T8 B3 Boston Center Jon Schippani Fdr- 2 MFR and Other Set Handwritten Notes 755

8/14/2019 T8 B3 Boston Center Jon Schippani Fdr- 2 MFR and Other Set Handwritten Notes 755

1/7

[Classification]M E M O R A N D U M F O R THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation A dministration (FAA ) Boston C enter Field Site Interview 1 withJo n Schippani, Operational Supervisor in Charge, Boston Center.Type of event: InterviewDate: Mo nday, September 22, 2003Special Access Issues: Non ePrepared by: Geoffrey BrownTeam Num ber: 8Location: FAA Boston Center, Nashua, New HampshireParticipants - Non-Commission: Chris , FAA General ConsulParticipants - Com mission: John A zzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion ofthe interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Schippani was supervisor for Area C on 9/11. He had 10 years prior experience assupervisor on 9/11, and had 16 years experience as a controller prior to that. There areusually two supervisors in an area, but he was the only one on that day.He first became aware of A A 1 1 when the 46R, Pete Zilowski radar position said he hadlost contact with an aircraft"; they followed up with the aircraft from there according tothe usual handling of a NOR AC aircraft. A A 1 1 became a real concern for Schippaniwhen the transponde r signal shut off. Schippani wen t to Area B , and confirmed that theyto o had no con tact. It was at this point that Pete Zilowski heard what he referred to as"threatening" language with an "Arabic accent" from the cockpit. John assigned AlMiller to sit with Zilowski. They asked U A L 175 for a visual on A A 1 1 , and UAL 175replied that AA11 had an approximate altitude of 28,000 feet.Until the threatening communication was confirmed, Schippani believed A A 1 1 ha dexperienced severe electrical or mechanical difficulty. Once the threatening conversationhad been con firmed, and A A 1 1 took a southbound course, Schippani believed AA11 washeaded for a landing at Kennedy or for Cuba.Schippani roughly recalled what occurred at the watchdesk. He remembers Dan Buenoattempted to contact Otis for a support, but Schippani did not recall an y procedure fo rrequest a fighter scramble. H e guessed that most likely pre-9/11 protocol for the request


2/7

should have been from Boston Center to the R egional Operation Command (ROC), andthe RO C would process the request. He confirmed that prior to 9/11 his understanding ofNORAD/NEADS role in a hijacking scenario was cloudy.To get the closest military asset, Schippani noted he would contact Giant Killer out of theVirginia Capes. Giant Killer monitors low to mid altitudes along the east coast. He had anunderstanding of how to contact them by phone. Schippani noted that from his experienceOtis Air Force Base was an unknown factor, and he would no t know how to contactNEA DS (North Atlantic Air Defense). Prior to 9/11 Schippani noted that ATCs had noinput in the coord ination o ver airspace with the military, unless there was an "aircrafttransfer". Schippani was aware of Herndon as a resource, but was not sure of its possiblefunction on 9/11, or in a 9/11 type event.Schippani noted that Boston Center had "good situational awareness" and relayed itsinformation prom ptly to the ROC and W OC . The lines of comm unication from ATCthrough TM U to the OMIC were effective, bu t Schippani noted that all of BostonCenter's experience handling aircraft in crisis still did not prepare them for the shock ofthe 9/11 attacks. Schippani felt that the Air Traffic system reacted as best as it could tohandle a complete change in, and then a shut down of the traffic pattern, especially afterthe New York air space was com pletely closed and Boston Center was forced to handleall of its users.Schippani noted that it was a mistake within Boston Center to "key the overheadmicrophone" so that the full sector could hear the AA11 communications. He believesthis contributed to the emotional stress of the ATCs.Schippani is highly concerned over nuclear power plants, and their susceptibility to 9/11attack scenarios.Regarding the FAA and the m ilitary, Schippani stated the relationship was "like oil andwater". He expressed some frustration that comm unication with the military over sharingairspace is often difficult. For example, Schippani explained when thunderstorms threatenthe airspace on the eastern coast, the m ilitary does no t coordinate well with clearingalternate routes for com m ercial aircraft if they are using the space. Furtherm ore, even inthe post-9/11 environm ent the coordination necessary for VIP flight is difficult to workthrough. Shipppani did acknowledge that the FAA could do a better job itself. Heexplained that the m ilitary needs large tracks of airspace for m id flight refueling, and thatthe FAA is reluctant to cooperate.Regarding coord inating an intercept, Schippani wou ld like to see m ore drills. He hadexperienced one scenario when a plane veered too close to a presidential airspace cap inMaine. He thought this scenario was a positive exam ple of the improving FAA/militaryrelationship.


3/7

Commission SensitiveMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA ) Boston C enter Interview w ith JonSchippani, Operational Supervisor in Charge, Boston Center.Type of event:Recorded InterviewDate: Monday, September 22 , 2003Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Geoffrey Brown an d Miles karaTeam Number: 8Location:FAA Boston Center, Nashua, NewHampshireParticipants - Non-C omm ission: Chris Perito, FAA G eneral ConsulParticipants - Comm ission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion ofthe interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Schippani was supervisor for Area C on 9/11. He had 10 years prior experience as asupervisor, and had 16 years experience as a controller prior to that. There are usuallytw o supervisors in an area, but he w as the only one on that day.He first became aware of AAl 1 when the 46R Controller, Pete Zalewski, said he had lostcontact with an aircraft; they followed up according to the usual handling of a "no radio"(NORDO) aircraft. AA l 1 became a real concern for Schippani when the transpondersignal shut off. Schippani wen t to Area B, and confirmed that they too had no contact. Itwas at this point that Pete Zalewski heard w hat he referred to as "threatening" languagewith an "A rabic accent" from the cockpit. John assigned Al Miller to sit with Zalewski.They asked another plane in the sky, UA L175, for a visual on AAl 1, and UAL175replied that AAl 1 had an approximate altitude of 28,000 feet.Until the threatening comm unication was confirmed, Schippani believed A Al 1 hadexperienced severe electrical or mechanical difficulty. Once the threatening conversationhad been confirmed, and AA l 1 took a southbound course, Schippani believed AA l 1 washijacked an d headed for a landing at Kennedy or Cuba.Schippani roughly recalled what occurred at the watchdesk. [Staff Note: The watch deskis the hub of activity in the Center.] He remembers Dan Bueno attempted to contact OtisAFB for support, but Schippani did not recall the procedure for request a fighterscramble. He guessed that most likely pre-9/11 protocol for the request should have been


4/7

from Boston Center to the Regional Operation C omm and (ROC), and the ROC w ouldprocess the request. He confirmed that prior to 9/11 his understanding ofNOR AD/NEA DS role in a hijacking scenario was cloudy.To get the closest military asset, Schippani noted he would contact G iant Killer out of theVirginia Capes. Giant Killer monitors low to m id altitudes along the east coast. He had anunderstanding of how to contact them by phone. [Staff No te: Giant Killer performs theAir Traffic Controller function in designated m ilitary warning areas over the ocean. It isa Na vy organization w ith its control center at Oceana, Virgina.] Schippani noted thatfrom his experience Otis Air Force Base was an unknow n factor, and he would not knowhow to contact NEADS (North Atlantic Air Defense). Prior to 9/11 Schippani noted thatAir Traffic Controllers (ATC) had no input in the coordination over airspace with themilitary, unless there was an "aircraft transfer". Schippani was aware of the FAACommand Center at Herndon as a resource, but was not sure of its possible function on9/11, or in a 9/11 type event.Schippani noted that Boston C enter had "good situational awareness" and relayed itsinformation promptly to the ROC and FAA W ashington Operations Center (WOC ). Thelines of communication from the Controller through the Traffic Management Unit to theOperations Manager In Charge (OMIC) were effective, but Schippani noted that all ofBoston Center's experience handling aircraft in crisis still did not prepare it for the shockof the 9/11 attacks. Schippani felt that the Air Traffic system reacted as best as it could tohandle a com plete change in, and then a shut down of the traffic pattern, especially afterthe New York air space was com pletely closed and Boston Center was forced to handleall of its users.Schippani noted that it was a mistake within Boston Center to "key the overheadmicroph one" so that the full sector could hear the AA11 communications. He believesthis contributed to the em otional stress of the A ir Traffic Controllers. [Staff Note: Later,Zalewski told staff he did that so that everyone else could experience w hat he wasexperiencing and to generate a sense of urgency which he felt did not exist.]Schippani is highly concerned over nuclear power plants, and their susceptibility to 9/11attack scenarios.Regarding the FA A and the m ilitary, Schippani stated the relationship was "like oil andwater". He expressed some frustration that comm unication over sharing airspace is oftendifficult. For example, when thun derstorms threaten the airspace on the eastern coast, themilitary does no t coordinate well with clearing alternate routes fo r commercial aircraft ifthey are using the space. Furthermore, even in the post-9/11 environment thecoordination necessary for VIP flight is difficult. Shipppani did acknowledge that theFAA could do a better job itself. He explained that the m ilitary needs large tracks ofairspace for mid flight refueling, and that the FA A is reluctant to cooperate.Regarding coordinating an intercept, Schippani would like to see more drills. He hadexperienced on e scenario wh en a plane veered too close to a presidential airspace cap inMaine. He thought this scenario was a positive example of the improving FAA/militaryrelationship.


5/7

p

fijfc Z ^X-e_ xx JL


6/7


7/7

^

uyC ^>

Documents

T8 B3 Boston Center Jon Schippani Fdr- 2 MFR and Other Set Handwritten Notes 755