T3 B9 Final Report Publication Fdr- Entire Contents- Emails- Withdrawal Notices- Lists of Questions and Answers Talking Points 989

8/14/2019 T3 B9 Final Report Publication Fdr- Entire Contents- Emails- Withdrawal Notices- Lists of Questions and Answers Talking Points 989

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Mike HurleyFrom: Warren BassSent: Tuesday, June 29, 2004 4:37 PMTo: Bonnie Jenkins; Walter Hempel; Team 3Cc: Stephanie KaplanSubject: RE: Graphics for Final Report

Great idea.Original MessageFrom: Bonnie JenkinsSent: Tuesday, June 29, 2004 4:32 PM

To: Warren Bass; Walter Hempel; Team 3Cc: Stephanie KaplanSubject: RE: Graphics for Final ReportTeam 3 and Stephanie,I note the list includes an illustration of the damage to the USS Cole. Do we want one of the bombings ofthe African embassies?Bonnie

Original MessageFrom: Warren BassSent: Tuesday, June 29, 2004 3:12 PMTo: Walter Hempel; Team 3Cc: Stephanie KaplanSubject: RE: Graphics for Final ReportP.S. I should add that I feel a bit of a twinge about printing art of the arm ed version. I suggest wejust use an image of the recon birdthough the images of the arm ed bird seem easier to find, so Iguess who are we trying to tod...W B.

Original MessageFrom: Walter HempelSent: Tuesday, June 29, 2004 2:53 PMTo: Team 3Cc: Stephanie KaplanSubject: Graphics for Final ReportStephanie has given me your May 28, 2004 response to her request for illustrations. Youlisted the following :


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I would prefer not to get into any copyright problems with images on the web. I cansearch the government sites but if you have images please get them to me.Anything you think is really important I would like to work on. The final decision as towhether the image is included is still down the road. It will depend on many factorsincluding the quality of the source illustration. Electronic formats are best.


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Mike HurleyFrom: Warren BassSent: Tuesday, June 29, 2004 3:10 PMTo: Walter Hempel; Team 3Cc: Stephanie KaplanSubject: RE : Graphics for Final Report

Just did some quick web-surfing, Walt, and I think I've answered some of the mail here:1. Armed Predator (USAF photo) httr)://www.cnn.com/20Q2/US/ll/Q4/predator.background/2. Tarnak Farmssee Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 392; nothing on Derunta3. Cole attack (Navy photos)http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.hrml/fu^^4. "Man in white" from Predator (NBC photos; also include Oct. 2001 shot of Tarnak)http://www,msnbc.msn,CQrn/id/4549030/5. Nothing on the October 2001 commando raidI'm sure we could get the permissions from NBC to run the Predator art. We could also ask Coll or hissource if they'd let us run their images of Tarnak. The USAF and Navy images should be publicdomain.The rest of the gang may have bright ideas of their own. And I'm sure Norton's art and permissionsdepartment could help, too.Best,Warren

Original MessageFrom: Walter HempelSent: Tuesday, June 29, 2004 2:53 PMTo: Team 3Cc: Stephanie KaplanSubject: Graphics for Final ReportStephanie has given me your May 28, 2004 response to her request for illustrations. You listed thefollowing:

1. Photo of the Predator - do you have a picture of the correct m odel/type that was used?2. Overhead photo of Tarnak Farms and/or Derunta Camp


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Anything you think is really important I would like to work on. The final decision as to whether theimage is included is still down the road. It will depend on many factors including the quality of thesource illustration. Electronic formats are best.


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Mike HurleyFrom: Stephanie KaplanSent: Thursday, June 24, 2004 3:43 PMTo: staffSubject: Report Illustrations

Colleagues:At today's meeting, the Commissioners reemphasized their desire to see tables and illustrations throughout thefinal report. The graphically inclined Walt Hempel of Team 5 has been drafted to help the front office coordinatethis process. He will start with Chapter 1 (Teams 7/8)tomorrow. Chapters 5/7 (Team 1 A) and Chapter 9 (Team 8)are on deck.Please be as responsive as possible to his requests, and many thanks to Walt for his expertise and assistance.Stephanie

STEPHANIE L. KAPLAN9-11 COMMISSIONT (202) 331-1125F (202) 296-5545www.9-11commission.gov


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WITHDRAWAL NOTICERG: 148 Exposition, Ann iversary, and M emorial Com missionsSERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 3

N ND PROJECT NU MB ER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/21/2008

BOX: 00004 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 1 DOC ID: 31206889COPIES: 1 PAGES: 6

( ACCESS RESTRICTED IThe item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Final Report Publication & Roll Out Prep.DOCUMENT DAT E: 06/18/1999 DOC UM ENT TYPE: ReportFROM:TO:SUBJECT: Special Analysis: Af ghan istan

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):9/11 Classif ied Information


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Mike HurleyFrom: Mike HurleySent: Friday, May 28, 2004 10:46 AMTo: Stephanie KaplanCc: Team 3Subject: RE: Illustrations in Final Report

Stephanie:Team 3 has the following suggestions:-A photo of the Predator (should pose no classification problem because there arephotos of it on the web).-Overhead photo of Tarnak Farms and/or Derunta Camp (these have been shown on thenetworks). Particularly useful to have these in the sections dealing with captureoperations.-Photo of the bomb blast damage to the USS Cole.-Stills of the famous "Man in white", aka UBL, as shot from the Predator video footageof September 2000. CIAwill probably grouse about this. But these, too, have beenshown on network news.-Stills from footage of the nighttime commando raid on mullah omar's compound onOctober 19, 2001. These were shown on network news.

Original MessageFrom: Stephanie KaplanSent: Tuesday, May 25, 2004 3:19PMTo: staffSubject: Illustrations in Final ReportStaff:The Chair and Vice Chair have expressed interest in incorporating illustrations (tables, graphs, timelines,pictures, etc.) into the final report. They believe that such devices, if selected carefully, will explain variousaspects of the 9/11 narrative in a clear and efficient manner.


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STEPHANIE L. KAPLAN9-11 COMMISSIONT (202) 331-1125F (202) 296-5545www.9-11commission.gov


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Q& A's for Final Report RolloutTeam 3Counterterrorism Policy

W as 9/11 Preventable?Q. Could 9/11 have been avoided?A. In hindsight, it's possible. Both the CIA and the FBI had opportunities to collateinformation on some of the would-be hijackers months before 9/11. It's possible that ifthese individuals had been arrested and questioned, or followed, they would have beenprevented from carrying out the plot. But there are no assurances that even had thathappened, the government wo uld have caught all of them before they could carry outtheir plan. Deficiencies in the CIA and FBI contributed to their inability to connect thedots.

Which Options Were Taken, and Which Were NotQ . Al Qaeda blew up our embassies in 1998 and the USS Cole in 2000. Why didn 'twe send troops into Afghanistan to wipe them out?A. Befo re 9/11, al Q aeda was responsible for the deaths of less than 50 Am ericans.This clearly showed it was a danger. But all senior policymakers of both the Clinton and

Bush administrations agreed it would have been impossible to invade Afghanistan before9/11. The Com mission, however, found that neither administration organized a robusteffort to shape congressional, American public, or international opinion about thenecessity of using force against Bin Ladin.Q. W hy didn't we put military "boots on the ground" in Afghanistan before 9/11 ?A. There were some officials in the Pentagon who advocated doing so. But it is a

major political and security decision to invade a country. An invasion would haverequired basing and support from Afghanistan's neighbors, such as Pakistan andUzbekistan. Many officials told us this w ould have been hard to obtain before 9/11.Q . Does the Co mmission believe that the Pentagon unduly resisted the option of


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the Bin Ladin threat. It was more engaged in taking defensive measures against al Qaedathan proposing offensive actions.The U.S. military was reluctant to deploy troops to Afgh anistan. It would have doneso had it been ordered to do so by the President. But the military's position was that itlacked actionable intelligence on Bin Ladin's location, without which it would havemeant that its forces would be exposed to great risk with a low probability of succeeding.Q. Wh o is responsible for the failure to protect our country from al Qaeda?

A. The Commission's view is that many committed officials were aware of the alQaeda threat and worked hard to counter it. The broader government as a whole,however, had a difficult time changing ou r security and intelligence institutions toeffectively combat this new kind of nonstate enemy. Both Presidents Clinton and Bushwere genuinely concerned about the threat. But the government did not organize agovernment-wide effort to defeat the threat until after the 9/11 attacks made clear that ourhomeland was in danger.Q. Did both the Clinton an d Bush administrations underestimate the threat posed byBin Ladin and al Qaeda?A. Both Presidents C linton and Bush were concerned about the threat. TheCommission found that across the government, there was a failure of imaginationconcerning the threat. Few had internalized the idea that al Qaeda could launchcatastrophic attacks in the United States.Q. Did President Clinton make the right choice in not autho rizing missile strikes onthose occasions when th e CIA provided intelligence on Bin Ladin's location inAfghanistan? Did we miss an opportunity here?A. Officials in the Clinton administration, including National Security AdvisorSandy Berger and DCI George Tenet to ld us that on the three major occasions when theCIA provided decision makers with real-time intelligence on Bin Ladin's location, theintelligence itself was found to be insufficiently reliable to serve as the basis fo r cruise

missile attacks. Officials were also concerned about the possibility of killing or injuringinnocent civilians in proximity to Bin Ladin. As Berger told us, the DCI w ould tellpolicymakers, "Wejust don't have it."Q. You say that before 9/11 the U.S. never adopted the elimination ofal Qaeda as a


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it had employed against terrorist organizations traditionally. These means wereinsufficient.

Q. Your report indicates th e CIA produced numerous reports about th e possible useof airlines as weapons. W hy weren 't these paid attention to ?

A. Some officials in the government did pay attention to them. But there were oftenso many threat reports that streams of reporting got lost in the greater flood ofinformation policy makers had to consider. Then, too, the CIA and intelligencecommunity failed to pull the threads together. In 1998, Richard Clarke performed a table-top drill with Pentagon and FAA officials to ask what could be done if terrorists hijackeda Learjet from Atlanta, stuffed it with explosives, and headed toward Washington, DC.The answer was, with the Pentagon still focused outward rather than inward, rather little.

Q. President Clinton had eight years to deal with Bin Ladin and al Qaeda, andPresident Bush had less than eight months before 9/11. Doesn 't more fault lie withPresident Clinton for f ailing to kill or capture Bin Ladin and damage al Qaeda?

A. The commission found that both Presidents were genuinely concerned about the alQaeda threat. They each used the FBI, CIA, and other instruments of national power torespond to the threat. President Clinton authorized a cruise missile attack against alQaeda in August 1998 in response to the attacks on our embassies. But our governmentat no time before 9/11 authorized a government-wide organized response to this threat onthe order of the commitment we made, for example, in the Balkans.

Q. Was the CIA risk-averse? W hy didn 't the CIA everput its personnel on the groundin Afghanistan to deal with Bin the Ladin problem?

A. Teams of CIA officers did go into Afghanistan on numerous occasions before9/11, risking their lives on hazardous missions. At the working level, we found noreluctance to risk such dangers. But policymakers and senior CIA managers were morecautious. Afghanistan was a country in the midst of civil war. There were no reliablemeans for inserting or extracting officers. Senior officials should be cautious aboutexposing U.S. personnel to great risk. Before 9/11, these officials weighed the risks ofdeploying U.S. personnel against the gains, andmade their choices. As a result, the U.S.government relied on proxy forces to carry out covert action programs.

Q. Your report says the CIA relied fo r years on proxies to capture or kill Bin Ladinand that CIA management placed little confidence in the effectiveness of th e proxies.


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Commission believes both the Clinton and Bush administrations should have consideredother options.Q. Did Executive Order 12333 's ban on assassinations limit our choices with regardto this major national security threat?A. No. The Attorney General and the Department of Justice made clear that the ban

had no application to Bin Ladin, an enemy of the United States. Under the law of armedconflict, action directed against Bin Ladin was justified as an act of self defense.

Q. D id President Clinton give the CIA authority to kill Bin Ladin?A. President Clinton and his top national security officials told us that his intentionswere clear: He wanted Bin Ladin dead. They said that this was communicated to theCIA. Our examination of the authorities signed by President Clinton showed that thelanguage is sometimes ambiguous. For one of the documents he signed, language wascrafted to give the CIA extraordinary authority that went beyond capture, but the extremesensitivity of this document meant that very few people saw it. On another occasion,

President Clinton clearly authorized an action that, if carried out, could only haveresulted in Bin Ladin's death. CIA officials, however, told us that they believed theywere authorized to capture Bin Ladin and that he could only be killed in the context of acapture operation.

Q. Did the confusion on kill vs. capture get in the way of dealing with Bin Ladin?A. It is unclear what impact this confusion had, as the proxies used by CIA nevercame close to either killing or capturing Bin Ladin. Director Tenet told usandPresident Bushthat he had all the authority to go after Bin Ladin that he wanted. TheCIA's inability to either capture or kill Bin Ladin before 9/11 seems to be a question notso much of authority as capability.Q. As part of his response to the al Qaeda attack on our two embassies in East Africain August 1998, President Clinton authorized a cruise missile attack on the al Shifa

pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum. W as that th e right decision?A. Clinton administration officials told us that intelligence indicated that traces of aningredient for the deadly nerve agent VX were found at this pharmaceutical plant ownedby Bin Ladin. They thought that perhaps one day a weapon containing VX produced at


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A. No. We have found no evidence whatsoever to suggest that President Clinton'sdecisions were m ade on ground s other than national security, in either docu ments o rinterviews.

Q . The Clinton adm inistration seemed to rely heavily on using cruise m issiles to killBin Laden an d hurt al Qaeda. Was this stand-off method the right approach?A. Policymakers thought cruise missiles might be an effective way to kill Bin Ladinand his lieutenants. The cruise missile strikes on Afghanistan in August 1998 were basedon intelligence that Bin Ladin and his principal aides would be gathered at a camp nearKhowst, Afghanistan. But cruise missiles cou ld result in death or injury to innocents.Bin Ladin could also change his location during the interval between when a cruisemissile attack was authorized by the President and when the missiles hit their targetsseveral hours later. Thus, there were limitations to reliance on them. CIA attempted toimprove its intelligence to increase the probability a cruise missile attack wo uld succeedand to make possible comm ando strikes on Bin Ladin's camps.President Clinton asked senior military officials about using comm andos to raid alQaeda facilities. W e found that the Pentagon often produced unimaginative options an dwas reluctant to recomm end any of them, leaving both Presidents Clinton and Bu sh withfew appealing options between cruise missile strikes and outright invasion. As Rice toldus, the m ilitary did n't particularly want this mission.Q . When should th e U.S. government have first known that Bin Ladin posed a lethalthreat to the United States, and al Qaeda was a worldwide organization?A. Officials who followed intelligence on B in Ladin closely had this picture by 1996.This is why the CIA established a un it devoted to tracking and finding Bin Ladin, anddisrupting al Qaeda's operations. But it was not until the Augu st 1998 attacks on twoU.S. embassies in East Africa that the full lethal nature of al Qaeda began to beunderstood by the broader U.S. government. During the months that followed, the extentof the al Qaeda network also became better-kno wn to the government.Q . W hy didn 't the CIA produce a National Intelligence Estimate on Bin Ladin and alQaeda after 1997?A. Responsibility for a governm ent-wide appraisal of terrorism and al Qaeda hadbeen moved from the National Intelligence Council to CIA's Counterterrorist Center.


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Did the Clinton adm inistration react to this intelligence? W hy didn ' t we do more toenhance domestic security in light of this threat?A. Working through Richard Clarke 's CSG, the Clinton administration produced avigorous response, p utting airlines and airports on alert and work ing with agenciesincluding the FA A and the FB I to ensure that the threat was handled. W e should note thatthis was one of many threats the U.S. governmen t received on al Qaeda. It seemsparticularly important now . There appears to have been no significant change in overallairline security measures after the 1998 threat. We should no te that this warning referredto a "traditional" hijacking, not to a suicide attack like 9/11.Q. How did the Clinton administration h andle th e terrorist threats around th eMillennium?A. The C omm ission found that the Millennium threat was generally well-handledand an important exceptiona significant episode where information was shared wellbetween agencies. E ven the FBI, which had persistent problems about disclosing w hat itknew to o ther parts of the intelligence comm unity and the government, w orked w ell in

the interagency process to handle the threat, including cabinet-level meetings.Q. Did the interagency fight over who w ould fund th e Predator flights get in the wayof using this capability?A. Several officials testified to us that this squabble between the CIA and thePentagon did not interfere with deploying the Predator. Budget fightswho pays for

what?happen all the time in government, even as projects go forward. TheComm ission does believe, however, that the disagreements over a relatively sm allamount of money suggest that the broader U.S. government had no t yet fully appreciatedthe seriousness of the al Qaeda threat. If it had had such an appreciation, we think thesebureaucratic spats would have been resolved more quickly.Q. Could an armed Predator have flown before 9/11? In other words, was this a lostopportunity?A. All those involved in the developmen t of the armed P redator told us that this wasone of the fastest-moving technical pro jects they had ever seen in their time ingovernment. A testing program that would normally take years was rushed through inmere months. Although it is arguable that an armed Predator could have been deployed


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A. Senior levels of the Clinton administration, as well as CIA officials, told us thatvirtually everyone believed al Qaeda was behind the attack on the Cole. Administrationofficials, including National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, said that just such a beliefwas not sufficient to justify a U.S. military response against al Qaeda in Afghanistan tothe American public or to the international community. The President needed, he said,firm and clear conclusions from the FBI and CIA directors that Bin Ladin and al Qaeda inAfghanistan were involved in the attacks. Berger told us that this conclusion had notbeen presented before the end of the Clinton administration. Richard Clarke told us thatthe first time any administration stated publicly that al Qaeda was responsible for theattack on the Cole came in a speech by President Bush immediately following 9/11.The Commission concluded that there should have been some response to the attack onthe Cole; that neither President Clinton nor President Bush had authorized a militarystrike; and that that was a mistake, which may have emboldened Bin Ladin.

CongressQ. How did Congressperform pre-9/11 ?A. We found significant problems in Congress's performance. Congress did notsystematically address the al Qaeda threat or educate the nation about it before 9/11.Its oversight of the intelligence community regarding terrorism was episodic andlacked depth. Substantial reforms are called for in Congress's committee structure,including over the new Department of Homeland Security. We address these in ourreport.

The Clinton-Bush TransitionQ. Did the fight over the 2000 presidential election an d resulting shortening of th etransition between the two administrations harm our readiness to deal with al Qaeda?A. The transition period was unusually short. The incoming Bush administrationtold us that outgoing Clinton officials communicated the al Qaeda threat well during thetransition. President Clinton discussed the threat with President-elect Bush. Incomingprincipals received briefings that spotlighted al Qaeda, including a briefing from RichardClarke to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. But it is also clear to us that


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A. The Bush administration made the initial decision to keep in place the W hiteHouse coordinator for counterterrorism, Richard Clarke, and his entire staff. Moreover, itkept in place the Director of the FBI, Director of the CIA and the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff, as well as many w orking-level officials

The Bush Administration

Q. On January 25, 2001, Richard Clarke urgently asks National Security AdviserCondoleezza Rice for cabinet-level decisions related to the al Qaeda threat. And yet theprincipals didn 't meet until Septemb er 4. Why was a meeting delayed for so long?A. Clarke asked for decisions on issues including aid to the Northern Alliance and aresponse to the Cole. Bush adm inistration officials told us that their em phasis was on theneed to conduct a policy review of our approach to al Qaeda, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.Only by including the regional dimension, they told us, could they fashion a more

comprehensive strategy. They did not wish to adopt a "tit-for-tat" approach, reacting toattacks from al Qaeda w ithout an overall policy. They conducted the policy reviewthrough the summ er of 2001. Their first Principals Com mittee meeting on al Qaeda w asheld on September 4,2001, after they had completed their policy review. Th e PrincipalsCommittee met 32 times on other topics in this period.Q. Richard Clarke said that the Bush administration saw the al Q aeda threat asimportant but not urgent. Was he right?A. The Bush administration has a different view. They said they regarded the threatas urgent, but that what was needed most urgently was a comprehensive policy. W ebelieve that both administrations took their responsibility to defend the country seriously.Rice and Clarke differ on interpretation here, not on the facts; both agree that the reviewwas underway, and one calls it fast while the other calls it slow. The fact, is however, thatneither administration, before 9/11, made eliminating al Qaeda the number one nationalsecurity priority before 9/11.Q. W as the strategy for dealing with al Qaeda developed by the Bush administrationsignificantly different from the strategy of the Clinton administration?A. Rice saw it as the embodiment of a comprehensive new effort to use all


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A. The adm inistration's D eputies Com mittee worked on this problem for months. OnSeptember 10, it endorsed a three-phase plan. First, a diplom atic envoy wo uld give theTaliban a last chance. Second, con tinued diplomatic pressure wou ld be com bined withcovert action efforts encouraging anti-Taliban Afghans to move against al Qaeda. Third,if the first two phases ha dn 't w orked, the United States wou ld try to use covert action totopple the Taliban's leadership from within.Q. President Bush told the Commission he had become impatient with what he called"swatting flies. " Does the Comm ission agree that President Bush followed through witha more aggressive plan?A. The Bush administration worked on a new policy docum ent. It was a m ulti-year,multi-faceted plan. W e describe Richard C larke's earlier strategy papers as well as thedraft Bush presidential directive but do not give a verdict on their similarities anddifferences. The C omm ission does not know how it would have been implemented had9/11 no t occurred.Q. W hy didn 't the Predator fly in 2001 before 9/11?A. The military and the CIA were w orking on arming the Predator through thesummer of 2001. The Commission found that some officials, including Clarke and someCIA officials, wanted to fly the Predator as a reconnaissance collection platform whilethat work was going onto perhaps provide the elusive 'actionable intelligence' thatwould let Wa shington target Bin Ladin for a cruise missile strike. Others in the Pentagonand the CIA had a different view, arguing that more missions might make al Qaeda

change its movem ents to evade the Predator and thus compromise the armed version'sability to attack Bin Ladin once it was ready. National Security Advisor Rice went alongwith the latter group's views, holding off on reconnaissance flights until the armedversion was ready. A t their September 4 meeting on the issue, principals determined thatthe armed version would not fly until spring 2002 but agreed on reconnaissance flights.The armed P redator flew within five weeks after 9/11.Q. What really came out of the September 4 Principals Meeting?A. The principals adopted the draft presidential directive designed to eliminate alQaeda as a threat with little discussion. T hey also agreed that the Un ited States needed tohave armed Predators, although they were not ready yet, and discussed issues aboutgetting the armed system up and running. Th e principals, including a previously reluctant


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A. The threat is ongoing. Wehave made important strides: our enemy has been setback but it is still capable of inflicting great damage. We are safer but not safe. Thecountry must continue to focus on the fight for years into the future.

RecommendationsQ. Does the Commission think the Homeland Security Council is a wise idea?

A. No. We think it reinforces the divide between foreign and domestic agenciesand should be abolished. Its responsibilities could be rolled into the existing NationalSecurity Council structure.

Q. Does the Commission think al Qaeda is interested in getting weapons of massdestruction?A. Yes. We found evidence going back to the 1990s of avid al Qaeda interest ingetting doomsday weapons. In 1998, before the East Africa embassy bombings,

intelligence reports described Bin Ladin talking about wanting to cause a "Hiroshima."Significant progress has been made to secure "loose nukes" and other materials, but werecommend that much more be done to ensure that the world's most dangerous weaponsdo not fall into the hands of the world's most dangerous terrorists.

Q. Does the Commission think we 're doing enough to "dry up the swamp " andstop potential recruits from joining al Qaeda?

A. No. Important progress has been made, but much more remains to be done.We recommend the creation of an international youth assistance fund to promoteeducational alternatives to extremist religious schools in the developing world.

Afghanistan and PakistanQ. Did the U.S. create al Qaeda or the Taliban to fight the Soviets after theirinvasion of Afghanistan?A. No. During the 1980s the U.S. assisted the Afghan rebels fighting the Soviets.


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Q. Was the proposed U NO CAL pipeline a driving factor in Washington's Afghanpolicy? Did we "lower our standards "and align ourselves with th e Taliban inhopes of receiving their support for the project?

A. No. To the extent that Washington had an Afghan policy before 1998, it focusedprimarily on ending the bloody civil was in that country. As one possible way tobring the waning factions to the table, the State Department supportedUNOCAL's pipeline project. But our research indicates that neither Washingtonno r UNOCAL favored the Taliban in hopes of securing a pipeline. Rather,Washington sought to work with all factions in securing a stable peace, aprerequisite fo r successful pipeline project. UNOCAL's pipeline project wasabandoned after the 1998 embassy attacks.

Q. Did the Sudanese o f f e r to give us Bin Ladin?A. Based on our investigation and interviews with a number of officials, we havefound no evidence that Sudan offered to turn Bin Ladin over to the U.S. in 1996.But we have also found no evidence that Washington asked Sudan to turn Bin

Ladin over to us (though we encouraged the Sudanese to expel him from theircountry). Some officials have told us that because there was no indictment of BinLadin at that time, there would have been no basis for us to take hold of BinLadin.

Q. How did we try to pressure th e Taliban into giving up Bin Ladin why didn 't itwork?A. Forover three years (spring 1998 - September 2001) American diplomats pressedthe Taliban to turn Bin Ladin over. Washington directly (and indirectly through

cooperating countries such as Saudi Arabia) demanded that the Taliban turn overBin Ladin. We enacted sanctions against the Taliban and even threatened to holdthem responsible for future al Qaeda attacks. But Bin Ladin's relationship withthe Taliban's Mullah Omar had become so strong that Omar was probably neverwilling to expel him.

Q. In our discussions with the Taliban, how did they react to our concerns andthreats?A. After raising the topic with the Taliban, American diplomats were often left

wondering what else could be done. Often the concerns and demands did not


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Q. How much of an obstacle was Pakistan in our diplomatic e f f o r t s to solve the BinLadin problem?A. Elements of the Pakistani government, such as its intelligence bureau (ISID),were a serious problem. The ISID had a strong connection with the Taliban anddid not want to press them on the Bin Ladin issue. And the country's politicalleadership was either unwilling or unable to force the ISID to change course onthis issue.Q. Was there any difference in the way diplomacy was used by the Clinton and Bushadministrations?A. Before 9/11 both administrations used the same diplomatic tactics to press theTaliban on Bin Ladin's presence in Afghanistan. This included constantcomplaints, threats to "be held responsible" for future al Qaeda attacks andsanctions.Q. Are we doing enough in Pakistan and Afghanistan today?A. This is a tough battle. These areboth poor countries that need a tremendousamount of attention to alleviate their long-term problems. We made a mistake in

the 1990's by ignoring was going on in these countrieswe can't make the samemistake twice. We are playing "catch-up" here and can't afford to abandon thesetw o countries.Saudi Arabia

Q. Fifteen of nineteen hijackers were Saudis, and the Kingdom appears to have beenth e leading source of money for al Qaeda, How involved was the Saudi royalfamily?A. We have no credible evidence of direct Saudi government support for the 9/11plot. However, the regime took fe w steps to stop al Qaeda fundraising andallowed support fo r jihadism to flourish when it was not directed at Saudi Arabia.Q . What were some of th e problems th e United States had with regard tocounterterrorism and Saudi Arabia before 9/11?A. Saudi Arabia often did not share relevant information on al Qaeda. The Al Saud


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A. The United States often did not make counterterrorism a top priority in thebilateral relationship, with Iraq and the Middle East Peace Process takingprecedence. Much of the emphasis within counterterrorism was on sharinginformation with regard to the Khobar Towers investigation, not on tracking an ddisrupting al-Qaeda.

Q. How good is counterterrorism cooperation today with Saudi Arabia?A. Counterterrorism cooperation with the Kingdom is the best it has ever been after a

long and trouble history. After the May 2003 attacks in the Kingdom, the regimetook unprecedented measures to confront jihadists with the country and to crackdown on terrorist financing. The Kingdom is cooperating today with several U.S.intelligence initiatives and is providing unprecedented access to informationrelated to terrorism. The biggest problem today is not the Kingdom's willingnessto cooperate, but rather its limited capacity fo r gathering, processing, an d sharingimportant information.

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Mike HurleyFrom: Mike HurleySent: Monday, July 19, 2004 12:37 PMTo: Front OfficeCc: Team 3Subject: Team 3's draft Q's and A 's for the final report rollout

Philip, Chris, Dan, Steve:

At the attachment please find our draft Q's and A's to prep commissioners for the finalreport rollout.Please let us know if we can be of further help on this.Mike


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Q&A's for Final Report RolloutTeam 3 Counterterrorism PolicyDeleted: 's andDeleted: fDeleted: rDeleted: r

W as 9/11 Preventable?

Q . Could 9/11 have been avoided?A . Ji n h i n d s i g h t , it's possible. Both the CIA and the FBI had opportunities to collateinfor mat ion on some of the would-be hijackers mon ths before 9/11. It's possible that ifthese in dividuals had been arrested and question ed, or followed, they would have been

prevented from carryin g out the plot. But there are n o assurances that even had thathappened, ^h e government would have caught all of them before they could carry ou ttheir plan. Deficiencies in the CIA an d FBI contributed to their in abili ty to conn ect thedots.Which Options Were Taken, and Which WereNot

Q . Al Qaeda blew up our embassi e s in 1998 and the USSo\e in 2000. W hy didn 'twe send troops into Afghanistan to wipe them out?A . Before 9/11, al Qaeda was responsible for the deaths of less than 50 Americans .This clearly showed it was a danger . But all senior policyrnakers of both th e Clinton an dBush administrations agreed i t would have been impossible to i nvade A fghanis tan before9/11. The Commission, however, found that neither admission organized a robust effortto shape congressional, American public, or international opinion about the necessity ofus ing force aga ins t Bin Ladin.Q . W hy didn't we pu t military "boots^onjhe^ground" in Afghanistan before 9/11?A . There werefs o m e officials in , th e Pentagon wh o advocated doing so. But it is amajor political an d security decision to invade a country. An invasion would haverequired basing and support from Afghanistan's neighbors, such as Pakistan andUzbekistan . Man y officials told us this would have been hard to obtain before 9/11.Q . Does the Commission believe that the Pentagon unduly resisted the option ofusing force in Afghanistan?A. The U.S. military follows orders. If ordered to deploy troops to Afghanis tan fo rcommando raids, or other operations i t would have done so. The mili tary when askedcame up with options fo r u s i n g force in Afghanis tan. In the commission's view,however, i t gave both Presidents Clinton and Bush limited and uncreative options, an dwas reluctant to take a position on wh ich option s would be most effective for reducing

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the Bin Ladin threat. It was more engaged in taking defensive measures against al Qaedathan proposing offensive actions.Th e U.S.military was reluctant to deploy troops to Afghanistan. It wou ld have done

so had it been ordered to do so by the President. But the military's position was that itlacked actionable intelligence on Bin Ladin's location, without which it would havemeant that its forces would be exposed to great risk with a low probability of succeeding.Q. Who is responsible for the failure to protect ou r country from al Qaeda?A. Th e Commission's view is that many committed officials were aware of the alQaeda threat and worked hard to counter it. The broader government as a whole,however, had a difficult time changing our security and intelligence institutions toeffectively combat this new kind of non,state enemy . Both Presidents Clinton and Bushwere genuinely concerned abou t the threat. But the governme nt did not organize agovernment-wide effort to defeat the threat until after the 9/11 attacks made clear that ou rhomeland was in danger.Q. Did both the Clinton an d Bush adm inistrations underestimate the threat posed byBin Ladin and al Qaeda?A. Both Presidents Clinton and Bush were concerned about the threat. TheCommission found that across the government^ there was a failure of imagination

concerning the threat. Few had internalized the idea that al Qaeda could launchcatastrophic attacks in the United States.Q. Did President Clinton make th e right choice in not authorizing m issile strikes onthose occasions when th e CI A provided intelligence on Bin Ladin's location inAfghanistan? Did we miss an opportunity here?A. Officials in the Clinton administration, including T^tional Security AdvisorSandy Berger and DC I George Tenet told us that on the three,major occasions when the

CIA provided decision makers with real-time intelligence on Bin Ladin's location, theintelligence itself was found to be insufficiently reliable to serve as the basis for cruisemissile attacks. Officials were also concerned about the possibility of killing o r injuringinnocent civilians in proximity to Bin Ladin. As B erger told us. the DCI would tellpolicymakers. "We just don ' t have it.'?Q. You say that before 9/11 th e U.S. never adopted th e elimination ofal Qaeda as aclear strategic objective? Why?

A. It was difficult for our gove rnment to unde rstand that the terrorist threat that it haddealt with for 30 years, one that was state-sponsored, had transformed; and that by thelate 1990,8., al Qaeda, a noi\state terrorist organization^ had become highly dangerous.Therefore, it dealt with al Qaeda using largely the means and elements of national power

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Documents

T3 B9 Final Report Publication Fdr- Entire Contents- Emails- Withdrawal Notices- Lists of Questions and Answers Talking Points 989