T8 B3 FAA Indy Center Sally Weed Fdr- Entire Contents- 9-24-03 MFR and 1 Set Handwritten Notes 763

8/14/2019 T8 B3 FAA Indy Center Sally Weed Fdr- Entire Contents- 9-24-03 MFR and 1 Set Handwritten Notes 763

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M E M O R A N D U M FOR THE RECORDEvent: Sally Weed, Support Manager for Operations of Indianapolis Air Traffic ControlCenterType of event: InterviewDate: Thursday, September 25 , 2003Special Access Issues: nonePrepared by: Gate TaylorTeam Number: 8Location: Indianapolis Air Traffic Control CenterParticipants - Non-Comm ission: Sally Weed, Support Manager fo r Operations; EileenParticipants - Com mission: John Farmer, Dana H yde, Gate TaylorThe purpose of this interview is to learn about Sally We ed's experience on 9/11 as aSupport Manager for Indi, gain knowledge of Weed's brief position as liaison to NORADpost 9/11, and to hear any recommendations Weed has for the Commission.BackgroundSally Weed worked as an Air Traffic Controller in Albuquerque, NM until 1982 whenshe relocated to the Indianapolis AR TC C. Here she was an Air Traffic Controller until1987, when she became a supervisor. In 1997, Weed transferred to Memphis, TN an dthen came back to Indi in 1999 as a Support Manager of Operations. During her career,Weed has worked w ith the military, as a liaison between NORAD and the FAA, and hasdesigned FAA airspace.Weed's experience on 9/11Weed was in her office on the morning of 9/11 when Doug Mullen came in and told herthat a plane had hit the World Trade Center. At some point after Indi had lost contactwith AA77 and a second plane had hit the World Trade Center, Dave Boone asked thatWeed go to the e-desk and help receive pho ne calls, take m essages and relay information.Grounding of all flights had already begun . W eed had no role in this decision.

Weed does no t specifically rememb er who she was talking to that morning. It is possiblethat she could have taken calls from NORAD on a commercial line. Other incoming callsincluded family members of Indi staff asking fo r information, notification of militaryflights taking off, and calls asking about a flight in Chicag o. W eed does not rem em ber ifshe had contact with W ashington HQ , the comm and center, or the ROC.At some point, Weed does rem ember hearing of a mining accident in K entucky. Soonafter this, John Thomas briefed her on police reports of a crash site in the area. There was


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COMMISSION SENSITIVEUNCLASSIFIEDno talk of a hijack situation at this point. A s Weed was not familiar with the e-deskbooks, she was unaware of any available POC or phone number to NORAD.Liaison to NORAD post 9/11Weed worked as a liaison for the FA A to N O R A D from November 2001 to February2002 in the Cheyenne Mountain Command Center. This position, created after 9/11, wasvolunteer and on a temporary basis. The purpose of this position was to bridge the gap inunderstanding between FAA air traffic controllers and military air traffic controllers.There were no operational duties associated with this position. 21 FAA peoplenationwide were involved with NO RA D in a liaison position.Weed noticed a vast difference in reaction to a NO RD O situation. If the military were toloose radio contact with an aircraft, they would be on high alert and get ready toscramble. How ever, if the FA A were faced with a NORDO situation, which happensregularly, they w ould no t panic, and try to regain contact with the aircraft. From Weed'sexperience, she believes the military did not expect a threat from within the country sincenone of their large scale training drills took this scenario into account.Since her experience in Cheyenne M t, Weed now thinks that the sense of urgency haschanged for both the military and the FAA. There is now a relationship between NORADand the FAA. Before 9/11, Weed would no t have thought to call NORA D in the event ofa hijack; she would have notified he r supervisor, John Thomas, who would have madefurther notifications.Weed noted that a major difference between the military and the FA A is the frequency oftraining and drilling. The military drills all of the time, but the FA A drills only a fewtimes per year. It would be difficult to incorporate regular drills into daily FA A routinefor tow m ain reasons: the air traffic controllers do not have time to get away from workand the scenarios would not be p ractical and thus not be taken seriously.Upo n returning to Indi in February 2002, W eed took about 1 month to retrain as anOpe rations M anager. S he noted that training now is no different than before 9/11.Other talking points of interview:Prior to 9/11, Weed knew of SCAT ANA. She participated in table top exercises to reviewprocedures about every two years. These drills involved little detail and few people.Since 9/11, every Air Traffic Control Center now has a DEN and a direct line to NEAD S.The FAA and military have worked on correcting the blank radar spot in Area 3.Recommendations:Weed stressed that the FAA needs to maintain the awareness level that they have now.She is concerned that as we mov e farther away from 9/11, the FAA will become morecomplacent. A m ilitary p osition at the center is a possible solution to keep the FAA morealert and attentive to m ilitary op erations and contacts. The liaison shou ld have a specificjob description so not to have an ineffective position.


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Weed is concerned with loosing the DEN due to the cost of its operation.M ilitary training is not nece ssary for Air Traffic Controllers since the operations andmissions of the FAA and military are so different.


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T8 B3 FAA Indy Center Sally Weed Fdr- Entire Contents- 9-24-03 MFR and 1 Set Handwritten Notes 763