Task Force Smitha Leadership Failure

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1M vlrwl upreaed ia dua paper In ! ItIoee of die audloraM do no t necaunly ret1ec t the riew'I of tJMDqlutmt : r \ o( De!mIe or any of Its "lIICieL Thlad o c u ~ 1 may noe be mUMCi (or pub(k.adoft untli( ~ , ; , """"en deared by die appropriate malituy aen-1ce orp e m m m t -rncy.

TASK FORCE SMITH--A LEADERSHIP FAILURE?

BY

COLONEL WILLIAM J . DAVIESUnited Sta t e s Army Nat iona l Guard

DISTRIBUTION S T A T E M E N T ~ Approved for publ ic r e l ease .Dis t r ibu t ion i s un l imi ted .

USAWC CLASS OF 1992

U.S. ARMY WAR COUEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 170135050


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PROPERTY OF US ARMY

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

The views expressed in this paper are those of theauthor and do not necessarily reflect the views ofth e Department of Defense or any of i ts agencies.This doc''llent may not be released for open publicationuntil i t has been cleared by the appropriate militarvservice or government agency.

TASK FORCE SMITH, A LEADERSHIP FAILURE?by

Colonel Will iam J . DaviesColonel Harry R. Yarger Pro jec t Adviser

U.S. Army War CollegeCar l i s l e Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

DlSTlUBUTlOU STATEMENT A: Approved for publie_Te1eas d 1 ~ b u . t o n i. unltmite4.

LIBRARY Jll8l992

ARMY WAR COLLEGE I


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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: William J . Davies, COL, ARNGTITLE: Task Force smith, A Leadership FailureDATE: 15 April , 1992 PAGES: 84 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassif ied

On July 5, 1950, an American regimental combat team led byLieutenant Colonel Charles "Brad" smith engaged North Koreansoldiers in combat. This force was referred to as "Task ForceSmith." Post World War I I leadership in the mil i tary andcivi l ian sectors fai led the soldiers of Task Force smith and a l lservicemen who fought in the Korean War. Thousands of l ives wereunnecessarily l os t due to the fa i lure of senior mil i ta ry leadersto demand high t raining and readiness standards and seniormili tary and pol i t i ca l leadership to see the nature of futurewarfare and prepare for i t . In the face of budgetary constraintsand resul tant reduction of the force st ructure, our mil i tary andcivi l ian leadership today must study and absorb the lessonslearned from the Task Force smith experience to insure th i sfai lure does not reoccur. This study i s an examination of TaskForce smith and of the fa i lure of senior leadership of the postWorld War I I era to assume the mandated responsibi l i ty tomaintain a strong defense. Failure of our mili tary and pol i t i ca lleadership to recognize the need for and needs of land powerforces today could be even more cost ly than t ha t experienced inKorea between 1950 and 1953.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PageABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i i LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS............. . ... i v CHAPTER I . INTRODUCTION . . ... 1 A BATTLE LOST . . . .3

I I . THE EIGHTH ARMY AND MACARTHUR ... .10 TRAINING . . .. . . . . . . . . . ... . 14 EQUIPMENT .......... .27

I I I . THE NEW ORDER OF POLITICS. . . 29 KOREA, JUNE 25 1950 ...... .. 31 NO PERCEIVED THREAT ....... . .32 POLITICAL AND DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM TAKES OVER. .34 IV. THE ROLE OF SENIOR ARMY LEADERSHIP ........ . .38 BUDGET CUTS ....... .42 THE BUDGET AND DOWNSIZING. 48 MODERNIZATION ...... . .50 INTELLIGENCE ......... 54 QUALITY OF SOLDIERS . . . 61 V. CONCLUSION. . 65 ENDNOTES ..... .73 BIBLIOGRAPHY. .81

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Page

1 . Korea and Adjacent Areas (Map 1) ........................ 68 2 . North Korean Invasion (Map 2) 69 3 . Task Force Smith, July 5 , 1950 (Map 3) ................. 70 4 . South Korea: Taejon to Pyongyang (Map 4) ........... 71 5 . The Far East Defense Line, January 12 , 1950 (Map 5) ..... 72

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTIONThis paper focuses on the immediate pos t World War I I era in

th e Army between 1945 and 1950, because th e s im i l a r i t i e s to themil i t a ry drawdown of t h a t e ra and the "new world order" of the1990 's a re s t r i k i ng l y s i mi l a r . The Truman Adminis t ra t ion wascompelled to "br ing th e boys home" and r e d i r e c t th e defensebudget to solve domest ic problems on th e "home f ron t " .

The gre a t mil i t a ry l eaders who fought in World War I I werenow the senior leaders a t the Pentagon and Defense Department.They were success fu l in t o t a l war in Europe and Asia, but in manyrespec t s fa i l ed to assess the capab i l i t i e s of our po te n t i a lenemies and th e new na tu re of warfare ; l imi t ed war, so unl ike th eg loba l wars of World War I and I I . That l eadersh ip fa i l ed toe f fec t i ve l y serve th e i n t e r e s t s of na t iona l secur i ty between 1945and 1950 a t a l l l e ve l s i s in some ways s e l f ev iden t inr e t ros pe c t . But why and how d id t h i s occur? .This i s th ei n s igh t h i s to ry can provide . Hopeful ly th e answers gained inr e t ros pe c t wi l l preclude a s im i l a r f a t e fo r so l d i e r s tossed in towar in th e fu ture .

T ra d i t i ona l ly , th e major reasons advanced fo r the Army'sunpreparedness a re p o l i t i c a l in na tu re . According to t h i sschool of thought , domest ic p o l i t i c a l pressu res upon th e

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government caused the securi ty of the nation to take a back sea tto domestic economic imperatives and the national desire toreturn to peace a f te r the nearly five years of world war. Butth i s is an inadequate explanation - American casual t ies of theKorean War were 54,246 ki l led (33,629 ki l led in combat) and103,284 wounded. A profess ional officers corps cannot acceptsuch a caval ier explanation. A more appropriate in terpre ta t ionof Army unpreparedness i s our senior mili tary leaders fa i led tovisual ize the nature of the next war, focus on readiness andconvince the democratic ins t i tu t ions of government of the needfor a well equipped, t ra ined and ready Army.

This paper br ief ly examines the key economic, domestic andpol i t i ca l issues t ha t confronted leadership between 1945 and thebeginning of the Korean War but focuses on how Army readinessfa i led . I t is intended tha t the issues surfaced in th i s paperwil l serve as a warning to our senior mili tary leaders ofpol i t i ca l and readiness p i t f a l l s of the current post-war era andprovide insights which may preclude unnecessary loss of soldiersl ives in future confl icts .

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A Battle Lost

A NATION THAT DOES NOT PREPARE POR ALLFORMS OP WAR SHOULD RENOUNCE THE USE OPWAR IN NATIONAL POLICY. A PEOPLE THATDOES NOT PREPARE TO PIGHT SHOULD THENBE MORALLY PREPARED POR SURRENDER. TOPAIL TO PREPARE SOLDIERS AND CITIZENSPOR LIMITED, BLOODY GROUND ACTION ANDTHEN ENGAGE IN IT, IS POLLY VERGING ONTHE CRIMINAL. I

- T.R. Pehrenbach

On th e evening of June 30th , 1950, Lieutenant ColonelChar les Brad Smith assembled h is task fo rce , packed up equipmentand prepared to move out . Task Force Smith depar ted Camp WoodJapan, a t 3:00 A.M. th e nex t morning in a rainstorm fo r I tazukeAi r f i e l d - an A ir Force base some seventy f ive miles away. Theconvoy a r r ived a t 8:05 A.M., f ive hours l a t e r . Smith was met a tth e a i r f i e l d by Major General William Dean, Commander of th e 24thInfant ry Divis ion . Brad Smith l a t e r commented th e order givenhim by General Dean was " the most genera l , widespread, fa r - f lungorder t h a t a ba t t a l i on commander ever had."2 Dean issued thefo l lowing order to Smith a t I tazuke Airf i e ld :

When you g e t to Pusan, head fo r Taejon. We want tos top th e North Koreans a s fa r from Pusan as we can.Block th e main road as fa r nor th as poss ib le . contac tGeneral Church. I f you c a n ' t loca te him, go to Taejonand beyond if you can . Sorry I c a n ' t give you moreinformat ion . Tha t ' s a l l I ' ve got . Good luck to you,and God bless you and your men.)

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General Dean could not even t e l l Smith where BrigadierGeneral John Church could be located. Brad Smith l a te r said tha the was convinced tha t Dean did not know i f they could even landin Pusan because the enemy might already be there waiting fo rthem.4 Some have cr i t ic ized General Dean for not challenging theEighth Army Commander, General Johnnie Walker, for sending 24thDivision soldiers into combat. 5

Task Force smith departed Japan on s ix C-54 t ranspor ta i rc ra f t headed fo r Pusan, Korea. Because of the res t r ic tedcargo capacity of the C-54's, c r i t i ca l weapons, equipment andvehicles were sent via ship with the remainder of the bat ta l ion.D Company, the heavy weapons company, t raveled by ship because ofthe heavy load of equipment it carr ied. I t would not re join thebat tal ion unt i l a f te r the i n i t i a l bat t le was over. In Japan,Smith had no knowledge of addi t ional support , i f any, tha t hewould have with which to f ight the North Koreans with.6

Arriving a t Pusan on July 1st , Task Force smith proceeded toTaejon by t ra in on an a l l night r ide . About 7 A.M. the nextmorning, smith located General Church's command post andrequested his orders . Church " . pointed to a place on the mapand said 'we have a l i t t l e action up here. All we need is somemen up there who won't run when they see tanks. We're going tomove you up to support the ROK's,."7 smith sought and receivedpermission to conduct a forward reconnaissance to se lec t aposit ion where he could stand and f ight the North K o r e a n ~ . Heheaded north, up the main Pusan-Seoul highway, toward Suwon with

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h is dr ive r and a few s t a f f of f i ce r s . He stopped on f ived i f f e r en t occas ions - reconning poss ib l e f igh t ing pos i t ions andrecord ing them in case of l a t e r need. As he proceeded Northtoward Osan and Suwon, he passed increas ing numbers of ROKs o ld i e r s - headed the oppos i te d i r ec t i on - south! The af ternoonof July 3d, he f ina l ly reached the loca t ion where he would s e tup h is i n i t i a l pos i t ion . Located on a r idge l ine about t h reemiles nor th of Os an (See maps on pages 70 and 71) , t he pos i t i onhad a panoramic view over looking the countrys ide c lea r to Suwonnear ly seven miles in th e d i s t ance . It a l so provided anexce l l en t view o f the main highway and a ra i l road c lose by.

Report ing back to Church, smith gathered h is force t h a tevening in Taejon and headed up the main highway to pyongtaekwhere he was jo ined by Bat tery A o f the 52d Fie ld A r t i l l e ryBat t a l ion led by Lieutenant Colonel Mil le r o. Perry . The bat te ryconsis ted of s ix 105mm howi tzers , 73 vehic les and 108 men. 8About 3:00 A.M. on the 5th of Ju ly , Smith ' s smal l t ask forcemoved in to pos i t ion a t the pre -se l ec t ed s i t e nor th of Osan wherethe men began to d ig in on th e r i dge l i ne . Bat tery A occupied apos i t ion approximate ly one mile behind the r idg l ine where th ef igh t ing pos i t ions were being dug. One of the ba t t e r y ' s s ixhowi tzers was emplaced along th e highway - halfway between theba t t e r y and Smith ' s pos i t ion to serve as an an t i t ank gun. Takings tock of his f igh t ing resources for t he upcoming a t t ack Smithfound the fol lowing:

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Two underst rength infantry companies [B and C)- A few headquarters personnel- Comma and heavy-weapons t roops- two 75mm recoi l less r i f les [from 21st Rgt 's 3d Bn

Recoilless Rifle Platoon - "M" Co]- two 4.2 inch mortars [from 21st Rgt 's Hvy Mortar Co]- s ix 2.36 inch rocket launchers [teams] [4 teams from

Btry A]- four 60mm mortars- s ix l ight howitzers (105mm)- four .50 ca l iber machine guns [from Btry A]9

Miller Perry sent volunteers from Battery A with four teamswith .50 cal iber machine guns and four teams with 2.36 rocketlaunchers to augment smith 's forward posi t ions. O The ar t i l l e rybatta l ion possessed eighteen rounds of "HEAT" (High ExplosiveAntitank) ammunition before departing Japan. However, Battery Awas allocated only s ix rounds of HEAT along with 1,200 rounds of105mm ammunition. HEAT rounds were "extremely scarce in the FarEast because the Department of the Army had given prior i ty toEurope for the few it had. "I I Signif icant ly there were noanti tank or antipersonnel mines avai lable to Task Force Smith inKorea. Antitank mines placed in the road would have hads ign i f ican t success in delaying or stopping the tanks andpersonnel. Additionally, each so ld ie r carried 120 rounds ofammunition for h is r i f l e and two days supply of C-rat ions.

On the morning of July 5, 1950, Task Force Smith consisted6


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of 540 soldiers : Smith;s or ig ina l contingent of 406 (17 off ice rsand 389 enl is ted men) augmented by 134 off ice rs and enl is tedsoldiers of Battery A, 52d Field Art i l le ry Battal ion. At about7:00 A.M. tanks were observed in the dis tance - moving along thehighway towards Task Force smith 's pos i t ion . At 8:16 A.M., thebat tery began direct ing f i re upon the columns of North Koreansoldiers and the i r tanks. The enemy infantry began to sca t t e ra ~ d take cover, but the soviet bui l t T-34 medium tanks continueddriving forward. The ar t i l l e ry 105mm high explosive roundsscored di rec t hi t s on the T-34's with no ef fec t . Even HEATrounds bounced off the T-34's , a second class tank. Fir ing 85mmcannons and machine guns, the T-34's continued to close with theAmerican so ld ie rs . The Task Force 's 75mm recoi l less r i f l e s weref i red a t dis tances of no more than 700 yards scoring di rec t hi t s ,but without effect.12 Fi rs t Lieutenant Oll ie Conners, PlatoonLeader in B Company, took a 2.36 rocket launcher and crawled intoa ditch within f i f teen yards of tanks moving along the road. Ina l l , Conners f i red 22 rounds a t the rear of a tank - supposedlywhere the armor was the th innest ; the rounds e i ther deflected ordidn ' t work a t a l l . Of the t h i r ty three T-34 tanks only fourwere put out of action.

One event in the bat t le was recounted as follows:

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Sergeant Fi rs t Class Loran Chambers, a veteran of WorldWar I I already had f ive Purple Hearts. When he cal ledover the telephone for some 60mm mortar support, theanswer was: 'Won't reach tha t f a r . ''How about some 8 l ! ' he yelled. 'We don ' t have any. ' 'Hel l , for Chris t ' s sake, throw in some 4.2 ' s1 ' 'We're out of tha t too . ' 'How about the ar t i l l e ry? ' 'No commun ications. ' 'How about the Air Force?' 'We don ' t know where they are . ' 'Then damn i t , qa l l the Navyt' 'They can ' t reach t h i s fa r . '

Chambers shouted an obscenity. 'Send me a camera.I want to take a picture of t h i s . ' A few minutesl a te r a mortar fragment gave Chambers his six thPurple Heart. 13

The abi l i ty to communicate between the infantry posit ionsand the a r t i l l e ry proved c r i t i ca l . Commo wire connecting theseposi t ions was la id on top of the road surface rather than buryingit in . Tanks moving across the highway severed the wire and thecommunications were out by approximately 8:30 A.M. Training,equipment, and doctrine had fa i led the va l ian t soldiers of TaskForce Smith.

The bat t le las ted nearly seven hours unt i l ammunition wasabout gone and the North Koreans were flanking and over-runningthe defensive posi t ions. At approximately 2:00 P.M. Smithdirected his men to withdraw toward Ansong. Brigadier GeneralBrad Smith l a t e r gave the following account of the North Koreanforce he was up against:

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IIt i s est imated by the t ime we f i red the f i r s t shot a tthe oncoming in fan t ry t ha t there were tw oreg iments of th e 4th Divis ion [NKPA] in our view.did no t know what t h e i r composi t ion was; I knew therewas a he l l of a lo t of people coming a t us and I d i dn ' tknow what was l e f t a t Suwon. It tu rns ou t t ha t it waswhat was l e f t of the 4th Divis ion and a l l of the 5thDivis ion coming r i gh t behind them. So, I hade v e n t u a l l ~ to face 20,000 ins tead of maybe four or f ivethousand. 4

Smith ' s force car r ied out as many wounded as could becar r i ed . However, othe r wounded and dead, toge ther withequipment, were l e f t behind. In a matter o f a few hours , TaskForce Smith had been over run. Thus ended th e f i r s t involvementof American so ld ie r s in the Korean War. "smith and Per ry hadl o s t about 185 men k i l l ed , wounded, captured or missing."tS TheNorth Koreans continued south toward Osan and Taejon. In l i gh tof h is command's capab i l i t i e s , th e qua l i ty of the equipment, thet ra in ing of th e so ld ie r s , th e i n t e l l i gence given, the ordersrece ived , Task Force smith fought bravely and i t s accomplishmentsshould n o t be degraded. Task Force Smith fa i l ed and the reasonsfo r fa i lu re poin t to unpreparedness fo r war. We need theins igh t s from Task Force a t t h i s t ime in our h i s to ry . Why didTask Force Smith f a i l ? Why was the wor ld ' s grea te s t armyunprepared fo r a t h i rd world con f l i c t ? The answers l i e fa r abovesmi th ' s l eve l .

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CHAPTER I I

THE EIGHTH ARMY AND MACARTHUR

MacArthur's strategy during the early days and months of thewar was intended to prevent the enemy from capturing Pusan whichwas the most c r i t i c a l port in Korea - with a capaci ty many t imesgreater than Inchon. The more the enemy could be slowed down,the more time would be available to move troops and supplies intoPusan. He l a t e r explained tha t Brad Smith's force was to "serveas an arrogant display of strength,,16 to the enemy. I t was morean arrogant ignorance of the readiness of the forces under hiscommand.

MacArthur's headquarters had instructed the Eighth ArmyCommander, Lieutenant General Johnnie Walker, to provide adelaying force of

. . two r i f l e companies under a bat tal ion commanderreinforced by two platoons of 4.2 inch mortars and oneplatoon of 75mm recoi l less r i f les to go by a ir to Pusanand repor t to General Church for orders .... the missionof the advance elements was phrased as follows:'Advance a t once upon landing with delaying force, inaccordance with the s i tua t ion to the north by a l lpossible means, contact enemy now advancing south fromSeoul towards Suwon and delay h is advance! ' 17

As we have seen, the 1st Battal ion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 24thInfantry Division led by Lieutenant Colonel Charles "Brad" smith

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was tasked fo r th e miss ion. How well prepared were they fo r t h i st a sk? smith was a west Poin te r who had served under th e commandof then "Lightening Joe" Col l ins in th e 25th Divis ion a tGuadacanal (who a t t h i s t ime was th e Army Chief o f Sta f f ) as aba t t a l i on commander and Divis ion G-3. Col l ins l a t e r sa idLieu tenan t Colonel Smith " ... had come to my a t t en t ion then as abr i gh t young o f f i c e r who showed grea t promise . Now matured and~ i t h combat exper ience back o f him, he was wel l qual i f i ed to leadth e f i r s t American army t roops to f i gh t in the Korean War. ,,18

LTC Smith reported t o h i s new duty s t a t ion a t Camp WoodKyushu, Japan, in th e summer o f 1949. A year l a t e r , on June 30,1950, a f t e r spending long hours on a l e r t duty as a r e s u l t of th eNorth Korean invas ion which had taken place f ive days ea r l i e r , hehad gone to bed ea r l y . At approximately 10:30 P.M., the phonerang and h is wife Bet t i e answered. Colonel Richard W. Stephens ,Commander 21s t Infant ry Regiment , was on the phone and he wantedto t a lk to Brad Smith. Bet t i e quickly awakened her husband andhe l i s t ened to Colonel Stephens i s sue o rde rs as fol lows: "The l i dhas blown of f . Get on your c lo thes and r e por t to th e CP. ,,19 Atthe command pos t , he l ea rned t h a t he would c o ~ a n d a t a sk force ,gathered toge the r a t Camp Wood, to counter th e invas ion by th eNorth Korean Army. At t h i s t ime , h is force cons i s t ed of a p a r to f h i s ba t t a l i on headquar te r s company and a mixture of . troopsfrom h is communication s e c t ion , and a pla toon formed with a mixo f 75mm r e c o i l l e s s r i f l e s and 4.2 inch mortars ; a t o t a l o f 406

wof f i ce r s and men.

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Only a thi rd of his off ice rs had been in combat during WorldWar I I . One half of his NCO's were veterans, but not a l l of themhad actually been in combat. Most of the enlis ted men weretwenty years old or under. Brad smith was himself th i r ty - four . 21What would have been the outcome of th i s encounter with the NorthKoreans i f more officers and men had been combat veterans? Whatwould have been the outcome i f there had been no combat veteransin Task Force Smith? These are questions tha t cannot beanswered, but some surpris ing ins ights are available on thereadiness of these men. General Collins l a te r said tha t TaskForce Smith "was scarcely a formidable body for checking even theleading elements of the North Korean divis ions driving south fromSeoul toward Taejon .... " l l General Collins may never havereal ized the extent of th is understatement.

Japan was occupied by U.S. Forces under the Far EastCommand, commanded by General Douglas MacArthur (CINCFE).MacArthur also was the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) andCommander in Chief, united Nations Command (CINCUNC). As theCINCFE, he had control of the Eighth Army, comprised of the 24th,25th and 7th Infantry Divisions and the 1s t Cavalry Division.The Eighth Army was commanded by Lieutenant General Walton Harris"Johnnie" Walker who commanded the XX Corps under George S.Patton in World War I I . The primary mission given to the EighthArmy was "occupation duty" - to watch over the defeated nation ofJapan. MacArthur had been the senior mili tary and pol i t i ca lleader in Japan since the end of World War I I . Walker became the

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Eighth Army Commander in 1948.The Army o f 1950 was th e pos t World War I I Army which was

"shaped l e s s by mi l i t a ry doc t r ine looking to a fu ture ... than byth e l a s t war of whose massive armies it was th e remnant. ,,23 InJapan , American l eaders and so l d i e r s had fa l len in to the calm andpeacefu lnes s o f t he pos t war period . occupat ion forces in Japanlacked th e knowledge of bas ic combat s k i l l s . There was littleemphasis on t r a i n i ng beyond th e squad and p la toon l eve l . Livef i r e weapons t ra in ing and exerc i ses were th e r a re except ion ,r a the r than th e ru l e .

Many o f th e men were more fami l ia r with beer ha l l s andbro the l s of th e Japanese c i t i e s than with t he bas ics ofso ld ie r ing as one c r i t i c l a t e r complained, it was a'cream p u f f ' army . . i f t hese guys had spen t more t imeon th e f i r i ng range and l e s s t ime in th e PX snackbar ... they might be a l i ve t o d a y . ~ The pre va i l i ng a t t i t u d e of the peacet ime occupat ion and lack ofemphasis on t r a i n i ng and readiness by mi l i t a ry l eadersh ip wasevident . This l eadersh ip f a i lu re would l a t e r prove to be anotable c os t to American l i ve s .

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T r a i n i n ~

WAR SEVERELY TESTS THB PHYSICAL ENDURANCB ANDMORAL STAMINA OP THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER. TOPERPORM HIS DUTIBS BPPICIBNTLY HE MUST NOTONLY BE WELL EQUIPPED AND TECHNICALLY TRAINEDBUT HB ALSO MUST BB PHYSICALLY QUALIPIED TOBNDURB THB HARDSHIPS OP THE PIELD SERVICE ANDBB CONSTANTLY PORTIPIBD BY DISCIPLINE BASEDON HIGH STANDARDS OP MILITARYCONDUCT. 25 - PM 100-5, AUGUST 15, 1949

The Army in 1949 and 19S0 was untrained and unprepared tomeet the sever i ty of combat. Irrespect ive of d o c t r i n ~ exis t inga t the t ime, such as the operat ions manual, FM 100-S, one of themost s t r ik ing cr i t ic isms tha t can be made of the senior Armyleadership between 1945 and 19S0 was t he i r fa i lure to i n s i s t uponqual i ty t ra in ing , doctr ine , and standards. I t i s s ign i f ican t tonote t ha t FM 100-S t ha t came out in August 1949, superseded theversion of June lS , 1944. For nearly f ive years (1944-1949), theu.s. Army had been operating on World War I I doctr ine even thoughs igni f icant changes took place in the force s t ruc ture as a r esu l tof budget cuts and downsizing.

The deact iva t ion of one ba t ta l ion in each of the threedivis ional regiments and removal of one of the three f i r ingba t t e r i es in each of the four a r t i l l e ry ba t ta l ions had ser iousrepercussions fo r doctr ine . The modif icat ion of the div is iona lregiments and a r t i l l e ry ba t ta l ions fo r budget reasons, conf l ic ted

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with the Army's t ra ining and doctr ine under the t r iangula r systemof maneuver units . 26 No doctr ine replaced the three-bat ta l ionregiments and therefore the deactivat ion s ign i f ican t lycompromised the readiness and combat effect iveness of thedivisions. Fi r s t into combat in 1950, the 24th Division was thef i r s t of many to pay the price for the lack of complete f ight ingunits . Three days a f te r Task Force Smith had fought the NorthKoreans north of Osan, Major General William F. Dean, Commanderof the 24th Division, conceded t ha t the divisions must be broughtup to the i r fu l l t r iangular organization. His l e t t e r of Julyeighth to MacArthur expressed h is concerns on th i s subjec t asfollows:

The two ba t ta l ion regimental organization with which weare operat ing does not lend i t se l f to effect ive combat.The same i s t rue , though possibly to a le sse r degree ofour two bat tery ar t i l l e ry ba t ta l ions . Recommend tha tinfantry batta l ions be sent us to bring a l l regimentsof the 24th Division up to regular t r iangularorganization. vNone of the four divisions of the Eighth Army had the capabi l i tyto projec t more than 62 percent of i t s normal combat power. 28The doctr ine publ icat ions were based on an assumption tha t uni tswould be able to deploy the i r fu l l wartime strength andcompliment of u n i t s . ~ A regimental commander would normally beable to deploy his three batta l ions with two forward and one heldin reserve. In th i s case, "no matter which course was adopted,the regiments t ac t i ca l in tegr i ty was gravely i m p a i r e d . " ~ Thecommanders and off ice rs in Korea were not t ra ined in orexperienced with such a modified t ac t i ca l system. This concept

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had not been taught in the Army schools, perhaps because i t wasbelieved tha t the spaces would be f i l led pr ior to combat. 31 suchwas not the case in June 1950. Thus the basic tene t of t ra in howyou wil l f ight was violated.

Reports on combat eff ic iency of the four divis ion ' s of theEighth Army were sent to the Department of the Army in May 1950showing estimates ranging from 84 percent to 65 percent of fu l lcombat efficiency.32 These four divis ions "mirrored the Army'ss ta te of unreadiness in a l l respects . t lD Lack of t ra ining of theAmerican soldier in the cont inental United s ta tes , as well asoverseas, was known to the leadership a t the most senior levels .Yet, suff ic ient and appropriate correct ive action was not taken,nor were the actions t ha t were taken followed up adequately.

In 1945, Basic Training had been cut from seventeen weeks toe ight weeks as a cos t saving measure. But th i s proved to be atremendous burden upon the gaining uni ts to provide theaddi t ional t ra ining needed. Later, in March 1949, the t ra iningcycle was increased to fourteen weeks, but it did not includespecia l ty or branch t r a i n i n g . ~ This attempt to economize andcut the "fat" had a fa r reaching and devastating ef fec t uponreadiness of the Army.

MacArthur in response to r i s ing readiness concerns issued anew t raining direct ive to the Eighth Army on June 10, 1949. TheEighth Army, relieved of many of i t s administrat ive occupationdut ies , was provided time for t ra ining in combat sk i l l s . Thiswas a dramatic change to the relaxed l i f e s tyle prevalent in

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Japan a t the t ime. The poor condition of t ra ining was evidentwhen the Eighth Army headquarters conducted a CPX (Command PostExercise) to comply with the increased level of t ra ining directedby MacArthur. The resul t s were not sa t i s fac tory :

The Assis tant G-3, Mike Michaellis , remembered withamusement: 'General Walker cal led an "a ler t " and movedthe headquarters to the f ie ld . I t was a top secre t CPXwhich envisioned a Russian invasion off Hokkaido.Unti l then combat preparat ions had been almostnegl igible . The CPX was a disas ter . I t took almostthree days for them to get the t ents se t up. The peoplehad no'place to s leep . There was no l ight ing, nocommunications. They couldn ' t get the meals together .I t was god awful. But by June 1950 [ the Korean Wars t a r t ed in June 1950!] we'd done t h i s so many t imestha t the headquarters was adequately t ra ined to go intoth e f i e l d . ,3 5

People a t the lower echelon of the chain of command were wellaware of the problems with t ra in ing , as in the case of MajorMichaellis . I t i s evident t ha t even rUdimentary t ra ining waslacking and major ef for t s were required i f so ld ie rs were to besuccessful in combat!

To meet MacArthur's t ra in ing d i rec t ive , Walker in tens if iedthe Eighth Army t ra in ing program. Training plans emphasized thef ie ld environment using a graduated schedule to meet cer ta inlevel t ra in ing standards by given time-frames: "Completion ofcompany-level t ra in ing by December 1949, batta l ion level by May1950, regimental- level by July 1950, and divis ional level byDecember 1950.,,36 Even i f accomplished perfect ly , the Army couldnot have f ie lded an in tegra ted combat ready force by June, 1950.In fac t , when the war s tar ted , regimental , divis ion , and. Armylevels of t ra in ing had not been carr ied out .

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Most uni t s were on record for having completed ba t ta l ionlevel t ra in ing on paper; some were noted as fai l ing t he i rt es t s . 37 However, there are indications tha t val idat ion ofbatta l ion level t ra ining was questionable a t best . I f suchbatta l ion t es t s were administered, some of the key commanderswere not aware of i t . For example, in a recent interview withBrigadier General ( re t i red) Charles Brad Smith, he was not awaretha t such formalized test ing had been implemented. smith did notbelieve tha t any l ive f i re t ra ining had been conducted during theyear he was commanding his bat ta l ion in Japan. 38 He recal led anArmy Training Test (ATT) being administered by the Eighth Army,but tha t was only in the form of a s t a f f and commander CommandPost Exercise (CPX). 39 In regard to a requirement to conductt ra ining a t company, batta l ion, regimental and divis ion level ,Brad Smith sai.d " i f tha t included l ive f i r ing and maneuvers,tha t ' s hogwash.,,40 He recal led tha t one CPX and a few amphibiousexercises had been conducted during h is tenure in Japan, but itwas not clear to him tha t th i s t ra ining was associated with arequirement to achieve batta l ion, regimental or.divis ion levelt ra in ing . 41 Smith ref lec ted tha t t ra in ing "was almost nonexis ten t . We had PT. We probably did physical t ra in ing as wellas we did anything. I t was PT in place - it wasn' t a three milerun followed by a ha lf dozen pushups . nothing l ike tha t . ,,42

The Department of the Army s ta f f conducted a t ra in inginspect ion v i s i t to the Far East Command during September andoctober 1949. Prior to tha t v i s i t , there ~ a d been no t ra ining

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inspect ion v i s i t s of overseas commands since the end of World WarII ! The Chairman of the Jo in t Chiefs of Staff , Omar Bradley, ina memorandum to Joe Coll ins confirmed th i s a t the t ime. MajorGeneral Clint Andrus, Director of Organization and Training forthe Department of the Army, in a memorandum to Colonel Phil ipDwyer of tha t off ice to arrange for a t raining inspect ion ofoverseas commands references th i s exchange. He s ta tes :

General Bradley in a memorandum to General Coll insdated 16 February 1949, s ta ted t ha t there has been noplan, s ince termination of hos t i l i t i e s (end of WorldWar I I ] , which the Department of the Army inspectst ra in ing of overseas units . The changing condit ions,in addit ion to the reorganizat ion of occupationt roops in combat type units , warrants a deeperin te res t by the Department of the Army [ indetermining the] t ra ining s ta tus of these uni ts . 43General Bradley himself had not vis i ted the Far East Commandwhile he was the Army Chief of Staff! I t would be easy to drawthe conclusion t ha t the senior leadership had been unconcerned ora t best complacent about the s ta tus of t raining and readinessoverseas. But a be t t e r question i s what did the senior leadershipknow about the readiness of the force?

Soon a f te r assuming the job as Army Chief of Staff (October1, 1949), General Coll ins vis i ted the Far East Command toascertain combat readiness . While in Japan, he wrote amemorandum "Report of Visi t to Hawaii and Far East Command"(October 20, 1949) to the Secretary of the Army:

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As a re su l t of the reduct ions in strength ofpersonnel . . . and because our troops were primari lyengaged in occupation missions unt i l recent ly , thetroops of the Eighth Army are now in f ightingcondition . . . given another s ix months the divis ions Iinspected should be in excel lent s h a p e . ~ He l a te r commented in h is book, War In Peacetime:

In my subsequent inspect ion vis i t s to the t roops itwas evident tha t the recent emphasis on t ra in ing ,inaugurated by General Walton H. Walker, the commanderof the . Eighth Army in Japan, had reached only thebatta l ion level and had not overcome the inevi tableslackness t ha t resul ts from occupation duty. On myre turn to Washington I reported to Secretary of theArmy Frank Pace tha t given t ime, def ic iencies incombat readiness could be corrected. Now it appearedthere would not be t ime. 4.5The dispari ty in these reports is s t r ik ing. Coll ins had his s ix

months. His ear l ie r repor t lacked depth and knowledge about therea l i t i es of readiness . He did not address the shortage ofc r i t i ca l equipment, weapons and munitions. He apparently was notaware of the poor condit ion of the aged and worn out weapons andequipment on hand. Most assuredly, his assessment of the EighthArmy as being in " ~ i g h t i n g condition" was unreal i s t ic andmisleading to say the l eas t .

The Department of the Army's f i r s t t ra ining inspect ion ofthe Far East Command (FEC) was conducted by Colonel F.M. Harrisand h is party in the f a l l of 1949. The inspect ion was documentedin a SECRET "Report of Training Inspect ion of the united s ta tesArmy, FEC.,,46 The inspect ion covered the Far East Command withthe exception of the Phil ippines and Korea. The report showeds igni f icant shortcomings tha t would question the Far EastCommand's readiness, but a t the same time it also revealed DA's

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f a i lu re to oversee th e commands under it. Overal l , conclus ionsi n the repor t s t a t ed t r a i n i ng in the F ar East Command was"considered sa t i s f ac t o ry t o th e Department o f th e Army[andl ... the indiv idual so ld ie r in the Far Eas t Command i sconsidered to meet Department of th e Army t ra in ing s tandards . ,,47The paradox of t h i s r e por t was seen nine months l a t e r , when u.s.so l d i e r s went in to combat aga ins t the North Koreans. They werenot ready fo r combat a t the t ime of th e inspect ion and they d idnot g e t themselves ready by June, 1950! The r e por t alsocont radic ted i t s e l f . On one hand, it sa id t ra in ing in th e FarEas t Command was "sa t i s f ac t o ry" . On t he o the r hand, th e repor tc i t ed se r ious shortcomings , t h a t in r e t ros pe c t , should havese r ious ly chal lenged the Eighth Army's r ead ines s fo r combat.

Eighth Army d iv i s iona l un i t s and commands were inspectedduring the per iod of September 24 through October 29, 1949. Thed iv i s iona l commands of the Eighth Army were the 24th, 25th, and7th In fan t ry Divis ions and a l so the 1 s t Cavalry Division( Infant ry) . Shortcomings of the Far East Command noted in thein spec t ion r e por t revealed many def ic ienc ies t h a t should havebeen noted by t he sen io r Army l eadersh ip . Eighth Army un i t sre f l ec t ed a d i spa r i t y in MOS overages and shor tages t h a t couldno t be matched with t he s t reng th r e por t s . There were a l soc r i t i c a l shor tages of ammunition and equipment. The r e por tc l ea r l y i den t i f i ed concerns about th e l ack o f adequate t ra in inga reas and t r a i n i ng a ids . Although th e emphasis was on combatt r a i n i ng , the re were fa r to o many combat p ~ r s o n n e l being used fo r

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administrat ive and other "overhead" duties. '" Misleading summaryfindings of the report stated tha t the

Department of the Army direc t ives concerning t rain ingare being carr ied out [and] the at t i tude of -a l lheadquarters toward t ra ining i s excel lent . The feelingt ha t t raining i s the primary mission of a l l combatunits exis t s in a l l echelons. Every e f for t i s beingmade to meet established t raining o b j e c t i v e s . ~ At best , uni ts had good in tent ions, but there was l i t t l e analysistha t clearly quant i f ied a s ta te of readiness for combat. I t isapparent from the report tha t not a l l was well in t rain ing andreadiness. A key statement in the report should have sent achi l l ing s ignal of warning back to Washington: "That a standardcr i te r ion tor determining combat et tec t iveness be developed andmade applicable to a l l c o ~ a n d s . " s o There was apparently nostandard to quantify what "combat readiness" meant!

I t i s also evident t ha t there was no clear ly definedprocedure to receive feedback on the conduct of t ra iningthroughout the Department of the Army. The repor t recommended" that a periodic report on t raining matters be submitted by theFar East Command to the Department of the Army .... ,51Apparently, there was no procedure in the Army to determine i fi t s subordinate commands were complying with established t rain ingdoctrine in the Far East and perhaps Europe. As a re su l t ofth i s vis i t , it was recommended tha t annual t raining inspect ionsbe conducted of overseas commands. 52 To be cer ta in tha t t ra iningwas accomplished and evaluated, the report also recommended tha tDA be represented when major f ie ld t raining exercises wereconducted. 53 What had the Army used to monitor and gauge the

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combat effect iveness of i t s overseas commands? Apparently, therewas no formalized Army policy for evaluating and documenting thereadiness of uni t s in the Far East Command and Eighth Army beforethe DA v i s i t in september 1949.

Histor ical analysis of the period has well documented theuns a t i s f a c to ry t r a in ing throughout the Army between 1945 to1 9 5 0 . ~ MacArthur's new t ra in ing program was underway, but farfrom reaching i t s object ive a t the time of the DA inspection inSeptember of 1949.

The DA inspection of the Far East Command should have been aclear s ignal t ha t the U.S. Army in the Far East Command was notready for combat. Instead, it was misleading and it apparentlyhad no bearing upon the decision of the Department of the Armyand MacArthur to question the prudence of sending t roops intocombat. Overall , the repor t shows a sa t is fac tory evaluation ofthe Far East Command in meeting what the inspection teamperceived as the Department of the Army's t ra in ing and readinessstandards. I f th i s repor t had been more candid and accurate ,would the Army have taken a di f fe ren t approach in i t s t ra in ingpolicy and w,ould it have been more prudent when it was confrontedwith sending soldiers in to combat eight months la te r? The repor ti s representat ive of a system t ha t was e i ther unaware of whatt ra in ing was required and how to evaluate it or was implementedby people who were unwill ing to repor t the short-comings. Eitheri s an indictment of the senior leadership of the Army and theins t i tu t iona l climate they to lera ted.

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What i s incomprehensible about the level of t ra ining andreadiness i s the general lack of concern about i t . Surely thesenior off icers with the i r extensive warfighting experience musthave known the ult imate r isk of th is unpreparedness. When toldto commit Task Force Smith to Korea, Walker would l ikely haveknown about the poor t raining of the Eighth Army. Brad Smithl a t e r commented in an interview tha t he believed Walker was" int imately famil iar with the t e r r ib le t raining fac i l i t i es inJ a p a n . " ~ I f Walker didn ' t know about the poor t ra ining and lackof readiness, he i s equal ly a t faul t for not insuring tha t h iss t a f f and command inspections ident i f ied the s ta te of combatreadiness. Yet, he apparent ly raised no object ions to MacArthurto the orders to send Task Force Smith into combat. The samequest ion should be asked of Major General Dean, Commander of the24th Division:

Bil l Dean well knew his division was in no wayprepared for combat, but he ra ised no object ions toJohnnie Walker. In view of the exist ing frenzy, had hedone so it was l ike ly he would have been rel ieved ofcommand i f not by Walker, then by GHQ. He subscribedto the prevai l ing American view tha t his divisionhowever ill equipped, had merely to make an appearanceon the bat t le f ie ld and the NKPA would melt into theh i l l s . ~

Neither of these jus t i f i ca t ions are acceptable on today 's bat t le -f ie ld with i t s fas t pace and l imited opportunit ies for recovery.I t represents a mind se t tha t should be incomprehensible to aprofess ional off icer corps.

However, it should be emphasized tha t poor readiness wasevident throughout the Army and not jus t with the Eighth Army in

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Japan. For example, the Army Ground Forces (AGF) Headquartersprohibited the use of l ive ammunition in t ra ining exercisesfollowing the end of world War I I . "Live f i re demonstrationsconducted a t schools continued, but uni t - leve l exercises withl ive ammunition were not conducted from 1945 un t i l the beginningof the Korean War in 1950."n General Mark Wayne Clark as Chiefof the Army Field Forces (AFF) Headquarters extended th i s policyin 1949 when he issued h is Training Memorandum No.1 . , whichs ta ted: "Training in i n f i l t r a t ion courses i s not authorized;Training in 'Combat in c i t i e s and Vil lages ' course and 'CloseCombat Course' are not to be conducted with service ammunition(or iginal emphasis)." 9 I t is in te res t ing to note tha t l iveammunition was not used in these t ra ining exercises unt i l July17, 1950, nearly two weeks a f te r U.S. t roops went into combat inKorea. S9 In a similar fashion, use of tanks in Japan wasres t r ic ted:

For economy reasons and to avoid damage to the roadsin Japan, the Eighth Army divisions were res t r ic ted toone company of old M-24 Chaffee l igh t tanks, which wereused primari ly for ceremonial purposes. The fewShermans and Pershings or variants in Japan were storedin warehouses. 60The inaccess ibi l i ty to c r i t i ca l weapons and equipment fort ra in ing i s a sad commentary of American mili tary leadership.Training cer ta in ly took a back sea t in occupied Japan. BradSmith l a t e r commented t ha t "you couldn ' t get any proper t ra ining.

don ' t think anybody f e l t there was any need fo r i t . ,61General Matthew Ridgway l a t e r expressed h is concerns for

t ra in ing levels and his observations are an indictment of peace25

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t ime readiness and the Army's leadership fa i lure . Upon assumingcommand of the Far East Command a f te r MacArthur's r e l i e f byPresident Truman, General Ridgway aggressively worked to get hisEighth Army forces back into shape. The war had been going onfo r seven months, but there was s t i l l a lo t of work to do. OnFebruary 4, 1951, Ridgway held a meeting with his corpscommanders and covered several issues he observed while vis i t ingthe i r commands in the f ie ld . His comments on the need fort ra in ing were noteworthy and typical of the fa i lure of seniorleadership to demand hard t ra ining to achieve combat readiness.On the subject of t ra ining he s ta ted: "Cannot over-estimateimportance. Present levels [on February 4, 1951J unsat is fac tory .Front l ine Infantry now appears uninspir ingly seasoned. Requiresceaseless a t t e n t i o n . " ~

Training was impeded in the Army as a whole for severalreasons. High personnel turnover, low t e s t scores and standardsfor enlistment into the Army, a shortage of equipment and a lackof funds. These wil l be examined l a te r , but one cannot escapethe fundamental fai lure of leadership a t a l l levels to becognizant of and ac t on obvious t ra ining and readiness issues.This i s indicat ive of an ins t i tu t ional environment which has l os ti t s primary focus - a senior leadership task.

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Equipment

Train ing and combat r ead ines s in the Eighth Army wass i gn i f i can t l y impaired by the lack of equipment and th e poorcond i t ion and age of th e equipment it possessed . The pos t WorldWar I I Army acquired no replacement of unserviceable equipment.Army procurement in th e pos t war per iod was genera l ly l imi ted toc lo th ing , medical suppl ies and food s t u f f s . 63 The Eighth Armyfought with equipment t h a t had been l e f t rus t i ng on th e Pa c i f i ci s l ands and was r e t r i eved and placed in a r epa i r program to fillth e s h o r t f a l l o f th e Eighth Army and Far Eas t Command. Ninetyp e r cen t of the weapons and seventy-f ive percen t o f t he veh ic l esin Japan had been recovered from th e Pa c i f i c b a t t l e f i e ld s a t theend of th e war.M Vehic les , weapon systems, and o ther equipmentrecovered from th e b a t t l e f i e ld s were repa i red by Japanesel abore rs - with little a t t en t i on t o qua l i t y c on t ro l . Thisequipment d id not s tand up to susta ined combat cond i t ions .

This program was necessary because Army l eadersh ip f a i l ed toimplement an adequate acquis i t ion program. No new t anks o rveh ic les had been received in to th e inventory s ince th e end ofWorld War I I . Such i tems as 4.2 inch mor ta r s , r e c o i l l e s s r i f l e sand medium tanks were d i f f i c u l t to f ind . "The Eighth Army wasauthor ized 226 r e c o i l l e s s r i f l e s , but had only 21. Of 18,000 4x4veh ic les in th e Eighth Army's s tocks , 10,000 were unserviceableand ou t of 18,780 2 1 /2 - ton 6x6 t rucks only 4,441 were in running

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condition. 1165 This worn out equipment simply could not bedepended upon when needed " . an est imated 80 percent of theArmy's 60 day reserve of armament equipment was unserviceable on25 June 1 9 5 0 ] . I I

Equally ominous was the datedness of equipment. Much of theequipment the Army fought with in World War I I had beeninadequate even during World War I I . Most notable, among thesewere the tanks and antitank weapons. Yet in 1950, five yearsaf te r the close of the World War, American soldiers s t i l l usedweapons proven to be ine f fec t ive . The ineffect iveness of TaskForce Smith 's weapons agains t North Korean tanks i s not ther esu l t of a progressive North Korean research and developmenteffor t , but the fai lure of Army senior leadership to push anadequate U.S. program through the pol i t i ca l process. One mustask - how can th is occur?

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CHAPTER I I I

THE NEW ORDER OF POLITICS

Korea was s p l i t along th e 38th p a r a l l e l between th e Sovie tunion and th e a l l i ed forces fol lowing the Japanese surrender onAugust 10, 1945. As a provis ion of th e Potsdam Conference l e s sthan a month e a r l i e r , severa l d i v i s i o n s of so v i e t t roops rushedin to Korea to g e t t h e i r share of th e s po i l s of war. Colonel DeanRusk ( l a t e r to be sec re ta ry of s t a t e under Pres iden t Kennedy in1961) and Colonel C.H. Bonesteel , both on Marsha l l ' s s t a f f ,recommended t h a t a l ine be drawn on th e j8 th p a r a l l e l to separa tethe areas to be occupied by Sovie t and u . s . fo rces . Japaneses o ld i e r s surrendered to th e Russians nor th of th e 38th p a r a l l e land to th e Americans south of th e 38th p a r a l l e l . The Russiansbacked th e communist t o t a l i t a r i a n l eader sh ip of-Kim Il Sung andthe un i ted Sta tes advocated a f ree democrat ic government , l a t e rto be headed by Syngman Rhee. Tensions in Korea cont inued tomount as North and South Korea argued fo r l eader sh ip of a un i f i edKorea. Both s i d e s were def ian t and unwi l l ing to compromise.

u . s . na t iona l po l icy toward Korea became known to th e worldfo r the f i r s t t ime on January 12, 1950, when Secre ta ry o f Sta teDean Acheson spoke before th e Nat ional Press Club in Washington.

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-- -

He " . . . declared Formosa outs ide 'our defense perimeter . ' He alsoexcluded South Korea from the American defense outposts. ,,67 The

. to Janan.efense Derimeter was drawn from the Aleutian Is lands. - ... ,to the Ryukyus Is lands - including Okinawa, and the PhilippineIs lands. 68 (see Map 5, page 72) Many his torians believe th i sspeech, along with the t roop withdrawal in September 1949, wasmisinterpreted to mean t ha t the United States had no in teres t indefending South Korea. Acheson's statement was seen asencouragement to North Korea, with the Soviet Union's and China'sbless ing, to invade South Korea. In his book War in Peacetime,General Joseph Lawton Collins sa id : "Why the Secretary of Statef e l t impelled to make th i s disclaimer publicly, I have neverunderstood. I imagine tha t , l ike a ba t t e r swinging a t a badbal l , he l a t e r would have l iked to have had t ha t swing backagain.,,69 In h is memoirs) Nikita S. Krushchev wrote: "Late in1949 . . . Kim I I Sung, the North Korean leader , vis i ted JosephStal in seeking approval for an at tack in South Korea. Stal ina f te r Mao Zedong gave Kim the green l ight."M Acheson's speechcerta inly gave more assurance to the North Korean leadership 'sdesire to invade South Korea.

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Korea. June 25 1950

sunday, June 25th, 1950, th e North Korean Peop le ' s Army(NKPA) crossed th e 38th p a r a l l e l to th e south with t anks andthousands of t roops (see Map 2, page 69. Opposing them wereabout 65,000 ROK so l d i e r s who were p a r t i a l l y t r a ine d in combats k i l l s and who were armed only wi th smal l arms, mortars ,howitzers and i ne f fec t i ve bazookas.

Before the invas ion , the United s t a t e s pol icy was f i rmlycommitted not to g e t involved in a war in Korea. The suddenchange in po l icy was expla ined by General Col l ins :

We could no t be l i eve t h a t such a smal l puppet s t a t e asNorth Korea would b l a t an t l y defy th e United Sta tes andUnited Nat ions . Our pre s t i ge in Asia and t h a t of theUnited Nations was suddenly a t s take , and we reac tedaccordingly . I f South Korea were to f a l l to Communism,Indo-China and, probably , Indones ia would fol low, andth e whole balance of power in th e Far East would beupse t . Such a upse t would be a d i r e c t th rea t , not onlyto Japan , b ut a lso to th e un i t ed Sta t e s and to th ewhole concept of i n t e rna t i ona l peace under th e char te rof the United Nat ions . nContrary to an ex i s t i ng plan to withdraw a l l U.s . personnel fromKorea i f invaded, th e Nat iona l Secur i ty Council and the P res iden tdetermined t h a t th e United s t a t e s should repe l th e invadersbecause of th e pres t i ge a t s t ake . Chairman of th e Jo i n t Chiefsof St a f f , Omar Bradley , sa id th e invas ion was a

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. . . major escalat ion in the cold war . . . a 'moral outrage 'w h i .... h i -ho TTnirDn C : : : r ~ r D c ! ~ n n r h o n ..' ; i - ... ..:a u " " ~ ~ _____. . ,..1- _ - ..... v A ....... ""' ---- ----'-''''''' " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "" . . . . . . """liW'-& J . l I Q l . . . U I l t : t \ " ,o V U ,L U not countenance. To knuckle under in th i s t e s t , hesaid , would be tantamount to 'appeasement'. One act ofappeasement could lead to fur ther acts and hence almosti n D u i r ~ h l u rn n l n h ~ l w ~ r 'wo ... ' ~ i - d ... .. +-h ... _ _.... m ... ... J- ... - . - - - - - ~ -- '"!J----. -......... - - - ...... J, w .J."'C:: somewhere,' Bradley concluded, and Korea 'offered asa n n n n ~ ~ ~ ~ ; n n ~ n r n r ~ w ; n n rh D lino ~ " , ~ h ... ...~ - - - - ------- - - - ----- '"!J _ . .. - -_ .. . - - ..... - .. . . . . . . . . "'""' . . . . . . . . . e lse . ,n

But th i s ins ight on Bradley's par t was sadly la te , the l ine couldnei ther be drawn nor defended. I t would take three years of warand 54,246 American l ives to draw the l ine . How could theobvious degradation of capabi l i t i es occur?

No Perceived Threat

After World War I I , as now, the nation had di f f i cu l ty inidentifying a formidable force t ha t threatened National Security.There was no clear ly defined threa t following the war and tha tmade it di f f icu l t for the services to bid for funds to maintain amodern and strong mil i tary force. The Axis powers had beendefeated, culminating with the Japanese surrender on August 10,1945. Although the Soviets were of some concern, with theoncoming of the "atomic" age it was believed t ha t they could notachieve nuclear par i ty with the united States unt i l the early1950's . Chief of Staf f of the Army, Dwight D. Eisenhower, sent aTOP SECRET memorandum to the Jo in t Chiefs of s ta f f re la ted toth i s on January 9, 1946. Attached to tha t memorandum was aenclosure (dated December 17, 1945) from the G-2, t i t l ed"Estimate of the World Situat ion", s ta t ing t ha t war was

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improbable because

. . . it i s most unlikely tha t the u.s . wil l use armedforce to implement u.s . foreign policy . . From thesoviet viewpoint, war i s most undesirable during theperiod under consideration since the USSR i s present lyweaker than she wil l be a t any subsequent period. I tis to the Soviet in te res t s to consolidate her presentgains and eliminate in ternal weakness. She wil ltherefore avoid war with the Anglo-Americans in thenear fu ture. At the same time, however, [the] Sovietswil l endeavor to extend t he i r influence beyond areaspresent ly occupied by means shor t of war. 73

The United s ta tes s t ra tegy was to diffuse a potent ia l Sovietth rea t with i t s monopoly on atomic weapons - believing it wouldwin a fu l l - sca le war with a i r delivered atomic w e a p o n s . ~ Thesoviet Union challenged th i s s t ra tegy when it detonated i t s f i r s tatomic bomb on September 3, 1949, but it did not have suf f ic ien tnuclear weapons to be an immediate th rea t to the securi ty of theunited s t a t e s . Even though the Soviet atomic t es t s s igni f ied aloss of the u.s . monopoly on atomic weapons, the response was arush to design the hydrogen bomb, not modernize land forces. Theu.s . also fe l t it could contain the Soviet influence by achievingcol lec t ive secur i ty both through the united Nations and l a t e rNATO. 7s

In par t , senior mil i tary leaders saw no potent ia l enemies tothe United s t a t e s tha t were sophist icated enough in modern combatpower to warrant the i r concern. China was not considered ath rea t , s ince it had no modern mil i tary s t ructure and weaponsystems. This was the atomic age, no nation in i t s r igh t mindwould go to war against the united s t a t e s , especial ly since ithad already demonstrated it would use nuclear weapons. However,

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events would soon reveal the i r respons ibi l i ty and lack ofvision of th i s thinking. Only senior mil i tary leaders have thetask of determining the nature of warfare in the i r time andadvocating adequate preparations.

Korea shat tered the American i l lus ion tha t atomicweaponry had outmoded the foot soldier . Pol i t ica l lyworld opinion would not support the use of such hel l i shweapons. Tactical ly atomic bombs were worthlessagainst infantry uni t s scat tered over scores of milesof rugged m o u n t a i n s . ~ History i l lus t ra tes time and again, t ha t although it can ' tnecessari ly be seen, a threa t is inevi tably there. An unpreparednation wil l suffer the consequences when tha t threa t exposesi t s e l f .

Political and Democratic System Takes Over

The period following World War I I promised prosperi ty andpeace for the American public. Although there were some economicand pol i t i ca l issues during the era , American l i f e was mostlyuneventful . "With the Depression over, A m e r i c a ~ s cherishedbuying cars and going to ba l l games; they wished no fur therworries about weighty affa i rs of s ta te . "n

Comfortable with post World War I I peace coupled withdomestic economic uncertaint ies , the American people andpol i t i c ians demanded minimal expenditures on mili tarypreparedness. Truman reacted to the American public when they"Cried to 'br ing the boys home!' and shippe,d scores of hundreds

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of baby shoes to congressmen to emphasize they wanted t he i rhusbands and fathers home immediately. ,,78 Representative John E.Rankin of Mississippi expressed the popular sentiment of thet ime, by saying:

I f the Congress does not get busy and expedite therelease of these men from the armed forces - men whoare needed a t home, who have jobs to go back to , whohave wives and children to look a f t e r or who have cropsto gather , or young men who should f inish t he i reducation you wil l soon be in the hot te s t water youhave ever been in since you have been in congress - andyou ought to b e . ~ And so, Truman heeded the outcry 's of the public and pol i t ic iansand brought ten and one half mill ion servicemen home by the endof 1948. Mili tary leaders were ineffect ive in convincing thePresident t ha t a graduated drawdown was necessary in order tokeep a qual i f ied force of off icers and enl i s ted soldiers as anucleus for a modern well t rained Army.

Ridgway in h is book The Korean War spoke of the Americanpeople 's mind se t of the t ime:

The concept of ' l imited warfare ' never enteredcouncils . We had fa i th in the United Nations. And theatomic bomb created for us a kind of psychologicalMagninot l ine tha t helped us ra t ional ize our nat ionalurge to get the boys home, the armies demobilized .... soAs a resul t of th i s pol i t i ca l pressure, Truman addressed

domestic concerns using funds from the Department of Defense.Truman was eager to improve heal th , education and l ivingconditions. As Roosevelt 's successor, he sought to increase thes ize and coverage of socia l secur i ty . He addressed unemployment,old age, sickness and disabi l i ty and recommended a system ofnat ional prepaid medical insurance under socia l security.8t To

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do anvthinq l ess , would not pass the vot ina Dublic 's scrutinv_- _.. - .. -""~ . - - - - - - - - - - - - -Truman's Secretary of Defense, Louis B. Johnson; was

formerly the Budaet Director and determined to reduce m i l i t ~ r v- - - - - - - - - ------ - - - - - - - - - " lspending. Not only a mandate from Truman motivated Johnson, hehad his own aspirat ions to become President of the United States .secretary of the Army Frank Pace had also been Budget Directorand he had similar motivations for reducing the Army budget. Aformidable budget reducing civi l ian leadership confronted themili tary.

President Truman lacked respect for many mil i ta ry off ice rsand "knew the i r prol i f ic tendencies with dol lars ."n However, hegained respect for and sought the counsel of Marshall ,Eisenhower, and Bradley who were perceived by him as visionaryand not narrow minded about issues confronting the Presidency aswell as the mili tary: "When Truman became president and inheri tedsome of these renowned f igures as advisers, he looked up to themand -thought them s incere . As time went on he valued the i r advicepart icular ly because they were not pol i t i ca l p a r t i s a n s . " ~

However, even with Truman's confidence, these seniormili tary leaders fai led to develop a combat ready mil i ta ry force.The inabi l i ty of these leaders to see the need for and obtaincongressional and pres iden t ia l support for the defense departmenthad dramatic repercussions for the Army. Lack of suff ic ientfunds to support the Army's needs in CONUS, the Far East andelsewhere - to provide sUfficient men, equipment and supplies resul ted in a "hollow" army tha t was ineffect ive and unable to

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respond to a na t iona l c r i s i s . "In sum, the shor tages o f men andsuppl ie s combined with inadequate t r a in ing to a f f e c t adverse lythe combat read iness of th e Far East Command j u s t as theyhindered the e f fec t iveness of th e U.S. Army e l s e w h e r e . " ~ Col l ins in h is book, War In Peacet ime, desc r ibes t h i s paradox:

It would seem t h a t proper planning and budget ing shouldhave obvia ted t hese personnel and mate r ia l shortages .However, mi l i t a ry p lans and budget l i m i t a t i ons exceptin wartime have inva r iab ly been in c o n f l i c t . Theessence o f mi l i t a ry planning i s to look ahead to th erequi rements o f th e nex t war; bu t t h i s i s a n t i t h e t i c toth e common American hope t h a t each war wi l l be thel a s t . While war i s on, Congress and th e people havesupported uns t in t ing ly th e demands of the mil i ta ryse rv ices but , once the war i s over , p o l i t i c a l andeconomic pressu res r e l ega t e mi l i t a ry planning to th eb a c k g r o u n d . ~

Despi te th e obvious t ru ism of Col l ins ' i ns igh t , t h i s i s prec i se lywhere th e l eadersh ip earns t h e i r money fo r th e job they hold .The pos t war mi l i t a ry leaders fa i led to gain the suppor t andconf idence of Congress . This fa i lu re and th e reasons fo r it hada dramat ic e f f e c t upon th e defense posture of th e United s ta te sin 1950.

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CHAPTER IV

THE ROLE OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP

5 JU L E HET SOHE VEHICLES ANDAMERICAN PYa. WB ALSO SA. SOHEAMERICAN DEAD. .E I'OUHD .. 01 ' OORTANltS. NEAR OSAN THERB WAS AGREAT BATTLB. 86

- DIARY 01 ' A DEAD NORTH KOREAN SOLDIER

Elections took place in South Korea on May 10, 1948, andSyngnam Rhee was elected President of the new Republic of Korea(ROK). The U.S. Government had announced tha t t roops would bewithdrawn from South Korea af te r the elect ions. With th isannouncement, it was believed tha t North Korea might take theopportuni ty to invade the South--once U.S. t roops were withdrawn.The Jo in t Chiefs of Staff state-Army-Navy-Air Force CoordinatingCommittee on united s ta tes Foreign policy in Korea made thefollowing statement in a TOP SECRET document, dated 24 February1948:

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Present information indicates tha t withdrawal of u.s .forces wil l probably re su l t in Communist domination andit i s extremely doubtful i f it would be possible tobuild up the constabulary [South Korean Army] intime and with the fac i l i t i e s available which would beable to prevent Soviet encroachment. Thereforeeventual domination of Korea by the USSR wil l have tobe accepted as a probabi l i ty i f u.s . troops arewithdrawn. 87

On March 26th , 1948, th e same committee wrote anotherSECRET document as follows:

From the mili tary point of view, it is the op1n1on ofthe j o in t Chiefs of s ta f f (see SANACC 176/38*) tha t the"US has l i t t l e s t ra tegic in te res t in maintaining i t spresent troops and bases in Korea." Moreover, in theevent of hos t i l i t i e s in the Far East, these troopswould const i tute a mili tary l i ab i l i ty . us troops couldnot be maintained there without substant ialreinforcement prior to the in i t ia t ion of hos t i l i t i e s ,but th i s would be mil i ta r i ly inadvisable since any landoperations would in a l l probabi l i ty , bypass the KoreanPeninsula. 88

I t was clear tha t the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw no mili tary ornat ional in te res t in f ighting a major conf l ic t in Korea. Thispolicy was also advocated by the President and s ta te Departmentand, therefore , created a complacent mind se t in regard to Korea.u.s . forces were to be withdrawn i f hos t i l i t i e s began. Thispolicy would be reversed in June 1950.

At 4 A.M. on the morning of June 25, 1950, the North KoreanPeoples Army (NKPA) invaded the South. With eight fu l l strengthinfantry divis ions plus "two more infant ry divisions act ivated a tan estimated half s t rength, a separate infantry regiment, a motorcycle reconnaissance regiment, and an armored brigade. "8 9General MacArthur was awakened and told of the invasion. He~ e s p o n d e d years l a t e r by saying . . .

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How I asked myself, could the united s ta tes haveallowed such a deplorable s i tua t ion to develop? Ithought back to those days only a short t ime before,when our country had been mil i t a r i ly more powerful thanany nation on ear th . . . but in the space of five yearsth i s power had been f r i t te red away in a bankruptcy ofposi t ive and outrageous leadership toward any longrange o b j e c t i v e s . ~ MacArthur, obviously, did not accept any responsibi l i ty for thelack of t ra ining and preparedness of the u.s . forces t ha t wentinto combat against the North Koreans.

The NKPA continued southward over the next several days andGeneral MacArthur was convinced u.s . troops must f igh t a delayingaction "to buy some time to bring more t roops .... "M He sent aTOP SECRET message to the Jo in t Chiefs of Staf f on June 30, 1950,as follows:

I f authorized, it is my intent ion to immediately move aUS regimental combat team to [Korea) for thereinforcement of [ the ROK and the] build-up to a two[u.S.] d ivision strength from troops in Japan for anear ly counter offensive. Unless provision i s made forthe fu l l ut i l iza t ion of the Army-Navy-Air Force team inth i s shat tered area our mission wil l a t best beneedlessly cost ly in l i fe , money and pres t ige . Atworse, it might even be doomed to f a i l u r e . ~

The Army Chief of Staff , General Coll ins; quickly responded toMacArthur's request and called the Army Secretary, Frank Pace,requesting tha t he obtain approval of MacArthur's request fromPresident Truman. Secretary Pace contacted President Truman a t4:57 A.M. on Friday June 30, 1950, and read MacArthur's cable toh i m . ~ Truman approved the request of MacArthur to send oneregimental combat team to Korea, but delayed approving divis ionsized forces unt i l the matter could be looked into fur ther .Collins then sent the approval back to MacArthur. I t i s

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s i g n i f i c a n t to note t h a t MacArthur ' s r e q u e s t and subsequentapproval to commit American combat forces in Korea was no tdiscussed or coordina ted with the J o i n t Chiefs of S t a f f o r th eChairman of the J o i n t Chiefs of St a f f (Bradley) by Col l ins u n t i la f t e r MacArthur was not i f i ed of the Pres i den t ' s approval to doso!

Having thus committed American ground forces in to th eKorean War, Col l ins t e lephoned h is JCS col leagues a tabout 5:30 A.M. to t e l l them what he had done. Inf ac t , they a l l were shocked, n o t only because they werenot consul ted , b ut a lso because of th e graveimpl ica t ion of th e d e c i s i o n . ~ The JCS co l l ec t i ve l y had formulated a po l i cy to not defend Koreabecause it was considered a m i l i t a ry l i a b i l i t y . Therefore , it i sremarkable t ha t General Col l ins made a commitment of t roops in tocombat without f i r s t consul t ing th e Chairman and h is fe l low JCSmembers. Thus a course of act ion was adopted fo r which th esenior mil i t a ry l eadersh ip unders tood th e Army was unprepared toaccomplish and th e na t ion to suppor t i n t he s hor t term. It i sunc lea r i f t he ex ten t of unpreparedness was made c l ea r t o thePres iden t and c iv i l i an l eader sh ip .

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Our senior leaders were ineffect ive in dealing with thePresident ia l and Congressional budget cuts . This is normallyin terpre ted as one re su l t of domestic problems driving thebudget. But, how effect ive were the senior leaders in addressingdefense needs? Can a l l of th i s be at t r ibuted to domesticpol i t ics?

The post World War I I budget ce i l ings imposed on theDepartment of Defense were draconian. General Col l ins , who wasArmy Chief of Staf f a t the outbreak of the Korean War, ref lec tedon the "skept ical at t i tude of Congress" t ha t prevai led before thewar. 9S A repor t of the House Appropriations Committee said:

. . the committee's careful scrut iny of the est imates ofmanpower, equipment, and missions to be performed leadsto the conclusion t ha t the est imates of funds requiredare out of proportion to the actual needs on thebasis of the Army's predic t ions of requirements. Whilethe committee does not propose to reduce the s ize ofthe Army below numbers estimated by mili taryauthor i t ie s as requisi te or the amounts of equipmentand supplies necessary to maintain such an Army, it i swell aware of the fac t tha t it i s the habi t of theservices to estimate the i r fund generously in ordert ha t they may be able to meet a l l contingencies. Thisi s sound policy to follow during actual warfare and theCongress a t tha t time approved it but there i s no soundreason why the Army cannot be administered in peacetimewith more regard for dol la rs t ha t apparently i s the i rcustom or intent.%

This pol i t ica l logic was remarkably unchallenged by seniormili tary leadership. The mili tary leaders were not suf f ic ient lycommitted to i ns i s t th i s reasoning did not apply to the post war

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Army. This impl ies they f a i l ed to recognize th e na tu re o f th esecu r i t y t h r e a t o r were unwi l l ing to chal lenge p o l i t i c a l

In Fisca l Year 1945,b i l l i o n , bu t by FY 1947 it had decreased to $13.5 b i l l i o n whichequated to about f ive percen t o f th e Gross National Produc t( G N P ) . ~ (By way of compar ison, the mil i t a ry budget fo r 1992 i sl ~ s s than four percen t o f th e GNP!) Upon r ee l ec t i on , Pres iden tTruman's goal was s e t on obta in ing a ba lanced fede ra l budget andreduc ing th e $250 b i l l i on na t iona l debt wi thout incur r ing newt axes . 98 Responding to th e budget , the Pentagon i n t u rnmainta ined t h a t th e new budget must be kep t a t $15 b i l l i o n inorder to adequate ly suppor t na t iona l defense needs . However, thePres iden t . .

a r b i t r a r i l y cu t th e Pentagon budget by a t h i rd - toabout $10 b i l l i on a year and tu rned a deaf e a r tor epea ted pleas from th e mil i t a ry ch i e f s fo r more. Infac t , h i s announced goa l was to c u t th e Pentagon budgeteven more d ra s t i c a l l y : to about $6 o r $7 b i l l i o n ayear . 99

Eisenhower disp layed h i s f ru s t r a t ions abou t th e reduced mil i t a rybudget in h is d ia r ie s and complained t h a t th e budget ce r t a i n l yd id not t ake in to cons ide ra t ion th e needs of defense:

During 1946, 1947, and ea r l y 1948 I pleaded fo r a $15b i l l i o n budge t . We never go t it . . [Later he j o t t ed : ]One o f our g r e a t e s t t r oub le s i s i n a b i l i t y to plan fo r agiven amount o f money. Some new author i ty alwaysi n t e rvenes to cu t it down in s p i t e o f p r i o r commitmentby t he p r e s ide n t himsel f . 1OO

The mi l i t a ry leadership had f a i l ed to convince th e Pres iden t t h a tthese budget reduct ions would severe ly compromise the ab i l i t y of

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the armed forces to protec t the nat ional in te res t s and defenseneeds of the United s ta tes .

Louis B. Johnson took off ice as the secretary of Defense inMarch 1949. committed to cut the "fat" out of the defensebudget, in May, 1949, he announced Truman's f i sca l year 1951mil i tary budget to be capped a t $12.3 bi l l ion . Bradley l a t e rwrote tha t "the news came as a profound shock". Eisenhower alsoc ~ m p l a i n e d : " . . . of course the resu l ts wil l not show up un t i l weget in serious t rouble . We are repeating our own his tory ofdecades - we jus t don ' t believe we ever wil l get into a rea ljam. ,,101 After the Korean War, General Matthew Ridgway said: " Ifever we were unprepared for a war, we were on th i soccasion .... Our armed forces had been economized almost intoineffect iveness . ,,100

Because in f la t ion in 1947-1948 had a c r i t i c a l impact uponthe buying power of the services , Truman was forced to ra ise themil i tary spending ce i l ing to $14 b i l l ion . But, Chairman of theJoin t Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley supported the budget submittedby the President . He sa id : "considering the budget const ra intsand ' in te l l igence est imates ' I am in complete agreement with tha tce i l ing . ,,103 As Chairman of the JCS, Bradley re i tera ted hissupport fo r the President 's budget when he spoke before theSenate Appropriations Subcommittee Hearings on March 13, .1950:

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I emphasized in my statement-maybe I did not emphasizeit suf f ic ien t ly - tha t the eventual s t rength of ourcountry depends upon i t s indus t r ia l capaci ty. We mustnot destroy t ha t by spending too much from year toyear. So i f we came here and recommended to you a$30,000,000,000' or $40,000,000,000 budget fordefense, I think we would be doing a disservice andtha t maybe you would get a new Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff i f I were one tha t did t h a t . l ~

History has shown tha t th i s recommendation was i l l -adv ised to saythe l eas t . But it reveaLs tha t the senior mili tary leadership ' signorance of the actual readiness of the Army or theunwill ingness to confront it and the extent of the securi tythrea t .

One month af te r Bradley made his statement before the SenateAppropriations Committee, he received a l e t t e r from Mr. VannevarBush, which must have been alarming news in view of what he saidbefore the committee. Mr. Bush's TOP SECRET l e t t e r of April 13,1950, to Bradley gave him a clear warning as to the serious s ta teof the defense posture of the united Sta tes . commissioned bySecretary of Defense Gray, Mr. Bush worked with the Army tostudy defense problems in Europe. The revelat ions of h isfindings were alarming and it caused him to write his l e t t e r toBradley. He remarked to Bradley tha t

. . . [these] are serious and disturbingconclusions .... the problem of defense of the uni teds ta te s is in a serious condit ion, a t which I amappal led. I f th i s problem i s at tacked vigorously a tt h i s t ime, and properly coordinated . . . it can be put insa t i s fac tory condit ion in a few years . I f we d r i f t aswe are going, it wi l l remain in unsat isfactorycondit ion and might well lead to d isas ter .... the resul ti s tha t i f war should break out tomorrow it would be along desperate war, in which we could hope to prevai lonly a f t e r a period of years ....

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Mr. Bush's concluding statement succinct ly expressed the resolvenecessary to repai r the deplorable condition of U.S. defense:

The primary desiderat ion [spel l ing in document] is tha twe should think fearless ly, without prejudice or falseservice in te res ts , tha t we should face tough facts ,and t h a t we should ac t . We have the organiza t iona lmachinery for a l l th i s , i f it wil l function withsuff ic ient vigor , and i f it i s allowed to do so. Weneed to get up to date, and to tackle our rea l lycent ra l mili tary problems with a l l our energy. Wehave the opportunity, i f we have the w i l l . l ~

Bradley did not have two years to fix the problem out l ined byBush; the Korean War broke out two months and twelve days af te rBush wrote his l e t te r . Bradley l a t e r conceded in his book,A General 's Life , t ha t the President 's mili tary budget cut t ing

. . . was a mistake, perhaps the grea tes t of Truman'spresidency . . . my bel ie f tha t s ignif icant ly higherdefense spending would probably wreck the economy - wasl ikewise a mistake, perhaps the grea tes t mistake I madein my post war years in Washington .... I was a dedicatedf i sca l conservative. I s incerely believed in thoseeconomists who were advising Truman to sharply l imi tdefense spending .107Coll ins also admitted t ha t he supported the FY 1951 budget:

"I l ikewise, as Army Chief of Staff , defended the $13 bi l l ionbudget before the same senate subcommittee." ul l Coll ins as wellas Bradley admitted tha t the mili tary budget they supported - aswell as the other Chief 's of Staff - was not suff ic ient formaintaining a strong defense:

From th i s record it i s clear t ha t members of the JCS,including General Bradley and myself, shared with thepresident , the Administration, and the Congress theresponsibi l i ty for reductions in JCS estimates ofmili tary requirements, which so hampered our conduct ofthe Korean War. 109The readiness shor t fa l l s and the leadership 's inat tent ion to them

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out l ined e a r l i e r i nd i c a t e senior mi l i t a ry l eadersh ip may not havegrasped th e e x te n t of unpreparedness o r th e probable na tu re ofwarfare in th e Cold War e ra . I f they had, these in themselvesr a i se se r ious ques t ions about how exi s t ing money was spent .Another l eadersh ip p i t f a l l i s a lso suggested here . The sen io rleadersh ip c lea r ly gave in to th e pressures o f th e Pres iden t andCongress and fa i led to s tand fo r a course o f ac t ion t h a t wouldpromote th e be s t defense . This suppor ts the idea th e seniorl eadersh ip ...

found themselves in a tough moral dilemma. They d idn o t agree in th e s l i g h t e s t with Truman 's budget ... butJohnson was th e c iv i l i a n author i ty to whom they owedobedience and l oya l ty . They had e i the r t o suppor t h isorders o r re s ign . None e lec ted to r e s ign ; theyunanimously supported the Johnson Budget. l1OCol l ins commented d i r ec t ly on t h i s sens i t i ve s ub je c t - be l i ev ingt h a t h is l oya l ty was to th e Pres iden t so long as he held th epos i t i on as Army Chief of Sta f f , but , when he moral ly could notsuppor t t h a t po l i cy , then it was t ime to res ign :

I always bel ieved in loya l ty to the Pres ident , who asCommander in Chief , bears t he u l t ima te r e spons i b i l i t yfor the defense o f our country an o f f i c e r o f th e armedse rv ices should fu l ly suppor t th e pres iden t ' s programonce it has been determined ...A Chief of S t a f f i s somet imes faced wi th th e dilemma o f res ign ing o r o f goingd i rec t ly to the Pres ident , over the head o f th eSecre ta ry o f Defense which he i s e n t i t l e d by law to doif he cannot , in a l l consc ience as a respons ib lemi l i t a ry man, accep t th e f i n a l budget l i m i t a t i ons ....When Secre tary of Defense Louis Johnson announced . . ano ther c u t i n t he Army budget fo r th e f i s c a l year1951, which would have resu l t ed in a fu r t he r reduct ionin the e f fec t i ve s t rength of th e Army, I f ina l ly had tosay to him, 'Mr. Secre ta ry , t h i s i s th e l a s t cu t i n theArmy t h a t I wi l l be ab le to accep t . ' Johnson g la red a tme, and I am af ra id I g la red back. I f e e l ce r t a in t h a ti f th e Korean War had no t in tervened, I would have beenre l i eved o r forced to re s ign . ll l

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Why hadn ' t our senior mil i tary leaders taken a stronger stance inaddressing other c r i t i ca l deficiencies of defense? In view ofthe consequences to American soldiers , answers of ignorance,inat tent ion, and loyalty to pol i t i ca l leadership are weakdefenses.

The Bud2et and Downsizin2

As the budget dwindled, so did the st rength of the armedforces. Histor ical ly , our downsizing of the force s t ructure hasresul ted in a "hollow force" whereby reduced combat readiness andeffect iveness has resul ted. In August 1945, the united s ta teshad a l i t t l e more than twelve mill ion men and women in uniform.In January 1946, Dwight Eisenhower (Army Chief of Staff) wrote toBernard Baruch saying: "What plans we make must be made nowbefore our forces have completely dis integrated and before webecome paralysed by public apathy which seems inevi table in t imesof re la t ive peace."1t2 By December 1948, a t the end of Truman'sf i r s t term as President and Commander in Chief, the active forceshad shrunk to a mere 1.5 mill ion men and women.,m Bradleycomplained in h is book, A Soldiers Life , t ha t upon assuming theoff ice of Chief of Staf f on December 1, 1947:

The Army had almost no combat effect iveness . Ikehad l e f t me an administrative ra ther than a mil i taryforce. Half of the 552,000 off icers and men wereoverseas on occupation duty, serving as policemen orclerks. The other half were in the States performingvarious administrat ive chores. Actually the Armx of1948 could not f ight i t s way out of a paper bag. 1448


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This i n s igh t i s re t rospec t and i s not r e f l e c t e d in Brad ley ' sac t ions as a sen io r leader a t th e t ime. He gave no i nd ica t ion ofh is comprehension of a "hollow" Army in 1950.

The spar tan d i s t r i bu t ion and s t reng th of th e Army duringt h i s per iod was spread throughout many regions . For example,MacArthur 's s t reng th in the Far Eas t was about 114,000 men;10,000 sh o r t o f th e author ized . He was informed l a t e r by th e JCSto expect add i t iona l cu ts in the s t reng th - down to 106,000 men,o f which only 30,000 would be s t a t ioned in Korea. ll s In 1950,th e author ized s t reng th o f th e Army had r i s e n t o 630,201; but itac tua l ly had 591,000 in the ranks . Of those , 360,000 weres t a t ioned in the United s t a t e s ; 108,500 in the Far Eas t ; 94,300in Europe and th e r e s t in Hawaii , Alaska, or th e Caribbean. 1l6

Secre ta ry Johnson ' s new f i s c a l yea r 1952 budget gu ide l inesca l led fo r a grea te r reduc t ion in s t reng th to 610,900. At t h a tt ime, th e United s t a t e s Army had t en d iv i s ions . However, t h a twas very mis lead ing . To s t ay within budgetary c ons t r a in t s , theArmy Chief of Sta f f , Joe Col l ins , deac t iva ted one ba t t a l i on ineach of t he th ree regiments in each d iv i s ion . One of t he th reef i r i n g b a t t e r i e s in each of th e four a r t i l l e r y ba t t a l i ons ( ineach divis ion) was also deac t iva ted to accommodate these budgetcuts . As discussed e a r l i e r (See "Tra in ing" , page 14) , theseun i t s were severe ly handicapped when it came to execut ingdoc t r ina l operat ions in combat. It was assumed t h a t t he re wouldbe t ime to fill these voids before t roops were committed in tocombat. 1I7 F i r s t in to combat in the Korean ,War, the Eighth Army

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divisions were severely void of the i r fu l l authorized combatmanpower.

An American infantry divis ion a t fu l l war st rengthnumbered about 18,000 men. owing to the budgetres t r ic t ions , however, three of the Eighth Army's fourdivisions each wer. authorized only 12,500 men; the25th (to which a l l blacks were assigned) 13,500. Onpaper the 1s t CAV, 7th, and 24th divis ions were thusabout 6,000 men short of fu l l war st rength; the 25th,about 5,000 men short . In rea

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Task Force Smitha Leadership Failure