T 2N/1NR: Engagement Can’t Require A Response

On engagement T

Extend our definitions and interpretations.

Our interpretation is that the plan itself must increase engagement which requires a particular response from the U.S alone for the affirmative team to access solvency. The problem that the affirmative faces is that the plan violates because it requires the U.S and China to create a response to one another. That refers back to our Smith 5 evidence.

Extend our violation that states that the affirmative cannot access any of their solvency as U.S action alone is not sufficient. The plan must be unconditional in order for them to access their solvency and advantages.

Extend our reasons to prefer our interpretation and group any counter-interpretation and counter-standards the 1AR extended. First, our definition of the word engagement not only takes in that single word but also refers to the whole resolution. This makes our definition of engagement the most common and most predictable. Predictability is more important than limits because limits and reasonability are arbitrary standards. Also, we provide better ground than any alternative interpretation because our ground is predictable.

Extends our argument that topicality is a voter, because the affirmative’s job is to affirm the resolution. If they don’t meet the best interpretation of the resolution, then they are not affirming the resolution.

Finally, extend that a plan flaw is an independent voter. Even if they prove they are topical, our Smith evidence proves that the plan is flawed because no response can be required. This takes out the solvency, because their plan cannot require China to respond or else, under our definition, they are not topical. Meaning that, even if the U.S responds, there is no definite that China will also cooperate. This takes out all of their advantages, and without the advantages then there is no reason to vote in affirmation. This should go down on the flow for the negative team.

AT No LinkApoc K

First, we asked them in the CX of the 1AC if their case was going to save the world from any type of extinction impact and they said that it did.

Second, their 1AC was phrased according to “try-or-die” logic..Quote a few lines from their evidence or tag lines from the 1AC. Look for words like extinction or apocalypse.

Third, now that it is clear that this argument links, I would like to emphasize that presenting impacts in terms of the apocalypse distorts risk assessment and causes inaction.Gross and Gilles 12 — Mathew Barrett Gross, New Media Strategist who served as the Director of Internet Communications for Howard Dean's 2004 presidential campaign, and Mel Gilles, Director of Sol Kula Yoga and Healing, 2012 ("How Apocalyptic Thinking Prevents Us from Taking Political Action," The Atlantic, April 23rd, Available Online at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/how-apocalyptic-thinking-prevents-us-from-taking-political-action/255758/, Accessed 10-31-2014)

Flip through the cable channels for long enough, and you'll inevitably find the apocalypse . On Discovery or National Geographic or History you'll find shows like MegaDisasters, Doomsday Preppers, or The Last Days on Earth chronicling, in an hour of programming, dozens of ways the world might end: a gamma ray burst from a nearby star peeling away the Earth's ozone layer like an onion; a mega-volcano erupting and plunging our planet into a new ice age; the magnetic poles reversing . Turn to a news channel, and the headlines appear equally apocalyptic, declaring that the "UN Warns of Rapid Decay in Environment" or that "Humanity's Very Survival" is at risk. On another station, you'll find people arguing that the true apocalyptic threat to our way of life is not the impending collapse of ecosystems and biodiversity but the collapse of the dollar as the world's global currency. Change the channel again, and you'll see still others insisting that malarial mosquitoes, drunk on West Nile virus, are the looming specter of apocalypse darkening our nation's horizon. How to make sense of it all? After all, not every scenario can be an apocalyptic threat to our way of life -- can it? For many, the tendency is to dismiss all the potential crises we are facing as overblown: perhaps cap and trade is just a smoke screen designed to earn Al Gore billions from his clean-energy investments; perhaps terrorism is just an excuse to increase the power and reach of the government. For others, the panoply of potential disasters becomes overwhelming, leading to a distorted and paranoid vision of reality and the threats facing our world -- as seen on shows like Doomsday Preppers. Will an epidemic wipe out humanity, or could a meteor destroy all life on earth? By the time you're done watching Armageddon Week on the History Channel, even a rapid reversal of the world's magnetic poles might seem terrifyingly likely and imminent. The last time apocalyptic anxiety spilled into the mainstream to the extent that it altered the course of history -- during the Reformation -- it relied on a revolutionary new communications technology: the printing press. In a similar way, could the current surge in apocalyptic anxiety be attributed in part to our own revolution in communications technology? The media, of course, have long mastered the formula of packaging remote possibilities as urgent threats, as sociologist Barry Glassner pointed out in his bestseller The Culture of Fear. We're all familiar with the formula: "It's worse than you think," the anchor intones before delivering an alarming report on date-rape drugs, stalking pedophiles, flesh-eating bacteria, the Ebola virus (née avian flu cum swine flu). You name it (or rename it): if a threat has even a

remote chance of materializing, it is treated as an imminent inevitability by television news. It's not just that if it bleeds, it leads. If it might bleed, it still leads. Such sensationalist speculation attracts eyeballs and sells advertising, because fear sells -- and it can sell everything from pharmaceuticals to handguns to duct tape to insurance policies. "People react to fear, not love," Richard Nixon once said. "They don't teach that in Sunday school, but it's true." Nothing inspires fear like the end of the world, and ever since Y2K, the media's tendency toward overwrought speculation has been increasingly married to the rhetoric of apocalypse. Today, nearly any event can be explained through apocalyptic language , from birds falling out of the sky (the Birdocalypse?) to a major nor'easter (Snowmageddon!) to a double-dip recession (Barackalypse! Obamageddon!). Armageddon is here at last -- and your local news team is live on the scene! We've seen the equivalent of grade inflation (A for Apocalypse!) for every social, political, or ecological challenge before us, an escalating game of one-upmanship to gain the public's attention. Why worry about global warming and rising sea levels when the collapse of the housing bubble has already put your mortgage underwater? Why worry that increasing droughts will threaten the supply of drinking water in America's major cities when a far greater threat lies in the possibility of an Arab terrorist poisoning that drinking supply, resulting in millions of casualties? Yet not all of the crises or potential threats before us are equal, nor are they equally probable -- a fact that gets glossed over when the media equate the remote threat of a possible event, like epidemics, with real trends like global warming. Over the last decade, the 24-hour news cycle and the proliferation of media channels has created ever-more apocalyptic content that is readily available to us, from images of the Twin Towers falling in 2001 to images of the Japanese tsunami in 2011. So, too, have cable channels like Discovery and History married advances in computer-generated imagery with emerging scientific understanding of our planet and universe to give visual validity to the rare and catastrophic events that have occurred in the past or that may take place in the distant future. Using dramatic, animated images and the language of apocalypse to peddle such varied scenarios, however, has the effect of leveling the apocalyptic playing field, leaving the viewer with the impression that terrorism, bird flu, global warming, and asteroids are all equally probable. But not all of these apocalyptic scenarios are equally likely, and they're certainly not equally likely to occur within our lifetimes -- or in our neighborhood s . For example, after millions of Americans witnessed the attacks of 9/11 on television, our collective fear of terrorism was much higher than its actual probability; in 2001, terrorists killed one-twelfth as many Americans as did the flu and one-fifteenth as many Americans as did car accidents. Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, the odds of an American being killed by a terrorist were about 1 in 88,000 -- compared to a 1 in 10,010 chance of dying from falling off a ladder. The fears of an outbreak of SARS, avian flu, or swine flu also never lived up to their media hype. This over-reliance on the apocalyptic narrative causes us to fear the wrong things and to mistakenly equate potential future events with current and observable trends . How to discern the difference between so many apocalyptic options? If we ask ourselves three basic questions about the many threats portrayed apocalyptically in the media, we are able to separate the apocalyptic wheat from the chaff. Which scenarios are probable? Which are preventable? And what is the likely impact of the worst-case model of any given threat?

Finally, this is the single most important impact in this debate because debate as a whole exists in order to improve our decision making skills – that’s Strait and Wallace 08.

China gets Taiwan in the squo – The US can’t continue to back Taiwan Mearsheimer 14 (John, Political scientist at UChicago, “Say Goodbye To Taiwan”, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931?page=4)

While the United States has good reasons to want Taiwan as part of the balancing coalition it will build against China, there are also reasons to think this relationship is not sustainable over the long term. For starters, at some point in the next decade or so it will become impossible for the United States to help Taiwan defend itself against a Chinese attack. Remember that we are talking about a China with

much more military capability than it has today. In addition, geography works in China’s favor in a major way, simply because Taiwan is so close to the Chinese mainland and so far away from the United States . When it comes to a competition between China and the

United States over projecting military power into Taiwan, China wins hands down. Furthermore, in a fight over Taiwan, American policy makers would surely be reluctant to launch major attacks against Chinese forces on the mainland , for fear they might

precipitate nuclear escalation. This reticence would also work to China’s advantage. One might argue that there is a simple way to deal with the fact that Taiwan will not have an effective conventional deterrent against China in the not-too-distant future: put America’s nuclear umbrella over Taiwan. This approach will not solve the problem , however, because the United States is not going to escalate to the nuclear level if Taiwan is being overrun by China. The stakes are not high enough to risk a general thermonuclear war. Taiwan is not Japan or even South Korea. Thus, the smart strategy for

America is to not even try to extend its nuclear deterrent over Taiwan. There is a second reason the United States might eventually forsake Taiwan: it is an especially dangerous flashpoint, which could easily precipitate a Sino-American war that is not in America’s interest. U.S. policy makers understand that the fate of Taiwan is a matter of great concern to Chinese of all persuasions and that they will be extremely angry if it looks like the United States is preventing unification. But that is exactly what Washington will be doing if it forms a close military alliance with Taiwan, and that point will not be lost on the Chinese people. It is important to note in this regard that Chinese nationalism, which is a potent force, emphasizes how great powers like the United States humiliated China in the past when it was weak and appropriated Chinese territory like Hong Kong and Taiwan. Thus, it is not difficult to imagine crises breaking out over Taiwan or scenarios in which a crisis escalates into a shooting war. After all, Chinese nationalism will surely be a force for trouble in those crises, and China will at some point have the military wherewithal to conquer Taiwan, which will make war even more likely. There was no flashpoint between the superpowers during the Cold War that was as dangerous as Taiwan will be in a Sino-American security competition. Some commentators liken Berlin in the Cold War to Taiwan, but Berlin was not sacred territory for the Soviet Union and it was actually of little strategic importance for either side. Taiwan

is different. Given how dangerous it is for precipitating a war and given the fact that the United States will eventually reach the point where it

cannot defend Taiwan, there is a reasonable chance that American policy makers will eventually conclude that it makes good strategic sense to abandon Taiwan and allow China to coerce it into accepting unification.

DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT Solvency 1.China and the US will not trust each otherMichael Mazza (research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute) 4-23-2013, "Why America and China can’t trust each other," No Publication, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/04/23/why-america-and-china-cant-trust-each-other/

Because the Chinese political system is a closed one, foreign observers can never be sure that Chinese pronouncements on foreign policy, strategy, and intentions are genuine . There is no free press or independent legislature to call Chinese leaders to account or challenge their public statements. Unlike in democracies, it is much easier for China’s leaders to keep the results of their internal deliberations secret and to control the message that is delivered publicly. Due to the nature of the Chinese political system and Beijing’s propensity for secrecy, it would be folly for any country – let alone the United States, which China clearly views as potential adversary – to take Chinese words at face value. Indeed, in his 2011 book, “A Contest Supremacy,” Aaron Friedberg quite clearly explained the link between transparency and China’s closed political system: “ Even if Beijing were suddenly to unleash a flood of information, American analysts would regard it with profound skepticism, scrutinizing it carefully for signs of deception and disinformation. And they would be right to do so; the centralized, tightly controlled Chinese government is far better able to carry off such schemes than its open, divided, and leaky American counterpart.” Nor is it easy for Beijing to trust Washington. While America’s open political system makes it difficult for the United States to pull off any sort of strategic surprise – consider how far ahead of time the Bush administration began preparing the American public for the 2003 invasion of Iraq – China’s leaders believe their U.S. counterparts have already aired their malign intentions in public. Successive American presidents have consistently stated their support for the spread of liberty globally and for the development of democracy in China in particular. One of President Bill Clinton’s main arguments for supporting Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization was that trade with China would, over time, lead to greater political freedom in that country. American leaders cannot trust Chinese leaders because the latter’s long-term designs are difficult to discern and clouded in secrecy. Beijing cannot trust Washington because it believes Washington has already made clear U.S. opposition to the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party, even if America’s ultimate plans for bringing down the CCP are unclear. If Beijing felt so inclined, it could publicize all PLA unit designations down to the platoon level, while Americans cheered China on for increasing transparency. Even then , each country would continue to look at the other through a glass, darkly. For the foreseeable future, true Sino-American trust will remain illusory .

1. China Doesn’t Trust the U.S.: History and differing views of government proveMichael Tai, The Diplomat, 9-15-2015, "The Missing Piece of US-China Relations: Trust," Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-missing-piece-of-us-china-relations-trust/

The Diplomat: In your book, you focus on the role of trust in international relations, arguing that such trust is crucial particularly between rising

and established powers. But is it possible for the U.S. and China to build up trust, given the vast differences between their

political systems and values? The problem lies not so much in differences in political systems and values as in Washington’s notion that no one should challenge U.S. supremacy. Washington applies morality selectively. Indeed, it has no problem befriending states with quite different political systems and values, even corrupt and repressive regimes, as long as they serve American interests. Its foreign policy is guided less by moral norms or the vision of a “shining city upon a hill”

than by the self-interest of an elite class. While claiming to champion democracy and freedom, the U.S. has a history of subverting or overthrowing democratically elected governments (in Indonesia, Iran, Guatemala, Chile,

etc.) who choose not to toe Washington’s line. It uses its power in institutions like the IMF and the World Bank to

advance American corporate interests against those of developing countries. Trust is based upon the record of a person’s words

and deeds. When it comes to trust, history matters. The Chinese government (the Chinese Communist Party) is not without blemish either. Economic experimentation and power struggle during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution led to famine, social upheaval, and the tragic loss of millions of innocent lives. Since market reforms began in 1978, however, China has gone from being a poor, backward country to become the world’s biggest economy. Living standards have risen dramatically but so too have pollution and corruption. These are, one might say, the growing pains of an ancient civilization building in 50 years what took the West, with its vast colonial resources, 500 years. China’s external relations, however, have been guided largely by a doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states,

a principle conceived by India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and China’s first premier, Zhou Enlai, in 1954. The Chinese conduct foreign relations with no reference to political systems, and whereas the U.S. operates hundreds of military bases around the world, there are no Chinese soldiers on foreign soil (except on UN peacekeeping duty) and no history of overthrowing foreign governments.

2. China has an inherent distrust of diplomacy and western powersJingchao Peng & Njord Wegge (Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan; University of Tromsø) “China's bilateral diplomacy in the Arctic” December 11, 2015 Polar Geography, 2015Vol. 38, No. 3, 233–249 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1088937X.2015.1086445

When analyzing the PRC’s diplomacy , different approaches can be selected. In several accounts, issues of identity and China’s historical experiences are emphasized (Zhu 2013: 16). Such approaches build on the idea that a state’s unique historical

experiences should be given attention in an analysis (Bjola and Kornprobst 2013: 104–105). Taking into account China’s millennium-long dynastic past and its self-image as the ‘Middle Kingdom’ has hence become essential . This is also

true of its more recent and modern past where the ‘century of national humiliation’ stands out as a defining period. This century, usually referred to as the period between the Opium War in 1839 until the end of the Sino-Japanese war in 1945, was a

period during which China was dominated by several foreign imperialist powers . It has been argued that the suffering felt by the Chinese people during this period still strongly affects the national psyche and

identity, particularly of the elite, and it is a sentiment that influences how the elites of the present day relate to foreign states ( Gries 2004; Lanteigne 2013: 35; Wang 2013). Moreover, while Mao defeated the western-backed Chiang

Kai-shek in 1949, the communist regime was not recognized by several western powers, including its Asian neighbors such as Japan, for over two decades until 1972. Nor was the communist government of the PRC acknowledged in the UN as a representative of China before 1971.

Mistrust toward the international community and especially the diplomatic system has therefore long been a characteristic feature of the ruling communist party’s perceptions of the international diplomatic

environment . Only after the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966– 1976) and the introduction of a new area of reform and opening under Deng Xiaoping has China’s relationship towards the foreign world gradually become normalized (Lanteigne 2013; Liu 2011).

Say No – General (Glaser Spec)

Grand bargain fails and China says noKim 16 (Spring 2016; Patricia Kim is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University and a research fellow in the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, in the John F. Kennedy School of Government, at Harvard University; “Grand Bargain or Bad Idea? U.S. Relations with China and Taiwan”; http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_c_00239)

In “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” Charles Glaser suggests that the United States should strike a grand bargain with China by ending its commitment to Taiwan in exchange for Beijing’s promise to peacefully resolve its maritime disputes and to accept the U.S. security presence in

East Asia.1 Although Glaser’s desire to mitigate the chances for future conflict with an increasingly powerful and ambitious China is laudable, his proposed grand bargain is a nonstarter . Glaser acknowledges that territorial accommodation could come at the cost of downgrading China’s assessment of U.S. resolve to protect its interests and allies in Asia,

compromising American values, and damaging U.S. credibility in the eyes of its allies. He insists, however, that by demanding China keeps its side of the bargain and by enhancing U.S. military capabilities in the region, the United States would signal its determination to stand by American interests. Glaser’s proposal is unsound for several reasons. First, if the U nited S tates did not damage its image by attempting such a bargain in the first place, it would not need to redemonstrate resolve . Second, such a bargain would undercut one of the fundamental reasons why the U nited S tates stands with its friends and allies in East Asia —a shared appreciation of democracy and liberty. Third , Glaser emphasizes that regardless of whether the United States and China were able to strike a grand bargain, the very attempt would provide useful information about China’s foreign policy decisionmaking and long-term

aims (pp. 79–82). En gaging in such a costly and risky exercise to gauge Chinese motives is imprudent to say the least, especially because motives evolve and are contingent on the behavior of other actors . Fourth, giving any state a concession for doing something it ought to do sets a dangerous precedent . China and other claimant states should solve their maritime disputes peacefully and refrain from unilateral moves. Even if one were to set aside all of the above concerns, history shows that Glaser’s proposal is infeasible , because Chinese leaders do not see the abrogation of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan as an issue over which they must bargain and offer concessions. For example, President Richard Nixon attempted a similar grand bargain while negotiating the opening of Sino-U.S. relations from 1971 to 1972 . At the time, one of the Nixon administration’s greatest concerns was ending the Vietnam War. Beijing’s greatest priority was obtaining U.S. recognition of Taiwan as a part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and securing the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the island.2 Understanding Beijing’s desires, President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger strategized that they would offer to remove U.S. troops in exchange for China’s help in achieving peace with honor in Vietnam. Nixon’s handwritten notes for his historic trip to China demonstrate the bargain he wanted to strike: Taiwan Vietnam trade off 1. Your people expect action on Taiwan 2. Our people expect action on VN Neither can act immediately—But both are inevitable—let us not embarrass each other.3 In preparation for Nixon’s official visit, Kissinger made a secret trip to Beijing in July 1971 and proposed the bargain to the Chinese leadership. In a meeting with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, Kissinger stated that because two-thirds of the U.S. forces in Taiwan were related to American efforts in the Indochina theater, the withdrawal of those troops would depend on the resolution of the Vietnam War.4 He reasoned that although the United States was sincere in wanting to end the war, several issues— ranging from war reparations to the North Vietnamese government’s refusal to talk with the South Vietnamese

government—stood in the way of an “honorable” exit.5 Kissinger implied that China’s help in pressuring its North Vietnamese ally to accept the administration’s peace terms would speed the exit of U.S. troops from Taiwan. Chinese leaders , however, refused to strike such a bargain. In their eyes, Taiwan was a rightful part of the PRC and they did not owe the United States anything in exchange for a withdrawal of U.S. forces from territory they considered theirs. Zhou, for example, told Kissinger during their July 1971 meeting that

attempting to attach conditions to the recognition of China’s sove reignty over Taiwan was as absurd as China questioning U.S. sovereignty over Hawaii or Long Island. He emphasized that the United States should “unreservedly” recognize the PRC’s sovereignty and withdraw all U.S. troops, as this was “the natural logic of the matter.”6 Again when Nixon

suggested during his trip to Beijing in February 1972 that ending the war in Vietnam would “help the direction on Taiwan,”7 Zhou replied subtly that China was willing to “wait a little while,” and that because Taiwan was China’s “internal affair,” Beijing could not “place too much hope on the U.S. and Mr. President to achieve this.”8 Moreover, China continued to fund North Vietnam’s war efforts in the name of aiding nationalist revolutions abroad. Instead of pressuring its ally, Beijing sent unprecedented amounts of military assistance to North Vietnam between 1971

and 1973.9 China today is much more con- fidant and ambitious than the China Nixon visited in 1972 . Th ere is little reason to believe that Beijing would entertain a bargain similar to the one it rejected decades ago. Whereas Glaser’s grand bargain is infeasible, the benefits associated with territorial accommodation, such as satisfying a rising power to reduce the chance of conflict and sending reassuring signals, are worthy of serious thought. To satisfy and reassure China, one must decipher what it wants. Determining exactly what Beijing desires may be difficult, if not impossible, given multiple interests within the Chinese state and the evolving nature of any state’s aims. The central government, however, has repeatedly articulated two broad goals: the “rejuvenation” of the Chinese state at home and abroad. In fact, Xi Jinping’s first remarks after his appointment as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012 were that the party’s responsibility was to work toward “the great revival of the Chinese nation,” so that China can “stand more firmly and powerfully among all nations around the world and make a greater contribution to mankind.”10 Since then Xi has promoted the idea of the “Chinese Dream,” or zhongguo meng, which essentially consists of achieving prosperity at home and expanding China’s role and prestige in the global arena.11 Importantly, these twin goals are not necessarily incompatible with U.S. interests. A domestically stable and prosperous China with a satisfied citizenry could reduce pressure on the central government to avenge China’s “century of humiliation” by outsiders. Furthermore, a wealthy and civic-minded China with an expanded international role would not necessarily threaten U.S. interests. The world could benefit from China’s contribution to disaster relief efforts and environmental issues, its leadership in

combating terrorism and nuclear proliferation, and its generous aid to developing countries. Chinese leaders today believe that the United States is determined to contain and divide China internally.12 To reassure Beijing that this is not its intention, the United States can assist China in its rejuvenation efforts. For example, it can deepen economic interdependence through initiatives such as the U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty, which is currently being negotiated; share information and ideas on issues such as health care and social safety net programs; and support China’s desire for a greater role in the global arena by welcoming Chinese initiatives such as the recently established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. In addition, China could be given a greater role in existing institutions

such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.13 Giving China a bigger voice at the table will inevitably lead to disagreements, but it is better to debate and compromise with China at the same table than to have it create separate venues in which the United States has no influence. To conclude, a one-time territorial accommodation is not the answer to dealing with an increasingly powerful and ambitious China. Acknowledging China’s fundamental goals and shaping its behavior through engagement are better approaches to dealing with a power that is here to stay. Moreover, the United States’ Asian partners would welcome such a move instead of unnecessary confrontation or compromise.

Grand bargains don’t work, China says no, and Glaser is deludedJackson 8/6/15 (Van Jackson, Dr. Van Jackson is an Associate Professor in the College of Security Studies at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI-APCSS) in Honolulu, where he specializes in Northeast Asia, military trends and modernization, strategic studies, and international relations theory. He is also an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) in Washington, as well as a Senior Editor for War on the Rocks, “The Myth of a US-China Grand Bargain,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-myth-of-a-us-china-grand-bargain/)

The latest salvo in this “America must accommodate China” literature hails from an accomplished political scientist at George Washington

University, Charles Glaser, writing in the most recent issue of International Security. Glaser makes the sweeping and somewhat unhelpful claim that military competition is risky and therefore undesirable. As an alternative he suggests that if only

the United States would abandon commitments to Taiwan, China would be willing to resolve its territorial disputes in the East and South China Sea, thereby sidestepping military competition. Prior to around 2008, proposals for U.S.

accommodation of a rising China made much more sense, or at least could be taken more seriously. But times have changed. China’s ambitions have changed. And so has its foreign policy behavior. These contextual changes matter for whether and when

accommodation can have the desired effect. More to the point though, there are a number of problems with the grand bargain line of argumentation. First, any proposal for a Sino-U.S. solution to regional problems is by definition taking a great

power view of Asia that marginalizes the agency and strategic relevance of U.S. allies and the region’s middle powers. In the brief period (five to ten years ago) when a G-2 concept was taken semi-seriously in Washington, allies—especially South Korea and Japan—chafed. The region’s middle powers would be unlikely to simply follow the joint dictates of China and the United States without being part of it, and attempting a G-2 could ironically create a more fragmented order as a result. Including others, at any rate, is antithetical to the concept of a Sino-U.S. G-2 arrangement. As early as the 1960s U.S. officials tried to rely on China to deal with regional issues spanning from North Korea to Vietnam. It was almost always to no avail. Second, and as I’ve written about extensively elsewhere, Asia is rife with security concerns that have nothing to do with China directly, so any understanding reached with China would leave unresolved many of the region’s

latent sources of potential conflict. Sino-U.S. grand bargain proponents forget that China and the United States only have real conflicts of interest by proxy. Every conceivable conflict scenario involves China and some other Asian state—Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, Korea. The United States only becomes part of the picture because of a commitment to regional order, including its alliance network. Third, as its recent stock market crash makes all too obvious, China remains a “fragile superpower,” to quote Susan Shirk. Many factors in its domestic political situation—corruption, growing wealth disparities, and many forms of civil challenges to government legitimacy—make it an unpredictable player. Nor is China showing meaningful signs of political liberalization. There’s so much brewing underneath the surface in China that dealing with China today as if it were a hegemon tomorrow assumes too much, and grants China too much credit too soon. Fourth, there’s a defunct theory that’s been smuggled into arguments about changing Chinese behavior through U.S. accommodation. Political scientists call it “neofunctionalism,” a term rarely used these days, even though its spirit is pervasive in grand bargain arguments. Neofunctionalism came about in the 1950s as a failed way to account for and push for European integration.The basic idea involved an assumption that low level and innocuous types of cooperation would “spillover” into still more and better quality cooperation. Comity among nations, it was thought, would be the eventual outcome of mundane socioeconomic interactions. But by the 1970s, the theory had become largely discredited. Nevertheless, echoes of neofunctionalism remain in contemporary claims that properly calibrated restraint, accommodation, or appeasement can have a transformative effect on a relationship. Ironically, these arguments tend to come from scholars, not policymakers. The idea that the United States can induce China into resolving its East and South China Sea disputes by “giving” it Taiwan reflects precisely this type of expectation, as do calls for the United States to make small concessions to China in hopes that it will enable a more stable situation. None of this means that accommodative gestures or strategies should be outright dismissed. There were numerous periods of detente with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and that rivalry was much more confrontational. China and the United States, moreover, have a number of overlapping—not just conflicting—interests. I might even go as far as saying that neofunctionalism has a bit of a bad rap; there are times when trivial or non-costly forms of cooperation can lead to greater and deeper cooperation, but political scientists

haven’t convincingly figured out what those conditions are. But grand bargains rarely work. There’s a dangerous naivete in abandoning U.S. commitments on the hope that China will then be more willing to resolve its other disputes. And policies of accommodation will not suspend military competition because that involves more than present day concerns with surveillance overflight missions, territorial disputes, and current political commitments. Regardless of the policy and crisis management decisions we make today, military competition plays out over years and decades; it relates to force structure investment and doctrinal decisions that can’t be sacrificed for political promises. China’s concerns will only be assuaged when the United States divests of the

military force structure that makes it possible to project power globally, uphold its commitments, and bolster the regional order. The U.S. military will be unable to pursue such a course as long as China maintains openly expansionist geopolitical ambitions and a force structure designed to achieve it . Competition, it seems, is the logic of the situation. We ignore that at our own peril.

Say No - SCSConcessions on SCS would be a deal-breaker for ChinaBlanchard & Petty 7-14 (Ben and Martin, regular Reuters contributors, “China vows to protect South China Sea sovereignty, Manila upbeat”, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-stakes-idUSKCN0ZS02U)

China vowed to take all necessary measures to protect its sovereignty over the South China Sea and said it had the right to set up an air defense zone, after rejecting an international tribunal's ruling denying its claims to the energy-rich waters. Chinese state media called the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague a

"puppet" of external forces after it ruled that China had breached the Philippines' sovereign rights by endangering its ships and fishing and oil projects . Beijing has repeatedly

blamed the United States for stirring up trouble in the South China Sea , where its territorial claims overlap in parts with Vietnam, the

Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. "China will take all necessary measures to protect its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests," the ruling Communist Party's official People's Daily said in a front page commentary on Wednesday. The case, covering a region that is

home to one of the world's busiest trade routes, has been seen as a test of China's rising power and its economic and strategic rivalry with the United States. U nderscoring China's rebuffing of the ruling, state media said that two new airports in the Spratlys, on Mischief Reef and Subi Reef, both received test flights from civilian aircraft on Wednesday. Beijing called the Philippines' claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea

" baseless" and an "act of bad faith ". In a government white paper published on Wednesday, China also said its fishing boats had been harassed and attacked by the

Philippines around the disputed Spratly Islands. "On whether China will set up an air defense zone over the South China Sea, what we have to make clear first is that China has the right to... But whether we need one in the South China Sea depends on the level of threats we face," Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin told reporters in Beijing, adding that China hoped to return to bilateral talks with Manila. "We hope that other countries don't use this opportunity to threaten China, and hope that other countries can work hard with China, meet us halfway, and maintain the South China Sea's peace and stability and not turn the South China Sea into a source of war." U.S. officials have previously said they feared China may respond to the ruling by declaring an air defense identification zone in the South China Sea, as it did in the East China Sea in 2013, or by stepping up its building and fortification of artificial islands. China's Liu also took aim at the judges on the tribunal, saying that as not one of them was Asian they could not possibly understand the issue and it was unfair of them to try. RELATED COVERAGE › Indonesia hopes fishermen can net its South China Sea claims COMPLICATED, UNCLEAR The Philippines reacted cautiously to the ruling late on Tuesday, calling for "restraint and sobriety", but the mood at President Rodrigo Duterte's cabinet meeting on Wednesday was "upbeat", presidential spokesperson Ernesto Abella said. Philippine Defence Secretary Delfin Lorenzana said he had spoken to U.S. counterpart Ash Carter ahead of the ruling who told him China had assured the United States it would exercise restraint, and the U.S. made the same assurance. Carter had sought and been given the same assurance from the Philippines, Lorenzana added. "The ruling can serve as a foundation on which we can start the process of negotiations which hopefully will eventually lead to the peaceful settlement of the maritime dispute in the South China Sea," Charles Jose, a spokesman for the Philippines' Department of Foreign Affairs, said. One of the lawyers who argued the Philippines' case said how and when the country would enforce the tribunal's ruling was complicated. RELATED VIDEO Video China claims right to air defence zone "There's no timeline for this game. It might have an extended period of gestation," said Florin Ternal Hilbay, a former solicitor general. "I would assume our diplomats have read the decision and understand the complexities and consequences of enforcing the decision." Global intelligence firm Stratfor said fishermen from China or the Philippines were the greatest potential disruptors in the region, beyond the easy control of law enforcement. "The greatest struggle for both countries will be to rein them in, preferably before they get to sea, lest they disrupt the delicate peace," Stratfor said in a note. In moves likely to antagonize Beijing, the coastguards of Japan and the Philippines took part in simulated rescue and medical response exercises off Manila Bay on Wednesday, part of what the two countries have called efforts to improve maritime security and combat crime and piracy. Japan and China are involved in a separate territorial dispute in the East China Sea and Beijing has warned Tokyo against meddling in the South China Sea dispute. RELATED COVERAGE › Chinese civil aircraft

land on new South China Sea airports PIVOT PRESSURE Beijing's ambassador to the United States earlier blamed the rise in tension in the region on the United States' "pivot" toward Asia in the past few years . Cui Tiankai said the arbitration case "will probably open the door of abusing arbitration procedures. "It will certainly undermine and weaken the motivation of states to engage in negotiations and consultations for solving their disputes," Cui said at a forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington. "It will certainly intensify conflict and even confrontation." South Korea on Wednesday announced the planned location of a U.S. THAAD anti-missile defense unit against North Korea's missile and nuclear threats, a system that has angered China and prompted a North Korean warning of retaliation. President Barack Obama's top Asia policy adviser, Daniel Kritenbrink, said the United States had no interest in stirring tensions in the South China Sea as a pretext for involvement in the region. "We have an enduring interest in seeing territorial and maritime disputes in the Asia Pacific, including in the South China Sea, resolved peacefully, without coercion and in a manner that is consistent with international law," Kritenbrink said at the same forum. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen boarded a navy frigate in southern Taiwan ahead of its departure for the South China Sea early on Wednesday, a regular patrol pushed forward due to the Hague decision, which Taipei rejected. "This patrol mission is to show the determination of the Taiwan people to defend our national interest," Tsai said from the warship. China considers self-ruled Taiwan a breakaway province to be united with the mainland eventually, and by force if necessary.

China says no – South China Sea sovereignty too important to ChinaCheng 15 (Dean, contributor to The National Interest, “How China Views the South China Sea: As Sovereign Territory”, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-china-views-the-south-china-sea-sovereign-territory-14249)

The Chinese formulation underscores that, from Beijing’s perspective, the central issue is a basic one of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Chinese leadership since at least Deng Xiaoping has consistently characterized its approach to various maritime disputes in the same way:

“Sovereignty is ours; defer disputes; engage in joint development.” When Deng set forth this formulation in the 1980s, the emphasis [8] was on the second two clauses. At the time, he

suggested that this issue could be set aside for the next—and perhaps wiser—generation to resolve. In the meantime, China was open to joint exploitation of resources. But where the emphasis under Deng was on rapidly pushing economic development, the focus under Hu Jintao, and even more under Xi Jinping, has steadily shifted to the first clause: “sovereignty is ours.” Part of this shift is likely rooted in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS required states to file formal declarations of their baselines by May 2009, or else risk losing their rights to seabed and offshore resources. As the various parties to the Spratlys dispute (including not only the PRC and Taiwan, but also Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam) all had economic interests, it behooved them to file formal claims—claims

which Beijing sees as jeopardizing its own claims to sovereignty. But China’s posture as the aggrieved party is not solely rooted in UNCLOS filings. One striking theme that arises in any discussion with Chinese officials regarding the South China Sea is the view that the neighboring states have been encroaching on China’s territories—deliberately. Some of this, as General Fang Fenghui indicated [9] when he visited the United States, is seen as inspired by American encouragement. But as important is the argument that China’s neighbors are exploiting Beijing’s patience and forbearance. Chinese interlocutors note that China has not drilled as many wells, has not built airfields and did not first expand its islands. The Chinese position is that they have shown

restraint in not reacting to these activities—even though they are presumably occurring on Chinese territory. This is the crux of the matter. For Chinese decision makers, the South China Sea—both the waters and the islands within it—are and have always been Chinese territory. The neighbors’ actions are not merely alternative claims; they are an effort to amputate a piece of China. In this context, China is not Germany: China is France or Poland. The same reasoning means that China is not intent upon establishing a sphere of influence over the South China Sea, in a modern version of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States dominated the Gulf of Mexico and Central America, but made no claim that Haiti or Guatemala was part of the United States itself. China, on the other hand, has made clear in its behavior, if

not in its enunciated policies, that it views the waters and islands of the South China Sea as part of its sovereign territory. Hence, Chinese construction of artificial islands is perfectly within its rights, since it occurs within Chinese territory; China has no more need to consult with others over such construction than they would if they were building a new expressway in Beijing. Sovereignty as a Core Interest: The situation is further exacerbated by the overall Chinese attitude toward sovereignty. There is probably no greater supporter of the Westphalian system of nation-states, and the attendant adherence to the sanctity of borders, than the PRC. It is the basis for China’s claims to not only the South China Sea, but Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet. Given the Chinese experience with the “century of humiliation,” when China confronted the real potential of dismemberment by the colonial powers, such a perspective should not be surprising. Consequently, China views sovereignty, along with

territorial integrity, as a “core interest.” Dai Bingguo, then State Councilor for Foreign Affairs, stated [10] in 2009 that for China, core interests are those that touch upon how the state is governed: i.e., the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party, issues of territorial integrity and national sovereignty, and the ability of the PRC to develop its economy and society. Some Chinese and American analysts question whether the Chinese specifically used the term “core interest” in connection with the South China Sea, but China’s behavior suggests

that it views the region as, in fact, a core interest. This view is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future . Indeed, China’s growing military capability would suggest the exact opposite . In the 1980s and 1990s, China’s military power was exceedingly limited; at the time, it was said that China had the world’s best obsolete equipment. In that context, it was not in China’s interest to press sovereignty claims even in the “near seas,” as its air and naval forces were largely limited to coastal operations. Today, however, China’s military is a far more substantial force [11]. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) easily outmatches any navy in Southeast Asia, especially among the rival claimants. Moreover, it can count upon the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and the Second Artillery to support it in any “near seas” or

even “far seas” operations. The PRC is therefore far more able to uphold its sovereignty claims than in the past. At the same time, its interest in the South China Sea has assumed even more of a security aspect. Hainan Island, an undisputed part of China, is rapidly becoming one of the most heavily militarized locations in China. It already hosts a carrier berth and submarine pens for China’s seagoing nuclear deterrent and its attack submarines. It is also the home of China’s newest spaceport, and multiple

airbases are located there as well. China has a clear interest in keeping foreign interlopers out of the adjoining South China Sea.

Advantage one

First as an overview to the advantage I just want to look at the newest card of the entire advantage is from Fall of 14 literally 2 years ago and

that is significant when looking at the warrents that say to vote for this plan because China could soon become violent. Second on the

impact of nuclear war turn that Internal Link TurnUS involvement will only make matters worse – China is on the brink of militarizing SCS like the ECSPetty and Blanchard 7/14/16 (Martin, Petty is Bureau Chief, Vietnam, Deputy Bureau Chief, Thailand & Indochina at Reuters News Agency, Ben, Blanchard is senior correspondent, in charge of political and diplomatic news coverage for China, “China vows to protect South China Sea sovereignty, Manila upbeat,” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-stakes-idUSKCN0ZS02U)

China vowed to take all necessary measures to protect its sovereignty over the South China Sea and said it had the right to set up an air defense

zone, after rejecting an international tribunal's ruling denying its claims to the energy-rich waters. Chinese state media called the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague a "puppet" of external forces after it ruled that China had breached the Philippines' sovereign

rights by endangering its ships and fishing and oil projects. Beijing has repeatedly blamed the United States for stirring up trouble in the South China Sea, where its territorial claims overlap in parts with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and

Taiwan. "China will take all necessary measures to protect its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests," the ruling Communist Party's official People's Daily said in a front page commentary on Wednesday. The case, covering a region that is home to one of the world's busiest trade routes, has been seen as a test of China's rising power and its economic and strategic rivalry with the United States. Underscoring China's rebuffing of the ruling, state media said that two new airports in the Spratlys, on Mischief Reef and Subi Reef, both received test flights from civilian aircraft on Wednesday. Beijing called the Philippines' claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea "baseless" and an "act of bad faith". In a government white paper published on Wednesday, China also said its fishing boats had been harassed and attacked by the Philippines around the disputed Spratly Islands. "On

whether China will set up an air defense zone over the South China Sea, what we have to make clear first is that China has the right to... But whether we need one in the South China Sea depends on the level of threats we face," Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin told reporters in Beijing, adding that China hoped to return to bilateral talks with Manila. "We hope that other countries don't use this opportunity to threaten China, and hope that other countries can work hard with China, meet us halfway, and maintain the South China Sea's peace and stability and not turn the South China Sea into a source of war." U.S. officials have previously said

they feared China may respond to the ruling by declaring an air defense identification zone in the South China Sea, as it did in the East China Sea in 2013, or by stepping up its building and fortification of artificial islands. China's Liu also took aim at the judges on the tribunal, saying that as not one of them was Asian they could not possibly understand the issue and it was unfair of them to try. The Philippines reacted cautiously to the ruling late on Tuesday, calling for "restraint and sobriety", but the mood at President Rodrigo Duterte's cabinet meeting on Wednesday was "upbeat", presidential spokesperson Ernesto Abella said. Philippine Defence Secretary Delfin Lorenzana said he had spoken to U.S. counterpart Ash Carter ahead of the ruling who told him China had assured the United States it would exercise restraint, and the U.S. made the same assurance. Carter had sought and been given the same assurance from the Philippines, Lorenzana added. "The ruling can serve as a foundation on which we can start the process of negotiations which hopefully will eventually lead to the peaceful settlement of the maritime dispute in the South China Sea," Charles Jose, a spokesman for the Philippines' Department of Foreign Affairs, said. One of the lawyers who argued the Philippines' case said how and when the country would enforce the tribunal's ruling was complicated. "There's no timeline for this game. It might have an extended period of gestation," said Florin Ternal Hilbay, a former solicitor general. "I would assume our diplomats have read the decision and understand the complexities and consequences of enforcing the decision." Global intelligence firm Stratfor said fishermen from China or the Philippines were the greatest potential disruptors in the region, beyond the easy control of law enforcement. "The greatest struggle for both countries will be to rein them in, preferably before they get to sea, lest they disrupt the delicate peace," Stratfor said in a note. In moves likely to antagonize Beijing, the coastguards of Japan and the Philippines took part in simulated rescue and medical response exercises off Manila Bay on Wednesday, part of what the two countries have called efforts to improve maritime security and combat crime and piracy. Japan and China are involved in a separate territorial dispute in

the East China Sea and Beijing has warned Tokyo against meddling in the South China Sea dispute. Beijing's ambassador to the United

States earlier blamed the rise in tension in the region on the United States' "pivot" toward Asia in the past few years. Cui Tiankai said the arbitration case "will probably open the door of abusing arbitration procedures. "It will certainly undermine and weaken the motivation of states to engage in negotiations and consultations for solving their disputes," Cui said at a forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington. "It will certainly intensify conflict and even confrontation." South Korea on Wednesday announced the planned location of a U.S. THAAD anti-missile defense unit against North Korea's missile and nuclear threats, a system that has

angered China and prompted a North Korean warning of retaliation. President Barack Obama's top Asia policy adviser, Daniel Kritenbrink, said the United States had no interest in stirring tensions in the South China Sea as a pretext for

involvement in the region. "We have an enduring interest in seeing territorial and maritime disputes in the Asia Pacific, including in the South China Sea, resolved peacefully, without coercion and in a manner that is consistent with international law," Kritenbrink said at the same forum. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen boarded a navy frigate in southern Taiwan ahead of its departure for the South China Sea early on Wednesday, a regular patrol pushed forward due to the Hague decision, which Taipei rejected. "This patrol mission is to show the determination of the Taiwan people to defend our national interest," Tsai said from the warship. China considers self-ruled Taiwan a breakaway province to be united with the mainland eventually, and by force if necessary.

Abandoning Taiwan does no good for anyone – damages US credibility and military, and triggers JapanRoy 1/21/16 (Denny, Roy is Senior Fellow and Supervisor of POSCO Fellowship Program, Research Program and has a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, “Trading away Taiwan is no bargain for the USA,” PacNet, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/Pac1537.pdf)

The argument that Washington should abandon support for Taiwan to gain favor with Beijing faces strong counter- arguments that have prevailed in policy-making up to now. George Washington University professor Charles L. Glaser presents a fresh reboot of the idea in the spring 2015 issue of the journal International Security. Glaser says protecting Asia-Pacific allies is a vital US interest, but protecting Taiwan is not. Yet Taiwan is the main cause of Chinese opposition to US strategic leadership in the region. Meanwhile, tensions between China and rival claimants over disputed territory in the East and South China Seas threatens to spark military conflict, and foreign governments wish for more clarity in Beijing’s longer-term strategic intentions – specifically, whether it is a “greedy state” that seeks to replace the United States as regional hegemon. Glaser proposes solving all of these problems through a Sino-US “grand bargain”: the United States government “ends its commitment to defend Taiwan” in exchange for Beijing’s promise to “peacefully resolve” its maritime territorial disputes and “officially accept

the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.” The case for abandoning Taiwan typically meets at least three large barriers: the betrayal of US ideals, harm to America’s reputation as a reliable security partner, and Taiwan’s strategic value. Glaser’s argumentation does not overcome these barriers. Glaser says he recognizes that a foreign friendly country’s hard-won civil liberties “are important values” that Washington “should be reluctant to jeopardize,” but in the end they are not “key national interests” for the United States and are therefore expendable. It is debatable that the preservation of a democratic Taiwan is not a key US interest. Recent US presidential administrations representing both major political parties have affirmed a US strategic interest in spreading democracy because democratic countries are generally supportive of the US-sponsored international system of liberal norms and institutions. Glaser focuses on the US interest in avoiding a war with China. But what about the US interest in preventing a Taiwan-China war? One of the main reasons for US forward deployment is to help keep the region stable. The PRC argues that the Taiwan “separatist” challenge would quickly dry up if the US stopped selling weapons to Taiwan, but Taipei has argued the opposite: cross-Strait stability is possible only if Taiwan feels secure, and the Republic of China (ROC) will not negotiate with China under the

gun. Beijing should not assume Taiwan would be quick to surrender even in a disadvantageous situation. Abandoning staunch, long-time friend like Taiwan would damage US credibility in the eyes of other regional governments. Glaser argues that in the case of Japan, this damage would be containable. Tokyo realizes that compared to Taipei, its relationship with Washington is more strongly

institutionalized. Japan also has nowhere else to go, he says, other than sticking with the United States. This is probably true, although US abandonment of Taiwan would reinforce Japan’s fear regarding the long-term US reliability to stand up to a strengthening China. This would embolden Japanese advocates of accommodating China, as well as those who call for a militarily strong Japan unleashed from the alliance. What about the damage to the reputation of the US among friends in Seoul, Canberra, Manila, and elsewhere? Glaser mentions only Tokyo, the relatively easy case. On the subject of Taiwan’s strategic value, Glaser spends most of his effort arguing against his own thesis. He points out that Taiwan acts as a huge barrier,

creating choke points for the deployment of PLA naval forces, while possession of Taiwan would give the PLAN direct access to the deeper waters of the Pacific, would increase the Chinese A2/AD capability, would extend the range of air cover for the Chinese navy, and particularly would make it easy for Chinese submarines to enter the Philippine Sea and threaten US carrier battle groups there . Having made these points, Glaser unconvincingly concludes that controlling Taiwan would not “significantly increase” Chinese military leverage. Glaser’s case has other weaknesses. He assumes that the US abandonment of Taiwan would “dramatically improve” US-China relations, and that “China can be very secure with the United States maintaining its alliances and forward deployment” as long as Taiwan is no longer in play. This is believable only if we posit that Beijing has no aspirations for regional leadership or revisions of the current order beyond gaining control over Taiwan, both now

and in the future. The “grand bargain” idea probably resonates less with Beijing than Washington. From Beijing’s point of view, this would be asking it to trade something it believes it already owns for something else it believes it already owns. If they did agree, how the “bargain” would be operationalized is unclear. What would it mean for China to “officially accept” US alliances and military bases in the Asia-Pacific? This would seem to require Beijing to renounce its proudly “principled” opposition to any country having “Cold War era” alliances and foreign bases. At the same time, it is easy to foresee China continuing its pre-bargain activities (military buildup, maneuvers with Russia, naval patrols in the East and South China Sea, etc.) while claiming these were not attempts to drive US influence out of the region. Glaser recognizes that Chinese leaders may intend to push out their US rival. He argues his proposal would answer the question of whether this is Beijing’s plan. If Beijing accepts the proposal, it would indicate that China has limited aims and can

tolerate continued US regional hegemony. If not, China intends to usurp that role from the United States. If we now recognize that expelling US strategic leadership may be Beijing’s intention, unilaterally assisting the Chinese by abandoning Taiwan is not the most sensible policy if the US hopes to retain its accustomed role . The timing of Glaser’s proposal is particularly bad given that Xi Jinping’s government seems to represent a shift toward a more assertive Chinese foreign policy that has grown impatient with waiting for the United States to decline on its own.

Advantage 2 Once again

Ext -- Inevitable

We’re already past the tipping pointGuterl 9 – Fred Guterl 9, Executive Editor of Scientific American, Will Climate Go Over The Edge?, 2009 http://www.newsweek.com/id/185822

Since the real world is so messy, climate scientists Gerard Roe and Marcia Baker turned for insight to the distinctly neater world of mathematics. Last year, they published an analysis in the journal Science arguing that climate models were skewed in the direction of underestimating the warming effect of carbon . The report reasoned that carbon emissions have the potential to trigger many changes that amplify the warming effect—water absorbs more sunlight than ice, humidity traps more heat, and so on—but few that would mitigate it. The odds, they figure, are about one in three that temperatures will rise by 4.5 degrees C (the top of the IPCC's range), but there's little chance at all that they'll rise by less than 2 degrees C . "We've had a hard time eliminating the possibility of very large climate changes," says Roe. The answer is still couched in probabilities, but they've shifted in a worrying direction.¶ What can be done? Can a diplomatic miracle in Copenhagen save the planet from the dreaded tipping point? Sea ice in the Antarctic was supposed to last for 5,000 years until scientists found that the melting was proceeding at a faster pace than expected. Now it will all be gone in a mere 850 years. Bringing it back would require something like 10,000 years of cooler temperatures. Is there any way to halt the process before it goes too far? ¶

No , says Susan Solomon, a climate scientist at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in Boulder, Colorado. In a recent study in the Proceedings of the National Academies of Science, she found that most of the carbon we've already released into the atmosphere will hang around for another 1,000 years. Even if world leaders somehow managed to persuade everybody to stop driving cars and heating their homes—bringing carbon emissions down to zero immediately —the Earth would continue to warm for centuries. The effect of rising temperatures on rainfall patterns is also irreversible, says Solomon. Parts of the world that tend to be dry (Mexico, north Africa, southern Europe and the western parts of Australia and the United States) will continue to get drier, while wet areas (the South Pacific islands, the horn of Africa) will keep getting wetter. "You have to think of it as being like a dial that can only turn one way," she says. "We've cranked up the dial, and we don't get to crank it back." The point of a climate treaty, then, isn't so much to roll things back as to keep them from getting a whole lot worse—a worthy and important goal, if not a particularly inspiring one.

Warming tipping points inevitable – too late

NPR 9 (1/26, Global Warming Is Irreversible, Study Says, All Things Considered, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99888903)

Climate change is essentially irreversible, according to a sobering new scientific study.

As carbon dioxide emissions continue to rise, the world will experience more and more long-term environmental disruption. The damage will persist even when, and if, emissions are brought under control, says study author Susan Solomon, who is among the world's top climate scientists.

"We're used to thinking about pollution problems as things that we can fix," Solomon says. "Smog, we just cut back and everything will be better later. Or haze, you know, it'll go away pretty quickly."

That's the case for some of the gases that contribute to climate change, such as methane and nitrous oxide. But as Solomon and colleagues suggest in a new study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, it is not true for the most abundant greenhouse gas:

carbon dioxide. Turning off the carbon dioxide emissions won't stop global warming .

"People have imagined that if we stopped emitting carbon dioxide that the climate would go back to normal in 100 years or 200 years. What

we're showing here is that's not right. It's essentially an irreversible change that will last for more than a thousand years," Solomon says.

This is because the oceans are currently soaking up a lot of the planet's excess heat — and a lot of the carbon dioxide put into the

air. The carbon dioxide and heat will eventually start coming out of the ocean . And that will take place for many hundreds of years.

Solomon is a scientist with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Her new study looked at the consequences of this long-term effect in terms of sea level rise and drought.

Extensions – AdaptationAdaptation now, it solves

Richard Stroup, Summer 2014, The Independent, The Economics of Climate Change: Adaptations Past and Present, Richard Stroup is a professor at NC State University

In contrast, adaptation not only shows promise but is a process that has been going on in response to changing climate for centuries-and probably for millennia. The fact is that regional changes in climate have been seen in many parts of the globe over the past century, and people living in those regions, especially farmers, have adapted. Some of those adaptations are recorded and analyzed in this book.

Libecap and Steckel suggest that as people learn more about how others deal with widely differing climates around the world, learning and adaptation will occur more rapidly, more effectively, and more inexpensively. As climate predictions and adaptive technologies have improved with each passing decade-more rapidly over time, especially in agriculture-changes in climate (the ones delivered by nature) have caused fewer surprises and less harm to humans.

Six of the eleven chapters deal with agriculture, which the editors conclude "was amazingly adaptive through new crop types, mixes, and methods of cultivation" (p. 12).

For such adaptation to continue, these authors say, one essential ingredient is that governments allow and encourage the research and experimentation, especially in agriculture, that make adaptation possible.

To make their case, the authors of individual chapters marshal an impressive variety of evidence to show that individuals and communities have reacted successfully to actual climate impacts such

as long periods of drought. For example, John Landon-Lane, Hugh Rockoff, and Richard Steckel analyze the impact of drought on bank failures and bank equity in two separate periods of stressKansas in the late nineteenth century and Oklahoma in the 1930s. In the early period in Kansas, drought hit the entire economy severely. The authors find, however, that in Oklahoma in the later period (the devastating and much more famous Dust Bowl) only small state banks suffered seriously; national banks spread their risk by making loans across wider geographic areas. Losses in one or two states could then be offset by surpluses from their branches in other regions. Also, after 1940 the link between weather and economic devastation weakened considerably. As the editors summarize the findings in this chapter, there was "considerable adjustment through institutional changes via branch banking that allowed banks to better sustain localized drought-induced economic stress and through agricultural adjustments through a shift to new crops and new production methods" (p. 15).

Another illustration of agricultural adaptation is found in the chapter on hybrid corn by Richard Sutch. To some extent challenging an important 1957 study by Zvi Griliches, Sutch says that the adoption of hybrid corn before the drought of 1936 was a slow and complex process-less straightforward than Griliches had argued. But the 1936 drought changed that. Farmers discovered that hybrid corn was different-it could tolerate drought. That discovery accelerated its adoption in areas prone to drought. Thus, the chapter illustrates the interrelationship of stress, such as climate change, and learning and adapting.

Can government intervention help adaptation? The book has a couple of chapters suggesting that some government intervention can be beneficial. For example, the chapter on water infrastructure by Zeynep Hansen, Gary Libecap, and Scott Lowe shows that the U.S. federal government's twentiethcentury investment in dams and canals in the West helped farmers adapt to changes in climate. Those counties with more water storage and distribution facilities were better able to deal with varying periods of drought and excess precipitation.

Global adaptation

News Point, August 16, 2014

Climate impacts report: Key findings

The scientists also have high confidence that wildlife on land, in the rivers and in the oceans have shifted their geographic ranges, migration patterns and seasonal behaviour. Few extinctions have been

tied to man-made global warming so far, but the report points out that much slower episodes of climate change over millions of years caused significant ecosystem changes and the disappearance of numerous species.

Previous studies have shown a mixture of impacts on food production, with some areas benefiting from changes, while others are hit hard. The authors say with high confidence that the negative impacts of climate change on crop yields have been more common than positive ones.

" Adaptation is becoming embedded in some planning processes , with more limited implementation of response."

Throughout history, people have tried to cope with a changing climate - with varying degrees of success, the report says. The document says that governments at various levels are beginning to develop adaptation plans and integrate climate considerations into existing programmes such as disaster risk management and water management.

The authors then present summaries of the steps different regions are taking to adapt to climate change. Progress has been variable. In Africa, for example, governments have started to build systems for disaster risk management and are taking basic public health measures.

But it points out that such efforts have tended to be isolated so far.

In Europe, adaptation policies have been developed across all levels of government, while in North America, "incremental" planning is taking place, with some proactive adaptation to protect long-term investments in energy infrastructure. Oceania's adaptation efforts have been focused around sea level rise, and in southern Australia, on water scarcity.

Asia adapting

States News Service, August 19, 2014, BOOK LAUNCH OF ASSESSING THE COSTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND ADAPTATION IN SOUTH ASIA

Second, we will need to address urban development issues and transform the transport sector. We [see] cities as the main battleground against climate change with need to push for sustainable urban infrastructure. ADBs Urban Operational Plan promotes green, inclusive, competitive and livable cities. Our urban lending for 2010-2013 is $6.6 billion, with more than 90% of urban lending is for urban environment improvement.

We have the Trust Fund for Urban Climate Change Resilience to strengthen resilience in secondary cities in Asia. Our Sustainable Transport Initiative guides us in our transport operations. The Dhaka Bus Rapid Transit System is a good example of sustainable transport. ADB and the other major multi-lateral development banks partnered last year during the Rio+20 summit to $175 billion for sustainable transport.

Third, increasing adaptation work is essential to responding to climate change. At ADB, we are increasing our capacity to do climate proofing. Our water supply and drainage infrastructure in project in Khulna is one good example of climate readiness - addressing the concern of possible salinity of the groundwater brought about by sea level rise.3 Recently, we adopted climate screening procedure for our projects. From our experience in ADB, the additional costs of climate-proofing vulnerable investment projects can range from around 5% to 15% of baseline investment requirements. What is critical though is the financing - adaptation costs in Asia and the Pacific may require financial resources of about $40 billion annually, through 2050. We have also adopted an integrated disaster risk management framework that includes climate change adaptation.

Fourth, we have in place financing mechanisms for climate finance. We are deploying concessional resources from both multilateral climate funds and internally-manage funds totaling about $2.55 billion. We have the Clean Investment Funds amounting to $1.76 billion. We provide carbon finance through our Asia-Pacific Carbon Fund ($151.8 million) and Future Carbon Fund ($115 million). This year we established the Y1.8 billion Japan Fund for the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JFJCM) to support the adoption of advanced low-carbon technologies. We promote public-private partnership (PPP) in climate finance. For example, we recently launched the $400 million Asia Climate Partners, a joint venture that will undertake commercially-oriented private equity investments across a variety of environmentally supportive, low-carbon transactions throughout Asia.