The Aesthetics of Human Experience

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The Aesthetics of Human Experience:

Minding, Metaphor, and Icon in Poetic Expression

Margaret H. FreemanMyrield Institute for Cognition and the Arts

AbstractThis paper argues that the cognitive sciences need to incorporate aes-

thetic study of the arts into their methodologies to fully understand the nature of

human cognitive processes, because the arts reect insights into human experiencethat are unobtainable by the methodologies of the natural sciences. These insights

dier from those acquired by scientic exploration, because they arise not from the

conceptual logic of reason but from the precategorial intuition of imagination. Aes-

thetics provides a methodology whereby we are able to understand how art enablesus to experience emotions caused by sense impressions. This methodology lies at

the heart of Giambattista Vicos Principi di scienza nuova (172544), which attempts toaccount for the way we live and participate in cultural, social, and civic communi-ties. Vicos theory challenges certain Western philosophical presuppositions that still

inform much of cognitive science, such as the relation of language to our experience

of the natural world, the nature of subjective and objective representations, and the

role of the arts in the evolutionary development of the human mind. In basing myapproach to literature on Vicos, Susanne K. Langers (1953, 1967), and Maurice

Merleau-Pontys (1962 [1945], 1968) theories, I argue that the language of litera-

ture is distinguished from conventional language use by its imaginative use of aes-

thetic patterns that make manifest the inherent character of the external world a weexperience it. By introducing the concepts of minding, metaphor, and icon as struc-

tures of the imagination, I show how the language of poetic expression in Matthew

Arnolds poem Dover Beach enables us to apprehend the ways we intuitively par-

Poetics Today 32:4 (Winter 2011) 10.1215/03335372-1459863 2011 by Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics

I am indebted to Mark J. Bruhn and Meir Sternberg for helping me clarify my argumentsand sharpen my presentation in their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of thispaper. This version is better, thanks to their editing.

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718 Poetics Today :

ticipate in the reality that underlies our conscious experience. Such participation

occurs because sensory impressions of the world we experience cause modications

in the human mind that result in aective responses. Current research in the cog-nitive sciences increasingly indicates that such modication occurs; aesthetic studyof the arts provides a means whereby we can know what it is like to experience such

modications.

. Introduction

Aesthetic inquiry and scientic inquiry are two parallel and complementaryways of knowing. The reality of the world that scientists and artists exploreis the same; the approach they take results in a dierent kind of knowledge:the dierence between to know and to be wise, conoscere and sapere, con-natre and savoir (Carr 1917: 193). Science encompasses knowledge of thenatural world through systems based on mathematics and logic; aesthet-ics encompasses knowledge of human creativity, culture, and civilizationthrough systems based on expressions of sensory perceptions and values.The two intersect at the point of the cognitive sciences, whose interdisci-plinary elds explore the activities of the human mind and human behav-ior. As cognitive scientists explore the workings of the human mind, they arefaced with the challenge of accounting for the functions of intuition, mem-

ory, emotion, sensory perception, and imagination in the way we think. Arethe methods of the natural sciences adequate to explaining them?

Over two hundred years ago, the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vicothought not. In criticizing Ren Descartess (190914 [1637]) discourseon scientic method, Vico (1990 [1709]) argued for a new science (scienzanuova), one with dierent theoretical bases and methodologies that wouldlead to better understanding of human thought and behavior. AlthoughVico focused primarily on explaining the historical course of human civili-zations, the principles of his new science also apply to an understanding

of aesthetics as the science of sensory perception. Vico believed that poeticwisdom (sapienza poetica) was the source of all knowledge, that it could befound in the imaginative universals (universale fantastico) held in commonby the memory of people in all cultures and across centuries. Whereas

1. Vico published the rst edition ofNew Science in 1725. For the second edition in 1730, onlythree passages from the rst edition were retained, to be printed within the secondNew Sci-ence. The third and nal edition, published in 1744 just before Vicos death, is consideredVicos denitive edition (Verene 2003: 15763).2. Vico uses the phrase imaginative universals in three places to describe Jove as a divinecharacter born naturally in poetry (Vico 1948 [1744]: 107, 381), poetic fables which pre-ceded rational or philosophic universals (ibid.: 138, 460), and the written hieroglyphiccharacters used by all nations in their beginnings (ibid.: 307, 933).

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Freeman The Aesthetics of Human Experience 719

Descartes explores the reliability of the images that come to us throughsense experience, Vico asks how we come to have those images in the rst

place, how they are made present to the mind.Human thought began, Vico believed, not with the development of

rational concepts but with that of memory and imagination. In makingthis argument, Vico places aesthetics at the very beginning of human con-ceptual development. The question for us then becomes, Can the two dif-ferent methodologies of aesthetics and science be understood as comple-mentary models that may be conjoined or interrelated to provide a fullerunderstanding of human activity in all its forms, including the arts?

I believe they can. Increasingly, the ndings of the cognitive sciences

in such areas as psychology, linguistics, and studies of the human brainconcerning sensory perception and emotion complement Vicos new sci-ence and support the ndings of scholarly research into the various arts.Knowledge of the arts, in both artistic creation and reception, providesinsight into the minds activities that involve human feeling. A great dealof current research explores the relation of aesthetics and cognitive sci-ence, and it is not my intention here to go into the dierent theoreticalapproaches taken. Instead, I focus on aspects of aesthetics that challengecertain presuppositions regarding the nature and role of poetry, such as its

3. In that human indigence, the peoples, who were almost all body and almost no reec-tion, must have been all vivid sensation in perceiving particulars, strong imagination inapprehending and magnifying them, sharp wit in referring them to their imaginative generaand robust memory in retaining them. It is true that these faculties appertain to the mind,but they have their roots in the body and draw their strength from it (ibid.: 280, 819).4. The word aestheticswas coined by Alexander GottliebBaumgarten (2007 [1750]) to referto the science of sensory perception, including the arts. Although Mark Turner (1996) haspersuasively argued for the role of imaginative storytelling in the origins of human thought,the idea that poetry came later in human development and served merely as play behavior,to provide a safe place in which to explore discomforting feelings, can still be found in recentwork in cognitive science, such as Boyd 2009. The notion of play in this respect is mislead-ing. As James P. Carse (1986: 19) notes: There is, however, a familiar form of playfulnessoften associated with situations protected from consequencewhere no matter what we do(within certain limits), nothing will come of it. This is not so much playing as playing at, aharmless disregard for social constraints. To dene art within the constraints of playing atis to ignore its role in the innite play of life.5. Researchers in the cognitive sciences are increasingly turning toward aesthetics as animportant factor in understanding the workings of the human mind. Dustin Stokess (2009)article Aesthetics and Cognitive Science surveys some of the issues involved and containsa preliminary bibliography of the burgeoning research in this area. Working from the per-spective of cognitive poetics, Reuven Tsur (1992, 2008) shows in his analyses how aestheticeects in poetry are supported by the ndings of cognitive psychology and neuroscienticresearch into brain structures.6. One useful if brief account of some of these approaches is in Stokes 2009. Li-Hsiang Hsuprovides a useful bibliography, Aesthetics and Cognitive Science, http://philpapers.org/browse/aesthetics-and-cognitive-science (accessed October 12, 2011).

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place in the development of the human mind, the Western notions of sub-jective and objective representation, and the relation of language to the

natural world. In realigning these issues into positions closer to a theory ofaesthetics that embraces sensory perception and emotion in poetry, I arguethat understanding the cognitive activities of minding, metaphor, and ico-nicity can illuminate the nature of poetic expression and our experience ofit. In my analysis of Matthew Arnolds poem Dover Beach, I apply Vicosarguments in his new science that relate to aesthetics by revising the waywe metaphorically construct mind as object and by understanding therole of the imagination in creating meaning. This goes to show how poetscreate an aesthetic language to break through the conventional uses of dis-

cursive language, which conceal our underlying, precategorial responsesto the world we experience.Vico makes several important points for a science of aesthetics. These

are, in no particular order:

1. As the rst humans experienced and responded to repeated sensoryepisodes, such as thunder, mental places, or topoi, were developedthat enabled memory of sameness.

2. Memory (Latin memoria) is equivalent to imagination, which enabledsameness to be interiorized as mental image, which, being named,

gave rise to conceptualization of thought or reasoning.3. Language began with inscribing physical signs (not with speech).

7. The rst men, who spoke by signs, naturally believed that lightning bolts and thunderclaps were signs made to them by Jove; whence from nuo, to make a sign, came numen, thedivine will, by an idea more than sublime and worthy to express the divine majesty. Theybelieved that Jove commanded by signs, that such signs were real words, and that nature wasthe language of Jove (Vico 1948 [1744]: 106, 379).8. The rst founders of humanity applied themselves to a sensory topics, by which theybrought together those properties or qualities or relations of individuals and species whichwere so to speak concrete, and from these created their poetic genera. So that we may truly

say that the rst age of the world occupied itself with the primary operation of the humanmind. (ibid.: 149, 49596). Donald Phillip Verene (1981: 170) comments on this passageas follows:

Vicos notion of a sensory topics, a topica sensibile, is tied to his conception of sensibility as away of thinkingthe notion that when sense takes the form of the imaginative universal in the

fantasia of the rst men, it is a kind of thought. A sensory topos, as Fisch points out in a remarkon this passage, is related to Aristotles conception of topics, or places, that could be kept in themind and serve for the inventing of possible arguments. (Fisch, Introduction,New Science, par.K5, note) The fundamental dierence is that the sensory topos is achieved through feeling and not achievedas an element within discursive thought.(My emphasis)

9.

But the di culty as to the manner of their origin [i.e., letters and writing] was created by thescholars themselves, all of whom regarded the origin of letters as a separate question from thatof the origin of languages, whereas the two were by nature conjoined. And they should have

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Before human memory, there was only a ux of sensations and responses;there existed no place in the mind, no toposwhich would contain the idea

of their repetition. Sensory topoideveloped when the rst humans discov-ered sameness in repetition. Thus, Vico says, when humans experiencedfear repetitively in responding to thunderstorms, a sensory toposcreateda memory that enabled meaning to emerge by imaginatively creating anidentication rst between the emotion of fear and the sensation of thun-der and then between the image of thunder and the name given to thunder,

Jove (see note 7). This imaginative identication is internal to the mind,unlike the logical functions of induction and deduction, which are predi-cated on objectifying perceptions of the external world. It reects the more

basic, primordial, precategorial level of emotion and sensory memory ofMaurice Merleau-Pontys (1962 [1945]) phenomenology and the morerecent understanding of the cognitive unconscious (Damasio 2010).

Vicos (1948 [1744]: 280, 819) theory accordingly explains the role ofmemory, invention, and imagination in developing human thought: Mem-ory thus has three dierent aspects: memory [memoria] when it remembersthings, imagination [fantasia] when it alters or imitates them and invention[ingegno] when it gives them a new turn or puts them into proper arrange-ment and relationship. Memory, as the blend of memoria, fantasia, andingegno, is understood, then, as forming wisdom, the faculty which com-mands all the disciplines by which we acquire all the sciences and arts thatmake up humanity (ibid.: 98, 364). Whereas logic manipulatesits termsthrough the functions of induction and deduction, the imagination createsthem by metaphorically fusing sensory and emotional topoiinto one:

The most luminous and therefore the most necessary and frequent [trope] ismetaphor. It is most praised when it gives sense and passion to insensate things,in accordance with the metaphysics above discussed, by which the rst poetsattributed to bodies the being of animate substances, with capacities measuredby their own, namely sense and passion, and in this way made fables of them.Thus every metaphor so formed is a fable in brief.(Ibid.: 116, 404; my emphasis)

ticular ideas, as we have fully shown, the peoples went on to form prose speech by contract-ing into a single word, as into a genus, the parts which poetic speech had associated. Take forexample the poetic phrase, the blood boils in my heart, based on a property natural, eternaland common to all mankind. They took the blood, the boiling and the heart, and made ofthem a single word, as it were a genus, called in Greek stomachos, in Latin ira and in Italian col-lera. Following the same pattern, hieroglyphics and heroic letters were reduced to a few vulgarletters, as genera assimilating innumerable diverse articulate sounds; a feat requiring consum-mate genius. By means of these vulgar genera, both of words and of letters, the minds of thepeoples grew quicker and developed powers of abstraction, and the way was thus prepared forthe coming of the philosophers who formed intelligible genera. What has here been discussed

is a small portion of the history of ideas. To such an extent has it been necessary, in seeking theorigins of letters, to deal in the same breath with those of languages!(Ibid.: 13939, 460)

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According to Vico, then, conceptual thought rst arose from metaphornot the conceptual metaphor of analogy but the sensory metaphor of attri-

bution or identity. Contemporary theories of metaphor (Lako and John-son 1980; Fauconnier and Turner 2002) do not make this distinction, seeingmetaphor in general as analogically and conceptually based. Examplesof conceptual metaphors are . By contrast, Vico says that when human beings rst developedthe metaphor they were not nding similarity or com-paring Jove with thunder but were attributing existential, sensory iden-tity between thunder and Jove. This distinction between analogical andattributive reasoning lies, I believe, at the heart of the dierence between

science and aesthetics. Aesthetics provides a methodology whereby we areable to understand how art enables us to experience emotions caused bysense impressions and thus uncover insights into the primary workings ofthe human mind.

As Vicos new science indicates, the methodologies of the natural sci-ences and of aesthetics are not the same. In commenting on biologists whoattempt to apply scientic principles to the exploration of art, Susanne K.Langer (1967: 24344) notes:

Their purpose is to penetrate the mysteries of art with the help of their bio-

logical knowledge; mine is to gain some biological and psychological insightsthrough the suggestiveness of artistic forms. A symbol always presents its importin simplied form, which is exactly what makes that import accessible for us.No matter how complex, profound and fecund a work of artor even the wholerealm of artmay be, it is incomparably simpler than life. So the theory of artis really a prolegomena to the much greater undertaking of constructing a con-cept of mind adequate to the living actuality.

In calling for a concept of mind adequate to the living actuality, Langersuggests, like Vico, that one cannot fully understand the workings of the

human mind without taking into consideration the structures of aestheticexperience. Understanding these structures, however, as they apply to lit-erary creativity depends on two radically dierent notions of how humanlanguage relates to the natural world: either nature is totally indepen-dent of language or language makes nature manifest. In the next sectiontherefore, I elaborate on this dierence to introduce my theory of poeticiconicity.

14. to distinguish conceptual

from linguistic metaphor. For example, the linguistic metaphor we have reached a cross-road in our relationship is based on the conceptual metaphor .

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724 Poetics Today :

. Language, Nature, and Mind

Vicos theory of the origins and development of language as arising fromnatural connections between physical nature and bodily interaction withthe environment stands in sharp contrast to traditional Western views thatfocus on the arbitrary nature of language. As Stephen Owen (1985: 79), theclassical Chinese scholar, has noted: There is language; there is some-thing that precedes and transcends language; between language and thatsomething, two relations are possible, and the distinction between themcorresponds to a fundamental division in human concepts of nature. Eithernature is independent of language, and language only blocks and distortsour knowledge of it; or the form and distinctions of language derive from

nature and grant us the most perfect access to it.Attributing the idea that there is a truth beyond language (and there-

fore inaccessible by it) to Western philosophy, Owen (ibid.: 21) claims thatWestern theories of literature are the children of the Platonic critique,and though they rebel and marry into less tainted lines, they cannot escapetheir ancestry. Chinese classical poetics, to the contrary, seeing humanbeings as an integral part of the natural world, considers the aestheticpattern (wen) of literary language as the nal stage in a process of mani-festation; and the writer, instead of re-presenting the outer world, is in fact

only the medium for this last phase of the worlds coming-to-be (ibid.:20). What literary language makes manifest, according to Chinese poetictheory, is direct presentation of the physical world and authentic pre-sentations of historical experience (ibid.: 57).

Rather than adopting the either/or perspective suggested by Owenscomparison of Western and Chinese thought, I suggest that it is not lan-guage per se that blocks or enables our experience of nature but the waylanguage is used.Blockingand enablingrefer to Leonard Talmys theory offorce dynamics as an explanation of causation. According to Talmy (2000:

10), force dynamics describes what happens when the energy or force ofone object or entity blocks or allows the energy or force of another tooccur. For example, a dam causes the buildup of water in a reservoir byblocking its normal ow; a steep hillside accelerates the ow of a moun-tain stream by causing the water to fall rapidly. In like manner, the devel-opment of abstract thought by naming or reifying sensory feelings andevents allowed a rapid acceleration of conceptual reasoning but at the costof blocking or concealing its origins (see note 13). Following Vicos under-standing of the emergence of conceptual thought and Talmys theory, I

argue that the conceptual reication that marks discursive language servesto block the underlying, preconscious experiences of the working mind.

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The term mindis itself an example. Having reied the cognitive activitiesof the brain through nominalization, we tend to assume the existence of

mind as an entity, which can then be conceived metaphorically as a con-tainer: we can bring things to mind, we can keep things in our minds, andso on. In fact, it is hard not to speak in this way. It is much more e cientand economical to speak of mind as though it were an entity than it isto characterize the actual cognitive events that the word refers to. It is pre-cisely this ability to conceptualize and to abstract from the experience ofsensory and emotional expression that led, as Vico argues, to the devel-opment of human thought. But in reifying the mind, we are blocking orconcealing those underlying forces. Literary language, to the contrary, as

Reuven Tsur (1992: 36061; 2008: 577, 585) has shown, serves to slow downsuch cognitive economy by delaying conceptual categorization. Delayingconceptual categorization enables us to draw closer to the phenomeno-logical world of immediate, preconceptual experience. In other words, theaesthetic pattern (wen) of literary language allows access to the precate-gorial activities of the mind that Vico describes as attributing senses andpassions to the external world and thus makes manifest the coming to beof the experienced world. To capture this aspect of our cognitive capaci-ties, I propose the term mindingfor the cognitive workings of the mind thatinclude the sensory and emotional as well as the rational, a mindfulnessthat is aware of our surroundings, attentive to and caring about the way weexperience and conceptualize our world through our sensory perceptionsand emotions (Freeman 2009). Using language aesthetically makes mani-fest the inherent character of the experienced world and our response to it.When poetic language succeeds in making the coming to be of the worldmanifest and evoking an emotional response to it, then, I claim, poetic ico-nicity is achieved, as I describe in the following section.

. The Ontology of Poetic Perception as Iconic of Reality

Although poets in the Western tradition cannot, in Owens (1985: 21) wordsquoted in the previous section, escape their ancestry, they neverthelesshave an intuitive understanding ofwen, of language as aesthetic pattern,that reveals the intrinsic, natural relationship of words to our experienceof nature that Vico describes. Poets and writers speak in terms of art andpoetry as a vision of reality (Yeats 1918: 13),of thinginess, or Dinge in

15. Cognitive psychologists emphasize the importance of mindfulness (paying attention to

the present moment with a sense of interest and curiosity) in decreasing stress and improvingoverall health (E. J. Langer 1989).

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theirDinglichkeit (Ransom 1938:11213), of the object as it really is (Eliot1964: 8283). Anthony Hecht (1995: 130) speaks of poetry as capturing the

rich complexity of actualitythe unsimplied plenitude of the objectiveworld. These writers suggest that art has the capacity to conjure up thefeelings of experiencing the concrete, precategorial world as it is before themind conceptualizes it. Joseph Conrad (1947: 7058), in his preface to The

Nigger of the Narcissus, expresses succinctly this notion of poetic art:

A work that aspires, however humbly, to the condition of art should carry its jus-tication in every line. And art itself may be dened as a single-minded attemptto render the highest kind of justice to the visible universe, by bringing to lightthe truth, manifold and one, underlying its every aspect. It is an attempt to nd

in its forms, in its colors, in its light, in its shadows, in the aspects of matter andin the facts of life, what of each is fundamental, what is enduring and essen-tialtheir one illuminating and convincing qualitythe very truth of theirexistence. . . . My task which I am trying to achieve is, by the power of the writ-ten word, to make you hear, to make you feelit is, before all, to make you see.Thatand no more, and it is everything.

Conrads task is what Victor Shklovsky (1965: 12) calls making the stonestony. As Aristotle (1995) rst argued in chapter 9 of the Poetics, whereasdiscursive language abstracts from the particularities of detail to capture

what they have in common, aesthetic language does the opposite: it cap-tures the essence of the particular individuality of experienced reality.

.. Intuitions and Concepts

By focusing on the particularities of experience, artists attempt to cap-ture what Benedetto Croce calls intuitions. Intuition is a necessary a prioricomponent in the development of concepts. As Croce notes:

What is knowledge by concepts? It is knowledge of the relations of things andthe things are intuitions. Without intuitions concepts are not possible. Just as

without the matter of impressions intuition itself is not possible. This river, this

16. In philosophy, the term a prioridoes not indicate temporal precedence but rather refersto a proposition that can be known independent of any experience other than the experi-ence of learning the language in which the proposition is expressed, whereas a proposi-tion that is knowable a posteriori is known on the basis of experience ( Jason S. Baehr, APriori and A Posteriori, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, www.iep.utm.edu/apriori/#H3[2006]). However, as Baehr notes, the denition is controversial, since it is a question ofhow to dene the experience on which the distinction is grounded. My use of necessarya priori attempts to capture the independent status of the aesthetic: If we have shown thatthe sthetic form is altogether independent of the intellectual and su ces to itself withoutexternal support, we have not said that the intellectual can stand without the sthetic. To

describe the independence as reciprocalwould not be true (Croce 1953 [1902]: 22).

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lake, this brook, this glass of water, this rain, are intuitions, the concept is water,not this or that appearance or particular instance, but water in general, in what-

ever circumstances of place or time it is realized, the matter of innite intu-itions, but of one constant concept only.(Quoted in Carr 1917: 81)

Croces use of the term intuition seems functionally related to the wayimage is dierentiated from concept in cognitive linguistics. Althoughimage schemata are, unlike intuitions, generalized forms, by providing,in Mark Johnsons (1987: 168) words, relations in a shared basis of mean-ing, they make concepts and propositions possible. A sensory impres-sion is preconscious, becoming an image in the mind when the experiencerbecomes aware of it and a concept when it becomes generalized through

abstraction. The repeated word thisin Croces list of intuitions draws atten-tion to the fact that he is referring to particular physical entities. The wordsriver, lake, brook, and so forth are concepts in the sense that they are gener-alized from the specic thing you might actually be looking at or plung-ing into. (Proper names help distinguish this dierenceLeaping River inChina, for example, or Lake Geneva in Switzerland.) But I suggest theyare not yet concepts in the sense that water is a concept, which is evenmore of a generalization/abstraction. At the furthest extreme of scienticabstraction, water is represented, both notationally and analytically, as

HO. Through science, we know the constitution of water; through aes-thetics, we know what it means to experience it. When we see a lake, weboth experience it as an intuition in Croces sense and recognize it as aconcept, a body of water. In this way, both the experiential fact of an imageand its conceptual value are compressed in its representation.

Since intuitions are always of sensations and impressions, Croce (1953[1902]: 10) identies artists not by a special kind of intuitive faculty but bythe fact that they are able to capture the qualities of sensation and impres-sion: The painter is a painter, because he sees what others only feel or

catch a glimpse of, but do not see. We think we see a smile, but in realitywe have only a vague impression of it, we do not perceive all the charac-teristic traits of which it is the sum, as the painter discovers them after hehas worked upon them and is thus able to x them on the canvas. Crocesdescription suggests that it is the activity of making (poesis) that leads to thediscovery of the nature of reality. Knowing through making is in this sensean aesthetic, not scientic, activity.

17. Fauconnier and Turners (2002: 322325) blending theory identies compression as a

governing principle for conceptual integration.

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728 Poetics Today :

.. Aesthetic Iconicity

Vico places the human knowledge that occurs through Croces making

within the modications of the human mind and so anticipates the studyof aesthetics as the science of human cognitive activity. The arts hold aspecial place in this general notion of aesthetics because they attempt tocapture human sensory experience of the external world. By focusing onthe concrete forms or qualia of the visible universe, the arts capture livedexperience through the fusion of concepts with the sensations and emo-tions that constitute feeling. When they are successful in doing so, they cre-ate what I call an icon of reality (Freeman 2007). Aesthetic iconicity ismy term for this characteristic of all successful art forms, poetic iconicity

my term for the literary arts.The theory of aesthetic iconicity draws from two dierent ways ofunderstanding the term icon. In its scientic, Peircean semiotic sense oficon, all direct representations of ideas may be said to be iconic. In popu-lar usage, the term iconic refers to anythingfrom photographs of warto New York taxicabsthat triggers a particular resonance in the mindin response to some experienced reality. That is, some thing or some

18. Vico (1948 [1744]: 109, 331) notes:

But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so remote from ourselves,

there shines the eternal and never-failing light of a truth beyond all question: that the world ofcivil society has certainly been made by men, and that its principles are therefore to be foundwithin the modications of our own human mind. Whoever reects on this cannot but marvelthat the philosophers should have bent all their energies to the study of the world of nature,which, since God made it, He alone knows; and that they should have neglected the study ofthe world of nations or civil world, which, since men had made it, men could hope to know.

19. For Charles Sanders Peirce, an iconic representation (hypoicon) can take the form ofimage, diagram, or metaphor. He writes: Hypoicons may be roughly divided according tothe mode of Firstness of which they partake. Those which partake of simple qualities, or FirstFirstnesses, are images; those which represent the relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded,of the parts of one thing by analogous relations in their own parts, are diagrams; those whichrepresent the representative character of a representamen by representing a parallelism in

something else, are metaphors (Peirce 1955: 105, Collected Papers2.274302). Since he believesthat the only way of directly communicating an idea is by means of an icon, then a dia-gram is a representation even although there be no sensuous resemblance between it and itsobject, but only an analogy between the relations of the parts of each (ibid.).20. Mayor Michael Bloomberg was quoted in the press as saying that the taxicab wasa New York icon. Examples of usage are too numerous to quote. Anything can becomeiconic, as the following quotation about E. M. Forster shows: Forsters timid sexual exploitsseem inconsequential rather than iconic (New Yorker2010: 137). Over the past decade, theterms icon and iconic have become extremely fashionable in everyday discourse. Hardly aday passes but I come across such usage in newspaper and magazine articles. Examinationof the British National Corpus and other databases would document the rise and usageof such expressions. Although I was not able to access these sources for this essay, I did

consult a new corpus developed by Jean-Baptiste Michel et al. (2011), who describe theirproject as follows: We constructed a corpus of digitized texts containing about 4% of all

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event becomes iconic when it takes on symbolic signicance for a person,a group, a nation, or a culture. In this sense, iconicity indicates the specialstatus an object, image, person, or event has acquired in potentially achiev-ing universal signicance, becoming an archetype in the collective mem-ory of humankind. From semiotics, aesthetic iconicity takes the isomorphicqualities of the sign; from popular usage, it takes the motivating impulsesof signicance (Freeman 2007). However, poetic iconicity is not simplysomething semiotically inherent within a literary text, nor does it reectsimply the signicance attached to things or events. Poetic iconicity is themeans whereby the poet manipulates the semiotic iconic features inherentin language to capture the essence of an experience. Iconicity in this sense

diers from its semiotic meaning in being not the direct representation ofan idea but the semblance of an ontological reality. Iconicity provides ameans for expressing the world of the senses before the conceptualizingmind moves us toward abstraction. It is, in Merleau-Pontys (1962 [1945])

books ever printed. Analysis of this corpus enables us to investigate cultural trends quanti-tatively (www.sciencemag.org, December 29, 2010). The n-gram (consecutive sequences ofn characters) I ran through Google Books Ngram Viewer for the terms icon and iconicreectsincreased usage up to the year 2000, not including references in magazines and newspapers.In the past decade, there has been an exponential increase in such usage. Although the

n-gram corpus cannot reveal the meanings ascribed to the terms, my informal record showsoverwhelmingly that the terms are being used in their popular, not semiotic, sense.

Figure 1A graph generated by Google Books Ngram Viewer, from 1800 to 2000.When you enter phrases into the Google Books Ngram Viewer, it displays a

graph showing how those phrases have occurred in a corpus of books (e.g., Brit-ish English, English Fiction, French) over the selected years. http://ngrams.googlelabs.com/graph?content=icon%2C+iconic&year_start=1800&year_end=2000&corpus=0&smoothing=3.

The x axis indicates percentage occurrence, they axis yearly span. Both curvesfor the terms icon and iconicshow exponential usage increase in the second half ofthe twentieth century.

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terms, our primordial experience of precategorial being that underlies thestructure of reality. This reality is usually in-visible to us, not as absence

or void but as being hidden in the visible but always present in the moment(Merleau-Ponty 1968). Like meaning, poetic iconicity is a dynamic processthe reader constructs that is triggered by the writers intentions as revealedthrough forms expressive of human feeling (Langer 1953: 51). In my de-nition, then, aesthetic iconicity is related to Vicos imaginative universals.For example, the sherman that frequently appears in classical Chinese artand poetry (especially Tang poems and Ci poems of the Song dynasty) isthe actual, particular gure in the poem or painting, but at the same timeit represents in Chinese cultural tradition the artist or the artists ideal

of being secluded from the imperial court. In this sense the image of thesherman is archetypal. But in each individual artists poem, according toTan Yingwen (personal communication), it may carry some unique char-acteristics like harboring his [the poets] lofty belief as the one in Liu Zong-

yuans River Snow or mentality of leisure and comfort as in Zhang ZhihesFishing Song. In poetry, words are made to work not discursively, to createmeaning, but aesthetically, to capture the precategorial essence of experi-ence that makes a poem an icon of felt reality.

The distinction between discursive and aesthetic language is exempli-ed in the contrast between two recent translations (see Bowersock 2009)of an epigram by Marcus Valerius Martialis (Martial):

Dum Phaethontea formica vagatur in umbra,Inplicuit tenuem sucina gutta feram.Sic modo quae fuerat vita contempta manente,Funeribus facta est nunc pretiosa suis.

(Martialis 1823: 43435)

The word epigram comes from the Greek (epigramma), inscrip-tion, and from (epigraphein), meaning to write on or inscribe. This

reects Vicos observation that language may have arisen from the physicalform of written characters. Martialiss epigram refers to a natural occur-rence whereby tree resin is fossilized into the precious stone amber. In itsliquid state, when amber exudes from the tree, it sometimes encases smallinsects or owers before it hardens. This hardening process takes millionsof years, so that in its own fossilizing it fossilizes whatever is caught in it,

21. I am grateful to Tan Yingwen for clarifying the iconic representation of the sherman inChinese poetry. Tan (personal communication) notes that the poet-sherman imagines thathe can retire from the imperial court, and so distance himself from the annoying competi-tion or ght against others for wealth, power or reputation, which is called gu yn ().This ideal is in striking contrast with ch sh (), scholar-bureaucrats mainstream ideal,that is, being recruited as a government o cial.

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which is itself therefore millions of years old. According to one mineraloidwebsite, The odd inclusions that are often seen in amber usually add to

ambers unique look and in many cases greatly increase its value (Ame-thyst Galleries 19952011). In Martialiss epigram therefore, the story ittells blends the fate of the ant encased (inscribed) in amber with the moralthat death can make precious what life despised.

D. R. Shackleton Bailey (Martialis 1993) translates the epigram almostword for word into discursive prose: As an ant was wandering in Phae-thonic shade, a drop of amber enfolded the tiny creature. So she that wasdespised but lately while life remained has now been made precious by herdeath (quoted in Bowersock 2009: 37).

A more recent translation by Garry Wills (Martialis 2008) has a pithier,more poetic quality:

A drop of amber hit an ant,While crawling past a tree,A brief and triing thing preservedFor all eternity.(Quoted in Bowersock 2009: 37)

Both translations preserve the two-part structure of Martialiss original epi-gram. First we are given a description of the event, then we are invited to

consider its signicance. Shackleton Baileys translation directly capturesMartialiss conceptual alteration of attitude toward the ant from beingdespised in life to being made precious in death. It does not attempt toreplicate the aesthetic eects of the original prosody. In Latin, the inscrib-ing of the ant is rendered in a ponderous metrical form with many polysyl-labic words, a form that humorously throws into relief the insignicance ofits subject. Although Shackleton Baileys prose translation uses Latinate-derived words, it does not capture the feeling that Martialiss originalpoetic form communicates. Willss translation transforms the original

into a poetic form that is quite dierent from the original Latin but takesadvantage of the aesthetic possibilities of English. The meter he chose isbased on ballad meter, which has the virtue of being ancient and memo-rable. Instead of the ponderous written quality of the original epigram,Willss translation depends for its aesthetic eects on its oral quality, withits short monosyllables and the predominance of the explosive-sounding/t/ consonant. These sound eects occur in the transitive verb hit, so thatwe feel more directly the impact of fate on the ambered ant, just as we feelthe impact of the apple that dropped on Isaac Newton. The progressive

use of crawling gives us a sense of the event as it is happening. (If the sec-ond line is altered to read While past a tree it crawled, one can feel the

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dierence.) The su xes of the two-syllable words, amber, crawling, triing,carry the weakest possible stress and thus throw into greater contrast the

wordpresrve with its major stress on the second syllable. Preserve is alsoa more indirect choice than Shackleton Baileys made precious, so thatwe are drawn into active interpretation, since we have to make the addi-tional connection that we only preserve that which we value. The termpre-serve also carries with it the notion of conservation, the idea of the ant fos-silized. The poem climaxes on the last word, etrnity, with its stressed vowelechoing that ofpreserve, and its four syllables, the longest word in the poem,mirroring the length of eternity.

These suprasegmental eects of syllables and sounds in Willss transla-

tion complement the way the words are working. The preserving of the antin amber reects the nature of the epigram itself as inscription. The physi-cality of burial is captured in Willss choice of the word preserved, reect-ing Martialsfuneribusmore specically than had Martial chosen mortibus,Shackleton Baileys death. It is not the death but the burial of the ant thathas occasioned the epigram. Note that the scope of the appositional phrasea brief and triing thing is conceptually ambiguous. On one level, thephrase obviously refers to the ant, a lowly, inconspicuous insect with a brieflife span. But it can also refer to the event, that is, the entire preceding twolines. Not only is the ambered ant preserved for all eternity, but its storyis too. In other words, the ambered ant contains within its fossilized pres-ervation the history of the event, and the forensic geologist who discoversthe fossil may read its inscribed story accordingly, just as we do in read-ing the poem. Shackleton Bailey (and perhaps Martial too) is reporting anevent as it actually happened. Wills is making the language of his poemenact it. The drop falls, the ant is ambered, and the story is preserved. Aswe read, the poem dramatizes for us its happening in an eternal present.

This moment of being in the eternal present for both ant and poemmarks the archetypal occurrence of poetic iconicity. Willss for all eternity

reinforces this aesthetic meaning. The word eternalhas two meanings. Forthe sciences, all necessary propositions are eternal in the sense that they areindependent of timethey are unchanging, true for all time, as opposed toexistential (contingent) propositions. For aesthetics, as Croce notes:

The present is eternal in quite another meaning. It exists and it comprehendsexistence. The temporal present is a present which succeeds a past and exists byvirtue of the non-existence of the past. The eternal present is the present outsidewhich no existence falls. The distinction of past from present is not the distinc-tion of did exist from does exist. The past exists in the present, and the temporal

distinctions then and now, before and after, are determinations within existence.It is only the abstractions of the mathematical and natural sciences which have

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made this doctrine sound contrary to reason. When we reect on our mind, ourlife, our self, our individuality, we perceive that what we apprehend as real exis-

tence is our past acting in the present. This past is carried along in the present,and cut o from it the present is not the present. Everything which partakes ofthe nature of life and mind involves the fact that it is process or activity, the exis-tence of the past in the present. This is the very notion of duration. The eter-nal present means, therefore, that reality is one duration which includes past,present, and future, as distinct from an abstract present which excludes fromitself an abstract past and an abstract future.(Quoted in Carr 1917: 203)

As readers, experiencing the feeling of being in the moment of a poemseternal present is to experience the poems iconicity. That is to say, poetic

iconicity occurs when we experience what Langer (1953: 40) has describedas the nature of all art, the semblance of felt life through forms symbolicof human feeling. It is not always easy to describe ones feelings when suchiconic enactments occur. Here we may feel a positive sense of completion,a sense of fulllment of the ants otherwise lowly destiny, a sense of amuse-ment, the comforting recognition that eternity too can belong to the mostinconspicuous of creatures, or indeed all or none of the above. Howeverone might describe them, the feelings we experience reading Willss ver-sion are more intensied compared with Shackleton Baileys.

.. Blending and Metaphor in Aesthetic Iconicity

An aesthetic icon can thus be understood in terms of an emergent struc-ture from the blending of concept, sense, and emotion. As Samuel Tay-lor Coleridge (1817: chap. 14) notes in speaking of the images, thoughts,and emotions of the minds faculties, the poet diuses a tone and spiritof unity, that blends, and (as it were)fuses, each to each, by that syntheticand magical power, to which we have exclusively appropriated the nameof imagination. The fusion or blending of sensory impressions and theforms of feeling to create the emergent structure of an icon is enabled by

metaphor, dened as domain crossing (Freeman 2009, 2011). Historicallyassociated with poetry, metaphor is traditionally understood as convey-ing ideas that are palpably false because they are drawn from dierentdomains. Time is not literally swift-footed (Shakespeare 1954: 1108, Son-net 19), nor does winter literally have a ragged hand (Shakespeare1954:1106, Sonnet 6).The question is whether this is an example of John Ruskins(1856) pathetic fallacy, which falsely projects human emotions or contem-plative fancy onto the things of the natural world. Yet poets and writers

22. Croces idea of reality as duration that subsumes past, present, and future is consistentwith Merleau-Pontys (1962 [1945]: 415) phenomenology of time, not as an object of ourknowledge, but as a dimension of our being. See discussion in Freeman 2004.

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claim that they show things as they really are. How can false impressionsgive a true sense of reality?

Cognitive scientists have shown us a dierent way of understandingmetaphor. Metaphor is no longer seen as a false equation of elements fromdierent domains but as the very process by which we are able to accessand understand the relation between domains. It is therefore not a troperestricted to poetic expression but an integral part of our cognitive pro-cesses. George Lako and Mark Johnsons (1980) conceptual metaphortheory and Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turners (2002) conceptual inte-gration network theory, known as blending, dene metaphor not as theresult of false imagination but as a process by which we make sense of our

experience of the world as reecting the way we think. In cognitive lin-guistic theory, a domain is a conceptual entity consisting of a coherentknowledge structure (Evans 2007: 6162). Domains in this sense are eitherexperiential, derived from embodied experience, both sensory and sub-

jective, or conceptual, more complex and not directly derived from experi-ence. According to conceptual metaphor theory, we understand abstractconcepts like love and justice in terms of journeys and scales based onconcrete image schemata of paths and balances. In conceptual integrationnetwork theory, we create new meaning from fusing or blending sharedtopology from dierent domains, whether they are abstract or concrete.

Both conceptual metaphor theory and conceptual integration net-work theory,as their names suggest, operate at the level of thought thatVico describes as emerging with the development of the human mind.

At the sensory level, Vico reminds us, the opposite occurs: there it is oursenses and passions that are imposed on the inanimate objects of the natu-ral world (see note 11). More recent cognitive research has taken up thechallenge of understanding how sensory impressions and emotions inter-relate with conceptualization within the cognitive mind. This challengehas led to a consideration of the role of aesthetics in the creation of mean-

ing with respect to both sensory perceptions of the natural world and artis-tic expression (Hogan 2003; Modell 2003; Turner 2006; Holland 2009).

The human capacity to synthesize through fusion or blending enablesthe poet to create through language a semblance or icon of reality for thereader, not the reality that arises from our discursive representations ofthe world (Shackleton Baileys descriptive narration) but the reality of ourbeing part of Merleau-Pontys (1968) in-visible world, the immediate,always eeting present that forever escapes our objectivizing gaze (Willssmoment of the drop falling). This feeling of being drawn in to the eternal

present of the poem comes from the cognitive activities of minding, boththe poets and the readers.

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The cognitive reading of Arnolds poem that follows focuses on theminding that makes the poem. This making through minding is pri-

marily mine as reader; however, my minding is guided by the etymologyof the poems language and the forms of its structural patternings, such asmeter, alliteration, repetition, and parallelism. I argue that by attendingto these cognitive processes of minding as revealed through the structuraland aective workings of the poems meter and words, one may capturesomething of the poets own minding in making a poem and thus pro-vide insight into the cognitive workings of an individual mind, what it islike to experience feeling. In my discussion of Arnolds poem, I intro-duce a notion of metaphor that reects domain crossing between physical

experience and emotional response dependent upon the interrelationshipof physical sensory impressions and responses in the brain. This domaincrossing, in connecting external sensory impressions to Vicos modica-tions in the human mind, creates an actuality of experience for the readerthat, I claim, results in poetic iconicity.

. Arnolds Dover Beach: The Aesthetics of Poetic Expression

Arnolds (1903 [1890]: 22627) Dover Beach is one of the best-knownpoems in the English language and has generated a great deal of commen-tary from both literary critics, such as Ian Lancashire (2009), and cognitivepsychologists and linguists (Holland 1968; Robinson 2005; Kvecses 2010).Historically, the poem has been universally interpreted as a statement ofalienation arising from the secularization of the scientic age ( Johnson1952; Selkirk 1878). My reading diers from these earlier ones, because itfocuses on the poems aesthetic patterns that lead us to experience its iconicsemblance of felt life. The poem presents many of the questions raised con-cerning the aesthetic activity of the human mind, and critics have not sat-isfactorily resolved them. Why does the poem resonate so strongly with us

even though its emphasis falls not on the calm scene with which the poemopens but on the image of ignorant armies clashing by night with which itends? How can one (to cite an oft-raised question throughout the historyof art) feel pleasure in face of anothers expression of pain? How can weexperience emotions for characters and situations we know dont exist (theso-called paradox of ction [Hjort and Laver 1997])? Why does the poetnd it necessary to refer to the literary past of Sophocles and Thucydides?How can one account for the many dualisms in the poem and the seem-

23. In the past, the term cognitive has been equated with the purely conceptual processes ofthe mind. I use it here to mean all the processes of the mind, which include sensory percep-tion and emotion as well as reasoning.

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ingly contradictory stances taken by its speaker? An analysis of the poemthat traces the cognitive patterns of minding, both poets and readers, can,

I believe, shed light on these questions.Dover Beach invites us to consider the nature of reality and our rela-

tionship to it, as the poet contemplates Vicos historical cycles of Westernthought. The poems speaker at rst experiences the feeling of identica-tion with the external world. He moves to a stage in which conceptualiza-tion creates metaphoric analogy between human culture and the world.He then reaches a nal stage of alienation, in which there is total discon-nection between human emotions and external nature.

Dover Beach

1 The sea is calm tonight,2 The tide is full, the moon lies fair3 Upon the straits; on the French coast the light4 Gleams and is gone; the clis of England stand,5 Glimmering and vast out in the tranquil bay.6 Come to the window, sweet is the night air!7 Only, from the long line of spray8 Where the sea meets the moon-blanched land,9 Listen! you hear the grating roar10 Of pebbles which the waves draw back, and ing,

11 At their return, up the high strand,12 Begin, and cease, and then again begin,13 With tremulous cadence slow, and bring14 The eternal note of sadness in.

15 Sophocles long ago16 Heard it on the Aegean, and it brought17 Into his mind the turbid ebb and ow18 Of human misery; we19 Find also in the sound a thought,

20 Hearing it by this distant northern sea.21 The Sea of Faith22 Was once, too, at the full, and round earths shore

24. I do not know if Arnold was familiar with Vicos theory, though reading Vico becamea popular activity in the secularizing movements of the nineteenth century. Arnolds father,who was a celebrated educator and headmaster at Rugby School, had read Vico andacknowledged his own debt to Vicos thought (Thomas Arnold 1845: 82). Arnold would cer-tainly have known of Ruskins theory as expressed inModern Painters, which contrasts the sen-sory perceptions of the early Greeks (especially Homer) with those of the medieval period(especially Dante) and the loss of faith of the modern period that Ruskin found epitomizedin the work of Sir Walter Scott.25. If the gender of the voice in the poem is not identied, it is my practice to adopt thatof the poets.

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nality of the last three lines, ending as they do with a couplet form remi-niscent of the Shakespearian sonnet, makes it di cult to imagine how the

poem might have been continued. One can read the nal stanza thereforeas a failed sonnet, and this might partially explain why Arnold abandonedit for fteen years before taking it up again and adding the preceding lines.

The poem in its nal form places this failed sonnet within a coherentstructural context that enables readers to follow the poets minding. Thepoem falls into two almost equal parts: lines 120 and lines 2137. Therst part describes the physically experienced scene at Dover; the secondintroduces the metaphoric analogy of the Sea of Faith. Both parts endby bringing the historical past into the present, eternal momentrst the

past of Sophocles, the Greek poet and dramatist, in lines 1520 and thenthat of the Greek historian Thucydides (1954: 45961), in his account ofthe battle of Epipolae, in lines 3537. Embedded in this two-part struc-ture is a tripartite structure that reects variations of the sonnet form. Therst stanza forms a complete sonnet in itself. The next two stanzas alsocomprise fourteen lines but with the sestet occurring rst, and this octet-sestet reversal crosses the divide of the poems two-part structure. The nalstanza I have already remarked upon as a failed sonnet. These changesin form move from the calm of the rst line, through the cadenceof the ebbing tide, to the clash of the last. They reect the movementfrom Vicos rst stage, of identication between human emotions and theworld of sensory impressions, to his second stage, of creating an analogybetween human emotions and the world, and ending with the total sepa-ration between human emotions and the external world that marks Vicosnal age of humans in the darkness of barbarism.

Beach may be read as a sonnet in reverse. However, that is not what appears to be hap-pening in Arnolds nal stanza. In his explication of the sonnet form, John Fuller (1972: 28)

refers to sonnet variations as constrained by legitimate possibilities and genuine expres-sions of its capabilities, but nowhere does he allow for the possibility of a turn occurringearlier than the sestet, though it may of course be delayed right up to the nal lines.27. Vico (1948 [1744]: 381, 1106) believed that there would be a recycling (recorso) throughthe three stages of gods, heroes, and people:

Through long centuries of barbarism, rust will consume the misbegotten subtleties of mali-cious wits, that have turned them into beasts made more inhuman by the barbarism of reec-tion than the rst men had been made by the barbarism of sense. . . . Hence peoples who havereached this point of premeditated malice, when they receive this last remedy of providenceand are thereby stunned and brutalized, are sensible no longer of comforts, delicacies, plea-sures and pomp, but only of the sheer necessities of life. And the few survivors in the midst ofan abundance of the things necessary for life naturally become well behaved and, returning to

the primitive simplicity of the rst world of peoples, are again religious, truthful and faithful.Thus providence brings back among them the piety, faith and truth which are the natural foun-dations of justice as well as the graces and beauties of the eternal order of God.

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.. Metaphor: Cause and Eect in Sense and Emotion

The poem opens with a speaker whose sensory perceptions are attuned to

the scene before him. The fourteen lines of the rst stanza have an uncon-ventional sonnet form, oscillating between the ballad meters, which havetheir source in the Germanic stress-timed meters of Old English poetry,and the syllabo-tonic tradition of the Romance languages. This oscilla-tion reects the historical emergence of English poetry as the productof a marriage or fusion between the two poetic traditions. The poemshifts to iambic pentameter at the introduction of the French coast, com-pared with the clis of England, and culminates in the invocation tothe addressee in line 6. This transitional movement of historical prosody

is reected in the way sensory perceptions move from images of sight inthe opening lines, through the synesthetic invocation to taste the sweet-ness of the night air in the second quatrain, to images of sound in the ses-tet. Arnold creates in this rst stanza a scene in which what we see, taste,and hear creates in us certain emotional responses, feelings that we projectback onto the sources of our sense impressions to create a sense of identi-cation between human subjectivity and objective reality, just as thegrating roar of the pebbles creates in the listener the eternal note ofsadness.

As we have seen, the idea that sensory experiences of the external worldcan create emotional responses in us forms the basis of Vicos explanationof how images come to be present to the mind. When Zoltn Kvecses(2010: 671) says of lines 1314 in Arnolds poem of course we know thatwaves cannot actually bring in sadness or notes of sadnessthey can onlybe metaphorically responsible for our sad mood when we hear the tremu-lous cadence slow, then he, like Ruskin, is representing metaphor as indicat-ing the false impression given by the pathetic fallacy. However, I suggestthat the causality implied by Kvecsess phrase metaphorically respon-sible in fact reects domain crossing among the physical sound, its musi-

cal cadence, and its emotional eect on the listener.

28. Several attempts were made in the twentieth century to characterize the grammar ofEnglish poetry, from George Saintsburys (1961) monumental study to the work of such lin-guists as Georey Leech (1969), Morris Halle and Samuel Jay Keyser (1971), Derek Attridge(1982), and Richard Cureton (1992). My own unpublished dissertation (Freeman 1972)explores the relation of English metrics to its sources in both Germanic and Romance poetictraditions. Fauconnier and Turners (2002) blending theory helped me reformulate my argu-ment there in terms of the metaphor of English poetry as the child of two parents, wherethe child carries traces of both but is itself unique. The emergent structure that results fromthe product of this metrical marriage has never been, to my mind, fully modeled in Englishmetrical theory.29. Of all art forms, music is the closest to pure sensory feeling, and there has been a greatdeal of research by cognitive psychologists into the relation between music and the emotions

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740 Poetics Today :

Arnolds description of the sound of the receding tide is expressedthrough the metaphor of music marked by the choice of the words cadence

and note in lines 1314. As readers, we respond to the aesthetic pattern cre-ated by the rhythmic sounds of the two lines that mimic the tremulous-ness of syncopation, lines in which an anapestic rhythm occurs in twosyllables occupying one metrical position; the pattern of a trisyllabic wordfollowed by two and then by one in tremulous cadence slow becomesthree, one, one, and two in eternal note [of ] sadness; and the stressedvowels modulate in form and order of occurrence:

With trmulous cdence slw, and bring1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

The etrnal nte of sdness in.1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8An examination of Arnolds manuscript changes to line 13 indicates that

he may be consciously distinguishing here between the fact that physicalsounds can cause emotional eects and Ruskins pathetic fallacy. Describ-ing the grating roar of the wave-driven pebbles, Arnold rst wrote Withregular cadence slow and then changed the adjective to mournful. Thisbecame, in the published version, With tremulous cadence slow. Theprogression of Arnolds thinking is illuminating. The notion of regularityserves as a commentary on the preceding line, Begin, and cease, and thenagain begin, and therefore appears redundant, although identifying therepeated regularity of the ebb and ow of the tide suggests the establish-ment of Vicos topoi in the mind. The term mournful anticipates the fol-lowing lines, and bring / the eternal note of sadness in. The question iswhy Arnold chose to substitute tremulous for mournful. The adjectivemournful in this context indicates that the sound of the pebbles roar is initself mournful, an example of Ruskins pathetic fallacy, whereas the adjec-tive tremulous can apply to both the turbulent action of the waves andthe physical trembling of an emotional response.

By choosing the word tremulous, Arnold hits upon a description thatapplies to the natural things of the world, including ourselves. That is, asthe movements of sound of the wave-driven pebbles vibrate and shake,so we too can experience vibrations and shakings when we physicallytremble. This sensory identication, reecting Vicos description of therst peoples fear of thunder, is the sensory metaphor of emotional iden-

(Sloboda 2001). A recent article inNature Neuroscience (Salimpoor et al. 2011) describes experi-ments that show chemical changes, through dopamine increase in the brain, when listenersanticipate and experience peak levels of favorite musical passages. Such research reinforcesthe nding that domain mapping occurs across the physical and the aective elements ofhuman experience.

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tication, not the conceptual metaphor of analogy. In conventional con-ceptual metaphor, the domains crossed are material (concrete) and intan-

gible (abstract); in attribution metaphors, the domains can be either bothmaterial, as in Juliet is the sun, or both intangible, as in Jove is thunder.Identity is eected by means of Fauconniers (1997: 41) access (or identi-cation) principle, which states that an expression that names or describesan element in one mental space can be used to accessa counterpart of thatelement in another mental space. The phrase tremulous cadence cre-ates a synesthetic identity between movement and sound, just as gratingroar does, and these identity connections cause a reaction in the hearer.

Arnolds speaker in this rst stanza is not committing the pathetic fallacy

of claiming that the waves themselves are sad; he is claiming, contrary toKvecsess statement quoted above, that sensory impressions do leave emo-tional traces in our minds. So the aural receptivity of our brains enablesthe force dynamics of physically representing the sound of the waves as anemotional feeling in our minds. Kvecsess metaphorical responsibilityimplies a cause and eect relationship between the physical acoustics ofthe ebbing tide and the emotional feelings aroused in the mind. It is ametaphor of cross-domain causality, which cognitive neuroscientists havediscovered actually occurs (see note 396).

This cross-domain causality challenges the division that dominatedWestern thought in the past between the physical bodily domain of objec-tive experience and the cognitive conceptual domain of the subjectivemind. In discussing the question of the relation between the physical andthe sensational/emotional, Ruskin (1856) notes that the objective/subjec-tive distinction is ambiguous and misleading. Using the example of color,he says that the denition of blue as the sensation of color on the humaneye as we look at the sky or at a blue gentian ower has misled some phi-losophers. They assume that there are qualities of things that . . . dependon our perception of them, and upon our human nature as aected by

them and consider these qualities to be subjective, as opposed to thequalities of things which they always have, irrespective of any other nature,as roundness or squareness, which are considered objective. In contrast,Ruskin (1856: 2) argues that the word Blue does notmean the sensationcaused by a gentian on the human eye; but it means thepowerof producingthat sensation; and this power is always there, in the thing, whether we arethere to experience it or not, and would remain there though there werenot left a man on the face of the earth.

30. In this way, Ruskin resolves the paradox of the old riddle of whether or not a tree makesa sound in the forest when it falls if no one is there to hear it. The falling tree has the powerto produce the sensation of noise regardless of who is or is not there.

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742 Poetics Today :

Modern science conrms Ruskins nineteenth-century view in moretechnical terms. As humans, we are able to see a world of color, because

our brains are adapted to register the wave spectrums that exist in the worldaround us ( Jacobs and Nathans 2009). The ability to detect the full rangeof the color spectrum results from a combination of trichromatic factors:the properties of the object, the kind of light available, and the particularvision system in the brain of the viewer. I suggest that there is a similarprocess regarding the aural spectrum. We know that there are sound tonesthat certain animals can hear and others cannot (Lipman and Grassi 1942;Wareld 1973; Fay and Popper 1994; Lopez-Poveda et al. 2010). The abilityto hear a range of sounds results from the properties that create sound

waves, the environmental conditions that regulate their transmission, andthe receptivity of the brains aural system. This is true for all ve senses. Itshows that we do not merely observe nature but are mindful as partici-pants of it.

Modern research has furthered our knowledge of how we relate cog-nitively to the world. The discipline of educational psychology has longrecognized the existence of three domains related to the brain: cognitive/mental, aective/emotional, and psychomotor/physical (Bloom 1956).Cognitive psychologists have documented through many experiments thephysical and emotional reactions we experience when reading value-ladenwords, whether positive or negative (see De Houwer and Hermans 2010for a review of current research). Neuroscientists are beginning to discoverhow cognitive, aective, and psychomotor processes are interrelated andintegrated in brain functioning (LeDoux 1996; Damasio 2010).

According to Lako s (2006) summaries of current cognitive scienceresearch (e.g., Regier 1996; Narayanan 1997a, 1997b; Rizzolatti et al.2002), certain neural circuits in the brain structure sensory-motor obser-vation, action, and stimulation and include image schemata and forcedynamic schemata. The metaphor, Lako (ibid.: 163)

explains, mapsforces that result in motion onto causes that result in change. InArnolds poem, due to that metaphor the sound of the retreating tide thatis registered through the auditory system of our brains produces a feelingof sadness. The rst stanza achieves this connection through the concep-tual image schemata of OUT-IN and CHANGE. In line 5, the word outcarries extra weight owing to its placement on the metrical position thatoccurs immediately after the prosodic caesura at position 4. It is syntac-tically ambiguous. It may be attached to the verb in line 4, as in the clisstand out, or it may be understood as an adverb of place, with the clis

lying out, away from the viewer. In either case, it is immediately followedby its semantic opposite in, and this juxtaposition of out in introduces

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a major theme of the poem, with the adverbial in of line 14 parallelingthe out in of line 5: the - schema reects the idea of the sensory

sound of a tide owing outin the world, bringing in a feeling of sadness intothe mind.

.. Iconicity: The Experience of Felt Life

Like Willss for all eternity, Arnolds eternal note in line 14 carries theaesthetic meaning of duration in the eternal present, as evidenced by theimmediately following invocation of a Sophoclean past, when the samesound produces in the Greek poet a similar emotional response of humanmisery, reinforced by the patterned repetition of bring / . . . in of lines

1314 and brought / Into of lines 1617. The relation between sensoryimpressions and emotions is created by the imagination that all humanbeings share, according to Vicos concept of imaginative universals, a con-cept that depends on Vicos understanding ofsensus communis. Though thislatter term is often translated as common sense, it is better understoodas consensusthe sense of what is held in common, that is, the under-standing that the same principles of recollective understanding shape andorder all human societies and cultures. As Donald Phillip Verene (1981:53) explains it, In Vicos view, common sense, or sensus communis, is not aproto-scientic form of knowledge, but the common way of experiencingthe world present in the life of a people. It is not a set of consciously formedcognitive or empirical beliefs. The sensus communisof a people is rootedin a common way of feeling, speaking, and symbolizing meaning in theworld. That common way includes practical judgment and arises fromthe poetic wisdom from which all knowledge springs and which is based onimagination (fantasia). Arnold invokes the natural quality of the sound ofpebbles thrown up by the ebbing tide to produce the eect it does whereverand whenever it occurs by connecting the speakers own experience withhistorical memory of what Sophocles also heard and how he responded.

Arnold may have had in mind Sophocless (1954: 180, ll. 58591) descrip-tion of a similar scene in which the hollow cry resulting from the wind-driven waves evokes the misery of human lives, whose house is shaken bythe gods:

Fortunate they whose lives have no taste of pain,For those whose house is shaken by the godsescape no kind of doom. It extends to all the kinlike the wave that comes when the winds of Thracerun over the dark of the sea.

31. I owe this observation to Meir Sternberg.

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Documents

The Aesthetics of Human Experience