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A Review of Marine Corps Intelligence Officer Training

CSC 2000

Subject Area - Intelligence

Table of Contents MMS Cover Sheet........................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined. Disclaimer .................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. Table of Contents............................................................................................................................i Illustrations ....................................................................................................................................ii Chapter One: Introduction ............................................................................................................1 Chapter Two: Background; Intelligence Training under the Intel Plan.........................................4 Chapter Three: Today’s Intelligence Officer Training Program ...................................................7

I. Entry Level Training ...............................................................................................................9 A. MOS 0203 Ground Intelligence Officer Training............................................................11 B. MOS 0204 Human Resource Intelligence Officer Training.............................................12 C. MOS 0206 SIGINT/EW Intelligence Officer Training....................................................13 D. MOS 0207 Aviation Intelligence Officer Training ..........................................................15

II. Post Entry-Level Training....................................................................................................16 A. MOS 0202 MAGTF Intelligence Officer Training ..........................................................16 B. Mid-Career or Senior Intelligence Officer Course ...........................................................17 C. Non-MOS Producing Schools ..........................................................................................18

Chapter Four ................................................................................................................................19 I. Is Intelligence Ready to drive OMFTS? ...............................................................................19 II. Intelligence Tasks inherent to OMFTS................................................................................21 III. Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................24

Chapter Five.................................................................................................................................25 I. Intelligence Officer Perspectives on Intelligence Officer Training ......................................25 II. Findings................................................................................................................................31

Chapter Six...................................................................................................................................34 I. Assessment ............................................................................................................................34 II. Recommendations................................................................................................................37 III. Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................41

Appendix A: Non-MOS Producing Intelligence Schools.........................................................A-1 Appendix B: Intelligence Questionnaire...................................................................................B-1 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................42

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Illustrations Page Figure 1. Intelligence Officer Career Progression. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Figure 2. Proposed Intelligence Officer Career Progression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

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Preface This project is the product of my exposure to intelligence training while serving at

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps as the Intelligence Occupational Field Sponsor from 1996-

1999. Prior to this assignment I was somewhat aware of the fundamental changes to the

Intelligence field in the post DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM period, however, the depth

and significance of them was something that I would come to appreciate only during my tour.

As with any plan, the forceful implementation of it holds the key to success. Additionally, the

ability to critically examine any plan, and make the necessary course corrections is also

fundamental to success. In this light, I have attempted to look at the career training we provide

to our Intelligence Officers to determine what needs to be done and how we can position our

Intelligence Officer corps to excel under our future operating concepts. Hopefully, my

conclusions will be implemented, or at a minimum, they will spur on further discussion and the

development of better ideas.

As with any work, much credit goes to those that are not officially listed as the author. I

appreciate the comments of those Intelligence Officers who responded to my questionnaire.

Their input has been extremely valuable and it was evident to me that we have a highly

motivated group of professionals who truly want to make intelligence better. I would also like

to thank my faculty advisors, Lieutenant Colonel (Colonel select) J. D. Williams, USMC, and

Doctor J.M. Klinger, for their perseverance. I know that shaping my rough ideas into an

acceptable and viable paper was difficult, to say the least. It does seem like a small miracle that

this train ever left the station! Lastly and certainly not least, I want to acknowledge the love

and support of my wife, Shari, and our children Katelyn and Kurt. They make it all worthwhile.

Life is pretty good.

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Chapter One

Introduction

On March 24, 1995, the Commandant promulgated his formal “Program to Improve Marine

Corps Intelligence” (here after referred to collectively as the “Intel Plan”).1 This watershed

policy change marks the beginning of the modern Marine Corps Intelligence Officer. Spurred

on by the post Cold War realities and, more poignantly, by the purported failure of Marine

Corps Intelligence in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the future of Marine Corps

Intelligence was analyzed in various Marine Corps fora. The result of several service flag level

studies, and with the input from other studies and reviews conducted outside the Marine Corps,

was a fundamental revision of Marine Corps Intelligence.2

The Intel Plan highlighted six specific deficiencies for specific programmed improvements,

which spanned the breath of how we fight, how we are trained, organized and equipped.

Among these deficiencies was the lack of an Intelligence Officer Corps career progression. The

solution under the Intel Plan was to establish an accession based3, unrestricted officer structure,

rather than reliance on the historical mix of lateral move officers, (who were typically senior

Captains and Majors), and restricted officers, both Warrant Officers and Limited Duty Officers

(LDO). Four distinct entry-level officer disciplines were also defined for unrestricted

lieutenants with MOS training coming from established Army, Navy, and Marine Corps training

1 Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps message to ALMAR (All Marines) 100/95, subject “Plan To Improve Marine Corps Intelligence,” 240040Z Mar 95. 2 For a detailed review of specific panels and how the Intel Plan was formed, see Major Ronald Buikema, USMC, Integration of Intelligence into Professional Military Education, Masters of Military Studies Thesis (Quantico, Va: Marine Corps Command & Staff College, April, 1996), 6. 3 Accessioned based occupation fields are those that utilize entry level Marines (Privates for enlisted structures and 2nd lieutenants for officer structures) in sufficient numbers, and accounting for normal attritions, to fill higher billets over time. Lateral move occupation fields depend on an infusion of Marines who have previously served in other occupational fields, to be retrained and fill the structure requirements. Lateral move

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programs. Upon selection to Captain, and augmented, each officer is returned to school for

further training, ultimately resulting in redesignation as MOS 0202, MAGTF Intelligence

Officer. Although various intelligence community training and education is made available to

intelligence officers, no further formal intelligence schools are required.4

Since the Intel Plan was initiated in 1995, both the Marine Corps and intelligence officer

training has evolved. OMFTS and its derivative supporting concept papers, sketch out the

future of the Marine Corps. OMFTS is also defining, either specifically or implicitly, the

operational intelligence requirements which future Intelligence Officers must strive to match.

Over the last two years intelligence officer training has been revised and improved in response

to FMF concerns. However, the review has not been holistic, but one narrowed to addressing

the identified deficiencies of a particular entry-level officer program.

It has been 7 years since the inception of the Intel Plan and 5 years since the implementation

of the intelligence training program. At this point, it is appropriate to conduct a relook at the

Intel Plan’s intelligence training program, and if necessary, advocate the issuing of additional

policy. A review of formal intelligence officer training is needed to determine if adequate

training is programmed over the course of the Intelligence professional’s career. Additionally, a

review is needed in order to position the intelligence officer to keep pace with the future

operational environment envisioned in OMFTS.

I propose to study the Marine Corps Intelligence Officer formal training program. The study

will begin with the concept of Intelligence Officer training as outlined in the Intel Plan and will

trace the current formal intelligence officer training plan. This study will also examine OMFTS

to draw out the tasks that Intelligence Officers will be required to accomplish in order to support

occupation fields generally seek Marines entering their second enlistment contract (4-6 years), or for officers, those officers with 4-8 years in service.

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the concept as presently envisioned. Finally, I will offer recommendations for appropriate

changes in officer training. The author acknowledges that the current intelligence officer

training program has made significant and durable improvements to Marine Corps Intelligence

Officer Training. However, intelligence community discourse and comments from the Fleet

Marine Force reflects a level of concern in the content and frequency of intelligence training.

Through the above approach, I intend to address the fundamental question of whether the

current intelligence officer career progression training program creates the best trained

intelligence officer to meet both today’s challenges and those envisioned under OMFTS.

4 ALMAR 100/95 delineates the formal MOS training for Intelligence Officers as entry-level (Lieutenants) and a career-level school (augmented Captain selects and Captains). No other intelligence training is mandated.

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Chapter Two

Background: Intelligence Training under the Intel Plan

In April 1993, responding to congressional direction, the Marine Corps provided the

Senate Armed Services Committee with an "Intelligence Roadmap" addressing present

deficiencies, current efforts and future plans to improve our intelligence capabilities.5 The

"Intelligence Roadmap" committed the Marine Corps' leadership to finalizing studies and

analyses regarding the current condition of capabilities and resources. The Roadmap also

affirmed the Marine Corps commitment to take appropriate action to correct deficiencies and

improve intelligence capabilities consistent with the Marine Corps' future direction. The 1993

Intelligence Study Group and the Mission Area Analysis 12 (Intelligence) draft final report of

12 January 1994 defined critical shortfalls in the Intelligence Mission Area. As a result, the

Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC) directed the development of a plan to

address the six fundamental intelligence deficiencies. The identified deficiencies were:

1) Inadequate Doctrinal Foundation

2) No Defined Career Progression for Intelligence Officers

3) Insufficient Tactical Intelligence Support

4) Insufficient Joint Manning

5) Insufficient Language capability

6) Inadequate Imagery Capability

5 Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps letter to Senator Nunn, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, 7000/C4I 30 April 1993. This letter forwarded the United States Marine Corps Intelligence Roadmap 1993-1998 to the Committee on Armed Services. A copy of the letter and document was also provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Armed Services Committee, the House Appropriations Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

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On 2 March 1994 the ESG approved the basic plan and directed its implementation.6 In FY95

the Marine Corps began a 4-year phased increase of Intelligence structure growth by 16 Officer

and 353 Enlisted billets.7 The Intelligence Officer structure was changed to phase out reliance

on unrestricted lateral move officers and restricted (limited duty) officers and shifted to a

accession based, unrestricted officer program. The goal was to develop “multidisciplined

MAGTF intelligence officers”8 who are “trained and experienced intelligence leaders and

managers.”9 The 02 Officer Marine Occupational Specialty (MOS) was redefined as follows:

Unrestricted Officers

0202 MAGTF Intelligence Officer

0203 Ground Intelligence Officer

0204 Human Source Intelligence Officer

0206 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)/Ground Electronic

Warfare (EW) Officer

0207 Aviation Intelligence Officer

Restricted Officers

0210 Counterintelligence Officer (Warrant Officer)

2602 SIGINT/EW Officer

The Officer career track was reformed to include reliance on direct accession of Lieutenants

into 4 entry tracks (ground, air, SIGINT, HUMINT). Under the Intelligence Plan, lieutenants

would be accessed from The Basic School (TBS) under one of the four entry-level intelligence

officer programs (0203, 0204, 0206, or 0207). After completion of their initial FMF tour, and

6 ALMAR 100/95. 7 Assistant Chief of Staff Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) letter to Commanding General Marine Corps Combat Development Command 5000/C4I, subject: “Implementation of the Intelligence Plan,” 22 March 1994. 8 C4I Staff, HQMC, “The Future of Marine Corps Intelligence,” Marine Corps Gazette, April 1995, 27. 9 MGen P.K. Van Riper AC/S C4I, HQMC, “The Future of Marine Corps Intelligence: Rekindling an Operational Art,” briefing presented to the ESG, HQMC, Washington, DC, 2 March 1994.

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upon augmentation and selection for Captain, the officer would attend the MAGTF Intelligence

Officer Course (MIOC).10 This follow-on MOS training, at the 4-8 years of service point, is

programmed for unrestricted intelligence officers under the Intel Plan.11 Completion of MIOC

results in officer’s redesignation as a primary 0202 while his initial 020x MOS is retained as his

additional MOS (AMOS). Figure 1 illustrates the present 02 MOS training progression.

Following MIOC, the intelligence officer does not receive any formal programmed

intelligence training or education. Intelligence training for specific skills is available, and in

many instances funded by HQMC. However, this training is normally focused on requirements

linked to a specific billet. Several Intelligence educational programs, such as the Director of

National Security Fellowship program, Junior Officer Consolidated Cryptologic Program

(JOCCP), and the Director of Central Intelligence Exceptional Intelligence Analyst Program,

are available to develop mid range and senior intelligence officer skills, however, only one

officer per year attends these programs. Selection to the DCI EIAP is very competitive and may

or may not accept the service’s nominee. For the vast majority of intelligence officers, MIOC

is the last formal programmed school they attend.

10 ALMAR 100/95. 11 I will not address restricted officer (0210) training in this study for two essential reasons. First, restricted officers are, by definition, technicians and appropriately focused on developing a high level of skill in a relatively narrow field of intelligence. Restricted officers are not, under normal circumstances, called upon to function as Intelligence Officers and charged with orchestrating the intelligence cycle. Second, they are relatively few in number and in proportion to the total intelligence occupational field structure. Total intelligence officer structure (FY00) numbers 806 billets that include only 50 MOS 0210 Counterintelligence Warrant officers, and 30 MOS 2602 SIGINT/EW Warrant Officer billets.

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Chapter Three

Today’s Intelligence Officer Training Program The present intelligence officer training program consists of formal MOS (Military

Occupational Specialty) and non-MOS producing schools. These schools, in addition to Marine

Corps Professional Military Education (PME) and personal professional reading, constitute the

scope of the intelligence officer’s skill development. The sum total of intelligence training and

education, intertwined with operating force and real world exposure to various aspects of

intelligence, accumulates with each assignment and forms the basis of the officer’s experience

level.

MOS schools are training programs dedicated to imparting a level of skill development to

their students from which they can develop higher knowledge and understanding. Training

programs are generally prescriptive in nature and are fundamental to entry-level training.

Students exposed to a topic of study for the first time require basic information and foundational

concepts in order to create a working knowledge of the discipline. After working in an area

over a period of time, the student is able to take the newly introduced information and progress

to a level of knowledge and understanding. MOS school curriculum generally revolves around

the question of “how.” For example, how to operate a specific system, or piece of equipment;

how to establish an operating network of system; what the standing procedures are and how to

employ them; how to build a reconnaissance and surveillance plan; how to plot enemy order of

battle using geographic coordinates; or how to conduct an intelligence briefing. The present

intelligence officer entry-level MOS schools are oriented primarily as training programs.

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Education seeks to empower the student to develop critical thinking skills and reason

through a problem. Critical thinking can be enhanced if the student has the ability to draw on

the lessons of previous experiences. Years of work in a discipline provide the officer with a

detailed level of understanding of his MOS and the experiences over time to be an effective

critical thinker. Prescriptive training is required throughout a career in order to keep up with

changing technologies and systems; however, the frequency is less over time. Accordingly, the

requirement for prescriptive schooling is greatest at the beginning of a career and decreases over

time. Conversely, descriptive education becomes more effective after a level of experience is

achieved. As I will show, the intelligence field lacks mandatory intelligence education

programs.

The Marine Corps PME program is reflective of this progression. The Basic School (TBS)

is a prescriptive school designed to present the second lieutenant with the foundational level of

information about the Marine Corps necessary to function as an officer. The officer’s entry-

level MOS school is similarly prescriptive in nature, and is focused on fundamentals and the

company grade level skills pertinent to that occupational specialty. During an officer’s PME, he

receives more prescriptive type training early in his career (TBS for Lieutenants and Career

level School (CLS) for Captains) with a lesser degree of descriptive education. As time goes on

and experience is gained, the officer receives and increasingly descriptive education

(Intermediate Level School (ILS) for Majors, and Top Level School (TLS) for Lieutenant

Colonels and Colonels) while the prescriptive training aspect of schooling decreases. However,

throughout an officer’s career, non-MOS producing prescriptive training continue to be an

important aspect of keeping up with developments in equipment, systems and policies.

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I. Entry Level Training

Of the four entry-level intelligence MOSs under the Intel Plan, three of them (0203, 0204,

0207) were new to the Marine Corps. To start up the new intelligence officer training programs

quickly, the Marine Corps elected to utilize preexisting training courses for entry-level MOS

training.12 During the years since 1995, FMF feedback on officer MOS training identified

several common deficiencies, among them:

* Inadequate coverage of Marine Corps and MAGTF organization and capabilities.

* Inadequate coverage of Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) or the Rapid Reaction

Planning Process (R2P2).

* Inadequate coverage of Marine Corps intelligence capabilities and tactics, techniques, and

procedures.

* The joint class environment (where the Marine Corps is the minority in a sister service

training program) officers were obligated to learn too much about the other service’s

intelligence training to the detriment of not being instructed on fundamentals required of them

when they arrive in a Marine unit.13

The collective result is that each of the entry training programs has been, or is in the process of

being, revised to more closely meet the training requirements of the FMF. Figure 1 shows to

current intelligence officer career progression from entry level to MIOC.

12 MGen P.K. Van Riper AC/S C4I, HQMC, “The Future of Marine Corps Intelligence: Rekindling an Operational Art,” briefing presented to the ESG, HQMC, Washington, DC, 2 March 1994 and AC/S C4I letter to CG MCCDC 5000/C4I, subject: “Implementation of the Intelligence Plan,” 22 March 1994. 13 Author’s notes from Marine Corps Intelligence Training Counsel (MCITC) Conference 7-9 April 1998.

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A. MOS 0203 Ground Intelligence Officer Training

Under the Intel Plan, the 0203s MOS track initially consisted of the Infantry Officer Course

(IOC) for 10 weeks (Infantry Officer School, TBS) and then Military Intelligence Officer Basic

Course (MIOBC) for 19 weeks (U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), Ft Huachuca,

Arizona). MIOBC was selected for essentially two reasons. First, MIOBC was an established

course that generally addressed the broader ground intelligence training requirement of USMC

Ground Intelligence Officers. Second, the training already existed and, therefore, was a cost

effective option readily available to quickly initiate the new MOS.14 The option of having

MCCDC T&E develop and start a 0203 curriculum within an existing Marine Corps school was

not pursued because of the cost and long delay in school startup. The cost to the Marine Corps

for participation in MIOBC, other than the purchase of the school seats, was two instructors

(Captain 0202).15

FMF feedback on MIOBC indicated that the course did not adequately prepare the 0203 for

his MOS16. On MCCDC T&E established the Ground Intelligence Officer Course (GIOC) at

the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC), Dam Neck, VA. GIOC

commenced its first course in January 2000.17 The April 1998 Marine Corps Intelligence

Training Council (MCITC) conference also established the requirement for 0203s to formally

14 MGen P.K. Van Riper AC/S C4I, HQMC, “The Future of Marine Corps Intelligence: Rekindling an Operational Art,” briefing presented to the ESG, HQMC, Washington, DC, 2 March 1994. 15 Http://138.156.112.14/TFSD/TFSD.HTML Table of Organization 5050 16 The inadequacy of 0203 training was formally voiced at the 1998 Ground Commander Conference (CG SECOND MARDIV 101400Z MAR 98 message subject: Ground Combat Element Conference After Action Report. Para 2 e. MOS 0203 Training. Note that this message was coordinated between all four divisions) and during the Marine Corps Intelligence Training Council Conference (7-9 April 1998). Head, Standards Branch, T&E Div MCCDC letter to Head, Joint and Interservice Training Branch T&E Div MCCDC, 1500/C 461, subject: “Military Intelligence Officer Basic course (MIOBC) Deficiencies,” 9 June 1998 documents a comprehensive review of MIOBC and established that the course satisfied only 11 of 43 MOS 0203 Individual Training Standards (ITS). Ultimately, MCCDC T&E and USAIC could not reconcile the deficiencies. On June 28, 1999 MCCDC T&E formally notified USAIC of the discontinuance of USMC participation at MIOBC. 17 Navy Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center Desktop guide to Intelligence Training, http//www.cnet.navy.mil/nmitc/dgit/marine_active/mactive_frame.html.

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receive sniper officer employment training. Previously, many 0203 officers received an

informal sniper officer employment course (which was the first several days of the enlisted

advanced sniper course training package), adapted from Weapons Training Battalion’s Scout

Sniper School. This training varied in length and quality and was provided to the lieutenants on

a not to interfere basis if the officer had time between TBS graduation and his reporting date for

MIOBC. The 0203 training track is now IOC (10 weeks), followed by Scout Sniper Platoon

Commander’s course (2 weeks) and then GIOC (11 weeks).18 GIOC provides the 0203 with a

wide range of instruction.19

B. MOS 0204 Human Resource Intelligence Officer Training

Training for MOS 0204 was achieved by adding seats to the existing 17.5-week Marine

Corps MAGTF Counterintelligence (CI) course taught at the NMITC. This course is also the

MOS awarding course for enlisted MOS 0211 Counterintelligence Specialists and is, when

required, MOS training for MOS 0210 CI Warrant Officers.20 MAGTF CI is a Marine Corps

course taught by Marine CI and Interrogator-Translator personnel. The course teaches

CI/HUMINT roles, functions and operations in support of the MAGTF; national, DoD and

organic Marine Corps intelligence assets and how CI supports the intelligence cycle. The

course also provides instruction on hostile threat posed against U.S. interests, CI/HUMINT

Operations, photography and digital imaging, CI/HUMINT automated Transmission system

(CHATS), interrogation techniques, investigations, interview skill and report writing, and

18 Marine Corps Order P1200.7T, Military Occupational Specialty Manual (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, May 1999), 5. 19 NMITC Desktop Guide to Intelligence Training, http//www.cnet.navy.mil/nmitc/dgit/ marine_active /mactive_frame.html. GIOC training consists of training in Intelligence disciplines; Intelligence cycle; Briefing skills; National, theater and Marine Corps and MAGTF intelligence structures; Intelligence analysis; Threat weapons, equipment, organization, doctrine and tactics; Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace; Tactical intelligence systems; National, theater, and MAGTF intelligence collection assets; Collections planning and management; Reconnaissance and surveillance planning; MCPP; R2P2; Intelligence support to MOOTW; Terrorism and intelligence support to antiterrorism; Intelligence support to force protection; and Garrison intelligence operations. 20 MCO P1200.7T, 6.

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certifies the student as a Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Level one instructor.21 This

course has not been significantly revised since the Intel Plan, but needs to be examined once the

T&R manual standards have been incorporated.22

The chief issue with this course is the mixed enlisted-officer course and focus of the

instruction. MAGTF CI trains the 0204 lieutenant along side with the 0211s. The 0204s are

provided with additional instruction during the training that focuses them on their future role as

Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence (CI/HUMINT) leaders and managers. Although

NMITC makes efforts to provide the 0204s additional training and mentoring as to their role in

managing and coordinating CI and Interrogator-translator support, the officers are being

primarily trained to perform as enlisted CI specialists. They do not receive tailored instruction

focused to their role as leaders and coordinators while de-emphasizing skill development to

function as enlisted CI specialist.23 The 02 T&R manual has more clearly delineated the

difference in training requirement between 0204, 0210, and 0211 and should result in better

defined requirements for the MAGTF CI course. However, the logical next step of breaking out

0204 training from 0211 training has not occurred.

C. MOS 0206 SIGINT/EW Intelligence Officer Training

This MOS existed prior to the Intel Plan as primary MOS 2602 for both unrestricted and

restricted officers. Within the Intel Plan the MOS was changed to 0206 and aligned as only an

entry-level unrestricted MOS. MOS 2602 was retained as the designation for restricted warrant

officers. Following TBS, Lieutenants attend the Cryptologic Division Officers Course (CDOC)

21 NMITC Desktop Guide to Intelligence Training, http//www.cnet.navy.mil/nmitc/dgit/ marine_active/mactive_frame.html. 22 Author’s notes as 02 Occupation Field Sponsor, HQMC during 0204/0210 T&R Manual Subject Matter Expert conference January 1998. 23 Interview with LtCol R.H. Irvine, HQMC, Head, Counterintelligence Branch, 14 January 2000. Marine Corps Intelligence G2 and Commander’s Conference, Marine Corps Intelligence Plan Update, brief on July 8, 1999. Mr. M.H. Decker, DAC/S Intelligence, HQMC, briefed a “work in progress” was to monitor the health of the 0204 population and to determine if 0204 PMOS training was appropriate. Additionally, other senior intelligence officers have expressed similar views. Author’s notes as the 02 Occupation Field Sponsor, HQMC.

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taught at the Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC), Correy Station, Pensacola, Florida (19

weeks). CDOC is a Navy administered course, attended by Navy Cryptologic and USMC 0206

officers. Prior to 1996, following TBS the 0206s attended the Basic Communications Officer

Course (BCOC), the Marine Corps’ MOS producing school for Communication Officers, and

then attended CDOC. MOS 0206 attendance of BCOC was discontinued and a communications

instruction package was established at Pensacola along with the creation of a billet for a

Captain, Communications Officer instructor. The 0206s received the communications

instruction concurrently with CDOC instruction, but the effectiveness of the instruction suffered

greatly from a lack of focus on developing communications skills and from a lack organic

Marine Corps equipment to train with. The FMF also voiced concerns that the 0206s were not

instructed on Marine Corps organic intelligence capabilities and limitations, MCPP, and R2P2.

These were similar to concerns voiced by the FMF about 0203 training at MIOBC.24

Since the completion of the 26 Occupation field Training & Readiness Manual in September

1999, HQMC C4I/CIRP and MCCDC T&E have determined that CDOC accomplishes only

50% of the 0206 entry-level (100 level) training requirements. Many of the deficiencies were

related to the ineffective communications training embedded in CDOC.25 Improving the

communications package to the desired level is plagued by significant difficulty in sourcing and

maintaining the requisite communications equipment. A proposed solution is to create a short

communications course (estimated at not more than 5 weeks) at the Marine Corps Command

and Control Systems School, Quantico, VA, to fill the training void. HQMC plans to make this

proposal to MCCDC T&E during March 2000.26 Other deficiencies in Marine SIGINT/EW

24 Agenda item at the MCITC conference April, 1998. 25 Major Mark D. Knuth, 2600 Occupation Field Specialist at HQMC C4I, interviewed by author February 25, 2000. 26 Major Knuth, interview by author February 25, 2000. Reversion to sending 0206s to BCOC is not a viable option. When the Communications Officers (2502) was merged with Data Processing Officers (4002) to form MOS 0602 Communication Information Systems Officer, BCOC was converted to a much longer, 0602 Communication Information Systems Officer course (23 weeks).

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training requirements, such as identifying communications gear for training and defining who

will maintain that communications equipment, are pending reconciliation between with NTTC

Correy Station, Naval Education and Training (CNET), and MCCDC T&E.

D. MOS 0207 Aviation Intelligence Officer Training

This is a new intelligence officer MOS created under the Intel Plan. MOS 0207 officers are

accessed from TBS and attend the Naval Intelligence Officer Basic Course (NIOBC) at NMITC

jointly with USN intelligence officers. NIOBC is the Navy’s sole entry-level intelligence officer

course and is, at present, 23 weeks long. The 0207s participate in 19 weeks of NIOBC. Many

of the same complaints of the deficiencies of 0203 and 0206 training were also voiced by the

FMF regarding NIOBC.27 Concurrent with the Navy’s revision of the course in February 1999,

the Marine Corps coordinated changes to the NIOBC curriculum that greatly addressed the

deficiencies. Because of the multitude of diverse entry-level assignments for Navy Intelligence

officers (carrier, flying squadron, joint, amphibious force, etc.) the Navy was faced with

preparing the officer for assignments that required differing skill sets. To address the need for

special training linked to the assignment of the officer, the Navy adopted a “core and strand”

approach to training.28 The common intelligence requirements would be taught in blocks of

instruction that constitute the “core” level. Instruction tailored to the officer’s future assignment

would be provided in specialized blocks of tailored instruction as a “strand.” Under this

concept, the Marine Corps established a Marine Corps Aviation “strand” which is planned to

commence during FY00. The 0207 strand and Marine Corps unique training days total 10.5

days of the 19-week course. Although NIOBC is greatly improved with the addition of the

27 Author’s notes as 02 Occupational Field Sponsor, HQMC at Marine Corps Intelligence Training Counsel (MCITC) Conference, 7-9 April 1998.

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strand, the Navy is poised to lengthen the course beyond 23 weeks to cover more of their

training requirements.29 Should this occur, it would be very difficult to reconcile the length of

the core curriculum and still include the USMC strand while remaining at 19-weeks or less.

The Marine Corps cannot support a NIOBC of over 19-weeks for Marine Corps students as this

would constitute the excessive cost of a PCS move for each student.

II. Post Entry-Level Training

Post entry-level training is formal training required of all intelligence officers.

A. MOS 0202 MAGTF Intelligence Officer Training

The MAGTF Intelligence Officer Course (MIOC) 0202 is unique within the Marine Corps in

that no other MOS brings its officers back in to a formal school environment at the captain

level. Prior to the Intel Plan, the 0202 course was designed as an entry-level course. In 1995-

1996 NMITC revised the curriculum to meet the requirement of the Intel Plan. MIOC is a 17-

week course designed to transition entry-level intelligence officer to be a MAGTF Intelligence

Officer. MIOC focuses on developing the skills to support the commander in a MAGTF and

joint environment. MIOC employs a mix of prescriptive and descriptive techniques to cover a

wide range of topics to include: the Nature of War, service and joint intelligence doctrine,

intelligence briefing and writing, IPB, MCPP, R2P2, the intelligence cycle, systems architecture

and dissemination. MIOC also provides training on the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support

System (JDISS) and Special Security Officer (SSO) training.30

28 Director, Marine Corps Intelligence Training (N3), NMITC letter to CMC (Code C4I/CRP), subject: “Discussion topics/Position Papers for Marine Corps Intelligence Training Council (7-9 April 1998),” 21 March 1997. 29 Author’s notes as 02 Occupational Field Sponsor, HQMC at NIOBC CCRB as member of the Executive Steering Committee, February 1999. 30 NMITC Desktop guide to Intelligence Training http//www.cnet.navy.mil/nmitc/dgit/ marine_active/Mactive_frame.html.

17

Operating force comments about MIOC have been positive. However, detracting comments

have increased largely due to the relatively high proportion of lateral move officers in the course

and the need to “water down” the curriculum. Additionally, operating force comments have

indicated that the current eligibility for MIOC (Captain select) is too inexperienced to fully

benefit from the curriculum.31 Several operating force comments are that officers should not

attend MIOC until they have completed two tours in their entry-level MOS. Such an argument

contends that two tours in the entry-level MOS will solidify the officer’s skills in that discipline,

particularly if the officer has one tour in the operating force and the second assignment in an

external, theater, national or intelligence agency assignment.32 In other words, the increased

proportion of inexperienced lateral move officers has necessitated a migration to a more

fundamental intelligence training approach vice the intended intelligence education program.

B. Mid-Career or Senior Intelligence Officer Course

MIOC is the last formal intelligence course that each intelligence officer is required to attend

as part of career progression. The Marine Corps does not have a required program of

instruction at more senior levels, but some officers do take advantage of several courses such as

the Naval Intelligence Mid-Career course (NIMCC), NMITC and the Senior Intelligence

Officer Course (SIOC), Defense Intelligence Agency. Only 2-3 quotas of the SIOC are

available annually. NIMCC, held at NMITC, is a two-week symposium designed to provide

mid-level intelligence officers with national level perspective of issues, emergent technologies

and ideas. It is open to all service and Department of the Navy (DoN) civilian intelligence

professionals 0-4/0-5, E7 and above, and GS-12 and above. Guest speakers provide joint

31 LtCol E. M. Walters, Director Marine Corps Intelligence Training (N3), NMITC, briefing to Mr. Decker, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, HQMC on MIOC Class 99-1 Composition”, January 1999. 32 MCITC conference (April 1998) discussion item. Additionally, recent emails from CO 2d Radio Bn and CO Marine Support Battalion commented in support of additional time in the operating forces prior to MIOC..

18

warfighting, and fleet perspectives, as well as, discussion on professional development, budgets,

manpower and other issues related to the Navy intelligence community.33

NMITC also offers the two-week Naval Intelligence Officer Senior Course (NIOSC)

intended for Commanders (0-5) returning to sea duty. The focus of this course is on refreshing

Naval intelligence officers for operational level staff N2, or Carrier Intelligence Center (CVIC))

intelligence assignments. NIOSC provides a level of training, but also is designed to provide a

mentoring environment where the student is paired with a past or present N2/CVIC OIC. This

course is similar in concept to the Marine Corps’ Advanced Communication Information

Systems (ACIS) course were 0602 field grade officers receive 2-weeks of formal training on

current communications topics in order to optimize the effectiveness of MAGTF G-6 officers.34

C. Non-MOS Producing Schools

Formalized non-MOS producing training and education is available. Non-MOS schools are

critical to developing additional intelligence skills or as prerequisites for assignment to certain

billets. The MOS manual and 02 T&R manual each identify skill progression training.

Although the T&R manual links some non-MOS producing training to a billet assignment, the

general progression of the officer’s skills is left to his own initiative. Appendix A contains a list

of non-MOS schools.

34 NMITC Desktop guide to Intelligence Training http//www.cnet.navy.mil/nmitc/dgit /navy_active/nactive_frame.html.

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Chapter Four I. Is Intelligence Ready to drive OMFTS?

In the post Cold War era and following DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the

Marine Corps embarked on a debate to define and ready itself to be relevant in the future world

environment. “From the Sea” and “Forward. . . From the Sea,” laid the foundation for

development of future naval expeditionary forces for joint and multinational operations in the

littorals. In 1996 the Marine Corps published its’ operational concept for the future,

Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS). OMFTS sets forth operational tenants against a

backdrop of an increasingly turbulent and volatile world captured in the concept of “chaos in

the littorals.”35 Since the unveiling of OMFTS, several supporting concepts have been

published. Concurrently, General Krulak issued a call for a professional discourse that would

rigorously examine not only OMFTS and its supporting concepts, but how Marine Corps

functional areas need to adapt in order to meet the challenges of OMFTS.36 OMFTS;

Focuses on an operational objective. Uses the sea as maneuver space. Generates overwhelming tempo and momentum. Pits strengths against weakness. Emphasizes intelligence, deceptions and flexibility. Integrates all organic, joint, and combined assets.37

The OMFTS concept paper specifically states the impact of the concept upon

intelligence.

The key to effective intelligence support of OMFTS, lies in the orientation of intelligence specialists. In particular, intelligence specialists must be capable of rapidly making educated judgments about what the enemy is likely to do.38

35 United States Marine Corps, Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command PCN 145 000001 00,1996), 3. 36 OMFTS, 2. 37 OMFTS, 11. 38 OMFTS, 24.

20

Although OMFTS set a broad course for the Marine Corps to follow, it does not contain

a definitive route to get there. As stated in OMFTS, “the purpose of this concept paper is to

begin this process of proposal, debate, and experimentation.”39 The purpose of this chapter is to

examine OMFTS from the perspective of intelligence to understand and define the intelligence

training requirements to support OMFTS.

OMFTS evolved from a view of the future operational environment characterized as that

of “both danger and opportunity.”40 The concept of danger is further characterized within the

phrase “chaos in the littorals” which refers to increasingly urbanized, highly concentrated

populations in coastal areas; increased numbers of economically failing states, the rise of non-

state actors or rogue states, within an atmosphere of nationalism, ethnic conflict, exploding

populations, and religious intolerance.41 The Marine Corps Mid-Range Threat Estimate 1995-

2005, which was the service estimate of the future operating environment published just prior to

the publication of OMTFS judged the key factors of future conflicts as nationalism, ideology,

competition, demographics, ungovernability and technological acceleration. 42 Joint Vision

2010 addresses potential adversaries noting that access to advanced weapons technology,

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the ability to employ these capabilities will increase

the number of adversaries who can upset regional balances of power and seek to confront the

United States asymmetrically.43 Having a conceptual understanding of those factors which

influence regional conflict will provide the intelligence officer the intellectual basis from which

to provide effective intelligence assessments to the commander.

39 OMFTS, 2. 40 OMFTS, 1. 41 Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) Marine Corps Midrange Threat Estimate 1997-2007: Finding Order in Chaos. (Quantico, VA: MCIA 1586-001-97. 42 MCIA, Threats in Transition, Marine Corps Mid-Range Threat Estimate, 1995-2005 (Quantico, VA: MCIA 1570-001-95), 1. 43 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, DC),10..

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OMFTS also cites “opportunity,” which is reflective of technological advances in

information management, battlefield mobility, and the lethality of weapons, as a key element of

the future operating environment. In total, this estimate of future conflict will have a singular

impact on “where we fight, who we fight, and how we fight.”44

II. Intelligence Tasks inherent to OMFTS

The following is OMFTS’s stated required intelligence capability:

The high tempo of operations essential to successful OMFTS requires that intelligence be provided to decision makers with a minimum of delay. Technology that permits the rapid dissemination of intelligence products will play an important role in this effort. However, a key to effective intelligence support of OMFTS, lies in the orientation of intelligence specialists. In particular, intelligence specialists must be capable of rapidly making educated judgments about what the enemy is likely to do.(emphasis added)45

High tempo of operations...that intelligence be provided to decision makers with a

minimum of delay. To enable high tempo operations, decision makers must have timely

intelligence of the environment, the enemy and weather conditions. Conceptually, this is what

intelligence officers are charged with providing today. However, within OMFTS, the scale of

the requirement will increase dramatically.46 OMFTS allows for multiple, widely dispersed

(potentially hundreds of miles) Littoral Penetration Areas (LPA), each with multiple Littoral

Penetration Points (LPP), requiring intelligence to expend effort and limited assets to assess

each point.47 The intelligence analyst must efficiently and effectively orchestrate relevant and

timely intelligence. To meet the challenge of OMFTS, the intelligence function will require

new or updated doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and supporting facilities (DOTES).

44 OMFTS, 2. 45 OMFTS, 24. 46 LtGen Carlton W. Fulford, Col Kent D.Keobke, and Mr. Jason M. Williams, “Organizing Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Forces for Tomorrow,” Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1999): 25-27.

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Of these elements of DOTES, the area provided the least scrutiny is training. The adequacy of

intelligence training will have a tremendous impact on the skills of intelligence professionals to

provide the commander with the accurate and timely intelligence required to propel OMFTS.

Technology that permits the rapid dissemination of intelligence products. This

requirement speaks to intelligence’s capability to either create organically or coordinate non-

organic production of timely, tailored intelligence products and the Marine Corps’ ability to

move that intelligence product to the commander in a form that is relevant to his decision

making process. Intelligence officers will need not only to understand MAGTF CIS, but must

also be knowledgeable of the theater intelligence architecture in order to identify and shape an

intelligence dissemination network that is responsive to the commander’s requirement. The

intelligence officer must recognize and exploit reachback capabilities in order to augment his

organic intelligence collection, analysis, and production operations. He must also know how to

tap into critical intelligence expertise from across the Department of Defense, the Intelligence

Community, other U.S. government departments (Departments of Energy, State, Transportation,

Justice, etc.), or non-US government expertise in academia or the private sectors.

In addition, the intelligence officer must know how to operate these architectures while sea-

based or ashore, and when in a joint or combined environment.

Orientation of intelligence specialists. This requirement refers to the broad level of

intelligence skills that intelligence officers must possess in order to remain relevant in OMFTS.

Accordingly, the intelligence officer must understand, orchestrate, and exploit both organic and

joint intelligence resources and capabilities. He must be proficient in MCPP and the planning,

coordination and execution of intelligence operations in Marine Corps and joint intelligence

47 OMFTS, 17-18.

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operations, across the intelligence disciplines (SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT) and intelligence

functions (collection and RFI management, reconnaissance and surveillance, targeting, etc.).

Lastly, the intelligence officer must be proficient in analyzing the threat (conventional or

unconventional forces, WMD, counterdrug, etc.), determining its capability and making

assessments.

Rapidly making educated judgments. The analysis and judgments of what the enemy is

“likely to do” is perhaps the most difficult, and most important, aspect of the intelligence

officer’s responsibility to the commander.48 The complexity of gaining information and

building rapidly to knowledge and understanding of the extensive OMFTS operations area

while sea-based, is a difficult assignment.49 A precondition to making a sound judgment is the

availability of relevant information. That is, the intelligence architecture must facilitate the

control of collection assets, and the flow of information between the MAGTF and adjacent,

JTF, theater, joint or reachback site(s). Speed in the intelligence officer’s decision-making is a

function of having sufficient information with which to base a decision. Secondly, the

experience of the intelligence officer will play a large role in how rapidly he arrives at a critical

judgment regarding the enemy and what the enemy is likely to do. Formal training coupled

with experience contributes to the increased speed in which a well-reasoned judgment is made,

given a constant level of information. Experience will play a greater role in the officer’s ability

to arrive at a sound judgment.

The OMFTS Working Group (WG) report examined the OMFTS concept from the

perspective of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and identified several

critical intelligence capabilities. Following these overarching conclusions, the OMTFS WG

48 Major Harry E. Jones II, USA, “Closing the Intelligence Gap in the OMFTS Concept,” Military Intelligence, (January-March 1999), 33-49. 49 LtCol J.D. Williams and others, “A Concept for 21st Century Intelligence Operations,” unpublished research paper (31 July 1999).

24

offered recommendations organized according to each of the elements of the MAGTF. Of the

ten overarching concerns OMFTS WG identified for ISR, most were concerned with either the

collection systems or the system to manage that information. Two of the conclusions were

oriented on the human factors involve in OMFTS ISR. Specifically, one concern cites the

increasing volume of information and the need to effectively analyze that information.50 This

concern of the OMFTS WG advocates development of automated support tools and data

visualization tools to aid in analysis, but reinforces the central role of human intellect in the

analysis process. The second concern notes the increasing complexity of the intelligence

process and advocates that, “training and education systems must support the development of

intelligence specialist capable of exploiting the capabilities provided by new technology . . .”51

III. Conclusion

Since specific and detailed intelligence requirements for OMFTS are still undefined, the

supporting training institutions must remain flexible and adaptable to rapidly changing,

emerging requirements. What is clear is that the size of the maneuver area envisioned under

OMFTS will demand that intelligence provide detailed expeditionary intelligence on a number

of widely dispersed littoral penetration points, where as, historically, the challenge to

intelligence for expeditionary intelligence was focused to a narrower geographic area with

fewer littoral penetration points. Additionally, given the uncertainty of the future environment,

OMFTS puts stock in intelligence officers who make good estimates. Success of OMFTS

hinges on the intelligence estimate. Accordingly, measures to enhance the ability to provide

well reasoned and timely intelligence estimates will materially ensure that intelligence is

positioned to drive OMFTS.

50 OMFTS WG Final Report (July 1999), III-2. 51 OMFTS WG Final Report (July 1999), III-2

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Chapter Five I. Intelligence Officer Perspectives on Intelligence Officer Training

The strengths and weaknesses of our present intelligence training program as noted in

chapter 3, together with increased challenges to intelligence embodied within OMFTS form the

key factors in determining the adequacy of our training plan. Analysis of our present

intelligence training and OMFTS requirements illuminated several deficiencies and reinforced

previously identified strengths and weaknesses in the focus of intelligence training.

A survey of intelligence officers was conducted in order to further define, from the

occupation field perspective, the strengths and weaknesses of our current program. The survey

also was useful in formulating potential adjustments to the training. The intelligence training

questionnaire was constructed to solicit response by all intelligence officers, and was

electronically mailed to all sitting USMC operating force G2s and senior intelligence officers

currently in non-operating force assignments. The recipients were asked to forward the

questionnaire to the intelligence officers within their respective areas. A total of 32 responses

were received and were equally spread between Lieutenants, Captains, Majors, and Lieutenant

Colonels. One Colonel provided a response. The purpose of the questionnaire (Appendix B)

was to determine the opinion of intelligence officers regarding the state of intelligence training

with a particular view on the challenges of OMFTS. What follows is a summary of these

responses.

Question 1. How well does current 0203, 0204, 0206, 0207 training prepare the officer to

understand and develop expertise with basic classes of intelligence?

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Responses to this question followed a pattern where most of the respondents believed

that the basic encyclopedic and current intelligence training was at the “right amount” (67% and

56% respectively) with only 45% believing the emphasis on estimative intelligence as

appropriate. Correspondingly, 29% believed that basic intelligence required more emphasis,

44% believed current intelligence needed more attention, and 55% thought that estimative

intelligence required increased attention. In general, those surveyed were satisfied with the

officer’s skill in handling baseline research, but less sure that officers are skilled to adequately

handle the increased analysis germane to producing current and estimative intelligence. One

officer summed it up by saying;

We train our officers well in the knowledge and use of basic encyclopedic intelligence, however, we are still weak in the skills of presenting current intelligence and tying it all together to provide the estimative intelligence that is desired by the commanders we support. More emphasis needs to be placed on the questions, “So what?” and “What does it mean to me?” We must train our Marines to anticipate the questions and requirements of the operations personnel.

- 0202 Lieutenant Colonel

Further support to this observation is that amplifying comments for this question

typically responded that the officer needs a higher level of both critical thinking and writing

skills.

Question 2-5. How well does 0203(or 0204, 0206, 0207) training provide the officer with a

functional understanding of the other three entry level disciplines? These questions solicited

views on how well the designated 020x MOS producing school exposed the officer to the other

three intelligence MOSs. As noted in chapter three, operating forces have criticized the lack of

training exposure that the 020x MOSs received regarding the capabilities and limitations of

their sister intelligence MOSs. The responses validated this concern. For each MOS, those

surveyed the responses ranged from “not enough”, “need more”, or “right amount.” Responses

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reflected the deficiencies of 0203 MIOBC, 0206 CDOC and 0207 NIOBC as previously

outlined in chapter three. Although the responses were randomly spread between these three

values, more significantly, no one responded that the training they received on the sister MOSs

was “more than enough” or “too much.” Comments such as the following were typical.

In the initial training schools, other intelligence MOSs are barely glanced over. I did not know what I needed to know until I floated on a MEU and worked along side the other disciplines. We could have saved each other much wasted time and effort if we simply divided our duties according to what each is best at from the very beginning.

- 0206 Lieutenant Officers believe that training exposure to their sister intelligence MOSs would have a positive

impact on their ability to understand the role of all-source intelligence and provide better

intelligence support to the commander.

Question 6. How well does current 0202 training apportion training emphasis between the

strategic, operational and tactical levels of intelligence? In a similar pattern to the responses

to question 1, a clear majority (79%) responded that the “right amount” of weight was placed on

the strategic and operational level. However, only 43% believed that tactical intelligence

received the proper emphasis (“right amount”). More revealing is that 57% believed said that

we ”need more” emphasis on tactical intelligence.

Question 7. From your knowledge of OMFTS, how well does 0202 training prepare the

officer to function across the intelligence cycle? Does the training provide proper emphasis

on each step of the intelligence cycle? Those surveyed responded that the “right amount” of

emphasis was placed on direction (67%), planning (60%), and dissemination (60%).

Conversely, the greatest area of improvement where respondents indicated “not enough” or

“need more” were in processing/analysis (60%) and collection (57%). Only one officer

declared excessive training attention (“more than enough”) in any function. The strongest

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comments were expressed regarding lack of processing/analysis, production, and dissemination.

Although 60% thought that dissemination training was the “right amount,” one officer typified

those who believed that training was not adequate.

Officers checking into the FMF lack a clear understanding of how to track and disseminate intelligence products. We have reached the mindset where “it’s posted on the web page…” or “I sent you an e-mail” seems to be an acceptable answer for dissemination…NOT TRUE!!!

- 0202 Lieutenant Colonel

Regarding the lack of processing and analysis skills, one officer described the problem as,

Analytical capability starts in the schoolhouse. It continues are (at) every level along the career. If we cannot develop good analysts, then the intelligence (they produce), which is so vital, (will undermine sound) OMFTS decisions.

- 0202 Major The lack of critical thinking in analysis was a particular shortfall and a recurring comment.

Respondents remarked that development of analytical skills was lacking and too many officers

confused the use of analytical skills with the ability to search the web and download finished

intelligence products from theater or national intelligence organizations. Further, the

importance of cultivating officers with good analytical skills was critical to sorting through the

voluminous amounts of all-source information when providing timely and accurate estimative

intelligence.

Question 8. Do we emphasize intelligence systems and architecture training in a

disproportionately greater manner than focusing on the skills that essential to building a

timely and relevant intelligence product? Based upon your thoughts of the preceding

question, does the present training invest the right amount of time in making our officers

“system smart?” The responses to this question were divided. An equal number of those

surveyed said “not enough” emphasis was paid to systems training (two field grade officers,

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both Majors, one of which a sitting G2), as those who said we have “too much” emphasis on

systems training. The majority (61%) believed that more emphasis on systems is required (9%

“not enough” and 52% “need more”). However, the comments, whether in support of, or

against more systems training, reflected caution that officers become well versed in systems

capabilities, architectures and making the systems work to support the commander, vice

becoming a “systems administrator” or the duty “know everything systems expert.”

Question 9. Does training develop the right level of “regionally, culturally, and humint

smart” intelligence officer? The responses were nearly unanimously in favor (79%) of each

officer having this type of skill. Only 21% said that the training was the “right amount” and no

one said that present training was excessive. Several respondents also advocated that

intelligence officers should be required to obtain a language and exposure to cultures. In fact,

several recommended that each officer be required to learn a second language. Others

recommended that intelligence officers be routinely assigned to the Foreign Area Officer (FAO)

or Regional Area Officer (RAO) programs. Several commented that the benefit of language and

cultural expertise would manifest itself in a better skilled intelligence officer more able to

develop insightful estimates of what the threat is “likely to do.”

Question 10. Do you believe that we should have some type of intelligence structured

training program (TAD, Distance Education) for officers selected for senior field grade

officers? This question and question 11 are linked. All respondents said that they support the

requirement for senior intelligence officer training. The proposed training indicated in question

11 was overwhelmingly supported by 93% of the respondents. They agreed that the intelligence

field should have some type of field grade intelligence officer training program particularly for

officers returning to an operating forces assignment after 3-6 years in external billets. One

30

officer responded that he had attended the Naval Intelligence Mid-Career course (NIMCC) and

saw it as beneficial. Several comments did not see the notional senior intelligence officer

symposium’s meetings with the Marines assigned in the Washington area joint billets as

important. However, the respondents clearly supported (93%) the value of getting the most

recent views from HQMC senior leadership on the vision and current policies for Marine Corps

Intelligence, as well as, a refresher on doctrine, systems, and other issues.

Question 12. How well do you believe the present 0202 training prepares the officer to meet

the intelligence tasks associated with OMFTS? Each response, in general, was split between

“need more” and “right amount” for each of the 9 sub-categories. That is, officers across the

board said that they want more training or the training was at the correct emphasis. The

following received the greatest responses of “more than enough” or “too much” emphasis:

counterdrug (29%) and WMD (17%). The top 4 areas where officers believed training was

either “not enough” or “need more” are amphibious operations (73%), intelligence systems

(72%), analysis (71%), and MCPP (67%).

Question 13. In general, is the length of 020x training sufficient to produce a basically

trained officer? Most responded “right amount,” (0202 71%, 0203 80%, and 0207 75%),

although 0204 (45%) and 0206 (58%) received the most number of “need more” or “not

enough” training. An overriding concern was the officers were not well grounded in “core”

general military intelligence, the MAGTF and its employment, Marine Corps intelligence

collection capabilities and limitations, and MCPP. Concern was also raised that 0206 and 0207

receive too much exposure to USN cryptology and air intelligence to the detriment of learning

about Marine Corps SIGINT/EW and aviation intelligence.

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II. Findings

The responses to the questionnaire have identified a number of deficiencies in the

intelligence officer’s current skills. These deficiencies can be summarized as follows.

1. A lack of analysis and estimative intelligence skills. The strongest comments received were

regarding the lack of critical thinking and analytical skills capability of our officers.

Respondents thought both education programs and time in operating forces were the keys to

developing credible analytical expertise. They also believe that development of analytical skills

must be institutionally emphasized. LtCol Sofranac’s article “Data Mining and Intelligence

Outsourcing,” is reflective of the sentiment of the respondents when he argues that not enough

time is spent on the quality of the content of intelligence analysis. He further comments on the

importance of intelligence analysis skills by stating they are critical and “can not be supplanted

by mechanical or information technology searches.”52 Capt Paul Shelton’s “Frontline

Intelligence for the 21st Century” also notes the decline in emphasis on intelligence analysis;

As our capabilities to collect information increased, we lost the art of focusing on the critical and spread our net wider and wider, eventually outstripping our ability to analyze collected information. Soon the mere storing of information in databases began to displace analysis as a key function of intelligence.53

Reviving the development of analytical skills is a key deficiency that must be addressed.

2. Inefficient and lengthy entry-level intelligence training. Not enough emphasis was placed

on coordinating within each entry-level 020x officer training program standardized exposure to

the other three lieutenant MOS disciplines. Further, each entry-level training course did not

incorporate common general military intelligence curriculum. Common core intelligence

training would ensure common intelligence officer development and would result in greater

52 LtCol Paul Sofranac USMC, “Data Mining and Intelligence Outsourcing,” Marine Corps Gazette (March 1999): 45-46.

32

cohesion when working in the operating forces. The respondents generally wanted more

training included in the entry-level programs, but at the same time saw a need to reduce the

overall course length of entry-level training. Respondents believed that the 020x course lengths

were artificially longer than required in order to cover sister-service training requirements.

Additionally, a consensus of respondents believed the existing curriculum is also diluted to meet

priority training requirements of the lead sister service school. Specifically, from a USMC

perspective, NIOBC and CDOC are longer than required because of the need to cover USN

unique intelligence officer training requirements. Similarly, the MAGTF CI course is longer

than required, from a MOS 0204 perspective; because of the detailed CI skill set development

required for MOS 0211. Efficiencies in both time and money could be realized should the

Marine Corps decide not to train with the Navy in CDOC and NIOBC. The courses could be

shortened much in the same way the 0203 training track length was reduced by leaving MIOBC

at Ft Huachuca and establishing GIOC at NMITC.54

3. A lack of regional and cultural expertise. The preponderance of those surveyed (79%)

believed that more emphasis is required to develop intelligence officers with regional and

cultural skills. Respondents viewed an officer’s first hand exposure to foreign cultures as

critical to providing meaningful intelligence estimates and current intelligence analysis.

Additionally, many advocated that each officer be required to obtain a foreign language with

the belief that it would also enhance the officer’s ability to develop accurate, meaningful, and

timely estimative intelligence. In his discussion of “Non-Traditional Military Missions,”

General Anthony C. Zinni’s comments dovetail well with the survey results. Specifically, he

provides a compelling discussion, from a commander’s perspective, of the importance of

53 Captain Paul Shelton USMC, “Frontline Intelligence for the 21st Century,” Marine Corps Gazette (September, 1996): 32-33.

33

understanding the dynamic of cultural intelligence in intelligence analysis.55 Survey

respondents supported programs that provided for language training or regional area expertise.

4. A lack of formal intelligence training and education for mid and senior-level intelligence

officers. All respondents agreed that a need exists for mandatory field grade officer training

and education to correct the present training and education void. The existing NIMCC is not a

mandatory course for field grade officers. However, if it where, it is not tailored to Marine

Intelligence Officer needs and presently only offers a limited return for the time invested. A

proposal for a mid and senior level intelligence officer symposium, sponsored by HQMC,

received overwhelming support (93%). This notional program would address the lack of

refresher training and education for officers returning to operating forces from joint and external

assignments. Additionally, the symposium would allow the officer to receive information on

present service level intelligence policy, doctrine, systems, joint intelligence support, emerging

intelligence issues, etc.56 Training related specifically to the officer’s next assignment, as well

as, intelligence programs designed to enhance the officer’s analytical skill, should also be

identified and required where appropriate.

54 Marine Corps Intelligence G2 and Commander’s Conference, July 8, 1999. The disengagement from MIOBC and start-up of the Scout Sniper Platoon Commander’s Course (2 weeks) and GIOC (11 weeks) resulted in a net savings of 5 weeks of T2P2 per student. With an FY99 requirement for 41 0203 Lieutenants, this equates to a total of 205 weeks, or approximately $63,000 in TAD funds saved. 55 General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, “Non-Traditional Military Missions: Their Nature, and the Need for Cultural Awareness and Flexible Thinking, A presentation to the Armed Forces Staff College, 4 June 1994” Capital “W” War; A Case for strategic Principle of War (Defense automated Printing Service Center; Quantico, VA): 266-267. 56 LtCol Bruce E. Brunn, “A Challenge of Command,” Marine Corps Gazette, (September, 1992): 19-20. LtCol Brunn advocates a similar course of education for intelligence officers by citing, “our fundamental education strategy is flawed by a lack of the career follow-on training that is essential in high technology fields such as intelligence, communications…” He further advocates schools to provide “skills required at each grade and concentrate our training on those skills that will be essential in that grade or billet assignment.”

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Chapter Six

Assessment and Conclusion I. Assessment

Under the Intel Plan, Marine Corps intelligence has made significant and meaningful

structural and conceptual progress in officer training. However, several organizational

improvements must be made to strengthen the training and education regime. Additionally,

changes are needed to position intelligence officer training to meet the emerging,

requirements of OMFTS. Chapter 5 concludes with four key findings drawn from the survey

responses regarding intelligence officer training. In reviewing the deficiencies of our present

intelligence officer training, in conjunction with the perceived demands of OMFTS and the key

findings of the survey, a number of training and education gaps are identified. These

observations form specific training and education deficiencies, which we need to correct if we

are to position intelligence officers for success in the future. The observed areas of weakness

are as listed below.

1. That much of the entry-level, and post entry-level training appears to be devoted to

understanding the process of intelligence (specific intelligence systems; C2; Standing Operating

Procedures; tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP)) rather than focusing on how to develop

the skills to produce the timely and accurate intelligence analysis that commanders need.

Surveys (key finding 1) and OMFTS both speak to the importance of intelligence officers

possessing credible critical thinking and analytical skills. The ability to develop analytical skills

and intelligence estimates that identify “what the enemy is likely to do” are critical to the

35

execution of OMFTS. Educational programs can provide the academic rigor necessary to

develop the officer’s judgment, critical thinking and analytical capabilities.

2. That the intelligence architecture to support the intelligence cycle functions is detailed and

rapidly changing with technology. Because of this, up-to-date training courses that are tailored

to each system are needed so that the officer can gain specific system knowledge when assigned

to a specific billet, or if he is in need of refresher training prior to returning to the operating

forces following an external tour.

3. Each 020x MOS has a common core of general intelligence concepts, functions, training,

tactics and procedures. The T&R manual is the first document to articulate common core

intelligence standards, however, a common block of instruction is not resident in each 020x

course. The overall organization of entry-level courses presently does not lend them to

developing a foundation of common intelligence concepts, or foster a single intelligence officer

culture. Without a standardized core of intelligence instruction, each entry-level course trains

their officers differently, or disproportionately, resulting in a loss of cohesion when the officers

meet in the operating forces. Each intelligence officer needs a common point of reference for

core concepts and subject matter such as, general military intelligence, intelligence support to

operational planning, and MAGTF organization, capabilities and limitations. Different 020x

schools can also inadvertently foster a culture of intelligence officers who more closely identify

themselves as 0203, 0204, 0206, or 0207 vice a future 0202 MAGTF Intelligence officer.

Because of the lack of standardized exposure to other entry-level training, we are developing an

environment of young intelligence officers who see themselves as an enclave of a specific

intelligence skill without an understanding of the greater role of intelligence and how they

contribute to that system.

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4. The established training lacks focused programs to educate intelligence officers on regional

and cultural issues. Entry-level MOS and MIOC do not address the need for intelligence officers

with regional and cultural experiences. Intelligence officers educated in regional and cultural

affairs will have a greater ability to understand the dynamics of the threat captured in the concept

of “chaos in the littorals” while rapidly make educated judgments to support OMFTS. Of the

available training and education, intelligence officers are not required to attend any schools or

programs over any given period of time.

5. After MIOC, there is no required programmed intelligence officer training or education.

Officers are free to pursue (or not) training and education on their own recognizance. Presently,

PGIP and NMICC either do not support the throughput necessary to support the needs of the

entire intelligence community, or the quality of the education is minimal. If the current state of

a lack of professional education opportunities is allowed to prolong, the professional education

level of the intelligence officer corps will vary greatly with some highly skilled and others

desperately lacking in formal education. The consequences of such a diverse span of ability

could be rather costly. The nature of OMFTS will require technological solutions to enabling the

concept. Intelligence officers will likewise be required to understand and exploit emerging ISR

technology while concurrently employing critical thinking and analytical skills geared to

providing the commander with the best estimate of the battlespace on which he will make a

decision. To meet the challenge, a deliberate intelligence education program, mandatory to all

officers, must be implemented.

Given the above deficiencies, the following changes are proposed in order to fully

professionalize the intelligence officer and position him best to meet the challenges of OMFTS.

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II. Recommendations

A. Consolidate all entry-level MOS training at NMITC under a single Marine Intelligence core-strand concept.

A single location would allow flexibility to efficiently change training to best address

OMFTS or other changes in doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. A single Marine

intelligence core-strand course, with strands for 0203, 0204, 0206, and 0207 will foster

development of a Marine Corps intelligence officer culture much in the same way that TBS

does for the officer corps (Figure 2). A single Marine intelligence core-strand course would

also provide a synergistic environment for intelligence officers regardless of their specific entry-

level discipline, and would ensure that training time would be focused on achieving Marine

Corps training requirements. MOS 0206 and MOS 0207 would particularly benefit, as they

would decouple the bulk of their training time from following curriculum weighted to satisfy

Navy requirements.

This change would also be cost effective and reduce T2P2 without decreasing training days.

For example, the shift of 0203 training from MIOBC to GIOC resulted in a decreased training

time of 5 weeks per student. Similar savings in 0206 and 0207 training time is also likely, but

would require additional study that is beyond the scope of this work. The proposed Marine

Corps intelligence core-strand would also benefit 0204 training by efficiently orienting the

officer to his role of CI employer/coordinator in the top down context of the MAGTF

intelligence effort, vice the bottom up, highly skilled technician view of the 0211 and 0210.

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B. Establish an Intelligence Officer Advance Degree Program.

The development of an educational program for intelligence officers to pursue advance

degrees in specific curriculum will enhance the officer’s ability to understand the complex

cultural environment describe in “chaos in the littorals.” First, HQMC should institute a

program where each year several officers (Captain through Major) are allowed to pursue funded

studies in International Relations, WMD, Terrorism, Force Protection, Counterintelligence,

Signal Intelligence, Imagery and Remote Sensing, Conflict Resolution, and Peacekeeping. After

completing their degree, the officer would return to a MAGTF l