Texto de Direitos Humanos em Inglês

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The new politics of protection?

Cte dIvoire, Libya andthe responsibility to protect

ALEX J. BELLAMY AND PAUL D. WILLIAMS

International Affairs : ( ) The Author(s). International Affairs The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Published by BlackwellPublishing Ltd, Garsington Road, Oxford , UK and Main Street, Malden, MA , USA.

The international responses to recent crises in Cte dIvoire and Libya reveal agreat deal about the UN Security Councils approach to human protection. The

Council has long authorized peacekeepers to use all necessary means to protectcivilians, in contexts including Haiti, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi and Cte dIvoire. But Resolution ( March ) on the situation in Libya marked the rst time the Council hadauthorized the use of force for human protection purposes against the wishes ofa functioning state. The closest it had come to crossing this line previously was inResolutions ( ) and ( ). In Resolution , the Council authorizedthe Unied Task Force to enter Somalia to ease the humanitarian crisis there,but this was in the absence of a central government rather than against oneapoint made at the time by several Council members. In Resolution ( ),the Security Council authorized the French-led Operation Turquoise to protectvictims and targets of the genocide then under way in Rwanda; this missionenjoyed the consent of the interim government in Rwanda as well as its armedforces. In passing Resolution , the Council showed that it will not be inhibitedas a matter of principle from authorizing enforcement for protection purposes by theabsence of host state consent. Although its response in Libya broke new ground, itgrew out of attitudes and processes evident well before this particular crisis. Mostnotably, the Council had already acceptedin Resolutions ( ) and ( )that it had a responsibility to protect civilians from grave crimes, and thiswas evident in a shift in the terms of its debates from questions aboutwhethertoact to protect civilians to questions abouthowto engage.

Consensus on the use of force against Libya was enabled by several excep-tional factors, in particular a putative regional consensus and the poor interna-tional standing of adhas regime, as well as the clarity of the threat and shorttimeframe for action. Messier circumstances, such as those in Cte dIvoire, aremore likely to be the norm; but here too political differences developed over howto respond. Most notably, Russia argued that the use of UN helicopters againstheavy weapons was not directly protecting civilians and therefore exceeded

On the centrality of human protection to the work of the UN, see Ban Ki-moon, Human protection andthe st century United Nations, Cyril Foster Lecture, Oxford University, Feb. .


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Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams

International Affairs : , Copyright The Author(s). International Affairs The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

the mandate set out in Resolution ( March ). There are also difficultoperational issues. How can the most effective means of protection be predictedin advance? How should international society engage with the complicated local

political dynamics in such conict zones? What operational guidance can be givento forces tasked with implementing human protection mandates? And how caninternational society manage the longer-term implications of its actions?

We submit that the Councils consensus on the principle of human protectionwill hinge upon the performance and legitimacy of the missions it authorizes.Indeed, the Councils informal consultations on the killing of civilians by theSyrian government in May suggest that disagreements about how to inter-pret Resolutions and , concerns about the UNs role in ousting LaurentGbagbos regime in Cte dIvoire and doubts about the efficacy of coercive meansare already making it more difficult to nd consensus on human protection. Sowhile the Councils response to the crises in Cte dIvoire and Libya might reecta new politics of protection, it is clearly much easier to agree on the principle thatpeople should be protected from serious crimes than it is to agree on what to doin specic circumstances.

We argue that the new politics of protection displays four principal charac-teristics and several unresolved questions, all of which emerged gradually overthe past decade and did not spring out of the blue in . First, internationalsociety is now explicitly focused on civilian protection. This is evident not onlyin the formal consensus on the responsibility to protect (R P) but also in theCouncils practice in relation to peace operations. The UN Secretary General andother arms of the Secretariat have played a particularly important role in estab-

lishing this focus. Second, the Council has repeatedly proven willing to authorizethe use of military force for human protection purposes. Third, the relation-ship between the Security Council and other stakeholders, particularly relevantregional arrangements, has proved crucial. While some regional arrangementshave become important peacekeepers in their own right, of more signicance hereis their emerging role as gatekeepersinuencing which issues get debated inthe Council, how they are framed and the range of possible Council responses.Fourth, both activist and more cautious states have agreed to respond to crisesthrough the Security Council and relevant regional organizations. Among otherthings, unresolved questions concern the interpretation of Council resolutions,

the relationship between protection and other goals, the relationship between theSecurity Council and regional organizations, and how protection mandates canbe effectively implemented.

The article proceeds in four parts. The rst contextualizes recent developmentsby briey summarizing the history of Security Council practice on human protec-tion. The second and third sections examine international societys response tothe crises in Cte dIvoire and Libya respectively. The nal section draws some

The fact that the Security Councils work is increasingly focused on protection was recognized by severalmember states at the Councils May meeting on the issue. See UN Security Council, S/PV. , May

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tentative conclusions about the new politics of protection and identies futurechallenges.

The politics of protectionAs is now well known, R P was unanimously adopted by UN member statesat the World Summit. This recognized that states had a responsibility toprotect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimesagainst humanity; that international society had a duty to assist states to full theirR P; and that, should a state manifestly fail to protect its populations from thesecrimes, international society would take timely and decisive action through thevarious provisions set out in the UN Charter. Since then, R P has been reaffirmedin Council resolutionsincluding ( ) and ( )in reports of theUN Secretary General, and in the establishment of a new joint office for R P andthe prevention of genocide. As we demonstrate below, the political consensus onR P and these modest steps towards institutionalizing the principle helped shapeinternational reactions to the crises in Cte dIvoire and Libya.

Although the formal adoption of R P was undoubtedly important, theSecurity Council has engaged with human protection issues since the late sand has developed a thematic civilian protection agenda related to but distinctfrom R P. This encompasses demands for compliance with international human-itarian law, operational issues connected to peace operations and humanitarianaccess, the Councils role in responding to emergencies, and disarmament issues. In the Council unanimously adopted Resolution , which expressed its

willingness to consider appropriate measures in response to situations of armedconict where civilians are being targeted or where humanitarian assistance tocivilians is being deliberately obstructed; called on states to ratify key humanrights treaties and work towards ending the culture of impunity by prosecutingthose responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violationsof international humanitarian law; and expressed the Councils willingness toexplore how peacekeeping mandates might be reframed to afford better protec-tion to endangered civilians. In , the Council issued an aide-memoire oncivilian protection, which was subsequently adopted and developed by the UNsOffice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In April ,

UN General Assembly, summit outcome, A/ /L. , Sept. , paras ; Gareth Evans,Theresponsibility to protect(Washington DC: Brookings Institution, ); Alex J. Bellamy,Responsibility to protect(Cambridge: Polity, ); Ramesh Thakur,The responsibility to protect(London: Routledge, ).

Most notably Implementing the responsibility to protect, A/ / , Jan. . See Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ABACQ and the fth committee negotiations on the

joint office, Jan. . See UN Security Council, Protection of civilians, Cross-Cutting Report no. (New York, Oct. ). While the resolution enjoyed broad support within the Council and the wider membership, there was some

scepticism about the Secretary Generals approach, notably from India and Egypt. See S/PV. (resumption), Sept. .

OCHA Policy Development and Studies Branch, Aide-memoire for the consideration of issues pertaining to the protection of civilians (New York, ). OCHA proposed a revised version in early , which was welcomedby the Security Council. See S/PV. , Jan. .


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the Council issued a further resolution ( ) on the protection of civilians whichreaffirmed R P, reiterated the Councils demand for humanitarian access in crisiszones and indicated its preparedness to act in cases where civilians are deliber-

ately targeted. In , Secretary General Ban Ki-moon created a working groupto explore avenues for translating the Councils commitment to protection intotangible outcomes for endangered populations.

The Council also supported human protection by crafting relevant mandatesfor peace operations. Protection is now widely seen as one of the primaryfunctions of peace operations and central to their legitimacy. Although someearly peacekeeping operations contained human rights components, it was veryrare for civilian protection to be considered a core objective of the mission.Starting in with the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the SecurityCouncil has regularly invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter to create protec-tion mandates. Shortly thereafter, the Brahimi Report argued that peace-keepers who witness violence against civilians should officially be presumedto be authorized to stop it, within their means. Since then, peace operationsin Haiti (MINUSTAH), Burundi (ONUB), Liberia (UNMIL), Sudan (UNMIS,UNAMID) and the DRC (MONUC/MONUSCO), as well as UNOCI in CtedIvoire, have been mandated under Chapter VII to use all necessary means toprotect civilians, though usually with the insertion of some important geograph-ical, temporal and capabilities-based caveats. The regular use of Chapter VII tomandate peace operations to protect civilians represented an important develop-ment in the Councils thinking. But it is important to stress that each one of thesemissions operated with the consentalbeit sometimes coerced and unreliable

of the recognized government. Indeed, for at least one permanent member ofthe Security CouncilChinahost state consent was a necessary prerequisitefor all such deployments. In practice, the caveats and problems related to consentresulted in peace operations employing force to protect civilians infrequently andin most cases only against non-state actors (despite the fact that government forceswere often equally culpable).

Over the past decade, the Security Council has also delegated authority toregional arrangements in order to protect civilians, as in the French-led OperationArtemis deployed to eastern DRC in and the African Union (AU) Mission inSudan deployed in . Like UN missions, these operations enjoyed the nominalconsent of the de jure authorities in the respective countries.

The Security Councils response to the crises in Cte dIvoire and Libyaneeds to be seen in the context of its increasing willingness to authorize coali-tions and blue-helmet peacekeeping operations to use all necessary means for

Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conict, S/ / , Oct. . For theSecurity Councils reaction, see S/PV. , Nov. .

Siobhan Wills, Protecting civilians: the obligations of peacekeepers(Oxford: Oxford University Press, ). See Victoria K. Holt and Glyn Taylor with Max Kelly, Protecting civilians in the context of UN peacekeeping

operations(UN DPKO/OCHA, ). Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, A/ / -S/ / , Aug. . Ian Johnstone, Managing consent in contemporary peacekeeping operations,International Peacekeeping : ,

, pp. .


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human protection purposes. This trend has become established in the contextof international debate about R P and the Councils own willingness to reaffirmthe principle. However, there were clear limits to what the Council and interna-

tional society more generally were prepared to do: the Council remained reluctantto authorize the use of force against states, while international society remainedreluctant to provide UN operations with the capacity to implement protectionmandates or supply more robust multinational operations for anything other thansmall and limited missions such as Operation Artemis.

Cte dIvoireThe latest crisis in Cte dIvoire has raised for international society a set ofchallenges not entirely dissimilar to those faced in several other parts of Africa,including Sierra Leone, Liberia, the DRC and Sudan. Specically, UN peace-keepers were deployed to oversee the implementation of the LinasMarcoussisAccords of January and to use all necessary means to protect civilians. Theywere not, however, provided with sufficient resources to enforce the peace agree-ment, to protect all civilians or to serve as a substitute for state authority, and insome senses played a more traditional interposition role between the conictingparties. UNOCI was also supported by several thousand French soldiers stationedin Cte dIvoire prior to the outbreak of armed conict.

The latest phase of the conict came to a head after the principal parties disputedthe results of the long-postponed presidential election of November .Shortly thereafter armed conict reignited between the supporters of incumbent

President Laurent Gbagbo and his challenger Alassane Ouattara. Within days ofGbagbo claiming an election victory, the Economic Community of West AfricanStates (ECOWAS) and the UN Secretary General concluded that Ouattara hadin fact prevailed, yet Gbagbo and his supporters refused to step aside. As ghtersfrom both sides began to commit atrocities, UNOCI and France confronted diffi-cult political and operational questions about how to protect civilians.

After independence from France in , Cte dIvoire was ruled by FlixHouphout-Boigny and the Parti Dmocratique de Cte dIvoire (PDCI).Houphout-Boigny resisted democratization but forged strong patronage tieswith France, encouraged foreign investment, achieved economic growth, and builta degree of national unity based largely on the balancing of competing groups andinterests. Cte dIvoire became the worlds largest exporter of cocoa, creatinga demand for labour satised by immigration from neighbouring countries. But the economic benets were distributed very unevenly, creating signicantinequities between the economically active south and the largely impoverished

See S/PV. , Nov. . Abu Bakarr Bah, Democracy and civil war: citizenship and peacemaking in Cte dIvoire, African Affairs :

, , p. . Ruth Marshall-Fratani, The war of who is who: autochthony, nationalism and citizenship in the Ivoirian

crisis, African Studies Review : , , pp. ; Daniel Chirot, The debacle in Cte dIvoire, Journal ofDemocracy : , , pp. .


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north. After Houphout-Boignys death in , economic disparities were usedby politicians to exacerbate ethnic, cultural and religious divisions within thecountry. Under the terms of the constitution, the presidency passed to the PDCIs

speaker of the National Assembly, Henri Konan Bdi. Bdi opposed democraticreform, thereby losing the support of the PDCIs reformist wing, Rassemble-ment des Rpublicains (RDR), which broke away and offered Alassane Ouattaraas an alternative leader. The PDCIs stranglehold on power was also challenged byLaurent Gbagbos opposition party, the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), which hadcontested and lost an election against Houphout-Boignys PDCI in .

Facing potential defeat at the polls in , Bdi resorted to sectarian politicsby espousing the doctrine ofIvoirit . This played on existing divisions and conictsrooted in economic inequality and held that certain groups could not claim to beIvoirian or enjoy citizenship rights. In he forced through a law demandingthat candidates for public office prove that their parents were Ivoirian by origin,which he then used to disqualify Ouattaras candidacy for the presidency on thegrounds that his father was allegedly from Burkina Faso. The FPI also boycottedthe election, allowing Bdi to claim a mandate to govern. ThenceforthIvoiritguided many aspects of national policy, including land tenure and publicemployment, adding to economic and political exclusion and exacerbating inter-group tensions. In General Robert Gu launched a military coup againstBdi, promising to move towards civilian and inclusive government. However,Gu also proved reluctant to relinquish power, and his attempt to legitimize hisrule through rigged elections in failed thanks to street protests organizedby the FPI (which championed the extension of Ivoirit ) and the RDR (which

opposed the policy). Gbagbo claimed an electoral victory, Gu ed the country,and the FPI and RDR turned on each other. Gbagbo retained power and usedIvoiritto discredit Ouattara and the RDR.

In September the Patriotic Movement of Cte dIvoire (MPCI), ledby disgruntled army officers from marginalized groups in the countrys north,launched an armed insurrection which quickly assumed control of the north,though an attack on the commercial centre Abidjan was repelled. The MPCI was joined by two other armed groups, the Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du GrandOuest (MPIGO) and the Mouvement pour la Paix et la Justice (MPJ), in estab-lishing the Forces Nouvelles led by Guillaume Soro. The rebels demanded recog-nition of their Ivoirian citizenship, an end to Ivoirit , and transparent elections. In the face of this challenge Gbagbos government established militia groups.Both sides recruited former combatants from Liberia and Sierra Leone as merce-naries and committed major violations of international humanitarian law on awidespread and systematic basis, including massacres, extrajudicial executions, therecruitment and use of child soldiers, and various forms of sexual violence. In

Bah, Democracy and civil war, p. . Bah, Democracy and civil war, p. . Human Rights Watch, Afraid and forgotten: lawlessness, rape and impunity in western Cte dIvoire (New York, Oct.

), p. . On the wider pattern of abuses, see Human Rights Watch,Trapped between two wars: violence againstcivilians in western Cte dIvoire (New York, Aug. ).


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it was commonly thought that a renewal of civil war would mean a resump-tion of violence against civilians.

International societys response to the conict was relatively rapid, facilitated

by the presence of French troops and the activism of ECOWAS. In October Gbagbo requested French assistance in suppressing the uprising. France respondedswiftly to his request, but, chastened by international criticism of its past supportfor authoritarian governments such as those in Rwanda, Zaire and Chad, Parisopted for a peacekeeping response and established a buffer zone between thebelligerents. In May , under Resolution , the Security Council estab-lished a political mission (MINUCI) to observe and facilitate implementationof the accords. Later that year, and with substantial French support, ECOWASdeployed a peacekeeping mission (ECOFORCE/ECOMICI) to help stabilize thesituation. After protracted French lobbying, which won over its African members,the Security Council reached a compromise in Resolution on the establish-ment of a medium-sized operation, UNOCI, comprising some , troops. Thisabsorbed the ECOWAS force and MINUCI and was to operate alongside Frenchforces. France had initially called for the UN to deploy a larger force, but this wasopposed by the Bush administration as unnecessary and costly. Among otherthings, UNOCI was given a Chapter VII mandate to protect civilians underimminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deploy-ment. The resolution also authorized French forces to use all necessary means tosupport UNOCI and help protect civilians.

Despite its robust mandate, UNOCI proved unable to prevent Gbagbos forcesfrom attacking the Forces Nouvelles in late or to protect civilians from periodic

abuses. Indeed, some of its personnel were themselves accused of sexually abusingand exploiting the locals. In late , tensions between France and pro-Gbagboforces escalated when nine French peacekeepers were killed by the Ivoirian airforce. France retaliated by destroying Gbagbos air force, seizing the key airportat Yamoussoukro, and deploying heavy armour near Gbagbos home. After that,political progress stagnated and planned elections were repeatedly delayed, notleast because of radical disagreements about the meaning of Ivoirian citizenship andfailures to implement disarmament and demobilization plans. In response, SecurityCouncil Resolution ( ) movedat French insistenceto strengthen theposition of prime minister as a counterbalance to the president. Although Gbagboaccused France of neo-imperialism, he entered into dialogue with Guillaume Sorowhich eventually produced the Ouagadougou agreement. This established a transi-tional government of national unity with Soro appointed as prime minister, pavedthe way to national elections, created a process for resolving citizenship disputes,and called for the phased withdrawal of UNOCI and French forces concluding

See Maja Bovcon, Frances conict resolution strategy in Cte dIvoire and its ethical implications, AfricanStudies uarterly : , , p. ; Moya Collett, Foreign intervention in Cte dIvoire: the question oflegitimacy, in Tony Coady and Michael OKeefe, eds,Righteous violence (Melbourne: Melbourne UniversityPress, ), pp. .

Bovcon, Frances conict resolution strategy, p. .


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after the presidential election. After several delays, the rst round of presidentialelections was held on October and widely judged successful.

The presidential run-off, which began on November , did not go

smoothly. Disputes about citizenship and ethnicity resurfaced; both sides usedviolence and intimidation, and dozens were killed in pre-election violence. Usingthis as a pretext, Gbagbo imposed a curfew during the election. When Ouatta-ras supporters in Abidjan took to the streets to oppose the move, security forcesopened re, killing ve people and injuring many others. With early electionresults suggesting a Ouattara victory, Gbagbos representatives prevented thedissemination of the result. In the meantime, the Constitutional Council declaredthat there had been massive vote-rigging in the north and cancelled , votesfor Ouattara, thereby handing the election to Gbagbo. On December securityforces red on demonstrators, leaving at least eleven civilians dead. Reports alsoemerged of a wider pattern of killings across the country, and UNOCI reportedthat government forces had denied access to the site of suspected mass graves. According to Scott Straus, there were two main dynamics of post-election violence:urban repressive violence directed against demonstrators, northern Muslims andWest African nationals by Gbagbos forces; and rural violence between indigenousand ethnic minority groups in the countrys west, which followed a spiral patternof reprisals. As violence escalated, in Abidjan Ouattara was conned to the GolfHotel, where he was protected by UNOCI peacekeepers.

By this stage the Security Council had already come to a consensus thatOuattara had won the November election and was the rightful president of CtedIvoire. After receiving a brieng from the Secretary Generals Special Repre-

sentative for Cte dIvoire, who insisted that Ouattara had prevailed, the Councilformally supported this view in Resolution ( December ) and urgedthe parties to respect this result. Among other things, at the Secretary Generalsurging the Council decided to strengthen UNOCI by requesting the deploymentof Ukrainian helicopters.

The Councils decision to call the election result was politically signicant forboth New York and Abidjan. In doing so, the Security Council dismissed thevalidity of the Ivoirian Constitutional Councils decisiona signicant step forthose Council members formally committed to working on the basis of host stateconsent. It is difficult to know why Council members chose this course of action,because no formal statements were offered after the adoption of Resolution

Bah, Democracy and civil war, p. ; Bovcon, Frances conict resolution strategy, p. . For example, International Crisis Group (ICG), Cte dIvoire: nally escaping the crisis? , Africa Brieng no.

(Brussels, Nov. ). ICG, Cte dIvoire: is war the only option? , Africa Report no. (Brussels, March ), p. . ICG, Cte dIvoire: is war the only option? , p. . Scott Straus, Its sheer horror here: patterns of violence during the rst four months of Cte dIvoireselectoral crisis, African Affairs, advance access May , http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/

/ / afraf.adr .extract, accessed June . For a useful guide to the order of post-election events, see Rebecca Friedrichs, Timeline: election crisis inCte dIvoire (Washington DC, Stimson Center), http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/ Timeline_Election_Crisis_in_Cte_dIvoire.pdf, accessed June .


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. The resolution itself, however, recalls the prior recognition of Ouattara aspresident-elect by the African Union and ECOWAS. As in Libya, therefore, theattitude of regional arrangements was a critical determinant of Security Council

action. It seems unlikely that China and Russia would have effectively dismissedthe Constitutional Councils decision without prior regional support. The decisionalso had a signicant impact in Abidjan because, as McGovern explained, suchunanimity countered Gbagbos strategy of playing for time, hoping that African European or inter-African schisms would provide him with some sort of mitigatedlegitimacy. It thus quashed any hope Gbagbo or his allies may have harbouredof securing a power-sharing agreement such as those negotiated in the wake ofdisputed elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe. The decision also legitimized economicsanctions against Gbagbos supporters. Most notably, ECOWAS members movedto suspend the governments access to banking services, undercutting Gbagbosability to pay civil servants and soldiers and thereby reducing his allies to a smallcoterie of dedicated followers. Finally, the decision rendered Gbagbos consentfor the deployment of UN and French peacekeepers legally obsolete. A few daysprior to the passage of Resolution , Gbagbo had demanded the immediatewithdrawal of all foreign forces on the grounds that they were biased in favourof the rebels. The UN Secretariat responded with a press statement insisting thatGbagbos statements were inconsequential because ECOWAS, the AU, France,the US and others recognized Ouattara as the de jure president andtellingly,in the light of what we have said about the place of consent in Council decision-makingbecause it was for the Security Council alone to determine whether toextend or terminate UNOCI.

Concerns about the potential for mass atrocities appeared shortly thereafter.On December, the Special Advisers to the Secretary General on the Preventionof Genocide and R P (hereafter Special Advisers) issued a statement expressinggrave concern at the situation in Cte dIvoire, highlighting concerns about theincitement of atrocities, and reminding all the parties of their responsibility toprotect. The Special Advisers reiterated their grave concerns in a second state-ment issued on January that also specically identied a series of clasheswhich if not checked, could culminate in mass atrocities. Protection was not theonly concern, but it was part of the equation early on in the post-election crisisand the UN Secretariat played a leading role in placing it on the agenda.

By early , international society confronted a highly complex situation:there was an imminent threat to the civilian population; UN and French forces

UN Security Council, Update report: Cte dIvoire, Jan. . The position of Russia and China is particularlyinteresting given that both had expressed concern about this policy in informal consultations and preferred atechnical resolution focusing on UNOCI and leaving political matters aside.

Michael McGovern, The Ivoirian endgame, Foreign Affairs, April , http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/ /mike-mcgovern/the-ivorian-endgame, accessed June .

McGovern, Ivoirian endgame. Voice of America, UN spokesman: Gbagbo not Ivory Coast president, Dec. . UN press release, Secretary Generals Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility

to Protect on the situation in Cte dIvoire, Dec. . UN, statement attributed to Secretary Generals Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the

Responsibility to Protect on the situation in Cte dIvoire, Jan. .


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were mandated to protect civilians; but although they enjoyed the support of thede jure authorities, Gbagbos de facto regime in Abidjan viewed the peacekeepersas partisan opponents. There was also little agreement about what should be done

to resolve the crisis and protect civilians, and a palpable absence of viable avenuesfor breaking the deadlock.Diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis proceeded on two fronts. First, in

early December ECOWAS had suspended Cte dIvoires membership, calledon Gbagbo to step aside and threatened that it might use legitimate militaryforce if he did not; and in early January it dispatched a delegation of presidentsto Abidjan to talk Gbagbo down. But Gbagbo called their bluff and stood rm.Although ECOWAS tasked its military chiefs of staff to examine the availablemilitary options, its political leaders were well aware that they were in no positionto mount an effective military intervention and instead called for the UN SecurityCouncil to take more forceful action. Meanwhile, on the second front, UN officialspursued quiet mediation. Fourteen rounds of negotiation made little headway,largely because Gbagbo was not prepared to concede defeat and Ouattara, withstrong international support, was not prepared to make fundamental concessions.In early January UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon publicly called on Gbagboto step down and indicated that any attempt to attack Ouattara or harass UNOCItroops would be unacceptable. In a letter to the Security Council, the SecretaryGeneral also emphasized the potential risk to civilians, noting that the precarioussecurity situation could quickly degenerate into widespread conict and pointingto the state medias incitement of hostility and violence against particular Ivorianethnic, religious and political groups.

On the ground, the situation deteriorated, pushing the UN and French towardsmore obviously partisan positions. In late February, the Forces Nouvelles seizedtwo western towns, Zouan Hounien and Binhouye. On March, a rocket attackon a pro-Ouattara part of Abidjan killed or maimed at least people. UNOCIissued a statement indicating that such an act, perpetrated against civilians, couldconstitute a crime against humanity. Ouattaras forces, now calling themselvesthe Republican Forces of Cte dIvoire (RFCI), took several more western townsand then, on March, launched a general offensive. Forces associated with theRFCI massacred an estimated , civilians in the town of Dukou (at thetime of writing the UNHCR had conrmed that it had recovered bodies). Pro-Gbagbo Liberian mercenaries were thought to be responsible for massacres inBlolequin and Guiglo, where up to civilians were killed.

On March the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution . Thisrecognized Ouattara as president, condemned Gbagbos refusal to negotiate aresolution, and authorized UNOCI to use all necessary means to protect civil-ians, including by prevent[ing] the use of heavy weapons against the civilian

Authors conversations with UN officials, Feb. . Thalif Deen, Cte dIvoire: UN tight lipped on use of military force, Inter Press Service, Jan. . S/ / , Letter from the Secretary General of the United Nations to the Security Council, Jan. . Ivory Coast shelling in Abidjan a war crimeUN, BBC News, March . Ivory Coast: more than bodies found, BBC News, April .


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population. At the time, Council members offered different interpretations ofthis text, differences which became very signicant in the light of what followed.The UK said the resolution did not alter UNOCIs robust mandate under

which the Operation is already authorized to use all necessary means to protectcivilians, but that it did reaffirm UNOCIs role in protecting civilians andpreventing the use of heavy weapons against civilians. China, in contrast, saidpeacekeeping operations should strictly abide by the principle of neutralityand UNOCI should help to peacefully settle the crisis and avoid becoming aparty to the conict. India, meanwhile, emphasized that peacekeepers cannot bemade instruments of regime change; as a consequence, its representative said thatUNOCI should not become a party to the Ivorian political stalemate [and] shouldalso not get involved in a civil war, but [should] carry out its mandate with impar-tiality and while ensuring the safety and security of peacekeepers and civilians.

The following day, RFCI forces entered Abidjan and, although most ofGbagbos army melted away, he remained in his stronghold. On April the UNevacuated its civilian personnel, and UN helicopters as well as French attackhelicopters assaulted military camps and destroyed heavy weapons and weaponsstockpiles. This helped turn the tide of battle decisively in Ouattaras favour,although Gbagbo was able to hold out for another week, with his forces attackingUN positions on April.

This use of force by UN peacekeepers and French troops blurred the linesbetween human protection and regime change and raised questions about therole of the UN in overriding Cte dIvoires Constitutional Council, about theproper interpretation of Resolution , and about the place of neutrality and

impartiality in UN peacekeeping. One vocal critic was the former South AfricanPresident. Thabo Mbeki, who argued that the UN had overstepped its authorityby overriding the Constitutional Council, that Ban Ki-moon had exceeded hismandate by declaring Ouattara to be the winner of the elections, and that UNOCIhad fallen short of its mandate by failing to prevent or stop ceasere violationsby the Forces Nouvelles and then by failing to protect civilians in Dukou. Thesource of these failings, he maintained, lay in the abandonment of impartiality bythe UN and the undue inuence exerted by France.

The Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also criticized the role played bythe UN, arguing that UN peacekeepers and supporting French forces in CtedIvoire have started military action, taking the side of Ouattara, carrying out airstrikes on the positions held by supporters of Gbagbo. We are now looking intothe legality of this situation, because the peacekeepers were authorized to remainneutral, nothing more. Russia sustained this line of criticism at the SecurityCouncils May debate on the protection of civilians. In a thinly veiled refer-

The specic reference to heavy weapons was an unusual addition to a civilian protection mandate and may havebeen deliberately inserted by France to foreground its planned military action in conjunction with UNOCI.

All quotes from S/PV. , March . Thabo Mbeki, What the world got wrong in Cte dIvoire, Foreign Policy, April , http://www.foreign

policy.com/articles/ / / /What_the_world_get_wrong_in_cote_d_ivoire, accessed June . Russia lashes out at UN military action in Cte dIvoire, Associated Press, April .


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ence to UNOCI, Russia insisted: We believe that it is necessary once again toclearly reaffirm that it is unacceptable for United Nations peacekeepers to bedrawn into armed conict and, in effect, to take the side of one of the parties when

implementing their mandate. At the same meeting, Brazil maintained that theuse of force by peacekeepers to protect civilians must be carried out with utmostrestraint. This is necessary to ensure that blue helmets are not perceived as partiesto the conict. Avoiding such a perception is crucial for the continued success ofpeacekeeping.

Responding to these criticisms, Ban Ki-moon argued that in line with itsSecurity Council mandate, the mission [UNOCI] has taken this action in self-defence and to protect civilians. This argument was reiterated in the SecretaryGenerals keynote address in Soa, where he argued that at no time has the UNexceeded its Security Council mandates. In Cte dIvoire, UN forces undertook alimited military operation whose sole purpose was to protect innocent people. Theonly targets of armed action were the heavy weapons used by the former regimeto attack civilians and our own headquarters and peacekeepers. In relation tothe self-defence argument, UNOCI reported that on March its headquartersin Abidjan had been attacked by forces loyal to Gbagbo and had returned re,and that three UN convoys had also been attacked, with three peacekeepers beinginjured. In line with past UN practiceespecially MONUCs campaign againstthe Democratic Liberation Forces of Ruanda (FDLR) in the DRCUNOCIexplained that on April it had responded to these attacks with limited forceaimed at degrading Gbagbos capacity to attack peacekeepers. A few days later,peacekeepers protecting Ouattara and his staff came under attack by forces loyal to

Gbagbo. One Bangladeshi peacekeeper was killed and another injured. Accordingto Bangladeshs Permanent Representative to the UN, his government demandedan urgent response from the UN, and both the deputy head of the Department forPeacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Atul Khare, and Ban Ki-moon himself advisedthat UNOCI was planning to respond with force soon afterwards. The second,and more intense, use of force by UNOCI was therefore portrayed as a responseto the killing of a UN peacekeeper and accordingly an act of self-defence. Thecivilian protection argument appears somewhat weaker, given that UNOCI didlittle to prevent or punish massacres by RFCI forces and their allies. Nevertheless,the proclivity of Gbagbo forces to re on unarmed protesters and re rockets intocivilian areas gave grounds for thinking that they posed a threat to civilians andwere prepared to employ heavy weapons against them.

International societys engagement with the crisis in Cte dIvoire includedhuman protection as a core goal, permitted the use of force to that end, andproceeded through the Security Council. The situation became more controver-

S/PV. , May , p. . S/PV. , May , p. . uoted in Ivory Coast: UN forces re on pro-Gbagbo camp, BBC News, April . Ban Ki-moon, Address to the Soa platform, May , http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/ / sgsm .doc.htm, accessed June .

Ivory Coast: Gbagbo troops hit Ouattara HQ, BBC News, April .


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sial once the UN Secretariat and Council had dened Ouattara as Cte dIvoireslegitimate president, enabling UNOCI to reject demands for its withdrawal madeby Gbagbos de facto regime. Finally, regional arrangements played a crucial

gatekeeping role in dening the problem and terms of engagement. In particular,the Security Councils judgement about the election result was explicitly condi-tioned by the prior statements of ECOWAS and the AU; the UN Secretary Generalwas clearly guided by that regional support; and the specic language on the useof force for protection purposes in Resolution was facilitated by ECOWASsearlier announcement that force could be a legitimate means of responding to thecrisis. Without strong regional support it is very unlikely that events would haveunfolded in this manner.

But the episode also highlights some of the unresolved challenges associatedwith this new politics of protection. First, Security Council members offereddifferent interpretations of UNOCIs mandate. Compared to the SecretaryGeneral and some other Council members, India, China and Russia adopted arestrictive interpretation and were particularly concerned that by using force onlyagainst Gbagbos forces and not against the RFCIwhich had also breached theceasere and massacred civiliansUNOCI had abandoned impartiality.

Second, the episode raised questions about whether the Secretary Generals roleshould be more secretary or general. Critics complained that the UN Secre-tariat exceeded its mandate by challenging the Constitutional Councils announce-ment about the election result and permitting the use of force by UN peacekeepersin collaboration with French forces without the specic authorization of theSecurity Council. Indeed, it has been suggested that Russia was so incensed by the

Secretary Generals actions that it considered vetoing Ban Ki-moons second termas Secretary General. Clearly, if the UN is serious about being in the humanprotection business, peacekeepers must be able to take decisions quickly; but thisneeds to be done in a way that ensures Council mandates are implemented in amanner consistent with its wishes.

A third challenge relates to coordination across and outside the UN system.In this case the International Criminal Courts chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, was criticized for undermining attempts to negotiate a resolution to thecrisis by issuing a statement on December in which he promised that thoseleaders who are planning violence will end up in The Hague. According toMichael McGovern, with one sentence, Moreno-Ocampo ensured that Gbagbowould reject any negotiated solution and instead ght to the end.

Finally, the human protection agenda clearly requires international actors toengage in messy and complicated national and international politics. In cases likethis, peacekeepers will have to make difficult judgements about how to balance

See Simon Chesterman, ed., Secretary or general? The UN Secretary-General in world politics (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, ).

Authors correspondence with Western diplomat in New York, April . Statement by ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo on the situation in Cte dIvoire, Dec. , http://

www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/EB B-C - E - -D C E A .htm, accessed June . McGovern, The Ivoirian endgame.


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potentially contradictory aspects of their mandate. Would human protectionhave been best served by enforcing the ceasere with equal vigour against all thepartiesin effect, pitting UNOCI against all the armed groups in Cte dIvoire?

Would things have been better had UNOCI tried to remain neutral, or in thatcase would we now be writing about a protracted civil war and mounting civiliandeaths and displacements? Should the UN have accepted the judgement of theConstitutional Council and proceeded to cooperate with a Gbagbo-led govern-ment? Should the UN have cooperated so closely with French forces? ShouldUNOCI have done more to prevent and punish massacres by the RFCI? In ourview, the course set by UNOCIs leadership and the UN Secretariat helped tostabilize the situation and minimize casualties, but things could have turned outvery differently. More thinking is required about the operational guidance andcapabilities required to full human protection mandates.

LibyaThe March crisis in Libya was unexpected and escalated rapidly. Indeed, noneof the worlds existing genocide/atrocity risk assessment frameworks identiedLibya as being at risk, despite some of those lists extending to countries. To their credit, the UNs Special Advisers warned of the risk of crimes againsthumanity in Libya beforemost non-governmental agencies did so, but even thiswas very late in the day.

The roots of Libyas crisis lie in the political upheavals associated with the ArabSpring protests that spread from Tunisia to Egypt and beyond in the early months

of . After some initial protests in mid-January, demonstrations quicklyturned violent. This was partly because of the regimes crackdown and partlybecause defections from the government and army facilitated the establishmentof an armed opposition group under the Interim Transitional National Council(henceforth referred to as the Interim Council). Initially the rebels enjoyed rapidsuccesses, establishing a rm hold over the cities of Benghazi and Tobruk anddeclaring they had taken control of most of the countrys other major cities. Inlate February and early March, however, adhas forces retook much of thecountry and by mid-March were threatening to crush the rebellions easternepicentre in Benghazi. In words that bore direct echoes of the Rwandangenocide, adha told the world that officers have been deployed in all tribesand regions so that they can purify all decisions from these cockroaches and anyLibyan who takes arms against Libya will be executed.

As in Cte dIvoire, senior UN officials framed the problem as one of humanprotection, warning of the imminent threat to civilians in Libya. On February

The Mass Atrocity Crime Watch List did not include Libya in its list of at risk countries (http:// www.preventorprotect.org/overview/watch-list.html); nor did Barbara Harff s list of countries (http:// globalpolicy.gmu.edu/genocide/CurrentRisk .pdf ). Minority Rights Group International did not listLibya among the countries posing a risk to minorities in (http://www.minorityrights.org/ / peoples-under-threat/peoples-under-threat- .html), and Libya was not an area of concern for theGenocide Intervention Network (http://www.genocideintervention.net/), all last accessed June .

Deant Gadda issues chilling call, ABC (Australia), Feb. .


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the UNs High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, called on theauthorities to stop using violence against demonstrators, which may amount tocrimes against humanity. On the same day, the Special Advisers said the regimes

behaviour could amount to crimes against humanity and insisted that it complywith its commitment to R P. The Secretary General reiterated this pointthe following day, thus framing the crisis as a human protection problem andreminding both the Libyan authorities (to no effect) and the Security Council(to good effect) of their responsibilities. On February, the UN Human RightsCouncil established a commission of inquiry to investigate the situation and urgedthe General Assembly to suspend Libya from the Human Rights Councilwhichit duly did on March.

As in Cte dIvoire, regional organizations played a gatekeeping role by estab-lishing the conditions under which the Security Council could consider adoptingenforcement measures. The rst sign that relevant regional arrangements wouldfacilitate a robust international response came on February when the Leagueof Arab States (LAS)an organization traditionally wedded to the principleof non-interferencesuspended Libyas participation until the violence wasstopped. On February, the AUs Peace and Security Council issued a commu-niqu which condemned the indiscriminate and excessive use of force and lethalweapons against peaceful protestors, in violation of human rights and InternationalHumanitarian Law, in response to the legitimate aspirations of the people ofLibya for democracy, political reform, justice and socio-economic development.

Activism by the UN Secretariat and the relatively tough stance taken byregional organizations thus set the context for the Security Councils discussions

on the crisis. From the outset, the UK and France supported a tough line whilethe US administration was more reticent, especially with regard to potentialmilitary options. The Council held informal consultations on February andwas briefed by the Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, Lynn Pascoe,after which it issued a press statement that welcomed the LAS statement earlierthat day, expressed grave concern about the situation in Libya, condemned theuse of force against civilians, called on the government to meet its responsibilityto protect and promised to monitor the situation closely. Four days later, afterfurther consultations, the Council unanimously passed Resolution . Amongother things, this condemned the widespread and systematic attacks against civil-ians, which, it noted, may amount to crimes against humanity; welcomed theearlier criticisms of the Libyan governments actions by the LAS, the AU andthe Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC); and underlined the Libyangovernments responsibility to protect its population. Acting under Chapter VII

Libya attacks may be crimes against humanity: UN, Reuters, Feb. . UN press release, statement by the UN Secretary General Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide,

Francis Deng, and the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, on the situation inLibya, Feb. .

See Arabic original statement, http://www.arableagueonline.org/lasimages/picture_gallery/bayan - .doc, accessed May .

AU document PSC/PR/COMM(CCLXI), Feb. . SC/ -AFR/ , Feb. .


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of the UN Charter, the Council demanded an immediate end to the violence;urged adhas government to ensure safe passage for humanitarian and medicalsupplies; referred the situation in Libya since February to the Prosecutor of

the International Criminal Court; established an arms embargo on the country;imposed indenite travel bans on individual members of the Libyan regime;froze indenitely the assets of six members of the regime; established a sanctionscommittee to monitor the implementation of these measures; and called uponmember states to make available humanitarian and related assistance for Libya.

Resolution proved relatively uncontroversial, although several Councilmembers intimated in the informal consultations that they were not prepared toendorse more coercive measures. Russia argued publicly thata settlement of the situation in Libya is possible only through political means. In fact, thatis the purpose of the resolution which imposes targeted, clearly expressed, restrictivemeasures with regard to those guilty of violence against the civilian population. However,it does not enjoin sanctions, even indirect, for forceful interference in Libyas affairs, whichcould make the situation worse.

It was widely thought at the time that China, India and probably Brazil shared thisview, making the adoption of further, more coercive, measures highly unlikely.In response, on March, adhas regime wrote to the UN Security Councildeclaring its condemnation of Libya to be premature and requesting that Resolu-tion be suspended until the allegations against Libya were conrmed.

After Resolution , three factors helped persuade the Security Council toovercome its differences and adopt enforcement measures, albeit with the absten-tion of ve members. The rst was Libyan intransigence, along with the deteriora-tion of the situation inside Libya, with the imminent fall of rebel-held Benghaziand fears that adhas forces would commit a massacre there. On the diplomaticfront, the adha regime rejected the demands set out in Resolution andrefused to permit humanitarian aid convoys into besieged towns such as Misrataand Ajdabiya. The UN Secretary General personally contacted the Libyan leaderand in a -minute conversation triedand failedto persuade him to comply.Thus, while the search for a diplomatic solution through the UN Special Envoyand the AU High-Level Committee enjoyed widespread support, many govern-ments, commentators and UN officials alike were coming to the view that diplo-macy alone would not prevent a massacre.

Second, the UK and France stepped up their calls for a tougher internationalresponse, introducing a draft resolution on a no-y zone several days before seriousnegotiations on Resolution began. This proposal was opposed by Germanyand regarded with considerable caution by the United States. On March,however, NATO announced that it was moving additional ships into the regionto support humanitarian assistance efforts and its own ability to monitor the crisis

On March, the ICC prosecutor said his office was investigating crimes against humanity that may have beencommitted by adhas regime.

S/PV. , Feb. . Cited in Security Council, Update report no. , Libya, March . Bruce D. Jones, Libya and the responsibilities of power,Survival : , , p. .


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effectively. Its Secretary General also revealed that the alliance was discussing howan arms embargo and/or no-y zone over Libya might be enforced.

The deteriorating situation and Anglo-French activism ramped up the rhetoric,

but with the US decidedly uncommitted and with authorization from the UNSecurity Council thought highly unlikely owing to Russian, Chinese, Indian,Brazilian and German opposition, the prospects for military action appeared slim.The political game-changer came with the third key factorthe positions takenby relevant regional organizations. Once again regional organizations served asgatekeepers by framing the issues and dening the range of feasible internationalaction.

On March the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) called on the UN SecurityCouncil to take all necessary measures to protect civilians, including enforcinga no-y zone over Libya, and condemned crimes committed against civilians,the use of heavy arms and the recruitment of mercenaries by the Libyan regime.The following day, the OIC echoed the GCC position when it called for a no-yzone over Libya, although it explicitly excluded foreign military operations on theground. On March the GCC claimed that adhas regime had lost all legiti-macy and urged the Arab League to initiate contact with the Interim Council.That same day, France, Italy and EU foreign affairs head Catherine Ashton alsoopened dialogue with the Interim Council. It was the March declaration by theLAS that proved decisive, however. This called on the UN Security Council toimpose immediately a no-y zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establishsafe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows theprotection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in Libya, while

respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring States, andto cooperate and communicatewith the Transitional National Council of Libya andto provide the Libyan people with urgent and continuing support as well as thenecessary protection from the serious violations and grave crimes committed bythe Libyan authorities, which have consequently lost their legitimacy. Givensubsequent debates about what was meant by a no-y zone, it is important tostress that the LAS statement called for a no-y zoneand the establishment of safe areasto protect civilians from shelling.

Unfortunately, we do not have a good understanding of why the LAS, alongstanding opponent of humanitarian intervention, adopted this decision; butthere are a number of factors that may have played a role. First, several immediate

NATO ready to support international efforts on Libya,NATO, March , http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natolive/news_ .htm, accessed June .

Final communique issue by the emergency meeting of the Committee of Permanent Representatives to theOrganization of the Islamic Conference on the Alarming developments in Libyan Jamahiriya, March ,http://www.oic-oci.org/topic_detail.asp?t_id= &x_key=, accessed June ..

Council of the League of Arab States, Res. no. , March , paras and . Thanks to Louise Fawcett for helpful advice on some of these points. On Arab attitudes towards humanitarian

intervention and R P, see Gulf Research Centre, Arab perspectives and formulations on humanitarian intervention inthe Arab countries (Dubai, UAE, Gulf Research Council Event Papers, ), esp. pp. ; Bassma Kodmani,The imported, supported, and homegrown security of the Arab world, in Chester Crocker, Fen OslerHampson and Pamella Aall, eds,Rewiring regional security(Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, ),pp. .


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contextual factors might have inuenced the decision: the meeting was drivenby the pro-US GCC grouping; only eleven LAS members were present, withthe GCC in the majority; and the meeting was held in Cairo in the immediate

aftermath of the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak and chaired by the new Egyptiangovernment. It would be unwise to exaggerate the role of the GCCs pro-USorientation in this instance, since the Obama administration was yet to endorsethe idea of a no-y zone and remained unenthusiastic about military optionsin general; nevertheless, it is not difficult to see how this context might havehelped facilitate the decision. Although LAS statements are taken by consensus,two non-GCC membersAlgeria and Syriawere reportedly opposed to thestatement, though Algerian diplomats later advised the Congressional ResearchService that Algeria had not in fact objected.

Second, although adhas regime was an important donor to the AU and avariety of African states, it was widely distrusted across Africa and the MiddleEast, not least for its role in fuelling conicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Chad, aswell as the radical Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. adha was alsoa prominent rival for regional inuence with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.He had personally insulted key Arab personalities: in he blew cigar smokeinto King Fahds face, and at a LAS summit he launched a widely publicizedtirade against Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, declaring him a product of GreatBritain and protected by the United States and a man whose past is a pack oflies and who is facing death. adha also proclaimed himself African king ofkingsannoying many African leaders by inating the status of their traditionalchiefsand Imam of the Muslims. It is therefore not difficult to see why the

GCC supported measures against Libya and why few countries were prepared todefend adha.Third, a combination of genuine humanitarian solidarity and opportunism

may have played a role. Al-Jazeeras reporting of Libyan abuses and mobilizationof opposition groups across North Africa and the Middle East prompted demandsfor action on Libya within the Arab world itself, while adhas unpopularity inthe region made an activist stance relatively easy to adopt. Indeed, some regionalgovernments might have calculated that turning the international spotlight onLibya would divert attention from their own troubles. Alternatively, they mighthave worried about being portrayed as obstacles to human rights in a way thatmight have encouraged internal opposition.

The position of the AUs Peace and Security Council was more cautious andrather less generous to the Interim Council than that of the LAS. Although itdened the situation in Libya as a serious threat to peace and security in thatcountry and in the region as a whole, it condemned the indiscriminate use offorce and lethal weapons and the transformation of pacic demonstrations intoan armed rebellion. It also emphasized its strong commitment to the respect of

Christopher Blanchard, Libya: unrest and US policy (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, March ), p. .

Libyas Gadda hurls insults at king,The Age (Australia), March .


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the unity and territorial integrity of Libya, as well as its rejection of any foreignmilitary intervention, whatever its form.

As it turned out, LAS activism had more of an impact at the UN Security

Council than AU caution. Indeed, Resolution would have been unthinkablewithout the LAS resolution. The most immediate effect was on US policy. TheObama administration had been cautious about the prospect of military actionin Libyabecause of concerns about military overstretch, potential casualties,budgetary implications, the potential for mission creep, absence of a clear exitstrategy, and concerns about alienating states in the Middle East and elsewhere inthe Muslim worldbut the LAS resolution strengthened the hand of the inter-ventionists within it. On March senior officials held what was described asan extremely contentious White House meeting which resulted in PresidentObama accepting the case for intervention argued by Hillary Clinton, SamanthaPower, Gayle Smith and Mike McFaul over the more cautious positions expressedby Robert Gates, Tom Donilon, Denis McDonough and others. Having decidedto support stronger measures against Libya, the US expended a lot of diplomaticenergy trying to persuade Security Council members to accept the proposedresolution, a factor that proved particularly important in relation to the votes ofRussia and South Africa.

It was in this context that Security Council members debated whether toauthorize the use of force to establish a no-y zone and to protect civilians. There were, however, a number of sticking points. Most signicantly, twopermanent members (China and Russia) and three non-permanent members(India, Brazil and Germany) of the Security Council were unconvinced of the

need to use military force and sceptical about the motives of those calling forit. Their rationale was in part principledfor instance, Chinas long-establishedve principles of foreign policy emphasize non-interference and the non-use offorce, as did Brazils and statements on national defence policies. Butthey also presented prudential and pragmatic objections, including that the use ofmilitary force might exacerbate an already bad situation and that the decision toimpose a no-y zone could quickly lead to more military commitments and mightprolong the conict. An additional problem identied by China, Russia and Indiarevolved around procedural and pragmatic questions which were left unansweredin the resolution. How would the no-y zone be enforced? What assets would beused? What would the coalitions rules of engagement be? And what would thepolitical end-game entail? A further complaint levelled by the Russian delegationwas that new provisions had been added to the resolution which went beyond theLAS request and opened the door to more large-scale military intervention. Indiasrepresentative also questioned the timing of the decision to use force, pre-emptingthe delivery of the UN Special Envoys report to the Council. Brazils represen-

AU document PSC/PR/COMM. (CCLXV), March . Josh Rogin, How Obama turned on a dime toward war, March , http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/

posts/ / / /how_obama_turned_on_a_dime_toward_war, accessed June . Jones, Libya and the responsibilities of power, p. . See S/PV. , March .


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tative questioned whether the use of external military force would change thenature of the rebellions home-grown narrative and thereby inhibit long-termconict resolution.

Despite these concerns, the Council having repeatedly expressed its determina-tion to accept its duties under R P and accepted the legitimacy of internationalengagement by unanimously adopting Resolution , and being confrontedwith advice from the UN Secretariat and elsewhere about the imminence of massatrocities, the sceptics had little diplomatic room for manoeuvre. A Russian draftresolution calling for political dialogue gained little momentum, in part becauseof the level of support behind the FrenchUKLebanon draft, and in partbecause it seemed dangerously out of step with the rapidly evolving situation onthe ground. Combined with the forceful calls for action by the LAS, GCC andOIC, and the supportive voices of the Councils three African members and soleMiddle Eastern member, these considerations prompted Russia and China (alongwith Brazil, India and Germany) to decide to abstain in the vote. Simply put, thoseCouncil members that remained sceptical about the use of force abstained becausethey believed that they could not legitimize inaction in the face of mass atrocities.

Brazil, for instance, stated that its vote should in no way be interpreted ascondoning the behaviour of the Libyan authorities or as disregard for the need toprotect civilians and respect their rights, but that it remained unconvinced thatthe use of force will lead to the realization of our common objectivetheimmediate end to violence and the protection of civilians. Russias delegation stillclaimed they were consistent and rm advocates of the protection of the civilianpopulation but argued that the quickest way to ensure robust security for the

civilian population and the long-term stabilization of the situation in Libya is animmediate ceasere. China welcomed attempts to protect civilians but also notedits principled objection to using force and the fact that we and other Councilmembers asked specic questions [about Resolution ]. However, regrettably,many of those questions failed to be claried or answered. China has serious diffi-culty with parts of the resolution.

When the vote took place on March, Resolution was passed with tenvotes in favour and ve abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia).It reiterated the Councils concern that crimes against humanity might have beencommitted, deplored the ongoing humanitarian crisis, and took note of thecriticisms of adhas regime made by a variety of international organizations(discussed above), particularly the LAS call for a no-y zone and safe areas toprotect civilians. Once again, it dened the situation in Libya as a threat to inter-national peace and security; and, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,it demanded, among other things, an immediate ceasere and intensied effortsto nd a political solution to the crisis. In operative paragraph , the Councilauthorized the use of all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilianpopulated areas under threat of attack while excluding a foreign occupation

Lebanon was acting as the representative of the LAS. All quotes from S/PV. , March .


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force of any form on any part of Libyan territory. In operative paragraph itestablished a ban on all ights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya inorder to help protect civilians, excepting only those necessary to enforce the

no-y zone and those whose sole purpose is humanitarian. It also rened thearms embargo and asset freeze detailed in Resolution , in part by creating apanel of experts to assist in their implementation.

Almost as soon as the resolution was passed, differences emerged as to how itshould be interpreted. NATO and several key allies, including atar and Jordan,interpreted the mandate as providing the basis for a wide range of military activi-ties including the suppression of Libyas air defences, air force and other aviationcapacities, as well as the use of force against Libyas elded forces, its capacityto sustain elded forces, and its command and control capacities, on the basisthat Libyas armed forces constituted a threat to civilians. This interpretationseems consistent with a plain text reading of Resolution as noted by severalprominent international lawyers, including Philippe Sands, Malcolm Shaw andRyszard Piotrowicz. Others disagreed. Perhaps with one eye on his candidacyfor the Egyptian presidency, LAS Secretary General Amr Moussa suggested thatNATOs action differ[ed] from the goal of imposing a no-y zone and stated thatwhat we want is the protection of civilians and not bombing other civilians. Although Moussa backtracked the following day, using a joint press conferencewith Ban Ki-moon to reiterate his support for Resolution , other SecurityCouncil members echoed his initial view. Russia, for example, noted that NATObombing had caused civilian casualties and emphasized that any use of force bythe coalition in Libya should be carried out in strict compliance with Resolution

( ). Any act going beyond the mandate established by that resolution inany way or any disproportionate use of force is unacceptable. China also statedthat it wanted to see an immediate ceasere and was not in favour of any arbitraryinterpretation of the Councils resolutions or of any actions going beyond thosemandated by the Council. South Africa, a cautious supporter of Resolution

, later joined the chorus of criticism, arguing that the Councils decision torefer the situation in Libya to the ICC in Resolution should trigger consider-ation of any actions that may have been committed in the purported implementa-tion of Resolution .

The future of protection politics will clearly be inuenced by how the situationin Libya is resolved. But there is evidence of what we have called the new politicsof protection in the decision-making that produced Resolution as well asthe challenges associated with its implentation. International society framed thesituation in Libya in human protection terms almost from the outset of the crisis,with the UN Secretariatin this case the Special Advisers, High Commissionerfor Human Rights and Secretary Generalplaying a central role. Second, the

See http://www.ejiltalk.org/what-does-un-security-council-resolution- -permit/, accessed June . Cited in Arab League criticises western strikes in Libya,Straits Times, March . S/PV. , May , p. . S/PV. , p. S/PV. , p. .


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Security Council proved willing to authorize the use of force for human protec-tion purposes. Indeed, it did so, for the rst time in its history, against the wishesof the host state. Third, regional arrangements acted as gatekeepers. Before the

LAS resolution calling for the imposition of a no-y zone and safe areas to protectcivilians, British and French diplomats were pessimistic about the chances of theCouncil being persuaded to authorize enforcement action and the US remaineduncommitted to the idea of enforcement measures. Without the LAS statementit is unlikely that what became Resolution would ever have been tabled fora vote. Whatever the reasons behind the LAS decision, it changed the Councilsdynamics: it made opposition to enforcement more difficult; it brought the USon board, adding to the feasibility of the military option; it helped persuadethe African Council members; and ultimately it pushed the remaining scepticalmembers towards abstention. One important question to emerge from the Libyacase, though, is which regional organization can legitimately claim the mantleof gatekeeper. In adopting Resolution , the Counciland not only thosemembers that supported the resolutionprivileged the attitudes of the LAS overthose of the AU. Particularly signicant in this regard was the decision of thethree African members (Nigeria, Gabon and South Africa) to support the resolu-tion rather than abstain. Had two of the three African members chosen to faith-fully reect the AU position in their voting, Resolution would not havebeen adopted because it would have fallen short of the required nine affirmativevotes. If regional organizations continue to play a gatekeeping role, questionsabout which organizations the Council should give priority to and the potentialfor forum shopping will come to the fore. Finally, as with Cte dIvoire, major

powers and other relevant actors demonstrated a preference for working throughthe Security Council.As for the challenges raised by the new politics of protection in the Libyan

theatre, four stand out. First, as noted above, NATO has been widely criticizedfor what some states see as an overly expansive interpretation of Resolution and for causing civilian casualties. Second, questions have been raised about therelationship between human protection and other goals, particularly regimechange. Critics contend that while protection is a legitimate activity it must notbecome synonymous with regime change. Third, the case of Libya raises questionsabout which regional organizations should be given the gatekeeping role in situa-tions where relevant institutions adopt different positions on the use of force.Finally, although it is too early to draw denitive conclusions about the effective-ness of the protection measures adopted by the Security Council, past experiencefrom Kosovo and elsewhere and evidence from the rst phases of enforcementoperations in Libya suggest that while air power can help stem the tide of masskilling, it provides only indirect protection and may come at the cost of someunintended additional harm to civilians.


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Conclusion: a new politics of protection

International societys response to the crises in Cte dIvoire and Libya reects anew politics of protection which has developed over the past decade and has fourprincipal characteristics. First, encouraged by the UN Secretariat, the SecurityCouncil has framed these crises in terms of human protection. Second, theSecurity Council has demonstrated a repeated willingness to authorize the use ofmilitary force for protection purposes and, with the adoption of Resolution ,has broken through the nal constraint of principle on humanitarian interven-tionthe nominal consent of the host state. Third, regional organizations havebecome important gatekeepers, inuencing how issues are framed and the rangeof plausible policy options available to the Security Council. Finally, internationalsociety has exhibited a commitment to working through the Security Council tofashion responses to human protection crises.

However, the cases of Cte dIvoire and Libya also make clear that this newagenda faces a range of unresolved challenges which could inhibit the establish-ment of consensus in responding to future protection crises and leave protectionoperations exposed to some critical vulnerabilities.

First, differences remain over how to interpret Security Council mandates. Inthe Libyan case this occurred in spite of the fact that, prior to the adoption ofResolution , US diplomats in New York extensively briefed their counter-parts from hesitant states about the activities that would be required to imple-ment a no-y zone and protect civilians. Interpretation issues came up againin debate on the protection of civilians in May . India, for example, asked,Who watches the guardians? and noted a considerable sense of unease about themanner in which the humanitarian imperative of protecting civilians has beeninterpreted for actual action on the ground. Likewise, China opposed anyattempt to wilfully interpret the resolutions or to take actions that exceed thosemandated by the resolutions. Such concerns may lead to some Council membersspecifying more clearly the language they are prepared to support or tolerate andinsisting that resolutions set out precisely what level and type of force is (andis not) authorized. This could have two potentially deleterious effects: it mightmake it more difficult for Council members to nd common ground on humanprotection mandates; and, when resolutions are passed, the imposition of moreconstraints on UN peace operations or coalitions of the willing might exacerbate

some of the operational problems experienced in Libya, making it more difficultto implement resolutions effectively.

A second and related challenge is the relationship between human protectionand other goals such as regime change. Several Council members complained thatcivilian protection might be used as a faade for other agendas. As the Russianrepresentative put it, the noble goal of protecting civilians should not be compro-mised by attempts to resolve in parallel any unrelated issues. Or, as the Brazilian

S/PV. , May , p. . S/PV. , p. . S/PV. , p. .


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representative argued, excessively broad interpretations of the protection of civil-ians could create the perception that it is being used as a smokescreen forintervention or regime change. South Africa emphasized that actions should

not go beyond the letter and spirit of Council resolutions or advance politicalagendas that go beyond the protection of civilian mandates, including regimechange. In our view, such actions will undermine the gains made in this discourseand provide ammunition to those who have always been sceptical of the concept. It is not difficult to see why some states might be concerned about the overlapbetween protection and regime change, and the potential for the former to beused as justication for the latter. Although many internet blogs and newspapereditorials have accused western states of pursuing their material interests in Libya,especially in relation to oil, we have found little evidence to support such an inter-pretation. Nevertheless, the perception of ulterior motives and agendas may make itmore difficult in the future to forge a consensus on the use of force for protectionpurposes, within the context of either a peacekeeping operation or a potentialhumanitarian intervention. China summed up the basic principle that many stateswant to see fullled: There must be no attempt at regime change or involvementin civil war by any party under the guise of protecting civilians. The problemwith this view is that it offers no answer to how the UN and/or coalitions mightprotect civilians from regimes that attack them without targeting, weakening andultimately changing the behaviour of the regime in question.

The third challenge relates to the role of regional organizations as gatekeepers.Evidence from these and other recent cases, including Kenya and Guinea, demon-strates that international responses to protection crises are most effective when

there is a strong partnership between the UN and relevant regional organizations.Moreover, the emerging gatekeeper role being played by regional organizationsprovides avenues for increased activism on human protection while (theoreti-cally) ensuring that the Security Council acts in a manner that is consistent withregional norms and interests. Nevertheless, such gatekeeping presents at least twochallenges. First, what should be done when regional organizations disagree, asthe LAS and AU did in relation to Libya? In the future, Council members might betempted to go forum shopping to nd regional organizations that better reecttheir own positions in order to legitimize those views. Second, while regionalgatekeepers can facilitate robust international responses to protection crises, theycan also block decisive action. Thus, while the LAS and its representative on theSecurity Council, Lebanon, facilitated intervention in Libya, it prevented theCouncil from even condemning violence against civilians in Syria. Most notably,in April and May China and Russia were reportedly comfortable in principlewith the idea of issuing a Council press statement criticizing the Syrian regime forkilling unarmed protesters (though they were uncomfortable with the wordingproposed by western states), and yet the initiative was blocked by Lebanon onthe grounds that press statements require unanimity. Recall that the Councils

S/PV. , p. . S/PV. , p. . S/PV. , p. .


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rst response to the crisis in Libya was a press statement. By preventing it fromtaking this course of action again, Lebanon effectively halted movement towardstougher measures. Clearly, Syrias relationship with Hezbollah and that organiza-

tions capacity to destabilize Lebanon inuenced this position, but Syrias gener-ally better standing in the Middle East compared to Libya has thus far protected itfrom LAS criticism, thereby limiting the Security Councils engagement.

In this instance, then, the gatekeeping role of a regional organization preventeda forceful international response to state-sanctioned killing in Syria, leavingprotesters to their fate. The closing of Security Council avenues by regionalgatekeepers also jeopardizes the international commitment to work through theSecurity Council when responding to protection crises. If the Security Councilpath is blocked, concerned states will look for alternative avenues to protectvulnerable populationsas the US and EU have done in the Syrian instance byimposing unilateral sanctions on the Syrian regime. Striking the balance betweenensuring that Security Council decisions are legitimate in the regions in whichthey apply, consistent with regional norms and interests, and taken in conjunctionwith relevant regional organizations, and the need to keep Council pathways toprotection open, will remain a difficult challenge.

Finally, human protection requires external actors to engage in local wars andpolitics, and this will blur the lines between protection and other agendas such asregime change. While the demand that these agendas be kept separate is politicallyunderstandable and conceptually appealing, it will often be hard to meet. Whenthe principal threat to civilians comes from the regime, those demanding strictseparation need to explain how peacekeepers or coalitions authorized to use force

to protect civilians can do so effectively without facilitating regime change. Moredialogue is thus needed on operational questions including: What do no-y zonesentail? How can civilians be protected from their own governments? What consti-tute safe areas and how can they be protected? What military resources, tactics andstrategies are required to full protection mandates?

To date, efforts to develop doctrine for civilian protection operations havefollowed in two main strands. The rst, the Protection of Civilians agenda withincontemporary peace operations, has inuenced documents setting out guidelines,principles and to some extent peace operations doctrine within the UN, AU andEU in particular. The principal scenario for these efforts is when peacekeepers aredeployed with the official consent of the host government but operate in environ-ments where a plethora of threats to civilians remain, usually from insurgents,predatory government soldiers and/or criminal gangs. Broadly speaking, theseguidelines have sketched two types of protection activities: positioning militaryforces between the civilian population and those that threaten them in order todeter and respond to attacks; and taking measures designed to eliminate or restrictthe activities of armed groups that threaten civilians.

See e.g. Holt et al., Protecting civilians; Alison Giffen, Addressing the doctrinal decit: developing guidance to preventand respond to widespread or systematic attacks against civilians, workshop report (Washington DC: Stimson Center,

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International Affairs : , Copyright The Author(s) International Affairs The Royal Institute of International Affairs

The second strand has emerged from attempts to develop new doctrine for theUS military to conduct protection operations effectively. Arguably the mostuseful

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Texto de Direitos Humanos em Inglês