1

The Asante Factor in the Alliance Matrix of Pre-Colonial Ghana:

A Historical Re-Evaluation Up To 1874

De Valera N.Y.M Botchway and Mary A.S. Owusu

Abstract

This study brings together scattered and varied information about

inter and intra ethnic interactions, particularly between Asante and

some ethnies in pre-colonial Ghana from the 17th

century to 1874.

The choice of this period is not altogether arbitrary for it marks an

era of political and economic self determination for Asante and the

other peoples considered within this study, namely: the Gonja-

Dagomba, Akyem, Fante, Ga-Dangme and Ewe. Unpacking the

theoretical constituents of alliances, this study posits that the

indigenous nations reviewed, like nation states elsewhere, involved

themselves in a matrix of alliances ostensibly to maintain an inter and

intra national balance of power. They were compelled to mould

alliances and interrelate for the three reasons of trade, war and

security, thereby building a long history of shared experiences.

Contacts also developed with people outside Ghana culminating in

the British colonisation of that country from 1874.

A Conceptual Anatomy of Alliances: A Premise to Inter-National

Alliance Systems in Pre-colonial Ghana

This article is a micro study on a pervasive and enduring, yet

often over-looked theme of the political and social history of pre-

colonial Ghana. It is about the phenomenon of inter-national alliance

systems. We first aim to, theoretically, unpack aspects of the

constitution of alliances, with its basis in why alliances are

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contracted, as not only a social construct, but also a natural

concomitant of individual, group, society, ethnic and national

interactions. That should reveal alliances, particularly those between

peoples of ethnic groups and geo-political entities such as nation-

states, as a trans-cultural phenomenon, which manifests at different

periods in the history of all people including the indigenous political

milieu of pre-colonial Ghana.

It is interesting to note that, within the context of European

historiography dealing for example with 16th

and 19th century

European history, this phenomenon in particular is often treated as a

subject in its own right and not as an appendix to some macrocosmic

theme(s). Hence, one can easily find in books on European history

chapters and sections that specifically deal with the subject of

European international and inter-monarchical alliances.1 These

chapters normally present and explain the factors, nature and

achievements of such alliances. The alliances often appear as well

schemed phenomena, by European diplomats and monarchs, for

nation-state and continental diplomatic expediencies.2 This attention,

given to international relations of the pre, inter and post periods of the

two 20th century world wars, which featured alliances, also punctuates

the historiography of Europe and various other world powers.

1 See, for example, chapter 61 titled The Growth of Alliances: International

Tension and the Armed Peace in Wallace K. Ferguson and Geoffrey Bruun, A

Survey of European Civilisation, Cambridge, Mass., Houghton Mifflin Company,

1952, p. 826. See also The German System of Alliances in Marvin Perry,

Western Civilisation: A Brief History, Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 2001, p. 506. See E. Lipson Europe in the Nineteenth Century 1815-

1914, London: Adam and Charles Black, 1916, reprint 1961/1968, chapter 7.

2 In response to acts of aggression from a menacing power/hegemon, in pursuance

of balance of power or in pursuit of political, economic, social and religious

interests, alliances which polka-dot European history from the 16th century to the

beginning of World War I manifested various ones bearing names like Triple,

Quadruple, Holy and Grand Alliances and Ententes. Examples are Triple Alliance

(1596), Triple Alliance (1668), Grand Alliance (1689), Grand Alliance (1701),

Triple Alliance (1717), Quadruple Alliance (1718), Quadruple Alliance (1815),

Holy Alliance (1815), Quadruple Alliance (1834), Triple Alliance (1882) and Triple

Entente (1907).

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Apparently, alliances, however, are not peculiar to the

histories of the areas mentioned. People, comprising individuals and

groups, naturally are prone to forms of symbiotic associations and

alliances. Naturally, all organisms are inclined to soliciting support

from one another, allying with each other at different times to counter

a threat or accomplish a feat, which individual organisms without

collaboration would find it difficult or not be able to accomplish. That

is alliance dictated by nature. Human beings at the individual level, do

ally, and form groups. Related to this individual level we even find

from the Alliance Theory or General Exchange Theory (the name

given to the structural method of studying kinship relation), which,

operating in various fields, like psychoanalysis, philosophy and

political science, finds its origins in Gustav Claude Lvi-Strauss's

Elementary Structures of Kinship (1949),3 that marriage itself is a

form of alliance. Within the frame of this theory, which tries to

understand the basic questions about inter-individual relations, or

what, constitutes society we find the emergence of the hypothesis of

marriage-alliance(s) which points to marriage as an enhancer of the necessary interdependence of families and lineages.

Therefore, matrimonies, initiated by exogamous intent, which

is a product of the notion of incest taboo, themselves are thus

described, by anthropologists such as Lvi-Strauss, as a form of

communication, and factor to such alliances. Levi-Strauss considers

the essence of incest taboos to derive not from the fact that they

prohibit marriage between certain persons but rather from the fact that

they force men to seek spouses from another category than the one,

which is prohibited. He, explaining the imposition of the incest taboo,

follows Tylor who had earlier observed the significance of marriage

alliances for social cohesion. Tylor had observed that even in early

human societies, an isolated family could not have survived for it

lacked sufficient manpower to organise collective hunts of big

animals and to defend itself against attacks by enemy groups. To

3 The interested reader can see Claude Levi Strauss, Les structures lmentaires de

la parent. Rodney Needham (ed.) The elementary structures of kinship, translated

by J.H. Bell, R. Needham and J.R. von Sturmer, Boston: Beacon Press, 1969 or

Claude Levi-Strauss, The elementary structures of kinship, (2nd Edition) London:

Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1969.

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survive economically, it needed to cooperate with other families and

friendly relations with other families were at the same time the only

guarantee of its security. These friendly relations were mainly

established through exogamous marriages. In the light of that theory

he posited Again and again in the worlds history, savage tribes must have had plainly before their minds the simple practical alternative

between marrying-out and being killed-out. He stressed that exogamy cementsuncultured populationsinto nations capable of living together in peacetill they reach the period of higher military and political organisation.By binding together a whole community with ties of kinship and affinity, and especially by the peacemaking

of women who hold to one clan as sisters and to another as wives, it

tends to keep down feuds and to heal them when they arise, so as at

critical moments to hold together as a tribe which under endogamic

conditions would have split up.4

Thus, incest taboo-necessitated marriage alliances are realised

by families and lineages through exchanges in which when a daughter

or sister is offered to someone outside a family circle, a circle and

cycle of exchange of women is started. In return, the giver is entitled

to a woman from the other's intimate kinship group. Thus through the

circulation of women in this theory, because of the need to avoid the

threat of incest taboo, alliances are created and links made between

various social groups in one whole society, primarily through

individuals who are matrimonially bonded. Levi-Strauss' model of

exogamous marriage rules over time formulate social structures, as

marriages are principally forged between groups and not just between

the two individuals involved. When groups exchange women on a

regular basis they marry together (ally).This is perpetuated as each

marriage creates a debtor/creditor relationship. This is and must be

balanced through the "repayment" of wives, either directly or in the

next generation. In Straussian thought the initial motivation for the

exchange of women was the incest taboo, but it is also reasonable a

notion that the search for and marrying women outside one's own kin

group was a way of fostering exchange relationships with other

4 E.B. Tylor, On a method of investigating the development of institutions applied

to the laws of marriage and descent, in: Journal of Royal Anthropological

Institute, 1889, p. 268. ( 245-272)

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groups. By necessitating wife-exchange arrangements, exogamy

therefore promotes inter-group alliances and serves to form structures

of social networks.

From the Straussian theory, and that of Tylor we see that

exogamy itself is a form of alliance, which engenders links between

and for individuals and their families and lineages. Consequently,

alliances can move from the individual to the group level, where for

some interest, individuals ally with one another to form groups like

families, clans, ethnies and nations.

Members of diverse ethnic and national groups have always,

in one way or the other tended to form alliances as means of

protecting common interests affecting their persons, ethnicity and

nationality, and against the advance of actual, potential and imagined

threatening entity or entities. Such alliances are constructed to bring

about the dissolution or containment of the power(s) of such threats,

or a balance of power between the power of the alliance and that of

the threatening entity. Within the history of humankind, this common

attitudinal trait, therefore, is a universalism. It is a truism, in the

context of statist diplomacy, that all ethnies or states seek, in

particular, survival, and are engaged in a perpetual struggle to

overcome forces that oppose and threaten them with dissolution. This

necessitates the search for creating social, economic or political

bulwarks (tools) to protect threatened interests and needs. Alliance systems are potent in helping to formulate such bulwarks. However,

in many cases within inter-national relations, entities that encounter

common threats to their military and non-military interests, (like

political and economic stability and survival) are likely to

institutionalise military pacts (alliances) with offensive and defensive

capabilities.

Contextualised in the history of pre-colonial inter-ethnic

relations in Ghana, alliances - military and non-military - , as a

pursued concept and system, can be said to have manifested in its

different facets, which we postulate were meant for survival and the

attainment of balance of power. These, containing the feature of

individual security, which made them collective security alliances,

comprised multilateral alliances, with three or more states, and

bilateral alliances. The formation of alliances of the former category

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could be instantaneous or gradually formulated over time through the

amalgamation of established bilateral alliances and incorporation of

new allies. Nevertheless, all such alliances that sought the interest of

the members were necessitated by the existence of a threat of hostile

power. For their construction, weaker nations could merge against

and/or in defence of a bigger power.

Again, one bigger power or two bigger powers could agree to

bear the extra burden of providing security to their own territories and

to other states and regions, if those regions agreed to consider them as

primus inter pares and consented to restrain their freedom of action to

them as bigger powers, in order to balance against external threats.

The creation of such hub-and-spokes multilateral collective security alliances commonly comes through coaxing or coercing of the smaller

powers.

Political and social histories of domestic politics and society in

pre-colonial Ghana are punctuated by turning points. Typically, these

watersheds, within inter-ethnic relationships, as reported by many

colonial European and postcolonial African and Africanist historians

have been connected to major wars and belligerence.5 Such

belligerent struggles appear as if they are the only recognisable and,

of course, the interesting features, within this history of relationships

in that territory of multiplicity of ethnic interests and diplomacy. In

any case, what do such histories have to tell us about pre-colonial

Ghana? What, if anything, is left out in the telling? Our purposes in

posing these questions are two fold. The first suggests that these

histories focus too narrowly on wars, wars that even appear not to

have been orchestrated and driven, within the context of inter-ethnic

diplomatic expediency, by consciously engineered alliance systems

like what, presented in history books, took place in Europe after the

5 See for example: A. Boahen, Ghana: Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and

Twentieth Centuries, Longman, 1975; W. W. Claridge, A History of the Gold Coast

and Ashanti, London, 1915; C. C. Reindorf, The History of the Gold Coast and

Ashante, Accra: GUP, 1966; W. E. F. Ward, A History of Ghana, London, 1958.

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defeat of Napoleon for example. The second is to propose an

alternative perspective on pre-colonial inter-ethnic relationship and

diplomacy. This seeks to highlight and draw attention to the idea that

political hegemonic authorities, as part of diplomacy, developed

means of engendering statist relations and protecting various interests,

leading to indigenously pursued conscious alliance systems, of which

wars were enhancers and/or became by-products of such

arrangements.

In the context of this re-evaluation of the political and social

history of Ghana, we are interested in some notable inter-ethnic and

national alliances and what necessitated them. Principally, alliance

systems, which were pro-Asante and anti-Asante, and the factors that

engineered their formation would be examined. These necessities,

which we posit were politically, socially, culturally and economically

inclined, were for survival of people-hood and inter-national balance

of power. As we move from this theoretical submission, we would use

historical facts as references to elucidate the alliance systems that

existed in the milieu in which we are interested. A plethora of

reasons, i.e. principles, engineered such alliances. Such symbiotic

relations between the cluster of indigenous peoples and their polities

were animated as they pursued such principles. Their political

authority institutions consciously motivated such pursuits. As

indicated, alliances feature among socio-political entities like ethnies,

nations and so-called nation-states and counties within different geo-

political spatial locales and periods. They come through consensus or

from the initiative of a self-appointed primus inter pares, who coerces

or coaxes a group or groups into an alliance system with it. Meant for

collective security, they can manifest as parity alliances or suzerainty

alliances. For the latter, which are often the systems arranged by self-

appointed first among equals, there appears to be, in principle, parity in membership, but in practice it is the initiating group(s) that

becomes the primus inter pares.

Like Europe, which after the Napoleonic Wars, witnessed a

series of alliances for the purpose of continental political and

diplomatic security, the indigenous ethnies of Ghana also were into

alliances which, although may not have had signed documents called

treaties and may not have featured the drinking of tea, coffee and wine, were consciously designed and purposeful. Fundamentally,

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such alliances were orchestrated for political and economic security

and survival for the entrants. Within the indigenous milieu of inter-

ethnic national and statist relations, alliances were formulated as

peer review and control mechanisms to foment balance of power. In that context, the application of the theory of balance of power, which

asserts that the most effective check on the power and threat of a

state, nation or ethnic group, is the power of other states, which are

brought together, is logical. In that development, there is a

distribution of power capabilities of rival states in an alliance to

contend another state or groups of states in an alliance. In that

situation, blocs normally maintain equivalent arsenal of weapons, and

troops, which protect their sovereignty, resources and interest from

one another. This helps to sustain military and territorial balance of

power and potentially protect the security and survival needs of the

contending alliance blocs. A tilt, in such arrangements could be

detrimental or healthy to a group. It could lead to the subordination of

one group and super-ordination of another. In fact the alliances

themselves, created to maintain balance of power, are also formulated

to work towards a tilt in it, so that the groups that use tact and strength

are able to use such a tilt in their favour or to their advantage and

eventually against the interest of the other.

For example during the Cold War the U.S.A.-led West and

US.S.R.-led East, represented individual alliance systems, which,

serving their respective interest were anti each other. They maintained

equivalent arsenals of arms in the 1970s and 1980s, which, conditioning a dreadful period of Mutually Assured Destruction,

helped to sustain within their ideological blocs a military balance of

power, territorial security and balance. Within the theory of balance

of power is the logical prediction that balancing processes help to

maintain the stability of relations between states. However, if another

one of the powers attempts to rapidly, or gradually bring a change or

changes in the balanced inter-national status of power and security,

where for example a bloc attempts to extend or widen its territorial

space and influence to the detriment of another, it provokes

counterbalancing action from the other bloc. Nonetheless, the struggle

by blocs to tilt the balance of power in their favour is a natural

constant and the one who does it successfully eventually dominates

the other or supersedes the other in influence. Hence within the

context of the Cold War, when a tilt consequently occurred in the

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1990s, because of sustained subtle economic and political manoeuvres (attempts) by the West to destroy the power of the East,

the Western alliance was able to remove the power of the East. This

brought about an imbalance of power when the U.S.S.R.

disintegrated, leaving the West as the triumphant power of the post

World War II ideologically-Cold War conditioned West-East

diplomatic relations of the twentieth century.

Another idea from the balance of power theory is that anytime

that one state or alliance increases its power or applies it more

aggressively, threatened states will increase their own power in

response, often by forming a counter-balancing coalition. For

example, the rise of German power before and during World War I

(1914-1918) and World War II (1939-1945) triggered the formation

of an anti-German coalition, consisting of the Soviet Union, Britain,

France, the United States, and other countries.

Applicable and true to the situation of pre-colonial Ghana

territory, we can see scenarios of indigenous diplomacy, which

evidence the formation of coalitions by and of smaller powers to

counter-balance or dissolve the position and influence of a threatening

power. This was apparent in the pre-colonial inter-state diplomacy of

Ghana. In the north, the formation of alliances had been evident

during the rise of the Mole Dagbani states and Gonjaland and in the

south it manifested during the rise of early kingdoms such as Adanse,

Akwamu and Denkyira. It was not surprising therefore that in the

period between 1690 and early 1700s a group of matrilineal chiefdoms in the forest region of Ghana, driven by a common fear of

extinction at the hands of the major power then Denkyira, decided to form a coalition to disband and replace the threatening power,

Denkyira. In the same way, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,

the insurgency and imperial ambitions of Asante would engender

alliances between states who felt threatened by the perceived

aggressiveness of Asante. Their actions and reactions were consistent

with the theory of balance of power which suggests and reveals that

states would logically counter any threat to their security by allying

with other threatened states and by increasing their own military

capabilities to stem that aggressiveness. In addition, they would do

that to contain that power or defeat that power if an engagement,

(physical i.e. military, propaganda and ideological duelling), is

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pushed by any side of the divide. Such states also will normally

employ the policy of forming a geographically based coalition of

states to surround and block an expansionist power in the strategy

known as containment. Consequently, within the historical

chronological milieu in which this study is situated, some of the

alliances of threatened states, in orientation and purpose were anti-

Asante alliances which were made to contain Asante aggression and

in some instances to engage in physical military engagements in a bid

to dissolve Asante and its suzerainty alliance of an empire.

Discussions on this subject will involve the alliances entered by the

Gonja-Dagomba, Akyem, Fante, Ga-Dangme and Ewe with particular

emphasis on those with or against Asante.

The Gonja-Dagomba

The Dagomba are a branch of the Mole-Dagbani group

believed to have migrated from an area East of Lake Chad under the

leadership of Tohajie (the Red Hunter). The Dagomba kingdom

(Dagbon) was founded by Sitobu, the son of a descendant of Tohajie

called Naa Gbewaa. Diari, which emerged as the first capital of

Dagomba, was later abandoned as a result of clashes over territories

that erupted between the Dagomba and the Gonja. Gonja traditions

recorded in the Umar Adjadina al Ghunjawiyyin, assert that it was

Wadh Naba, or Nabaga, who founded the Gonja state and became its

first chief. He was originally sent by the chief of Mande Kaba on a

punitive expedition against the trading centre of Begho because of a

major decline in gold exports to Mali. He moved to Yagbum and

established a military base around A.D. 1554. From there, he went on

an expedition of conquest. By 1600, he had taken much territory of

many indigenous communities in the North. The intrusion of the

Gonja led to clashes with Dagbon over territories. It was in one such

disagreement that the Dagbon were forced to move their capital from

Diari to Yendi.6

6 For some insight into the origins and early histories of the Gonja and Dagomba, as

well as others ethnies in northern Ghana, see: J. Anquandah, Rediscovering

Ghanas Past, Longman, 1982; A. A. Boahen, Ghana: Evolution and Change in the

Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Longman, 1975; F. K. Buah, A History of

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The location of these two states brought them into contact

with the Akan to the south. It is believed that Gonja incursions into

the Akan state of Bono contributed to the decline of the latter and its

subsequent incorporation into the Asante Empire in 1723. Asante

which emerged around 1700 as a small confederation of segmentary

matrilineal chiefdoms expanded rapidly in the eighteenth century. It

embarked on a policy of territorial expansionism by successfully

conquering and dominating its neighbours politically and

economically. In the 1730s Asantes conquest of Gonja and Dagomba incorporated these nation states into the sprawling Asante

Empire.

On the part of Gonja and Dagomba, two kinds of relationships

emerged after this smashing defeat of their armies. The first was

characterised by dislike of Asante as a result of perceived tyranny

during the reign of Asantehene Opoku Ware. Understandably, the loss

of sovereignty to Asante embittered the two states. The extent of

bitterness against Asante during the militaristic reign of Opoku Ware

can be appreciated when we consider the obituary written for the

Asantehene by a Gonja annalist, believed to be Imam Sidi Umar in

1750; may Allah curse him and cast his soul into hell. It was he who harmed the people of Gonja, oppressing and robbing them of

their property at his will 7 Seventy years after this, another Gonja Imam, Malik, writing to Asantehene Osei Bonsu makes prayers for

the latters good health, success in war and significantly blesses his ancestors.

8 Obviously something had changed. In Asante itself change

came through the influential role played by mercantilist members of

the Asantehenes court who wanted peace and open roads ostensibly to facilitate participation in the northern bound international trade. For

Gonjaland, the difference came by way of Asantes development of the Salaga market which encouraged international trade with

Hausaland. The mutual economic benefits of this important market

Ghana, Macmillan, 1980 and, D.E.K. Amenumey, Ghana A Concise History from

Pre-Colonial Times to the 20th Century, Accra: Woeli, 2008.

7 Ivor Wilks, One Nation, Many Histories, Accra: Ghana Universities Press, 1996,

p. 34-35.

8 Ibid.

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thus completely changed the nature of Asante-Gonja relationship

forcing their leadership to realise that they were allies with a common

goal economic prosperity and state security. Innate survival instincts guided by economic as well as political considerations thus

necessitated and fuelled the second reaction - that of friendship and

partnership until the defeat of Asante by the British in 1874.

Asante-Dagomba relations also matured from the stage of

conqueror and conquered to that of allies who had mutual respect for

each other. This can be ascertained from the fact that, although the

Asante were considered as foreigners the Dagomba chief was bestowed with the highest Asante accolade Asante Kotoko, Anwaa Kotoko translated, Asante porcupines, Dagomba porcupines. The Dagomba also cultivated a new title for the general of one contingent

made up of strangers, called Kanbong Se, in the Dagomba army9. The title was Kanbong Naa, which roughly translated as Chief of Strangers.

One obvious result of the Asante/Gonja-Dagomba alliance

was the institutionalisation of writing as a means of documenting

transactions of the Asantehenes court by Moslem clerics of northern (Gonja-Dagomba) extraction. Some of these scholars served as

advisors to the Asantehene. By far the most obvious effect of

Moslems and Islam in the Asantehenes court was exemplified during the reign of Asantehene Osei Kwame (1777-1798) who not only

flirted with Islam but actually resorted to the use of Koranic laws in

place of indigenous laws. This tendency, coupled with the fact that he

courted the hatred of the Asantehemaa, Konadu Yiadom and some

other important chiefs of Kumase led to his deposition.10

In the area

of warfare, Asante benefited immensely from the Gonja-Dagomba by

way of the two providing able-bodied men to serve as soldiers in the

Asante military wing. Asante having usurped the position of trading

giant in the south followed the tradition of earlier kingdoms such as

Akwamu and Denkyira to rely on subject states for the important

9 , Interview, Oheneba Adusei Poku, Akyempemhene, Kumase, 24th May, 2009.

10 See Ivor Wilks, Asante in the Nineteenth Century, London: CUP, 1975, pp 250-

255.

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trading commodity of the time slaves. The two northern states accounted for most of the slaves Asante acquired during its

participation in the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade. Asante is noted to

have reaped major financial benefits from participation in this trade as

well as the thriving kola trade between Asante, its northern

neighbours and Hausaland.

The political and economic benefits derived from the northern

states thus encouraged Asante to cultivate a peaceful relationship with

them. This is not to say that Asante lost sight of its overlord position.

Actually, Asante jealously guarded this position by stationing

ambassadors in the north to oversee the interests of Asante. Again,

Asante left no doubt in the minds of leadership in the two states that

attempts to assert their independence would incur the wrath of

metropolitan Kumase, the capital of imperial Asante, and the thrust of

the latters military might. A re-appraisal of the Asante / Gonja-Dagomba alliance clearly shows that Asante nurtured this alliance

based on the knowledge of the potential negative impact of secession

by these two powerful northern states. In this respect, leadership in

Asante were guided by the principles of territorial integrity and

protection of the political and economic balance of power. The

political and economic interactions further facilitated numerous socio-

cultural exchanges that have influenced the three peoples.11

The new

and deepened relationship was disturbed by a southern alliance that

mainly comprised the British, the Fante and the Akyem.

The Akyem

There are three identifiable Akyem groups namely, Abuakwa,

Kotoku and Bosome with Kyebi, Odaa and Akyem Swedru as their

respective capitals. The ancestors of the Akyem were migrants from

Adanse. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Akyem states

of Abuakwa and Kotoku had been firmly established in their present

homelands. The Akyem Bosome on the other hand are said to have

11 For details on the cross cultural borrowings see Jack Goody, The Akan and the

North cited in Ghana Notes and Queries, No. 9, November 1966; and other related

seminar papers on the Akan of Ghana.

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founded their state in the first decade of the eighteenth century.12

In

the years under review, the Akyem sought to maintain a territorial and

economic balance of power that would incline only in their favour. To

this end, they allied with or against other states in southern Ghana as

well as states from Europe. Closely linked to the political, was the

economic need to participate in the Trans-Atlantic trade. The

satisfaction of these objectives led the individual Akyem states to ally

with states such as Denkyira, Akwamu, Akuapem, Fante, Krobo,

Wassa, Assin and Ga as well as the Krepi states in Eweland. These

same reasons engendered antagonistic relations between the Akyem

states and Asante leading to series of wars from 1701-1875.13

Hostility with Asante aside, there were misunderstandings with

Akwamu from the second half of the seventeenth century to the third

decade of the eighteenth.14

Oral traditions about the Akwamu indicate that they first

settled in the Twifo-Hemang area and relocated under their leader

Otumfuo Asare to found Asaremankese later corrupted as

Asamankese situated west of Akyem Abuakwa. With the help of

firearms derived from Europeans stationed on the coast, Akwamu

pursued a policy of imperial domination over its neighbours thus

extending its sphere of influence to the Ga coastal state of Accra. The

drive to participate in the coastal trade led to the repositioning of the

Akwamu capital first to Nyanoase and then to Nsaki about 20km from

Accra.

Owing to the proximity of Asamankese to Abuakwa it was

inevitable that the Akyem Abuakwa and Akwamu people would have

an interaction. Relations between the two were sometimes volatile

12

For details, see: Robert Addo-Fening, Akyem Abuakwa 1700-1943 from Ofori

Panin to Sir Ofori Atta, Trondheim: NTNU, 1997, 2001.; Kofi Affrifah, The Akyem

Factor in Ghanas History 1700-1875,Accra: Ghana Universities Press, 2000.

13 Affrifah, Akyem Factor, op. cit., p. 1.

14 For more information see: Affrifah, Akyem Factor, p. 26-27, 46-50; Amenumey,

Ghana, op. cit., pp. 32-40; C. C. Reindorf, The History of the Gold Coast and

Asante, Ghana Universities Press, 1966, pp. 60-85.

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and sometimes cordial. In 1659 and 1682 the two were engaged in

war. However, in 1677, Abuakwa extended a hand of friendship by

giving a loan to Akwamuhene Ansah Sasraku. It is believed that this

financial assistance was geared towards ensuring that Akwamu

allowed the Akyem room to consolidate themselves as well as to

ensure unimpeded Akyem participation in the coastal trade. Post 1677

hostilities between the two states are considered by some to have been

partly caused by Akwamu inability or refusal to pay this loan.15

Conflict between Akyem and Akwamu carried on to the first

half of the eighteenth century. Akwamu which was arguably the most

powerful southern state at the start of this century was perceived by

the others to be a danger to the geo-political survival of the less

endowed states in the eastern corridor of southern Ghana. They were

accused of slave raiding by subject states like Ga and Akuapem. In

the matter of illegal acquisition of slaves, Kotoku also blamed

Akwamu for the latters inability to account for the Akyem refugees who sought shelter in Akwamuland in the 1717-1718 periods when

Asante attacked Akyem. There was evidence to the effect that the

Akyem refugees had been sold into slavery by Akwamuhene

Akonnor. In weighing the options available, Abuakwa and Kotoku

operating within the conceptual framework of balance of power,

concluded that they could enter into an alliance with other southern

states to protect their political and economic interests as well as their

pride. They thus set about organising the other states to rebel against

Akwamu and by so doing entrenched themselves as a formidable

force in the south-eastern corridor.

Power politics thus accounted for much of the opposition

Akwamu encountered from Akyem. Therefore it came as welcome

news to the Akyem when the Ga and Akuapem called on them for

assistance in a war of liberation against Akwamu. Akyem Abuakwa

and Kotoku together with their allies fought Akwamu in the Nyanoase

war of 1729-1730 and the Akwamu were heavily defeated. The defeat

and subsequent departure of the Akwamu ruling house from their

home to Trans-Volta paved the way for Akyem ascendancy in eastern

Ghana. The two Akyem states assumed authority over all Akwamu

15 Affrifah, op. cit., p. 26-27.

16

territorial possessions positioned west of the Volta. Having lost her

territorial possessions to the Akyem, Akwamu went shopping for a

formidable ally to protect the new Akwamu from the Akyem. In this

quest, Anlo and Asante emerged as allies of Akwamu. Another

significant evolutionary product of this war was the union of the

fragmentary Guan and Akan communities to found the Akuapem

paramountcy under the leadership of Ofori Kumaa of Akyem

Abuakwa. Affrifah opines that Abuakwa received the lions share of Akwamus territorial possessions because Kotoku was primarily concerned with their northern neighbour Asante and was thus not

ready to take up possessions further south aside the Ga state of Osu.16

Enmity between Kotoku and Asante extended as far back as

the formative stage of the latter. Kotoku allied with Denkyira in the

seventeenth century against the recently united states of Asante. The Kotoku / Denkyira alliance was believed to have been motivated by

security concerns as well as the fact that the two were members of the

Agona clan and therefore brothers. Between 1689 and 1701, Kotoku

joined Denkyira to fight the Asante confederate states that were by

then fighting their war of independence. The confederate states

defeated Denkyira and its allies and Asante never forgave Kotoku.

Therefore, in 1717, Asante organised an attack on Kotoku which

ended in the formers defeat and the death by drowning of the first Asante king, Osei Tutu in the Pra River. From this time onwards,

Asante tried to suppress and incorporate the Akyem states of Kotoku

and Abuakwa into its growing empire. The two Akyem states also

fought to prevent Asantes overlordship. Kotoku submitted to Asante in 1744 but Abuakwa resisted until 1783.

In 1742, the Abuakwa chief, Pobi, negotiated an alliance with

the Akuapem and Krobo aimed at instituting economic sanctions

against Asante. The three states jointly blockaded trade routes leading

from Asante through the eastern sector to the coast. Closure of the

trade routes forced Asante traders headed for the Ga and Adangbe

coast to use a longer route through the Kwawu Mountains, traverse

the Afram Plains and cross the Volta to Akwamu where escorts

guided them to their destination. The eastern blockade against Asante

16 Affrifah, Akyem Factor, p. 47.

17

was followed with a western one which included the Assin, Wassa,

Twifo and the Fante Confederate states in 1750.

Still in the eastern corridor, from 1750 to 1757, during the

Ada-Anlo battle of Nonobe, Ada secured the help of Abuakwa,

Krobo, Akuapem and Agave.17

This coalition under the leadership of

Twum Ampoforo of Abuakwa and Sakyiama Tenten of Akuapem

successfully defeated Anlo. During the war, Abuakwa supplied Ada

with guns and gunpowder in exchange for fish and salt. It goes

without saying that the Ada derived security from this alliance while

Abuakwa earned the respect of being accepted as a powerful people.

Abuakwa also gained access to Europeans stationed on the Ada coast

and managed to secure for itself passage across the Volta River. By

1769 therefore, Abuakwa had formed a southern alliance against

Asante for defensive and offensive purposes. The alliance consisted

of the Akuapem, Krobo and Ada in the east and the Wassa, Twifo,

Assin, Denkyira and Fante states to the west. This grand alliance was partly broken in 1783 when Asante defeated Abuakwa and

incorporated it into the sprawling Asante Empire.

Incorporation into the Asante Empire did not end Abuakwas anti-Asante feelings. If anything, that development further

exacerbated it. In 1823, Abuakwa and Kotoku joined another southern

alliance against Asante, this time led by a Trans-Atlantic trading giant

- the British. In 1831, another European state, Denmark, joined the

coalition and together the allies defeated Asante. These alliances

paved the way for British control of the states following another

Asante defeat in 1874. As already indicated, other southern states

allied with the British in order to subdue Asante, prominent among

these was the Fante confederate states.

The Fante

The Fante are a section of the Akan living in a number of

traditional states found in the coastal belt of Ghana roughly from the

Pra on the west to about twenty-five kilometres west of the capital

17 D. E. K. Amenumey, The Ewe in Pre-Colonial Ghana, Accra: Sedco, 1986, p.

44.

18

Accra. Like most of the Akan, the Fante claim to have migrated from

Bono to their present home on the coast under the leadership of three

men; Obunumankoma, Odapagyan and Oson. Although the exact date

of their immigration is unknown, it is believed that this movement

predates the fifteenth century when the Portuguese set foot on the

coast. 18

From the fifteenth century, trade in West Africa changed its

northern direction southwards to concentrate in the coastal polities

along the Gulf of Guinea part of the Atlantic Ocean thus empowering

and enriching the southern states. In Ghana, the Fante formed part of

the nouveau riche by virtue of their geographical location on the

coast. They carved a niche for themselves as middlemen in the Trans-

Atlantic trade between the Europeans and the inland states. Thus from

the sixteenth century a major policy of the Fante states was to

safeguard their role. Economic issues aside, the Fante states sought to

protect their territorial integrity by warding off attacks from other

states especially Asante and its allies who did not only entertain the

idea of supplanting Fante in its middleman position but schemed to

extend her imperial authority to Fanteland. Well aware of the might of

Asantes army, the Fante concluded that it would be prudent to ally with other militarily powerful states in order to ensure their

security.They saw their chance when Asante and Akyem Kotoku

fought in 1717. The aftermath of this war left a lasting impact on

Fante-Akyem relations. In the years before 1717, the Fante were

hostile to the Akyem but following the defeat of Asante, the Fante

states sent congratulatory messages to the victor.19

Perhaps this was

for their own protection but the gesture sowed a seed of friendship

that led to an alliance between the Fante, Akyem, Akuapem and

Agona to prevent Asante from gaining access to the Elmina Castle, which was another important commercial nerve centre on the coast

and for the Trans-Atlantic trade. Another important economic ally of

18 For information on the Fante states see Amenumey, Ghana, op. cit., pp. 74-79.

Boahen, Ghana: Evolution and Change, pp. 20-25. K. Y. Daaku, Trade and Politics

on the Gold Coast, OUP, 1970; John Mensah Sarbah, , Fante National Constitution,

London, 1906.

19 Affrifah, op. cit., p.39.

19

the Fante was Wassa. The two states often conspired with the Assin to

blockade the trade routes leading from Assin to the coast against

Asante traders. This caused Asantehene Osei Bonsu to organise an

Asante attack against the Assin Tanosu, Fante and Wassa.20

As a form

of retaliation, the Fante and Tanosu organised attacks on Elmina and

Accra, allies of Asante on the coast.

Another important ally of the Fante was the British.21

The

English like other Europeans came to the Ghanaian coast in search of

trading partners. The first English fort was located at Kormantse in

1631 but was taken over by the Dutch in 1665. A year earlier, in

1664, the English took control of Cape Coast Castle from the Dutch. From all indications this take-over marked the beginning of a lasting

friendship between the English and the Fante. The English supplied

guns and gunpowder to the Fante states and relied on the latter for

gold and slaves from the interior. By the middle of the eighteenth

century European rivals of the British had begun to desert the Gold Coast. The Brandenburgers had gone bankrupt, the Swedes had been expelled and Danish activities were confined to fort Christiansborg at

Osu and a collection of forts towards Keta. The most active people

aside the British were the Dutch who controlled thirteen forts against

the British eight. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the

English overtook the Dutch as the leading commercial power in

Europe. In Ghana, the two European powers decided to collaborate

effectively leading to an Anglo-Dutch exchange of forts and castles in

1868.22

By 1872, the Dutch had sold their possessions on the coast of

Ghana to the British and left. The Dutch departure paved the way for

British imperial ambitions leading the latter to ally with other

southern states including the Fante and Akyem to defeat Asante in

1874 and institute British colonisation.

The 1868 Anglo-Dutch exchange of forts antagonised the

Fante and their neighbours who felt that they as the indigenous

20 Ibid, p.39, 106-107.

21 For information on Fante- British relationship, see books cited in the Reference

section below. D. Kimble, A Political History of Ghana, OUP, 1963, pp. 192-261.

22 Kimble, op. cit., p.223.

20

political powers had been ignored and, therefore, disrespected during

the transactions. These developments coupled with others like the

lack of effective British protection of the Fante against Asante raids as

well as British interference in the internal affairs of the Fante pushed

the latter to unite. Another grievance was the arrest and deportation to

Sierra Leone in 1865 of King Aggrey of Cape Coast.23

Infuriated by

security concerns and the exchange of forts among others, a meeting

of all Fante states was convened at Mankessim and a fighting force

was instantly deployed to aid Komenda and Dixcove. Almost

immediately a constitution was drawn up with Winnebas King Ghartey as first king-president. The union became known as the Fante

Confederation and marked the first unified Fante resistance to British

colonial activities. It is noteworthy that the coalition, one of the

biggest intra-ethnic alliances was not of only Fante states but included

other states located in the Protectorate such as Denkyira, Wassa,

Twifo, Assin and Ahanta.

To the east of the Fante states was the Ga with whom Asante

enjoyed friendly relations. Reindorf records for example that the

Fante and their allies fought the Ga (Akra) in 1809 to punish them for

their alliance with Asante.24

It must be noted however that unlike

Elmina which usually bore the brunt of Fante attempts to punish

Asantes allies, the Ga were rarely attacked. Probably owing to the fact that Fanteland was quite a distance away from Ga territory but

most likely because the Ga was militarily strong.

In assessing the Fante and the alliances they engaged in, it is

obvious that they were calculated and strategic. Alliances such as

those with the Akyem against Asante were in line with the principle

of containment in the balance of power theory. Wars against friends

of Asante such as Elmina and Akra, were fought in order to threaten

23 He was a nineteenth century indigenous chief who challenged the legal basis of

British rule in Ghana. His deportation occurred when the colonial administrator,

Colonel E. Conran released several prisoners convicted by King Aggrey. He is said

to have written a seditious letter to Conran for which the latter responded by

deporting him. See Kimble, pp. 217-219.

24 C. C Reindorf, The History of the Gold Coast and Ashantee, GUP, Accra, 1966,

P. 142.

21

Asante through possible dissolution of pro-Asante alliances, which

when achieved could ultimately result in the containment of Asante.

Again in creating the Fante confederacy, they showed that individuals

and groups were prone to unite in order to protect what is perceived

by them as the common good.

The Ga-Dangme

The origin of the Ga-Dangme is still a matter of immense

dispute among scholars.25

One school of thought that has gained

general acceptance and is confirmed by oral traditions is their origin

from south-western Nigeria. The Ga occupy the coastal strip of land

from the mouth of the Densu River to that of the Volta. By the

seventeenth century, the Ga had gained recognition as a formidable

force in the Trans-Atlantic trade. As mentioned elsewhere, active

participation in the trade led to a military clash between them and

Akwamu, a neighbouring inland state. In their first encounter, the Ga

led by King Okai Koi inflicted a heavy defeat on Akwamu thus

incorporating the latter into the Ga kingdom. However in 1660,

Akwamu under Ansa Sasraku was able to defeat Okai Kois forces in the battle of Nyantrabi. The Ga resisted incorporation into the

Akwamu kingdom for twenty years but in 1680 Akwamu decisively

concluded its defeat of the Ga thus dominating its people and land

from 1680 to 1730. During this period, the Ga borrowed extensively

from Akwamu in terms of language related to economics and

statecraft. Also, cultural practices related to trade and war was learnt

from Akwamu. In these years, Akwamu gained direct and unimpeded

access to the coastal trade as well as the notes to the Christiansborg

Castle, which conferred on it the right to collect ground rent thereby enriching itself. Akwamus governing tactics over the Ga and other states incurred the wrath of the governed, causing them to unite with a

common agenda freedom from Akwamu rule. The desire to oust or contain Akwamu therefore brought about the Ga-Dangme alliance

with Abuakwa, Kotoku and Akuapem which resulted in the 1729-

1730 Nyanoase war.26

25 Anquandah, Rediscovering Ghanas Past, Longman, 1982, p. 113ff.

26 See preceeding pages on the Akyem.

22

This alliance ensured for the Ga-Dangme states protection

against Akwamu aggression; and on the downside, loss of their

independence to another Akan state, Akyem. As before, cultural

interactions resulted in borrowings that enriched the Ga language and

customs. Economically, the alliance enabled a state like Ada to have

an upper hand in the control of the Volta River. It also positioned Ada

as a middleman between the inland states and the Europeans.

In the 1740s following the Asante attack on and defeat of the Akyem states, Asantehene Opoku Ware made overtures to King Tete

Ahene Akwa of Accra and the two concluded a pledge of

understanding that promoted peace between the two states and

prevented them from taking up arms against each other. Accra agreed

to help Kumase in times of war and vice-versa. It is noteworthy that

subsequent leaders of the two states respected this agreement to the

extent that some traditions alluded to the fact that the people of Accra

and Asante were brothers. The two states enjoyed mutual economic

benefits from this alliance. There was also mutual borrowing of

language and culture. The Asante for example adopted the Ga title of

Asafoatse27

as the title for the leader (chief) of the Asante youth

otherwise known as the nkwankwaahene.

Financial concerns forged relations between the coastal Ga-

Dangme and European traders such as the Dutch, English, Swedes,

Danes, and French. Alliance with European states also ensured

security for the Ga-Dangme because they were assured of a regular

supply of arms and ammunition from their European allies. They

sometimes joined forces with the Europeans to fight other states. For

instance during the battle between the Danes and Anlo from March to

May 1784, the Ga-Dangme joined others like Akuapem and Ge (a

combined group of local Ewe and migrants or fugitives from Accra,

27 This title was abolished by Asantehene Prempeh II in 1938 following a protracted

legal case orchestrated by some Asante youth for the destoolment of the

Asantehene. For details see Mary Akosua Seiwaa Owusu, Politics of Survival: The

Life and Times of Asantehene Sir Osei Agyemang Prempeh II, MPhil thesis,

University of Cape Coast, 2003, p128ff.

23

Ladoku and Elmina) to fight on the Danish side, inflicting a heavy

defeat on Anlo, one of the Ewe states.28

The Ewe

The Ewe of Ghana are said to have migrated from Nigeria to

Notsie and thence to the area east of the Volta where they are

presently located. It is important to note that some of the Ewe can be

found outside Ghana in countries such as Togo and Benin.29

Although

they were essentially one people, the Ewe stayed variegated, as its

sub-groups did not unite in order to establish a formidable empire that

could rival others like Asante and Abuakwa. In discussing Ewe

alliances, attention will be paid to the Anlo, Krepi and the Ge.

Anlo emerged as one of the leading Ewe sub-groups and so

attempted to dominate some of the minor groups politically and

economically. The expansionist aims of Anlo antagonised some of her

neighbours leading to armed confrontation. This was the case with

their eastern neighbour, the Ge.30

The most important Ge towns were

the capital Glidzi and Anexo also known as Little Popo, the

commercial centre. Having entrenched themselves in Eweland, the Ge

began to contend with Anlo for political and economic supremacy.

Politically the two were engaged in a battle for territories and military

superiority. Concerning the economy the two were battling over the

control of the slave trade in the region as well as the coastal trade in

fish and salt. A number of wars were fought between the Anlo and Ge

during the second half of the seventeenth century and almost

throughout the eighteenth. Neither state emerged as overlord of the

28 D.E.K. Amenumey, The Ewe in Pre-Colonial Ghana, Accra: Sedco, 1986, p.49-

50.

29 Dennis Laumann, A History of the Ewe of Togo and Benin from Pre-Colonial to

Post-Colonial Times, cited in Benjamin D. Lawrence (ed), The Ewe of Togo and

Benin, Accra: Woeli, 2005, p. 14.

30 Ibid., p. 17. Also, Amenumey, The Ewe in Pre-Colonial Ghana, p. 17-18.

24

other. To a large extent, they were engaged in a battle of equals

although the Ge proved to be the stronger of the two.31

Anlo also suffered attacks from her western neighbours such

as the Ga-Dangme and Agave. Again, this was a case of commercial

rivalry. The struggle was over control of the sources of fish and salt to

serve the booming markets in Krepi and Krobo. Ada in particular

persistently picked up arms against Anlo over the issue of fishing

rights on the lower Volta basin as well as access to the salt lagoons at

the mouth of the river. To this end, Ada persistently procured the help

of Accra and Agave. The Danes joined on the side of Ada because of

Danish commercial and landed interests in the Ada region. This

rivalry led to the battle of Nonobe in 1750 which saw an initial Anlo

defeat at the hands of the Ada allies of Accra, Agave, Akuapem,

Krobo and Akyem as well as the Danes. Faced with opposition from

her neighbours Anlo sought an ally in Akwamu. The alliance with

Akwamu was a politico-economic one. Anlo supported Akwamu in

the 1730 war which saw Akwamu defeat. Similarly, Akwamu aided

Anlo in 1750. Although the combined forces of the Anlo and

Akwamu beat back the invading force of the western allies, Anlo was

dealt a crushing blow when her capital Anloga was razed to the

ground. Peace was restored in 1757.32

Anlo, Ada and their allies took to the war fields again in 1769.

The war adversely affected trade causing worry among the trading

states. Events took a different turn when the Akyem and Krobo were

reported to have engaged in the harassment of traders from Asante.

After Akyems refusal to answer the summons of the Asantehene to explain actions of its people, Asante was compelled to enter the war

on the side of Anlo. The Asante army attacked and defeated the

Akyem and Akuapem thus freeing Anlo from fighting a war of many

fronts. The war ended when the combined force of Anlo and Akwamu

forced the Ge to retreat. Not totally satisfied with this victory Anlo

organised a successful surprise attack on Ada in 1776. This victory

entrenched Danish dislike of Anlo. Threatened by the power of Anlo

31 Amenumey, The Ewe, pp. 21-42.

32 Ibid, p. 44.

25

the Danes schemed to have Anlo defeated especially after a looting of

the Danish lodge at Keta by some Anlo citizens in 1783. The Danes

quickly solicited the help of Anlos enemies for a decisive military attack. In March 1784, soldiers from Ada, Krobo, and Akuapem

under the leadership of an Accra chief, Otoo attacked Anlo. The allied

forces were able to solicit and use the support of other states including

Aflao, and Ge. By 14th

May, Anlo had once again been crushed and

her capital destroyed in what the Anlo call the Sagbadre war.

The wars with the Ge and Ada constantly stretched the

military might of Anlo and this made support from Akwamu very

vital. Anlo adopted the effective war tactics of Akwamu. In return,

Akwamu was assured of constant supply of fish and salt as well as

access to the Anlo coast in order to trade with the Europeans. A direct

result of the Anlo-Akwamu alliance was a friendship that evolved

with Asante, an ally of Akwamu. It was not until 1792 that Anlo had

direct contact with Asante.33

A Danish mission occasioned this to

Asante, which encouraged some Anlo elders to embark on a friendly

mission to that territory. An alliance of mutual benefit was established

between the two states, which lasted up to the nineteenth century.

The friendship was put to the test during the Asante invasion

of the coastal states in 1807 and 1811. Anlo became involved in the

1807 war when some Fante fugitives crossed the Volta to seek refuge

at Keta. They were quickly rounded up by Anlo and delivered to

Akwamu for onward transfer to Asante. Thus when Avenor and Some

entered a secret alliance to attack Anlo in 1809, Akwamu with active

support from Asante helped Anlo to attack and defeat the two. An

important factor in the Anlo-Asante alliance was the reliance on each

other for security. Asante could count on Anlo anytime she had to

attack the southern peoples. Anlo was also free from worries over an

Asante invasion of her territories. It should be noted that had Asante

which was the stronger of the two wanted to attack Anlo at anytime, it

could easily have routed any Anlo army but peace prevailed among

the two because of the security benefits they both derived from the

Anlo-Akwamu-Asante alliance.

33 Ibid, p.62.

26

Krepi was another important and dominant Ewe group. Krepi

was the term used by eighteenth century Europeans to refer to the

north-western part of Eweland. Krepi comprised a number of states

and towns independent of each other. Some of the Krepi polities were

Peki the most renowned; Anfoe, Tsito, Kpando, Taviefe, Ho, Hohoe

and Agotime. Krepi was an area well positioned on the important

trade route linking the Anlo coast to inland areas like Krachi and

Salaga in the eastern sector of northern Ghana. The strategic

placement of Krepi was not lost on a state like Akwamu. Akwamu

designs on Krepi probably pre-dated 1730 but it was the relocation of

Akwamu into Ewe country that incited Akwamu to conquer the Krepi.

Amenumey believes that Akwamu conquest of Peki and its

dependencies was probably in the 1760s. Following this conquest Akwamu established an indirect rule over Krepi through Peki. The

Krepi were enjoined to pay regular tribute in kind (slaves) and in cash

to Akwamu. They were also expected to provide military assistance

anytime Akwamu went to war. Owing to the alliance between

Akwamu and Asante, the Krepi states became indirect subjects of

Asante during the reign of Akwamuhene Opoku Kuma (1744-47).

This meant that the Krepi had to pay tribute in slaves not only to the

Akwamuhene but also to Asante throught he Akwamu. The

acquisition of slaves by Peki from the other Krepi states culminated in

the dislike of Peki by the rest of the Krepi states. Realising the

importance of maintaining an influential and less suspicious position

among her neighbours, Peki began serious attempts to gain

independence from Akwamu. Amenumey opines that the

unpopularity of the slave trade from 1807 when the British called for

its abolition further eliminated the economic benefits Peki derived

from its alliance with Akwamu thus pushing Peki into a coalition with

states like Tsito, Bame, Kpando, Kpeve, and Hohoe to fight Akwamu

in 1833. The allies defeated Akwamu and Peki once again emerged as

the head of the Krepi by leading their struggle for independence. 34

The positive results of the various alliances notwithstanding, it

is noteworthy that the Ewe could not unite to form one big empire

since they did not develop their political institutions in order to

34 Amenumey, The Ewe, pp. 66-85. Also, Amenumey, Ghana, pp. 70-74.

27

compete favourably with the other southern states who managed to

accomplish that feat.

Conclusion

The period between the 16th

century and 1874 was a time of

consolidation in the historical progression and art of nation-building

for most of the individual states that make up modern Ghana. The guiding principle for these states was in the main, that of territorial

integrity and economic security largely through participation in the

Trans-Atlantic trade. In achieving these aims, most of them had to

contend with Asante, a militarily and politically powerful inland state.

They were compelled to ward off Asante attacks or unite with Asante

to protect their state against other aggressive neighbours. The

situation thus invited a policy of inter-ethnic and inter-national

alliances.

Inter-state alliances were often marked by signs of dependence

and independence. The alliance system once created had positive and

negative impacts on the people. Within the context of inter-national

relations, it contributed to the maintenance of a balance of power.

However, it brought political insecurity, as a result of the wars and

conflicts, to the peoples of Ghana. Trade, which was mostly at the

centre of these conflicts, was repeatedly brought to a standstill. For

example in 1751 the Danish, Dutch and English traders on the coast

lamented the absence of Asante in the trade for seven years owing to

what they considered to be quarrels with Wassa. The so-called quarrel

actually involved other states like Akyem, Twifo, Assin, Denkyira

and the Fante as part of a western blockade of the trade route used by

traders from Asante. The wars also led to mass migrations. It is on

record that the Wassa had to abandon their home in 1721 because of

quarrels with Asante. Akwamu also relocated due to squabbles with

the Ga, Akuapem and Akyem. In 1875, people from Asante Dwaben

moved en masse to the Eastern region to found New Dwaben due to

an intra-ethnic conflict.

In the final analysis, regardless of their natures, alliances have

a purpose to serve, potentially or actually, the interest of the allies.

Naturally, the national entities found in pre-colonial Ghana, were

aware of the necessity of the balance of power, therefore, the

28

pursuance of diplomacy of a balance of power definitely served at

different times as a motivating factor that compelled them to construct

pro and anti alliances among sections of those nations. Operating with

the conceptual framework of the balance of power theory we posit

that wars and struggles between states and nations within inter-statist

diplomacy in pre-colonial Ghana were fomented by alliances which

were pursuing the protection of their economic and political interests

within the theoretical notion of the balance of power. Asantes relationship with other groups, regarding intricate diplomatic rivalry

and friendship, must be viewed within that context of struggles of

alliances as the desire for security and pursuance of the conception

and institution of a balance of power.

References

Interviews

1. Oheneba Kwame Kyeretwie, Apegyahene, 65+ years, Kumase,

May 31, 2009.

2. Oheneba Adusei Poku, Akyempemhene , 60+ years, Kumase, May

24, 2009.

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2. Ghana Notes and Queries, No. 9, November 1966. Books

1. Addo-Fening, Robert, Akyem Abuakwa 1700-1943 from Ofori Panin to Sir Ofori Atta, Trondheim:

NTNU, 1997, 2001.

2. Affrifah, K. The Akyem Factor in Ghanas History, Accra: GUP, 2000.

3. Agbodeka, F. Ghana in the Twentieth Century, Accra: GUP, 1972.

4. Amenumey, D. E. K., The Ewe in Pre-colonial Times, Accra: Sedco, 1986.

5. Amenumey, D. E. K., Ghana: A Concise History from the Colonial times to the 20

th century, Accra: Woeli,

2008.

29

6. Anquandah, J., Rediscovering Ghanas Past, Longman, 1982.

7. Boahen, A., Ghana: Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Longman, 1975.

8. Claridge, W. W., A History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti, London, 1915.

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