The a Prior i of Communication And

7/30/2019 The a Prior i of Communication And

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K A R L - O T T O A P E LU niversity o] Saarbriicken

T H E A P R I O R I O F C O M M U N I C A T I O NA N D T H E F O U N D A T I O N O F T H E H U M A N I T I E S

(W ha t so r t o f r e la t ion be t w een sc ience and the hum an i t ie s shou ld bepos tu la ted w i th in the con tex t o f con tem pora ry soc iety ? )

I . E x p o s i t i o nI do no t b e l i eve tha t the q ues t ion concern ing the r e la tion be tw eensc ience and the human i t i e s i s any more s e t t l ed , o r more dea r ly es tab -l i shed , today than when i t was b rough t to the fo re in the days o fDi l they and Neo-Kan t ian i sm. I t i s t rue tha t , f rom t ime to t ime , speaker sa t congres ses a ff i rm tha t the o ld con t rover sy be tw een u nder s tand ing andexp lana t ion has been overcome and r endered obso le te . And the i raud ience may app laud the i r appea l no t to sp l i t the un i ty o f s c ience , no tto r e -es tab l i sh " two cu l tu res , " a s Snow uses the t e rm. Bu t I th ink tha tappeasemen ts and quas i -mora l appea l s o f th i s k ind shou ld no t in te rvenein , or worse , prevent , a ser ious meta-sc ient i f ic analys is of the re la t ionsbe tw een sc ience and the hum an i ti e s . I n m y op in ion , the ch ie f ques t ions t il l i s : whe th e r i t does o r does no t m ake a d i ff e rence fo r the p h i losophyof sc ience that in the human sc iences , the o b j e c t of sc ience is a lso thes u b j e c t of s cience , nam ely human soc ie ty as a com m unica t ion com mu ni ty .F ro m th is subs tan t ive ques t ion a me thodo log ica l ques t ion a ri ses : Shou ldthe hum an i t i e s imi ta te the m ethods tha t have been so success fu l in thenatura l sc iences in order thus to ar r ive a t the s ta tus of genuine sc ience ,a l so ? O r shou ld they pe rhaps deve lop m ethods wh ich a re comple -men ta ry to those used in the na tu ra l s c iences , me thods tha t f low f romthe i r own lead ing knowledge in te res t s ? In the l a t t e r case i t cou ld ve rywel l be tha t the knowledge in te res t gu id ing the human i t i e s i s equa l lycomplemen ta ry to tha t found in the na tu ra l s c iences .

This q ues t ion , or so i t seems to me, i s for us mo re s ignif icant thane v e r b e f o re , b e c au s e w e h a v e le a rn e d N o r m u s t s o o n l e a r n - - t o c on -s ide r the methodo log ica l p rob lems o f s c ience and the human i t i e s in


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K A R L - O T T O A P E Lconnect ion wi th thei r re lat ions to social prax i s . Dil they ' s o ld ques t ionas to wh eth er the goa l o f the hum ani t i es is o r i s no t th e same as tha t o fna tura l s c ience- -namely , exp lana t ions accord ing to l aws as a bas i s fo rp r ed i c t i on s - - i s t oday exempl i fi ed by t he ques ti on a s t o w he t he r , i n t hehumani t ies , the relat ion to social praxis i s o r i s no t the same as in thecase of natu ral sc ience : th at i s, is i t a social technolo gy or n ot ? Th isqu es t ion is , in fact , answ ered in the af f i rm at ive by th e prevai l ing philos-op hy o f science, and the pract ical s ignif icance of this answ er i t sel f in thefact that , f rom this perspect ive, pedagogy, for example, i s cons ideredto be appl ied psychology , p r imar i ly in the sense of condi t ion ing t ech-nology . Since , how ever , the hu m an o bjec t in th is condi t ion ing t echnologyis a lso a co-subject of the educator , the ques t ion ar ises as to whethert he r e m us t n o t be a com pl emen t a r y m e t hod o f c r i ti ca l- human is ti ceduca t ion to preve nt sp l it ting soc ie ty in to the m anipula ted and them anipu lators . Such a spl it society wo uld, of course, be the ideal pre-suppo s i t ion of a n o bject i fying social science and social techn ology. I tcou l d pe r f o r m r epea t ab le expe r i men t s w i t hou t be i ng d i s tu r bed by a f eed -bac k tha t tu rns con trollab le pred iction s into self-fulf il ling or self-destroy-ing prophec ies . But the ques t ion r emains as to whether the humani t i es ,by the i r very method , should no t p resuppose a r e la t ion to soc ia l praxistha t is com plem entary to th e idea l ob jec t i fi ca t ion of hu m an b ehavior ,nam ely , unres t r i c ted com m unica t ion by wa y of in te~subjec t ive "under -s tanding."

I t i s aga ins t th i s concre te and cur ren t background tha t I w ish onceaga in to r a i se the ques t ion of the r e la t ion be tween sc ience and thehum ani t i es . 1 A nd I w i l l do. so by wa y of a c r i t ica l examina t ion of theneo-posit ivis t ic "logic of unif ied science."

I th ink tha t the c lear -cu t m ode l o f s c ien ti st ic r educ t ion i sm developedby th i s r epresen ta t ive school o f meta- sc ience is even . today a parad igmtha t domina tes the t ac i t p reconcept ions even of those sc ien t i s t s andphi losophers w ho w ou ld no t w ish to be u nd er s tood to be neo-posi tiv is ts .Th e m os t deep ly roo ted of these preconcept ions , i t s eems , is th e idea ofknowledge as descr ipt ion and explanat ion of object i f ied data , conceiv-e d - a p r i o r i - - a s cas es o f i n st ances o f pos si b le l aw s . A ppa r en t ly eventhe un der s tand ing and the in te rp re ta t ion of sym bol ic me aning is to besubsumed under th i s concept ion of knowledge , i f i t i s to be r egardedas a top ic o f methodologica l r e levance . In th i s contex t , my ques t ion i s


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T H E A P R I O R I O F C O M M U N I C A T I O Nw he the r there a re , perhaps , u l t ima te metaphys ica l p resuppos i tions in th emodern " logic of science" which imply concept ions of this kind, pre-suppos i t ions tha t p revent the poss ib i l i ty o f even imagin ing a " l ead ingin te res t o f knowledge" ou t s ide or beyond sc ien t i sm. I would , indeed ,rep ly to th i s ques t ion by way of a heur i s t i c susp ic ion tha t a modern"logic of science" th at does no t ref lect upon u l t im ate a pr ior i pre-suppos i t ions has jus t by this very fact inher i ted a taci t presuppos i t ion oft r ad i tiona l ep i s t emology : nam ely , tha t one so l it a ry sub jec t o f know ledgecould ob jec t i fy the whole wor ld , inc lud ing h i s f e l lowmen. To pu t i tano the r way , it inher i ts the presuppo s i tion tha t the kno wing subjec t can ,in pr inc ip le , w in ob jec t ive knowledge about the wor ld wi thout a t thesame t ime presuppos ing knowledge by s ign- in te rpre ta t ion or in te r sub-jec t ive under s tanding , which cannot have the charac te r o f ob jec t iv i ty ,and neve r t he l e s s may be i mpr oved upon i n a me t hod i ca l w ay . L e t mee x p l a i n - - o r b e t te r , e x p l i c a t e - - t h i s , b y s o m e r e m a rk s a b o u t th e m e ta -phys ica l backgrou nd of th e m ode rn , ana ly t ica l ph i losophy of science.

I f one were to ask about the a p r io r i p resuppos i t ions of modern neo-pos i t ivis t ic logic of science, several answers could be given. The f i rs tmight be : the only a pr ior i presuppos i t ion here impl ied is logic i t sel f ,which in sc ience has to be combined in some way wi th the observa t ionof facts . This might , perhaps , f i t the or iginal sel f -unders tanding of thelogical pos i t ivis ts . But af ter some ref lect ion, i t becomes clear that , evenin logical pos i t ivism, a few more a pr ior i presuppos i t ions are actual lyinvolved . Thus , i t i s no t s imply a mat te r o f f ac t tha t there a re f ac t s ;rather , i s has to be presupposed, a pr ior i , in the logic of science thatthere ex i s t f ac t s tha t a re independent o f human th ink ing about them,and that those facts can be recognized, intersubject ively, a s f ac t s . Now,what we have s tated as presuppos i t ions of logical pos i t ivism are, in fact ,two of the metaphys ica l p r inc ip les o f Le ibn iz , nam ely , tha t there a re" t ru ths of reason" ( v d r i t d s d e r a i s o n ) based on logic , and " t ru ths of fact"( v d r i t d s d e f a i t ) based on ex per ience .2 An d here , im med ia te ly , a fu r th era pr ior i presu ppo s i t ion com es to l ight w hich th e logical pos i t ivis ts or igin-al ly also shared w i th Leibniz : the presupp os i t ion o f an ideal langua geof sc ience wh ich can br ing toge the r mathem at ica l log ic and exper iencedfacts in an unequivocal manner (as Leibniz puts i t : in a l i n g u a p h i l o -s o p h i c a s i v e c a l c u l u s r a t i o c i n a t o r , which pu t s an end to misunders tand-ings in phi losophical com m unica t ion by pro viding rec ourse to a "calcule-


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m us" 8) . I m ight a dd that the logical pos i t ivis ts had at the i r disposal atheo ret ical basis fo r thei r sem ant ical cr i t ique of m etaphysics , only as longas the neo-Leibniz ian metaphys ics tha t they inher i t ed f rom Russe l l andt he young W i t t gens t e i n r ema i ned h i dden . O bv i ous l y , t hey l o s t t h i stheore t i ca l bas i s once they were forced to ques t ion these metaphys ica lpresuppos i tions . A nd th is happ ened once it be came c lear tha t the fo l low-ing ideal pos tulates s imply could no t be real ized in t he logic of science :f i rs t , the idea of o ne syn tact ico- semant ica l f r am ew ork wh ich c ould bepresupposed as the un iver sa l l anguage of sc ience as a whole ; s econd ,the idea of observa t iona l sen tences wh ich could be cons idered as copiesof f ac ts (p ro tocol sen tences ) indep end ent o f theore t i ca l contex t s a l readyimpl ied in th e form ula t ion of the observa t iona l sen tences .

Since the language applicable in science always presuppose s som e ref -e rence to par t i cu la r f ac ts , whi le th e observa t iona l s t a temen ts a lways pre-suppose some or ien ta t ion wi th r espec t to theore t i ca l f r ameworks , afur ther a p r io r i p resuppos i t ion of the log ic of sc ience comes to l igh t :"convent ion . " Convent ions a re needed to cons t ruc t "semant ica l f r ame-wo rks" as poss ib le l anguages of sc ience and to in te rpre t these f r am ew orksas applicab le to l anguages of sc ience w i th the he lp of a meta language ,w hic h is , in pract ice, the no n-form al ized language of th e science al readybeing used. Convent ions are also needed to es tabl ish observat ional s ta te-ments which could func t ion as bas ic p ropos i t ions for conf i rmat ion andfa ls i fi ca tion of hypotheses or theor ies . But w ha t a re "convent ions" ? I fone reads the l i t e ra ture of log ica l pos i t iv i sm one might th ink tha t aconvent ion is some absolutely i r rat ional factor that precedes al l reason-able discourse, because i t i s a l ready presupposed by the rules of asemant ica l f r amework . A convent ion seems to be the same th ing as asol i tary and arbi t rary decis ion, such as , for ins tance, the decis ion of asovere ign ru le r who, accord ing to Hob bes , es tab l ishes and in te rpre t s thelaw by the au thor i ty of h i s w i l l , o r s t i l l ea r l i e r in the h i s to ry ofnominal i sm, the f i a t o f God ' s w i l l which , accord ing to the Franc i scantheologians , precedes al l reasoning.

W hi le i t i s t rue tha t a conven t ion precedes a ll ra t iona l o pera t ionswh ich a re conce ivable accord ing to the neo-pos it iv i s ti c idea of r e a so n - -for convent ions cannot be deduced f rom f i r s t p r inc ip les wi th in a ca l -cu l u s - - ne i t he r can t hey be de r i ved f r om empi r i ca l obs e r va t i on o r byind uc t ion f rom such observat ion. ( I n fac t , the neo-posi tivists ser ious ly6


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T H E A P R I O R I O F C O M M U N I C A T I O Ntr ied to reduce the so-cal led pragmat ic d imens ion of the language ofsc ience , wh ich inc ludes the u l t ima te conven t ions abou t the ru les o fs eman t ica l f r am ew orks and the i r in te rp re ta t ions , to an ob jec t o f empi r ica lobse rva t ion b y way o f an o the r , beha v io ra l s cience . Bu t th i s en te rp r i s ewas , o f cour se , doom ed to f a ilu re , fo r even i f i t w ere po s s ib le to desc r ibeconven t ions by means o f a behav io ra l s c ience , th i s wou ld in tu rn p re -suppose conven t ions embedded in the obse rva t iona l s en tences o f th i sdesc r ip t ion , and so on , ad h f f in i fum . )

Thus , for the neo-pos i t iv is t ic logic of sc ience convent ions are , indeed,u l t ima te p resuppos i t ions wh ich have to be acknowledged as p r io r to a l lsc ient i f ic ra t ional i ty . But here the ques t ion ar ises as to whether sc ient i f icrat ionali ty, in the sense of the logic of science ( i .e . , logical inferencesp lus obse rva t ion ) , in f ac t exhaus t s the who le o f human r a t iona l i ty , sotha t b eyo nd i ts l imi t s on ly the i r r a tiona l i ty o f a rb i t r a ry dec i sions canex i st . Such a l imi ted v iew o f r a t iona l ity cou ld , in m y op in ion , b e ju s t i f i edonly i f one man, a lone, could a t leas t in pr incip le pract ice sc ience . For ,in th is case , the conve nt ions wh ich , so to speak, in terve ne in the ra t ionalo p e r a t i o n s o f c o g n i t i o n w o u l d i n d e e d h a v e t o b e c o n c e i v e d o f a s c o m -ple te ly i r ra t ional personal decis ions. B ut the very w or d "con-ven t ion" ( inG e r m a n ~dberein-leunft) speaks agains t th is in terpre ta t ion . Indeed, thela te r Wi t tgens te in even exp la ined h i s conven t iona l i sm by po in t ing ou ttha t one pe r son a lone canno t be s a id to fo l low a ru le . Thus he has show ntha t con ven t ions p resuppo se l anguage games . Ho w ev er , language gamescanno t be founded by conven t ions in the s ame way tha t a r t i f i c i a ls eman t ic f r ameworks can . In s tead , they mus t on the i r own p rov ide thef o u n d a t i o n s f o r r u l e c o n v e n t i o n s i n a c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y . N o w ,is i t poss ib le to poin t out the pre-sc ient i f ic ra t ional i ty of meaning con-ven t ions in a com mu nica t ion com m uni ty ? Even t ac i t conven t ions abou tt h e u se o f w o r d s - - n o t t o m e n t i o n e xp l ic i t c o n v e n t io n s a b o u t d ef in i -t ions , theoret ica l f ram ew orks o r s ta tem ents of fac ts in em pir ica l science - -imply an in te r sub jec t ive consensus abou t s i tua t iona l meanings and th ea ims o f p rac t i ca l l i f e wh ich can on ly be ach ieved by a mutua l under -s t and ing o f in ten t ions and mot iva t ions as the ve ry s ense o f the con-ven t ions . Whi le i t i s t rue tha t conven t ions canno t be deduced f rom the i rm ot ives , and thus canno t b e ju s t if i ed by the log ic o f an ax iomat ic sys tem,they m us t never the les s no t be co nce ived o f a s a rb i tr a ry ac ts o f a so l it a ryw i l l o r - - w h a t a m o u n t s t o t h e sa m e th i n g i n t h e c o n t e x t o f j us ti fi ca -


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K A R L - O T T O A P E Lt i on - - a s even t s w h i ch can on l y be des c r i bed and exp l a i ned f r om t heout s ide , as de te rm ined by ex t ra - ra t iona l mo t ives as causes. F or i t i s byt he i r intelligibility tha t m eaning convent ions m us t fu l f il l the co ndi t ion ofbe i ng p r e suppos ed by a com muni ca t i on com m uni t y a s a common basisof in te rac t ion and wo r ld in te rpre ta t ion , a t the sam e t ime be ing imp rovedin the course of improving such in te rac t ion and wor ld in te rpre ta t ion .An d i t i s by such improv em ents o f meaning-convent ions , impl ici t inpubl ic l anguage games , tha t exp l i c i t convent ions , fo r ins tance the de-f in it ions o f concept s , come about .

Now the ques t ion a r i ses whether there should no t ex i s t an in t r ins icconnec t ion be tween the presc ien t i f i c r a t iona l i ty o f meaning convent ionsand t he me t hod i ca l ratio of the humani t i es . So fa r as I know, on ly thenear ly forgot t en Amer ican ph i losopher Jos iah Royce rea l i zed th i s pos -s ib i li ty o f a nonsc ien t is t ic and n onobjec t iv is t ic founda t ion o f the hum an-ities in his philosophy of "interpretation. ' '4 R o y c e m ade it clearind i spensab le convent ions about the meanings of concept s needed insc ience presuppose tha t there a re no t on ly cogni t ive opera t ions , such aspe r cep ti ons and concep t ions , w h i ch r e s t on an exchange be t w een m anand nature, but a lso cogni t ive operat ions , such as interpretat ion of s igns ,w h i ch r e s t on an exchange be t w een m en i n a " com mu ni t y o f i n te r -pre ta t ion . " 5 Thi s co ncept ion of Roy ce ' s wh ich i s , so to speak , a her -meneut ical e laborat ion of the semiot ieal ideas of C.S. Pei rce, in myopin ion , p rov ides the dec i s ive sugges t ion as to the contex t in whichconven t ions have the i r d im ens ion of poss ib le r a t iona l i ty . Convent ionss o i t seems t o m e - may be med i a t ed by a r a t iona l it y o f a pecu li a r k i nd :i t i s no t th e sc ien t if i c r a t iona l i ty o f opera t ions on ob jec ts whic h cou ldbe pe r f o r m ed i n a r epea tab l e w ay by exchangeab le hum an s ubj ec ts , bu tra ther the pre- and meta-scientific rationality of intersubject ive discoursem e d i a t e d b y explication of concepts and in te rpre ta t ion of in ten t ions .Th is dim ension of reasonab le discourse is inaccessible to those phi losoph-ies wh ich proceed f rom m ethodica l so lipsism, tha t is , f rom the a p r io r ip resuppos i t ion tha t "one per son a lone could fo l low a ru le ," fo r example ,tha t one per son a lone could per form sc ien t i f i c r esearch , e t c . Therefore ,I ca ll the p resuppos i t ion tha t mak es the d imen s ion of the r a t iona l ity o fconvent ions access ible the A priori of Communication, or r a ther , theA priori of Language Communication, because no o t he r com muni ca t ionprovides the poss ibi l i ty of rat ional convent ions .8


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T H E A P R I O R I O F C O M M U N I C A T I O NMy f i rs t c laim in this paper i s that the log ic o f sc ience , as i t was

developed by the logical pos i t ivis ts , has not , up to now, ref lected uponthe f ac t tha t , a f t e r the exposure of the h idden metaphys ics o f i t s ear lydays , i t moved t o t he new g r ound o f t he A priori of Communication.Ins tea d o f r e f lec t ing upo n th is n ew presuppos i t ion of i ts conventionalistphase, i t has taci tly held on to i t s form er presuppos i t ions ( inh er i ted f romlogical atomism wh ich imp l ied m ethod ical solips ism. ~ I w i l l then i l lus t ratemy f i rs t thes is by displaying the consequences of methodical sol ips ismin the logic of science. My expos i t ion of these consequences amounts tothe asser t ion that methodical sol ips ism is one of the main reasons whythe n eo-pos i tivist ic logic of science has no t , up to no w, b een able to cop ewi th the pecul i a r in te res t s and problems of the humani t i es , bu t has hadto c l ing to the program of a sc ien t i s t i c r educ t ion of the methods ofthe hu m ani t ies to those of the na tural sciences , or a t leas t to those of thesocial sciences s tyled natural sciences. This assert ion will make up thesecond thes is of m y paper . Final ly , the bas is of this cr i t ique of re duc t ivescie nt ism as a conseq uence of m ethodolog ical solips ism wi l l b e m a d eexpl ic i t by my th i rd thes i s : tha t the A prior i o f Language-Commu-nication provides an adequate presuppos i t ion for under s tanding thesoc ia l func t ion and the m ethodologica l approach of th e hum ani t ies .

II . M ethodical Solipsism as metaphysical presuppositionof Logical Posi t ivsm

I t m ight perhaps see m cur ious , a t f i r s t sight, that m od ern analyt icallogic of science, based on semant ical recons t ruct ion of the language ofscience, should have methodical solipsism as i ts tacit presupposit ion.A t f i r s t s ight , the neo-Leibnizian po s tulate o f a universal language ofscience lying at the ground of the Russel l -Wit tgens tein-Carnap programseems to be eq uivalen t to an ac kno wled gem ent of the quasi -t ranscen-den ta l func t ion of l anguage com mu nica t ion as a condi t ion of the poss ib il-i ty and va l id i ty of human knowledge . In par t i cu la r , Carnap ' s t r ans i t ionf rom the l anguage of p r iva te exper ience ( in Der log isehe Au fbau derW e l t , 1928) to the intersubject ive " thing language" of "phys icial ism"(cf . "Die phys ikal ische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaf t , "Erkenn tn i s 3 , 1932) seems in pr inc ip le to surm oun t the t r ad i tion o f themethodical solipsism tha t i s involved in the very foundat ions of t r a -


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K A R L - O T T O A P E Ldi t iona l empi r i c i sm and pos i t iv i sm (and , by the way , a l so in tha tt r ad i t ion of r a t iona l i s t i c ph i losophy which , f rom Descar tes to t tus ser l ,conce ives of t ru ths as ev idence for consc iousness ) . Thi s v iew, ho wev er ,i s , i t seems to me, unjus t i f ied. Indeed, I wish to maintain the thes isthat a phi losophy which pos tulates a phys ieal is t ic-behavior is t ic languagefor ob jec t i fy ing the phenomena of human in te r subjec t iv i ty involvesm ethod ical solips ism to no less an exte nt tha n a phi losophy that s tar tsf r om t he a s s umpt i on t ha t m ean ing and t r u t h a r e ma t t e rs o f i n t r o spec t iveeviden ce of pr ivate e xper iences of consciousness . Th e co m m on bias o fboth phi losophies l ies in the taci t assumption that objec t ive k n o w l e d g eshould be poss ib le w i thout in tersubjec t ive unde r s t and i ng by com-munica t ion be ing presupposed . The t r ad i t iona l sub jec t iv i s t i c fo rm ofem pi r ic i sm t ri es to r ea li ze th i s idea of kno wled ge wi tho ut p resuppos inglanguage as a condi t ion of intersubject ivi ty at a l l . Modern logical( sema nt ica l ) emp i r ic i sm a lso l eapfrogs the co mm unica t ive func t ion oflanguage by pos tu la t ing a l anguage which would be a p r io r i in te r -sub jec t ive by be ing s imply ob jec t ive and un iver sa l . I t is , how ever , jus tth i s idea of in te r subjec t iv i ty as w ar ran ted by ob jec t iv i ty tha t ma kes theneo-Leibnizian concept ion of a universal " thing- language" a new ex-pres s ion of the ep i stemologica l idea of m ethodica l "so l ips ism."

I n o r de r t o e l uc i da te th i s po i n t l e t m e f i rs t m ake s ome r emar ks abou tthe pecul iar i t ies of formal ized languages as poss ible real izat ions of theneo-pos i t ivis tic idea of a unive rsal language o f science.

At the ou t se t l e t us no te tha t the formal ized l anguages of the log icof science, in pr inciple , can not be used fo r intersubject ive communicationin the fu l l s ense of tha t w ord . I t is on ly sentences abou t states of af fairs( no t even s ta t emen t s abou t f a c t s ! ) an d logical connections b e t w e e nsentences tha t can be form ula ted in these l anguages , b u t no t "u t t e r -ances" 7 or "speech acts" s because these uni ts of ordinary language dono t g e t the i r m eaning exc lusive ly f rom the syn tac ti ca l and semant icalru les o f a fo rmal sys tem, bu t on ly f rom the contex t o f the pragmat ica luse of l anguage in co ncre te si tua t ions of l i fe . Now , amon g those par t s o fspeech which cannot be expressed are , above al l , personal ident i f ierssuch as " I , " "you , " "we, " e tc . , which im m edia te ly expres s the s i tua t ionof in te r subjec t ive com mu nica t ion , and the r e f l ec t ion upo n th is s i tua t ion .Such u tt e rances , w h i ch a t te s t t he hum an "compe t ence o f comm uni ca ti on"by langua ge can, in th e logic of form al ized " thing-languages," only be10


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T H E A P R I O R I O F C O M M U N I C A T I O Nthe ob jec t o f descr ip t ions of "verba l behavior" by an ob server wh o doesno t himse lf par t ic ipate in the co m m unicat ion. No w, s t r ic t ly speaking, adescr ip t ion of verba l behavior in a fo rmal ized l anguage cannot expres san understanding of the in ten t ions of th e per sons speaking , because th isalways impl ies that these persons and the "descr iptor" par t ic ipate in acomm on l anguage game t ak ing r ega r d o f t he comm uni ca ti ve compe t enceof bo th s ides. 9 Th e language o f science as c onceive d by the neo-pos it iv i st ic log ic o f sc ience ex c l u de s - - i n p r i n c i p l e - - t h e ex is tence o f alanguage game common to the sub jec t s and to the ob jec t s o f s c ience .I t has to exc lude th is because the very po in t o f con s t ruc ting formal izedlanguages for scient i f ic use is to get r id of th e hermeneutic pr ob l emsof communica t ion , tha t i s , o f in te rpre t ing one another ' s in ten t ions , byes tab l ish ing a f r am ew ork of l anguage which is a priori an intersubjectiveone and so provides the condi t ions of the poss ibi l i ty of object ivekno wled ge. In shor t , th e logically rec ons t ru cted language of science isdes t ined for describ ing and expla in ing a wo r ld of p ure ob jec ts ; i t i s no tsu i t ed to expres s com mu nica t ion wh ich i s the in te r subjec tive d imens ionof l anguage .

However , one could perhaps s t i l l ask what a l l th is should have to dowith methodical sol ips ism as an ul t imate presuppos i t ion of thinking.I have to concede tha t the log ic of s c ience wo uld n o t , in f ac t, imp lyme thodica l solipsism i f it we re to r e f l ec t upo n two th ing s : f i rs t , tha teven the cons t ruc tor , l e t a lone the user , o f a fo rmal ized l anguage ofscience al ready presupposes co m m unicat ion , in th e ful l sense of under-s tanding human in ten t ions , fo r b r ing ing about those convent ions tha ta re need ed for in t roducing an d t es t ing the formal ized l anguages ; s econd ,that human beings , so long as they are cons idered as poss ible par tnersof com mu nica t ion , and so of in te rac t ion , cannot be r educe d to ob jec ts o fdescr ip t ion an d/ or explana t ion of the i r behavior by means of fo rmal izedlanguages, bu t have to be dea l t w i th in the co ntex t o f a language gamewhich is , in pr inciple , common to the subjects and to the objects ofsc ience ( i . e . , the humani t i es ) .

The log ica l pos i t iv i s t s would presumably no t deny the f i r s t o f thesetwo poin t s. Par t i cu la rly in the school's r ecen t s t ages , w hen the bas icneed for convent ions could no longer be over looked , i t has begun tomove in this di rect ion. But s t i l l there are int r ins ic reasons that preventi t f rom tak ing a l l the consequences of the A pr ior i o /Communica t ion

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K A R L - O T T O A P E Li n t o a c c o u n t . T h e m a i n s u c h r e a s o n i s t h e i d e a o f a u n i f i e d s c i e n c e ,o r i g in a l ly c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e i d e a o f t h e u n i v e r s a l l a n g u a g e . I t i s t h i sr e a s o n t h a t p r e v e n t s l o g i c al p o s i t i v i s m f r o m m e t h o d i c a l l y r e f le c t i n g u p o nt h e i n te r s u b j e c ti v e c o m m u n i c a t i o n p r e s u p p o s e d b y c o n s t ru c t iv e s e m a n t ic si n t h e m a n n e r o f a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p r a g m a t i c s t h a t d o e s n o t r e d u c e t h ei n te r s u b j e c ti v e d i m e n s i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n t o " v e rb a l b e h a v i o r. " A n di t i s t h i s s a m e r e a s o n t h a t p r e v e n t s l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s m f r o m a c k n o w l e d g -i n g a s g e n u i n e t h e m e t h o d s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n t h e h u m a n i t i e s , a n d s op r e v e n t s i t f ro m a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h a t h u m a n b e i n g s c a n n o t b e r e d u c e dt o o b j e ct s o f d e s c r i p ti o n a n d / o r e x p l a n a t io n o f t h e i r b e h a v i o r b y m e a n so f f o r m a l i z e d l a n g u a g e s .I f o n e r e a l l y h o p e s t o o b j e c t i f y t h e w h o l e w o r l d , i n c l u d i n g t h ed i m e n s i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , b y a la n g u a g e o f a u n i f i e d s c ie n c e , t h e no n e m u s t , s t r i c tl y s p e a k i n g , c li n g t o t h e a p r i o r i o f m e t h o d i c a l s o li p s is m ,f o r t h e t o t a l i z a t i o n o f t h e i d e a o f s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t i v i t y i m p l i e s t h a t t h es u b j ec t o f t h e o b j ec t i fy i n g s c i en ce co u l d , i n p r i n c i p l e , p r ac t i ce s c i en cew i t h o u t b e in g a m e m b e r o f a c o m m u n i c a ti o n c o m m u n i ty . H e s h o u ld ,o n t h is v i e w , b e a b l e t o f o l l o w t h e r u l e s o f t h e u n i v e r s a l " t h in g - l a n g u a g e "a s i f t h e y w e r e r u l e s o f a " p r i v a t e l a n g u a g e " - - t o s p e a k a s t h e l a t e rW i t t g e n s t e i n d o e s . I t i s w e l l k n o w n t h a t t h e l a t e r W i t t g e n s t e i n d e n i e dt h i s p o s s i b i l i t y ; a n d , i n m y o p i n i o n , h e h a s , i n d e e d , r e f u t e d " m e t h o d i c a ls o l ip s i sm " w i t h h i s n o t i o n o f p u b l i c " l a n g u a g e g a m e s " a s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n so f a l l i n t e n t i o n a l i t y o f a c t i o n s a n d c o g n i t i o n s . B u t t h e n e o - p o s i t i v i s t i c" l o g i c o f u n i f i e d s c i e n c e , " a s i t i s r e p r e s e n t e d f o r i n s t a n c e b y H e m p e l ,N a g e l , a n d S t e g m f i ll e r, h a s n o t , u p t o n o w , d r a w n e p i s te m o l o g i c a lc o n s e q u e n c e s f r o m W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r e f u t a t i o n o f " m e t h o d i c a l s o l i p s i s m . "R a t h e r i t c l i n g s t o t h e i d e a o f a u n i v e r s a l " t h i n g - l a n g u a g e " a s d e v e l o p e di n t h e Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus o f t h e y o u n g e r W i t tg e n s t e i n .

L e t u s , t h e r e f o r e , f i rs t p a y s o m e a t t e n t io n t o t h e y o u n g e r W i t tg e n s t e i n ,w h o e x p l i c i t l y c o n f i r m s m y t h e s i s t h a t methodical sol ips ism i s t h eu l t i m a t e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f a lo g i c o f a u n i v e r s a l " t h i n g la n g u a g e . " I n h i se a rl y w o r k , Travtatus Logico-Philosophicus, W i t tg e n s t e i n t ra c e d t h e i d e ao f a universal language, i n w h i c h o n l y t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s o f t h e n a t u r a ls c i e n c e s w o u l d b e j u s t i f i e d a s m e a n i n g f u l , d o w n t o i t s l a s t f o u n d a t i o n s ,w h i c h h e h i m s e l f c a l l e d " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l . " N o w , a m o n g t h e s e l a s t f o u n d -a t i o n s , w e r e t h e f o l l o w i n g s e n t e n c e s o f t h e Trac ta tus :5 . 6 3 1 : " T h e r e i s n o s u c h t h i n g a s t h e s u b j e c t t h a t t h i n k s o r e n t e r t a i n s12


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T H E A P R I O R I O F C O M M U N I C A T I O Ni d e a s . . .. " T h i s s e n t e n c e m a y b e c o n s i d e r e d a s t h e v a n t a g e p o i n t f o r ar i g o r o u s p r o g r a m o f behaviorism w i t h i n t h e n e o - p o s i t i v i s t i c p r o g r a m o fu n i f i e d s c i e n c e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , W i t t g e n s t e i n h i m s e l f d i d n o t f o r g e t t h etranscendental p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f b e h a v i o r a l s c i e n c e i ts e lf . T h e s e a r ec o n d e n s e d i n t o t h e f o l l o w i n g s e n t e n c e w h i c h s e e m s t o c o n t r a d i c t t h es e n t e n c e I h a v e a l r e a d y q u o t e d :5.641 : " T h u s t h e r e r e a l l y i s a s e n s e i n w h i c h p h i l o s o p h y c a n t a l k a b o u tt h e s e l f i n a n o n - p s y c h o l o g i c a l w a y . W h a t b r i n g s t h e s e lf i n t o p h i l o s o p h yi s t h e f a c t t h a t ' t h e w o r l d i s m y w o r l d ' . . . . " T h e a p p a r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o nb e t w e e n t h is s e n t e n c e a b o u t a p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t o f " t h e s e lf " a n d th ep r e v i o u s d e n i a l o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a th i n k i n g " s u b j e c t " h a s t o b e r e -s o l v e d , a c c o r d i n g to W i t t g e n s t e i n , b y t h e tr a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s i d e r a t i o nt h a t t h e " s e l f " e x p r e s s e d i n t h e s e n t e n c e , " t h e w o r l d i s my world," i s n o texist ing in t h e w o r l d b u t i s j u s t t h e l im i t o f t h a t w o r l d w h i c h c a n b ed e s c r i b e d i n t1 ~e l a n g u a g e o f n a t u r a l s c ie n c e s .5.62 : " . . . T h e w o r l d i s m y w o r l d : t h is i s m a n i f e s t i n th e f a c t t h a t t h el im i t s o f l a n g u a g e . . . m e a n t h e li m i t s o f m y w o r l d . "

S o , a c c o r d in g t o W i t t g e n s t e i n , t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l u n i t y o f t h e I a s t h eu n i t y o f t h e l a n g u a g e i s t h e c o n d i t i o n o f th e p o s s i b i l i ty o f n a t u r a l s c ie n c ej u s t a s , i n K a n t , t h e transcendental unity o f t h e I i s t h e uni ty of con-sciousness. B u t n o w t h e r e c o m e s t o l i g h t a p o i n t o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' sc r i t i q u e o f a p u r e l a n g u a g e o f s c i e n c e w h i c h g o e s , a t a n y r a t e e x p l i c i t l y ,b e y o n d K a n t ' s c r i ti q u e o f p u r e r e a s o n : i f t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l I d o e s n o te x i s t in t h e w o r l d , b u t o n l y a s t h e l i m i t o f t h e w o r l d , s o t h a t a ll m e ni n t h e w o r l d h a v e t o b e c o n c e i v e d a s o b j e c t s o f ( d e s c r i p t i o n a n de x p l a n a t i o n b y ) n a t u r a l s c i en c e , t h e n t h e r e m u s t b e n o n e e d f o r in t e r-s u b j e c t i v e c o m m u n i c a t i o n a b o u t t h e u s e o f l a n g u a g e. E v e r y s c ie n t is t , s ot o s p e a k , m u s t b e c o m p l e t e l y s t i r - s u f f i c i e n t a s a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c to f h is l an g u a ge w h i c h i s - - b y m y s t i ca l g u a r a n t e e - - t h e l an g u ag e o f a llo t h e r s c ie n t is t s. I n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s w o r d s : 5 : 6 4 : " H e r e i t c a n b e s e e nt h a t s o l i p s i s m , w h e n i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s a r e f o l l o w e d o u t s t r i c t l y , c o i n c i d e sw i t h p u r e r e a l is m . T h e s e lf o f s o li p s is m s h r in k s t o a p o i n t w i t h o u t e x -t e n s io n , a n d t h e r e r e m a i n s t h e r e a li t y c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h i t ." P r e d s e l yt h is p r e s u p p o s i t i o n i s t h e p o i n t o f m e t h o d i c a l s o l i p s is m , w h i c h d e n i e s n o tj u s t t h e e x i st e n ce o f o t h e r m i n d s, b u t t h e p r e s u p p o s i ti o n o f o t h e rm i n d s - - f o r in s ta nc e, b y w a y o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n - - f o r u n d e rs ta n d in go n e s e l f a n d t h e w o r l d . A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s p o s i t i o n i t s h o u ! d b e p o s s i b l e

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f o r a s c i en t i s t t o r educe a l l o t he r s c i en t i s t s - - no t t o s peak o f l aymen- -to ob jec ts o f h i s descr ip t ion and explana t ion of the i r behavior , inc lud ingthe i r verba l behavior i f such a th ing should ex i s t in the w or ld . I t is m ythes i s tha t th i s very pos i t ion has become the u l t imate presuppos i t ion ,one no. longer r e f l ec ted upon , o f th e neo-pos it iv i st ic idea o f a un i f i edscience , and i t has r em ained so even a f t e r the sh i f t f rom the m etaphys icsof logical a tomism to the convent iona l ism of cons t ruc t ive semant ics.

111. M ethodical So l ips i sm as presupposi tion of the neo-posit iv i st idea oJ"unders tanding"I wi l l now go on to i l lus t rate my f i rs t thes is by giving a cr i t ical sketch

of the neo-pos i t iv i s t t r ea tment o f the humani t i es , espec ia l ly of the o ldques t ion about the r e la t ionsh ip be tween nomologica l exp lana t ions andthe unde r s tanding of mean ingin ten t ions . S t r ic t ly speaking , i t i s n o t qu i t ecor rec t to speak o f a neo-posi tiv is ti c t r ea tm ent o f th e hu m ani t i es becauset he ve r y hea r t o f t he human i t i e s , philology in a broad sense, was nott reated but s imply ignored in the " logic of unif ied science." As has s t i l lto be shown, this exclus ion is ra ther character is t ic , and ins t ruct ive wi thregard to the neo-pos i t iv i s t s ' s t r a tegy of a rgument . Never the les s , thereremains the fact that the "social sciences ," and wi thin thei r context a lsohis tory, had to be deal t wi th by the logical pos i t ivis ts . In this context ,they had a l so to d i scuss "unders tanding" wh ich was c la imed by Droysen ,D i hhey , C r oce , C o l l i ngw ood and o t he r ph i l o s ophe r s t o be t he ve r ym etho d of the "Geis teswis senschaf ten ." 10 N ow , h ow d id they proce edin dea l ing wi th "unders tanding" ? Let us at this point take a closer lookat the i r s t rategy of argument .The f i r s t th ing which s t r ikes one upon read ing the d i scuss ions by ,say , O . Neura th , C .G . Hempel , P . Oppenheim, E . Nagel , Th . Abel , andW. Stegmii l ler ,11 is the fact that they do not at al l discuss the under-s tanding of language-s igns , of s t a tements , o r whole t ex t s o f s c ience ,ph i losophy or l i t e ra ture . Thi s i s cur ious i f one r emembers the f ac t tha tt h e m o d e r n logic of science is , accord ing to the i r o w n m ethod , es sen t ia l lyan analys i s of language which , fo r ins tance , t r ans forms the o lder pos i -t ivist ic logic o f explan at ion 12 into the f ormal mode , accord ing to w hichi t is no longe r even ts tha t are explained by laws a nd causes, b ut sentencesmak i ng up t he explanandum t ha t a r e deduced f r om s en tences mak i ng up14


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T H E A P R I O R I O F C O M M U N I C A T I O Nthe explanans . Thus , the f i r s t th ing ana ly ti c ph i losophers themselves dois always to explicate the concept s o f t r ad i t iona l ph i losophy by recon-s t ruc t ing the i r s emant ica l f r ame wo rk . But sho uldn ' t th i s en te rpr i se s tandin close connect ion wi th the act ivi ty of those sciences that interprettexts , for ins tance, the his tory of science ? That i s what one might askas an ou t s ider ; bu t one ge t s no answer to th i s ques t ion , fo r , as I havealready ment ioned, the neo-pos i t ivis t logic of science does not deal wi ththe philological, or , to use an oth er term , wi th the herm eneu t ical , sciences .( I w i l l r e tu rn to th i s la t e r on , w i th a conjec ture as to th e r easons w hythe neo-pos i t ivis ts ' analyses of language over look thei r most congenialrelat ives among the sciences, in a broad sense. )

B u t w ha t abou t understanding of actions in h istory and sociology ?As an ou t s ider , aga in , one might th ink tha t th i s k ind of under s tandingshould i t s e l f s t and in c lose connec t ion wi th an understanding o~ signsand texts because u l t imate ly the opera t ion of under s tanding i s d i r ec tedto meaning as i t i s expressed by texts , works or act ions , more or lessaccord ing to the mea ning- in ten t ions of th e i r a u thors2 3 One could here ,perhaps , fo l low the l a te r W i t tgens te in and t ake i t as a heur is t ic hor izonthat speech, act ions and interpretat ions as meaning- intent ions are always" i n t e rw oven" i n language-games as " forms of l i f e . " One might thus beled to think that the his tor ians and sociologis ts had to inquire intoactions, inst i tut ions, etc. , in a way similar to that in which philologistsinqui re in to t ex t s , in o rder to under s tand forms of l i f e by in te rpre t ingthe meaning of the goa l - se t t ing and the va lue- sys tems expres sed byac t ions and ins ti tu tions . E lab ora ted und er s tanding of th i s k ind is , indeed ,needed no t on l y f o r ans w er i ng t he ques t i on w hy cer tain act ions ofins t itu t ions came abo ut bu t fo r answe r ing the ear l i e r ques tion as to whati s given : tha t i s, as to w ha t those act ions (especially col lective one s) andins t i tu t ions a re tha t a re to be iden t i f i ed and descr ibed wi th in a contex tof an his tor ical s ituat ion a nd a socio-cultural form of l ife. Th us answ er ing"w hat ?" ques t ions and a nswer ing te leo log ical "w hy ?" ques tions seemsto be in ter w ov en in historico-sociological desc riptions w ith the so-called"herm eneu t ic c i rc le" which a l so m akes up the m ethodica l ru le o f t ex tin te rpre ta t ion . Somet imes the h i s to r i an might even be in te res ted inact ions as supplements of texts ; thus for ins tance, he could inquire intothe pol i t ical act ions of Mar t in Luther as being elucidat ions or , perhapsalso, con tradic tions of his theolog ical writ ing s. A ll these possibili ties of

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m e t h o d i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n - - w h i c h h a v e n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h causal ex-p l a n a t i o n - h a v e a l ready been explored in a r i ch l i t e ra ture ex tendingf rom Schle ie rmacher , Boeckh , Droysen to D i l they , W eber , Croce , Col-l ingwood, Rothack er , Ga dam er , Bet t i and o ther s . 14 An d, as I havea l ready ment ioned , the l a te r Wi t tgens te in has a l so g iven an impor tan thin t as to the p oss ibi li ty of a he rm en eu t ie approach in sociology, asP . W i nch , f o r i n s t ance has s how n . 1~ But i f one hopes to f ind the neo-pos i t iv i s t s dea l ing wi th th i s k ind of under s tanding in h i s to ry and so-c io logy , one i s once aga in d i sappoin ted . True , they do speak about the"so-called theoreticians of understanding o r Vers tehen in the Geistes-wissenscha/ten" and t hey t r y t o come t o t e r ms w i t h t he s e peop l e , bu tjus t a t the beg inn ing of the ho ped- for d i scuss ion they in t rod uce a r a the rcunning presuppos i t ion , n am ely : tha t the " theore t ic ians of the Geis tes -wis senschaf ten" conce ive of un der s tand ing ( Ve r s t e h e n ) as a me t ho d t ha tcom petes w i th "cover ing law explana t ion" b y appea l ing ins tead to h igher ,intui t ive ins ights . 16 Th ere by the y a ssume that understanding, i f i t were am e th o d of cogni t ion , would answer the same k inds of ques t ions asexplanation, t he on l y d i ff e rence be t w een t h e t w o ope r a ti ons be ing t ha t"unders tanding" would have the addi t iona l ambi t ion of r each ing thesame goal as explanat ion by a shor tcut , so to speak. Having int roducedt hes e p r e s uppos i t i ons - - w h i ch , by t he w ay , s how t ha t t hey a r e unab l eto conce ive of an y o th er l ead ing in te res t o f kno win g 17 than tha t o f thena t u r a l s c i ences - - t hey s t a r t e l abo r a t i ng t he i r ow n t heo r y o f " t heope rat ion cal led 'vers tehe n ' . " 18

The neo-pos i t ivis ts are , then, generous enough to concede a place insc ience to the opera t ion ca l led "ver s tehen . " But the y do so by conce iv ingof "vers tehen" as "empathy," and that means as " internal iz ing" specialk inds of observable da ta , nam ely : hum an b ehavior as r eac t ion to s timul i.B y s uch i n te r na li z ing em pa t hy one is a b l e - t he neo - pos it iv i st s s a y - t of ind maxims of behavior f rom one ' s own exper ience and to in te rpo la tethem in to the o bserved behav ior o f o ther s . By th i s in te rpo la t ion of abehavior -maxim, the s t imulus -da ta and the r eac t ion-da ta become con-nec ted in such a way as to a rouse in the observer the f ee l ing of hav ingunde r s t ood w i t h i n t u i t i ve ev i dence w h y a human be i ng r eac t ed t o as t imulus in th e wa y tha t h e ac tua l ly d id . Fo r ins tance , one "u nders tands"in th i s way , why one ' s ne ighbor s tops work ing a t h i s desk and l igh t sa f i r e in h i s s tove , by in te rpo la t ing tha t he suddenly became co ld .16


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T H E A P R I O R I OF C O M M U N I C A T I O NPresu ppos ing this parad igm of "unders tand ing," th e neo-positivists, no tsurprisingly, come to the following estimate of its value as a scientificmethod: Understanding is only a psychologically interesting, heuristicdevice for hitting upon law-hypotheses in the context of explaininghuman behavior. But as such a heuristic device, it remains marginal toscience because its results are only possible ingredients of the explanans.So what is relevant as a scientific method here, as in every case of neo-positivist explanation, becomes the deduction of the explanandum fromthe explanans in such a way that a prediction becomes possible whichcan be tested by observation. The first to fo rmulate this a rgum ent against"understanding" as a method of science was, so far as I know, OttoNeurath, a me mbe r of the Vienna Circle, wh o w rote in his book Empi-rische Soziologie (Wien , 1931, p. 56 ): "Empathy, understanding andthe like may help the researcher, hu t it enters into a system of stateme ntsof science as little as does a good cup of coffee, which helped theresearcher to do his work." (Translation by K.-O.A.) In this paperI will, therefore, call the neo-positivistic theory of understanding thecup of coffee theory of understanding.

C.G. Hempel, who, together with R. Oppenheim, gave the neo-posi-tivistic theo ry of "explan ation" its precise for m in his so-called deduc tive-nomological model, s elaborated upon the cup of coffee theo ry of under-standing as follows : " . . .understanding.. . in terms of one's own psycho-logical function may prove a useful heuristic device in the search forgeneral psychological principles which might provide a theoretical ex-planation : but the existence of empathy on the part of the scientist isneither a necessary, nor a sufficient, condition for explanation, or thescientific understan ding [ sic ! ] of any hum an action." 2o Le t us exam inethis last, two-part thesis of Hempel and Oppenheim more closely. Thefirst half of the thesis, namely, that understanding by empathy is not anecessary condition for the explanation or the scientific understanding,of any human action, is illustrated in the following way" "For thebehavior o f psychotics or o f people belonging to a culture ver y differen tfrom that of the scientist may sometimes be explainable and predictablein terms of general principles even though the scientist who establishesor applies those principles may not be able to understand his subjectsemp athetically." 21 This is so characteristic and instru ctive a n illustrationthat I will take it as a point of depa rture for m y critical discussion of th e

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whole neo-pos i t iv i s t i c s t andpoin t . F i r s t I w i l l t ry to make c lear underw ha t t ac i t p resuppos i t ions the thes i s o f the i l lus t r a t ion could be as sumedto be t rue , and u nd er wh at o ther p resuppos i tions i t i s s imply absurd ;then I w i l l t ry to show tha t i t i s , in f ac t , Wrong, even under the t ac i tp r e suppos it ions o f H em pe l and O p penhe i m.

Th e thes is tha t i t is no t necessary to "unde rs tand" hum an ac t ionsbecause one can somet imes expla in them by genera l p r inc ip les w i thoutunde r s t and i ng t hem by em pa t hy can , i n p r inc ip l e, be a s sumed t o b e t r uei f , and only i f , one is a pr ior i n o t i n t e r e s t e d in under s tanding be l i e f s ,r easons, o r a ims of hum an be ings , bu t on ly in cover ing l aw explana tionso f w h a t , in f ac t, is g oin g o n . B u t t h is m e a n s - p r o p er ly s p e a k i n g - - t h a tone is no t i n t e r e s t ed in m ak i ng a d i f fe r ence be t w een hu m an be i ngs andt he i r ac t ions on t he on e hand , an d any o t he r na t u ra l even t s on t he o t he r ,f o r on l y by u n d er s t a n d i n g in the contex t o f communica t ion i s one ab leto d i scover and to va l ida te th i s d i f f e rence . Externa l explana t ion bygenera l p rinc ip les , even i f they we re conf i rm ed by so-called observa tionsof behavior , cou ld never ascer ta in tha t the ru les by which we "expla in"behav i o r a r e f o l l ow ed , as ru les , by t he agen ts o f t he behav i o r , o r , t o pu ti t in o ther words , tha t the concept s o f our "explana t ion" could , inpr inc ip le , be used by the agent s themselves in o rder to conceptua l i zethe i r ow n ru le - fo l lowing behavior . Now , to prov ide ro les and concept sof jus t th i s k ind makes up the l ead ing in te res t o f "under s tanding , " asP . W i nch has s how n . 22 ( E ven H e m pe l and O ppenh e i m d i d , i n f ac t,r esor t to "under s tanding" when they spoke of "psychot ics " and "peoplebe longing to very d i f f e ren t cu l tu res . " For i t i s obvious tha t in the i ri l lus t r a t ion th ey wish to in t rodu ce examples of hum an ac t ions in ad e f i c i e n t m o d e , so m speak. )Now i t i s c l ear tha t to exc lude a p r io r i an i n t e r e s t i n unde r s t and i ng( and t hus t o exc l ude an i n t e r e s t in th e d i s tinc tiveness of hum an ac t ions )as a poss ible presuppos i t ion of cogni t ion, prevents any reasonablediscuss ion wi th so-cal led " theoret ic ians of unders tanding." I t s implybegs the ques t ion and reduces the as ser t ion tha t under s tanding i s no tnecessary to a b lank t au to logy . Thi s , aga in , m ay be i l lus t r a ted by th ek i nd o f i n t e r p r e t a t i ons o f t he H empe l and O ppenhe i m exampl es t ha tm ight be e xpe cted in a fai r discussion. Fo r , in the case of the beha viorof psychot ics , the theore t i c ians of under s tanding would of course say :jus t this case i l lus t rates that , in pr inciple , unders tanding of human18


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T H E A P R I O R I O F C O M M U N I C A T I O Nbehavior is necessary , for only in cases of def ic iency of humani ty such asthese may one , pe rhaps , have to g ive up under s tand ing . In the case o ffo re ign cu l tu res , no t even th i s a rgumen t wou ld be p laus ib le , fo r cu l tu ra lanthropologis ts , e thnologis ts , h is tor ians , or l inguis ts who are in teres tedin recogniz ing thes e phe nom ena as /ore ign cul tures s i m p l y w o u l d n o tg i v e u p " u n d e rs t an d i n g ." T h e y e v e n t u a l ly w o u l d - - a s , i n f ac t , a ll cu l-tu ra l sc ien ti s ts , more o.r l e ss , d o - - m e d ia te o r check the i r "em pa thy" byother ways o~ understanding and quas i - exp lana t ion wh ich s eem to beto ta l ly un kno w n to neo-pos i tiv i st s . I w i l l r e tu rn to th i s l a te r . B u t cu l tu ra ls c ien t i st s wo u ld no t by any m eans g ive up a l l c la ims to unde r s tand ingin favor of cover ing law explanat ions . Not even socia l sc ient is ts who areno t in te res ted in under s tand ing , bu t who wish r a the r to s e t up p re -d ic t ions for socia l engineer ing , can d ispense wi th a l l presuppos i t ionsinde b ted to under s tand ing ; though in th i s case one can concede tha t theymake on ly heur i s t i c u se o f under s tand ing in the s e rv ice o f exp la in ing .Bu t th is case l eads us back to ou r d i s t inc t ion b e tw een tw o k inds o fp o s s i b l e a n s w e r s t o t h e t h e s i s o f H e m p e l a n d O p p e n h e i m .

The mos t r e levan t answer , in my op in ion , has a l r eady been pu t fo r -ward . I t cons i s t s in the a rgumen t tha t a theo ry wh ich a p r io r i a s ses sesunderstanding according to i t s value /or explaining, s imply begs theques t ion by fo rge t t ing to ask fo r the p roper a im o f under s tand ing as away o f cogn i t ion . Fo r in s tance , i t can never come to t e rms wi th wha ttex t in te rp re ta t ion i s abou t . Bu t even i f one p resupposes tha t cover inglaw exp lana t ion , and thus p red ic t ion , i s the on ly s e r ious l ead ing in te res tof sc ience , as neo-pos i t iv is ts a lways tac i t ly do , one is not permit ted tod i spense comple te ly w i th a ll heurist ic undersfanding, as H em pel sugges t s,a s long as one w ishes to exp la in human behav io r . And i f h i s to r ica l lyre levan t human behav io r i s to be exp la ined , i t i s no t even pos s ib le tot r ea t under s tand ing as on ly a heu r i s t i c dev ice in the s e rv ice o f cover inglaw exp lana t ion , fo r the s imple r eason tha t cover ing l aw exp lana tions inh i s to ry a re no t pos s ib le , a s W. Dray has r ecen t ly shown wi th s t r ik ingargu m en ts? a (Th e s t ruc tu re o f so -call ed h i s to r ica l exp lana t ions wh ichshou ld be t t e r be ca l l ed quas i - exp lana t ions canno t , in my op in ion , bel o gi ca ll y r e d u c e d t o t h e H e m p e l - O p p e n h e i m s c h em e o f deduct ive-nomo-logical explanation. They may we l l be answers to a ques t ion fo r causes ,bu t even as such they canno t p rov ide a bas i s fo r p red ic t ions bu t on ly fo rin te l l ig ib i l i ty in a sense of ex pos t / ac t um de t e r mi n i s m . A s D r a y h a s

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K A R L - O T T O A P E Lshown, the "because" sen tences of h i s to r i ans , in cont rad i s t inc t ion tothose of an unhis tor ical social scient is t , cannot , in pr inciple , be replacedby an explanans in the sense of the I - t empel -Oppenheim scheme. Thema in r eason for th i s lies in th e f ac t tha t h i s to r ians can not accep t genuineempi r i ca l law-hypotheses as expl i ca tions of th e necess ity mean t by the i r"because" sentences . What they eventual ly should accept as an expl i -ca t ion of tha t ex post factum necess i ty i s e i ther a pseudo- law wi th on lyone ins tance ( s t a t ing formal ly the pred ic tab i l i ty o f the explanandum inthose cases where all ind iv idua l c i r cums tances of the s ingular eventwo uld r e tu rn) o r a p rogres sive spec i fi ca tion of the boundary-cond i t ionsof the searched- for l aw w hich m us t r eco ns t ruc t the ind iv idua l c ir cum-s t ances o f t he exp l anandum by t he u s e o f p r ope r names and de f i n i t edescr ip t ions . In bo th cases on ly a pseudo-law can be p roposed , an d th i sis , indeed, intel l igible , i f one ref lects upon the fact that his tor ical ex-p lana t ions , even i f no t p r imar i ly in te res ted in under s tanding in ten t ions ,mu s t be m ed i a t ed by an unde r s t and i ng o f hum an ac ti ons aga in s t t heback ground of s ingular s itua tions . Af te r a ll, in m y opin ion , we can hereno longer p resuppose , as w e m ight in the case of na ture , tha t the r e levan tda ta o f exper ience a re descr ibab le in t e rms of un iver sa l theor ies imply inguniversal , that i s , unchangeable laws. At leas t so much can be main-ta ined : the e labora t ion of the very understanding of hum an mo t i vat ionswi th in the contex t o f s ingular s i tua t ions i s an ind i spensab le method ofcogni t ion e v e n i f one is in te res ted on ly in h i s to r ica l ( causa l ) ex-p lana t ions , wh ereas the idea tha t every h is to ri ca l even t may be expla inedas a s ingular complexion of universal ly val id laws which, in pr inciple ,cou l d be f oun d w i t hou t h e r men eu t i c me t hods i s, up t o now , a m e ta -phys ical hypothes is of the neo-pos i t ivis ts . In natural science jus t theoppos i t e i s t rue ; the r enuncia t ion of mot iva t iona l under s tanding hasbeen a method ologica l p recon di t ion of i t s p rogress s ince Gal il eo andKepler .Fr om he re I tu rn to th e second hal f of the t- Iempe1-Oppenheim thes is ,nam ely , to th e as ser t ion tha t unde r s tanding i s no t a suf f i c ien t condi t ion"for the explana t ion , o r the sc ien t i f i c under s tanding , o f any humanact ion . " W e have a l r eady l earned how th is thesi s i s take n by T h . A bel ' sana lys i s o f " the opera t ion ca l l ed ' ver s tehen ' " ment ioned above .Abel ' s analys is , in fact , conf i rms Hempel ' s by s t ress ing that "verstehen"provides on ly a possible hypothes i s fo r explana t ion which has to be' 2 0


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T H E A P R I O R I O F C O M M U N I C A T I O Ntes ted by observa t ion , because our f ee l ing of under s tanding a humanact ion might be i l lusory. Now, the f i r s t th ing to be said in reply to thisi s to once aga in ca l l a t t en t ion to the f ac t tha t Hempel and Oppenheimbeg the qu es t ion by t ac it ly equa t ing "sc ien t if ic under s tanding" wi th"explana t ion" accord ing to l aws , fo r i t becomes im me dia te ly c lear tha tt es t ing the p red ic t ive va lue of the r esu l t o f under s tanding by observationdoes no t he lp you i f what you a re in te res ted in i s jus t understanding.I f , for ins tance, one is intere s ted in und ers tand ing, wh y, that i s , f o r w h a treasons, a popula t ion of f a rme rs le f t a cer t a in s t r e tch of l and and se t t ledin another r eg ion , no amount o f t es t ing nomologica l hypotheses in th i sand s imi lar cases by observat ion can provide the decis ive evidence. Atmos t i t can g ive h in t s , on the as sumpt ion tha t those h in t s can be in te -g r a t ed i n t o t he ve r y a t t emp t a t understanding. For i t is not just obser-vat ion of data as in the case of a phys icis t ' s hypothes is , but com-municat ion by language wi th so-cal led objects as co-subjects , whichwould provide the bes t t es t o f hav ing under s tood someone ' s r easons foract ion.24 Thus , in the case of the f a rmers , one would have to conductinterviews to provide a conclus ive tes t for , say, the hypothes is that theylef t the i r o ld l and because i t had become bar ren , and no t because theyhad heard about go ld be ing d i scovered somewhere e l se . Inc iden ta l ly ,f rom th i s example one can see tha t the f amous d i s t inc t ion be tween the"con t ex t o f d i s cove r y" and t he " con t ex t o f j u s t i f i ca t i on" - - s t emmi ngf r om K a n t - - c a n n o t be u s ed t o s how t he me t hodo log i cal i rr e levance o f"unders tanding" as many "logicians of science" seem to suppose. For ,as the ana ly t i ca l ph i losophers could have l earned f rom Wi t tgens te in ' st heo r y o f l anguage games , t he w ay by w h i ch know l edge has t o be" jus t i f i ed" i s no t independent o f the k ind of ques t ion to which i t i sa n s w e r i n g : external explanations may be jus t i f i ed by ex te rna l obser -v a t i o n ; intersubjective understanding can on ly be jus t i f i ed by the im -provement of intersubject ive unders tanding. To neglec t th i s in te rna lconnec t ion be tween the contex t o f d i scovery and the contex t o f jus t i -f icat ion amounts to an abs t ract ive fal lacy which leads to a total izat ionof the l ead ing in te res t o f jus t one k ind of know ledge and i t s cor respond-ing k ind of just if ica t ion . I t is impo r tan t to r em ark here tha t the r d e v a n thypotheses for und er s tanding the charac te ri s ti c ac tions of fo re ign peoplesor cu l tu res a re no t s imply in te rpo la t ions of our own exper iences in tothe i r behavior , as Abel sugges t s ; nor a re they hypotheses of a genera l

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n o m o l o g ic a l k i n d , t o b e c o n f i r m e d b y i n d u c t i o n f r o m o b s e r v in g a s m a n yc a s e s o f b e h a v i o r a s p o s s i b l e . I f , f o r i n s t a n c e , w e w i s h t o k n o w w h y i nt h e n i n t h c e n t u r y B .C . t h e M a y a n s le f t th e i r f i r st a r e a o f s e t t le m e n t a n di n t w o m i g r a t io n s m o v e d t o t h e n o r t h o f Y u c a t a n , w e p r e s u m a b l y h a v et o k n o w , b y s o m e k i n d o f i n d ir e c t c o m m u n i c a t i o n , s o m e t h i n g a b o u t t h e i ra s t ro l o g i ca l r e l i g i o n . S i mi l a r l y , i n t h e ca s e o f C l eo p a t r a ' s s u i c i d e w e i nf a c t k n o w , f r o m i n t e r p r e t i n g d o c u m e n t s , t h a t t h e q u e e n t o o k h e r l i f eb y m e a n s o f a s n a k e b e c a u s e t h i s k i n d o f d e a t h p r o m i s e d i m m o r t a l i t yt o h e r , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e E g y p t i a n r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n .

T h e s e e x a m p l e s , i n o u r p r e s e n t c o n t e x t , s e r v e t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h ew h o l e c o n c e p t o f understanding as empa thy p r e s u p p o s e d b y t h e n e o -p o s i t iv i s t s, i s h i g h l y i n s u f f ic i e n t a n d m i s g u i d i n g , p a r ti c u l a rl y i f t h e o n l ys c i e n t i f i c a l t e r n a t i v e t o e v i d e n c e b y e m p a t h y i s s o u g h t i n t e s t i n g , b yo b s e r v a t i o n , t h e r e s u l t o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a s a h y p o t h e s i s o f c o v e r i n g l a we x p l a n a t i o n . I d o n o t , o f c o u r s e , w i s h t o d e n y t h a t e m p a t h y ("Ein/iih-lung" a s H e r d e r s a id ; o r "Nacherleben" a s D i l t h e y s a i d ) i s a n i m p o r t a n ti n g r e d i e n t o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t , a s e v e n D i l t h e y m a i n t a i n e d , i t h a st o b e i n t e g r a t e d in t o , a n d c h e c k e d by , t h e p r o p e r m e t h o d s a n d c o n t e x tso f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w h i c h h a v e b e e n d i s ti n g u i s h e d a n d d i li g e n tl y d e s c ri b e di n h e r m e n e u t i c s , p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e S c h l e i e r m a c h e r a n d B o e c k h 3 ~ T h e s ec a n o n i c a l m e t h o d s , a s f o r i n s t a n c e , g r a m m a t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n i n t h e l i g h t o f l i t e r a r y g e n r e o r t o p i c , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f s i n g l eu t t e r a n c e s o f a w o r k b y t h e w h o l e o f i t , a n d v i c e v e r s a , h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n , p s y c h o l o g ic a l -b i o g r a p h ic a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i n t h e m s e l v e s a l-r e a d y p r o v i d e c o n t e x t s i n w h i c h t h e " d i v i n a t i o n s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g "( H a m a n n , S c h l e ie r m a c h e r ) a re c o n t i n u a l ly e l a b o r a te d a n d c o r r e c t e d b yw a y o f a f r u i t f u l c o u n t e r c h e c k i n g o f a p r i o r i a n d a p o s t e r io r i , s u b j e c t i v ea n d o b j e c ti v e , u n i v e r s a l a n d e m p i r ic a l , p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g .T h e s e t r a d i t i o n a l c a n o n s o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n m a y , t o d a y , b e s u p p l e m e n t e db y s o p h i s t i c a t e d m e t h o d s o f , f o r i n s t a n c e , s e m i o t i c a l a n a l y s i s , b u t t h i sd o e s n o t m e a n t h a t u n d e r s t a n d i n g s h o u l d b e r e d u c e d t o a h e u r i s t i cd e v i c e i n t h e c o n t e x t o f c o v e r i n g l a w e x p l a n a ti o n , in o r d e r t o b e c o m ec o n t r o l l a b l e , a n d t h u s r e s p e c t a b l e , a s a r a t i o n a l m e t h o d o f c o g n i t i o n .H o w m i s l e a d i n g t h i s c l a i m o f t h e l o g i c o f u n i f i e d s c i e n c e i s m a y b es h o w n b y t w o f u r t h e r a r g u m e n t s .

1 . H e m p e l a n d O p p e n h e i m t a k e it fo r g r a n t e d th a t , in t h e c as e o fi n t e n t i o n a l l y g o a l - d ir e c t e d a c t io n s , o n e h a s o n l y t w o a l t e r n a ti v e w a y s o f22


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T H E A P R I O R I O F C O M M U N I C A T I O Nanalyz ing these phenomena .26 Either one has to s tart a teleologicalanalysis , presupposing the goal as a cau sa f i~r w hi ch can de t e r mi nepeople ' s ac t ions f rom the fu ture , or one must replace goals by causalmot i ves , suppos ing fo r ev ery s ing le in tend ed goa l a cor responding wishor wi l l to reach jus t this goal , thus providing antecedent condi t ions fora cover ing l aw explana t ion . Hempel and Oppenheim, of course , dec idein f avor o f the second a l te rna t ive , bu t w hat i s in te res t ing in o ur co ntex ti s the r eason they g ive for th i s dec i s ion : i f the m ot ive we re to be con-ce ived as a goal ly ing in the fu ture , the y a rgue , we could no t dea l w i thcases where the goal was not a t ta ined at a l l .

Now, th i s a rgument , f rom my poin t o f v iew, aga in shows tha t theneo-posit ivists are unab le a priori to con ceive of a leading interest ofcognition o t he r t han causal explanation. For, the teleological al ternativeto the i r o wn approach , as they conce ive of i t , is on ly ano ther typ e ofcausa l exp lana t ion . I f they could imagine a genuine in te res t in under -s tanding goa l s as mot ives they would see tha t , even in the case wheregoals have not been reached, his tor ians may, never theless , be concernedwi th under s tanding the goa l s as such , and no t jus t the causes of whatreal ly happ ened . Hu m an goals , for e xam ple social or poli tical program s,even i f no t r ea l i zed , may be the top ic of de ta i l ed in te rpre ta t ion asposs ibil it ies of l i fe to be d iscussed and even tual ly real ized by la tergenerat ions . From this one may real ize that i t i s , indeed, poss ible andnecessary for hermeneut ica l s c iences to separa te human mot ives quagoal s f rom fac tua l ac t ions and to t r ea t them l ike meaning in ten t ions intexts . Bu t ev en i f , as in his tory and sociology, one is pr ima r i ly intere s tedin explaining why cer tain act ions (or forbearances ! ) tak e place, i t i s farf rom be ing se lf -ev ident tha t herm eneut ica l m ethods could be d i spensedwi th and under s tanding of r easons be r educed to explanation by causalmot ives . The problem here i s whether those vo l i t iona l cogni t ive com-plexes which may be formed out o f w ishes to r each some goa l s andbel iefs such that , in a cer tain s i tuat ion, cer tain act ions become necessaryand suf f i c ien t means for r each ing those goa l s , may be cons idered asan tecedent condi t ions in the sense of the Hempel -Oppenheim scheme.Th e d i f f icu l ty here l i es in the f ac t tha t the w ishes and be l ie f s can on lybe def ined wi th r e fe re nce to the i r in ten t iona l objects . Thu s they a rei n te r na l ly ( concep t ua ll y ) connec t ed w i t h t he " exp l anandum, " w he r easin genuine causal exp lana t ion an ex te rna l ( co nt ingen t ) r e la tion be tw een

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K A R L - O T T O A P E Lthe an teceden t cond i t ions and the exp lanandum i s p resupposed , andt h e r e f o r e a n empirical law, in s tead o f a practical in ference ' o f under-standing, i s r e q u ir e d i n o r d e r t o b r i d g e t h e g u lf b e t w e e n t h e e x p la n a n d u mand the an teceden t cond i t ions . I t m ay be ob jec ted tha t , w i th in th e con-tex t o f an exp lana t ion , i t i s no t the in te rna l r e l a t ion be tween w ishes o rbe l i e f s and the i r in ten t iona l ob jec t s tha t i s re l evan t , bu t the ex te rna lr e la t io n b e t w e e n t h e o c c u rr e n c es o f w i s h e s a n d b e l i e fs o n t h e o n e h a n da n d t h e e x p l a n a n d u m o n t h e o t h e r . B u t t h i s o b j e c t i o n o v e r l o o k s t h ef a c t - - i n c o n tr a d is ti n ct io n t o n a t ur a l c a u s e s - th e r el ev a n t o c cu rr en c eso f w ishes and be l i e f s canno t be iden t i f i ed (o r ve r i f i ed ) w i thou t p re -suppos ing the in te rna l r e l a t ion to the exp lanandum as in ten t iona l ob jec t .And the exp lanandum, in tu rn , canno t be iden t i f i ed (ve r i f i ed ) a s ace r t a in ac t ion w i thou t a l r eady p resuppos ing the in ten t ions by wh ich the" a n t e c e d e n t c o n d i t i o n s " a r e d e f i n e d Y I f o n e t a k e s i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o nthat , in any case , goal -d i rec ted act ion presupposes for i t s rea l iza t ion agenu ine causa l connec t ion , one may wonder whe the r the s ea rch fo r suchconnec t ions and thus fo r genu ine na tu ra l l aws i s no t obscured by c la im-ing tha t a l l pos s ib le hum an in ten t ions a re pos s ib le causes w i th in thecon tex t o f cover ing l aw exp lana t ions . Bu t even i f th i s wou ld be a l low-a b l e , i t w o u l d b y n o m e a n s p r o v e t h a t hermeneut ica l m e t h o d s c o u l d b ed i spensed w i th , fo r in o rde r to de l inea te the voli tional-cognitive com plexwhich i s s a id to func t ion as cause w i th in the con tex t o f an exp lana t ionone has f i r s t to und er s tand the co r respond ing hum an in ten t ions , and fo rt h is o n e h a s t o r e c o n s tr u c t t h e w h o l e c o n t e x t o f t h e c o r re s p o n d in g f o rm sof l i f e , inc lud ing va lue sys tems , wor ld v iews , and so on . The un in tendedi rony o f Hempel ' s and Oppenhe im ' s concep t ion o f causa l mo t ives l i e s inthe f ac t tha t p rec i s e ly as many d i f f e ren t w ishes and be l i e f s mus t beava i l ab le a s causes a s were p rev ious ly d i s covered by method ica l e f fo r t so f under s tand ing .

2 . Our l a s t h in t , a s to the r econs t ruc t ion o f who le fo rms o f l i f einc lud ing wor ld v iews , may l ead us to a fu r the r c r i t i c i sm o f the who leconcep t ion o f under s tand ing as empa thy , a s i t i s p resupposed in neo -pos i t iv i sm. The t ac i t p resuppos i t ion o f app ly ing empa thy as a pa rad igmfor under s tand ing i s the idea o f emp irical data as resul ts of a descr ip t ionw h i c h w o u l d p r e c e d e a l l understanding as wel l as explaining. A m o n g a l lt h e e m p i r i c a l d a t a p r o v i d e d b y d e s c r i p t i o n - - s o t h e y w o u l d h a v e u st h i n k - - t h e r e a re si m p ly s o m e k i nd s w h i c h m a y b e i nt er na li ze d b y24


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T H E A P R I O R I O F C O M M U N I C A T I O Nem pathy and thus conn ec ted by so-ca lled unde r s tanding . Th i s pos i t iv i s ti cidea of exper ience , s t emming f rom Hume, J .S . Mi l l and Mach , com-ple te ly over looks the f ac t tha t under s tanding mus t be presupposed inord er to descr ibe the ex per ienced da ta o f the wo r ld a s s o m e t h i n g , tha tis , for answer ing the ques t ion w h a t a thing is . This pr imary unders tand-ing of the da ta o f the wo r ld i s in te rna l ly conn ec ted wi th unde r s tandinghum an language and form s of lif e. T hi s c i r cums tance m ay be neg lec tedin the case of na tura l s c ience because here the fundamenta l wor ld-interpretat ion which precedes al l s ingle explanat ions (as answers to theque s t ion of w hy this or th at i s the case) i s general ly no t cal led intoques t ion except , perhaps , in a so-cal led fundamental cr is is of normalscience. 28 In the case of the hum ani t ies , how eve r , such a fun dam enta lcris is is , in a sense, the normal s i tuation, for here one has aIways tounders tand human u t t e rances , works , and ac t ions in the l igh t o f the i rwor ld- in te rpre ta t ion . On the o ther hand , one a l so has to in te rpre t theda ta o f the w or ld as those o f a h i sto r ica l " L e b e n s w e l t " (E . Husser l ) inthe l igh t o f human language games and forms of l i f e . I t i s jus t in th i sf ru i t fu l c i r c l e o f a t r a n s cen d en t a l h e r m en eu t i c tha t , in my opin ion , thepoin t o f convergence be tw een Di l they , Heidegger , and the l a te r W i t tgen-s te in i s to be sought . One thus sees tha t the concept o f empathy doesnot th row much l igh t upon the opera t ion ca l l ed "ver s tehen . " Taken inpsyc holog ist ic isolat ion, as is pres upp osed b y the neo-positivis ts , i t rath erleads to over looking the e lementary f acu l ty of s i g n -u n d er s t a n d i n g o rc o m m u n i c a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e wh ich is a t the cen ter o f a l l in te rpre ta t ion inthe humani t i es . I t i s much more usefu l fo r hermeneut ics to s t a r t f rom"pragmat ical unders tanding" of s igns , act ions and ci rcumstances of as i tua t ion wi th in the contex t o f a "common sphere" of l i f e , as the l a te rDi l they d id . e9 I f one does so , one has ho wev er , to t ake in to account tha tDi l they ' s "pragmat ica l under s tanding , " which comes near to Wi t tgen-s te in ' s idea of under s tanding wi th in a l anguage game, i s no t ye t under -s tanding in the sense of the humani t ies , as hermeneut ic sciences . Only i fthe "pragmat ica l under s tanding" wi th in the "common sphere" of l i f ebecomes doubtful , for example when a cr is is in unders tanding rel igiousor legal t radi t ions comes about , does methodicaZ unders tand ing in thesense of herm ene nt ics ar ise, according to D i l they.~~ A n d now , w he n t hep r ob l em i s no l onge r unde r s t and i ng w i t h i n t he f r amew or k o f anes tab l i shed l anguage game or "common sphere , " bu t r a ther f ind ing the

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a c c e s s t o a f o r e i g n l a n g u a g e g a m e a s a f o r e i g n f o r m o f l i f e , e m p a t h y( E i n f i i h l u n g ) , a s a k e y t o t h e p h e n o m e n a o f sense-express ion, alsof u lf il ls i ts h e u r i s ti c f u n c t i o n w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t o f h e r m e n e u t i c m e t h o d s ,a s a l r ead y s u g g es t ed ,a l

I t i s n o w t i m e t o c l o s e t h i s c r i t i c i s m b y a s k i n g t h e q u e s t i o n : w h y ,a f t e r a l l , a r e t h e n e o - p o s i t i v i s t s p r e v e n t e d f r o m c o p i n g w i t h t h e h u m a n i -t ie s b y t h o s e s h o r t c o m i n g s w h i c h I h a v e t r i e d t o r e v e a l ? T h i s q u e s t i o nm a y , a s a f u n c t i o n o f m y c r i t i c i s m , b e d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e p a r t s .

1 ) W h y d o t h e n e o - p o s i t i v is t s i g n o r e , i n t h e i r " l og i c o f s c i e n c e ,"p h i l o l o g y i n t h e b r o a d e s t s e n s e a s t h e h e a r t o f t h e h u m a n i t i e s c o n s i d e r e da s h e r m e n e u t i c s c ie n c es ? W h y , i n p a r t i c u l a r, d o t h e y o v e r l o o k t h e f a c tt h a t t h e s e e m p i r i c o - h e r m e n e u t i c s c ie n c es s t a n d i n a c l o s e c o n n e c t i o n t ot h e i r o w n m e t a - sc i e n t if i c b u s i n e s s o f r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e l a n g u a g e o fsc ience ?

2 ) W h y d o t h e n e o - p o s i t iv i s ts , i n t h e h i s t o r ic a l a n d i n t h e s o c ia ls c i e n c e s , f r o m t h e o u t s e t o v e r l o o k t h e g e n u i n e i n t e r es t i n u n d er s t a n d i n ggoals and reasons a s b e i n g d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e i n t e r e s t i n c a u s a l e x -p l a n a ti o n ? I n o t h e r w o r d s : w h y d o t h e y b eg t h e q u e s t io n i n t h e ird i s c u s s i o n w i t h t h e " t h e o r e t i c i a n s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g " b y p r e s u p p o s i n gt h a t e x p l a n a t i o n i s t h e a i m o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d t h u s b r i n g a b o u t t h ec u p - o f - c o f f e e t h e o r y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g .

3 ) W h y , f i n a l l y , d o t h e L o g i c a l P o s i t i v i s t s o v e r l o o k t h e f a c t t h a t t h ef u n c t i o n o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g l ie s n o t o n l y in a n s w e r i n g w h y - q u e s t i o n s b u t ,m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y , i n a n s w e r i n g w h a t - q u e s t i o n s , a n d t h a t a n s w e r i n gt h e s e q u e s t i o n s i s " i n t e r w o v e n " w i t h a n s w e r i n g q u e s t i o n s a s t o t h em e a n i n g o f l a n g u ag e - s ig n s ?

I t h i n k t h a t t h e s e t h r e e q u e s t i o n s p o i n t t o t h r e e f u n d a m e n t a l s h o r t -c o m i n g s o f n e o -p o s i ti v is m t h a t h a v e t h i s i n c o m m o n : t h e y s p r i n g f r o m al a c k o f r e f l e c t i o n u p o n t h e f a c t t h a t a l l c o g n i t i o n o f o b j e c t s p r e s u p p o s e su n d e r s t a n d i n g a s a m e a n s o f i n te r s u b j e c ti v e c o m m u n i c a t io n . T h e m o s tc u r i o u s a s p e c t o f t h i s l ac k o f r e f l e c t i o n l ie s i n t h e f a c t t h a t e v e n t h e i d e ao f c o n s t r u c t i n g s e m a n t i c a l f r a m e w o r k s ( a s a m e a n s o f f ix i n g , a p r i o r i, t h eo n t o l o g i c a l c a t e g o r i e s i m p l i e d i n a l a n g u a g e o f s c i e n c e ) , t h a t e v e n t h i sm e t h o d o f l a n g u a g e a n a l y s i s h a s n o t p r e v e n t e d l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t s f r o me x c l u d in g a ll g e n u i n e in t e r e s t o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g f r o m t h e ir m e t h o d o l o g yo f p o s s i b l e s c i en ces . T h ey , s o t o s p eak , t r y t o an t i c i p a t e t h e r e s u l t s o fi n t e r s u b j e c t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n c e a n d f o r a l l i n t h e i r s e m a n t i c f r a m e -26


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T H E A P R I O R I O F C O M M U N I C A T I O Nworks , l eav ing to sc ience on ly the descr ip tion and explana t ion of ob-jec t ive da ta w i th in the f r amework they have es tab l i shed . But even th i sprac t i ce would be a l l r igh t i f they were to r e f l ec t upon the f ac t tha tcons t ruc t ing semant ica l f r ameworks has to be conce ived as on ly ani nd ir ec t w ay ~2 o f i mpr ov ing i n t e rs ub j ect ive co m m un i ca t i on - - a w ay t ha ta lways r emains dependent upon , and indebted to , under s tanding andi n t e rp r e t ing mean i ng w i t h i n t he con t ex t o f com muni ca t i on i n na t u r a llanguages. I f they d id r e f l ec t upo n th is thoroug hly , they would hav e toacknow ledge tha t be h ind th e con s t ruc t ion of s emant ica l f r amew orksthere s t and no t jus t i r r a t iona l ed hoc convent ions , bu t long cha ins ofra t iona l d i scourse media ted by in te rpre ta t ion and c r i t i c i sm of the t r a -d i t ion of ph i losophy and science. A nd by re f l ec t ing upo n th is f ac t theywo uld , fu r the rm ore , have to acknow ledge tha t there a re "sc iences" in ab r oade r s ens e o f t he w or d w h i ch make up a con t inuum w i t h t he i r ow nme ta-scient i f ic languag e analys is b y un ders ta nd ing and interp ret ing t heform a nd the contex t o f t r ad i tiona l languages. Th ey wou ld thus no t t ryto r educe und er s tanding to an auxi li a ry func t ion o f s c ien t if ic explana t ion ,as they do in the cup-of -cof fee theory , bu t wo uld r a ther s ee the m eta-scient i fic fun ct ion of un ders tand ing al ready presupp osed in ai1 descr ipt ionand explanat ion of science.

By a cons iderat ion of these cr i t ic isms, in my opinion, an answer issugges ted to our ques t ion r egard ing the shor tcomings of the log ic ofun i f i ed sc ience w i th r espec t to the hum ani t i es : the a nsw er was a l r eadyant icipated by our f i r s t thes is and is only to be i l lus t rated in this para-graph. Methodical solipsism is , so far as I can see, the ult imate, tacitpresuppos i t ion of the pos i t ivis ts ' idea of cogni t ion. I t i s for this reasontha t they can on ly dea l w i th cogni t ion by in ference and observa t ion ; th a ti s, w i th cogni t ion as an exchange be tw een m an and the w or ld of ob jec t s,bu t no t w i th cogni t ion as under s tanding and in te rpre ta t ion , tha t i s ,p r imar i ly w i th cogni t ion as an exchange be tw een m en in a com-mun i ca t i on - communi t y .

IV . T he A priori of Communication and the Foundation o[ theHumani t i es

I th ink tha t by the preced ing expl ica t ion of my two in i t i a l theses con-cerning methodical sol ips isms and i t s consequences in the phi losophy of27


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K A R L - O T T O A P E Lscience, I have a l ready suf f ic ient ly sugges ted my own pos i t ion to thep o i n t w h e r e I c a n n o w b e b r i e f i n t h e e x p o s i t i o n o f m y t h i r d t h e s i s :t h a t t h

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The a Prior i of Communication And