The battle of Hattin 1187.pdf

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THE BATTLE OF HATTIN. I187

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff Co lleg e in partialfulfillment o ft he requirements for thedegreeMASTER O F MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

byERIC W. OLSON, LCDR. USNB.S., Georgetown Ilniversity, Washington, D.C., I983

Fort Leavenwonh. KansasI997

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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- .-L13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)Th e study reviews the Battle of Hattin to determine why the arm : of the Crusaders was decisively defeated. TheHattin was one of the most critical battles of the Mid dle Ages. The battle resulted in the virtual destruction of thiStates and directly led to the Third Crusade. The study begins with a brief overview of the political, economic, amotivations behind the Cm ad es . A brief chronological history of si@icant events is provided to bridge the rouyears from the foundation of the Crusader States until the Battle of Hattin. A description of the Crusader and Mamilitaq organizations, equipment, swtegy and tactics isprovided to give a fnmework to examine the actions 01prior to and during the Battle of Hattin. The study concludes with an examination of the Crusader decision to figwhellier that decision was in accordance with the s tnt cgi c objectives of the C r u d e r S tates. The study presents Ian example of poor su ateg ic and tactical decision making.

F O m ApprovedI O M 6 No. 704-0188

6.AUTHOR(S)Lieutenant Commander Eric W. Olson, U.S.Navy

14. SUBJECT TERMSCrusades, Saladin, Hattin, Te rnpe as, Hospitalities16.PRICE CODEL

OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRA CTSECURITY CL ASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLA SSIFICATIONUNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIEDOF REPORTUNCLASSIFIEDc ISlandardForm 298 (Rev. 2-59)Piarcnbsd b y b N S I Sld 239-18298.102SN 754041-28(F55M)


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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCETHESlS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Lieutenant Com mander Eric W. OlsonThesis Title: The Battle of Hattin, 1 187

Approved by:

Accepted this 6th day of June 1997 by:

,Dircctor. Graduate Degree_-Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those o ft he student author and do notnecessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General StatTCollege or any othergovernmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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A H S T R A C ITIIT:B A T T L E O F I IAT I ' IN. I187 by LCD R Eric W . Olson. l SN: XY pagesThe study reviems the Battle of Halt in to determine why the arm o ft h e Cru wde rs was decisivelydefeated. 'I e Battle o f Hatt in was one o f thc most critical battles o ft h e Midd le Ages. The battleresulted in the v i r t ua l destruction o f the Crusader States and directly led to the Th ird Crusadc.The study begins wi th a brie f overview of the political. economic: and religious mo tivations behindthe Crusades. A brie f chronological history of significant events is prwided to bridge the roughlninety )ears fro m thc foundation o fth e Crusader States until the Ba t~l e f I lat tin. A description ofthe Crusader and Mo slem m ilita ry organizations. equipment, strategy. and tactics is provided togive a framework to examine the actions o f both partics prio r t o and during the Ba ttle o f Hattin.The study concludes wit h an exam iiiillion o f the Crusader decision to tight and whether thatdecision was i n accordance u i t h the strategic objectives o ft he Crusader States. The study presentsthe battle a s an example o f poor strategic and tactical decision making.

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LIST OF II.I.~JSTRATIONSPage-.-.igure

I. The Muslim Near East 1127-1 174 ....................... ........................... 042. Feudal Iloldings in the Kingdom ofJerusalem .............................................................. I03 . T h e Rattle of1 laitin. afternoon ..................................................... . 0 54 . The Battle of Hattin. late morning to noon ........................................... 6 75 Map of the Vic in ity O fh t t i n ............................................... ..... 71


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INTRODUCTION

The Battle of Hattin (3-4 July I 87) was one of the most decisive battles of the MiddleAges. The battle was fought between the combined Crusader armies, under the leadership of thcKing of Jerusalem, and a Moslem army, under their great leader Saladin. Over the course of thebattle, the Crusa der army w as virtually eliminated. Without a field army to oppose him, S aladin

destroyed the Crusader States with the exception of three major cities and a few isolated fortresses.What the Crusa ders had spent ninety years building was destroyed due to the Crusade r leaderships'poor tactical and strategic decision making prior to the battle.

The focus of this thesis will be on the strategic, political, and tactical decisions that led tothe decisive defeat of the Army of the Crusaders at the Battle of Ilattin. Strategic questio ns willinclude: What were the strategic objectives of the Crusader States? Why did the Army oft heCrusa ders commit to battle? Did the Crusa ders have to commit to battle to achieve their strategicobjectives? And, Was the risk of battle worth the gain?

Political questions will include: Did a politically divided leadership directly lead to theCrusa ders' defeat? Did King Guy's experiences in a similar defensive action in I 83 influence hisdecisions at Hattin'? And. As King of Jerusalem, did King Guy have to be concerned with thepolitical ramifications of not committing to battle?

Tactic ally, what tactical decisions led to the Crusa ders ' de feat at Hattin? Was the decisionto march from SalTuriya to Tiberias in one day feasible? Was the decision to halt the army and

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camp in the open on 3 July 1187 a primary c ause of the later defeat? And, Could the Army of theCrusaders have reached a source of water on 3 July?

To provide a framework for answering thse questions, a historical background and adescription of the opposing armics will be provided. The historical background will provide B bricfdescription of the events that led to the First Crusade, the establishment of the Crusader States, thepolitical divisions within the Crusad er States, and thc rise ofs al ad in . The description o f theoppo sing armies will include a description of the armys organization, strategy, tactics. andequipmcnt.


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CHAPTER IFOlJNDATION AND GROW TH OF THE CRUSADER STATES. 1095 - I174

The period 1095-1174 would see the foundation of the Crusade r States in the Middle Eastand their dramatic political. economic, and military growth. What starte d as an attempt to help thebeleaguered Byzantine Empire and t o reduce the fighting i n Western Eu rope would be the start of aChristian military presence in the region for two hundred years. The C rusades would also ser ve asthe catalyst for a reunification of the Moslem Near East, first under Nur-ad-Din and later underSaladin. During this period, the Crus aders would reach the height of their power. I-lowcvcr, by theend of th is period. the strategic balance of power in the region will begin to swing against them.

In the year 1095. there was a political vacuum of power i n the Near East. The two historicpowers in thc region the Abbasid C aliphate and the Byzantine Empirc w crc both severelyweakened. The Abbasid Caliphate existed i n name only as its military power had been crushed bythe Seljuks. Thc Seljuks also dcfcatcd the Byzantines at the battlc ofM anzikcrt (1071). whichresulted in the Byzantine loss of most of Asia Minor. Up until the battle of M anzikert, theByzantines. due to their military strength. could influence the Moslcms who controlled Jerusalcmand the Holy Lands. I n 1095, without a strong military presence i n Asia Minor, the Byzantineslost thcir ability to protect Christian rights in the Iloly Lands.'

Also in the year 1095, the great Seljuk Empirc includcd all of present day Iraq, Iran, Syria.Lebanon. Jordan. and most of lsracl and T urkcy. The Seljuk Empirc's growth. while explosive,was not stable. Loyalties were still mor e to the tribe than to the empire. Only the strong rule of theSultan Alp A rslan and his son Malik-Shah kept the empire together.. With Malik-Shah's

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Fig. I . The Muslim Near East. Rcprinted from: Jonathan Riley-Smith MI.. The Atlas of theCrusades, (New York: Facts on File, 1990). 59.

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assassination in 1095, the empirc began to break apart du ring a battle for succession. Asia Minordivided into three. part s, the largest being the Sultanate of Rum ruled by K ilij Arslan. Th e othertwo parts, to the north and east of present day Ankara, were ruled by tw o separate Turkomantribes. I n Syria, separate emiratcs were established at Antioch. Alcppo, Horns, and Damascus.Mesopotamia also divided into separate emirates with the strongest being based on M o s ~ l . ~

The other Moslcm major regional power was the Fatamid Caliphate based in Cairo. TheFatamid Caliphate had lost most of its former territory in what is now Lebanon and Israel toMalik-Shah. Th e Fatam ids were Shiites and. therefore, natural rivals to both the Sunni Seljuksand the Caliph i n Baghdad. Prior to thc arrival of the First Crusade. thc Fatamids w erc able toreconquer the ports alon g the coast as far north as T yre and reconquered Jerusalem i n 1098. TheFatamids wcrc, therefore, not firmly entrenched in the region when the First Crusade arriw d.When the Crusaders conquered Antioch and Edcssa, the Fatamids did not initially view them aspotential rivals but a s a possible counterbalancc to the Seljuks.

The major Christian power in the region, the Byzantine Empire, was attempting to rcbuildafier the disaster at Manzikcrt. The Byzantines had lost most of thcir traditional armys recruitinggrounds and were having difficulty raising troops to defend what was leA of thc cmpirc. TheByzantines were hard pressed by the Seljuks i n Asia Minor, by the Slavs i n the Balkans, and inGreece by the Normans of southern Italy. The currcnt emperor Alexius I Comncnus had appealedto Pope Urban I1 for assistance in raising troops to help reconquer a portion of Asia Minor. A s anincentive, the emperor had agreed to hclp rcconcile the Eastern (Orthodox) and W cstcrn (RomanCatholic) churches that had officially split in 1054. For his part, Urban I I sought the emperorssupport in his continuing struggle against the anti-Pope Clement 111.

Christian Western Europe in 1095 was in a period of both expansion and internal division.Christians were fighting Moslems in Spain, the Western Mediterranean, and Sicily: and, even for a

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brief time: Normans from Sicily occupied Tunis. The Capetian K ing of France. the GermanEmperor I lenry IV, nd the E nglish King William 11 were all attempting to form more centralizLdfeudal states. Excess military manpower and the law of primogeniture led to extensive fightingbetween Christians. Th e pope was struggling against the major European m onarchs for control ofthe Catholic Church. Th e German Em peror Henry IV was su pporting the anti-Pope C lement 111.who, for a short period of time. occupied Rome with German military assistance forcing PopeUrban I1 to find safe havcn with the Norman rulers of southern Italy.4

Thc eleventh century was also a period of explosive growth of m onasteries and religiousorders. The average Western E uropean was very dcvoot. With the conversion o ft h e Hungariansto Christianity, Byzantine control ofthe Balkans and Asia Minor. and control ofthe WesternMcditcrranean by the Italian City States, pilgrimages to the Holy Lands bccamc possible even forChristians of modest means. A pilgrimage to Jerusalem and the Holy Lands becam e the goal formany Western Europeans. In the middle part of th e century, hospices were set up to receivcpilgrims in Egyptian controlled ports and along the major land routes in what is now 1,ebanon and

Israel. This system of supp ort for pilgrims broke down with the Byzantine l o s s of most o f AsiaMinor after the Battle of Manzikert and the Egyptian loss of control in most oft he Holy Lands.The new Moslcm rulcrs of the pilgrimage routes sa w the pilgrims a s either a so urce of revenuc orpossible threat. The breakdown in the support stru cture for Christian pilgrims led to reports ofabuse and death of pilgrims at the hands of M o ~ l e m s . ~

In 1095, one man Pope Ijrhan I I started a chain of events that changed the face of W esternEurope and the Near East for almost two hundred ym rs. On 27 Novembcr 27 1095, at the C ouncilofClermont, Pope Urban II first proclaimed a holy Crusadc to frce thc Eastern churches fromMoslem domination. Urban l l saw a Cru sade as a means to accom plish three primary goals: limitfurther Ch ristian against C hristian fighting in Europe by sending cxcess military manpower to thc

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east, provide supp ort to the Byzantines who w ere attempting to recover territory lost after theBattle of Manzikert, and strengthcn the papacy. Th e Council of Clermont was the culmination o fmonths o f work by Urban I I to ensure that he had the supp ort of several key nobles and thepowerful Abbot o f Cluny. The extensive preparation ensured that the announccd Crusade w ouldnot fail and at least a minimal amount of aid would reach the Byzantines. Urban 11 neverconceived how successful his call for a Crusade would be or how long its effects would l a x 6

With the Byzantine need for military assistance and the ~ X C C S Sof military manpower inWestern Europe, a Crusade i n support of the eastern Christians (B yzantines) would achieve all ofUrban 11's goals. Send ing manpower east would ease military tension in Western Europe whilehopefully expanding the Christian frontier. Supporting the Byzantine Emperor would ensure thatthe Emperor supported Urban I I against the anti-pope and also opcncd the door fo r a reuniting ofthe Eastern and W estern churche s under the papa cy. Finally, if the call for a Crusade wassuccessful, i t would increase the prestige of the papacy and strengthen Rome's control over theincreasingly indepcndcnt bishops and monasteries.'

Afier extensive preparation, thc First Crusade let1 for the Holy Lands in 1096. Th e size ofthe army of the First Crusade is not known. a good estimate would be between 5,000 to 7.000cavalry and 35.000 to 45,000 infantry.' Ane r stopping first at Constantinople, the Crusaderspassed across the straits into Asia Minor in 1097. Their first opponent was the strongest Seljukstate. the Sultanate of Rum. The Crusa ders fought and won three major battles--Nicea,Dorylaeum. and Ta rsus. The Crusaders, while victorious. w ere severely wcakcned and might nothave been able to continue without the assistance of the Hyiantines. The First Crusa de's nextmajor challenge was Antioch. which had a garrison of 10,000 and was one of the largest cities inthc Near East. Unable to take the city by storm, the Crusa ders placed the city under siege i nOctober 1097. The siege lasted nine months and only ended after the Crusa ders dereated a Moslem

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rclicfarm y. estimated to consist of over 20.000 troops. On e y w r later. thc Crus aders took thcirm i o r objective Jerusalem.

.Ihc success of the First C rusadc w as due to excellent and very fortunate timing. If Malik-Shah had not bccn assassinated. it is likcly thc Crusaders would not have made i t past the firstseries of battles in Asia Minor. Instead, the Crusa ders faced rival Moslem rulers who hadweakened thcmsclvcs i n internecinc fighting. I n addition. the backbone of Moslem strength inSyria the Turkoma n tribes had withdrawn to fight in Mesopotamia and Iran. Even with theseadvantages, the Crusaders were fortunate to capture Antioch and defeat the first of the Moslemcounteroffcnsives under Kerbogha Governor of Mosul.

The Crusa dcrs wcre successful dcspitc divided leadership, lack of a logistics base oncethey lcft Byzantine territory, and no plan for how to administer the captured territory. Lack ofccntralizcd leadership led to a pcrmancnt division o ft he C rusader army after the successful siegeof Antioch. One of the most powerful Crus adcr Icadcrs, Bohemond of Taranto, decided to remainin Antioch and attempt to establish an independent kingdom . Another major leader, Baldwin ofBoulogne, also broke offon his own to establish his own kingdom among the Armenians i n thevicinity of Edessa. The army was further weakened after the capture of Jcrusalcm, when most ofthe Crus ading army. having complctcd its mission, returned home. In 1099: the small Crusadcrarmy w as sprcad from Antioch and Edessa in the north and northeast to Jcrusaleni and Ja ffa in thesouth. The C hristians only held thcsc four major cities.

Thc lack of a local logistics base madc i t impcrativc for the remaining Crusade rs to cnsurecontinued acccss to supplies from Western Europc. One o ft h e last acts of the Crusa ders returningto W estern Europ e was thc fortification of Jaffa. J a f h bccamc thc lifcblood of the infant KingdomofJe rusa lcm . The requirement for access to the Mcditcrranean for resupply madc the capture ofports held by thc Fatamids, especially Acre, crucial for the long term survival o ft h e Crusadcrs.

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Acquisition of ports, such as Acre, Tyre, Sidon and Ascalon, provided not only for security butalso for the tinancial well-heing o ft h e Kingdom.

With the return of the bulk o f the Crusader army to Western E urope, those that remainedhad to determine how they were going to defend the captured territory. Unity of command w asnow vital, a s the Crusader army by the year 1 100 nurnbercd only between 1.000 to 2,000 troops.The Cru saders decided to form a kingdom with its capital at Jerusalem. For the next forty years:the Crusa ders were able to expand their territories due to continued divisions in Moslem leadershipand suppor t from Western Europc. Evcntually. the Crusa der Sta tes would stabilize as four distinctpolitical entities: the Kingdom of Jcrusalcm. the Principality of Antioch, and the counties ofTripoli and Edessa.

The Kingdom of Jcrusalem includcd all of modern day Israel. the West Bank, G ai a, thecoastal plain of Lebanon up to and including Hcirut. and the areas immcdiatcly east of tlie JordanRiver. The P rincipality of Antioch included the city of Antioch. all arcas west of th e Orantes riversouth to the present S yrian-Lebanese border. and thc coastal plain north of A ntioch to

Alexandretta. The County of Tripoli included thc coastal areas of L ebanon north of Beirut to thecurrent Syrian-Lebanese bordcr. Thc County of Edcssa was based on the city of Edessa andincluded most of the then A rmenian populatcd area s in what is now southcastern T urkey.Officially, the Principality of Antioch and the two countics wcre vassals of th e King of Jerusalem:however, these states frequently acted independently and made their own treaties with ncighboringMoslem states, 0 t h o the detriment of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. During the period of thisstudy, the Principality of'Antioch and thc Coun ty of Tripoli were depcndcnt on the Kingdom ofJerusalem for military support and, thcrcforc, nominally recognized thc authority of the King ofJerusalem. Collwtively. the four states were referred to as tlie Kingdom of th e Crusader s or thcOutremer.

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Fig. 2. Feudal Holdings in the Kingdom or Jerusalem. Reprinted liorn: Jonathan Riley-Smith ed..The Atlas of the Crusades, ( N e w York: Facts on Filc. I990), i .


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,The C rusaders enjoyed spectacular success until the beginning of the I 130s. Prior to

I 130, the Crusad ers w ere able to prevent the various Moslem Emirs in Syria and Iraq from unitingagainst the newly established Crusa der States. In I 130, ad-ad -Din Zengi, the Governor ofMosul, w as ab le to establish effective control over Aleppo. The uniting of two of the mostpow,erful Moslem provinces presented a direct threat to the Principality o f Antioch and the Countyof Edessa. Between I 130 and I 144, the Crusad ers had been able to retain possession of most oftheir northern holdings as Zengi was occupied in not only fighting the Crusa ders but also his co-religionists in northern Syria and M esopotamia. In I 144. Count Joscelin of Edessa removed mostof his Army from Edessa w hile fighting in suppo rt of a Moslem ally. As a result, Zcngi was ableto bring the bulk of his army against Edessa and capture i t before the Cru saders could respond.

The loss of Edessa was quite possibly the culminating point for the Crusaders. Thecapture of Edessa elevated Zengi from a power hungry warlord to defender of the faith. Zengi'sreputation and relations with the caliph in Baghdad were restored. Zengi now received suppo rtfrom Baghdad, which strengthened his hold of northern M esopotamia. Control of the County ofEdessa improved communication between Zengi's territories. Moslem Syria was no longersepara ted from Mesopotamia by a hostile Christia n state. 'The loss of Edessa denied the Crusad erStates their forw ard defense and opened up the Principality of Antioch and the County of Tripoli toattack. Access was also lost to a significant portion ofCh ristian Armenia and its Christianmilitary resourccs. Th e loss of Edessa sent a shockw ave through Eu rope which directly led to thcSecond Crusade.'

The Second Crusade. which was launched to help recapture the County of Edessa, failed tostrengthen the Crus aders' position in the Holy Lands. The Second Crusade failed due to a lack o fcoordination between the Crusading armics, attempts t o separate and weaken the force by theByzantine Emperor, and stronger Moslem resistance. Instead of a strong. united Christian army:

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the Second C rusa de divided into two s eparate armies which were defeated piecemeal by the Seljuksin Anatolia. Th e Byzantine Emperor, unsure of the intent and reliability of the Crusaders. dideverything he could to divide the Crusaders, limit direct Byzantine assistance to the Crusaders, andprevent resupply of the Crusad er army from Byzantine territory. By the time the army of theSecond Crus ade reached Antioch, it was reduced to one tenth its original size.

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When the army of the Second Crusad e reached Antioch, its objectives had also changed.Th e original objective to recapture Edessa was abandoned, and. instead of fighting to help se curethe beleaguered Crusad er States in the north, the Army m arched to the relative security ofJerusalem. After a delay to reconstitute, the army of the Second Cru sade moved againstDamascus: which, even though under M oslem control, was not openly hostile to the Cru saderStates. Dam ascus was the last major city in Syria not under the control of Zengi's successor, Nur-ad-Din (Zengi was assassinated in I 146). The Crusader assault on the city failed in part due todivisions in the Cru sader Army and a relief force sent by Nur-ad-Din. Instead of attacking Nur-ad-Din directly an d possibly weakening his hold on northern S yria, the Second Crusade actuallystrengthened his position by forcing Damascus to rely on him for military assistance.

For the next ten years the Cru saders and Nur-ad-Din would fight for control of Damascus.The C rusaders never again threatened to capture the city hut, through a military alliance, attemptedto keep the city independent. In I 156 Nur-ad-Din was finally able to capture Damascus and uniteMoslem Syria. Nur-ad-Din now controlled virtually all Moslem territory bordcring the CrusaderStates, except for Fatamid Egypt and the territory of the Assassins in the Lebanese mountains.Nur-ad-Din was prevented from moving decisively against the Crusader S tates by a series ofviolent earthquakes w hich devastated northern Syria. While Nur-ad-Din was attempting to restorehis defenses in northern Syria he fell seriously i l l . This was the first of two long term seriousillnesscs which reduced Nur-ad-D in's ability to lead offensive operations over the next cight years.

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.Nur-ad-Din died. Nur-ad-Dins empire collapsed once again into rival emirates, with one majorexception--Saladin was now master of Egypt. the w ealthiest and most populous Moslem state. andready to ca ny out his own Crusade.

Sir Steven Runciman, A History of the Crusades: I The First Cru sad e (Cambridge, UK: Camb ridge University Press, 1951), 51.

*Claude Cahan. T he Turkish Invasion: The Selchukids in A Historv o f the Crusades:Vol. I The First Hundred Years, ed.Kenneth M. Senon (Madison, WI: University of WisconsinPress, 1969), 162-165.Sir Hamilton A. R. Gibb, Th e Caliphate and the Arab States in A History of theCrusades: Vol. I The First Hundred Years, ed. Kenneth M. Setton (Madison, WI: University ofWisconsin Press, 1969), 94-95.Sidney Painter, Western Eu rope on the Eve of the Crusades in A Historv of theCrusades: Vol. I The First Hundred Years, cd.Kenneth M. Setton (Madison, WI: University ofWisconsin Press), 17-1 9, 24-29.

Sir Steven R unciman, Th e Pilgrimages to Palestine before 1095 in A llistorv ofthgCrusades: Vol. I The First Hundred Years: ed. Kenneth M. Setton (Madison . WI: University o fWisconsin Press), 71-78.

6Dana Munro, T he Kingdom of the Crusade rs (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press,1935). 32-33.

lbid.Sir Steven Runciman, The Pilgrimages to Palestine before 1095 in A H istorv ofthcCrusades: Vol. I The F irst Hundred Years, ed. Kenneth M. Setton (Madison. WI: University o fWisconsin Press), Appendix 11, 336-341.Sir Hamilton A. R. Gibb , Zengi and the Fall ofEdessa in A Historv of the Crusades:Vol. 1 The First llundredb d. Kenneth M . Setton (Madison . WI: University of Wisconsin

Press), 461.

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CHAPTEK 2THE DECLINE OF THE CRUSADER STATES. 1174-1 187

The year 1 174 was a watershed y ear in the history of the Holy Lands. The Christian andMoslem worlds were both divided an er the deaths o f King Amalric ofJerusalem and Nur-ad-Din.Between 1 174 and I 187, the Moslems strived for and achieved unity, while the Christians split intotwo major factions critically weakening the Crusa der States. Also during this period, theCrusa ders attempted and failed to prevent Moslem reunification. Saladin. based in Egypt. rose toprominence and reunited Zengis former empire setting the stage for the decisive hattlc of Hattin.Meanwhile. the factional split o ft h e Crusader nobility and rhe struggle over who would succeedBaldwin IV dominated the Cru sader S tates. Christian disunity prevented unified opposition toSaladin and played a major part in the Crusader defeat at the battle ofl-la ttin.

On 15 May I 174, Nur-ad-Din died. His death len his underage son. al-Malik as-Salih. innominal control of a united empire. Saladin acknowledged his allegiance to as-Salih. whileattempting to position himself as the boys guardian. Due 10 an attack on Alexandria by Sicily andan attack on Banyas by King Amalric, Saladin was unable to move into Sy ria until October. FromMay to October 1174, one ofNur-ad -Dins nephews Saif-ad-Din had taken control of Mosul andmost ofNur-ad-D ins former territory in Mesopotamia. In addition. the Emir of Damascu s hadmade peace with King Amalric and agreed to pay reparations, and one of Nur-ad-Dins household.the eunuch Gumushtigin seized as-Salih and Aleppo.

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The Crusade r St ates'h ere not able to take advantage of Moslem disunity, as King Amalricd i d on I 1 July I 174 at the age of thirty-eight. Am alric had been a strong and very active King.He had the suppo rt of the Latin nobility, the military ordcrs. and the Church. He was the last kingto enjoy un i f i c d suppo rt from the three major power blocks in the Crusader States. King A m a hwas succeedcd by his son Baldwin IV, who was still a minor and suffered from leprosy. I t wasevident from the start that Baldwin IV would not live long past his majority. His illncss and thefact that he was a minor led to a battle for control of th e bailliage (regency) and w ho wouldsucceed him as the next king.

The initial question of who would be bailli for Baldwin IV was scttlcd when Raymond 111,Count of Tripoli, declared himself bailli in late Autumn I 174. Raymond 111 was Baldwin 1v'sclosest m ale relative and one of the strongest and wealthiest nobles i n the Kingdom o f Jerusalem.In addition to his control of onc of thc thrcc remaining Crusa dcr States, he was also the Prince ofGalilee. Count Raymond had the suppo rt of most of the established nobility, including theprinciple houses of Toron. Ibclin, Sidon, and Ramlah. Therc was no recorded oppositioii to hisassumption of duties as bailli.

In Octobcr 1 174, Saladin was tinally able to m ove his army out of Egypt and into Syria.Much to the consternation o f both the Crusadcrs and Saladin's Moslem rivals. he was able tooccupied Damascu s almost w ithout opposition on 28 October. Saladin appointcd his hrotherTughtigin as Governor of Dam ascus and procccded north with his army toward Aleppo and Nur-ad-Din's heir, as-Salih. Saladin quickly occupied Homs and Hamah and continued on to Alcppo,which he laid under sicgc. Gumushtigin. who hcld Aleppo in as-Salih's name, attempted to rallyopposition against Saladin. Specifically. Gumushtigin scnt rcqucsts for support to Saif-ad-Din inMosul and to Count Raymond. The Crusad er army, under Count Raymond. besieged Horns, whilethe Moslem army from Mosul marched to the relicfol'A lcppo. The combination of the Crusader

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threat to Homs and the size oft h e reliefarmy caused Saladin to l i f t the siege and return t oDamascus. With Saladins withdrawal, the Crusa dcr a rmy left the field and dispersed.

In April 1175, the combined armies of Aleppo and M osul attempted to pressure Saladininto relinquishing control of Hom s and H amah. Saladin, with timely reinforccment from Egypt,was able to defeat the combined army at Hamah. With the victory at Ham ah, Saladin returned tothe offensive and oncd again laid siege to Alcppo. Without the military forcc to oppose Saladin,Gumushtigin signed a truce with Saladin and agreed to support Saladins army aga inst theCrusaders. Saladin, in seven months. had seized control of all of Moslem Syria, with thc cxccptionof Aleppo. Saladin also received recognition of his conquests by the Caliph in Baghdad, whichprovided legitimacy for his actions. Saladins final major action of 1 175 was thc signing of a truccwith the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Having secured his foothold in Syria. Saladins immediateobjective was not to attack the C rusaders. but to gain control of northern Syria.

At the beginning of the campaign season o f I 176, Saladin was once again i n northernSyria facing the combined armies of Aleppo and Mosul. Saladin was victorious and the position o fAleppo was further wcakcncd. The wcakness of Aleppo and the strengthening of his hold in Syriaallowed Saladin to shitt his attention for the next three years against the Crusadcr S tates.

The year I 176 was very significant for the Crusadc r States. Baldwin IV reached thc ageof majority and Count Raymond relinquished the bailliagc. The Crusader S tate leadershipattempted to stabilize the line of succession by arra nging thc m arriage of Baldwin IVs sistcr Sybilto W illiam Longsword, son of William of Montfcrrat, a powcrful French noble family.Unfortunately, William Longsw ord dicd lcss than a year later. The union of William Longswordand Sibyl would result in a son, Baldwin V: who would briefly bc King ofJcrusalcm.

While the Crusa dcr States appcarcd to be building a stable foundation for the futurc, thebalance of power in the Year East shifted in favor of the Moslems. In September I 176, the army

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,

of Byzantine Empcror M anuai I was dkis ively defeatcd at M yriokephalon by the Seljuk Turks ofthe Sultanate of Rum. The Byzantine losses wcrc so great that the Byzantines were removed a s amajor playcr in thc Holy Lands. For years thc B yzantines had actcd as a major sou rce of militaryand economic support to the Crusader States. The prcsence of a large and powcrful Byzantinearmy and navy had prcvcnted serious attacks on thc Principality of Antioch. During the reign ofKing Amalric, the By7m tines had provided substantial military support for the Crusadercampaigns in Egypt. Even after King Amalric's death, the B yzantincs proposed a further jointByzantine-Crusader attack on Saladin. What little suppo rt remained from the Byzantine Empircdisappeared completely with Empcror Manual 1's death in 1 180.'

The last major opportunity for the Crusade rs to decisively attack Saladin cam e i n I 177.Philip of Flanders, accompanied by a large army (estimatcd at bctwcen seven to twelve thousandtroops), arrived in the Holy Lands. Philip was offered the bailliage of th c Kingdom o f Jerusalemand eventual succession to the throne through marriage to Sibyl, the rcccntly widowed sistcr of th cKing Baldwin IV. The presence of Philip momentarily checked Saladin's expansion. Saladinwaitcd in Egvpt to see where the Crusa ders and Philip of Flanders would strike. Philip's lime inthe Holy Lands was a frustrating period for the Crusadcrs . Philip rcfuscd the bailliage and said hcwould support whocvcr the King appointcd as hailli. Reginald of Chatillon. Lord of Montreal andKcrak, was appointed bailli. and preparations were made for an attack on Egypt. Whilcpreparations were underway, Philip of Flanders refused to participate, stating he would ratherattack a target closer to Jerusalem. Philip also rcfuscd to attack D amascus and. instcad. sent hisarmy north to attack on one Saladin's lcsscr possessions the town of Harim.

The division of th e Crusa der army gave Saladin the opportunity to deploy the bulk of hisarmy against the southern border of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Saladin's army was estimatcd toincludc 26.000 troops. which probably included most of his Egyptian Army. Saladin was so

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a l l costs nssociatcd with the construct ion ot'rtie fortress. if t h c Crusaders would have i t dism;~ntlctl.Ki ng B;iId\vin IV refiiscd and bot h sides prepared fi)r battle.

Saladin gathcrcd his forces a t 1)arnascus. \vhilcsending columns of hrag crs into theKingdom o f Jcrusalcrri arid the Cnunt . o f Tr ipol i . Moslem Syria wa s sril l suffcring frnm drought.a r i d Saladin ticcdcd to cibtain supplics frcm his fornscrs i n Crusader territory tn keep his army int h e tield. S a l d i n also sent a dctachrncrit of troops froin I h n a s c t ~ so shado~r he Crusader armyand provide details o f i ts mnvcmcnt . The L~ainascus orce hecnmc cn ga~ c'd ith and defeated anadvancc guard of the Crusader army. Most notable about tlic victory was the death of Humphreyof Toron. the Constable of the Kingdo m ol'Jcrusalcrn and an :ill of Count I


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~ o u l dpen li irnsclfu p to attack from the ~ H Oi t ies. Saladin decided that lie had t o remove thetlirc iit these two ci t ies poscd hcli irz tic could decisively engage the Crusaders."

l r o t n tlie end of 1 I 7 0 through the cleveiit l i of Junc I 18.3. Saladin dcvcitcd the illajo rit o fhis attention to reducing M ow 1 and Alcppo. Instead ofta kin g advantage ofthe absence o f most ofSaladin's army. the Crusader States limited their militar y actions to a series of raids againstDamascus : ind Mos lem Syria. In I IX?. wli i lc Sa lxl in \vas campaigning against Mosul . theCrusaders raided t o the w r y outskirts of Damascus. SOIIICf Sal;iditi's ;id\ isors suggested that heshould retiirn to S r ia to defend against the Crusader raids. Saladin disagreed and stated. "let them(raid). w hile they knock dow n villagcs \\c arc taking cities."' I ' l i i s statement very iiptl sums uph e change iii the stratesic en\ ironnicnt. Saladin \\;is strcngthciiing his cmpirc b [tic capture o fmajor ci t ies i n Mcsopotaniia. and tlic Crusaders were onl> able t o mot t i l t inetfi.ctual raids andcapture ininor villages.

- .

Du ring the period I 17% I IYO the f~ ict i~~t ta l iz ar iont t l t c C'rusadcr Starc>' nobility bcg:itl.Count I laymontl Ill \bas no longer hiiill i niid had withdrawn to i t t tcnd to the affai rs o i ' t he Count>o f l r i p o l i . King I3;i ldnii i IV ' s medical condition declined and his inothcr. Agnes. and t i i s matcriialuncle. Josccliri 111. hcir t o the lost County o f Edcssa. t~scd e i r in f lucncc to appoint theirsupporters t o key positioiis iii the govcrttment. 111 I 179. the Constable t rf' thc Kingdom o fJcrusalcm Hurnphrey of .I'oron was killed. Humphrey was ;in al ly o l 'Co i i n t Ila itlorid and thepowerfi l l noble tirnil ics that had existed in the Kin gtlotn since i ts foiindiition. This tiction. mhich\ b i l l hc rcfcrrcd to as the old nobility. supported pc;icc \\it11 Saladin and a defensive strategy. Ih cold nohilit \titlio iit t l ic prcscncc of he ir Icadcr Count l l a> nond were unable to prevent theappointment of Amalric de Lu5ipian. n rclntivcl n e n i i r r i b i i l to tlie I d l m i c l s . a s the l i e uconstablc.N


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Thc appointrricnt of Am alr ic dc 1.usignan was signiiicnnt hccausc the othcr m i o r Piction.which will he referred to ;I$ the court party. now controllcd t h e t w n major ofticcs ill the Kingdom ofJerusalem. In addition to the Constable's position. Joscelin Ill was tlic Kiiigdom's Seneschal(respons ible for the Kingdom's finances and administering r o y l err i topi. The next move hy thecourt party \ \as to control tlic succession a f t e r Baldwin IV's death. ngnes. thc quccn mother.proposed that Sihyl ma rry Ama lric dc Lusignan's hrothcr G u y Gu y dc Lusignan was also a n e narrival to the kingdom. Guy had no significant military cxpcricncc and did not bri ng any additionalmilitary strength to the kingdom. The prnposcd marriage \bas opposcd by the old nob ility \vho fcltthat Sibyl's marriage should bc uscd to strengthen the kingdom. and if a I'avorahle suitor coulrl notbe hunt1 in Western Europe. then she should m arry into one o f t h c old cstahlishcd nohlc families."

' lhc opposi tion of th c old nohility came to a head in Marc h I IXO tvhen Count Rnynondand his ally Rohcmond. Prince o fh t io c h . marched into the Kingtloni ofJcrusalcni with asubstantial military forcc. The quccii mother convinccd Ki ng Dn ldwin t l i i i t Count Kayniondplarined to scizc tlic throne. s Da ldw in ordered the immcdiatc triarriagc o f his sister. Sibyl. t o G u y .l l ic marriage was iicrfor tiicii hcforc Raymond and Bohcmond rc x h c d .Icrusalcrn. Whrtl news of

the wedding rcachcd Count Kaymond and Prince Bohcmond. the ttiri icd their t'orccs around andlcft the kingdom. Count Kaymond \wu ld stay out o f t h c Kingdom for t w o years. The cnurtparty's control of the Kingdorn of Jerusalem w a s further strcngthcncd when thcy w r c ahlo toappoint one of th ci r party a s Patriarch of Jcrusalcm. 0

'The court par ty as now in ascendancc. lnstcad of usins thcir n c n position to strcngtltcnthe kingdom, thc court piirty continued i t s attempts tn wcakcn the old nobility. In I 18'. Countllay mo nd attempted to return t o t l ic kingdoni to visit his ticfof(.iaIilcc. 1 110 cnttrt party pcrsuadcdt l ic K ing t o dcny him entrance. The old nobility used t l ie incidcnt to counterattack against the coiirtparty. The old nob ility convinced t l ie kin g that he w u l J no t itlictiatc one ol'tl ic strongest tioblc> i i t


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t l i c Crusndcr States. especially with Saladin's growing strengh. Ra rnond was n l l owcd to cntc'rt l ie Kii ipdoin: houcvcr . tlic coiitlict over thc issue clcarl> dcliiicatcd taction rncmbcrship. 'The

court part n w v consisted ot'tlic qiiccn rnothcr. the Scncsclial Joscclin 111. the Constable Amalricde I.usigian. the PLitriarch of Jerusalcin. mid l lcg ina ld dc ~ l i a t i l l o ~ i - - l . o r ( ~f Moi i t rca l and Kc'r:th.Tlic old inohility f i c t i o n consisted of('ount Rnyinond 111. Isscssicvis. Saladiii signed ii trucewith the Principali t d.A nt i ocl i s o lie coiild conccntriitc' his li m es ngaiiist (lie K i t y d o in of

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Jeriisalcni. Saladin I~OH' commanded a force that consisted of"8.500 cavalry. nunierous l.ootsoldiers. Turko niaii auxiliaries. and the o w r 4.000 ltro ng reserve forces ol. Egypt and i i ava l

squadrons."" In August hc announccd to the Ca liph in Baghdad that the tiinc had comc to rcsumethe Jihad. A Jihad is a struggle (war/hattlc) I Moslctns against those nho attack the faith.

Wi th Saladin's success i n S ~ r ia . e Crusader Ar my gathered at Saffi iriya to awaitreinforccnicnts and Saladin's attack. K in g Uald\vin IV's leprosy mas approaching i ts final $tapes:he could no longer scc arid had lost t he iisc o f his hands arid feet. As he was t iot able to lead theCrusader :\rmy. he nccdcd to appoint a baill i . The coiirt party succeeded in hav ing their candidate.Guy dc Lusignan nanicd bailli. The upcoming batdc \vith Saladin would be an opportunity t oso lid ify Gu 's pos ition as the next king of Jcrusalcm. Wliilc awaiting Saladin's attack. theCrusaders wcrc able to sather an iirm of approxirnately thirteen hundred knights arid tiftectithousand infan try. l h i s was the largest field urm) the Crusaders had raised since thc SecondCrus;itie."

Saladin critcrcd the kingdom of Jerusalem near thc t o w n o f Uuisan. nh ich hc sacked andbiirtied to the ground. Saladin wanted to lurc the Crusader urrny away f rom its base at Saffi iriya.Saffi iriya offered the Crusaders a central location. an outstandiitg logistics base with ample waterand access to a number of important fortilications il. the Crusadcrs needed to retreat. Salad in sentraidin g columns throughout the region in an attempt t o lure the Crusader army. led b) Gu) dcLusignan. away f rom Sathriya . The Crusnder mi iy did not inow i i ir eight days aiid Saladinrcturncd with his army to Damascus. Wh ile thc Kingdom of Jerusalem sustained damage from theraidin g parties. the kinsdotn had t iot lost any signiticant tcrritory.

What would appear to bc a strategic victor for the Crusaders was seen as a dct'eat bCrusader nobility. The Crusader army was the stroiigcst it had hcci i i t i thirry -tivc years. yet it 11x1t iat raised a hand against Saladin. There are confl icti ng tlicorics why fhc Crus;idcr arm d id not

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nio\c. The f i rst is t l i i i t Guy dc I..usiginan was n v.cnk lcndcr uiiuble to decide liowarm y. 'The second theor i s flint t l ic old nobil i ty did not \\ant G u y to \ \ i n : great vicmry obcr

Saladiii. thcrcb y ensuring that he \\auld hc t l i c next king ofJcrusalcni. The third theory i s that theold nob ility knew that tlic Crusaders wcrc consitlerably outiiurribcrcd b> Saladiri's arm arid that i fthe Crusndcrs stayed i n their mong position a t Saffuri>a. Saladin wo u ld hn\c to come to SaKuriyi ior withdrnu .I'

employ ~ I i c

Thc net result o f t l i c dcfci i>i \e i c t ion \ v a ~hat ( ; t i> dc Liisignaii \bas discrcditcd a s aleader. The old nobil i ty was nblc to hiiw Guy rc i i imcd a?;buil l i . In additioii. the old nobil i tyconvinced K in g Bald \ r i i i IV that Gu y wa s the wrong person to riiccccd l h l d t r i n as K i n g ofJcrusulcnn. King Baldwin I V cliangcd his wil l to rend f l i n t Guy \ \ a s no longer cl i f ib lc t o succeed tothe throne. Ihldwin IV's tivc-year-old i icpliciv \ \ ; IS crowned Baldwin V and wo uld succeed Iiiiii. I this ricplicw I3aldain V died v.hilc' st i l l a ~n inor .hc next king of.lerusalciii \vould he choscin by thecombined coiiiic il o f t l i c Kings of I~ ng la nd . :r:iricc. t l ic llol> Roniaii I:mpcror. and thc Pope. K i n gDaldmin IV cvcn attempted to Iiavc Guy's marriage t o his sister aniiullcd. He tvas dissuaded in thisby his iiiotlicr and tlic patriarch: Ihowcver. the court part> had lost control of t l ic government to t l icold nobil i ly. The final act sign i f i ing the cliangc w i s the reinstating o f ( ' o u n t Ra mond Ill i s hail l iin November I 18.3.

Fro m November I 8 3 t o rhc spring (I I I . i . Saladin's attacks against thc Crusaders nercdircctcd at the fortress of Kcrak. Kcrak \\;is oiic o f the strongest Crusadcr fortilieations a n d \crdi f l icul t to siege due to restrictive tcrrairi and lack oft odd cr for the besieging arm . Kc rii h M ' ~ Salso the horne of Kcg irinld dc C:hatilloii. the niiiii ~ v l i oiad attempted t o raid Mecca. h h i e ofSaladin's attacks caiiie close to taking Kcrak. I t :ippcarcd t l i i i t Saladiii ma h a w coiiductcd thccampaigns only 11) fiiltill his obligation as defendcr ofttic faith. Salntl i i i 's iittcritioti rcriiniiiedfocused on b~vlosul.'"

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111 spring I 1x5. Saladin recci\cd wo rd that the ruler of Mosul \ \ : is moving against I rh i l .lrhil \ u s allied \\it11 Saliidiii. giv ing Saladin t l i c cxcu sc l ie \ \as looking thr to attack Mosul.

Saladin signed a four year triicc w ith the Crusaders to sectire his southern and western flanks priort o mo\ i i ig on Mosul. ,After inconcIusi\c campaigns iii Northern Mcsopornniia and Armenia.Saladin fell fravcly ill in I~c ccn ibc r 1x5. Rclicving that he ma be dy ing arid tearing ii revolt inSyria. Saladin negotiated a pcaccllil settlemen[ n i t t i the ruler of Mosul. Saladin's illness provedthat l i i s empire \\as held tofcthcr onl b his person. Whcn S;iladin wiis ;iblc [(I takc the l i c ldagain iii I IMI.e began t o reo rga nix his empire and rcpl:iccd or rcassigncd emirs H o were ofqucstionahlc loyalty. 17

1 0 ensure thc stability ot'his cinpirc. Saladin iiccdcd 21 signilicant victor against thcCrusaders. Fro in Niir-atl-D in's dcatli in I I74 to I 186. Saladin had riot seriously weakeiied theCru md cr States. No m j o r tortress or strutcgic Iocitlion had bccn taken. and tlic Crusader armwas as strong or stronger than \\licii Saladin started his o\\n Crusade iii I 17-1 o reunite Nur-;id-Din's ti)rinner empire. With thc elid vt'his struf f le \ v i l l i Mosul. Saladiti w a s read t o turn hisattentioii towa rd thc Criisadcr States. I o\rc\cr. he had signed ;I four- car t r i i c c wi th lie Crusadersthat . i inless violated. would last i i n t i l I IXY. Saladiii had broken other truce agrccrncnts: however.he appcarcd to hc in no hurry to attack tlic C'rtisadcr States. One o f ~ l i ccasoi is tliiit he may hnveheld off l i is attack is the continued fr:icturing o ft h c Crusader le:idcrship.lx

While Saladin was campa igning ngainst Mosul in I IX5. 13ald\cin I V l i i ial ly succumbed tohis i l l i iess and died. In accordance \\it11 his will. his nephew Baldw in V was crowned King ofJcriisalem. Baldwin V mas only h e cars ' old mid \ x i s iiot ii hualth> child . (.:mint Iii ioi idremained baill i and Bal dtri n V \ va s givcn into the care of his great unc le .losccliti 1 1 1 . Josccliii 111was still the Scncschal ot'thc Kingdoni and a cta lwart o f th e cour t party. Count K;iyiiond.ho mi ng the ch i ld was sickly. did not \ \ an t the child to die tinder his care and lx ;iccused ot'hilliiig

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the child in order t o take the cro\\n. Count Kayiiiond's opinion o f Daldwin V ' s hedth \ \ ; i s corrcc .;is 13aldwin V died ii year later.

In accordance with I3aldwin I V ' s will. iii t li c w c n t o f U n l d ~ i n 's death. Count I la)it lorid\ \as to remain ba il l i unti l thc Kings o f England and France. the llo ly Roman Emperor. and thepope agreed upon who would be the iicxt king. Joscclin Ill told Count Ra)mond thiit he would takcttic body ot'Baldwin V back to Jerusalem for hurial. While Count Kayriiond w a s out o fJcrusalem. t l ie coun part attempted a coup d'etat. Forccs lo)al t o Josccliii Ill scizcd con trol o fAcre and Beirut. Guy dc Lusignaii and his brother Amalric the constable. closed tlie city o fJerusalem. 'Thc new Grand Mastcr ofrhe l.cniplars Gerard de Ridefort. i i t i old enem of CountRaymond. conspircd with the court party to cronn ( ; u j hing. 111 \ iolation dB ald \vi i i IV's will. t l i cPatriarch o f Jerusalem (also a mcnihcr of t t ic court pert?) cro\bncd G u y K ing o f Jcrusalcm.

Count Raymond and the old noh ility attcinptcd to stop the coroiiiitioii hut coii ld not m o v etheir militar forces against Jcrusalciii in time. Tlic Count attcinptcd to cro\vIi Humphrey of'l'aron(son o f l ic former Constable). thc husband of Baldwin IV's younger sister Isahcl. king. The oldnob ility were wil ling to split thc kingdom and storm Jcrusalcm. The old nobility's plan failcd \\hentlicir cnndidatc I lump hrcy flcd to Jerusalem arid swore allcgiancc to Guy. The old inobility weren o u faced with a tiat accompli and m o s t dccidcd that rhcy had to tiinkc t l ic best ot'a hiid sittiittionand swear allcgiancc to G u y . Thcrc w r c t i w exceptions. Baldwin of R;iml;ih. o11c o f th cKingdom's best military Icadcrs. refused arid left the kingdo m for the princ ipality 01'Antioch.stating that wit h Guy as kin g thc Kingdoni wo uld not last the bear. The ~ t h c r xception wa s CountRaymond who rctrcatcd to his eiistl~'t Tiberias. IU

Having cffcctivcly scizcd t l ic throne. Ki ng G u y wa s faced n i t t i the scriou5 problem of l i o n10 dcal wit h Count Raymond. Count Raymcind was the ruler ofthc Coun ty o f l r i p o l i a s \vcII ast l i e Prince of Galilee. oiic o f t h c Kingdom's major vassals. K ing G u y kncn that Count Raymond

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\\otild alv .a s he his r i va l . Most of t l ic coi ir r parry ad\ iscd Kin g Guy 10 hesiege Count Raymondat Tiberias until l ie ngrccd to w e a r allegiance. Whcii nc\\s ofii possihlc militnr nio\c against

him reached Coun t Kaymond. tic searched tor an ;illy t o help l i i t i i dcfciid liirnselt and his cast le atTiberias. Count Ra moiid rcqucstcd niilitar\ assistmice from Saladill. \+hn \ a s currently in1)amascus. Saladin ayrccd an d sciht a large hod of tr oo ps t o help defend Tiherins. CounrI


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'Marshall W . Hnldwin. "The Decline and Fall ol'.lcrusalern. 1174-1 1 8 9 ' in .A l l i s to rv ol'che Crusades: Vol. T li e F i r : c l - l u d r q l l . i d . Kenneth M. Set ton (b1;idison. WI: University o fWisconsin Press. 1969). 594-595.

'Sir I lamilton A . K.Gibb. "The RiscofSalat l i i i . 1169-1 189" n .A Historv of th eCrusades: Vol. I The F)ist_ l,lundred Years.. cd. Kenneth M. etton (Madison. W l : I. niversit> ofWisconsin Press. lY6Y). 571.'Marshall W . Baldwin. "The Declinc and Fall ofJerusalem. 1174-1 189" n A I l i s t o r v ofthe (:rusa_d_e_s:Vol. I Thc First Hundred Years. ed. Kenneth M. et ton (Madison. WI: University ofWisconsin Press. 19693. 595-597.'Sir Hamilton A . K.Gibb. '.The Kise o f Salatlin. 160-1 189" n A s t o r v o f th eCrusades: Vol. I Tlie First tlund-cd.ysY, cd. Kcnneth ivl Sctton iuadison. WI: Universit ofWisconsin Press. 1969j. 572-.3.'lbid.1 bid'And rcw Ehrcnkreutz. S;ia Albaii N Y : t it i i \crsit ofUcir York Press. 1972). 177'Marshall W. Baldwin. "I'Iic 1)ccliiie ai id Fn11 oiJcriisii lci i i . I 174-1 89" i n A Histo? q fthe Criisades: Vol. I The Fir st Hundred Years. ed. Kenneth M et ton (M;idison. WI: llnivcrsity ofWisconsiii I'rcss. 1969). 596-597.'lbid.. 596-598"'lhid.. 596-597."Marshall Whithcd Ihldwin. Ravrnond Ill of 'Tripol is a d he Fall ofJcr iAnlL.ln.(l l:lQ-1187) Princeton. NJ: I'rinceton liiiivcrsit). Press. IOX).41-46."Andrew Ehrenkrcut7. &@I (Albany. N Y : University ol"e u York Press. 1972). 179-

180.

Ibid.. 182.1

"Marshall W. Baldwin. "The Decline ;ind Fall o f Jcriisalcrn. 1174-1 189" t1 A.llj=\ofrhc Crusades: Vol. 1 The l>r'iIun_dred Ycars. cd. Kcnnctti h.1. Sclton (Madison. WI: University ofWisconsin Press. 1960). 597-598.'51hid.. 599-600


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The Crusadcr army that Ihccd Salui l i i i a[ tlic Batt le of l - iat t in had biisicnlly the sameorganization and equipment of feudiil armies i n Western Europe. Un like the Bymnt incs. theCrus;itlers had lint adapted to l l i e new pti>sical and rnilitar challeng and aildition;il rcsotirccs rodefend {t ic fronticrs. B> I187. the niilirur ordci-5 ncrc rcspoiisihlc l iv dcfci id ing i m s t ofilicimpo rtant horder forti l ications ol ' t l ie Crusiider Ski res :ind li)r p r w i d i n g d ie nIicIciis for ;I standingarmy.

renl f rom i ts Western Curope;in ro(its \\ere [lie sources o f i l s

With the cstahlishnient of tlic Kingdom ot. Icr i i~. : i lct i i. l i e Criisader leadership rerilized t l i i i lthcy did not ha\e the m;mpower or recruit ing b;ise to ccrmpeie with their Moslem enemies. Tl icmilitary tiorccs tliiit rciiiained. less t l i a i i t l ircc rhousaiid ca \nlr y and infantry. f rom the First Criisadehad to he reorganircd to provide for the ci~riiiiiondefense. The Crus ailer Ieadcrsliip decided tobuild irs niil itar or yi i iz at ion ; irourid a revised versioii d t h e Western European feudal qstetii.The feudal lev> w i s [he hackbone d t h e Crusader arm>. I he I \VO principle terms upplicd t o tliclevy wcrc t h e Liwc (111 K o i mid t l i c crrriwc h t r i i . I ie l iwe ( I I / K o i dictared that ;I \ m s a l h:id 10

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provide his liege m i l i t q service i t i person for ii period o f ~ i po )ear. This \vas a unique fc;iturcin the (Julremcr due t o the imniediac) ofihc threat and I l ic l imited ii ianpowcr hasc. Typical scr\icciii Western Eur ope was no more thati six ty day:, a year. aftcr irhich the liege lord would have t opa his vassals for each da ofser\icc. In he Outrmicr. tlic liege lord \ \as only rcquircd toprovide l i iod and fodder. The otlicr major source ot'manpcwcr was the w r i w o h ~ t iIicrenftcrrcfcrrcd t o as the ban). The ban \ \as a call-up o f a11 men of mil i tary age u h o could carry nweapon. The ban \\.as normally a desperation inciisurc. a s i t dc pr iic d [tic cities and fortresses $4any reserve ofm anp oue r. Additionall . the troops raiscd by the b a n w r c of l i i i i i tcd qualily.poorl) quipped. and not 21sdisciplined as tlic regular feudal Icv?.

The hasis for the fi.udul systciii \ \ a5 the licl'. Knig hts were granted enough tcrri tory to payfor their own maintenance. that o f a squirc. and fhur to six n a r horses. The more importantniilitar leaders weru grunted larger tiel's eapablc of mainraining anynherc liorn ten ro one hundrcdknights. :At the t ime o f t h c Hattlc of1 iittin. the Kingdom ofJcrus;ilcm'.i l icfs truc turc (norincluding the County of Tripol i or the Priiicipalit of.Atiticich) supporwd sonw vliurc hct\\ccii 635to 750 knights. In addition to the fcudal scrvicc rcqtiircn iciits o f t l i c nohil it ) . thc ki iyd oni rccci\cdmil i tary s e n ce o f both mounted and noiiniounkxi scrgcanrs fro m church property and lie tnajortowns and cities. A t the time of th c Battlc of I latt in. tlic King dom of.Icrusalem suFportudapproximately tivc thousand sergeants. M o s t oft hc scrqxnts w r c probabl) infantry. iind t lioscthat w r c mounted nornially rode t o hattlc and disniciuntcd.'

Turcopolcs \ w e another major sourcc o f milita ry rnaripo\\cr for the Crusader Stares. Thisterm w a s used ro refer to loca lly raiscd m ercenaries \ tho supplcmcntcd the Kirydom's t'eutlaltiirces. A Turcopolc c c i u l d be o f ;in> r a w or rc ligioii prcscnt in tlic rcsi.icin. Most frcquciirl).however. Turcopolcs \ \ould be S r i m and I.cl)ancse (:hristi;ins or Armcninns. Tlic 'Tllrcopcrlccould be either inountcd or foot troops and could he armed in ii variety o f I ishions. 'I icre lins been

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a great deal ofdcharc ovcr wliiit role [lie l 't ircopolc iio rma lly playcd. h u t i t i s l ikely they werepri i i iar i ly niouiircd ;irehers aiid light c a a l r y , h r i t i g hc C:rus;ider period. ligh t cn\alr Iiiid l i i i i i t c t l

arii io r protection. normally consist ing o f l i cavy clotti or qi i i l tc t i :irtiior. l h c i i ia i t i dcfcnsc o1'tlicli Jit cavalry \\:is speed. Turcopole light cmalry probided a limited rcspunse t o t l ic Moslcmmoi i i i tcd ;ircIicrs and give tile C:rusndcrs ;I IigIir-r iioun tcd rcccwii:ii i i i a t i p o ~ c ror the Crusader Starc5 \ \as themili tary orders. T \ \ o riia.ior (aiid latcr one mii ior) rc l igious mil i tary ~ irgai i i7at ions \cr t formed: tlicKnights of thc I-lospifal o f St . Joliti of. Icrusalcni or Hospitcillcrs :iiid t he Kniglits offl ic Tci i ip lc 111'Jcrusalcm or 'l'cmplars. l h c Knights o f t l i e H q i i t a l cvoI\cd out ot 'a rcligioiis order t1i:it p r w i d c dmcdic;il care to Clir is t iai i pi lgr i i i is in flit I d Lands. ' I ' l ic original I ospiral \\.as cstat~l is l ic i liiJcrusalcm v.ith chapters in m o s t oftlic rriajor ports o f t l i e Ilol> Laiids. . A s tlic d c r grcn i tacquired territory and castles l i o t r i patrons tliroiigliotit Europc. 1 0 cicfcnd t l icsc posscssioiis theHospital \ \ as p a n t e d tlic ahi l i ty to raise a mi li ta ry a rm db ro f l i c r hniglifs. tlic Hospifallcrs. T l i korganization mirrored ii rcccntl cst:tbli~liud e l i ~ i o u s - i n i l i t a r ~rgaiiiwf ion. the Ktiights ol flic

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.rcmplc o f Jerusalem or the Tcniplars. Tl ic T cniplars were designed from t l ie start to be a militarorganization. T h e Tcmplarr established chaptcrs rhroughout Europe n i t l i the express piirposc o iproviding meii and matcriiil to support the war in the Holy I.ands. The minor religious-militaryorganizatioii was the Knights of St. 1.azarus. l h c Knights of St. La7arus consistcd of Knightswho had contracted I..cprosy hut who sti l l wishcd to continue servicc i n the Holy Lands. A t theirheight. the combined military orders could muster approxima tely 800 knights and prohahly close to3.000 infantry. not including mcrcciiarics.

l l i c Crusader inilitar) organiration \\as directly tied t o t l ic feudal structure. l l i c King o fJcriisiilcm was at the t o p of the feudal structure. and tic was the military comiiiandcr when he tookt l ie field. When the kine wa s unahlc to take tlic ticld. he would appoint an overall militarycommaiidcr. norm ally t l ic most scnior noble present or the i iohlc whose territory w a s directlythrcntcncd. When a noble other tliati the kin g coniinnndcd the Crusader arm . a11 troops i n directservice to king w r c commnndctl by the kingdom's co n~t ahle . I'hc constnhlc \ \ a s rcspoiisiblu forthc day-to-day dcfcnsc o f t h c kingdom. Troops iii service to vassals of the king scrvcd iiiid cr theirindivid ual licgc lord. For example. the knights owin g service to I


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cxperiei icc fighting together. 111 additionkept in reserve.

the di\ isions. a cci i tra l ized fnrcc o f knights \ w s usitall>4

I f he Crusadcrs \verc tiphtiiig I ~ he riiarcli. they form ed three distinc t rnilitar uiiits : thead\ancc guard or van. the main body. and t l ic rear guard. Eac h unit included both infant ry andcav alry . 'The infiinrr shicldcd tlic cavalr) l io i i i t l ic Moslem inountcd arclicrs. while the ca\alrprevented tlic Moslcms f r om c lo i i ng I ith the Crusader infantr>. Tlic advancc guard and ruarguards were designed to absorb t l ~ cnit ial contact a l lowi i ig the i i ia i i i hod> t n t'orni a bat t le l ine. Theadvance p a r d \as also responsible tix rcc(1nriaicsancc. Rccnnnaissiincc \\'as one o f the grc:itest\\eiikncsses of army of the Crusaders. With llic exception ~ f t l i c'urcopolcs. thc Crusaders did in01hnvu light or medii im cavalry that could s x \ c as Fcnuts. I cu vily arnic:rcd knigh ts und inoitntcdsergeants could not coiripctc ivitl i the Mnslcrn horse :ircIicrs. Rcminaissiiiicc. whcii i t wascoiiductcd. had t o be done iii force. The lack o f ;idcqua c rcconnaissaiicc w a s often ii fatal\ ~ c a k i i c s s f l i c Crusader arm .'

rhe two rcniuining units. t l ic i i i a i i i body and 111crear ya r d . \ \e re rcspo ii si bl c h r he hulko f t hc a rmy. .Ihc m i t i body consisted ofthe rria.jority o f t l i c in fantry. t l i c suppl trains. and tlicsenior Icadcrship. Tlic rear guard was rcsponsihlc for prc\entiny a surl ir isc ~ittc ick n t l i c m i i nbody. Tl ic rear guard niis usuallyI igni l icant port ion of the to ta l Criisadcr army iis ctandardMos lem tactics were to f ix the Crusiidcr ;id\niicc guard wli i lc dirccting tl icir main a t tack itgainstthe rear guard. .The d is tance hc tw cn the thrcc elements of a Crusader arm (11 the i i i i ircl i differedaccording t o the terrain and the t li rc ii t. l h c advance and rear guard had to he far enoiigl i from rhcmain body to a l l ow rhc main bod to t i?rma hattlc l i i ic once coiitiicr \ \ ; is inadc. but close enoilgl i r oprevent tlie army from being divided.

l i n k he ot tic r Ch ri st ia li p cw c r iii the rcpioii. the Crusaders ncvcr dc\clopcd mi cffccr i \eresponse to the ~ l o ~ l e r norse i i rchcr and tl ie M n s l c i i i ' s mobi le r ty lc o i i \ ; l r I i r c . 'I'hc Hy;.aiitinc\

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dcrclopcd their owi i I igl i t-to-mcdii ini nrmorcd cii\ u l ry t ha t was hcttcr equipped to l i ght :I rnorcmobile battle. I ie I 3~ ia t i t i r i c s lso hi red large i i i i i i i t rc rs o i l~urk is l i i id Asiatic light Iiorsc archerst o mcct the blos lerns hrcc ni i force. The Byzantine , also cstablishcd set rules t i i r co i i ibat whenfacing Moslcrn horse archers. ' l ' l ic rul cs co ti i li cd hy n~ za i i t i n c mpc ro r Leo thc LVisc iii thc earlytenth centtir ii iclud cd: ncvcr gn to hatt lc wi thout infantry. i i ia i i i tn in a Inrgc screening tkvce. a voidl ight ins iii broke n groi intl . kccp a large ruscrbc. pick Rattle p(isirions w licrc tl ie rear and poss i b loiic ot ' thc f lank\ i s guarded hy a ni i tur i i l obstacle. a l t i i iys for t i fy the camp. a nd i ic ve r p u r s ~ ~ cr cr rc at in g h r c c w it ho u t i n h i [ r y , "

Kli i lc the C'rusnrlcrs follo\\ed sonic o f t l i c I3y7:intines rules. thc Crusaders ncr c iiiirlhlc toestablish ii proper scrccnii ig and rcconn i i i sancc h rcc due to tlic kick o f light ca\a l r> . TheCrusaders rvcrc olicii l ' imcd to light in broken terrain \ \ liere they could tint l'ortii a good dutctisi\cposi tion. F i i i i i l ly . wi t l imi t l l i c ahilit to match the \ loslcm Iiorsc archer. the (:rus;idcrs lost t l icin i t iat ive to 11ic Moslems. 'Tlic bloslcms n c r c ahlc to chose \ \ l ien a n t i \vIicrc to cngiiyc theCr iis ad cr arm . The C r w i d c r s had t o wait for [ l ie Moslems to mahu :I tnist;ikc or conic cIo\cenough s o t l ic Crusader's Iicav cavalry could ch;irgc.'

The i i rn ior and weapons ol'thc \ar io i ts clct i ic i i ts of the Crusadcr arm d i ff


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r i d y . he knigh t 's horse norr iial l had sonic form ofn rn io r protection. i isual ly a light c h i n mi i i lc 031 . *

I he major weapons d a rusad er k nig ht v.cru the lance. mi ~ ) t 'I \ a r i d ) of Iiaiid-heldireapons. mid ii wir horse. TIic iiiiiiii inissioi i of t l ic knight \vas to provide t he devastating chargcor shock against the uncni> l i iie. Th e knig ht v.ould chargc using ti is Iai icc and v.ould change to l i i ssecondary \\capon only after he had lost h i s lance or he was unable to maneuver. Since the knighthad to he able to i i i a i i c incr to he cffcctivc. R major par t o f t he cc implc tc weapon system (tlic knight )was t he wa r horse. W ar Iiorscs were spcciall bru d and trained horses. T hc Iiorscs liiid to hc ;ihIc'to support the wiglit o f t l i e kiiisht and his armor. t l i c horse's c w i i ari i ivr. respond t o Oiittlc signals.and r e m i i n u nd er c o i i h l iii battlc. In battlc. I knight would t r a w l w i t h t w o to tour war horscs.

Tti c Crusu dcr infantr forces l'cll into tl i rcc catcsorics: l'ciidal lev . \olui i tccrs and troopsraised by the han. and Turcopolcs. Th e largest category ot' int;intry w a s scrgcciiits raised tlir ou glithe tetid~~le\y. .The ser;:cant iiormiilly l ind qui l tcd a r i i i c x midc ofI ic; i \> c lo th or. iii soii ic cases.wore chain ma il. Infantr w a s clussi t icd as h ca \y i t f wore metal armor arid liglit or incdiui i i i f twore c loth or qi i i l tcd armor. .Addud t o t ha t armor protcctioi i . t l ic sc rga in t no rc I coi i ical or pothclni and carr ied :I large shield. Primir weapons w r c he spear and crossbo\v. The spear masused 1 defend against a mnui i tcd cl i i i rgc and tlic crossbou \\'as used to respond to the Mos lemhorsc archers. The qual i ty of t l ic armor and cquipinci i t depended 011 hc sergeant's spoilsor. Tl icbest rqu ippcd scr fcants nc rc iii scr \ i cc to t l ic mili tary orders."

Ttic v o l i ~ r i t c ~ r ~r inl:,intr raised IJ the bar1norniall did not \year :irnior. Lack of armorwas espccial l t rue o f rel igious pi lgr i i i is a n d sailors. What l i t t le armor the hnd \ \as l i ri i i tcd to theoccasional suit of quil ted armor. M?st ot't l ic inf;intr> carried t l ic traditional spear. bon. orcrossho\\. I t i e w l u i i t e c r ;ind hail inthntr \ \ a s ofquestion;ihlc vrl luc and useful i i ia inly fordefrndiiig fort i t ied posi t ions \ \hcrc thei r lack ofari i lor \cab Icss o f a disadvmit;i~c.

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The f ina l type of intarttry w i s he Turcopolc. Thc ma jority o f Turcopoles are believed t ohave been light cavalry: however. loca l Maronirc and Cliris tian Arnicniuns wcrc also used a sinfantr). The Maronites nc rc noted for the use o f a compound how and frequently supported thearniies of both the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the County o f T r ipo l i . Tlic Armenians supplcrncritcdt l ic forces of thc I'rincipality o f Anriocli b ut were availahlc in small numbcrs throughout theCrusader States. The Maronitcs and Armeniiins normall) wore quilted armor. light hcadprotection. arid carried a shield. The primary weapon of th c Maronires \\as the compound how.The Armenians norinall) carried a how and spear."'

The Crusader army. therefore. consisted of a I I I I ~ I L I I S of hcavily armored knights. lightca\ air) ('Turcopoles). rricdiiiin-to-hca\ infan try (wr gca iits). and ligli i n h i t r y . A i ior i i i i i lCrusader ticld army \roiild h a w a rat io of one knight to cisl i t t o ten infantry. Most contemporaryauthors do not differentiate tlic 'l 'urcopcilcs froni the dil'lcrcnt types of inkintry. Houcvcr. ~ n ~ l c s sthe kingdom was in cxtrcinis. tlic in lhntry would he dinost ;dl lcudal lev) sergeants. It i s dif f icultt o cstiiniitc what percentage o f a i i iirin uiis Tiircopolcs: ho\\cvcr. i t i s iinlikcl that it uou ld hemore t han 10 to I 5 percent.

I 't ic m o s t iniportnnt factor in determining ho\v thc Crusadcr ~ n i )v a s uscd \+as the l imitedmanpower hasc. L h c t o tlic limited rnanpo\vcr the Crusader's strategy w a s prcdominantl)dcl cns iw . Offensiv e operations wcrc focused 011 sci7ing a singiilar ohjcctivc or dcfcuting onecncm) arniy. M ajo r campaigns wcrc rare. the cxcep t im k i n g Kin e ,4 ln ia l r ic~s ampaigns inEgypt ( I 163-1 171). A s part of th ei r defensive stratcg). the Crusaders attcinptcd to kccp tlicirMoslcti i opponents di\ idcd. The Crusaders even allied with various Moslem rulers ;igainst othcrMoslems. Ciootl ex:imples arc :illiaiiccs with Damascus and Alcppo to kccp the t w o citiesindependent. When Nur al-Di i i and Saladin united the Moslcna. the Crusaders l iniitc d theiroffensive action to raids dcsigncd t o weaken the Moslems tbli i lc not heconiing dccisively engaged.

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tlic knights. I t thc Moslems attempted to close nit11 the intin try. the knights ~ o u l dliarge to drivethcni off. l h e symbiotic rclationship bcbrccn the infantry and 'l'urcopolcs and the knights \ v a s thecorn ersm ic ofCi-us;idcr tactics."

When cngagcd. tlic kc to a Crusader victory w a s forcing the enemy in to conccntrating i t stroops so the Crusader knights could chargc. When the Crusaders w r c successfiil. it was usuallydue to rcstrictivc tcrrain. surprisc. or o\cr confidcn ce on the part ot'thc M oslcms. Good examplesarc the battles of Mon tgisard and hzaz. A t Montgisard. K in g Raldwin IV was ablc to surpriseSaladin's I:gyptian army in a ravine. Kin f Bald\\in. w ith approximately 375 knights and two tothree thousand ini mt ry . was able to rout Saladin't army. In tlic battle ofAi.az. the Crusader army.wh ich corisistcd ofclcvcri hundred cavalry and on ly two tilousand intantry. \\as attacked by fitteento twenty thousand Moslem cavalr). Relicv iny that they could ovcrw hclm the Crusaders. theMoslems c loscd with the Crusader arniy. ' l ' l ~ c rusader knights w r c hen able to charge androuted the MosIems. ' "

Saladin's invasion o f the Kingdoni ol'Jcrtisalcin in I 183 is a good cxatnplc o it hcCrusader's dcfcnsivc strategy and tlic s)rnbiotic rclationship o f nfan try and knipllts. WhetlS;iladin entered the kingdoin. the Crusader army had h n c d t Salfiiri a. which gave tlicCrusaders a very central. well-pr(ivisionc d basc. The positioii of the Crusader army pr ew itc dSaladin's army from penetrating info the richest. most dcnsely populated arcas of th c kingdom.Tlic Crusader army \\;is also positioned to rc lic\c the border Ibrtrcsscs if the) \\ere phccd utidcrsiege by Saladin. The prescncc o ft h e army cnsurcd t h a t Saladin would not be ablc to fakc an)significant tcrritory. Saladin attcinptcd to d r a n tllc Crusader army a u a y from Saffuri a byscndiny ra iding parties through thc rcgion and by harassing thc Crilsadc r camp. Saladin's advanccgua rd conducted hit-and-run attacks agaitist the Crusader camp for s e w n days b ch rc Saladin'rarmy with dr ew S;il;idin's horse archers were titiable to c;iusc any signilicant daniagc. ;IS the) \\ere

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unable to get closc cnougii t o tlic Crusader camp to t i re their ar roi \ s \\it11 any real penetratingpower. The Crusader infaiitr was able to kccp the Moslci i is awa f rom the knights w ith theirh o w and crossho\\c. v.li ilc t l i e knight\ ensured that the M o s l e m horse ;irchcrs did no t c l o s e wi tht l ie i i i fantry.

l ' l i c hrcukdo\vn o f t h e s) mhiosis o l ' t l ic Crusadcr infaiirr) and c m a l r y \ \ a s o w o f t h cdecidiii; f x t o r s o f t h c I3attlc of Hatt i i i . Whi le t l ic (.'rusadcr< were ahle t o retain the s>m hiosis. thervloslcms were iiot ahlc t o in l l i c t an siyi f icant damage. Most o f t h c Crusader defeats in theeight years hc forc the Battle o f I a t t i i i can all he attr ihutcd to a breakdown in t l ie inl:antr)-knightsymbiotic rclationsli ip. In the I ' rusadcr defeats. the kni;hts w r c usually pro\oke d into cl iargi i igearly and w r c cu t o f l ' l i o i i i the iiifaiitr . Uotli the Crude r . ; and t l ic kloslcms \\ere \\cI1 aware illthe importa iicc o f lic in fantry-kniyht re lat ionship.

' f l i c i ria jo r wak ncs s ofttic Crusader ariii \ r a t that i t d id not ;idapt t o i t s nenen\ i roninciit. I n the roughly ninct car\ I h c ~ \ \ c c ~ ii c First Crusade atid f l ic I3nrtlc o f1 a t t i i i . t l i carmy o f t h c Crusader States remained basicall iincliaiigcd. 'H i e Crusadcr ;irni>'s cquipii icnt.mil i ta ry organization. and tactics al l ni i r rored t x t i c ) u t c d iii Wcs tcrn Europe. Wh ile WcstcrnEuropean tactics were ruitahlc against Fatam id T.Q pt. the) w r c io t cft'ccrivc against ' l~urkishmounted horse archers. .The Crusaders ncvcr developed a n ctfcct ive means for de:ilitig \\it11Turk ish tactics. In battle. the C'rusndcrs f;vincd ii batt le posi t ion and let the Moslcms at tack.wait ins for an opportuni ty to chary. 1-hcrcfcirc. the Crusadcrs gave awl the in i t ia t i \e and lettheir Moslem opponents chose when and \vhcrc to tight. The Criisaders ncvcr developed their o \v i imedium. how armed ca\;i lry. whic h ci iahled flic Uy7anrines to take t l i c of l icns iw iii the earlyeleventh century in Anatol ia. ' l ' l ic 103s ol ~ i i i t i i i i i \ c\as one more cause for the Crusudcr dcfcat ; i ttlie 13attle of I Iatr in.

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.

'R. C. Sm ail, Crusading Warfare 1097-1 193 (Cambridge. UK: Cambridge UniversityPress: 1956). 1 1 1 - 1 12.21an Heath: Armies and Encmies of th e Crusades. 1096-1291 (Worthing, I IK : FlexiprintLrd., 1978): 1 12- I 15.'K.C. Smail, C rusadincr Warfare 1097-1 I93 (Cambridge, IJK: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1956): I 1 1 - 1 12.?bid., 173-179.'lbid.: 156-165bCharlesOman, A.&srorv of th e Art of War (London. U K : Methuen and CO.. 1898). 206-

207.'hid., 260-270'Ian Heath, A m ie s and Enemies o ft he Crusades. I j 0 ) y h - l ~Worthing. UK: FlcxiprintI.td.. 1978), 67-69,'lbid.. 71-73.'1 bid."R.C. S iiui l. Crusadinn Warfare 1097-1 193 (Cambridge. IJK: Ca m br id y University

Press. 1956). 138- 139."lbid.. 204-209''Ibid.; 198-203."Ian Heath. Armies and Enemies o f t h ~ ~ s a l e ~ , l ~ 9 6 - 1 2 9 1Worthing. UK: FlcxiprintLtd.. 1978). 5 1-54.


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M:loslcrn i i i i l i tar force that ticed the ('rusadcrs a t l l l e H;r t~ Ie f1 i : i t t i i i \ \as one of thelargest tni l i tary Ibrccs arrayed apirist the Crusaders sirice the l i , t indatioi l ol ' thl: Crusader States.t3) t in i l i ng Moslcir i terr i tory froi r i Cairo to Moscil. Snladin was ahlc to ut i l i x t l ic vast rnanpowcrresources o f t h e region wi th the sole pi i rpose o f destroying [ t ic Crusader arm . The Voslcrns \\ereno longer tlividetl. i ind Snladin did iio1 h i i \ c to divert I roops to defend :iyainst \~l.loslcm ivals.M o s l e m troops. {heir eqi i ipmeiit. and t i lcticz were ci i i i i lar to the ilril l ies that had I'ought the~ r u s n t l c r tates l iw the liisl IiIQ years. Thc dI d c r s l i i p t inder Sa lad it i.

r w x \ a s t h e size oI'rlie ariny arid its t i n i l i d

By I187 S a l x i i n had r e u i l i l a i :Icootl part o f t l i u Scl j i th enlpi rc. .I'lic Seljirk empire ~ 1 5setnili.iidal stiile hh i ch ru li cd on it s l rony Sul ta i l ( r i i l c r or monarch) to keep l l l e empire tcrgcllier. 111il iniiti ibcr o f ways. the Moslem feiid:iI system \ \ a s s i i n i l i i r lo the (:rusadcr S1;trcs. 'I ie Sultangraritcd land or revenue in the Ibrm o f i q / n (t ict) lo an i nd iv idual in rettirri Ibr mili tar y scr\ ice.Linl ikc the Crusader S~iitcs.he iitiioiiti1 ol ' t i i i lc required for serv ice \\;is rw t speci l icd blil \ \ a siisuall l imi ted 10 a single campaign season and ended pr ior t o the l i r l l l i a r \ cs t . Admin i s~ ra t i vecontro l granted tinder the iy/tr systetn was iilw greater th;m l h a l granted ti i ider the C'rusadcr l i dsys tem. f o r example. the Moslcr l l imlir of.Aleppo had full adrn in is t ra l i \e co i i l ro l o f the cit andw a s only required 10 provide ;I specil ied numhcr of troop, when reqcicstcd t)) lie St i l l an . f o r a11intents and piirposes. he was virtiiall on i ridcpctldcnt ri i lcr. II't11c Sul tan n ~ i k .hc ai i l i r of


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Aleppo could igno re requests for troops. For the rouyh ly nii ict) cart from thc dcatli o f M a l i kShall to t l ic r ise ofSaladi i i . t l ie great Scljuk mnirs operated as indcpcndcnt states. 'The lack of astrons eeiitral leadership u iit i l tlic rise of Saladi i i was thc major re:isoii t l ie Crutadcrs w r c able t o>ucccssli i l ly establish arid maintain the Crusader States.

T\vcll i l i-ccntur Mo slem armies were predom inantly cavalry . T Iicrc nc rc four prim arysoiirces of Mohlem cab ii lr y: m;iniluks. non- nom adic Arab s. 13edouins. and 'Tiirkomans. The el i teo f t h c ivloslc.in arm ies w r c the rnamluks. blam luks were slave troops. not of Arabic origin.spcci;illy traincd to t isl it as the personal guard o f a n amir or sultan. Mamluhs had no t r ibal orrcgiorial loyalt mid w r e hcrc forc cons idcrcd t o he more rcli;ihlc. .The pro\ idcd thc h ulk o fMoslcni i i icdiuni-to-t ica\y c m xlr y. M; imluks norrnnl ly worc metal i i r i i io r s~in ic\ \ l ia t imi lar to t l icCrusader knishts. and t l icir primary weapons \ \crc hov.. lance. and inacc. 1 ) pically. the inamlukhwould form t l ie personal guard ofari ainir arid would hc used to dc l i \c r the decisive o r t i i ia l attack.,At the t ime o f t h c I3att lc ofl-latt in. t l i e rnanilukr w r c hc e l ite cavalr o f t l i e : \ri ih world.

'1 I ic second source ofc a\ al r) . non-nomadic Arahs. was in dcclinc h> t l ic later ha lf o f t l i ctv.cl l ih century. Arah cavalry w a s considered Icss reliable clue to c lan and regional loyalt ies. Arabcavalr) f o u ~ l i t r imari ly w ith lancc a n d sword nnd n c r c no t considered good liorsc archers \\~licncompared to t l ic Turkom;inr. Similar to the maniluks. A ra b troops were equipped as mctl i i im t oheavy cavalry. A s mcdiurn to hcav cnvLilry. Ar ab c;ivalr) \vould be used to c h a r y an cncinyposit ion and tight hand-to-liand. Ar ah caviilr were better trained ar id equipped t o t is l i t theCrusader arm y in hand-to-hand combat t l ia i i t l ic Bedouins and Turkoinans. 1

A n ; iuxil iary hut usefi l l wi irc c ofcav alr) n cr c the Bedouins. Bcdoui i i cwalr . wore l i t t leor 110 armo r and werc equipped wit h spear and sword. The Redouin j were used primari ly as scoutsand foragers. They \\ere ahlc t o surviv e ot'f'thc I:ind cv cii in harsh terrain. Th e ima.ior dra wh ack oft l ie i3edouins werc their un rclia bilit). Prio r t o the hatt le o f 1 artin. Bedouins fougtit Ihr both the

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Crusatlcrs and Saladin. Ucdouiris operated in triba l i i i i i t s and \ r i )uld riormall serve only on iic:iiiipaign-hy-cnmpaign h:isis. Siilxtiii's Egypt ian arm did t iarc a s i i i i i l l pcriiiaiicnt I'orcc ofDcdollin ca\alry: ho\vc\cr. there i$ in rckrence of ' t3udouii i I roops jcr \ i n g in Saladi i i 's arrn a t tlicB a t t i e of i ~ t i n . ~

flit. l i na l arid one o l ' t l i c i i inst iniportant soiirccs of cavalry were the Turkonian tribes.Turkornan tribesmen formed ii major port ion o f m o s t nf the M o s l e m arniics. The Turkoi i ians ivcrcusiially l iglit ly armored horsc archers. who were able t o t i re arrnns cffcctivcly from horsebackwhi le the horse w a s in mot int i . Due t o the rcqii ircnicnts nf t i r ing on t l ic move. Turkoman i i r i i iorhad to be l igl it and t lcxiblc a n d cni i ld not constrict the :irms. Most Turkonians worc qu i l ted armoror t h e lightest and most I lexihle i i lc t i i l armor availahlc. When f ighting I iaiid-to-hand. theI 'urkomans carr icd a smal l round shield and a swnrd or i i iacc. Lhic 10 their lighr armor and smii l lshields. the Turkoii ians were at a distiii ct disadvantaFc i i i I iuiid-lo-l iandcoi iibar w ith Crusadcrknights. .TIicrcli)rc. battles hctrvccn I 'urko ii iuii tronp\ a i d tlic Crusaders \+ere decided by t h euhilit o f t l i c Crusatlcrs t o crigngc thc Turkonial ic . I f rh c C'rusadcrs ivcrc nble t o c n g ~ g cheiurkoii iuns. they normally \van the battle: il_ ot. the 'Turkoii iaiis \ vn i i l d i isuiil ly force the C'r i i radcrrto witl idraw.'

While the bulk o f t l i c army \vat cm al ry. there rvcrc prot2ssion:i l infhntry u nits iii klo~lciiii i rmics. Inf i inlry \ v a s used pri i i iar i l ) t n coiiduct sieges and defend tbrt it icd posit ions. As Moslemtactics relied on mobi l i ty . i n h i t r y were ei t licr not i i ic ludcd or thrmcd n very smal l porti on nt.a t iclrlarmy. It' nfantry was required. it \var raised local l) tix a specil ic batt le or siege then disbanded.I f a professional infantry unit took the field. i t usuall \ had a spcciali/cd l i i nc t ion . Most infuntr:supported siege operations as citt icr : irt i l lcrymcii or soppcrs. I\.loslctii in t iinr ry w r c ight ly nrrnorcdand were equipped wit11 how and spear. /At the t ime ot' t l ic Bnttlc (d'I Inttin. blos lc i i i armies hi id iioequivalent to Crusader I i ca \y infantry.


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Tl ic basic building hlock o f Moslc tn arn iics \\:is the r r r l h n niilitar unit tha t could ranyel'roni se\cnt to tv.o huti drc d nicii . A /rdh consisted o t o i i l y one type o f t r o o p c.3.. tn;iniluk'i n tx i l don l? he l'cwtid i t i n inni i i luk tiilh). 'I l ie tiilh'i wcrc nssigiicd to rcyiment.; wi th upproximatel owt l i ~~usn t i dicn per regiment. Tlic i iunihcr of troops in tlic t i i lbs arid rcginicnts dif fcrcd xc or di ng totroop type and where t l i c unit \\as ra ised. Ikdo i i in arid I i rkoninn t i i lbs vnricd in si i c depending onthe s i c ol'triba l groups. Ucdouins served a s :I rr ihal p u p . a s in c h dual R cdouin tribes usu:ll lycould t i o ~ otitrihutc tnorc t l icn a single rrrlh

Tlic tiiosr orgati izcd troops belonged to t l ic household cavalr o f h e largest iiniirsH ou sc lio ld c x a l r w r c called t r skar t . Askt7rs w r c d if tc rcn t ia te ii hy m o p ype. Memluk troopswere called toassin. Xon-tvl;iniluk c;i\slry wcrc cal lcd ytirtry/rrrltmr.\ (hlnck slaves). :lsktrrs w r cbroken d o w n into one Iiutidrcd innii r u l h . each lend ti :in mii ir. 'I'Iic lc rn i i in i i r W I \ used t odesignate ii cointiinrider o f n nii l i tary t i t i i t . The tcrni : iniir ih contiisinp a s i t could rcfcr to iiriindividu;il \ v h o cotnrn:iiidcd as few as ten troops. l l i c most i i i ipor txi ani i rs . t he proviticialc o \ cr i io r s o t t l i c niiijor cities. coi i ld comm:ind :i i ni:iny as four tliotisntid nicti.

B the f i r l ie o f t h c I k i t t l c of1 Inttin. Sal:idiii could dra\v ot i t l ic mi lita ry nianpo wcr ol';iII tlicma jor aniirs l 'roni Eg pr IO iortlie rti Mcsopor;imin. I'rccisc liyur cs arc no t available tor t he s i x ofthe mko r . \ o f t he ma jo r mt i rs . 'l'lie fo l lowing i s an estimate ol ' t l ic s i i c d t h e dart ( i f ~ l i c iii.ior:Voslcni ci ics:

Aleppo: 2.000Damascus: 2.000t-larnah: 1.000Murd in : 1.000Diya r Bckr: I OOOHarran: 1.000ivl l>sul: 4.000E g t: 10.000

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l ' ti c figures rcprcsciit only household ca\.alr and do not include 'l'iirkoinan and I3edouiti~~icrcci iar icsr itifatitr . Saladin tticrctixc could cal l on approxirnarcly twenty thous;indprofissional cavalry. It i s unlikcly tha t l ie would strip a rcxion o f all i t s standing military force.arid Moslcni records fro in ttic Battle of Hattiri s t a t i that only t ~ c l v elioitsand professional cavalrwerc present. '

I'hc s i i c of the provincial t i h r . s lent itsell'natur:illy t o the fbrniation o f t h c ma.jorcor~~poncntsf Saladiii's field urn i>. HICarger tisktir.s cou ld easily form h e vangiiard or \rin:s of: in ;irmy. When arrayed tbr battle. the trsktrrc. wcrc norma lly grouped together on a rcgioiinl basis.At thc Hattlc o f I latt in. the Mesopotamian trskars of Llosul. Mardin. Diyar Hckr. and stniillrrregional tiskrrr.c t i ~ m e dhe left wing o f Snlndiii's urmy undcr the command of Gokhorki o f I rbi l .The Syrian contingutits of 1 lam ah^ I o ins . Alcppo. and the smaller rc gioiial c r s k cm foriiicd the rightwi ry 0fSaladin's ~ r m ) ndcr the corninand ofTaqi-al-F)in of 1 am;ih. T h e rcinaining aiid largcctportion of the army the Egyptian :ind Dni i iasccnc i.\kt.ir\ \\ere iiridcr tIic cornniund d'S;iIa(fiii.7Grouping tlic t r s k t r r s regionall) \ \ a s both i t i i l i tari ly and politic:ill imporranr. Mi lita ril y. the tiskt;r.y\ w e more iamiliar \ b i t t i eiicli other and hiid likely touyht toycthcr iii the past. A l s o .Tiirkomanaiixili;irics serviny in the same rcgion p r i h i h l y came t iom the s ~ n cribal groitp t n a k i n ~ntcyra[ion( ) f . 1ux111arics:imirs. Appointing a loyal amir l ion1 the rcgion to corninand that region's l i i r ces prcveiitcddissension.

easier. Politicall). i t \ v a s important t o inaintiiiii good relations with tlic regional

A Moslem ticld arm) consisted o f all tiwr typcs o f Moslem c;ivalry. Thc I3cdouins orTurkomans would be uscd as the ;idvancc guard and scoiits. Turkomans \witld a l s o forin t l i cwirirs ofthc arm) and be used t o \beaken and divide the opposing army. Ttic niarnluks and noii-noiiiadic A rab cavalry were held i n rc'scrvc to deliver t l ic t i t ia l or dccisitc blow.


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O i i c o f tlic t i iaior \ rcaknesscs of tlic M o ~ l c i i imil w a s i t s logistics. .To orm a t icld armI x y c enough to oppose t l i c Crusudcrs. troops l iad to be drawn f ro i n both t i pt and V1csopotmiii:i.'I'Iic distance tlic armies had t o travel and the general arid condi t ions incant flint the bloslcm armieshiid t o I iave :I sizable suppl) triiiii. I his is especially t rue o f foddcr and \rater for the Iiorseh. Oneo f t h c icy tactics of tlic ('rusadcrs was to posi t ion t l ic i r l ic ld arm t o tlcn) t l ic Lloslenis tlic abilitto l i \ c o lTt l i c land. I t ' t l ic Crusaders cou ld prcvcnt the Moslci i is f ro i i i be ing :ible t o resuppllocally. t h e M os lcm s \r.ould he forced to \vithdrli\r..

;\i iotlicr w x k i i c s s of tlic hlos lem ;irti i ics was thei r l imi ted abi l i ty to remain in the t ic ld for

niorc t l icii I single c i i i i ip aiy i scasoi i. Unl ik e t l ic Crusader ticfsystcni. iy,c: required service foronl a single campaign sc:isoii. mid m i s t M o s l c n i troops \ranted to be l iomc in t ime for t l i c l iar\cst.'I'Iic inabil i ty to keep t roops in t l ic field for a i i cktc i idcd per iod o f t i i i i c p rc \cn tcd the Moslems f r o mconsol idut ing p i n s against t l i c Crumic rs . as tlic C'rusadci-s cou ld retake te rri tory once the bldslc~narm) l iad bcci i dishandcd. 1-heCrus;idcrs were able to use t he l imi ted t imc thc 'v los lc tm c a l l dkccp iiii

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