Term Paper in Socsci

8/12/2019 Term Paper in Socsci

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RACHEL ANNE T. CASTRO I BS ARCHITECTURE 5

THE SOCIAL RELEVANCE OF PHILOSOPHY

What is the social relevance of philosophy? Any answer to this question mustinvolve at least three elements. First, we need to understand how philosophy hasbrought about social change in the past. Second, to dig into the question more

deeply, we need to see how the definition of philosophy can be opened up.Thirdly, we need to critically examine and challenge some of the assumptionsthat might be hidden in the question. Once we have done all this, we can try toanswer the question.

REVOLUTIONS

Philosophy can instigate revolutions. These revolutions are sometimes slow andprofoundand, for this reason, they can be difficult to perceive and appreciate. For example,

consider the transformation of thinking about nature in the 17th century. Galileo,Descartes and other thinkers invented physics, and thereby made science as a

unity possible. Prior to this quiet revolution, the world was conceived as consisting offour elements: earth, water, air and fire. Physical changes were usually explained interms of the natural tendencies of these elements and in terms of the purposes ofGod. The intellectual uprising consisted in the discovery and the invention of themodern notion of matter, the concept of physical laws and the idea of describingphysical changes mathematically. Along with these concepts, philosopher-scientistsdeveloped the empirical method of science, of making controlled, repeatableobservations, and separated this from both a priori deduction and the citation of

authority.

This was an incredibly productive set of ideas and practices. By the end of the 17 thcentury, it already had many practical applications and socio-political effects.

There were a host of inventions that were precursors to the industrial revolution ofthe late 18th century. The initial discovery and creation of these fundamentalconcepts and methods of investigation was a philosophical revolution because itwas not merely a question of encountering new empirical information. It alsoinvolved crucially the molding of new concepts, and finding new ways of thinking.Consider another important conceptual revolution. Locke portrayed society as asocial contract among equals in a way that explained how it was sometimes

legitimate for a people to overthrow the government. His political thought becameenshrined in the U.S. constitution and, because of this and the work of other thinkers,the idea of a right became common political currency in the 20th century. Many oftodays political movements could not exist without thisnotion. Usually, we take theconcept of a right for granted, as part of our everyday political vocabulary, but a

little reflection shows us that it had to be built and, probably, that it can beimproved and refined. These are theoretical and philosophical tasks.


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Here is a third example. The 19th century sawa revolution in our thinking about logic andthe foundations of mathematics. The idea

of a formal system became possiblebecause of the theoretical work done atthis time in mathematics and logic, whichbroke two thousand years of domination byAristotles syllogistic logic.

In turn, the idea of a purely formal system

made the development of purecomputational processes possible together

with the computer in the 20th century. As inthe previous examples, the development of

new concepts opened up new areas ofresearch, which in turn permitted newtechnology and social institutions. These three examples illustrate how philosophicalrevolutions can occur quietly on a grand scale. They also suggest how they canfunction in a more modest way. For example, in the 1960s, there was a fundamentalchange in the philosophy of mind, which went hand in hand with a transformationin psychology. This consisted in the realization that, to avoid ontological mind/bodydualism, one does not have to espouse behaviorism. In other words, the study of

cognitive processes can be scientific and, in part as a result of this conceptualinsight, cognitive science was born.

Consider another example. In the 1970s, thephilosopher and economist Amartya Sen,along with other political theorists,challenged the standard view ofdevelopment as economic growth and, inthe 1980s, Sen developed new ways tomeasure the well-being of individuals andcommunities based on the kinds ofcapabilities that people need to have in

order to be able to live well, and whichincludes many non-economic factors (cf. Sen 2001). This work was part of a

conceptual revolution that overthrew the conception of development as merelyeconomic growth, which was prevalent in the 1950s. As a result of this change, non-

governmental organizations and, to a lesser extent, governments have altered theways in which they give aid. Once again, a conceptual change brings, as well asreflecting, new kinds of practices.


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CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY

A more complete answer to the original question requires that we reconstruct theconcept of philosophy itself. We should not assume that philosophy is an activityperformed exclusively by university professors who work in philosophy departments.Such a definition excludes, for example, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke andHume who never taught in a university. Moreover, it also excludes a lot of todaysexciting philosophical thinking that occurs outside philosophy departments andacademia.

We should conceive of philosophy as a way of

thinking rather than as an academic institution.Put simply, it is critical thought about conceptsand ways of thinking. It is thought that involves

the analysis or clarification of concepts and theuncovering of meanings, and which is normally

supported by arguments. Perhaps, this seems anoverly generous or wide characterization ofphilosophy, but narrower definitions end upexcluding aspects of what is normally consideredas a part of philosophy. Anyone who asks questions about concepts, seeksclarifications and distinctions, and opens up new conceptual space and gives

some argumentation to support his or her claims, thereby engages in philosophy.Academic philosophers tend to have certain styles of practicing these arts; theytend to focus on the most abstract questions and often emphasize rigor as againstinnovation. However, there is no uniform philosophical method or pre-defined set of

philosophical problems that could make a hard and fast distinction betweenacademic philosophy and conceptual thinking outside academia.

The main purpose of this broad definition is to contrast philosophy as conceptualinquiry with empirical investigations that attempt to discover facts. Such empiricalinvestigations form an important part, but not the whole of, the natural sciences,the social sciences and some of the humanities, such as history. In contrast,

philosophy is concerned with clarifying, expanding and creating concepts andmeanings. This does not imply that we can separate sharply empirical research fromconceptual innovation and clarification. Such a distinction is, for example, difficultto apply to the historical development of quantum mechanics and relativity.Furthermore, the invention of new concepts always takes place in the context of abackground of empirical knowledge and of investigative and other practices.Consider the work of the pioneering economist and philosopher Adam Smith. Smith

observed the division of labor in the manufacture of pins in small factories in his


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native Scotland and applied this idea to international trade. Lockes political

philosophy did not occur in a vacuum.

The ideas that he expressed explicitly and systematicallywere becoming part of the political atmosphere of 17th

century England, where there had been a longpower struggle between parliament andvarious kings.

Also, this view of philosophy does not mean that empiricalfacts are irrelevant to philosophical thinking.

For example, the philosophy of physics would be concerned with questionssuch as what would count as an elementary particle? to give a

satisfactory answer to this kind of question, one needs to know a lot ofphysics. Finding answers to questions in the

philosophy of economics requires a goodknowledge of economics.

Furthermore, in any field,formulating new conceptualquestions in a way that opens upspace for innovation requiresempirical knowledge.

The important overall point that emerges from this discussion is that academicphilosophers are not the only practitioners of the art of critical thinking about

concepts. For example, biologists who try to answer conceptual questionsregarding their area of research are practicing philosophy. Educational theorists

and teachers who try to rethink the basic principles of curriculum development are

also engaging in philosophy.

As a consequence of this broad view of philosophy, there are philosophicalquestions and problems in all areas of human inquiry and practice. Moreover,almost every person has practiced the art of conceptual thinking at some time. Forinstance, many people ask questions like these: what would count as animprovement in the quality of my life? or what sort ofwork would be good for

me?. In part, these questions are philosophical because they seek a definition orclarification of an idea, in addition to empirical, psychological information about

oneself. They request the relevant criteria.

To return to the original question, the expandedconception of philosophy implies that philosophical

thought is bound to have social relevance. Viewed inthis way, philosophy is a human activity in much thesame way that telling jokes is. Asking about its socialrelevance is a little like inquiring about the socialrelevance of talking. It is so much a part of the human


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condition that it hardly can be separated in the necessary way.

Sometimes, questioning the social relevance of philosophy is motivated by ageneral worry about the usefulness of theoretical thinking in general. Theory is often

opposed to practice, and the term practice apparently implies something

practical and useful. In this way, theory becomes regarded as something that is,almost by definition, useless and impractical. According to this view, theory is forivory towers and practice is for everyday life. I shall try to meet these concerns,which are based on a method of contrasting theory and practice that is flawed inat least two respects.

First, theoryand practice inform each other

becausenecessarily they are

bound to each other. On the one

hand,theory builds on existing

practices. We have already noted

the examples of Smith and Locke. Infact, Smiths idea of the specialization

of labor, which he applied tointernational trade, had manyconsequences that he could nothave foreseen. For example, it led tothe idea of the automated factoryand, eventually, had an impact on

computer science. In effect,theorizing itself is a practice that takes

place within a context of otherpractices. On the other hand, all of

our social practices and individualactivities are expressions of understanding. Actions are caused by beliefs anddesires, which are framed and limited by our concepts. Therefore, practicenecessarily has an implicit theoretical aspect, and we can improve practice byimproving theory.

Of course, there are also other more direct ways to enhance practice. Not allimprovements in practice require conceptual change. Furthermore, we do notwant to fall into the trap of imagining that, by resolving a problem in thought, wesolve it in practice. Theory is only useful insofar as it is actually used, even when theway it is employed is not predictable.

Second, this way of contrasting theory and practice tends to be traditionalist; itsilently tends


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to oppose change. This is because the usefulness and practicality of somethingalways assumes an end. X is useful and Y is practical are incomplete expressions

in that they do not specify any relevant objective. Something useful is merely ameans, a hopefully dispensable instrument to some goal. If we take the aimsimplicitly for granted, then this signifies that they are not open for revision or explicit

acceptance. This may not be very problematic, for instance, when we refer tosome general instrument, such as a telephone or a bridge. However, when we referto an activity as socially useful, we may have to consider important ends that arenot so obvious.

For example, does being educated count as an end? By this, I do not mean is it

socially useful that people are better educated?; rather, I mean does the

improvement in peoples education itself count as an end?. If it does, then anactivity that leads to this result may well be socially relevant, even if it does not

produce visible technological changes.The examples of the use of philosophy that we examined in Part I of this chapter

sufferfrom a defect. They were cases where conceptual change has resulted in obvioustechnological and social applications. For instance, we claimed that 19th centurylogic was necessary for the computer; 17 th century philosophy of science wasnecessary for the industrial revolution and so on. These examples assume astandard of usefulness and try to show how philosophy has contributed to socialdevelopment that accords with this standard. This gives us a relatively superficialunderstanding of how philosophy is socially relevant because it makes a narrow

assumption about what the appropriate ends are in order for something to count associally relevant. We need to understand better the very idea of something being

useful or socially relevant, and that is a philosophical question.

The original worry that may motivate one to contrast theory and practice can bereformulated to avoid these problems. The reformulation is: how, in fact, can theoryand practice be better integrated? This question assumes that, ideally, theory andpractice should not be divorced, but it implies that, in actuality, they often are. Thisreformulation is really a new and more interesting concern, which, when applied tophilosophy, implies a criticism of the discipline as it is often practiced in academia,and also of those people who engage in practices but without reflectingphilosophically about their meaning and presuppositions.

For example, until quite recently, philosophers have stayed away from

management science, and business managers have religiously tried to avoid thephilosophical implications of their practices. In politics, in the hands of the

practitioners, theory has tended to be considered as a tool for gaining votes andpackaging preformedideas rather than as a serious enterprise to deepen and refresh our understanding.And,


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in the minds of the theoreticians, political practice has tended to be regarded as aDarwinian struggle between parties, best left to those who do not mind having dirty

hands or a soiled reputation rather than as an activity loaded with presuppositionsthat need to be articulated.

What is the social relevance of philosophy?

The first way challenges the question rather than trying to answer it directly. Thequestionhas two major assumptions built into it, which may be disputed.

First, what counts as socially relevant? What are the social ends that we should

have in mind?

Without some specification of the appropriate ends, the question is incomplete andcannot be answered. As we have seen already, we should not merely assume the

ends because this amounts to taking accepted social values for granted. Aspecification of such ends must be the result of a normative social analysis ordiscourse, which is part of the function of philosophy.

Second, the question suggests that philosophy ought to be socially relevant.

Perhaps, philosophy ought to be more socially relevant than it is usually today.Nevertheless, even if we assume that this is true, we still should challenge the

question by asking should philosophy always be socially relevant?.

There are two reasons for thinking that it ought not, and

both relate to the idea that having social relevance as aprimary goal can destroy important facets of thephilosophical process.First, the very general goal of philosophy is to improve the conceptual aspects ofour understanding in any field. With this idea in mind, let us review some of ourearlier conclusions. We have seen that there are conceptual aspects to all fields ofknowledge, whether they appear socially useful or not. Also, we noted thatdramatic conceptual revolutions have occurred slowly when groups of thinkershave pursued their work without having specific practical results in mind. The

theoretical work undertaken in the 19th century concerning the foundations ofmathematics was not instigated in order to develop the computer. Galileo did not

foresee the industrial revolution; he wanted to understand the mechanics of motionand overthrow the medieval conception of physical explanation. Furthermore, we

have seen also that practice always presupposes theory, or ways of understandingand concepts. Better theory can lead to better practice, but not necessarily in waysthat are predictable. Given these three points, the anti-answer to the questionwhat is the social relevance of philosophy? is that philosophy should not always


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aim to be socially relevant because, by so aiming, it may undermine the conditionsthat allow it to be fertile and transformational.Second, the philosophical process is sometimes comparable to artistic creation, not

in the sense that it results in conclusions that should be aesthetically appreciatedrather than critically assessed, but rather in the sense that philosophers often

struggle with expressing insights that nag them. A similar creative process occurs inmuch investigation. Additionally, much philosophical thinking can be likened also toexploration, motivated by curiosity and love for an area of knowledge. A thinkerfascinated by the conceptual implications of the theory of evolution will explore thisarea of knowledge without trying to justify it in terms of its usefulness. Of course, thepersons love for the area may lead him or her to praise it as one of the most

important fields of contemporary research, but that is a different point. Theinvestigation is motivated mainly by the love of the subject matter and by the desirefor greater understanding, and not primarily by the idea that it will have useful

results.For these reasons, philosophical activity cannot be compared always appropriatelyto our usual models of the socially useful. For example, consider the building of ahospital, the search for a new pharmaceutical drug and various forms of social andpolitical activism. These are exemplary socially useful actions. Such actions are

motivated by goals that are perceived to be useful for society in a way that artisticcreation and exploration are not.

Consequently, insofar as the philosophical process is like artistic creation and

exploration, we should not expect it always to follow our typical paradigms ofsocially useful actions. However, once again, this point does not negate the claimthat philosophy should be more socially relevant. Nevertheless, it warns us not toassimilate all forms of the philosophical quest to our usual models of actions that aresocially useful.

In summary, the question is philosophy socially relevant? is

loaded with some unspecified conception of social

relevance and with the assumption that philosophicalthinking should be directed towards being useful, which may destroy the creative

and exploratory facets of such thought. It might be better to ask how can

philosophy be socially relevant?.

We can answer this new question as follows. To counter-act narrow-mindedness, weneed to understand better the idea of being socially useful. Something useful ismerely a means to some goal. The concept of the useful is not especiallyproblematic when the ends in question are obvious. However, when we refer tosomething as socially useful, we may have in mind, for example, an idea that


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promotes important ends that are not obvious and that require either redefinition orinvention.

For example, without doubt, the globalcommunity will face increasing natural

resource shortages during this new centuryand, while part of the solution to thisproblem will be technical, we will also haveto change our ways of thinking. Forinstance, economics will have to become

more ecological, as well as more human.Of course, we do not know how this should

happen because this is exactly theproblem. We need to discover and invent

new ways of thinking economically, andwe do not know yet what these are. In a

densely populated world, our conceptionof design will have to change because

more aspects of our environment will have to be designed. The question how

should it change? is precisely the problem. Here is another example. The political

changes we have seen happening in the world these last twenty or so years almostcertainly indicate the need for a reformulation of the concept of democracy. For,while regions affirm their need for more autonomy, at the same time globalproblems indicate the future need for better management and more democracy

at the international level. Meanwhile, the traditional debate between the left andthe right has lost steam in many parts of the world.

All of this points to the need for new political thought. These examples illustrate twoimportant general lessons. First, that it is a mistake to place theory and practice in asharp dichotomy. Theory and practice, like thought and action, always influenceeach other. Furthermore, thought itself is an action, and every practice embodies atheory. Think of Adam Smith. Practice breeds theory, which breeds new practice.Second, conceptual thought is suited to the solving and clarifying of what we cancall open and basic normative questions, which cannot be answered by empirical

investigation alone. Questions, such as how should we conceive democracy?

and how should morality be defined? are a request for the redefinition of ends

and intrinsic values and, in this way, they are quite differentfrom technical questions, which seek more efficient means

to a given set of ends.

Filipino Philosophy and Post-Modernity

Post-Modernity, with its stress on freedom andcreativity, is a vantage point that can


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dispose Filipino thinkers to philosophically formulate, construct and develop thoughtsystems. This liberating milieu can be reckoned as a fertile occasion where Filipinos

can explore the conditions of possibilities that grant a philosophical status tothoughts, statements or constructions that either come from or pertain to the Filipinomind. Such that when we use the concept Filipino Philosophy, we are well-

conscious of these two interrelated points The Identity and Referential Nature ofthe concept Filipino, and the connotation/intension of the term Philosophy. Is itFilipino? Is it philosophical? These are the questions that have guided theruminations in this philosophical treatise. And as an initial insight to such questions,we propose a kind of vantage point that can address the identity and referential

nature of the term Filipino in a Filipino Philosophy and the philosophical substance ofits claim. This perspective, we shall argue, may be construed by a social-scientist-

philosopher. As a social scientist, this thinker is mindful of the descriptions orcharacteristics that may be regarded as telling of the Filipino milieu. As a

philosopher, this thinker makes it his task to regress to speculate on the logicalassumptions or presuppositions that regulate activities that are suggested and

verified by the social scientist.

The concept Filipino Philosophy has gravitated many Filipino thinkers to participatein processes or explorations that seek to comprehend its meaning.1 Professors of

philosophy in universities, for instance, have been informed of its emergingpresence. To date, only scanty efforts were made to outline the possible content of

a philosophy subject in Filipino Philosophy.2 This phenomenon, when reckoned,seems to suggest two things: there is an existing hesitation among universityprofessors to deal with the identity concept of being a Filipino, and philosophyteachers anticipate that they are not ready to face the complexities in thisexpected query: What is the meaning of the term philosophy in the concept of a

Filipino Philosophy?

With these two tracks of thinking, the present article hopes to demonstrate the needof having a vantage point that can possibly meet and uphold the demands thatcome from the referential connotation of the term Filipino, and the intension of the

word philosophy. This perspective, as we shall later demonstrate, may beaccomplished by a Filipino thinker who asks and reflects like a social scientist-

philosopher. This bridging of two disciplines cannot happen instantaneously.However, we take the cudgels to begin in this reflection on what it means to socially

construe the concept of being Filipino while remaining equally mindful that whatone is proposing is philosophic.

With this insight, the present article, therefore, looks into the conditions of possibilitywhere the social science lens and philosophical vantage points can interface. Inthis way, the attempt to lay down the cards that are at stake when one talks of aFilipino Philosophy is continued and hopefully nourished. This is a response to our

perceived need of having a group of Filipino thinkers who can provide sufficient


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content to the term Filipino and who is convinced that their work belongs tophilosophy.

A Post-Modernist Strand: A Presupposition

In Post-Modernity, we have witnessed the privileging of the language of particulars.

This is most seen in the growing appeal of situational perspectives and transitoryvantage points. Since flux and cracks have occupied the forefront of discussions,thinking in the post-modern milieu can be analogous to make-shifts temporaryshelters to live by, nurture and defend. This transitory character of thinking, in ouropinion, is a logical consequence of the primacy of the particulars. When the

individuals voice is given so much meaning and power, we are somewhat allowed

to imagine that the kind and degree of philosophizing today are directlyproportional to the number of individuals who wish to and are engaged inphilosophical thinking.

This clich seems apt to describe the possibilities of philosophical thinking today

the sky is the limit. Perhaps, this is one promise that Nietzsche has foreseen in hisattempt to unlock the doors of differences/Equivocity and banish the hold of

Univocity/sameness in the platform of philosophizing.3 After all, things and ideas donot appear all-too-human when thinking functions in the midst of the unfamiliar,with this milieu in philosophy the privileging of particulars may not be entirelysurprising after all. Since the post-modern effect is to make ourselves disposed to thedialectic between the familiar and unfamiliar, the unfolding milieu can actuallyserve as an opportune occasion for the systematic articulation of particularphilosophies.

An Apprehension with Post-ModernityBy invoking our own specificities, we propose that post-modernism can also bereckoned as a location for the discussion of a particular philosophy that can becalled our ownFilipino. This is an important presupposition that the present articleholds. But there are some hesitations in proposing that a Filipino Philosophy is to bediscussed within the ambit of the Post-Modern Milieu. Let us look into thisapprehension.

Presupposition, in this regard, is understood within the purview of a historicalscience. This is in contrast to the modernist attempt to present a stainless

constellation of assumptions similar to the project of modern mathematics. Robin

George Collingwood,

Part of the initial hesitation is the free-for-all-attitude that

the Post-Modern mindset carries. Should the notion of aFilipino philosophy follow certain standards of

thought? Not discounting the possiblelimitations that standards bring, we are of the opinionthat there is still a need to have a logical and


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organized way of presenting thoughts. Otherwise, wemight all be content with aphorisms. Can we effectively communicate each

other's thoughts if we solely use the language of aphorisms? Here, we are alreadyintroduced to the conflict of having a laissez-fair approach to thinking and tothinking logically. What ideal should be followed in pursuing a Filipino Philosophy?

Since we need to start somewhere, how can we begin discussing the concept of aFilipino philosophy without becoming too obliged to follow the logical format thatstructures provide and without becoming too pressed to ride the winds of changethat post-modernity blows? Our present ruminations tell us that we can still make use

of the modernist stress on structure and organization. Under the Post-Modernstance, such a point need not be construed as non-sensical, since we can always

assert that post-modernism still confers value to conditions that remain meaningfulfor a specific group of people. The hold of meaning, to the say the least, is a

condition that even the Post-Modern milieu maintains and lives by.7 Thus, to makeamends with these two seemingly conflicting positions, we have decided to begin

with a classification system that has tried to organize the different faces of Filipinophilosophy. This is a stance that comes from an individual who has undergone aclassical training in philosophy Gripaldo's. After which, we shall try to be post-modern by looking into the strengths and weaknesses of each classificatory label inthe hope that we can introduce a fourth category the social scientist-philosopherapproach.

Significance of the ClassificationThe reason for choosing Gripaldo's classificatory style is conditioned by the logicand comprehensiveness with which his distinction provides on the differences

between traditional philosophy and a philosophy construed from the cultural lens.This difference, as we shall later argue, provides an entry point in raising these othertwo questions that are interrelated to the question on the meaning of philosophy ina Filipino Philosophy:

When does a position/statement participate as a species in the traditional-

philosophical genus?,

When does a social science/cultural construction become philosophical?

Why do we need to face and own such questions?

To make the significance of the foregoing questions understood, let us look into thequestions' two-fold assumptions. One presupposition of the two queries is that not allstatements can be considered philosophical. If such is not the case, then theremight be no need to write a paper on philosophy, since anything can be amember of its fold. Philosophy will be reduced to pure sameness or differencewhich does not really help in our attempt to better understand its claims. One mightbe tempted to let go of classifications, but it may all


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lead to non-sensical confusion. As a consequence of thispresupposition, there is a need to identify the conditions

that allow us to say that a stance can be consideredphilosophical. Thus, when we say that a position is a species of the

genus Filipino Philosophy, we have clarified the meaning of the term

philosophy in such a category.The other assumption is that not all social science facts can join the bandwagon ofphilosophy. For a socially construed fact to be philosophical, the article proposesthat it must traverse these three stages of abstraction establish the sufficiency ofthe issue, tease out concepts, and ruminate on the possible universal and logical

nature of such concepts. This is a line of thinking that we shall try to elucidate anddefend as we discuss the transition from social science facts to philosophical ideas.

Approaches to Filipino Philosophy

Using Gripaldos ruminations, the concept of a Filipino Philosophy can be demarcated in

three ways: Citizenship, Traditional, and Cultural. Let us look into the meaning of theselabels.

Citizenship Approach and Filipino Philosophy

The National category, Gripaldo holds, refers to any philosophical stance done by a

Filipino. As a Filipino citizen, his philosophical contributions can already beconsidered part and parcel of the Filipino Philosophy concept.The question as to

whether or not the proposed perspective reflects the culture or life ways of Filipinosis not the main concern. It may be the case that their positions will eventually reveal

the life-world of certain communities but such an outcome is not a priority.Consequently, this category has the propensity to beef up every Filipino's capacityto contribute to the archeology of a Filipino philosophy. This is because anyinterested Filipino is empowered, invited and encouraged to philosophically reflecton the uniqueness of their thinking ways.

Our rumination on the nature of the aforementioned category, however, promptsus to question and challenge its main effect to automatically classify a

contribution made by a Filipino philosophical. This seems to be anti-thetical to whatphilosophy stands for. In this respect, we propose that there should be an inch of

hesitation in considering citizenship as a sufficient condition of philosophizing.

Logically, citizenship and philosophizing are unrelated terms. It is true that the citizencategory allows for greater participation amongst Filipinos in construing a FilipinoPhilosophy. However, the question as to whether or not a stance is philosophicalmust not be discussed within the purview of citizenship. The question on the natureand meaning of philosophy deserves a different platform. We can even proposethat the meaning of philosophy should act or function as a conceptual filter ofcontributions made by Filipinos. Until Filipino thinkers have decided on what toinclude and exclude in the term philosophy, the question as to margins.


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What is Philosophy? This is one question which can help us provide a philosophical

foundation to a Filipino Philosophy.

The foregoing challenge is a task that we have initially

tried to address when we presented in a publishedarticle a philosophic treatment of thinking.What is thinking? is the classical question that we triedto own in the article. In our initial analysis, weproposed that thinking is to be regarded as an interplay of these three species:

Regressive (Philosophic), Progressive (Scientific) and Digressive (Artistic). Thisdiscourse on thinking may be regarded as a possible start in our attempt to

contribute a philosophical ground to Filipino Philosophy. We have owned thequestion and continued in our attempt to substantiate philosophy's meaning. With

the proposed categories, we hope to provide a separate article for each thinkingspecies. In so doing, we can deepen our reflection on the possible nodal points on

what it means to think.

And with the initial reflection on thinking, we have proposed a conceptual filter thatcan be used in assessing whether or not a contribution in Filipino Philosophy isphilosophical. This is a big change from the usual habit of using the conceptualframeworks and theories of known non-Filipino thinkers, and of not attempting to

substantiate the conceptual categories that we discover. As Gripaldo notes, It isbest not to stop at just being a scholar, but to become a philosopher himself or

herself.This stress on the philosophic side, however, means that we have only filledup one side of the coin. The other side still needs some serious reflection and

attention. Thus, the possible controversy that rests with our initial contribution is its

weakness in confronting the demand carried in the term Filipino in a FilipinoPhilosophy. Is it enough to say that a position is philosophic? Is it also Filipino? Thelatter question is another aspect that the Citizenship Category must also be willingto look into.

The Traditionalist and Filipino Philosophy

The traditional category, Gripaldo opines, refers to students of philosophy who haveinherited philosophical problems from the thinkers they have decided to specialize

in. He notes that the main constraint for this kind of philosophical training is the

influence of the studied philosopher's concepts on the biases of the student.

In our reflection, this source of worry is grounded, since a classical training inphilosophy usually involves these three levels:

(1) Given the long years of studying Kant, for example, the consciousness of thestudent is eventually formed by Kants philosophical positions. In our experience o fthis classical training in the study of philosophy, the first five years of research are


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usually devoted to comprehension and reconstruction of the thoughts andprinciples of Kant. In the process, the expectation is to master how Kant developed

his ideas and elucidate the claims of his arguments. With this training, we can easilysay that the worry of Gripaldo is justified. Can the student get out of the shadows

and caves made and carved by Kants positions?

(2) Moreover, the scholars of Kant have different interpretations. There areconflicting camps and traditions. For example, if one reads Kant by first goingthrough the Critique of Pure Reason, followed by the Critique of Practical Reasonand the Critique of Judgment, Kants philosophy will appear highly rigid and

formalistic. But if Kant is read starting with the Critique of Judgment and followed bythe other two books, his philosophy will appear more attuned to the elements of

surprise and uncertainty.With these two divergent approaches to Kant's philosophy, a student who attempts

to specialize in Kant has to anticipate such a complexity. This context simply furthersthe initial worry Can the student escape Kant's philosophic biases and

propositions?

(3) But after zooming into Kant's philosophy, the next challenge is to be originarytodistinguish a position which is different from Kant's. Is this possible? Usually, thisseparation and eventual autonomy takes years of painstaking work. The initial stepnormally includes the discovery of some cracks and holes. When this phase begins,the student of Kant changes his intellectual gears. From an expert of thoughtreconstruction, he morphs into a critical student eager to magnify where Kant's

philosophy possibly failed. A mistake or error in Kant's seemingly flawless system is aprized possession.

Social Science and Filipino Philosophy

The social science approach is a route that has greatly influenced currentdiscussions on Filipino philosophy. In the present list of Filipino Thinkers, many of themare social scientists who have made studies in various parts of the Philippines. ForGripaldo, this approach, as an activity, is extractive in nature. He mentionsLeonardo Mercado (1974,1994), Florentino Timbreza (1982), Virgilio Enriquez (1988)

and F. Landa Jocano (1997) as examples of Filipino writers who apply the culturalapproach in the construction of a Filipino Philosophy.

26 Since the cultural approach makes use of the social sciences, their researches

have disposed them to meet and reflect on the different aspects in the life-ways ofFilipinos. These experiences have fueled their confidence to construct variousimages of the Filipino. If the question on the meaning of the concept Filipino israised, they invoke and tap the particular encounters gained in the course of theirimmersion and the concepts they brewed and discovered in the process ofrumination.


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Today, the unfolding of various particular truths is a cherished approach in theproduction of knowledge. This is probably the reason why many social scientists

have punctuated the need to have a thick description of the life-ways of variousFilipino communities. Such descriptions are esteemed since they do not only depictcommunal activities. The narratives, symbols and meanings that regulate the life of

certain groups of people are also saved from possible extinction. Since this is theprocess of reasoning that many social scientists follow, it can be logically expectedthat they will have this demand - the concept of a Filipino philosophy has to be incontinuum with the life-world of the Filipino people. The growing presence of socialscientists in the discussions on philosophy is also confirmed by the number of known

social-scientist/philosophers in the post-modern scene.28 This is a big contrast to thedominance of mathematician/philosophers in modernity.29

If in modern times the thinkers moved from mathematics to philosophy, today, somesocial scientists move from their respective fields to philosophy. This unique

phenomenon simply solidifies humanitys current love affair with the content that

particulars can offer.

The difficulty, however, with the cultural approach is the transition from descriptiveto normative valuations. This is a point that Gripaldo has explored when he mentionsthe difference between descriptive analysis and philosophical analysis. Gripaldo,

The Making of a Filipino Philosopher,. Whereas the former is engaged inpiecemeal analysis, the latter's concern for the 'ought' discourse must be zoomed

into and not abandoned. In a later section of this article, we shall take up this pointof Gripaldo and deepen it in our discussion on the interplay between the particular

and universal. Although Gripaldo mentions the need for the holistic eye, we felt that

there is a further need to substantiate the kind of interface between the particularand the universal which the social-scientist-philosopher's gaze can look upon.

Filipino Thinkers: In Broad StrokesIn Mindanao, for instance, many of the proponents of Filipino philosophy are at thesame time social scientists. We have Alejo 32 and Gaspar.33 These thinkers havebeen immersed and exposed to the rudiments of social science and have been at

the forefront in the discussions on issues of Mindanao. Hence, if one proceeds in thediscourse on the possibility of a Mindanaon philosophy, the mentioned thinkers can

be consulted. Their immersion and passion to be with the communities in Mindanao

are telling of the wealth of insights that they possess on the life-world of aMindanaon.

In the area of Luzon, one has to include the thinking of Ferriols34 and Salazar.35 Theformer zooms into the phenomenon of 'Meron,' 'Loob' and Filipino spirituality, whilethe latter pronounced and specified the conditions of possibility of a 'PantayongPananaw'. These concepts are complex and have been seriously ruminated upon.More importantly, their commitment to have a critical gaze at their own positions


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tells us that they have tried to carefully substantiate their thoughts. In so doing, theyhave disposed us to trust the insights and arguments that their works propose.

Consequently, the possible criticisms that their positions can provide are worthy ofattention, since they have explored a vantage point which we can glean and lookinto. Hence, their phenomenological reflections on the experiences of Filipinos are

grounded, since such interpretations emanate from a ruminated perspective.

In Visayas, we have at the forefront the continued strengthening of the collection ofCebuano Literature and History housed in the University of San Carlos. Researcherslike Alburo have spearheaded attempts to make an account of narratives and

histories of various towns, cities and communities in the province of Cebu. Thismassive effort to collate and study the particular stories of Cebuanos reminds us of

the capacity of local experts to contribute in discussions on the concept of being aFilipino. This is even reinforced with the term Filipino being an identity and referential

concept. To whom does it apply? What is its content? These are perennial questionsemerging in many identity and referential concepts. However, it might be of help to

be reminded of the epistemological assumption when dealing with the conceptFilipino either one attempts to know the abstract essence, or one acknowledgesthat there can never be a Filipino essence. What we can provide are alwaysestimations on what and who a Filipino is. If the latter presupposition is held, we canexpect the rise of particular philosophies. But when the former is expected, theproduction of knowledge will always have problems dealing with the content ofuniversally oriented thoughts.

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