Tetra Tech

Salang Tunnel Study T.O. AID 306 Security Plan

Version 1.0

Plan Owner

Project Risk Manager

May 2012

RESTRICTED USE WARNING GardaWorld Limited prepared this SMP at the request of the client to whom it is furnished. The client agrees that information received from GardaWorld Limited is strictly confidential and are intended solely for the private and exclusive Use of the client. Any other Use and any communication, publication or reproduction of the report or any portion of its contents without the written consent of GardaWorld Limited is strictly forbidden. The client agrees to indemnify and hold harmless GardaWorld Limited against any damages or claims resulting from such unauthorized Use

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DOCUMENT CONTROL Revision Record

Revision No Date Details of Document Change Process Owner

Review and Approval Revision No: 01

Name Designation Signature Dates

Approved

Reviewed

Prepared

Document Distribution

Name Function / Title Type Date HC / E

Note: HC: Designates hard copy of document. E: Designates electronic copy of document

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GardaWorld Contents

GardaWorld Mission 3 Introduction 3 Location 4 Risk Assessment 4 Concept of Operations 6 Site Security Team Composition 6 Roles and Responsibilities 7 Manpower Requirements 8 Weapons 8 Equipment 10 Vehicles 10 Training 11 Communications 12 Emergency Response 12 Evacuation 13 Medical Support 13 Intelligence 14 Operational Security 15 Annex A – Actions On 16 Annex B – Command and Control/Medical 20

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1. GardaWorld Mission GardaWorld’s objective is to facilitate a safe and secure working environment in the form of static and mobile security for Tetra Tech personnel while conducting a feasibility study on the Salang Tunnel. 2. Introduction This policy document serves as the Security Plan (SP) and will also highlight relevant Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for GardaWorld (GW) on Green Village (GV), Kabul and the Salang pass area of operations. This policy applies to all Tetra Tech / GW personnel assigned, attached, or detailed to support the Salang Pass projects on GV and surrounding areas of operations. All of these individuals entering and exiting the site are subject to GardaWorld force protection policy and Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs). This procedure is not intended to supersede Force Protection measures already in place within the local area (US Military / Afghanistan National Army) and is subject to modification based on established threat levels. This SP will be reviewed as required and any recommended changes will be forwarded to GardaWorld Operations center for review and implementation. 3. Location

Salang Pass Risk Assessment (May 2012)

The Salang Pass is located in Parwan Province of Central Region and

is historically known to be a permissive and low threat operating

environment for the international community. Throughout April 2012

there was only 1 x officially recorded incident and this referred to an

IED that is thought to date back to the Soviet occupation. The Salang

Pass, at an elevation of 3878 m above sea level, is the major mountain

pass connecting northern Afghanistan and Kabul province. The pass

crosses the Hindu Kush but is now bypassed through the Salang

tunnel, built by the Soviet Union in 1964, which runs underneath it at a

height of about 3,400 m. It links Charikar and Kabul with Mazari Sharif and Termez.

The road through the pass has carried heavy military traffic in recent conflicts, and is in a very bad state

of repair. On 3 November 1982, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, there was a huge fire in the

tunnel that was filled with Soviet military convoys, a large amount of Soviet troops died in the blaze.

On February 9, 2010, the pass was hit by 36 avalanches that

struck the southern approach to the tunnel and killed dozens,

buried miles of highway, and trapped vehicles in the Salang

tunnel. By February 10, 2010 authorities had recovered over

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160 bodies. Radio Free Europe reports the first avalanche blocked the tunnel, and trapped vehicles in a

traffic jam in a "deadly avalanche zone". The avalanches were caused by a freak storm in the Hindu

Kush Mountains. Annually about 250 avalanches strike the road; and the total loss of life during the

2008/9 season was about 40 people.

4. Threat

The greatest threat to operations in the Salang pass area is not considered to be from the insurgency but

from the inclement weather conditions which occur annually each winter. Extreme cold weather and

survival equipment is essential due to the high amounts of avalanches which claim many lives each year.

An Afghan snow clearance team is now resident in the area to clear the route following heavy snowfall

and has greatly assisted in ensuring the pass stays open despite the inclement winter weather.

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TT Site, Salang Tunnel MGRS: 42S WE 02520 08781 (Northern Point) MGRS: 42S WE 04295 07037 (Southern Point)

5. Concept of Operations All GW security operations are compliant to:

• All MOI requirements. • GardaWorld Code of Conduct.

GardaWorld will employ a Site Security / PSD team to support Tetra Tech movements between Green Village complex in Kabul and the Salang Pass area of operation. The Security Team (ST) will be prepared to support the following projected mission scenarios which are limited to: Scenario No. 1: 7 Trips during a 5 month period

• One (1) to two (2) expats traveling round trip to the Salang Tunnel. • Departing at 1200hrs from Kabul and arriving at the Salang Tunnel at 1500hrs. • Work through the night inside the Tunnel. • Departing the tunnel at 0800hrs the following day and returning to Kabul.

Scenario No. 2: 4 Trips during a 5 month period

• Three (3) to four (4) expats traveling round trip to the Salang Tunnel. • Departing at 1200hrs from Kabul and arriving at the Salang Tunnel at 1500hrs. • Work through the night inside the tunnel. • Departing the tunnel at 0800hrs the following day and returning to Kabul.

Scenario No. 3: 3 trips during a 5 month period

• Two (2) expats traveling round trip to the Salang Tunnel. • Departing at 0800hrs from Kabul and arriving at the Salang Tunnel at 1100hrs. • Work within/outside either end of the tunnel on Day 1. • Overnight stay in the area with hotel, life support, and meals by GW. • Work inside and or outside the tunnel at either end for 1 additional day. • Requires a total of two nights of housing and meals in the tunnel area. • Departing the tunnel at 0800hrs on Day 3 and returning to Kabul.

Scenario No. 4: 10 trips during a 5 month period

• Two (2) expats traveling round trip to the Salang Tunnel.

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• Departing at 0800hrs from Kabul and arriving at the Salang Tunnel at 1100hrs. • Work within/outside either end of the tunnel on Day 1. • Overnight stay in the area with hotel, life support, and meals by GW. • Work inside and or outside the Tunnel at either end for 4 added days. • Requires a total of 5 nights of housing and meals in the tunnel area. • Departing the tunnel at 1200hrs on Day 6 and returning to Kabul.

Scenario No. 5: 4 trips during a 5 month period

• Two (2) local nationals and one (1) expat traveling round trip to a point 50-80 miles past the Salang Tunnel for the purpose of interviewing local village elders.

• Visit local villages 50 miles either side of the tunnel for the purpose of interviews. Interview some of the southern villages on the trip up to the tunnel. Interview northern villages on Day 2.

• Two (2) overnight stays in the tunnel area with hotel, life support, and meals by GW. • Departing the tunnel at 0800hrs on Day 3 and complete interviews south of the tunnel.

Scenario No. 6: 40 trips during a 5-1/2 month period

• Transport expats between Kabul Airport and Green Village or other secure lodging in Kabul. Scenario No. 7: 70 trips during a 5-1/2 month period

• Transport expats from Green Village to meetings and various locations in Kabul, including USAID, Tetra Tech Villa/Offices, and Louis Berger Villa/Offices.

Scenario No. 8: 6-10 trips for a total of 50 hours during a 5 month period

• Provide traveling security team for helicopter over flights of Salang Tunnel and various alternate driving routes around the tunnel. Tetra Tech would charter the helicopter for 6-8 hour flight to over fly routes.

All Tetra Tech staff movement will be monitored by the Project Risk Manager (PRM) and the Deputy Project Risk Manager (DPRM). In the event it is required to leave the GV perimeter, this movement will be in a B6 Level Armored Vehicle (B6 AV) with a PSD. The ST will provide an emergency response (QRF / Medic) capability in the event of an incident. There will be two armored B6 vehicles dedicated to this task. All project activity will be intelligence-led. Intelligence collated by the GW Risk Analyst Manager and other available sources will assess the security situation relevant to the location / task. Tetra Tech will be regularly briefed by the SM of the existing security situation in the Area of Operations (AO). Roles and Responsibilities 6. Security Team (ST) Composition The ST is composed of the following functions:

• Project Risk Management Consultant (PRM) • Deputy Project Risk Management Consultant /Medic (DPRM) • Local National Driver • Guards, Static and Mobile

6.1 Project Risk Management Consultant The PRMC is responsible for the security management of the project. He will be based out of Green Village and available 24 / 7. His duties are:

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• Overall responsibility for the GW ST and equipment. • Ensuring the SP is fully implemented. • Attend all coordination and process meetings with the client and military representatives as

required. • Interfacing between US Military, ANA and GW within Kabul and Salang AO on security issues. • Preparation and submission of all incident reports to the GW Operations Manager and Tetra Tech

Site Manager. • Providing regular situation reports to the GW Operations Manager. • Brief all incoming personnel of existing security situation. • Ensuring Operational Security (OPSEC) measures are in place and maintained. • On-site commander for the Crisis Response Plan (CRP). • Maintenance of radio communications between all ST posts. • Oversee and maintain ST training and training records. • ST administration. • ST welfare issues.

Throughout the contract period the PRM is responsible for making sure that all stated security measures are in place. The PRM will have ownership of the Security Plan and all related Standard Operating Procedures. These are live documents and reviewed minimum on a quarterly basis to meet the project requirements and changes in the security situation. 6.2 Deputy Project Risk Management Consultant/Medic The DPRM will support the PRM, taking responsibility of the project security in his absence. The DPRM will be fully briefed and aware of all aspects of the SP, SOP’s and ST Management. His duties will include the following:

• Deputizing the PRM’s duties as required. • Reporting all incidents to the PRM. • Be the first point of contact for all medical / casualty issues. • Maintaining ST discipline. • Supervising logistical administration / maintenance of all ST equipment. • Organizing the LN duty roster. • All aspects of refresher training for all GW LN staff.

6.3 PSD team and static guards

The responsibilities of the PSD are to. • Brief the client(s) on what action is to be take in the event of various contingencies • Conduct a reconnaissance of all venues to be visited to familiarise themselves with its location,

surrounding area and routes / alternate routes to / from the venue • Ensure that all vehicles, equipment, weapons and communications are maintained at the peak of

readiness • Ensure that all necessary preparations are made for each and every individual mission • Ensure that every operator is briefed and fully conversant with current contingency counter-

measures • Ensure that every operator is fully conversant with and practised in primary trauma survey • Ensure that all operators undertake regular training with respect to ‘action on’ drills, weapons,

communications, trauma survey etc.

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• Ensure that they are in constant communications with the Ops room when on task. • Ensure that they are familiar with the procedure for calling for assistance from US Military / ANA. • Ensure they are conversant with the location of all US Military / ANA bases and emergency

medical treatment centres in their AO 7. Manpower Requirements

Ser #

Desc

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Ser

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# Pos

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# Loc

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# Shi

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# Per

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Duty

Note

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1. Security Management 1.1 Security Manager Expat 1 1 1 1 24/7 1.2 Team Leader Medic Expat 1 1 1 1 24/7

2. Mobile Security Services 2.1 PSD Operator LN 4 1 1 4 Shift 2.2 Driver LN 3 1 1 3 Shift

2.3 Soft Skin Vehicle 1 24/7 2.4 Armoured Vehicle 2 24/7

GRAND TOTAL Ex-Pat 2

7 LN

Security Team Positions (to be finalized after site visits)

8. Weapons (GW will comply fully with the Government of Afghanistan) 8.1 General The primary weapon system used by GW is the AK-47. Personal protection weapons may be carried by the PRM / DPRM or as a secondary weapon for certain tasks. These vary from GLOCK 19 to Makarov. 8.2 Weapon Safety Weapon safety is an essential element of an armed security employee/consultant’s duty and will be the subject of frequent refresher training. 8.3 Weapon Handling All GW employees / consultants will carry out weapon handling drills on arrival in country and at regular intervals as specified by their PRM. A record of weapon training conducted will be made and retained at the project site and by the GW office, Kabul. 8.4 Weapons Readiness and Safety The following guidelines should be followed by all GW employees, however, specific Security Plans (SP’s) and location specific Local Orders should be followed where applicable. Whilst deployed on escort duties all weapons are to be “LOADED” but not made ready (Magazine on, Not cocked).

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Weapons can be “MADE READY” (Magazine on, Weapon cocked) when the threat on the ground dictates that it is necessary or when ordered by the PRM / DPRM.

All weapons are to be loaded and unloaded in the unloading bays provided at each project location under supervision at all times.

When away from a base location, “LOADING and UNLOADING” is to be conducted in an appropriate place under supervision.

Under no circumstances are weapons to be “LOADED OR UNLOADED inside any accommodation or office area”. There are to be no loaded weapons in any of the team accommodation buildings.

GW employees / consultants may only carry “AUTHORISED GW ISSUED” weapons and only after sufficient weapon handling training has been conducted.

8.5 Weapon and Ancillary Maintenance Weapons are to be inspected for defects every time the weapon is cleaned and full mechanical safety checks carried out. A weapon magazine must be emptied and the springs rested for a minimum of seven days within every twenty eight days. GW will provide sufficient magazines to facilitate this. 8.6 Security of Weapons

Weapons are to be stored and secured when not in use or permanently with the ST member whilst on duty. 8.7 Negligent Discharge

If a member of the GW ST is determined to have had a negligent discharge, an incident report is to be drafted on the basis of which it will be determined if any disciplinary action is required. 8.8 Accountability of Weapons All weapons are to be inventoried, and subject to a weekly check. Unserviceable weapons are to be returned to the GW office, Kabul, for exchange on a one for one basis. The loss or theft of a weapon is to be reported immediately to the Country Manager. The PRM is to submit an immediate oral report of the loss/theft followed by a full written report within 24 hours. 8.9 Ammunition Ammunition is to be accorded the same level of security as weapons.

Ammunition is to be stored separately from weapons and storage areas clearly labeled. Ammunition of different types and caliber should be clearly labeled and grouped together. 9. Vehicles A combination of Soft Skin and Armored vehicles has been assessed as necessary and will be deployed on site.

Vehicles Role B6 Armored x 2 Client Moves

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Soft Skin 4x4 / SUV x 1 Support vehicle All Vehicles will be subject to a first and last Parade. This is the responsibility of the allocated drivers as outlined in the Drivers orders. All systems are checked within the vehicle for its operational viability.

• Oil levels. • Fuel Levels. • Tyre Pressure. • Battery fluid levels. • Electrical systems and fuses. • Window and glass. • Ensure there is a full running kit. • Complete recovery kit. • Spare tire check.

If there are any problems with the vehicle fleet while on site then:

• Attempt to rectify the problem. • Recover vehicle to within the base compound, if in un-safe location. • Driver to complete a full check on all components and systems of vehicle. • Inform SSM / TL who will arrange for immediate repair / replacement.

9.1 Vehicle Security

In a hostile and dangerous environment such as Afghanistan it must be and will be paramount that our vehicle security is nothing short of excellent. All vehicles when parked on or off-site will be checked by GW prior to any personnel entering / using them. This pre-deployment check is an important part of the GW SST SOP’s, and will be carried out without exception.

• Vehicles must not be left unattended, unless within secure area. • All vehicles must be locked after use. • Key control will be applied. • Vehicles must be checked prior to use. • Guard Force will systematically patrol vehicles while on site.

9.2 GW Quick Reaction Force (QRF) Vehicle There will be two (02) GW QRF vehicles. One will be located inside Green Village complex. They are to be used for:

• Mobile vehicle patrols. • Support vehicles to evacuate personnel or move casualties in the event of an incident. • As directed by the PRM /TL / GS.

In the event of heightened threat levels, these vehicles can be pre-positioned on-site and will be used to move personnel in the event that a FOB evacuation is required. 10. ST Security Orders The following functions have specific orders. For details see relevant Annex’s

• Guard Supervisor (GS)

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• Guards. ECP / Tower / Mobile • Drivers

11. Training All ST members will be trained according to their individual role through a GW training package. Regular refresher training is carried out under the supervision of the TL on a weekly basis subject to availability of ST personnel outside of their duties. This training is recorded and all training records are held on-site with copies at the GW Operations department. These records are readily accessible and will remain on file for the duration of the project. 13. Communications Effective communications are vital to the security of the project. The ST will use the following means of communication:

• Very High Frequency (VHF) radio communications is the primary communications means

employed to provide voice communications between all ST personnel / vehicles. • Cell phones are employed as the secondary communications means, which are used for more

comprehensive communications and if there is a failure of the primary means. • Thuraya satellite phones are employed as the tertiary communications means and are used as a

back-up system for use when communications by the primary and secondary means fail. • Internet/E-mail communications are used for contact between sites / Kabul and for data

exchange. This is primarily a non-emergency means, but available if the network is available during an incident / crisis.

When using the VHF communications network, all users will adhere to voice procedure, with an emphasis on the brevity of conversations. VHF is an unsecured means of communications; operational security must be considered when using these means. A Communications Matrix will be completed once on site with all relevant call signs (C/S). 14. Emergency Response Emergency response is divided into two categories; Incidents and Crisis. Incidents are punctual events relevant to the project location / security that require an immediate action from staff, and are not initially dependent on external support. Staff will be informed of these actions during their arrival brief. If the incident develops the GW Crisis Management Team will then be convened as the incident escalates into a crisis.GW will assist the Tetra Tech Manager with the completion of any required Serious Incident Reports. Types of Incidents

• Indirect Fire (IDF) / Complex Attack (CPX) / Vehicle Bourn Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) / Body Bourn (BBIED) / Intrusion

• Civil disorder • Fire • Earth tremor / quake

Incident management is documented in detail in Annex H, Incident Management Plan, with appropriate Immediate Action Drills (IA) Types of Crises

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A crisis is a significant threat to project personnel, property and/or business, requiring external support and eventual relocation. This kind of event actively involves the HQ Crisis Management Team.

• Kidnap Incident • Terrorist Incident • Serious staff injury / Illness / Fatality • Political unrest / Increased terrorist threat • Significant Natural disaster • Significant Crime

15. Evacuation It is unlikely that there will be a requirement for evacuation when considering the size and Military presence on the base.

• Military Option. See Annex B

16. Medical Support Medical support for the project will be for GardaWorld (GW) staff and Tetra Tech personnel. The medical support for the site is broken down into stages:

• Stage 1 GW DPRM / Medic • Stage 2/3 US Military Assistance/MEDEVAC

A GW Expatriate DPRM will be the first line for medical treatment on site; this will be the initial medical response. The DPRM will also provide routine medical care if needed. 17. Intelligence The GW Risk Analysis Manager (RAM) provides daily, weekly and monthly reports. In addition intelligence from multiple sources when assessed as relevant will be punctually transmitted to the PRM, again on an ad-hoc basis. These are made available to the ITSI project manager. All GW SSM’s run a 24/7 Skype chat net to allow immediate diffusion of intelligence to all sites. 18. Operational Security (OPSEC) Afghanistan is a hostile and dangerous environment. The threat of attack is high and when given the opportunity, AGE will strike. Protection must be given for personnel, colleagues, families and friends. Under long working hours in a stressful and dangerous environment OPSEC can be easily forgotten These SOPs for ensuring our sensitive information/materials do not get in to the wrong hands. Types of sensitive information are;

• Any personal information. • Tasks & timings. • Locations details. • Vehicle Types / Plates.

Types of sensitive material are;

• Files &Paperwork. • Communication Equipment (Radios, Mobiles and Satellite Phones).

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• Social Networking Sites. • IT material. • White Boards. • Mapping.

Attention will be paid to sensitive information/materials with individual accountability. This can be achieved by:

• Ensure all paperwork is shredded. • Do not leave paperwork / files with sensitive information unattended, lock it away. • When using insecure communications: be aware of the information that you are sending: Names,

addresses, timings and locations. • Ensure all sensitive mapping and construction drawings are covered up, and locked away if

unattended. • Ensure wipe boards are wiped clean after use. • When talking be aware of your surroundings. • Planned events must only be discussed with the personnel who are directly involved.

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ANNEX A – ACTIONS ON GW has a list of “Actions On” which is a military term for advice on what to do during an incident. These lists are basic principles that should occur, however they are not hard and fast, and common sense should dictate as every situation will differ.

Actions on – Attack In the event of any incident occurring against or within the Green Village (GV) compound, the following actions will take place:

• The order to stand-to will be given by either: PRM or DPRM or GW PSD or any other security personal directly involved in the incident.

• GW PRM/DPRM will inform all relevant agencies GW HQ and ISAF to seek assistance if required if not already done so by the GV Security team.

• All personnel will seek the nearest available cover, then stay under cover until directed by GW ST Personnel. All clients, sub-contractor and GW Personnel will have PPE close to hand at all times once leaving any hardened building.

• Contact/incident report will be sent to GW Operations. • Designated GW personnel will account for personnel. • Any medical treatment to be administered on site.

Following the incident the site is to be “swept” to ensure that all personnel are accounted for and that the areas are safe.

Actions on – Indirect fire (IDF) attack The threat of IDF attacks in this area remains high. In the event of IDF the following actions will be carried out:

• Count launches and take note of the time. • Take cover where possible. If in the open, lay flat on the ground. • Move to a safe location i.e. Bunker/Sanger. • Radio- MORTAR! MORTAR! MORTAR! • Observe and count IDF impacts. • Await for ‘cool’ period all clear, given by PRM/DPRM. • Location of possible ‘blinds’, CONFIRM, CLEAR, CORDON, CONTROL. • Seek assistance: Medical, ISAF and QRF. • At the earliest available time a full personnel check and report will be conducted. • Listen to the radio and await further instructions.

Actions on - Direct Fire Attack – RPG/SAF/Grenade The site could sustain a direct fire attack from fire positions around the perimeter fence area. Below are the actions that GW personnel will take in the event that this type of attack should occur:

Take appropriate cover/shelter. Report incident in full to PRM/DPRM.

o Location of Incident o What time incident occurred o What happened

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o What you did o What is currently happening o What assistance you require

Assist casualties/check full accountability of personnel. Listen to radio and directions of ground commander.

Actions on - Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) - Unexploded Ordnance In the event of a VBIED which fails to initiate, or only partially initiates, the following actions are to be taken:

• Take appropriate cover/shelter. • DO NOT APPROACH VEHICLE/DEVICE. • CONFIRM, CLEAR, CORDON, CONTROL. • Inform GW PRM/DPRM of situation, send full contact report. • GW Inform ISAF if assistance required. • Observe arcs of fire, possible SECONDARY attack. • Avoid Use of radio as this may detonate the device. • Listen for voice commands (or use a runner) and directions from ground commander.

Actions on - VBIED detonation If the vehicle is not identified on approach and before detonation, then the following procedures should be carried out:

• Take immediate cover/shelter. • Inform PRM/DPRM, send full contact report. (Include assistance required). • Treat casualties/check for full accountability of personnel. • Continue to observe arcs, possible SECONDARY attack. • Listen to radio and directions from ground commander.

Actions on - Suicide Bomber/IED Vest- Body Born Improvised Explosive Device (BBIED) If in the event that a suicide bomber breaks through the initial access control and then gains access to the ECP search areas, the following actions will be taken by the GW ST:

• Take appropriate cover/shelter. • Inform PRM/DPRM. • Evacuate the area around incident. • Send full contact report. • Listen to radio and ground commander for further instructions.

Actions on - Drive by shooting The threat of a Drive by Shoot whilst remote is a possibility and in such the event of such an incident, the following actions will be taken by the GW ST:

• Take appropriate cover. • Report incident by Radio to PRM/DPRM: Contact report, colour of vehicle, and direction of travel. • Assist and treat casualties, (when safe to do so). • Observe arcs for secondary coordinated attacks.

Actions on - Demonstrations/crowds

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Afghanistan is frequently subject to demonstrations or crowds. These demonstrations/crowds can both be peaceful or aggressive. The potential for crowds gathering should not be ignored. Below is listed the actions each guard should take if he is faced with this situation:

Never inflame the situation. Inform PRM/DPRM of situation and inform him of the following:

• Location • Number/size of demonstration/crowd • State, Aggressive/non-aggressive • Weapons (if any) • Assistance required, (ISAF/ANP/ANA)

Listen to radio and ground commander for further instructions. Actions on – Casualty Below is listed the actions that will be taken by the GW guards if a casualty should occur:

• Appropriate reaction to security incident. • Brief casualty report. • Secure area. • Administer first aid to casualties • Request medical assistance, if required through the PRM/DPRM. • Listen to radio and ground commander for direction.

Actions on – In the event of a fire

• Shout “Fire, fire, fire” and attempt to alert all personnel on site, and in the buildings verbally. • Direct personnel out of their porter-cabin or tents where possible. • DO NOT PUT YOURSELF AT RISK BY RE-ENTERING A VEHICLE, TENT OR BUILDING. • Account for all staff and treat any casualties.

Actions on - Intruder on site There may be a slight chance of an intruder on site. In the case of an intruder the following actions should be carried out:

• Take appropriate cover and do not approach the intruder. • Shout verbal warnings and state that the person(s) have been identified as an intruder. • Inform PRM/DPRM of incident, send full contact report. • Confirm what locations the intruder has been in and ensure a 100% search of those areas is

conducted. • Take details of intruder, full name, Tashkera/Passport number (if applicable), and date of birth

(DOB), place of birth (POB), Address and Father’s Name. Pass these details to SM/DSM • Escort the intruder from the site if satisfied all is clear, detain and hand intruder over to ISAF. • Send full report to SM/DSM and GW CMT.

PSD Mobile Security Team – Actions On There may be a chance of the PSD Mobile Security Team being contacted by SAF, IED’s, VBIEDS’s and Mines while transiting the AO.

Actions on – Small Arms Fire

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• ST receives SAF. • Drive or reverse out of the area (preferably drive). • Activate tracking system. • Give contact report. • If there are casualties treat wounded, stabilize and take to the nearest ISAF facility. • PRM/DPRM will inform the nearest ISAF facility of the situation. • GW CMT will be informed. • If any vehicles are immobilized, clients and wounded will be put moved to another vehicle

(preferably the other B6 AV).

Actions on – IED/Mine

• PSD Team activates a mine or IED. • Drive or reverse out of the area. • Be aware of follow up with Small Arms Fire (SAF). • Activate tracking system. • Give contact report. • Once clear of area, a full situation report will be sent to the GW CMT. • If there are casualties, treat wounded, stabilize and take to the nearest ISAF facility. • PRM/DPRM will inform nearest ISAF facility of the situation. • If any vehicles are immobilized, clients and wounded will be put moved to another vehicle (preferably the other B6 AV).

Actions on – VBIED • Suspicious vehicle is seen. • Drive away and avoid the vehicle. • Head towards the nearest ISAF facility or back to the project site. • If all Sign (C/S) makes contact with VBIED treat as for IED/Mine.

Actions on – Find While transiting through Afghanistan, GW may come across UXO/Mines/IED’s at any time. These finds are to be reported through the chain of command and under no circumstances to be tampered with.

• UXO/Mine or a similar device is seen from the vehicle. • Mark on GPS. • Keep driving and do not stop. • Report back to PRM/DPRM.

Actions on – Being Followed GW Mobile ST may be actively followed while traveling through the AO. If this happens the C/S should head for the nearest ISAF facility.

• Team observes suspicious vehicle shadowing the C/S. • Report to PRM/DPRM. • Use counter-surveillance techniques. • Head for a safe location either an ISAF facility or the project site.

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ANNEX B -COMMAND AND CONTROL/MEDICAL

External The GW PRM/DPRM will attend meetings with the Client/ISAF/ANA/ANP. These meetings will allow the PRM/DPRM to gather up to date information of the scope of work, issues arising from sub-contractors and other employees. The PRM/DPRM will be the liaison link between all elements of the GW security team and the ISAF/ANA/ANP personnel. The PRM/DPRM will also deliver briefings on the security situation applicable to the AO and the project site on a daily basis to the LN guard force, security team members and clients. All and any incidents that occur within or around the site/compound will be reported by the GW PRM/DPRM to ISAF and the GW Operations Room, Kabul. The PRM/DPRM will oversee the accountability of all personnel, by employing a simple and easily managed system.

Internal The GW PRM/DPRM will be in overall command of the GW ST and will be responsible for the ST. The PRM/DPRM will brief the ST on a daily basis on the situation applicable to the compound and the surrounding AO.

Rehearsals The GW PRM/DPRM will conduct regular rehearsals for all GW staff regarding the actions to take in all events of an attack.

MEDICAL SUPPORT - TBC

Stage 1 The GW ST will be the first line for medical treatment on site; this will be the first hand medical response to any incident involving all GW staff. The GW ST vehicles have trauma packs to be used for any incidents.

Trauma Packs Trauma packs contain medical emergency equipment designed to treat and stabilize injured persons until more extensive medical care can be obtained. These medical packs are held by the ST and also at static locations.

Medical Equipment on Site Under GW Standard Operating Procedures, all GW sites will hold medical/trauma packs in the event of a medical emergency. These packs are located in designated areas and are not for routine medical care. The PRM/DPRM as part of their duty will inspect medical packs on a monthly basis to ensure all items are present and that expiry dates are monitored. So any items that have expired or about to expire can be changed quickly.

Stage 2 GW site security team members are trained in basic medical care.

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Stage 3 - Medical Evacuation Plan (MEDEVAC) TBC

Emergency Medical Plan Emergency medical plans are operation specific; even though they follow the same format the content will be different. This is because every project will have its own unique set of circumstances due to location, threat, terrain, availability, response time etc. Before the medical emergency plan is compiled a recce is conducted in the project area highlighting all available ISAF/NATO and ANSF facilities available. Once the recce is complete the PRM/DPRM will generate the emergency medical plan, taking into account all the relevant information. Once the plan is complete it is then sent to GW Operations for approval. Medical emergency plans cover as a minimum:

• Primary, secondary and alternate locations for medical care. • The closest location where a medical care facility is available. • ANSF Medical Facilities. • The level of care provided by each facility. • Helicopter landing sites in the area for medical evacuation. • Imagery showing routes and alternate routes to each location. • “Actions On” medical emergency while travelling by road. • “Actions On” medical emergency while at a static location. • “Actions On” medical evacuation by road. • “Actions On” medical evacuation by air. • Medical emergency contact numbers.

Routine Medical Care Routine medical care is available throughout Afghanistan and can be acquired on a subcontract basis. Subcontract companies offering routine medical care are generally located at larger ISAF/NATO bases throughout the country although they can offer services at more remote locations.

Intelligence GW has a developed a network of intelligence sources within Afghanistan.

Health Safety and Welfare It is the responsibility of the individual to ensure his health and safety/welfare is looked after, ensuring that all vaccinations, medical and dental issues are dealt with prior to operations. The nature of the role and environment means the individual needs to be fit and healthy at all times, so that he can carry out his role and responsibilities. In the event that the individual has a welfare problem it should be brought to the attention of the GW Country Manager at the earliest opportunity as not to manifest and becoming a potential life threatening problem at a later date.

Evacuation Plan The principle levels of evacuation readiness are shown below: EVAC State

Trigger Action

Routine Normal activity Routine activity, grab bags packed and ready

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UXO SPOT REPORT Line 1: Date / Time Group Discovered Line 2: UXO Grid Location Line 3: POC and Contact Number for POC Line 4: Type of Munitions (Dropped, Projected, Placed, or Thrown) Line 5: NBC Contamination Line 6: Resources Threatened (Equipment, facilities, other assets) Line 7: Impact on Mission (How does the UXO affect your status) Line 8: Protective Measures Taken (How is UXO marked) Line 9: Recommended Priority (Immediate, Indirect, Minor, or No Threat)

Imminent Intelligence of attack in area Return all C/S to Accommodation area. Lock down. Prepare to evacuate

Significant raise in IDF attacks in area

Critical Direct intelligence of attack on compound

If unable to relocate to chosen safe location. Remain locked down Take orders from the military Sustained accurate IDF fire or

other attack on compound

Reporting Procedures

• DTG of discovery. • MGRS grid of own unit and IED find. • POC – C/S or freq. • Type of number of ordnance. • Resources threatened. • Impact on missions. • Protective measures being taken. • Recommended priority (immediate, indirect, minor, no threat) ….always Use immediate.

Contact/Situation Reports

• Who. • When. • Where. • What has happened. • What are you doing about it. • Number of casualties. • Extent of injuries. • Assistance required.

PRM/DPRM will in turn, pass all information onto the relevant agencies.

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S.A.L.U.T.E

Size: What is the size of the element? Activity: What the enemy is doing? Location: Grid coordinates or orientation to local buildings Unit: Uniforms /patches /clothing /other elements involved Time: Date Time Group (DTG) of the observation Equipment: What equipment do they possess? SPOT Size: What is the size of the element? Position: Observer’s location, and call sign Observation: What actions did you observe/take? Time: DTG of the observation

Use the 5 C’s drill:

• Confirm – Type and location. Use first hand report or use Binoculars, at night consider night vision. Only expose one individual, and only if necessary.

• Clear – 300m for small devices /500m for car size /1000m for truck size. (Do consider the size of the site you may have to clear beyond the site perimeter).

• Call – All SM C/S on the required radio channels. SM/DSM to inform ISAF/NATO for any EOD assets.

• Cordon – Maintain cleared area until ISAF arrives. DO NOT leave the outer cordon until authorized by SM/DSM.

• Control – Supervisor to maintain a log and co-ordinate all responses, instructions and directions until EOD arrive or relieved by higher command.

The NATO 9-Line MEDEVAC procedures:

Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) Request

LINE 1: Location of Pickup Site (Grid) Zulu X-ray 12345689

LINE 2: Radio, Frequency, Call sign, and Suffix 55.50 "Witchdoctor Six Delta"

LINE 3: Number of Patients by Precedence A - Urgent (Urgent patients and one priority patient) B - Urgent Surgical D - Routine C - Priority E - Convenience

Alpha Two, BREAK, Charlie One (Two urgent patients and one priority patient)

LINE 4: Special Equipment A - None C - Extraction Equipment B - Hoist D - Ventilator

Bravo (hoist)

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Casualty Feeder Report LINE 1: Name of Casualty LINE 2: SSN of Casualty LINE 3: Grade of Casualty LINE 4: Date-time group of incident LINE 5: Unit of Casualty LINE 6: Geographical location (nearby city and grid) LINE 7: Type of Casualty: Killed in action (KIA): died of wounds, died not a result of hostile action Body recovered/ identified (yes/ no) Wounded or injured in action (severity) Evacuated to (name of medical treatment facility {MTF} / medical unit) LINE 8: Witness who saw incident or identified remains (Name, grade, SSN, Unit) LINE 9: Remarks (Additional circumstances, any religious ministration performed) LINE 10: Name of person giving report (Name, grade, SSN, Unit)

LINE 5: Number of Patients by Type L - Litter, plFrench number of patients A - Ambulatory, plFrench number of patients

Lima Two, BREAK, Alpha One (Two litter

LINE 6: Security of Pickup Site N - No Enemy Troops in Area P - Possibly Enemy Troops in Area (approach with caution) E - Enemy Troops in Area (approach with caution) X - Enemy Troops in Area (armed escort required)

Papa (Possibly Enemy Troops in Area)

LINE 7: Method of Marking Pickup Site A - Panels D - None B - Pyrotechnic Signal E - Other C - Smoke

Bravo (Pyrotechnic Signal)

LINE 8: Patient Nationality Status A - U.S. Military D - Non-U.S. Civilian B - U.S. Civilian E - EPW C - Non-U.S. Military

Alpha Three (Three U.S. Personnel)

LINE 9: NBC Contamination (Wartime) N - Nuclear B - Biological C – Chemical

NONE

LINE 9: Terrain Description (Peacetime) Include details of terrain features in and around proposed landing site. If possible, describe relationship of site to prominent terrain feature (lake, mountain, tower)

Open field 100 meters southwest of microwave tower

Local Medical Centre incident/injury report

Disclosure/Summary

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This document is a living document and by no means exhaustive. It is intended to guide and assist members of the GW ST in the execution of their duties and to ensure that the team as a whole operates securely and effectively. Although focusing mainly on the ST its contents apply equally to the wider aspects of all GW employment within Afghanistan. The rules and procedures contained within are specific to Afghanistan and although designed to cover Actions On, team members will be guided in the main by common sense and standard close protection procedures in line with UK military training. A safe and secure working environment is the goal of this plan. It is achievable if all employees adhere to the work specific rules and regulations. This security plan will be used as a guideline with the integration of task specific and operational needs. This will ensure that all of our tasks are made easier and the ISAF/ANA/ANP/clients can work within a secure location. Although the security plan is self-explanatory, the ultimate success of this mutually beneficial relationship rests solely in the hands of all the individuals concerned. This plan is a living document, to be reviewed and updated on a periodic basis.