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The Aerospace Industry Steering Committee on Structural Health Monitoring and Management

(AISC-SHM): Progress on SHM guidelines for aerospace.

Peter Foote, BAE SystemsGrant Gordon, Honeywell

Mark Derriso, AFRL

Presented by Peter Foote

International Workshop on Structural Health Monitoring,Stanford University, 2011

Contents

• Motivation of AISC-SHM• Background• Interaction with ATA MSG-3• Summary and challenges to the industry

Vision and Motivation of AISC-SHM

The AISC – SHM is an international teamcomprising industry, government and academic participants with a collective vision to efficiently and effectively implement structural health monitoring for a wide variety of commercial and military aerospace applications through the development of guidelines, procedures, processes and standards for implementation and certification of the technologies.

The AISC-SHM operates as a Technical Committee within SAE Aerospace (an SAE International Group) within the Aerospace Division (G-11 SHM)

Provenance

• 3rd EWSHM 2006 in Granada: Call from industry for an international ‘community of practice’

• Professor Fu-Kuo Chang, Stanford University launches AISC-SHM in Stanford, Sept 2006

• Commercial Aviation Working Group formed – 2007• Military Aerospace working group formed - 2008• AISC-SHM joins SAE Aerospace as a new technical

document committee – 2008• First meeting as an SAE Committee (G-11 SHM), -

London Jan 2009

Provenance

• Granada 3rd EWSHM: Call from industry for an international ‘community of practice’

• Professor Fu-Kuo Chang, Stanford University founds AISC-SHM in Stanford, Sept 2006

• Commercial Aviation Working Group formed – 2007• Military Aerospace working group formed 2008• AISC-SHM joins SAE Aerospace as a new technical

document committee – 2008• First meeting as an SAE Committee (AMS-S), London Jan

2009

Stanford 2006

The committee focus is development of aerospace industry guidelines for structural

health monitoring to achieve:• Cross industry consensus on SHM implementation issues.• Basis for SHM systems certification by providing the

necessary guidelines (e.g. SAE ARP).• Identification of technology gaps.• Interface with other activities pertaining to aeronautical

SHM• Collective view among various organizations such as:

– OEMs: aircraft manufacturers– Regulatory Authorities– System Integrators– Developers / Research organizations– Operators and their representatives

AISC-SHM membership Platform OEMs System Integrators

Operators

Research Organizations

Regulators

Research Institutes

System Integration

Aircraft / Fleet LevelIntegration & Processes

Regulatory Agencies

SystemDeveloper

1

2

3

5

6

Research Institutes

System Integration

Aircraft / Fleet LevelIntegration & Processes

Regulatory Agencies

SystemDeveloper

Airbus (EADS)AFRLBAE SystemsBoeingBombardierEASAEmbraerFAAFHIGEHoneywellNASANAVSEARIMCOFSandiaStanford Uni.Univ. of Tokyo

• The mission of the AISC-SHM is to provide an approach for standardizing integration and certification requirements for SHM of aerospace structures, which will include system maturation, maintenance, supportability, upgrades and expansion. The goal is to develop a guidebookspecifying approaches for SHM usage on Air and Space vehicles and to identify technology gaps leading to SHM utilization.

AISC-SHM mission

Organization and Responsibilities

AISC-SHM Main Technical Committee .Operators / end users, Regulatory agencies, OEMs, Systems integrators andSHM Suppliers, Research organisations / institutions, other interested parties.

AISC-SHM Executive Management Board (EMB)Officers, industry/ institutional representatives, chairs of working groups, plus SAE representative.

ATA / IATA input

SAE Administration

Working Groups

CAWGSAE SHM Guidebook task

MAWG

CAWG – Commercial Aviation Working Group

MAWG – Military Aviation Working Group

Future groups

AISC-SHM: Aerospace Industry Steering Committee for Structural Health Moni toring.

Committee structure

AISC -SHM

Current Chairmen:AISC-SHM – Peter Foote, BAE SystemsCAWG and SAE Document sponsor: Grant Gordon, HoneywellMAWG: Mark Derriso – US Air Force

AISC-SHM Main Technical Committee .Operators / end users, Regulatory agencies, OEMs, Systems integrators andSHM Suppliers, Research organisations / institutions, other interested parties.

AISC-SHM Executive Management Board (EMB)Officers, industry/ institutional representatives, chairs of working groups, plus SAE representative.

ATA interaction

SAE Administration

Working Groups

CAWGSAE SHM Guidebook task

MAWG

CAWG – Commercial Aviation Working Group

MAWG – Military Aviation Working Group

Future groups

AISC-SHM: Aerospace Industry Steering Committee for Structural Health Monitoring

Committee structure

AISC -SHM

Current Chairmen:AISC-SHM – Peter Foote, BAE SystemsCAWG and SAE Document sponsor: Grant Gordon, HoneywellMAWG: Mark Derriso – US Air Force

The committee is also known as G-11 SHM within the SAE International Aerospace Division

Creation of an SAE International, Aerospace Recommended Practices Document on the implementation of SHM for aerospace.

Guidelines contents

• Scope (air vehicle, air frame, structural components)• Applicable documents (existing standards, related guidelines etc)• Background (context of SHM in aircraft support processes and structural

design philosophies, overview of technologies) • Introduction to SHM systems. (Functional elements of structural health

management systems based on condition and usage monitoring techniques)• Fields of application (How SHM can be used, intended function, concepts of

operation)• SHM system requirements (What must SHM systems and techniques do)• Qualification• V&V• Certification

• Military annex (differentiation of military and civil implementation)

How to assure that chosen SHM solutions meet functional,operational and regulatory requirements

Division of effort

Section LeadScope Boeing

Applicable documents Honeywell

Background Boeing

Introduction to SHM systems BAE Systems

Fields of application Airbus and Boeing

SHM system requirements Airbus

QualificationV&VCertification

Hahn Spring (Consultant) and Sandia plus team

Military annex AFRL

Team (alphabetic): Airbus (EADS), AFRL,BAE Systems, Boeing, Bombardier, EmbraerFHI, Hahn Spring, Honeywell, NASA, NAVSEA, RIMCOF, Sandia, Stanford Uni., Univ. of Tokyo

Illustrative work in progress

Regulator: R (FAA, DOD, MOD)Aircraft manufacturer: ASHM system manufacturer: SOperator: OTechnology developer: T (small companies/academia)

Expected Organisat ion[0] any[1] any[2] S, O, A[3] S, O, A[4] S, O, A[5] R, S, O, A[6] R, S[7] O[8] O, S, R, A, T

System [2]Development

Intended funct ions [0]and funct ion use cases

Inst ruct ion [6] for Cont inued Airworthiness

System [7]Ut ilisat ion

System [3]Product ion

System [4]Installat ion

Cert ificat ion: tasks to obtain approval for [5]Design Product ion Installat ion

Benefit /Credit [8]Validat ion

Maturat ion [1]

Figure 1(a): Evolut ion and cert ificat ion of SHM systems, a simplified diagram

Illustrative work in progress…..


Intended funct ions: [0]Detect , monitor and/or assessaccidental/environmental/ fatigue damage or damaging events such as overloads and over-speed.Monitor and/or assess fatigue, usage, loads, and/or structures integrated with SHM to reduce weight, revise safety factors, use new materials, et..Funct ion use cases:Advisory, Maintenance benefit/creditOperational benefit/creditDesign benefit/credit

Maturat ion [1]Benefit / credit evaluat ionalgorithm validation,finite element analysis, simple structure tests,complex structure tests,flight tests, …Validat ion evidence

Integrity requirementsRequirements for software, environmental tests, …

System DesignsTest & Evaluat ion



System requirementsFunctional requirements, and designer, integrator, and operator requirements


System Integrat ionTest & Evaluat ion Flight tests

Determine crit icalitySafety Assessments, FMECA,Functional Hazard Analysis, …



System Development [2]

Conceptual design

Requirements definit ion

Compliance planning

Implementat ion Post cert ificat ion

Conceptual design


Compliance planning


Cert ificat ion phases through Project Specific Cert ificat ion Plan [5]

Validat ion evidenceTests may be required not only for SHM but also for structural items and may cover: coupon tests, environmental tests, full scale tests, static tests, durability tests, etc.

Figure 1(b): Evolut ion and cert ificat ion of SHM systems, an explanatory diagram

Illustrative work in progress…..


Intended funct ions: [0]Detect , monitor and/or assessaccidental/environmental/ fatigue damage or damaging events such as overloads and over-speed.Monitor and/or assess fatigue, usage, loads, and/or structures integrated with SHM to reduce weight, revise safety factors, use new materials, et..Funct ion use cases:Advisory, Maintenance benefit/creditOperational benefit/creditDesign benefit/credit

Maturat ion [1]Benefit / credit evaluat ionalgorithm validation,finite element analysis, simple structure tests,complex structure tests,flight tests, …Validat ion evidence

Integrity requirementsRequirements for software, environmental tests, …

System DesignsTest & Evaluat ion



System requirementsFunctional requirements, and designer, integrator, and operator requirements


System Integrat ionTest & Evaluat ion Flight tests

Determine crit icalitySafety Assessments, FMECA,Functional Hazard Analysis, …



System Development [2]

Conceptual design


Compliance planning


Conceptual design


Compliance planning


Cert ificat ion phases through Project Specific Cert ificat ion Plan [5]

Validat ion evidenceTests may be required not only for SHM but also for structural items and may cover: coupon tests, environmental tests, full scale tests, static tests, durability tests, etc.

Figure 1(b): Evolut ion and cert ificat ion of SHM systems, an explanatory diagram

The major benefits

Working definitions and examples of credits / benefits• The maintenance credit/benefit functions achieve specific improved

maintenance tasks that can replace existing tasks or can be considered as Alternative Means of Compliance (AMOC) to existing inspection tasks. Examples of such tasks are (a) detect a falsely reported hard-landing event and eliminate the inspection required after the event, (b) detect structural damage at fixed scheduled intervals (S-SHM), (c) indicate need/opportunity to change maintenance planning (turning unscheduled into scheduled maintenance) etc.



• The operational credit/benefit functions achieve improved operational, management and structural integrity tasks that can replace existing tasks or can result in maintenance planning benefits as increasing inspection intervals. For example, load and fatigue monitoring functions can be used to adjust scheduled task intervals or trigger crack inspection tasks.




• The design credit will be sought to underwrite new designs and materials.

Interaction with ATA MSG-3

Courtesy ATA and Lorenz Wenk, Airbus

initial loop

International MRB Policy Board Meeting

Requested further review of detailed MSG-3

structure procedure steps

April 22-25, 2008Cologne, Germany

Maintenance Programs Industry Group (MPIG)

Meeting

Defined Industry accepted methodology

January 8-10, 2008Memphis, TN

ATA SHM Working Group activity kick off meeting

Established initial revision proposal for S-SHM

September 12-13, 2007Stanford, CA

third loop


Reviewed further SHM revision proposal

March 31- April 3, 2009Singapore


Meeting

Concluded on proposed further SHM

methodology

November 3-5, 2009Bordeaux, France

ATA SHM Working Group meeting

Develop further revision proposal for scheduled task

adjustments & replacements by SHM

Sep. 29-Oct. 1, 2009Toronto, Canada

IP 105Approval

second loop

MSG-3 Revision 2009.1

Approval


Reviewed and accepted final S-SHM revision

proposal

March 31- April 3, 2009Sao Jose dos Campos,

Brazil


Meeting

Concluded on proposed further S-SHM methodology

November 18-20, 2008Washington, DC

ATA SHM Working Group meeting

Developed further detailed S-SHM revision proposal and initial P/C-

SHM principles

September 16-18, 2008Hamburg, Germany

MSG-3 SHM revision history






Embodied in MSG-3 IP 2009-1

An S-SHM task:• would be a generic AMM task procedure without Non-

Destructive Test Method (NTM)• can be carried out with aircraft type rating without

additional training• uses technology with built in go/no-go determination

capability• significantly reduces human factors

• No unplanned operational interruptions• Safe operation within the interval scope per definition• Potential SHM technology failure will be evident when

performing the task

The fixed interval avoids operational issues!

SHM in MSG-3 revision 2009.1






Aspiration and logical end goal for SHM to fully utilize its capability….IP 105

SHM in MSG-3 IP105

SHM Operation Mode

• Scheduled SHM (S-SHM) – from IP92, no change

• Automated SHM - SHM technology which does not have a pre-determined interval at which maintenance action much takes place, but instead relies on the system to inform maintenance personnel that action must take place

SHM Technology Type

• Damage Monitoring System – SHM technology that uses sensors to directly monitor structure for deterioration conditions

• Operation Monitoring System – SHM technology that uses sensors which do not directlycheck the structure for damage, but instead correlate various measurements (e.g. environment conditions, loads) to make an inference to the probability or likelihood of damage


Principle SHM evaluation procedure

automatedscheduled

NONO

operation mode

?

damage monitoring

operation monitoring

technology type

?

YES YES

SHM covers classic

inspection requirement

s?

no task

adjusted scheduled inspection task

classic scheduled

inspection task

SHM in MSG-3 IP105

IP 105

scheduled SHM task

MSG-3 rev.2009.1

classic inspection

can be adjusted by

SHM ?


Perf

orm

ance

Time

Point where degradation starts

System detection limit

System notifies maintainer

Trend monitoringand RUL calculation

Operational limit if safety critical

Maintenanceplanning window

Failure

Safety margin

Automated SHM allows true CBM

In Summary

• The AISC-SHM is preparing SAE International Aerosapce Recommended Practices guidelines for the implementation of SHM for aerospace application

• Target date for publication 2012• The group draws on a wide range of OEMs, integrators, regulators

and technology providers• The AISC overlaps with the ATA MSG-3 revision process via the ATA

MSG-3 SHM Working Group• Successful revisions and Issue Papers from the ATA working group

will be reflected in the AISC guidelines.

Challenge to the industry

• Issue guidelines for implementation of SHM using wide consultation with industry, regulator and user communities.

• OEMs, Technology Developers and suppliers must join efforts to present real S-SHM and A-SHM applications proposals to Regulatory Authorities in the next couple of years: only this will convince all stakeholders of the value of SHM.

Contacts and links

http://structure.stanford.edu/AISC

www.sae.org

AISC-SHM Committee chairman: Peter Foote ([email protected])Guidelines document sponsor and Chair of Commercial Aviation Working Group:Grant Gordon ([email protected]) Chair of Military Aviation Working Group: Mark Derriso ([email protected])

mailto:[email protected]�

Acknowledgements

• SAE International• The Air Transport Association• Members of SAE Aerospace Technical Committee G-11

SHM• ATA MSG-3 SHM working group

Public Hearing

• 11:20 Room HC 200-002 (Basement meeting room)

• Informal Q&A / discussion on guidelines with members of the AISC-SHM team.

Documents

The Aerospace Industry Steering Committee on Structural ...structure.stanford.edu/workshop/documents/Keynote presentations... · The Aerospace Industry Steering Committee on Structural