevo Valley,

which is home to the largest Albanian com-

munity in Serbia, notice the great impor-

tance of the decision not only for Kosovo but

also for its eastern side: Presevo, Bujanovac

and Medvedja, “three municipalities that

never given up the struggle for freedom

and independence.” Radical and moderate

political parties in the Valley published press

releases on ICJ’s decision, congratulating the

Kosovo authorities and the Albanian nation.

Additionally, the Albanian diasporas around

the world celebrated their personal contri-

butions to this historical achievement. In all

Albanian-inhabited territories, community

leaders, activists, politicians, and intellectu-

als viewed the decision as a historical victory

that belongs to the whole Albanian nation.

Although Albanian political elites in the Bal-

kans have a long history of mutual animos-

ity as far as their own distinct problems and

agendas is concerned, it should not be dif-

ficult to find common ground when it comes

to the Kosovo issue.

Bledar Feta is a Junior Researcher at the

Hellenic Centre for European Studies.

Apostolis Karabairis is an expert on Balkan

affairs.

cover story

World powers facing a fateful dead-

line in the Middle East peace process will

invite Israelis and Palestinians to open direct

talks on 2 September in Washington. Envoys

from the so-called Quartet of Powers - the

United States, the European Union, Russia

and the United Nations - have been discuss-

ing a draft statement inviting the two sides

to talks intended to conclude a treaty in one

year, diplomatic sources said.The Israelis and

Palestinians were expected to agree to at-

tend, and US President Barack Obama would

be present at the talks. The Quartet said in

June that peace talks would be expected to

conclude in 24 months, but the new draft

says 12 months. The Palestinian Authority

government intends to have established all

the attributes of statehood by mid-2011.

Diplomats say the idea that a unilateral

declaration of statehood could win support

if talks do not start or collapse in the next

12 months is gaining interest. The peace

process resumed in May after a hiatus of 19

months but is stalled over the terms of an

upgrade from indirect talks mediated by US

envoy George Mitchell to direct negotia-

tions. Israel insists it is ready for direct talks

provided there are no preconditions. The

Palestinians are ready provided there is a

clear agenda. Israel says an agenda means

preconditions. Resolving the snag over

terms is crucial, diplomats say. The "invita-

tion to talks" statement by the Quartet has

been awaited since Monday.

Face to face

Obama wants face-to-face talks started

well before 26 September, when Israel's

10-month moratorium on Jewish settle-

ment building in the occupied West Bank is

due to end. Full-scale return to settlement

construction could sink the talks for good.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

spoke by telephone with the Quartet repre-

sentative, former British Prime Minister Tony

Blair, as well as Jordanian Foreign Minister

Nasser Judeh  as Washington kept up pres-

By Thanos Triantafyllou

30 31

sure for talks to resume. State Department

spokesman P.J. Crowley said: "We believe

we are getting very close to an agreement

to enter into direct negotiations. We think

we're well positioned to get there. But

we continue to work on the details of this

process. "Clinton also spoke to Egyptian

President Hosni Mubarak about the peace

process. The Quartet draft reaffirms a "full

commitment to its previous statements".

Quartet statements from Moscow, Trieste

and New York this year called for a halt to

settlement building. The draft, however,

does not explicitly repeat that demand,

which would be rejected by right-wingers in

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's

centre-right coalition. It simply says that

direct, bilateral negotiations that resolve all

final status issues should "lead to a settle-

ment, negotiated between the parties, that

ends the occupation and results in a state at

peace with Israel". It says negotiations "can

be completed within one year". Success will

require the sustained support of Arab states,

it adds. Netanyahu may benefit from a move

to direct talks, countering the notion abroad

that he is not a genuine peace-seeker. Pal-

estinian President Mahmoud Abbas, by con-

trast, has a lot to lose politically. He could be

destroyed if he emerged from the process

after months of talking as a failed appeaser.

If accepted by Netanyahu as the basis for

talks, the Quartet invitation could give Ab-

bas the backing he needs. Few Palestinians

or Israelis believe direct talks would lead to

a peace treaty soon, or that one would be

quickly implemented if it were ever agreed.

In Israel's coalition, attention is focused on

the 26 September settlement moratorium

deadline, with a majority of Netanyahu's in-

ner cabinet opposed to extending the settle-

ment freeze, but a minority seeking some

compromise that Abbas could swallow. One

idea is to allow building in big established

settlements that Israel expects to keep in a

peace deal but not in those it would hand

over in a land swap with the Palestinians.

cover story

book reviewsGreece’s decision to lift its veto and

grant candidate status to Turkey at the

ΕU Summit in Helsinki in December 1999

was the result of a paramount shift in

Greece's foreign policy that most ana-

lysts attributed to Greece's entry into the

European Community in January 1981.

The paramount shift in Greece’s policy

toward Turkey has been the instigator

of a process that managed to bring a

substantive change, actually a break-

through, on Greek-Turkish relations.

What were the reasons for this U-

turn in Greece’s foreign policy vis-à-vis

Turkey, the neighboring state which was

considered to be Greece’s major security

threat over the course of the last thirty

years, as well as of the reasons behind

Greece’s major foreign policy initiatives?

Was this fundamental reorientation of

Greece’s strategy the result of a rational

recognition of Greece’s new strategic

needs and priorities, of a more in-depth

ideational change related to a collapse of

the traditional – and reigning – ortho-

doxy about how to deal with the ‘threat

from the east’ or of a combination of

both? When did Greece’s new strategy

to transform the three decades dispute

with its NATO-ally and ‘arch-enemy’

into a less confrontational and more

stable relationship reach its climax?

What were the particular goals the new

strategy was aiming at achieving and,

most importantly, to what extent had

the new strategy managed through its

implementation to affect the behavior

of Turkey and/or its definition of national

identity and interests? To what extent

had the assumption of power by a con-

servative government, in March 2004,

resulted in an alteration for the better

– the so-called refinement – or for the

worse – the so-called invalidation – of

the strategy adopted by the socialists?

Panayotis Tsakonas’ new book offers

insightful answers to the above central

questions which --although related to

the most important chapter of Greece’s

foreign policy in the post-WWII era—

remained unanswered in the relevant

literature. Moreover, based  on unique

primary sources (given that the author

is an academic who served as an advisor

to the former Minister of Foreign Affairs,

George Papandreou from June 1999 to

January 2004) and extensive research

on secondary sources, the book presents

the first theoretical treatise of the most

significant shift ever made in Greece’s

strategy vis-à-vis Turkey.

Indeed, by advancing the 'strategic

culture' literature the book illustrates

that culture is a basic determinant in un-

derstanding change in a state’s strategy.

It also highlights the causal linkage be-

tween culture and strategic behavior by

demonstrating the role particular realms

of Greece’s strategic culture – agentic

culture and national culture – play in

explaining outcomes and in accounting

for change.

Moreover, by proposing how states

employ international socialization in

their strategic approaches to transform

the behavior of other states, the book

presents the most comprehensive ex-

planation to date of what defines a

state's socialization strategy, when it is

likely to emerge in relations between

adversaries, what forms it can take and

with what consequences. The book thus

shows how the paramount change in

the traditional strategy Greece followed

towards Turkey from the mid-70s and

the adoption and implementation of a

new strategy in the late-90s provides a

unique empirical case to approach the

concept of international socialization

as a state strategy, pursued and imple-

mented by a threatened Greece vis-à-vis

a threatening Turkey. By developing a

particular type of socialization strat-

egy, namely active socialization strategy,

Greece managed –Tsakonas argues—

to transform over a certain period of time

the EU factor into a catalytic instrument

able not only to strengthen its balancing

efforts but also to lead to the resolution

of the Greek-Turkish dispute.

The book does not only offer a fasci-

nating new theory on foreign policy be-

havior, as T.V. Paul, James McGill Profes-

sor of International Relations, notes in his

endorsement. More important, taking

stock of the book’s findings Greek and

Turkish decision makers now do know

what it would take for a breakthrough in

Greek-Turkish relations to happen.

Dimitris Xenakis

The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greek-Turkish Relations. Grasping Greece’s Socialization Strategy

Panayotis J. Tsakonas, The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greek-Turkish Relations. Grasping Greece’s Socialization Strategy

(Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke and New York, 2010), pp. 304.

34 35

The State of Europe: Tough

questions for the EU

On October 14 Friends of Europe will

host its seventh annual State of Europe high-

level brainstorming roundtable for Friends of

Europe’s Trustees, business leaders, top poli-

cymakers and opinion-formers at the Palais

d’Egmont. Organised by Friends of Europe

with the support of Belgium’s EU Presidency

and the Financial Times in partnership with

Veolia Environnement, NYSE Euronext and

Vodafone, it will consist of three sessions and

a TV debate. The roundtable will welcome a

select group of some 70 senior discussants,

including ministers, senior policymakers,

business leaders and international press. A

maximum of 2 introductory discussants will

give remarks at the start of each session be-

fore the senior discussants will engage in an

interactive debate. The roundtable will also

be attended by a few hundred observers.

Entitled “Tough Questions for the EU”, State

of Europe will be co-chaired by Friends of

Europe’s President Viscount Etienne Davi-

gnon and Former European Commissioner

for Competition and President of Università

Bocconi Mario Monti. Herman Van Rompuy,

President of the European Council, Michel

Barnier, EU Commissioner for Internal Mar-

ket and Services, Jerzy Buzek, President of

the European Parliament, Dominique Ce-

rutti, President, Deputy Chief Executive Of-

ficer and Global Head of Technology of NYSE

Euronext, Vittorio Colao, Chief Executive of

Vodafone Group and Josette Sheeran, Ex-

ecutive Director of the United Nations World

Food Programme (WFP), have confirmed

their participation.

http://www.friendsofeurope.org/Home/tab-

id/454/Default.aspx

The Future of the Integrated Border

Management Strategy

On September 06, Centre For European

Policy Studies, will organize In cooperation

with the Law, Science, Technology and So-

ciety (LSTS) research centre of the Vrije Uni-

versiteit Brussel (VUB).

Speakers: Jean-Louis De Brouwer,

Deputy Director-General, DG Home Affairs,

European Commission; Simon Busuttil, MEP

and Member of the Committee on Civil Lib-

erties, Justice and Home Affairs; Sergio Car-

rera, Research Fellow, CEPS; Henrik Nielsen,

Head of Unit for Border Management and

Return Policy, DG Home Affairs, European

Commission; Anneliese Baldaccini, Execu-

tive Officer for Asylum and Immigration,

Amnesty International EU Office; María Duro

Mansilla, Advocacy Officer, European Council

on Refugees and Exiles; Katarzyna Cuadrat-

Grzybowska, Legal Advisor, European Data

Protection Supervisor (EDPS)

http://www.ceps.eu

Upcoming

36 37

International Conference EuroMed

2010 on Digital Cultural Heritage

The EuroMed 2010 joint event will focus

on interdisciplinary and multi-disciplinary

research concerning both cutting edge Cul-

tural Heritage Informatics and use of tech-

nology for the representation, documenta-

tion, preservation, archiving and communi-

cation of CH knowledge. The scope includes

every phase of CH information technology:

initial data capture/digitization, informa-

tion/data processing, reconstruction, visu-

alization, preservation and documentation

as well as dissemination of results to the

scientific and Cultural Heritage communities

and to the general public (Multilingual, Mul-

timedia Digital Library). This event will be

supported by a scientific committee which

consists of almost 100 renowned profession-

als in the area of CH for a blind peer review

of all submitted papers. The main goal of the

event is not only to illustrate the programs

underway but also excellent work wherever

it is located and however it is supported, in

order to promote a common approach to the

tasks of e-documentation of World Cultural

Heritage. Furthermore, regional capacities

in the area of Cultural Heritage and IT will

be facilitated in advancing their know-how

through the exchange of information and

generation of new ideas and cooperation’s,

where the world meets the finger prints of

several ancient civilizations on earth.

http://www.cs.ucy.ac.cy

European Innovation Summit (EIS

On October 11, Knowledge for Innova-

tion, organize the 2nd European Innovation

Summit (EIS) in the European Parliamen.

The role of innovation in tackling the

grand challenges will be at the centre of dis-

cussion with stakeholders and policy makers

from all over Europe and beyond. A debate

will take place on how to achieve Europe’s

goal to become a global leader in innovation

and how we can make innovation partner-

ships successful. The Summit includes a

three-day exhibition in the European Parlia-

ment, breakfasts, lunches and dinners, as

well as the session “Europe’s Future Nobel

Prize Winner”, aiming to raise students’ in-

terest in science and technology careers.

http://www.knowledge4innovation.eu

Events

cover story

Kremasti bridge, Lesbos, Greece

38 39