Tajikistan-The Rise of a Narco-State

8/7/2019 Tajikistan-The Rise of a Narco-State

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2007 BY THE J O U R N A L O F D R U G I S S U E S

T A J I K I S T A N : T H E R I S E O F A N A R C O - S T A T EL E T I Z I A P A O L I , I R I N A R A B K O V , V I C T O R I A A. G R E E N F I E L D , P E T E R R E U T E RSince the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Tajikistan hasexperienced anextraordinary and devastating expansion of opiate trafficking and consumptionW hile heroin w as virtually unknow n In the country up to the mid-1990s and o piumwas produced and consume d locally only to a modest degree, in less than a decadeTajikistan has become a key transit country for Afghan opiates bound north- andwestwards, at the same time as ithas w itnessed a rapid growth o f domestic h eroiuse. Tajikistan now rivals Afghanistan for the unenviable title of the country mosdepe nden t on the illicit drug industry, with the opiate indu stry adding a t least 30% tthe recorded gross dom estic product. The opiate trade is so important econom icallythat it corrupts the whole political system. This article therefore argues that sincethe m id-1990s Tajikistan has becom e a narco-state, inwhich leaders of the mospowerful trafficking groups occupy high-ranking govemment positions and misusestate structures for their own illicit businesses.

I N T R O D U C T IO NSince the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Tajikistan has experienced anextraordinary and devastating expansion of opiate trafficking and consumption. Unti

the mid-1990s, heroin w as virtually unknown in the country, and o ther opiates werenot major sources of concem. But, in less than a decade, Tajikistan has become akey transit country for Afghan opiates bound north- and westwards and a majoheroin consumer.As a result of the skyrocketing development of the illicit opiate industry (andthe collapse of the legitimate economy in the 1990s), significant groups within theTajik population have become dependent on the revenues of the illicit opiate trade

Tajikistan now rivals Afghanistan in being the country m ost dependent on the illici


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P A O L I , R A B K O V , G R E E N F I E L D , R E U T E Rdrug industry. As shown by detailed calculations made elsew here {Paoli, G reenfield& Reuter, 2008, forthcoming), it is unlikely that opiate trafficking adds less than30% to the recorded gross domestic product (G DP).' The opiate trade is so importaneconomically that it is central to the political system, which even a decade later istill recovering from five years of bloody civil war. Indeed, the worrying hypothesithis article supports is that, since the mid-1990s, Tajikistan has effectively becoma "narco-state," in which leaders of the most powerful trafficking groups occupyhigh-ranking govemment positions and misuse state structures for their own illicibusinesses. Coupled with the ineffectiveness of law enforcement agencies, thisuperimposition has led to the emergence and consolidation of relatively largand integrated drug trafficking enterprises controlling an increasing share of thdrug-trafficking market^a rare event in the illicit drug industry, signaling lax ononenforcement of prohibitions against production and trafficking (for com parisonsee Paoli et a l , 2008, forthcoming).

The first section of the article singles out the main factors prompting the veryrapid growth of the illicit opiate industry in Tajikistan. The second pinpoints themain phases of growth and the progressive involvement of ever more regions of thcountry in the opiate trade. The third section p rovides a typology of drug traffickinenterprises, showing the growing relevance of large and integrated smugglingenterprises, which are headed by civil war commanders tumed politicians. Tharticle ends with a brief discussion of the connection between heroin traffickingand Islamic movements.

This article is part of a larger research project on the world opiate market;- idraws on a detailed report on opiate trafficking prepared by the Analytical Center othe Dm g Control Agency of Tajikistan {DCA, 2004), a specialized law enforcemenagency, which w as founded in 1999 and has since been working with the financiasupport and guidance from the United N ations Drug and Crime Control P rogrammand the United Nations Office on Dmgs and Crime (UNDCP/UNODC). It alsorests on a candid report of an experienced and high-rank ing Tajik law enforcemenofficer who carried out detailed field observations and interviews with over 20 ohis colleagues specifically for the study but has adopted a pseudonym for fear oretaliation (Khamonov, 2005). As far as possible , the data drawn from Tajik sourcehave been cross-checked with interviews with officers of intemational agenciestationed in Tajikistan, secondary sources, and, in particular, through an extensiv


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T A J I K S T A N : T H E R I S E OF A N A R C O - S T A T E

among them are geographical prox imity and ethnic ties with Afghan istan, the civwar and its aftermath, state failure and the rise of warlords, the problem of bordecontrol, cormption, and migration.GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY AND ETHNIC TIES WITH AFGHANISTANThe first and perhaps most obvious factor of note is Tajikistan's geographicaproximitytoAfghanistan,the world's largest supplier of illicit opiates. Tajikistan'southern edge and Afghanistan's northem edge abut, creating a porous border oover 1,200 kilom eters. The developm ent of illicit opiate exchanges between the twcountries was also facilitated by the common ethnic identities and clan ties of thpeople, broadly known as "Tajik," living on the two sides of the border. The termTajik is used locally in both Afghanistan and Tajikistan as a generic expression toindicate the Persian-speaking population and covers a number of groups, whichare perceived as distinct by their mem bers. The groups call themselves by regionanam es, such as Pansh iri, Darwazi, or Raghi, and straddle the Tajik-Afghan bordeon the river Pyanj (Centlivres & CentUvres-Demont, 1998).THE CIVIL WAR AND ITS ECONOMIC AFTERMATH

The devastation of the Tajik legitimate economy, which followed the implosionof the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent civil war in Tajikistan, providedstrong incentives to get involved in the illicit opiate industry. Though it reached itheight in 1992, the conflict lasted five years, claiming 50,000 lives and displacingalmost one fifth of the country's total population of six million. As a result of thewar, natural calamities, and the collapse of economic relations with former Sovierepublics, Tajikistan's GDP was 57% lower in 1998 than in 1990. With a per capitGDP of only $180, it had thenas it has nowthe lowest per capita GDP of althe countries belonging to the Com monwealth of Independent States (CIS)."* TodayTajikistan's per capita GDP is still only about $290, valued at the official exchangerate and $1,300, valued in terms of purchasing power parity (Central IntelligenceAgency [CIA], 2007).Given the enduring economic crisis, the temptation to become involved innarcotics-related transactions remains high for large sections of society. Reportof Tajik and foreign law enforcement agencies and intemational nongovemmenta

organizations (NGOs) as well as interviews with both illicit opium traders andlaw enforcement officers concur in showing that by the late 1990s many tens o


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P A O L I , R A B K O V , GREENFIELD, REUTERSTATE FAILURE AND THE RISE OF WARLORDS

The civil war also prompted a complete state failure, thus further enhancinTajikistan's advantage in becoming a key transit country for Afghan opiatesAccording to Kirill Nourzhanov (2005, p. 117), the Tajikistan of 1992 resemblethe Lebanon of 1975, where "the govemment does not exist, and whatever part oit exists has no authority, and whoever has authority it is not the government" (sealso Zviagelskaya, 1997). Since then, the govemment of Emomali Rakhmonovwho was elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet in late 1992 and President oTajikistan two years later, bas made considerable progress in restoring statehood anreestablishing central authority. However, the govemment personnel and operationaprocedures are still patrimonial and dominated by interests of a particular regionaelite and its changing allies, which leaves them prey to cormption and infiltratioby drug traffickers (Intemational Crisis Group [ICG], 2004; Nourzhanov, 2005Indeed, as we show in the last section, circumstantial evidence suggests that severahigh-level politicians and state officials head (or have headed) some of the countrylargest dmg trafficking groups.

Despite being formally included in government stmctures, some of these civiservants and politicians-cum-traffickers virtually remain warlords,^ disposing of themore or less private armies and fiefdom s. The w arlords ' power is itself a product othe civil war. This not merely entailed an armed stmggle between pro-govemmen(former Communist) forces and Islamist and pro-democracy groups, but was alsoconflict between sub-ethnic groups of the Tajiks, who represented different regionof the country. The elites and people of Kulob and Gharm, in the south and centeof the country, were protagonists of the confrontations, representing the govemmenand the opposition, respectively. Kulobis and Gharmis were respectively aided bethnic Uzbeks and Hissoris from westem Tajikistan and Pamiris from the eastemregion of Gomo Badakhshan (Nourzhanov, 2005; Shirazi, 1997).^

As the spiral of intemal violence unfolded, a variety of more or less ideologicallinspired armed groups emerged, which fought each other. Some were based opatronage and consanguineal networks, reviving the traditional custom of blood feudOthers resulted from the splitting up of the former Soviet police and military forceStill others were veritable criminal gangs, which had engaged in illicit entrepreneuriaactivities and extortion since the 1980s. By the end of 1992, the real power wain thehands of warlords in most Tajik regions, and these maintained considerabl


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Other w arlords, this time from the Gharm and B adakhshan regions, the latter owhich straddles the Tajik-Afghan border, were included in the govem ment whenRakhmonov signed a peace agreement with the United Tajik Opposition in 1997Under the terms of the "General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace andNational Accord," which was brokered by the United Nations, former oppositionleaders were integrated in the govemment and received 30% of all govemmentpos itions. Further, their militias becam e part of the Tajik army and law enforcemenagencies.THE PROBLEM OF BORDER CONTROL

For much of the 1990s, the Taj ik state agencies were unable to protect the countryborders and to prevent any type of smuggling, including that of opiates (Pasotti1997; Zelitchenko, 1999, 2004). Though they have made considerable progresssince the start of the 21st century, considerable problems still remain. As notedin the 2003 International Narcotics Co ntrol Strategy R eport (U.S. Department ofState, 2004, p. 462), "the Pyanj river, which forms [a long and most accessible]part of Tajikistan's border with opium-producing Afghanistan, is thinly guardedand difficult to patrol. It is easily crossed without inspection at a num ber of po ints"(see also McDermott, 2002).A 1993 agreement with Russia entrusted defense of the 1,200-kilometer longborder with Afghanistan to the Russian Border Forces (RBF).^ These operatedfor over a decade in Tajikistan with the support of Russia's 20P' Motorized RifleDivision. Tajik troops took over the full control of the border only in July 2005

M A P O F TAJIKISTAN

m wfrM


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P A O L I , R A B K O V , GREENFIELD , REUTER(Maitra, 2005). The Tajik forces are considered "unequal to the task" by mosobservers {U.S. Department of State, 2005, p. 502; ICG, 2004, pp. 17-18), andtheir takeover has had a negative impact on dm g interdiction efforts: heroin seizurdecreased by half between 2004 and 2005 (see Table 1 below). In tmth, the RBFalso lacked sufficient human and technical means to effectively patrol the long TajikAfghan borden During the civil war, in particular, many units primarily had to defenthemselves from the rioting population, as they supported the Tajik govemment intheir fight against the opposition fighters. They also had to finance their own livingas their salary was not regularly paid (Atkin, 1997; Machmadiev, 2003).

Given their meager salaries, RBF guards were prey to corruption, and, givetheir inadequate resources and the traflickers' few restraints in employing violencethey could be easily intimidated (ICG, 2001b; DCA, 2000). Russian soldiers anofficials were also repeatedly found to be involved in heroin smuggling attempts intRussia (DCA, 2000; Knox, 2004). Russian military planes were also occasionallused for these purposes (ICG, 2001 b; Olcott & U dalova, 2000).

Tajikistan's borders with former Soviet republics are still less effectivelcontrolled than its border with Afghanistan. Even though Uzbekistan has repeatedlclosed and even mined its border with Tajikistan for fear of importing instabilitythe weakness and limited means of the Tajik border guards and law enforcemenagencies and, more generally, the difficulties of establishing effective borde

TABLE 1O PI AT ES S E I ZED I N TA J I K I S TA N ( K I L O G R A M S ) 1991-2005

1991199219931994199519961997199819992000

Opium1.96.7

3 7 . 92 4 3 . 6

1 , 5 7 1 . 43 , 4 1 1 . 43 , 5 1 5 . 51 , 4 6 1 . 91 , 2 6 9 . 24 , 7 7 8 . 4

H e r o i n---

6.46 0 . 0

2 7 1 . 57 0 8 . 81 , 8 8 2 . 9


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TAJIKSTAN: THE RISE OF A NARCO-STATE

controls between the countries that once belonged to the former Soviet Union makthe smuggling of even large lots of heroin to CIS countries a relatively low risenterprise (Zelitchenko, 2004; Olcott & Udalova, 2000).CORRUPTION

Corruption is not only an almost inevitable by-product of wholesale drutrafficking, but also one of its most powerful breeding grounds. In Tajikistan iexisted before the developm ent of the illicit drug industry and, as in other CIS statesflourished already in Soviet times and has been further enhanced by the post-Sovietransition (see for exam ple Cokgezen, 2004). In Tajikistan, as in other Central Asianrepublics, corruption has an "Eastem" character that shows itself in three formsFirst, such corruption is very closely linked to traditional social institutions andrelations through family, clan, place of work, and compatriots. Even without thflow of bribes, members of the in-group are treated preferentially. Second, corruptionhas a hierarchical structure. The bribe taker, who has often bought his own posis required to pass a share of his eaming to the boss who helped him. In such asystem there is little stigma to a functionary taking a bribe , it is improper only whenhe takes more than he is supposed to. According to the DCA (2000), for exampleas of 2000, the position of head of the Interior Ministry Department in one of thdistricts bordering Afghanistan cost about $50,000. With the bribes extorted fromdrug traffickers, however, the position holder can quickly eam the money paid inadvance and give a share of his revenues to his superiors as well (see also ICG2001b). Third, moral views of corruption depend on whether it is "our" or "theirgroup. It is bad to take bribes from "ours" and it is pemiissible to take them from"theirs" (Reuter, Pain, & Greenfield, 2003).

Such "Eastem" corruption powerfully enhances Tajikistan's advantage in theworld opiate industry. Coupled with the growing means invested in corruption bydrug traffickers, it also undermines the consolidation of dem ocratic and accountablestate structures. Despite the limited number of Tajik officials charged on corruptionor drug offenses,** Tajikistan is regarded as one of the wor ld 's most corrupt countries(e.g.. Transparency Intemational [TI], 2005). This perception is confirmed by severahigh ranking Tajik law enforcement officials interviewed ad hoc for this projectAs one official stated:


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P A O L I , R A B K O V , GREENFIELO, REUTERparts of Tajikistan the percentage of corrupted officers is lower.In my opinion, eight officers out often are corrupted in Dushanbe[Tajikis tan's capital] . (Khamonov, 2005, p. 55; for similarassessments, see ICG, 2001b, p. 8; 15; 200 1c, pp. 14-15)

Even if there might be some exaggeration in this assessment, the few criminacases that are brought to court are enough to show the extent of dmg-relatedcorruption and the involvement of high-ranking civil servants in dmg deals. InMay 2000, 86 kilograms of heroin and large amounts of foreign currency werediscovered in Almaty, the (then) capital of Kazakhstan, in cars belonging to the Tajikambassador and trade representative. The latter was then convicted on dm g chargeswhile the ambassador fled Kazakhstan ("Tajik Trade Representative ," 2001). In Apri1998, a former Tajik deputy defense minister was imprisoned for using a militaryhelicopter to smuggle 89 kilograms of opium from Dushanbe to Pendjikent in thSoghd region ("Tajik dm g bu siness ," 2002). Moreover, several officers of Tajik lawenforcement agencies as well as diplomats have been arrested and charged in Russiand Kyrgyzstan for wholesale opiate smuggling (e.g., DCA, 2004; Sukhravardy2002; Bajun, 2003). Many customs and police officials possess lavish houses andexpensive ears, which they could not have bought on their salaries. This providecircumstantial evidence of law enforcement cormption (U.S. Department of State2005). General N ustam Nazarov(20 05 ), and the respected director of the Tajik DruControl Agency himself stated that "cormption in law enforcement bodies becamcritical and hampered dmg control activity."MIGRATION AS A SOURCE OF TRAFFICKING LINKS

Migration flows have further increased Tajikistan's competitive advantage inbecoming a privileged channel for Afghan heroin bound to other CIS countrieand particularly to Russia. Between 1992 and 1999 more than 600,000 people lefTajikistan (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2000). At least 60,00of those immigrants fled into Afghanistan, a flow that not only revived commoethnic identities and clan ties (see above), but also created the basis for futurtransactions in opiates and other illicit commodities (DCA, 2004).At the other end of the supply chain, the consolidation of Tajikistan's role aa key transit country for Afghan heroin has been favored by the growth of a larg


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often fails, and many immigrants live in terrible conditions, some tuming to drugcourier services and prostitution for income (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty[RFE/RL], 2003; Intemational Organisation for Migration [lOM], 2001).

Tajikistan's advantage was powerfully multiplied by the dramatic growth oheroin demand in many countries of the former Soviet Union since its collapse in1991. Russia, a minor consum ption market in 1995, becam e one of the largest in thworld by 2000 and today has one of the world's highest prevalence rates of opiatabuse (see Paoli, 2005; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNO DC ], 2005Above-average rates of heroin consum ption can also be found in m ost Central Asianrepublics and eastem European countries, which are also to a large extent servicedby Afghan opiates smuggled through Tajikistan (United Nations Office for DmgControl and Crime Prevention [UN OD CC P], 2002 ; UN OD C, 200 4).TH E PHASES OF TRAFFICKING

The interplay of the above-mentioned factors can be seen clearly in the evolutionof the illicit opiate industry in Tajikistan since the early 1990s. The industry hagrown rapidly in quantitative terms, but it has also undergone substantial shifts inthe origin and type of opiates trafficked and in smuggling routes.D R U G SOURCES: FROM LOCAL TO AFGHAN OPIUM

The first years following Tajikistan's independence recorded the rapid expansionof domestic illicit opium poppy cultivation, particularly in the Panjakent and Ayndistricts of the Soghd (previously Leninobad) region close to the Uzbek border. By1995 about 2,000 hectares were cultivated with opium poppy, and from 1991 to1995 more than half of all reported dmg offences involved the illegal cultivationof dm gs (Khamonov, 2005 ).Since 1995, however, local opium and its derivatives have been largely supplantedby cheaper and better quality opiates imported from Afghanistan. The smugglingof Afghan opiates began on a small scale as early as 1992, the first full year ofindependence and the first year following the expansion of opium growing intothe northem regions of Afghanistan. Initially the traffic was almost exclusively oopium. This was imported mainly into the eastem, autonomous region of GomoBadakhshan and from there was smuggled to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In thismountainous and wild area of the country, opium as well as other (lieit and illicitcommoditieswere mainly moved through the Pamir highway linking Khorog


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P A O L I , R A B K O V , G R E E N F I E L D , R E U T E RFive kilos of Afghan opium were seized in the same year in Kyrgyzstan (Zelitchenko1999).

Around 1994, according to our research collaborator, at least 20 tons of opiumwere trafficked yearly from Afghanistan into Tajikistan, primarily in the GomBadakhshan region. This generated few criminal eases: a maximum of 53 druoffenses were recorded yearly in the region between 1992 and 1995 (Khamonov2005).ENTRY POINTS: FROM EAST TO WESTAfter the shift from local to Afghan opium, a second shift took place in the m id1990s: namely, trafficking spread from Gom o Badakhshan to the rest of the countryas Afghan opiates began to be smuggled fi-om Afghanistan into the southwesterKhatlon region , whose main centers are the cities of Kulob and Q urghonteppa . Asresult ofth is shift, Dushanbe and the more populated regions in the westem part of thcountry also became m ore directly involved in the opiate trade. The lower altitude anbetter road infrastructure ofthis region, both in Tajikistan and in Afghanistan, werprobably the main factors promptmg the shift of routes (DCA, 2004; UNODCCSub-Office in Tajikistan, 2000). The shift of routes was accompanied by a furtheexpansion of the volum es of opiates trafficked, which have probably exceeded 10tons per year since the late 1990s (Khamonov, 2005 , p. 12).D R U G TYPES: FROM OPIUM TO HEROINThe change of routes and the expansion of the illegal trade were accompanied ba third shift, this time involving the type of opiates smuggled: namely from opiumto heroin. Heroin w as seized for the first time in Tajikistan in late 1995: 1.9 and 9kilos were recovered in late 1995 by the Russian border guards close to the town oPanj in the Qurghonteppa district of the Khatlon region. In 2000 , the UN dm g officestimated that about 100 tons of heroin m ay be smuggled yearly from Afghanistainto Tajikistan (UN OD CC P Sub-Office in Tajikistan, 2000). The mle of the thumis that 10 kilograms of opium are necessary to produce one kilogram of heroin.

The rapid increase in seizures provides further evidence of the rapid expansioof heroin trafficking. Table 1 is based on the data of the Tajik Dmg Control Agenreporting opiate seizures in Tajikistan (which for the early 1990s do not include thseizures carried out by the Russian border guards). In 1996, Tajik law enforcemen


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T A J I K S T A N : TH E R ISE OF A N A R C O - S T A T E

(o almost 4,800 kilograms in 2000 and then declined substantially in the followinyears, when trafficking primarily shifted to heroin.By 1998, heroin had flooded the landlocked country of Tajikistan, and itwholesale and retail price had sunk to less than a fifth of its price in 1996. Whereaa kilogram of heroin bound for export cost $ 17,000 in Dushanbe in 1996, its pricplumm eted to $ 3,000 in 1998, to become as low as $1,000 in 2000 (DCA, 200 2)

TAJIKISTAN'S INTEGRATION INTO THE WORLD HEROIN MARKETWith the growing influx of Afghan heroin in the late 1990s, Tajikistan becamfully integrated into the world heroin market. The process took only a few years

Whereas most of the opium was consumed locally or at most in the neighboringCentral Asian republics, heroin soon became one of Tajikistan's main export goodsIn fact, Tajik heroin exports service the whole CIS market, including the boomingRussian market and, to a lesser extent, the Eastem and Westem European marketus well.ESTIMATES OF OPIATE FLOWSIn 1999, the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB, 1999, par. 354estimated that "up to 65 percent of all Afghan opium, morphine and heroin itrafficked through Central Asia." A year later, the UN drug office (UNODCCPSub-Office in Tajikistan, 2 000) put the same figure at around 50% of the Afghanopiates intended for export. The truth is that no one knows even approxim ately thpercentage of Afghan heroin that goes through Tajikistan and the other C entral Asianrepublics; there are no strong m ethodologies for creating such estimates. How everas explained in detail elsewhere (Paoli et al, 2008, forthcoming), it is plausiblethat 50 to 95 tons of pure heroin are consumed annually in Russia, the Ukraineand Central Asiamarkets that are served primarily by heroin smuggled throughTajikistan, Turkm enistan, and, to a much lower extent, U zbekistan.

To an unknown degree. Central Asian heroin exports also travel along the socalled "Silk Ro ad" to the European market, which yearly consum es 60 to 80 tons opure heroin (see also Reu ter et al., 2003). The law enforcement officers interviewedin the course of the primary data collection in Turkey and in several WesternEuropean countries (France, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom) all stressedthat the bulk of heroin sold in Westem and Southeastem European countries come


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P A O L I , R A B K O V , G R E E NF I E LD , R E UTE Rconsumption, excluding consum ption in Turkey, Russia, and the Ukraine is suppliedvia Central Asia. Total shipments also inelude opiatesprimarily heroin that areseized in the markets that Central Asia services. After accoun ting for those seizureswe estimate that 75-121 tons of pure heroin flow yearly into or through Central Asi(Paoli, et al., 2008, forthcoming).

An unknown but probably not very large fraction ofthis throughput is smuggledIrom Afghanistan through Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. We assume that one third othe heroin throughput is potentially smuggled from A fghanistan into one of the twocountries. As a result ofthis calculation, 50 to 81 tons in pure heroin equivalent unitare left to be potentially smuggled each year into or through Tajikistan, representingabout 15-25% of Afghanistan's opium production at the time of our calculation andsomew hat less more recently. Without correspond ing information onpurity for thabove-mentioned 100-ton supply-side estimate of the UN (UNO DCC P Sub-Officin Tajikistan, 2000) a direct comparison is difficult; however, our range for purheroin may be roughly consistent.TAJIK EXPORTERS, COURIERS AND DISTRIBUTORS IN CIS COUNTRIESIn the initial phases of development of the Tajik illegal dmg industry, opportunistismugglers were happy to bring their lots to Sou them Kyrgyzstan and sell them therto Kyrgyz and other former USSR citizens. Since Afghan opiates began to flowthrough Western Tajikistan, Tajik citizens have increasingly become involved in thexport and, to a more limited extent, in the distribution of heroin and other opiatein all CIS countries.

Imitating Nigerians, many Tajiks initially mastered the skills of the "swallow er,transporting d m gs in their stomachs or altematively on their body, their personabelongings, and allegedly even by children. Dozens of such cases were discovereyearly by CIS law enforcement agencies and reported by Russian and Central Asiamedia (e.g.. Ministry of the Interior of the Russia Federation [M VD]. 2000 ; DCA2000; "Tajik Dm g Business," 2000 ; "Child O bliged," 2000). Despite the risks , suctrips were quite attractive as a transporter could eam $200 per trip, a ftill year'income for the average Tajik (DC A, 20 00; KJiamonov, 200 5).At the tum of the century, however. Tajiks became somewhat higher-risk dmsmugglers. Both in Russia and in Central Asia they received growing attentiofrom customs agents, who had also becom e m ore skilled and better equipped. Th


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T A J I K S T A N ; T H E R I S E OF A N A R C O - S T A T E

Since then smugglers have developed other methods of drug delivery anpossibly used transporters from other ethnic groups, as reflected in the decline oTajik citizens arrested on dm g charges in other CIS coun tries since 2000 .'' Reflectinchanges in trafficking groups (see below), a growing share of drugs also travels ibig consignments in cargo trains and heavy trucks, particularly those transportincotton and aluminum, Tajikistan's main legitimate export goods.'" Opiates aralso frequently transported on buses, particularly those leaving from the NortherSoghd region." The smuggling methods are increasingly ingenious. Heroin is nlonger simply covered w ith fmits and vegetables but is transported inside them , foexample inside apricot clingstones, apples, and pomegranates (Reuter et al., 2003Rossijskaja, 2001).T H E R A P I D GROWTH OF LOCAL OPIATE CONSUMPTION

During the second half of the 1990s, the grow ing availability of heroin promptethe rapid spread of heroin use throughout Tajikistan, displacing opium and, to a morlimited extent, even cannabis. According to a Rapid Situation Assessment carriedout in each of the Central Asian republics by the UN drug office in 2001, there wer45,000 to 55,000 problem dmg users in Tajikistan, m ost of whom were heroin addict(United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Regional Officfor Central Asia [UNOCCP-ROCA], 2001). The estimate was revised slightly bythe Tajik Drug Control Agency at the end of a more detailed survey in 2003 and inow set at 55,000-75,000 problem dmg users, 80% of whom regularly use heroin(Khamonov, 2005).The alarming diffusion of heroin consumption in Tajikistan is described by long-term dmg user, who began injecting heroin in 1998:

We didn't have it before. We didn't know anything about heroin.And there were fewer dmg consumers. All dmg consumers in thecity [Dushanbe] knew each other. Many of us smoked cannabis.But everything has changed during the last ten years. You could buyany dmg you wanted. Then heroin appeared and it nearly replacedall other dmgs. I suppose that they did it on purpose so that all ofus would start using heroin. Ifyou have no job or money, you haveno choice left but to deal with d m gs . That is why there are so manydrug consumers now. (Khamonov, 2005, p. 22)


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P A O L I , RABKOV, GREENFIELD, REUTERresearch collaborator (Khamonov, 2005) and his interviewees recall that up to theyear 2000, a gram of heroin of uncertain purity cost as little as five lo six somon(or 5,000 to 6,000 old Tajik rubles, the official currency until October 3 0 ,2000 , i.eabout $2) and a singte dose of 0.2 grams could be bought for as little as one somoniEven though this is a considerable sum for most Tajiks with annual incomes of lessthan $200, heroin still costs less than a bottle of vodka or beer (DCA, 2000).

The rapid spread of heroin consumption is also shown by the dramatic growthof drug users registered in "narcology" centers, which provide treatment for drugabusers (see Table 2). Within a decade, from 1994 to 2003, their number grew morethan tenfold, from 653 to 6,799 (DCA, 2004). The increasing share of heroin useramong registered clients can be observed since 1999, as these were not differentiateby type of drug before. In 1999 heroin users represented slightty tess than two thirdofthe total (62.7%). By 2004 they comprised more than three quarters (76.1%) othe total number of registered users.As a result of this rapid growth, by 2003, Tajikistan had the eighth highesprevalence of opiate abuse, following Iran, Laos, and several countries ofth e formeSoviet Union. The unenviable peculiarity of Tajikistan and many o fthe other formeSoviet countries is that heroin users today make up the bulk of their addicted opiat

users, whereas Iran, Laos and, more generally. South Asian countries also have substantial number of opium consumers (UN OD C, 2004).There are signs tbat since the beginning o fth e new century the heroin epidemiin Tajikistan has stabilized. This is due to several factors, among which the mosimportant may be the growing awareness of the negative consequences of heroin

TABLE 2D R U G ADDICTS REGISTERED BY TAJ IK NARCOLOGY CENTERS

199419951996199719981999

Registered dmgaddicts6538239679961,4592,703

Of whom areheroin usersn.a.n.a.n.a.

iLa.n.a.1,695


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use. To an unknown degree, however, the stabilization of heroin use has also beeprompted by changes in the organization of retail distribution, which may havraised retail heroin prices almost fivefold in comparison with 2000 and conside rabldecreased availability. As a drug u ser interview ed for this study s tated, "You cou lget any drug quite easily till 2000. Everybody sold drugs. Since 2001 only thoswho have some power behind them have remained in business." Paralleling thevolution of drug smuggling organizations (see below), there has been a dowselection of retail drug dealers too. Only well-connected drug dealers enjoyinthe protection of high-level law enforcement officials or politicians remain on thmarket, and their power is allege dly such that they can afford to select cu stom erand raise heroin prices at the same time as they decrease its purity (Khamonov2005; DC A, 2000).

The price increase and the reduced availability have prompted many users toshift from smoking or sniffing heroin to injecting it, sharply fostering the spreadof HIV/AIDS. In 2005 Tajikistan was still considered by UNAIDS (2005) to be acountry with low prevalence of HIV infection. As of Novem ber 20 04 ,317 cases oHIV infection had been reg istered in Tajikistan, or 4.9 per 100,000 ofthe populationHowever, the official data, which are based on case reports, differ substantiallyfrom the UN AIDS e stimation. According to UNA IDS, the number of people livinwith HIV in the country at the end of 2004 was probably around 5,000. What iparticularly worrying is that more than 60% ofthe official cumulative HIV casewere registered in 2004 (UNAIDS, 2005). As it happened earlier in other formeSoviet repu blics, Tajikistan also se em s to be on the ve rge of a major HIV epidem i(see also Intemational Crisis G roup [ICG], 2003 b).D R U G TRAFFICKING ENTERPRISES

Three major types of drug ente rprise s can be identified in the brief, but dramaticdevelopment ofthe Tajik drug industry; the relative importance of each type hatended to shift with the development ofthe Tajik drug trade.'^INDEPENDENT PEDDLERS

During the initial stages of development (1993 to 1995) opiates were veryfrequently traded by individuals or sm all, unorganized groups of people who had nopreviou s criminal expertise and for whom opiate trafficking repres ented a me ans o


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P AO L I , RABKOV , GREENF IELD , REUTERFrom 1996 to 1999, women made up 27% to 4 5% of all those convicted annuallyfor drug offenses in Tajikistan (DCA, 2000; see also Zelitchenko, 1999).

With virtually no law enforcement, this highly decentralized drug trading hardlyneeded to involve regular paym ents of bribes to governm ent officials (though manyof them engaged themselves in drug trafficking). The only restraints were moralapparently, there was considerable resistance among older family members, whoconsidered drug trading discreditable (Reuter et al., 2003).

The independent pedd lers were primarily active in the W estem region of G omBadakhshan, often bringing batches of no more than a few kilograms of dmgdirectly from the Afghan border to Osh or Andijan. With time, some of them alsbegan to sell drugs on retail markets in Dushanbe or other cities and even to exporsmall quantities of opiates directly into Russia, usually relying on the help orelatives, acquaintances or members ofthe same village or neighborhood. Thoughsome independent traders still exist, most have been incorporated into larger, morprofessionally organized trafficking groups (DCA, 2002).SMALL- TO MEDIUM-SIZED TRAFFICKING GROUPS

Small- to medium-sized trafficking groups appeared simultaneously with thindependent peddlers but largely superseded them as heroin smuggling fromAfghanistan expanded. There is no precise information on the number of small- tomedium-sized trafficking groups operating in Taj ikistan; Kham onov (2005) estimatethat at least 100 of them are active on the border with Afghanistan.Despite their higher degree of professionalization, the illegal enterprisebelonging to the second category rarely consist of more than 10 to 15 persons. Witheach group there is some division of labor, but this is quite mdimentary (DCA

2000, p. 14). Affiliation is based on extended family ties, locality, or membershiin a professional association, sporting group, or other traditional male groupsTrafficking and distributing groups with a m ixed regional base can be found primarilyin D ushanbe, where peopleft^omdifferent Tajik regions are used to living togethe(K-hamonov, 2005). Though Tajiks living abroad are part of some groups, these dnot usually have a tmly intemational membership. Many of them are active onlintermittently. They come together when opportunity arises, to disband again andpossibly reform with a partially changed mem bership on another occasion.'^On the average, the monthly heroin tumover managed by small- to medium


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are frequently in charge of their export or wholesale distribution in CIS countries(Khamonov, 2005). Unlike independent peddlers, organized trafficking groupsusually enjoy some form of govemment protection, though this may be limitedto connections with a few Russian border guards, local policemen, or customsofficers.CRIMINAL COMMUNITIES: CHARACTERISTICS...

Since the late 1990s, a third group of dm g trafficking organizations have gainedcontrol of a significant and probab ly majority fraction of the opiate tradeThese are large organized criminal groups, which are usually known as "criminacommunities," a term inherited by most CIS countries from the Soviet penal code(see for exam ple, Butler, 1997). The m ost successful ones are able to deal with oveone ton of heroin a month.

Stable and usually high-level govemment protection has been critical to thesuccess of these large trafficking groups. Almost paradoxically and certainlyironically, the progress in border control and law enforcement that Tajikistan hasachieved since the late 1990sthanks to the support of intemational agencies andforeign d o n o rs ^ h a s helped the large groups to achieve their success. By 2001, forexample, there were 12 to 13 police and customs posts on the route from Khorogto Osh, a distance of only 700 to 800 kilometers. The roads from the Afghanistanborder to Dushanbe are checked even m ore strictly. Rather than create insuperablebarriers to drug transportation, this has generated large paym ents to border and policeofficials. Sm all-time individual smugglers are disadvantaged; apparently, there areeconomies of scale in corruption (Reuter et al., 2003). This has led to some coalitionof corrupted bureaucracy and dmg trafficking organizations. Whereas small- tomedium-sized trafficking groups rarely enjoy high-level protection, systematiccollusion is the characteristic ofthe organizations belonging to the third category.This variation was candidly described by the DCA (20 00, pp . 17-18) in a report onthe illegal dmg market in Dushanbe:

The leaders of all groups have their own relations or otherconnections with some govem mental stmctures or law enforcementagencies. In many cases the[se] are paid regularly definite sum[s]of money. In some large groups a leader is either a commanderof military troops or law enforcement agency, ln the largest


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P A O L I , R A B K O V , G R E E N F I E L D , R E U T E RLike the smaller groups, some "criminal communities" are usually specialize

in one or two phases ofthe heroin business and, as in the case of smaller groupstheir specialization is a function of their location. However, there are also a fewlarge and particularly w ell connected o rganizations that involve up to a few hundreindividuals, including core mem bers and service providers and operate across a broaspectrum of trafficking activities, from the importation of opiates from Afghanistaup to the wholesale and, occasionally, even retail distribution of opiates in Russiand other former Soviet states.

Most ofthe latter coincide with the private armies of former civil war com mandetumed career or elected pub lic officials. As the DCA states, "there are several largorganizations in Tajikistan dealing with deliver[y] of dmgs . As a matter of fact theall are subject to commanders of military formations, which were formed durinTajik Civil War . . . some of these formations becam e parts of armed forces of thcountry; some are still under the subordination to their comm anders and are illegin their essence" (2000, p. 70; see also pp. 18 and 21-22). Though formulated imore cautious terms, the U.S. Department of State (2002, pp. 128-129) made thsame allegations in its 2001 Intemational Narcotics Control Strategy Report (awell as in previous editions ofthe same report):

The dismption of nonnal economic activity during the 1992-1997civil war gave rise to a warlord c lass whose leaders jos tle for controlofthe lucrative narcotics trad e.. .. Influential figures from both sidesof Tajikistan's civil war, many of whom now hold govemmentpositions, are widely believed to have a hand in the dmg trade.While it is impossible to determine for certain how pervasivedmg cormption is within govemment circles, salaries for even topofficials are low and often seem inadequate to support the lifestylesmany officials maintain.

Little is known about the recruitment criteria and intemal division of labor oTajikistan's most successful dmg trafficking groups. Their core is usually composeof people united by clan or locality ties; however, people from different backgroundare involved in the less delicate and more risky tasks. Occasionally these largdmg enterprises also develop stable partnerships with trafficking groups of othe


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TAJtKSTAN: THE R ISE OF A NARCO-STATE

prohibition enforcement. As private armies, they are also well equipped with m odemcommunication means and weapons, including annored vehicles, anti-aircraft rocketsand military planes, and operate professionally (DC A, 2000; Osm onaliev, 2005). Thlargest usually include so-called "protection g roups", i.e., hit men, who take care othe most dangerous operations, and particularly the drug import from Afghanistanand charge protection feesfi"omother trafficking groups, when the these groups wanlo operate on their territory (Kham onov, 200 5, pp. 14-15; Nasarov, 2002).'"*. . . AND EXAMPLES

The leaders of Tajikistan's largest trafficking groups belong to both the formerPeop le's Front of Tajikistan (PFT), which brought President Emomali Rakhmonovto power, and the former United Tajik Opposition (UT O), the PFT 's main opponentwhich was included in the govemment in late 1997.

The founder ofthe first large-scale Tajik dmg trafficking group was probablyYaqubjon Salimov, who started his career as a racketeer in Dushanbe in the 1980sand went on to become the lieutenant to hobo ("the grandfather") Sangak Safarova powerful warlord and the founder ofthe PFT, and then Tajikistan's Minister ofInterior in December 1992 (Nourzhanov, 2005). From then on Salimov beganorganizing opiate smuggling from Afghanistan via the Southem Vanch district ofGomo Badakhshan, which he controlled through a relative. O pium and then heroinwere allegedly transported by military airplanes to Dushanbe and then by planes ortrains to the Russian Federation (Khamonov, 2005; DCA, 2000).

Salimov's drug business long ran undisturbed, as he had control ofthe policeAlong the lines of a popular saying in Tajikistan, "If you put epaulettes on a criminalyou w ill get a Tajik cop." The Sixth Department ofthe Ministry ofthe Interior incharge of combating organized crime was entmsted to an individual who had spen17 years behind bars. The rank-and-file members ofthe police were little better;one third of them were purged from the force after Salimov's dismissal in August1995 (Nourzhanov, 2005). Salimov was then m ade head ofthe Customs Com mitteebefore siding with an opponent of President Rakhomonov's in 1997, fleeing intoUzbekistan, being arrested and sentenced to 15 years in prison for state treason,banditry and abuse of office in early 2005 (Wetherall, 2005).

Having had to finance their fight with illegal means up to the late 1990s, manyopposition com manders are believed tohave been even more systematically involved


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P A O L I , RABKOV, GREENFIELD, REUTERZiyoev became Minister for Emergency S ituations, a position which was specificallcreated for him in July 1998. The ministry has a fijll-size army brigade on its payro(consisting exclusively of Ziyoev 's m en). Though his brigade has been permanentldeployed in the northem part ofthe country, Ziyoev allegedly controls, as if it werhis personalfief,considerable parts of the Panj district in Southem Tajikistan, whicis one ofthe most frequent and easiest entry points for Afghan opiates (Khamonov2005; Nourzhanov, 2 005; Sukhravardy, 2002)

Other former UTO commanders-tumed-statesmen are also suspected of beininvolved in wholesale drug smuggling.'- As much as Ziyoev, all these formewarlords retain substantial private armies and largely control pockets of lands iSouthern Tajikistan, which they consider their patrimony and from which thecan organize undisturbed large trafficking deals (Nourzhanov, 2005; DCA, 2000Khamonov, 2005). Support for these allegations was provided by the dmg-relatemurder of Habib Sanginov, another UTO commander who had acquired the poof deputy M inister ofth e Interior. According to the prosecution in his murder caseSanginov was shot dead in April 2001 because he had refused to pay for a deliverof 50 kilograms of heroin worth $100,000 (Gleason, 2001).

Even ifthe Salimov's days are gone, dmg-related corruption is far from beinan exclusive characteristic of former opposition members. Several politicians anofficials belonging to the former PFT are (or were) also involved in the heroin tradTwo former PFT com manders, for exam ple, were forced to retire ftom their posts othe border protection committee in January 2 00 2: though it was not publicly statethe reason for their dismissal was their systematic involvement in dmg traffickin(Khamonov, 2005; ICG, 2004). General Gaffor Mirzoev, the fonner PFT comm andand head ofthe Presidential Guard ,"' was also said to mn a powerful drug traffickinorganization up to his arrest on numerous but nondrug related charges in Augus2004 (Khamonov; 2005; Abdullaev, 2004; Shvaryov, 2004; BBC, 2004/ Russiamedia sources allege that Mirzoev's long-time business partner was MakhmadsaiUbaidulloyev, who as of 2005 was the mayor of Dushanbe and head ofth e upphouse ofthe Tajik Parliament (for a review, see Reuter et al., 2 0 0 3 /Whereas in the above-mentioned cases the identification between dm g traffickeand governm ent officials is almost com plete, there are also a few large independetrafficking groups, which merely buy "protection" services from cormpt govem meofficials. Among them there is, for example, an organization led by six brothers fro


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TAJIKSTAN: THE RISE OF A NARCO-STATE

CONCLUDING REMARKSOn the basis ofthe evidence presented so far, one can safely say that Tajikista

has becom e, in less than 10 years, a veritable "narco-state ." Drug trafficking heavipollutes the country's economic and political systems and seriously threatens itrecovery from the ruinous civil war ofthe 1990s. What is even wo rse, a preponderapart of its dmg trade is conducted not by common criminals or terrorist groupbut by gangs headed or protected by high-ranking govemment officials. In nother country ofthe world, except perhaps contemporary Afghanistan, can such superimposition between drug traffickers and govemment officials be found (sePaoli et al., 2008 , forthcom ing).

Corrupt high-ranking govemment officials do not merely represent a few "baapples ," but carry out on a larger scale what significant portions o fth e populationincluding many low-ranking law enforcement agen ts, also do . The key question foTajikistan is which fraction ofthe Tajik population profits from the opiate tradeDespite the consolidation process undergone by the dmg industry in recent yearit is fair to assume that the share ofthe population supplementing their legitimatincome with opiate revenues is not insignificant. In addition to those directly involvein the trade , in fact, one has to consider also those who profit from it indirectly, bworking in legitimate companies fiinded with dmg money or by supplying goodand services to wholesale dmg traffickers and their families. This means that Tajileaders face a serious dilemm a, as cracking down on heroin trafficking would resuin a substantial deterioration of living conditions for a considerable segment of theimpoverished people.

Given this and the co un try's limited means, it is clear that Tajik state stmc turewill not be able to effectively control dmg trafficking on their own and will neetthe continued guidance, supervision, and financial support of the intemationacommunity.N OT E S' Relying on no scientific procedure, M atthew Kahan e, the UN DP head iTajikistan estimated that the dm g trade accounts for 30% to 50% ofthe econom(ICG , 2001c).- Paoli. Greenfield, and Reuter were the principal investigators of the large

project on the world heroin m arket. Th is entailed primary data collection in eigh


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PAOLI, RABKOV, GREENFIELD, REUTERlimited data collection in Europe. The findings ofthe larger project are beingpublished in Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter (2008, forthcoming). The projectwas funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Justice and its Scientific Researchand Documentation Centre (known as WODC from its Dutch acronym), theUnited Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Smith RichardsonFoundation, and the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and Intemational C riminalLaw. We thank all funding agencies for their financial and logistic support; theviews expressed in this article are, however, entirely our own.

^ This case study also builds on a previous research project that addressed thecontribution of the dmg trade to the Central Asian economy and was carriedout by Peter Reuter, Emil Pain, and Victoria Greenfield (2003).^ The CIS includes all the former Soviet Union repub lics, less Estonia, Latviaand Lithuania.

^ In a nutshell, a warlord is a military leader exercising civil power in a regionwhere the central govem ment is weak. For a thorough discussion ofth e conceptsee Giustozzi (2003).

* The northern elite from Khujand and its prov ince, the Leninobad (now Soghdoblast, which had been predominant under Soviet mle, initially remained neutraand then accepted an ancillary role in the govem ment restored in late 1992 anddominated by Kulobis (Nourzhanov, 2005).

^ Tajik citizens com posed 7 1% of th e 11,700 RB F's contract soldiers, and 99%of its conscripts, but only 7% of its officers (ICG, 2004).^ According to official data, a maximum of 27 civil servants were charged yearlyfrom 1997 to 2003 for drug offenses in Tajikistan (Khamonov, 2005).^ In 1997 ,657 Tajik citizens were arrested in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan

or the Russian Federation. Within three years, this figure almost tripled, onlyto fall back to 669 in 2003 (DCA, 2004).'" On June 30 20 01, for exam ple, 135 kilograms of heroin were seized in theRussian Astrakhan region on a train transporting raw cotton, which was en routefrom Qurghonteppa to Ilichevsk (Ukraine) and then to Switzerland (Borisov2001). In November 1999, over 730 kilograms of opium along with smallerquantities of heroin and cannabis were seized from a tmck driven by a Tajikcitizen in Uzbekistan (D CA , 2004). In July 2 00 3,4 20 kilograms of heroin wereseized near Moscow from the hidden compartments of a tmck driven by three


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TAJ I KSTAN : THE R ISE OF A NARCO -STATE

'- Contrary to what maintained by other scholars (e.g., Comell, 2004; Engvall2005), we have found no evidence proving that several radical Islamist groupare also major players in the Tajik drug industry. True, the most prominent othese groups, the Islamic M ovement of Uzbekistan (IMU ), was involved in thdrug trade up to 2001. How ever, since then the IM U's strength has d ramaticallydeclined and even at the height of its power, its role in the regional dmg tradewas overestimated (ICG, 2001a).

'' This is a pattem typical of many dmg dealing enterprises all over the worldsee Paoli et al. (2008, forthcoming) and Paoli (200 3).

' Clashes between smugglers and Russian border guards were reported frequentlysince the late 1990s and often ended up with heavy casualties on both sides(Osmonaliev, 2005).

^^ Am ong them, there were some who held, as of 2005, thepositions of chairmanof the State Customs Com mittee, first deputy M inister of Defense of Tajikistandeputy chairman ofthe State Com mittee of Border Protection, and the chairmanofthe State Oil and Gas Committee (Khamonov, 2005).

' For much ofthe 1990s the Presidential Guard was President Rakhmono v's mainmilitia, though its loyalty lay primarily with Mirzoev, who paid his men out ohis pocket, using income from the largest casino of Dushanbe, which his familyowned (Nourzhanov, 2005).

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Documents

Tajikistan-The Rise of a Narco-State