The 2014 Census, Identity and Citizenship in Burma-Myanmar

8/12/2019 The 2014 Census, Identity and Citizenship in Burma-Myanmar

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transnational institute

Burma Policy Brieng 1

Burma Policy Brieng Nr 13February 2014

Overview

Ethnic politics and statistics have long beenamong the most contested issues in Burma/Myanmar. 1 With one o the most diversepopulations in Asia, Myanmar has been hometo ethnic conict and intractable politicaldiscord through every governmental erasince independence rom Great Britain in1948. Most popular, official and internationalsources have considered the ethnic minoritypeoples to constitute up to 40 per cent oMyanmars estimated 60 million people.However, these statistics are based on

projections rom and assumptions aboutoutdated survey research, and are themselvesthe subject o much con usion. For example,in December 2013, the National League orDemocracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi told AlJazeera, we [ethnic Bamars/Burmans] areactually in the minority in the whole countrybecause the other ethnic nationalities make upabout 60 percent. 2

Under President Tein Seins post-junta,constitutional government, which assumedoffice in 2011, a new political system isemerging in which the contours o identity,

Ethnicity without Meaning, Data without ContextThe 2014 Census, Identity and Citizenship in Burma/Myanmar

Conclusions and Recommendations

Te 2014 Population and Housing Census islikely to undertake the most signicant ethnicand political boundary making in the countrysince the last British census in 1931. However,by using awed designations that date romthe colonial era and ignoring the considerablecomplexity o the present political situation inMyanmar, the census is likely to raise ethnictensions at precisely the moment that peacenegotiations are ocused on building trust.

Ethnic politics, democratic re orm and conict

resolution are at a critical juncture. I carriedout in an inclusive, transparent and ethicallyimplemented ashion, a census could supportnational reconciliation and momentum towardsre orm. Instead, many ethnic groups ear thatits timing, ormat and methodology, with anunwarranted array o questions and overseen bylaw en orcement officers, will urther diminishand marginalise the political status o non-Bamar groups. Citizenship rights or somepeople could even be under threat, based oncensus results.

Te timing o the census in the year be ore akey general election raises additional concerns.

Statistical reports that result rom it could havecon using and negative impact on politicaldebate and ethnic representation in thelegislatures, as dened by the 2008 constitution.Tere are many communities and internally-displaced persons in the conict zones o theethnic borderlands who will not be properlyincluded as well as others with marginal legalstatus who would pre er to disappear in anofficial counting exercise.

Trough inclusive dialogue, planning and

timing, many o these controversies could havebeen addressed. Te UNFPA and Westerngovernment donors, with a projected US$74million budget, have a special responsibilityto ensure accurate research, denitions, datacollection and inclusion in any process o thismagnitude. Difficulties have been treated purelyas technical problems with simple, one-size-ts-all solutions, rather than as undamentallypolitical and ethnic challenges that needresolution. Instead o creating the opportunityto improve inter-ethnic understandingand citizenship rights, the census promisesto compound old grievances with a newgeneration o complexities.


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Burma Policy Brieng2

belonging and in ormation are in ux. Manyrestrictions on reedom o expression andassociation have been lifed, and hopes arecontinuing that the country is set on a long-term path towards modernity and politicalre orm. However, many serious tensionsremain, including those over identity andethnic nationality rights, in the countdown tothe next general election in 2015.

In particular, despite ceasere offers by thePresident Tein Sein government to ethnicarmed groups, many groups and organisationsthat mobilize around identity have expressedconcerns that their causes and peoples will,once again, be marginalised during anothertime o political and economic change. Suchperceptions are especially acute amongcommunities where the impact o conictremains. Afer decades o war are andinstability, international agencies estimatethat a total o 650,000 internally-displacedpersons and 120,000 re ugees remain inthe borderlands, where populations areoverwhelmingly ethnic minorities. 3 Substantialnumbers o ethnic minority people have alsomoved to Tailand, Bangladesh, India, Malaysiaand the Middle East over the years.

Against this unsettled backdrop, theinternational community, in collaborationwith the post-2011 government, has causedsurprise by pushing ahead with a Populationand Housing Census (PHC). Tis will be therst attempt at a countrywide census since 1983and, very likely, will be the most widely-citedpopulation data collected since the last andmuch-criticised British census in 1931. Tenew census, unded by Western donors andthe government, has been supervised by theUnited Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)

with a budget initially projected at $58 million,but which recently has grown to $74 million. 4 UNFPAs estimate o per capita costs at $1.50 arexceeds the cost o Indias 2011 census, whichcost only $0.50 per person. 5

However, rather than use the process as anopportunity or dialogue and reection on pastmisconceptions, UNFPA and the governmenthave ensured that the census howeverexpansive it may appear in its remit willperpetuate many o the inaccuracies and

inconsistencies that have rein orced ethnicgrievance and gross inequalities within thecountry.

Among many concerns, the 2014 census willcollect ethnicity and identity in ormation basedupon a much disputed list o 135 nationalraces.6 Te current list is almost identical toone rst deployed during the Socialist era(1962-1988) and resurrected during the earlyyears o the previous military government(1988-2011). Tese, in turn, were derived roma awed British census in 1931. Furthermore,in the 2014 census each individual may berecorded as one and only one o the highlysuspect race categories. As a result, not onlywill the common experience o mixed ethnicidentities not be recorded but leaders o someethnic political groups also ear that their

ollowers will not be counted by the identitiesor ethnicities that they sel -report. echnicaldecisions about enumeration procedures likethis one could have adverse impact on politicalrepresentation and, in some cases, citizenshiprights.

Equally concerning, the timing o the censuswill not only have implications or ethnic-dened constituencies in the 2015 generalelection but it will occur at a time whenconict continues in the ethnic borderlands,with large population numbers o non-Bamarcommunities displaced and potentially out o

reach o the census, and with the question oethnic political representation still unresolved.Finally, with a complex array o 41 questions,there are widespread doubts about thecompetence o the 100,000 enumerators, whoare young school-teachers with limited surveyexperience, to accurately complete such adifficult task.

Much can yet depend on the methodology othe census, practices by immigration officialsin the eld, and proper data analysis that

takes contextual sources o unreliability intoaccount. But, or the moment, such issues arear rom clear and their importance appears to

be underestimated or disregarded by donors,UN agencies and the government. Unless moreappropriate analysis, terminology and systemsare employed, many non-Bamar leaders eara weakening o minority political rights as thecensus outcome.

Tis brieng, there ore, is intended to providebackground on the difficult issues o ethnic

identity and citizenship in Myanmar as well asanalysis o the 2014 census. It warns that thereare many changes still needed in planning,


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socio-political understanding and nationalinclusion i the census is to really supportre orm and progress or all the countryspeoples during a critical time o transition.All these issues could be addressed with timeand reection. Te government, UNFPA andWestern donors should ensure this be oreproceeding.

Dilemmas over Identity in a DiverseLandscape

Characterizations o identity and citizenshipgure prominently in Myanmars currentpolitical debates, ceasere negotiations,religious affairs, communal violence, economicaffairs, oreign engagement and investment.During a time o political transition, acombination o official and unofficial orcesinside the country, as well diasporas and theinternational community, are engaged in anunprecedented burst o ethnic and politicalboundary-making i.e., narrating, counting,classi ying, registering, documenting andidenti ying who belongs in the country andwho does not, who is entitled to what, andwho represents whom among the differentnationalities and peoples. Te category o

identity known in Burmese as lu-myo, whichliterally means kinds o people, is usuallytranslated as ethnic in English. Howeverlu-myo is a concept o differentiation rootedin the belie o objective, veriable, xed, andblood-borne lineage and is ar closer to theEnglish concept o race than ethnicity.

Identity and citizenship are tightly interwovenin Myanmars ethno-political landscape. Some,but not all, individuals and groups eel deep andmoral attachments to lu-myo identities. Tese

attachments play out in public and politicalsettings, including elections, nationalistmovements, anti-state conicts, mob violenceand citizenship determination. Tey are alsoevident in more nuanced ways in daily inter-actions where the bonds o shared ethnicityare evoked.7 Ethnic-denominated beautypageants, culture associations, conversationclubs, social media, movies, popular music,religious celebrations and Union Day estivities,as well as language, idiom, gestures, clothingand ashion, all work to veri y, strengthen or

change lu-myo attachments and identities.

Currently, Myanmar is undergoing its most

important time o political change in a quartero a century. Following the stepping-downo the State Peace and Development Council(SPDC) junta, this transition has beenunderpinned by a series o epoch-shapingevents, including the 2008 constitution, the2010 general election, assumption o office bythe Tein Sein government, the chairmanshipo ASEAN, and the conclusion o bilateralceaseres with a majority o the countrysarmed ethnic opposition groups.

Re orms under the post-junta, constitutionalgovernment have there ore increased the stakeso identity politics in one o the most ethnically-contested countries in Asia. It is thus notsurprising that different government, ethnic,religious and social actors have been mobilizingto dene, expand or contract the boundarieso lu-myo identity in the country. But aferdecades o political deadlock and armedconict, such a burst o activities inevitablybrings many long-standing and highly disputedcontroversies and dilemmas to the sur ace.

On the one hand, successive military-backedgovernments since 1962, which have beendominated by ethnic Bamar-majority leaders,have viewed the country as an indivisible

unitary state bound together by a historicamily o national race relatives, and withpower concentrated in the central plainand river valleys. Tanks to unity and

arsightedness o our ore athers, our countryhas existed as a united and rm Union andnot as separate small nations or over 2,000years, the SPDC chairman Snr-Gen. TanShwe claimed in 2002.8 Under this dominantnarrative, which is shared by much o themajority Buddhist population, outsiders andtheir intentions are suspect, a sentiment most

recently given voice in the Buddhist monk-ledactivities o the Committee or the Protectiono Religion and Nationality, which seeks to banmarriages between Buddhist women and meno different aiths and national origins.9

On the other hand, non-Bamar groups andorganisations have generally regarded ethnic,nationality or national race identities asthe basis or claims to autonomy and politicalrights, and have long sought a devolved ederal system o government. Tey point

out that the Bamar kingdoms and Britishcolonial rule never established ull controlo the surrounding hills and mountainous


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regions. Still today, in many parts o the countryBamars are seen as intruders and invaders. Tissentiment is rein orced by the ever-increasingpresence in ethnic minority regions o Bamarswho exercise power, including the nationalarmy, missionary Buddhist monks and localadministrators. In consequence, as in otherdeveloping countries, resistance to oppressive,centralized power is ofen organized aroundmeaning ul ethnic or religious ties and claims,which themselves generate signicant stakesin sel -policing authenticity inside groupboundaries.

In this volatile context, claims about non-Bamar lu-myo identities are ofen expressionso shared cultural roots and reect deepreservoirs o injustice, suffering and distrust. Assuch, they provide hope to marginalized anddisen ranchised minorities who have enduredover seven decades o militarization and warin a requent state o chronic emergency.10 Minority groups generally consider that theBamar majority population and governmentshave shown little regard or their interests andhistories. Tus all central government attemptssince independence to redene or regulate non-Bamar identities and rights have been met withsuspicion and concern. At the same time, claims

o ethnic territories by opposition groups havebeen eared by government officials as the basisor separatism and even the break-up o the

Union.

As these experiences show, claims in the nameo identity are never based on denitions thatare universally accepted and uncontested.Tey are political assertions on behal o oneethnic group or another that conceal a armore uid reality in everyday li e. It is ofenassumed, or example, that identity categories

are unproblematically singular and natural. Inact, the experience o many individuals revealsthat amily heritages can span different cultural,linguistic, religious and national boundaries.Moreover, ethnic tensions in Myanmar havenot simply pitted Bamar majority against ethnicminorities. Over the years there have also beenconicts, or example, between Buddhist andMuslim populations in the Rakhine state orethnic Shan and Wa organisations in the Shanstate.

Complicating the picture, the populations omany o Myanmars villages, towns, districts,regions and states are ethnic mosaics, with

varying degrees o diversity in settlementpatterns. Domestic and international migrationover the past two decades, as well as civiliandisplacement and re ugee ight, have addedto this uidity as many people have movedaway rom the traditions and languages o

amily homes at unprecedented rates. Whetherthrough marriage or relocation, manyindividuals and amilies experience complexsocial lives that are not reducible to singularidentity categories. Tere are a hand ul ogovernment regulatory mechanisms, suchas national identity cards (see below), thatembrace the mixed heritage experience o manypeople, but in both state and society, there are

ar more widespread interests committed to thenarrative o singular identity and racial purity.Furthermore, afer decades o war are andlimited state capacity throughout large expanseso territory, there are many citizens withoutidentity cards, and there are still disputes,sometimes violent, over which populationsquali y or nationality rights and citizenship inthe country.

Despite these ambiguities o lived experiences,ew people in Myanmar would question that

singular, xed and bounded labels o ethnicidentity are real and accurate representations

o their society. In power struggles overrepresentation and authority, the notion thatany individuals identity belongs to one andonly one category is rarely questioned, andthis perception o unproblematized singularityhas only been rein orced by civil stri e overthe past seven decades. Identity claims thatrein orce the singular simplication o ethnicityremain an important mechanism or mobilizingand ordering national politics.

In the next two years, there ore, as the country

moves toward the 2015 general election,many existing perceptions and dilemmasin national politics will come under reshscrutiny. Te 2008 constitution createdpolitical-administrative units that transcendthe seven older single-ethnic-named states andestablished six additional single-ethnic-labelledsel -administered units. It also provided or

urther minority national race representationon a population basis in the legislatures. In thiscontext, political parties are likely to continue tomobilize on the basis o exclusionary, singular

lu-myo identity claims, and thus embark upontheir own campaigns to shore up and policeboundaries around particular lu-myo labels.


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At the same time, peace initiatives to endMyanmars long-running civil wars are raisingthe stakes o contention over ethnic identity andterritory even urther. Future national stabilitywill very likely depend on the governmentsability to trans orm ceasere negotiations intoeventual political solutions acceptable to bothBamar majority and non-Bamar populations.

Be ore, however, these peace processes achieveeven the most preliminary agreements, thegovernment, Western bilateral donors and theUnited Nations are collaborating on ambitiousand unprecedented programmes to enumerate,categorise and regulate identity and citizenship.

wo ocal points by the Ministry oImmigration and Population (MOIP) standout: a national identity card campaign, whichis already underway, and the orthcomingPopulation and Housing Census, scheduled orlate March 2014.

Te stage is thus delicately set. Already manygroups and parties that are organized aroundethnic identity claims are criticizing the timing,structure and detail o these initiatives. 11 At thesame time, although an undercount o ethnicnon-Bamar numbers is eared, there could in

an ideal world be benets to disadvantagedpeoples, i national surveys are appropriatelyconducted. 12 But, as these debates continue,stakeholders o all kinds both governmentand opposition will have to ace the realitythat the present census procedures and plethorao activities in counting populations andpolicing identity are unlikely to resolve thecountrys challenges in nationality rights andrepresentation. Under present conditions, newcomplexities will likely be layered upon oldcomplexities, and many o these difficulties

rooted in Myanmars troubled history are yetto be nationally discussed and resolved.

Legal Conceptions of Race andRegulation of Citizenship

Tere are different ways that ethnic ornationality identity can be dened. It could,

or example, be on the basis o language,birthplace, parentage, territory or history. But inMyanmars case, there has been an evolution o

different concepts, enumerations and laws overthe past hundred years that make the subject oidentity and citizenship unusually complex.

Legally, who belongs in or to post-colonialMyanmar has been dened by 14 differentlaws since independence. Te most importanttoday are the 1982 Citizenship Law andthe implementing procedures issued a yearlater. Departing rom earlier citizenshiprequirements, the 1982 law denes those whobelong in the country as members o groupso lu-myo (kinds o people or race) thathave been designated as taingyinthar (literally,sons/offspring o the geographical division).13 Te 1982 law lef determination o which racesqualied or taingyinthar status at that pointtranslated into English as national races toan executive body, the Council o State (whichno longer exists), with the only stipulation thatsuch races had to have been present in whatcame to be mapped into Burma be ore 1823when the rst British annexation began.

As a result, the notion o being indigenousbecame the primary basis or citizenship,14 and access to this categorisation was basedupon perceptions o xed and historicidentities, born rom ancestry, that are viewedas having been disrupted only by the impositiono colonial rule (1824-1948).15 Denoting whathave become regarded as the eight majorraces in the country, Section 3 o the 1982 law

explained: Nationals such as the Kachin,Kayah, Karen, Chin, Burman, Mon, Rakhineor Shan and ethnic ( taingyinthar ) groups ashave settled in any o the territories includedwithin the State as their permanent home roma period anterior to 1185 B.E. (1823 A.D.)are Burma citizens. In contrast, any racesdetermined by the State Council not to havebeen present within the modern boundariesare considered non-taingyinthar (i.e., non-native) and eligible or lesser associateor naturalized citizenship, but not ull

citizenship.

Te Burmese-language concepts o lu-myo and taingyinthar are complex and donot translate cleanly into English-languagecategories associated with race, ethnicity,or nationality. Tis disconnect is evidentwhen lu-myo identity is queried in everydayconversations. Answers depend on howrespondents view themselves in relation to various kinds o others. For example, whenpeople are asked in Burmese, What lu-myo

are you?, different replies are commonlysel -reported: Myanmar (which is thecontemporary designation or citizenship, but is


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not one o the 135 taingyinthar lu-myo); one othe major national races (e.g. Bamar or Mon)or smaller nationality groups (Pa-O and Wa);by clan, tribe or sub-group names (e.g. Kuki[Chin] or Sgaw [Karen]); and also by a minorityreligion, such as Christian or Muslim.In addition, assertions o lu-myo identityofen depend on relationships and context.For example, someone might sel -identi y asKachin in supporting a nationality cause,but then invoke the Maru (Lawngwaw) orRawang sub-groups when choosing a churchor seeking election to the legislatures. 16

Similarly, taingyinthar does nottranslate clearly into English terms suchas indigenous peoples or natives, andthe national regulation o status has beeninconsistent among government agenciessince independence. Over the years, centralgovernments have recognized differentnumbers and labels o taingyinthar. Butthese administrative distinctions were neverbased on systematic research or in ormed,evidence-driven debate about the content othese categories. In consequence, or much othe post-colonial era, the legal and popularnorm was to break the taingyinthar categoryinto eight major ethnic groups (including the

majority-Bamars17

) and a number o smallernative ethnic groups re erred to as myo-ne-su(usually translated as minor races or tribes).

Some o these denitional boundaries betweenkinds o peoples developed out o powerstruggles or sel -determination. Myanmarsconstitution at independence enshrined rights,statuses and claims or some non-Bamargroups but not others. 18 But an appearanceo ethnic symmetry was ormalized or therst time under the 1974 constitution during

the military socialist era in which sevendivisions (renamed regions under the2008 constitution) were demarcated where theBamar-majority mostly live and seven states

or non-Bamar groups categorised as major:i.e. Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon, Rakhineand Shan. In contrast, smaller ethnic groupswere administratively and popularly consideredto be sub-groups either culturally relatedto the eight major nationalities or as native(taingyinthar) to the ourteen territorial units.Neither the regions nor the states are mono-

ethnic.

During the early years o the State Law and

Order Restoration Council (SLORC; renamedSPDC in 1997), however, Gen. Saw Maung andthe military intelligence chie , Lt.Gen. KhinNyunt, proffered a more complex taxonomyo taingyinthar lu-myo. In a characteristicallyrambling speech in July 1989, the SLORCchairman Gen. Saw Maung re erred tothe Census Department, rom which hediscovered 135 categories o national racegroups.19 At the time, with constitutionalgovernment suspended, this was widelyperceived as a con using but tactical attempt toweaken non-Bamar solidarity around identityin a new game o divide and rule.20

Nevertheless, the seven ethnic states weresubsequently retained in the 2008 constitution,and new sel -administered zones and a sel -administered division were demarcated or sixsmaller national races that were not previouslyrecognized in territorial-administrativeterms: i.e. Danu, Kokang, Naga, Palaung ( a-ang), Pa-O and Wa. A urther constitutionalinnovation resulted in seven other taingyintharlu-myo gaining electoral representation, among29 such reserved seats, in the 2010 election inthe legislatures or states and regions wherethey were smaller minorities. Tese wereAkha, Bamar, Intha, Kayan, Lahu, Lisu and

Rawang (see below).21

In consequence, theimplementation o the 2008 constitution hasso ar given legal status to 20 national raceidentities or administrative or representativepurposes. 22

Despite this emergence o a more complexlegal and bureaucratic landscape o ethnicity,the Ministry o Immigration and Population(MOIP) has allen back on the SLORC-SPDCscontroversial 135 list o ethnic groups orprocessing identity card applications and

coding the 2014 Population and HousingCensus. As a result, MOIP activities, with theull support o international donors and UN

agencies, are promoting citizenship and identitypractices that, over the years, have adverselyaffected many peoples. At root, identityregulation has always been a matter o lawen orcement and security, rather than a neutral,technical procedure.

Government immigration officials have beenthe main arbiters and en orcers o belonging

and citizenship since independence. Everyindividual present in the territory o Myanmarmust apply or and carry some orm o


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government certicate that legally establishestheir citizenship status. Dual citizenship is notallowed, and residents who live in Myanmarcan quali y or three kinds o citizenship: ull,associate or naturalized. Everyone else mustcarry a visa in their passport rom countryo origin and or longer stays a ForeignRegistration Card issued by the MOIP. Anyonewho does not hold such documentation isconsidered a doubted citizen, who mustshoulder the burden o proo in establishingthat he or she meets the requirements orcitizenship. 23

In line with these practices, since 1949immigration law en orcement officers have alsobeen responsible or collecting lists o memberso households (Household Registration Lists)and issuing national identity cards. 24 Pink, or

ull citizenship, cards go to those certied tobe o taingyinthar (i.e. indigenous) heritage,among other requirements. Tese are nowcalled Citizenship Scrutiny Cards (CSCs),but are more commonly known as NationalRegistration Cards (NRCs).

Afer passage o the 1982 Citizenship Law, theImmigration Department conducted whatit called citizenship tasks, which included

issuing or updating Household RegistrationLists and distributing a new round o identitycards to replace old ones or to en orce thestricter rules or certi ying citizenship.25 Onceagain, however, inconsistencies crept in. Onthe Household Registration orm, the space orkind o group or lu-myo is quite small, andthe usual practice has been or a single categoryto be recorded or the person identied ashead o household. Te rest o the membersthen tend to be labelled the same.

On the CSCs, in contrast, there is more spaceavailable, and some individuals have up to sixdifferent lu-myo identities listed. For example,a person o mixed heritage may have listedon the lu-myo line, Shan, Kayan, or Mon,Kayah, Kayin, or Chinese, Bamar.26 Except orthose grand athered in rom the more liberalpre-1982 citizenship laws, individuals who areclassied as lu-myo categories other thanthe indigenous taingyinthar groups do notquali y or the ull citizenship CSCs that arepink in colour. In particular, despite continuing

international criticisms 27, inhabitants who arelegally recognized as having Chinese or Indianancestry have been classied in secondary

categories o citizenship, a designation stillretained today.

In summary, six decades afer the countrysindependence, Myanmars ethnic landscaperemains characterised by anomalies andcontroversies whether in the identication onationality groups or establishing citizenshiprights. Te lessons are clear. New evaluationsand understandings have long been needed toaddress the many ailings and inconsistencieso the past. Tese are all deeply political issuesthat need political solutions. Tey are not justtechnical exercises to be carried out by oreignconsultants. Te question remains whether there orm momentum currently underway in thecountry will lead to inclusive recognition and just solutions.

Censuses and Boundary-making in the20 th Century

In Myanmar, the status o race as denitive inthe distribution o rights and power encounters very little contestation in both state andsocial circles. In reality, although linguistic,cultural and other orms o group identitypre-date British rule, it was the bureaucratic

simplications o colonial officials thatproduced the basic ethnic taxonomy uponwhich post-colonial politics and popularculture have since anchored many perceptionso identity. Indeed the current census list o135 national races or taingyinthar lu-myo islargely derived rom the 1931 British census oIndia, o which Burma was a constituent partuntil 1937. Te colonial-era taxonomy is notidentical to the registry presently in circulation

or the 2014 census, but many o the categorynames are similar. 28 Equally important, the

assumptions underlying the colonial censusclassications that the identity category oevery individual can be captured by a singular,measurable, indivisible race label underpinsthe regulatory apparatus o the modern state.In other words, the colonial-era perceptionso race, long since challenged in many otherpost-colonial settings in A rica and Asia, stillendure in Myanmar. Such a legacy becomesparticularly problematic in discourses aboutidentity, ethnic politics and citizenship.

Te British analyses were by no meansconsistent or accurate. In ormed by ten-yearlycensus enumerations that began in 1871-72,


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British administrators eventually arrived in1931 at a total o 15 indigenous race groups29 that were comprised o some 135 sub-groups.Tese distinctions were largely made on thebasis o shaky in erences about language usage,erratic reporting rom district officials, andun ounded assumptions that territorial unitswere racially homogenous or mono-ethnic.British censuses also recorded substantialIndian and Chinese populations (o variousethnicities), which consistently grew throughimmigration during colonial rule.

Te labels and numbers o racial categories,however, shifed rom one census to another,as did the methodologies or identi ying typeso people. Heavily inuenced by 19th centurysocial Darwinism, colonial officials regardedrace as a scientic and objectively veriablecategory.30 Differences rather than similaritieswere sought to distinguish origins andauthenticity. Censuses and other populationreports advanced many theories o migration,conquest and absorption o races and by 1931had adopted a classication system or races[that] is the same as that or languages.31 However, J.J. Bennison, Superintendent o the1931 Census and author o the narrative thataccompanies the statistical report, admitted

the unreliability o the counts. He noted theextreme instability o language and racialdistinctions in Burma, and considered manyo the languages coded as distinctive anddifferent were likely to be only dialects oother languages. 32 O the entire census report,Bennison wrote: [A]pologies are due or lacko style, de ective arrangement and repetitions.Many o the statistics are unreliable.33

Tese caveats stand in stark contrast to thecolonial production o hundreds o precise

statistics said to represent Myanmarspopulation and peoples in census afer census,dozens o government reports, regulationsand surveys under British rule. On such bases,table afer table in the colonial census reportsconstructed an empirically unveriable,but stridently overcondent, architecture oexact, indivisible units o British Burma. Tenarrative texts o censuses and reports impliedhierarchies o superiority and in eriorityor civilization and backwardness o thedifferent ethnic groups. Many ndings linger

to the present, including the 1931 nding thattwo-thirds o the population speak languageso the Burmese group, a number that aligns

almost too neatly with contemporary narrativeso national identity.34

On the basis o such acts, the Britishseparated the territory newly mapped intoBurma into two very different entities. Teseseparate territories were Ministerial Burma orBurma Proper in the heartland o the Bamarmajority where a degree o parliamentaryhome rule was gradually introduced, and theFrontier or Excluded areas in the ethnicminority borderlands which were largely lefunder the control o local rulers, including Shansawbwas and Kachin duwas.

Inconsistencies abounded. Indeed Burmawas not separated rom India until 1937.Classications were subject to arbitrarychange; administrative lines arbitrarily cutthrough many peoples, languages, culturesand territories; and some minority groupscomplained that their populations were under-represented by counting Burmese speakers orBuddhists as majority Bamars. In particular,leaders o the Karen nationalist movementcontended that the Karen population wassubstantially under-counted during Britishrule, resulting in subsequent marginalization. 35 Unhelp ully, political sentiments and identity

were urther racialized during the SecondWorld War, when Kachin, Karen and othernationality groups largely ought on theAllied side, while Aung San and the BurmaIndependence Army initially supported theJapanese occupation to seek national liberation

rom the British empire.

As in other post-colonial states, independentMyanmar then inherited the intellectualarchitecture o race. As armed rebellionsswept the country, linguistically-derived

racial classications were continued in theparliamentary era (1948-62) as a undamentalprinciple in ordering the population. Tis didnot reect Myanmars new political map, inwhich our ethnic States were created underthe 1947 constitution (Kachin, Karen, Karenni[ rom 1951 Kayah] and Shan) as well as a ChinSpecial Division. But an explanation o Racein the 1953 First Stage Census conrmedthat language-denominated classication styles

rom the colonial era were regarded as scienticand straight orward.36 By the time o the 1973

census, under Gen. Ne Wins military socialistgovernment (1962-88), these objectivecriteria or measuring race were replaced with


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Min operation, but the academic and diplomatMoshe Yegar described it as a systematic searchthroughout the problematic regions intendedto update the governments demographicdata: to register and classi y all the residentsas to whether they were Burmese citizens. 39 However, as was the case in much o ruralMyanmar at that time (and still today), manyresidents lacked proper documentation, whichYegar concluded was taken by the governmentas prima acie evidence that they were eitherillegal immigrants rom Bangladesh or criminalsrunning rom justice who were a raid to acelegal action. Amid allegations o brutality,perhaps as many as 6,000 local civilians werearrested and 200,000 residents ed acrossthe border into Bangladesh. But when theirreturn was negotiated by the UNHCR in late1978, Yegar reports that they were offered onlyForeigner Registration Certicates and somewho had held ull NRCs prior to Naga Mincould not receive them back. 40

It was in this highly charged context that Gen.Ne Win established a Law Commission to drafa new citizenship law. Te late Dr. Aye Kyaw, ahistorian who sel -identied as Arakanese, isofen credited or blamed or the 1823 endpointto authenticity. In a 2009 interview about

Rakhine-Rohingya dynamics, he explainedhow the date was determined. He recounted a1978 conversation in which he debated possiblecut-off dates o racial origin in the countrywith the jurist, Dr. Maung Maung, chair o theLaw Review Commission and who later brieybecame Myanmar President:

I said that or recognizing an ethnicnationality in Burma, there was a censusrecord during the Bodaw Phaya reign, madein the 18th century. It listed all nationalities

living in Burma, and it mentioned Arakans,Karens and Mons ( alaings) in the survey.Te document can be taken as a base, Isuggested. Dr. Maung Maung said thatsurvey was too early. Ten I suggested theyear o 1824, a turning point in Burmesehistory when the British annexed lowerBurma. Dr. Maung Maung agreed on thatdate, and we drafed a law that people livingin Burma during 1824 were recognized asethnic nationalities. We ound no such wordas Rohingya in that survey. 41

Tere was, however, no survey conductedduring 1823-24, nor has a public record

emerged to document the process by whichthe lists o pre-1823 ethnic nationalities werecompiled. Instead, the historical evidencesuggests that the 1982 Citizenship Law andits implementation were driven as much bya political campaign to exclude the alien

rom the country as to dene the citizen,and the interruption o British colonial rule,which was widely detested, was chosen as alegal closing date. Tus, in addition to thosewho sel -identied as Rohingyas, individualso Chinese and Indian heritage also oundthemselves excluded rom ull citizenship.

Such citizenship restrictions have affectedmillions o vulnerable inhabitants in modern-day Myanmar. Teir rights and entitlementshave been limited ever since, includinguniversity enrolment, land ownership,inheritance and security. In contrast, citizenshipregulations avour those who can demonstratea heritage category that has been designatedtaingyinthar or national race. Equallystark, the second major exodus o 260,000Muslims rom the northern Rakhine stateinto Bangladesh amidst government securityoperations in 1991-92 and another cycle o violence there since 2012 suggests that identityand citizenship struggles are anything but

resolved. Tese are not technical questions, butinstead pro oundly political ones.

oday, ew domestic leaders in Myanmar voiceany doubts about the requirement that citizensmust be descendants o pre-colonial sons,born o the land that is now the sovereignnation-state. Indeed, as communal violenceand loss o li e have ared during the past twoyears, the question o who does and especiallywho does not belong in Myanmar has returnedas a major national crisis. 42 However this time,

unlike in 1978 and 1992, anti-Muslim violencehas spread into several parts o the country,including Meiktila and Lashio. In addition,heavy ghting in the Kachin borderlands withChina, in which 100,000 people have beeninternally displaced, warns o the continuing volatility and diversity o identity-basedtensions in the country since President TeinSein assumed office despite the spread ogovernment ceaseres.

A main ash-point, however, continues to

be the Rakhine state where sel -identi yingRohingya leaders seek legal recognition ortheir people as ull citizens. In contrast, no


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ethnic Bamar or Rakhine political elite, andew among the Buddhist-dominant population

in general, appears prepared to consider themas anything except Bengalis and illegalimmigrants. Currently, UN agencies estimatethat over 140,000 people43, mostly Muslims,are internally displaced in the Rakhine stateafer the violence o the past two years, anda majority o those identi ying themselvesas Rohingya have no accepted nationalitystatus or legal rights in either Myanmar orBangladesh. Indeed in January 2014 a patrioticcampaign was started by Buddhist monks ina new Nationality and Religion Sa eguardingAssociation to restrict inter- aith marriage,ban MPs who are not Myanmar ethnics,and prevent Rohingyas rom using any kindo re ugee or temporary identication card tosecure a right to vote in uture elections.44

A battle o historical narratives thus continuesby all sides in the Rakhine-Rohingya clash, allrooted in claims about ethnic origins, presence(or absence) in British-delineated Burmabe ore 1823 and ancestral pedigree. Even inthis debate, however, all views converge in theirperception o lu-myo or kinds o persons asa veriable, xed and blood-borne lineage tiedto ancestral territory.

In this respect, the pattern o arguments overrights and identity in Rakhine State is replicatedin other struggles taking place elsewhere inthe country over land, resources, culture andpolitical rights today.

Against this backdrop, long-running identity-related disputes will shape governmentactivities such as the MOIPs citizenshipregistration initiatives and the 2014 Populationand Housing Census. In the rst such attempts

at a national enumeration in many decades, theresults will be closely watched. As with the 1982Citizenship Law, the stakes could be very highover which people they appear to avour andthose they disadvantage.

Moving Targets: Race, Rights andTerritory

Te challenges o democratization andprovision or minority rights are complex

everywhere. From politics and economics toculture and education, non-Bamar groups eela considerable sense o grievance that they have

been marginalised and never enjoyed equalrights or opportunity with the Bamar majority.Few identity-based groups, however, live incompletely homogenous or sel -containedterritories on the present political map whether Bamar, Chin, Karen, Kachin, Mon,Shan or other major nationalities. For example,less than hal the Karen population lives inthe present-day Karen state, while substantialKachin and Shan populations live on bothsides o the Kachin and Shan state borders. Insuch a diverse country, there ore, the needsand challenges o nationality rights cannot besimply in erred rom territorial location.

At the same time, the past century clearlyshows that Myanmars political map hasenshrined identity according to impreciseand inaccurate claims about inhabitation oland. Tis arbitrary, yet enduring, connectionbetween land and identity has had importantimpact on national politics. In particular, thepresent delineation o seven Bamar-majorityregions and seven ethnic states has evolvedout o long and hard- ought struggles betweenpolitical movements and central governmentsled by the Bamar majority in the centre o thecountry, on the one hand, and non-Bamargroups dened by singular identity claims in

the borderlands, on the other. Although allsides, in theory, concede that the populationin their area is multi-ethnic, the salience oterritory, identity and ancestry narratives hasremained an unchallenged ocal point in claims

or both legitimacy and authority.

National regulatory bodies, too, such as theMinistry o Immigration and Population andthe Ministry or the Progress o Border Areasand National Races and Development Affairs( ounded in 1993), have urther naturalized the

terms o belonging to a geographic area. As aresult, race, rights and territory are conated,including by those claiming to speak or theethnic group afer which a state is named. Forexample, in November 2013, in a parliamentarydiscussion o a Protection o Ethnic Rightsbill, an MP rom the Rakhine state equated raceand state-ness:

Ethnic nationalities badly need a law orthe protection o their rights whether theconstitution is amended or not. Under this

new law, the needs o states and regions canharmonize and the rights o the people candevelop.45


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As the Rakhine-Rohingya crisis has shown,the conation o race and territory reduces thelikelihood that identity-based representationwill evolve in ways that any communities woulddeem just or acceptable. Over the years, therehave been urther cultural, religious and ethnicgroups seeking political recognition, but whohave been excluded rom the constitutional

ramework or their rights and identity claimshave not been accepted by either the majority othe population or government officials.

Te 2008 constitution, there ore, whilereserving 25 percent o all seats in thelegislatures or armed orces ( atmadaw)appointees, appeared to accept some othese historical omissions and expanded the

ormulation o ethno-political straticationby, rst, affirming the seven ethnic statesand seven Bamar-majority regions and,then, adding two urther categories o ethnicrepresentation.

First, Sections 49-56 and Sections 274-283created ethnically-dened sel -administeredzones, which were allotted in territorycomprised o at least two contiguous townshipswhere a taingyinthar groups numbersare estimated to tally more than hal the

population. Zones were allotted to Danu,Kokang, Palaung and Pa-O in the Shan stateand Naga in the Sagaing region. A larger sel -administered division was created or the Wain Shan state.

In a second innovation, Sections 161 (b)and (c) o the new constitution provided orguaranteed representation in all o the new stateand region parliaments o lu-myo minorityethnic groups in these territories whosepopulation constitutes at least 0.1 percent o

the national populace. Both the Burmese andEnglish wording o the provision is con using.But, in the 2010 general election, the UnionElection Commission (UEC) seems to haveinterpreted that lu-myo populations inside astate or regions borders that amounted to about57,000 (a plausible estimate o 0.1 percent o thenational population) received electoral seats orrepresentation.

For the moment, it is not known how the UECcalculated population totals to implement

either o these provisions. For the Section 161provisions, it authorized 29 constituencies orethnic or taingyinthar participation in state

and region legislative bodies. Tese includedsuch previously undemarcated groups asthe Akha, Kayan and Lahu, as well as Bamar. 46 Although there were probably variations romone polling place to another, it appears thatcandidates or Section 161 ethnic seats werelisted on a separate ballot, and only those voterswhose identity papers marked them as thesame taingyinthar lu-myo were allowed to llout that ballot. 47 Once elected, these lu-myorepresentatives were then named nationalraces affairs ministers in the state and regionparliaments.

It needs to be stressed that the power o theseofficials is limited by the discretion o thechie ministers o states and regions (who areappointed by the President), and like thato other legislative representatives theirpolitical authority is or the most part quitemarginal at present. 48 Nevertheless, the creationo additional sel -administered areas andreserved legislative seats or constituenciesbased upon tallies o taingyinthar lu-myopopulations marks a urther development inidentity politics, adding to the sensitivities oidentity-based classications in the country.

One additional innovation rom the 2008

constitution bears pointing out. It laysout a process to redraw and rename theadministrative boundaries o states, regions,and sel -administered zones and divisions.Tis is only raising ethnic concerns about the

orthcoming census more. What i the existingenumeration procedures produce statisticsin which Kachins, Mons, Rakhines or Kayahare not the majority populations in theirstates? Perceptions o race, rights and territorycontinue to be inextricably linked and deeplypolitical.

Government Management of Identity inEveryday Life

In the past three years, Myanmars re ormprocess has included identity documentationinitiatives that have been mistaken oreach other by the media, activists and evengovernment staff themselves. erms such asverication, scrutiny, registration andcensus are used interchangeably to describe

very different programmes. All, however,involve governmental review o individual legalstatus with the purpose o distinguishing those


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who do rom those who do not belong in themodern nation-state o Myanmar.

In practice, two o the most importantdocuments in a residents li e are the HouseholdRegistration List and the Citizenship ScrutinyCard. Tey present, however, some basiccontradictions. Without the ormer, it isdifficult to obtain the latter. And those wholack the latter ace obstacles to ree movement,enrolment in higher education, and access tobanking, health care and many other everydayservices and liberties. At the same time, bothrecord lu-myo. But, as described above, theHousehold Registration orms tend to assign asingular lu-myo category, while althoughthere is inconsistency in application theMinistry o Immigration and Populationappears to allow multiple lu-myo identities onthe CSCs.

Despite the importance o these documents,the MOIP has never developed acomprehensive central registry o how manyresidents carry what kind o citizenship cardsat any given time. Tere appear many reasons.In remote and war-torn areas, it is commonnot to possess CSCs; it has been historicallydifficult to replace a lost card; many residents

gave up when the bureaucratic red tapeproved costly or risky; and, at various times inhistory, the counter eiting o CSCs has beenwidespread, particularly during initiatives toupdate cards.

o try and ll in such gaps, rom April 2007immigration officials under the ormer SPDCregime began the attempt to expand coverageinto rural and under-served areas. At that time,local township officers ormed scrutinizationcommittees to promptly issue citizenship

scrutiny cards to those with the characteristicso a citizen in line with the 1982 Myanmarcitizen law.49 Ten, afer the 2011 inaugurationo President Tein Sein, the MOIP expandedand accelerated the updating o both householdregistration and citizenship identity. In aparliamentary session in March 2011, a ormerMinister or Immigration and Populationdescribed the requirements or a CSC (whethera rst one or a replacement):

(1) Applicant must apply in person

(2) Original census certicate 50 that includes theapplicant and its copy [sic]

(3) Te application orm or citizenship scrutinycard and the original letter o endorsementissued by Ward PDC 51 concerned proving thatthe applicant lives in the ward concerned

(4) A copy each o parents citizenship scrutinycards / national registration cards

(5) Te original birth certicate (or) the schoolendorsement and its copy

(6) Te blood test

(7) Four photos measuring 0.8 x 0.8 incheswithout spectacles. 52

In July 2011, the MOIP ormally expanded suchregistration efforts, launching its Moe Pwint(droplet o rain) operation. Te latter, nowin a third stage o implementation, introducedmore exibility into the application process.Te updating o Household Registration listsalso appears to be part o the same process,although this is not entirely clear. With unding

rom Norway, Switzerland, Australia andthe European Commission, the Moe Pwintoperation supports mobile units to villages in

ormer conict areas in the Karen state and islooking to move into the Kayah and southern

Shan states. According to the internationalPeace Donor Support Group, a multi-donorplat orm that has unded registration carddistribution, the approach sets up a temporaryone-stop shop which covers, ree o charge,all the steps involved in issuing the CitizenScrutiny Cards on the same day. 53 Applicantswho do not have all the needed documentationare vetted by a 3-5 member committee thatincludes, at a minimum, the village headand the township Immigration and NationalRegistration Department officer. Te committee

then rules on whether the applicant and his/herancestors lived in the village and whether theindividual is the taingyinthar lu-myo statedon the application. On such bases, 487,000household registration certicates and about3.5 million National Registration Cards wereissued under Moe Pwint between July 2011and May 2013.54

As always, any attempt to document Myanmarspopulation has been controversial. In part,the MOIPs drive has been a result o around

a dozen ceasere agreements with differentethnic armed groups, in which the TeinSein government promised (and in some


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cases has delivered) ull-citizenship status via CSC distribution to internally-displacedpopulations in combat zones or to those whohad never received them be ore. However,because this process un olded at the same timethat the Tein Sein government undertookcertication o Myanmar migrants in Tailandand a verication review o residentsdocumentation in the Rakhine state, urthercon usions arose.

In particular, Muslim community leaders haveexpressed concern that the MOIPs attempts toveri y the documentation o residents in theRakhine state is the same as Operation NagaMin in 1978 to target illegal immigrantsespecially those who sel -identi y as Rohingya or punitive action. Te communal and anti-Muslim violence o the past two years has onlydeepened such anxieties.

Popular responses to CSC distribution andrevision are there ore mixed. Recipients othe citizenship cards report a sense o relieand gratitude, and yet rumours abound aboutalleged hidden motives behind the NationalRegistration campaign. Despite governmentassurances that [i]ssuing national scrutinycard[s] is not based on race and religion, 55

some ethnic nationality groups suspect thatthe registration campaigns will result inthe undercounting o their identities andpopulations. 56 In response, Chin, Karen, Monand Shan activists have activated communitynetworks over the past two years to examinethe lu-myo designation recorded on the CSCso these communities; smaller groups such asthe Kaman, another Muslim minority in theRakhine state, have also been counting theirpopulations. 57

A particular concern is what they view as theunder or mis-reporting o their nationalitiesor the countrys new political system under the

2008 constitution. In their own surveys, theirndings have suggested that the issuance onew CSCs may be categorizing more people asmajority Bamars and as Buddhists than wouldso sel -identi y. Tus, or example, Karen Newsreported that incorrect in ormation in thelu-myo section o the CSCs had resulted ininaccurate counts o Mons in several states anddeprived them o opportunities or political

representation. 58 Concerns have also beenraised by an account o a township in Sagaingwhere residents applying or CSCs were instead

given Union Solidarity and DevelopmentParty membership cards. 59 Tis only urthersdoubts about the impartiality o governmentdepartments and staff.

For the moment, it is not clear how accurateor representative these reports are, or what isbehind the irregularities in different parts othe country: or example, incompetence orhonest mistakes on the part o governmentstaff, deliberate policies, or personal choices byindividual applicants hoping to simpli y theirlives by indicating majority Bamar identity.Whatever the reasons, such operations hardenboth government and popular conceptualboundaries o ethnic identity, citizenship andpopulations. Tus, the 2014 census stands readyto accelerate boundary-making during thistransitional time.

Who Counts, How and Why? The 2014Census

Te 2014 Population and Housing Census(PHC) will collect data on many aspects oli e in contemporary Myanmar, includingsome categories also documented on theHousehold Registration lists and Citizenship

Scrutiny Cards. Under the guidance o theUnited Nations Population Fund (UNFPA),the Department o Population (DOP) in theMOIP will carry out the rst official censussince 1983.60 According to the UNFPAs Chie

echnical Advisor, Te 2014 census is going tobe the rst true snapshot o the population oMyanmar. 61 o achieve this snapshot, the aimwill be an ambitious 100-percent headcountwhich, i success ul, would be the rst time inMyanmars history.

Te 2014 PHC is now expected to cost US$74million, a 20 percent increase over the totalprojected several months back. Te UnitedKingdom, Australia, Switzerland and Norwayare the principal oreign donors to UNFPA,which has the personal endorsement o UNSecretary-General Ban Ki-moon. Germany,Italy and Finland have also contributedunknown amounts. 62

For its part, the Tein Sein government bringssignicant capabilities to the process, despite

no serving DOP staff having worked on acensus be ore. Te vertically and centrallyorganized chains o command inherited rom


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previous military governments have acilitatedlarge-scale administrative operations in thepast, including the 2008 re erendum andgeneral elections in 1990 and 2010. U Khin Yi,Minister o Immigration and Population and

ormer chie o the Myanmar Police Force, haspublicly stated his commitment to carryingout the census to international standards, 63 while President Tein Sein has characterisedthe project as a national duty or all toparticipate in, to be carried out under theleadership o the government and atmadaw,in order to gain exact data or the countrysdevelopment.64

Conduct o the census, however, will be acomplicated and difficult task. Te counting othe population will be carried out by 100,000 junior school-teachers between 30 March and10 April 2014. Tey will collect data on 41question categories, including lu-myo, whichis translated as ethnicity under UNFPA.Tese enumerators are being instructed in theBurmese language via at least our levels ocascading training-o -trainers around thecountry. ownship Immigration and NationalRegistration Department officials, who are lawen orcement officers, will then be responsible

or ensuring the enumeration is completed.

Te official census orm has been printed inBurmese and will be lled out by enumerators not respondents themselves based oninterviews with residents. Most answers willbe recorded by lling in a bubble on a large,machine-readable paper orm produced by aUK-based printing company. However, otherquestions will require the enumerator to writean answer in Burmese script and still othersmust be completed with Arabic numerals.

Te timing o both the enumeration and

publication o census results is very sensitive.In all likelihood, the enumeration will occurbe ore a nationwide ceasere is signed orthe much-anticipated political dialogue isunderway. Instead, some leaders o non-Bamargroups believe that a census should only havebeen considered and started afer these events,so as to help not risk the process o nationalreconciliation. 65 It should not be done in arushed manner, as this is the rst time in 30years, said Cherry Zahau, a Chin human rightsactivist.66 Some ethnic political parties and civil

society organizations have received briengs byUNFPA on the census process, but the agencyhas produced no evidence that changes were

made to the census process based on eedbackin those sessions.

As a result, many organizations that mobilizearound identity claims complain that they havehad no input and little in ormation about thecensus preparation and conduct a perceptionthat only deepened when census orms weremade public. 67 Tere remain signicantlogistical barriers including continuing violence, vast stretches o landmine-ladenterritory and a lack o agreed processes orchoosing and protecting enumerators toaccurately count and assess populations inconict areas. In addition, with internationalorganizations estimating that Myanmar has650,000 IDPs, the census claim o a 100 percentheadcount is widely rejected. 68

In December 2013, U Khin Yi, Minister oImmigration and Population, and Janet Jackson,UNFPA Myanmar Representative, met orthe rst time with leaders o armed ethnicopposition groups, including the umbrellaUnited Nationalities Federal Council, tobrie them on census preparations and allaytheir anxieties. 69 But the meeting revealedmore concerns than it allayed, and it seemedimpossible that undamental problems could

be addressed in time, with some ethnic leadersinsisting that no census could be conducted intheir areas without re orm and stable ceaseres.It is difficult to dispel mistrust afer decadeso living under a military regime, accordingto recent media coverage o a a-ang NationalLiberation Army meeting. 70 In consequence,although some ceasere groups said thatthey might cooperate with the census, othersconsider it premature. Hence, it is very likelythat the map o census coverage will lookmuch like the map o the 2010 elections, with

large expanses o ethnic minority areas alongthe borders once again lef out o the nationalprocess.

Census results, or delays in their release,likewise could be controversial, as they willcoincide with what is promising to be a hard-

ought 2015 general election campaign. Te July2014 release o preliminary results (aggregatepopulation by sex, age and township) will setexpectations o how many voters should beon the rolls or the next election. Te Final

Results o the census which include reportson religion, race, and citizenship status arethen due in March 2015 as the campaign season


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escalates and as contesting candidates andparties debate minority rights, populations,territories, politics and representation. Anydeviation rom this schedule will very likelycause different partisan groups to cry oul.

When results are rst made public, many o thelikely controversies over and irregularities o theconduct o census conduct will take centre stagein national politics. No matter how reliable thedata collected, the snapshot o the countrythat emerges in the 2014 PHC will not alignwith the different opinions o vested interestsin the country, and the heightened tensions oelection year will only add to the signicanceo the census. In particular, many activists arealready complaining that the governments135 taingyinthar lu-myo ormulations donot t with the lived experience o identity inthe country. Rather, many ear the census isintended to water down non-Bamar identitiesand thus minority rights to political status,recognition and representation. 71

Te question o identity lu-myo is only

one o 41 highly complex questions on thecensus. Te process will be raught withinconsistencies and ambiguities. Canvassers,who are young teachers (almost all women),will be directed to ask interviewees what lu-myo they are and then enter a code rom a listo 135 taingyinthar lu-myo or an additional 14categories o non-native, oreign races.72 Teywill then record one and only one lu-myoidentity or each member o the household.

Tere is, however, much con usion about

the draf o the code list which, without anyparticipatory input rom stakeholders outsidethe donor and UN agency community, has

resurrected the disputed 135 categoriesrom the SLORC-SPDC era. Existing ethnic

anomalies rom colonial era populationcalculations have only been added to. Inparticular, the number o ethnic groups amongsuch peoples as the Chin, Kachin, Karen andShan have been conated and con used byincluding local dialect labels and, in somecases, identity terms that are not accurate ordo not reect daily lives and perceptions. Forexample, the Kachin nationalist movement hasalways considered that there are six or sevenethnic Kachin sub-groups, and even the lavishnew National Landmarks Garden in Nay Pyi

aw counts only six, but the census demarcateseleven (codes 102-112).73 Equally con using,the eight major races (see chart) are also givenseparate codes or identity on the census orm.But given that enumerators will record only onelu-myo code or each member o a household,this means that ethnic identities will appeardiffused; or example, someone o the majorityKachin sub-group will have to choose betweenJinghpaw (code 104) and Kachin (code 101)but cannot assert both. It will, in act, be theenumerator who writes down any answer.

As a result, as news o the census plan belatedlycirculated, 30 ethnic organisations including

armed groups with ceasere agreements deemed the list unacceptable in a December2013 letter to the UNFPA. 74 Meetings werehurriedly held at which different ethnicorganisations, including Chin, Kachin, Karen,and Shan, called on their peoples to only sel -identi y by their collective name (e.g. Kachin,code 101) rather than sub-group, dialect orclan identities that the census code lists. Acon erence o 400 Kachin representatives inDecember called or the postponement o thecensus so that the content and process could

be reviewed, while a similar Karen orum inJanuary concluded: Te Code Numbers,designating the ethnic sub-groups, used inthe 2014-Population Census EnumerationPlan, cause, in addition to contradiction, moredivisiveness among the ethnic nationalities. 75 Illustrating the census con usion urther,smaller groups like the Kayan and Palaung ( a-ang) remain eager to be counted as separateraces and reject their placement under Kayahand Shan major races, respectively. 76

In response, both government and UNFPAofficials assured that such concerns would berespected. But there still remains no clarity as

Major race No. categories

Chin 53

Shan 33

Kachin 12Kayin 11

Kayah 9

Bamar 9

Rakhine 7

Mon 1


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to how enumerators will interrogate and recordethnicity. Te difficulty is acute among non-Burmese speaking peoples, whose in ormationwill be recorded on Burmese-languagequestionnaires according to an enumeratorinstruction manual also in Burmese only.Census personnel appear to believe that theycan dene the 8 main ethnic groups romdata collected on the 135 ethnic groups. 77 But this does not assuage doubts. Adding tothe challenge, mixed-race lineage will not berecorded except in the case o Myanmar +Foreigner (Mixture) (code 900). Respondentscan only choose a single identity rom oneparent, or i the parent is also o mixedheritage, rom one grandparent a problemMinister U Khin Yi acknowledged but did notoffer any solutions, except or offering thatindividuals may apply to change their lu-myodesignation on their national registration cardafer the census. 78 Similarly incongruous,any respondents whose lu-myo is not onthe 135 list will be coded as one o 13 oreignraces (codes 901-913) or as a catch-all Othercategory that is worded (in English), otherEthnicities in Myanmar and other Foreigners.Tis will be especially contentious in the caseo the Muslim population in the northernRakhine state, where many sel -identi y as

Rohingya. Against the stated wishes orepresentatives o two Rohingya parties, themost likely scenario is that enumerators willrecord Rohingya as Bangladesh (910) orOther (914). 79

o the degree that there is an identiable logicin the lu-myo list o 135 categories, it appearsthat smaller ethnic groups (e.g. Lahu, Wa) arelisted under the name o the state that theymostly inhabit (e.g. Shan state), while othersare categorized by language or dialect putatively

spoken (e.g. Dawei [ avoyan], who are placedunder Bamar). Tis variability increases themany irregularities in the PHC code list anddouble-counts some groups by using differentnames. Te result only con uses the picture oMyanmars diverse landscape.

Just as perplexing is variation across majorraces. Tree major races (Kachin, Karen andChin) include culturally and linguisticallyrelated sub-groups under the same ethnicband o codes (e.g. 101-112, 301-11, 401-453).

Tis would be logical or a language-basedsurvey. But in the case o the Rakhine andShan categories, culturally unrelated groups are

recorded under the major lu-myo headings,such as Mro and Tet under Rakhine, and KoKant (Kokang), Palaung ( a-ang) and Pa-Ounder Shan. Similarly inconsistent, the Kayahsub-group among the people collectivelyknown as Karenni is given the coding or anentire race (code 201), while related peoples arebroken down into eight categories under theKayah name (202-209).80 Indeed only the Mon(code 601) have a singular code among all themajor taingyinthar lu-myo delineated or thecensus.

Tis means that the census template orrecording lu-myo identities is analytically andin ormationally inconsistent, and many citizensare concerned as to how their ethnicities willbe recorded on a countrywide scale. As U SanPyae, an MP rom Mogaung in the Kachinstate, warned o likely con usions: I dont knowwhat Shan groups live in Sagaing region but inKachin state there are ve major Shan groups ai-Leng is the one o these But the [same]group goes by different names in Kachin state,including ai-Hlan, Red Shan, Shan Lay, ShanMyanmar and ai- ai. 81

Finally, also looming in the background orcontroversy is the volatile issue o religion. It

is still unclear how census enumerators willensure nationwide consistency in elicitingreligious identity responses, given the inter-communal violence that has plagued parts othe country. Te last census in 1983 reportedthe national population to be 89.4 percentBuddhist, 4.9 percent Christian, and 4.4 percentIslamic. But against a backdrop o continuingBuddhist-Muslim violence, any divergence

rom the 1983 distribution could inamecommunal tensions, particularly in the lead-up to a highly contested election. Christian

and other aith leaders have already expressedconcerns. We are not oreigners, ArchbishopCharles Bo recently stated. We are sons anddaughters o this great nation and we wish tocontributein the nation building. 82

It is, however, the Rakhine state that presentlyholds the greatest threat or community-based violence around the time o censusenumeration. Early warning indicators havealready appeared. Following allegationso illegal immigrants entering be ore

the national census and occupying partso the state, Union Parliament SpeakerTura Shwe Mann met with Buddhist


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Rakhine representatives to hear their callsor establishing local peoples militia, and

he publicly praised them or sa eguardingMyanmars western border. 83

As reports o Rakhine-Rohingya violenceappeared again in January 84, many minorityMuslims eared that their troubles in 2014could just be beginning. Violence appearsincreasingly likely. Rakhine residents oMaungdaw, or example, are seeking toestablish armed militias in every village. ElevenMedia quotes a Rakhine resident as saying,Every minister and departmental head whohas visited the Maungdaw border area hassaid that they have a plan to orm militias orregional security and will arrange the weaponsthat can be taken through respective policestations and outposts. 85 And throughoutMyanmar, there are widespread rumours thatextremist Islamic groups are ooding thecountry with ollowers, to inate the numberso Muslims tallied.

For perspective, it is important to stress thatMyanmar is not unique as a multi-ethnicstate nor is it the only modern state to havechallenges that result rom ethnic and religiousdiversity. As experiences around the world have

shown, contention over coding and labellingis not unusual in censuses and should alwaysbe acknowledged as a potential risk to datareliability. As David Kertzer and DominiqueArel have pointed out: [ ]he categorizationo subjective categories [like ethnicity] bycensus-makers is more ofen than not a mattero political negotiation, rather than objectiveassessment .86

What, however, is very striking and unusualin Myanmars case is the absence o any

recognition on the part o the UNFPA andinternational governmental donors that thecensus ethnicity list is politically problematic,culturally sensitive and in ormationally awed.As o February 2014, no signicant publicparticipation in census preparation, planningand management had been invited to deal withthese issues, and it was difficult to detect anymechanism or inclusive input, discussion ornegotiation on the categories to be recorded orreported nor or real consultation, eedbackand procedural change aferwards. Rather,

greater concern appears to have been shownover public relations than addressing the manyobvious inconsistencies in ethnic labelling.

Data Unreliability and the Overreach ofthe Census Questionnaire

Finally, when orecasting the census outcome,it needs to be stressed that there are signicantchallenges to the goal o everyone beingcounted, as the 2014 PHC advocacy materialspromise. Fielding 100,000 enumerators acrossan ethnic and geographical terrain as complexand contested as Myanmar or the rst time in30 years increases the likelihood that the censuswill not be completed and that the data willbe o questionable validity. Unreliability haslong characterized other areas o governmentstatistics, such as health and education, wherenational coverage is also claimed. In ormationand analysis o issues that involve ethnicidentity claims are among the most difficultchallenges in the country. Tis does not meaninitiatives should not be started; in act, theopposite. But it does mean that due care andattention are taken to understand humanneeds and realities, working within the difficultcountry context.

At present, the difficulties o 100 percent accessand appropriate ethnic coding are receiving themost publicity over the reliability o the censusresults. But, as the enumeration continues,

a number o urther issues are also likely tochallenge the census accuracy.

Firstly, a undamental barrier to datareliability lies in the overreach o the censusquestionnaire. Te 41 question categories havebeen in place since September 2012. Againstinternational standards, no systematic pre-testso the questionnaire were conducted prior tothe 2013 pilot o the census, save or in ormalones among government staff. And in the 2013pilot, enumerators struggled to sort out all

the different code lists, possible answers, andmisunderstandings. As a result, MOIP andUNFPA officials changed some o the wordingafer the pilot, but no question categories wereeliminated.

Te length o the questionnaire also means thatenumerators will be tasked with assemblinga great diversity o data. Te questions range

rom basic demographic data to maternaland child wel are in ormation to occupationand questions about sanitation, electricityand migration. At least ve questions queryissues that could risk the legal status o therespondent; nine interrogate culturally or


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politically sensitive topics; and another seveninvolve taxable items or activities. Suchcomplexity in a census questionnaire is notunusual in many developing countries, butit is without precedent in Myanmar. It is alsodecidedly at odds with the last census in 1983,in which just seven questions were asked o80% o those enumerated, and only anothereleven in a long orm administered to a randomsample o 20%. As David Coleman, Pro essor oDemography at Ox ord University, has warned:Te longer the questionnaire, the higherthe level o non-response and the greater thetrouble and expense. 87

Te range o questions in the 2014 census thencompounds a second major barrier to accurateenumeration o the long questionnaire: thato language diversity. Te DOP and UNFPAhave promised communities populated byspeakers o languages other than Burmese that(e)numerators will conduct the interviewand ask questions in your local language. 88 However, no details are available on theselection process or these local languageenumerators, which o the languages and

dialects spoken in Myanmar will be covered,how that decision was or will be made, andwhat process will be ollowed to translate

the complex and nuanced concepts in thequestionnaire. Implicit in this promise is anassumption that language usage can be mappedto discrete local territories, which is probablyrare. Many rural areas, villages and quarters otowns and cities are characterized by ethno-linguistic diversity, not homogeneity. Teremay be a shared lingua ranca that can be used

or basic social and market transactions, butthe complexity o census questions is verylikely to exhaust the capacity o those whosemother tongues are different. Hence, it seemslikely that the enumeration interviews will becomplicated by the presence o translators, whoare not trained to use standardized practices orensuring data reliability. Concerns are also highthat, given the pressures o time and difficultiesin communication, enumerators will simply llin the questionnaires according to their ownopinions and assumptions.

Finally, this leads to a third major barrier toenumeration accuracy: the issue o distrust. Tepromise o condentiality in the 2014 PHC, inline with international norms, is not one thatresonates with much o the population. Aferdecades o war and political repression, mostcitizens have adapted to the environment odeep-rooted historical structures o surveillance

and censorship, which have long madein ormation production, dissemination andconsumption, dangerous undertakings. In thiscontext, many citizens are ear ul o providingwrong answers. In ormation collection hasrarely been neutral and requently has beenassociated with law en orcement and possiblepunishment or conscation o belongings.As a result, respondents are cautious aboutculturally sensitive questions, such as religion,deaths and marital status. Equally important,they know only too well what is at stake when

they answer questions that can invoke legalissues, including citizenship status, names ohousehold members abroad, and possession otaxable goods.

In this context, having lived through decadeso military rule, people in Myanmar havedeveloped strategies o survival that includerevealing as little as possible to those in powerand telling officials what they want to hear.Respondents are likely to ear that accurateanswers might increase their tax burden, put

them at risk o arrest, or threaten their access toimportant documents, like Citizenship ScrutinyCards and Household Lists, or services such as

1983 Census Questions

Shortform, 80percent

NameRelationship to head ofhouseholdSexAgeMarital statusRaceReligion

Longform, 20percent

all of the above, plusSchool attendanceHighest standard passed

LiteracyOccupationIndustryEmployment statusReason for not workingWorking during last 12monthsChildren ever born aliveChildren still livingDate of birth of last child


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Endnotes

1. In 1989 the then military government changedthe official name rom Burma to Myanmar. Tey arealternative orms in the Burmese language, but their usehas become a politicised issue. Myanmar is mostly usedwithin the country and in international diplomacy, but

it is not always used in the English language abroad.As these differences highlight, there are variations anddisagreements over many names in the country. Forconsistency, this brieng will use the contemporary

orms o words used around the census. For example,Bamar (Burman) re ers to the majority ethnic group,while Burmese is a general term or the language oris sometimes used as a general adjective: i.e. someonecan be o Karen or Shan nationality but a Burmese(Myanmar) citizen.

2. Interview with Stephen Cole, alk to Al Jazeera,28 December 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2013/12/aung-san-suu-kyi-there-no-rule-law-20131225133951643936.html, at

around 8 minutes, 45 seconds into the interview.3. See e.g., UN OCHA, Myanmar: CountrywideDisplacement Snapshot, November 2013; Te BorderConsortium, Programme Report: January to June2013, pp.16-21. Te majority o those affected areethnic Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon and Shan as wellas Muslim populations in the Rakhine state. Tere arealso estimates o over 100,000 ethnic Chin re ugees andmigrants in India and Malaysia.

4. UNFPA, Press Con erence on MyanmarPopulation and Housing Census, 10 February 2014.$45 million has reportedly been invested by eightcountries, Australia, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway,Sweden, Switzerland and the UK; $15 million by thegovernment; and $5 million by the UNFPA. A urther$10 million is said to be required or the data analysisand dissemination stage.

5. Dr. C. Chandramouli, Census o India: A Story oInnovations, Press In ormation Bureau, Government oIndia, 16 August 2011.

6. erms to describe ethnicity can be contentious.Race is ofen used with caution in contemporaryEnglish i associated with racism. But, as this brienghighlights, national race has long been used inMyanmar.

7. Andreas Wimmer, Ethnic Boundary Making:Institutions, Power, Networks (Ox ord: Ox ordUniversity Press, 2013), p.4.

8. SPDC, Information Sheet, Yangon, Myanmar , No.C-2103 (I), 30 January 2002.

9. Zarni Mann, Monks Con erence Backs Bills toRestrict Inter aith Marriage, Rohingya Voting, TeIrrawaddy, 16 January 2014.

10. Mark Duffield, On the Edge o No MansLand: Chronic Emergency in Myanmar, Centre orGovernance and International Affairs, University oBristol, 2008, p.8.

11. See e.g., Yen Snaing, Ethnic Groups VoiceConcern over Census Classication System, Te

schooling or their children. Furthermore mostcitizens under the age o 40 have no memoryo participating in a census or even know whatone is, much less why it would be in theirinterests to answer so many intrusive questionswith any degree o accuracy.

In short, many challenges in the conduct,enumeration and completion o the censusclearly lie ahead.

Conclusion

As the count-down to the census hascontinued, controversy over its timing andpreparation has steadily grown. 89 Te need orin ormative, accurate and relevant social anddemographic data has never been in doubt ina country acing serious socio-economic andpolitical challenges afer decades o internalconict. But there are many warnings thatthe 2014 Population and Housing Censuscould sustain and even expand the historicallyprevalent distrust by many o the population ogovernment in ormation in the country.

Te risks have been increased because donorsand the United Nations have pushed orward

on a conict-insensitive census methodologyagainst a backdrop o unusually rapid politicaltransition within the country. A hard- oughtgeneral election is approaching in 2015, whilethe impact o the census is likely to be anunnecessary contributing cause o tension,albeit probably not a decisive one, amongarmed combatants negotiating an end to 70years o civil war are.

o counter these concerns, the census is beingpromoted as non-political but, in most political

and ethnic circles, it is regarded as anythingbut. Te worry is that the census will trans ormthe social ctions produced by unreliable datainto highly problematic social acts that setnew national parameters and boundaries onethnicity at just the moment in history whenpeace-building is starting and when new,inclusive and participatory ways are neededto deal with the state ailures o the past. Atsuch a critical juncture, national reconciliationand understanding will not be helped by anunreliable and contested census.


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Challenge: From Aspirations to Solutions, NI-BCNBurma Policy Brieng Nr 12, October 2013.23. U Khin Yi, Union Minister or Immigrationand Population, in, Questions raised and answered,proposals discussed and submitted at rst PyithuHluttaw second regular session, New Light oMyanmar, 2 September 2011.

24. Te Burmese term, ein-taung-su sa-yin, isofen translated as amily list. Te latter translationbelies the administrative purpose o the HouseholdRegistration List, which is undamentally a lawen orcement mechanism.

25. Ministry o Immigration and Population website,http://www.modins.net/myanmarIn o/ministry/population.htm.

26. O the other identity documents, birth certicates,which are not available in many parts o the country,also record lu-myo identities; passports do not.

27. See e.g., Peter James Spielmann, AP writer, UNChie ells Burma to Make Rohingyas Citizens, TeIrrawaddy, 11 July 2013.

28. J.J. Bennison, Census of India,1931, Vol. X1, Burma (Rangoon: Government Printing and Stationery, 1933),pp.198-204.

29. Sixteen groups were in act listed; Burma, Lolo-Muhso, Kuki-Chin, Naga, Kachin, Sak (Lui), Mishmi,Mro, ai, Malay, Mon, Palaung-Wa, Khasi, Karen, Manand Chinese. No inhabitants, however, o the Khasigroup were recorded and elsewhere in the censusChinese was recorded as non-indigenous, despite theChinese-speaking Kokang population in the Shan state.

30. For purposes o perspective, it is worth noting thataround the same time the British began counting upsubjects in colonial Burma, race appeared or the rsttime in the US census. Te 1890 census categories were:white, black, mulatto, quadroon, octoroon, Chinese,Japanese and Indian.

31. Census of India, p.173.

32. Ibid , p.174.

33. Ibid., p.173, ix.

34. Ibid., p.175.

35. Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics ofEthnicity (London: Zed Books, 1991 and 1999), pp.30,51-2, 75, 83-4.

36. Union o Burma, First Stage Census 1953 (Rangoon:Government Printing and Stationery, 1957), p.xvii.

37. Socialist Republic o the Union o Burma, Ministryo Home and Religious Affairs,Burma: 1983 PopulationCensus (Rangoon: Immigration and ManpowerDepartment, June 1986), pp.1-8.

38. See e.g., Smith,Burma; Insurgency , passim.

39. Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession:Te Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines,Southern Tailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar

Irrawaddy, 10 January 2014; Burmas Ethnic MinoritiesDecry Census, Jostle or Advantage, Te Irrawaddy, 10February 2014.

12. IRIN, Myanmar: Census offers hope to ethnicgroups, 16 May 2012.

13.

See denitions or components o termat Myanmar-English Dictionary, http://www.myanmar-dictionary.org; see also Burmese Amyo, lumyo, taing yin tha lumyo, Languages oSecurity in the Asia-Pacic, 25 May 2011, availableonline at http://asiapacic.anu.edu.au/blogs/languageso security/2011/05/25/burmese-nation/#_fn4. Non-Bamar languages have developed relatedterminologies. Among the Kachin, or example,Jinghpaw amyu ni is the races/branches o theJinghpaw. Tis brieng will ocus on Burmese and the2014 census.

14. Tis law represented a signicant change romSection 11 o the 1947 constitution and Section 5 o the

1948 Union Citizenship Act, which dened citizenshipar more exibly. Nick Cheesman, Te Eliminatingo Rights and the Politics o Being Burmese, paperpresented at the Annual Meeting o the Law & SocietyAssociation (Session: International Dimensions oCitizenship and Nation), 2011, p.2.

15. Myanmar

Documents

The 2014 Census, Identity and Citizenship in Burma-Myanmar