Susquehanna University Political Review Susquehanna University Political Review

Volume 11 Article 5

4-2020

Youth Bulge in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Theoretical Discourse on the Youth Bulge in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Theoretical Discourse on the

Potential of Demographic Dividend vs. Demographic Bomb Potential of Demographic Dividend vs. Demographic Bomb

Jordan Sanderson

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Recommended Citation Recommended Citation Sanderson, Jordan (2020) "Youth Bulge in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Theoretical Discourse on the Potential of Demographic Dividend vs. Demographic Bomb," Susquehanna University Political Review: Vol. 11 , Article 5. Available at: https://scholarlycommons.susqu.edu/supr/vol11/iss1/5

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Youth Bulge in Sub-Saharan Africa:A Theoretical Discourse on the

Potential of Demographic Dividend vs. Demographic BombBy: Jordan Sanderson

AbstractWith the continued globalization of

economies and culture, more development theorists have begun to shift their attention to a generational phenomenon called the youth bulge. This phenomenon has led to literature by political scientists, sociologists, and security theorists who study potential conflict or development for which a youth bulge may ultimately be a catalyst. Traditionally, the majority of youth bulge research has focused on the regions of North Africa and the Middle East. This theoretical discourse focuses on six Sub-Saharan African states that have a present youth bulge and attempts to provide development discussions on three of them. The analysis aims to forecast whether Nigeria, Burundi, and Sudan have a tendency to move towards a demographic dividend or demographic bomb in the future. Content analysis from the lenses of modernization, dependency, and world-systems theory are used while considering the measures of GDP per capita,

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unemployment of youth, fertility rates, and political stability/ absence of violence.

Introduction: At the young age of 8 years old, George Bull

was coerced into joining a militia in the early days of the Liberian civil wars. Any potential childhood innocence that Bull may have possessed was ripped from his hands and replaced with an AK-47 (Chicago Tribune 2008). His life, education, and experiences were not valued by the rebels, rather, Bull was seen more as human capital to further theambitions of violent leaders. From fighting under the anti-government forces to enforcing their authoritarian rule once Charles Taylor took control of the country, George Bull had been one of 15,000 child soldiers who transitioned into adulthood knowing the horrors of war (Chicago Tribune 2008). Child soldiers like Bull were just a fraction of the youth-dominated civil wars. The “revolution” started by Charles Taylor and approximately one hundred men would soon explode into chaos, characterized by young people fighting each other and inciting terror (Sommers 2011). This way of life dictated Bull’s world for thirteen years, where he would experience the loss of 200,000 lives, the proliferation of 700,000 refugees, and the displacement of the internal Liberian population (Sommers 2011).

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While George Bull was forced into war, Joshua Blahyi led it to some of its worst atrocities. A reverend as of 1997, Joshua Blahyi was a warlord during the First Liberian Civil War and was known as “General Butt Naked” for going into battle with no clothes on, wearing shoes, and carrying his gun(Chicago Tribune 2008). An opponent of Charles Taylor, the notorious General Butt Naked commanded his army of mostly child soldiers, killed 20,000 people, conducted human sacrifices, and committed other brutal human rights violations (Toweh 2016). Living once more in the country he had previously caused so much pain in, Rev. Joshua Blahyi has tried to provide food, clothing, and shelter for jobless former fighters (Chicago Tribune 2008). Many of these ex-combatants were once child soldiers and now have reached the age of young adulthood. After the Second Liberian Civil War ended in 2003, approximately 70% of Liberia’s population was 30 years old or younger, an estimated 88% of youth in the country were unemployed, and many young adults and children felt alienated from older generations who perceived them as exhibiting rebel behavior (Sommers 2011).

While some like Rev. Joshua Blahyi were able to transition into a profession and even have the resources to attempt to take care of their community, the vast majority like George Bull were left behind. People echo the thoughts of Bull, who

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has said that he “wants to work but there are no jobs” and that he doesn’t “have enough money to go back to school to study.” (Chicago Tribune 2008). The issue of extremely high youth unemployment rates, youth dissatisfaction of their income, and youth frustration with the status quo are not unique to Liberia but are also found in other states across the globe (Yifu Lin 2012). Many credit this to the demographic phenomenon where a significant portion of a country’s population is young people entering the workforce, better known as the youth bulge (Yifu Lin 2012). However, a youth bulge theoretically does not have to result in social and political instability (Yifu Lin 2012). Several economists, think tanks, and educational institutions believe that a youth bulge can be capitalized on to further a nation’s development and economic growth (Johns Hopkins University 2019). In the course of this paper, I will attempt to apply several theoretical perspectives of development towards this idea of the youth bulge and determine whether or not certain factors within a state may make a youth bulge result into a demographic bomb.

Development and Population:Modernization Theory

Before approaching a phenomenon like the youth bulge, an understanding of development theory must be established. The first of the three

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major paradigms of development is modernization theory. American economist, government official, and political advisor Walt Whitman Rostow conceptualized modernization theory in his work “The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto” (Your Dictionary: Biography 2019). Rostow’s five stages-of-growth was the foundation of this work and the goal was to convince developing nations that liberal democracies lead to prosperity while single-party communist rule leads to stagnation (Your Dictionary: Biography 2019). Traditional society, preconditions for takeoff, takeoff, drive to maturity, and age of high mass-consumption make up the five developmental stages that modernization champions, leaving no room for “Third World” nations to be nuanced and potentially skipping stages (Rostow 1960). According to Rostow’s ideas, if a nation did not follow these exact steps than they would forfeit the potential of becoming a wealthy, developed, and high-consuming nation like the United Kingdom or the United States.

Traditional societies are defined as comprising of pre-Newtonian social structures with limited innovation that does not have access to modern sciences, its uses, and its currentperceptions of the world (Rostow 1960).Civilizations from the Bronze Age, Antiquity, Medieval Ages, and other eras that predate the

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Newtonian world consist of an economy that isbased on agriculture and craftsmanship with centralized political power, making them traditional societies. Preconditions for takeoff is the second stage, one that begins to let go of regional identities, begins to adopt nationalist views, and a centralization of government takes place (Rostow 1960). Education becomes more accessible and manufacturing dominates traditional craftsmanship in preconditions for takeoff, prompting Rostow to point to the late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century Western Europe as examples of this second stage. In the third stage, takeoff is fueled by technological advances that serve as catalysts for rapid industrialization, increased investment, and commercialized agriculture (Rostow 1960). While in the takeoff, demand for democracy begins to fester among populations and centralized governments begin to weaken. Drive to maturity occurs forty to sixty years after takeoff. This stage is characterized by increases to standards of living, urbanization of the state, emergence of new industries, a materialization of the service sector, investment into the global economy, proliferation of political revolutions, and shifts toward liberal democracies (Rostow 1960). The final stage, age of high mass-consumption, is achieved once maturity is accomplished and a state is modernized. This social structure is dictated by consumers,

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entrenched in bureaucratic processes, consisted of a service-based economy, and specialized to promote skill labor, a social welfare state, and modern technological advancement (Rostow 1960).

Dependency TheoryAndre Gunder Frank, an economist and

sociologist, believed that Rostow was too idealistic and functionalistic in his belief, resulting in Frank constructing a conflict-centered approach to development. This paradigm of thought would be known as dependency theory and centered its argument on the notion that many nations around the world were not developing (Frank 1969). Frank focused on the idea that many developmental scholars before him were ignorant of the historical significance that impacted the structure of “underdevelopment countries.” The current developed nations had never been underdeveloped compared to their contemporaries, only ever being undeveloped (Frank 1969). Now, having existed in a state of underdevelopment compared to the West, countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and other regions were in a position that made them easily exploitable. This was only made easier by the penetration of capitalist institutions into the cultures of underdeveloped (Frank 1969). According to Frank, the vulnerability of underdeveloped nations led to a satellite and metropolis state relationship.

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During the age of colonialism, a metropolis-satellite relationship could be explained as the controlled structure held up by colonizers to be used against the colonized. Metropolis cities located in developed Europe extracted resources and labor from satellite colonies, furthering the development in the metropolis (Frank 1969). One such example is the colonial relationship between Spain and Chile. Spain, the metropolis, formed a structural relationship with Chile, its new satellite, which exploited the indigenous people for its raw resources, agricultural land, and accessible labor. Spain’s continued development and economic growth because of their position of power were disproportionately faster and more efficient than Chile’s, who was already at a disadvantage. As time progressed into modernity, metropolises only improved with exponential development while satellites fell into a more dramatic level of underdevelopment (Frank 1969).

Frank’s perception of current development in the global arena was shaped by this understanding of history and unequal relationships between the metropolis state and their satellites. Colonies only enabled further development and, had it not been for them, metropolises would not have grown at the rate they had historically. Frank argued that Western development and economic growth relied on the exploitation of satellites that had their

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resources stripped away from them, showing a clear flaw in modernization’s assertion that the five stages-of-growth can be applied to any country (Frank 1969). In a state of dependency to their former colonizers, underdeveloped satellites rely too much on metropolis states, causing a lack of development and a relationship of unequal exchange. The only way to solve this issue, according to Frank, is for underdeveloped nations to remove themselves from the external actors that are solidifying their disadvantaged status in the world (Frank 1969).

World-Systems AnalysisBelieving that the developmental paradigms

established did not explain globalization and its processes sufficiently, the historical social scientist and sociologist Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein conceptualized world-systems analysis (Iwallerstien.com). Wallerstein’s theory was predicated on the idea that a hierarchical, capitalist world-economy exists to maintain global inequality, further unequal exchange, and uphold an inherently exploitive structure (Chase-Dunn 2019). Unlike Frank and dependency theorists, Wallerstein asserted that former colonies could develop despite external relationships with Western developed nations. However, rather than being classified rigidly between satellites and metropolises,

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Wallerstein interpreted a nation’s status in the capitalist world-economy as either core, semi-peripheral, or peripheral (Chase-Dunn). The classifications under world-systems analysis allowed more room for interpretation and flexibility when trying to categorize countries within these labels.

Core nations are on the top of the global hierarchy due to their level of development, standing within the global division of labor (service-based), and ability to take advantage of unequal exchange (Wallerstein 2012). Just on the outside of the core countries are states in the semi-periphery. Semi-peripheral nations can be characterized as going through a period of development, industrialization, and mechanization (Wallerstein 2012). Furthest from the core lie periphery countries, who fill the global need for agricultural production in order to sustain food consumption in the core and semi-periphery. Nations that fall in the periphery tend to lack significant economic growth and development due to the need for a significant division of labor within the capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein 2012).

The unequal exchange that is ever-present in Wallerstein’s world-systems analysis forces peripheral countries to remain in perfect competition with one another while also attempting to entice foreign investment from NGOs,

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multinational corporations, and core states. Kondratieff cycles (k-waves), or periods of cyclical downturns and growth, is a consequent phenomenon in semi-peripheral and peripheral nations (Wallerstein 2012). Core nations do not have to significantly worry about k-waves since they had developed to a degree where political stability is present, strong social safety nets exist, and dramatic increases in poverty are preventable. World-systems analysis points to the ever-present threat of negative k-waves and the current practice of unequal exchange as hindering development in the semi-periphery and ceasing development altogether in peripheral nations (Wallerstein 2012).

PopulationSeparate from the paradigms of

development are fundamental theories on population. A basic understanding of population is essential to approach the phenomenon that is the youth bulge. Population is defined in this study as the number of people in a country (Merriam-Webster.com 2019). The growth of a population is the increase in the number of inhabitants within a country (The Law Dictionary 2017). Although the youth bulge was defined earlier as a significant portion of a country’s population existing as young people entering the workforce, the specific age group that will be categorized under this

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phenomenon is the population of a country from age 15 to age 24. For a country to have a youth bulge, the age group of 15 to 24 must make up at least 19% of the country’s population and the country’s population pyramid must have a heavy base. A youth bulge will theoretically result in two results, a demographic dividend or a demographic bomb. A demographic dividend occurs when family size begins to decrease and life span increases. This can be taken advantage of by capitalizing on the increase in human capital, incorporating women into the labor supply, encouraging saving, and investing in economic growth, women’s empowerment, and health and educational services (Johns Hopkins University 2019). If a youth bulge doesn’t take advantage of a demographic dividend when the opportunity presents itself, a youth bulge will result in a demographic bomb. A demographic bomb has an oversaturated workforce, resulting in very low employment and income for young people ages 15 to 24. This results in a frustrated young populace, leading to political instability, social stagnation, and negative economic growth (Yifu Lin 2012).

Inquiry of Research:Having established the theoretical

understandings of development and population, the primary inquiry for this research is if certain

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developmental indicators suggest whether a youth bulge will transform into a demographic dividend or demographic bomb.

Methods:The six countries that will have data

presented, analyzed, and interpreted include the following Sub-Saharan countries: Liberia (19.27% population 15-24), Nigeria (19.03% population 15-24), Rwanda (19.29% population 15-24), Burundi (19.24% population 15-24), Uganda (20.30% population 15-24), and Sudan (20.15% population 15-24). Understanding that each region of the world has an innumerable number of social factors that contribute to its youth population and the impact youth have on society, it is reasonable to narrow down this study to one region in the world. Sub-Saharan Africa was chosen due to a lack of youth bulge literature on the topic of this region. In contrast, North Africa and the Middle East have been where youth bulge scholars have designated the majority of their attention. Furthering theoretical findings in a region where the youth bulge is prevalent serves to promote more empirical researchers to dedicate attention to Sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, the specific six Sub-Saharan African countries were chosen through a stratified random sampling of countries in this region of

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Africa and can be classified as having a youth bulge.

In order to analyze country reports obtained through the World Bank, content analysis will be applied for this study. This method of quantitative analysis aims to interpret macro-country level data. Specifically, longitudinal changes every ten years will be observed from the years 1995 to 2015. Procedures from longitudinal analyses at a country level have been shown to be a valid way to conduct comparisons between countries over time (Yang-Hansen, Kajsa, and Gustafsson 2008). In regards to the study of globalization and development, country-level content analysis has been applied to interpret quantitative data previously without the need to run regressions (Ramsaran 2004). For a study that aims to use several developmental lenses to interpret and explain the youth bulge, the method of context analysis is prioritized to further theoretical debate rather than other forms of quantitative methodology and tests.

GDP per capita (4/24/2019 US$) is one measure that will be analyzed as an indicator for a state’s direction towards demographic dividend or demographic bomb. Observing economic growth or stagnation of a country and its populace aids in interpreting the impact of a large youth cohort on a state’s future development and stability (Weber 2012). A youth bulge that coincides with youth

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economic marginalization has been shown toincrease social and political unrest in a country (Sukarieh 2017). If economic uncertainty is reduced and economic opportunities become more available, the tendency for youth to challenge the prevailing social structure is not as prevalent. With this line of reasoning, the measurement of GDP per capita is a consistent, accepted, and efficient variable for content analysis.

Unemployment of youth (ages 15-24), is the second measure that will be observed for this macro-country level content analysis. Although there are several critiques for using unemployment as a measurement (primarily due to a positive correlation between unemployment and education existing), increasing employment opportunities is still a chief concern that needs to be addressed (Kilimani 2017). Ultimately, a correlation between two social consequences, such as higher unemployment with higher education, is not vital when interpreting the feelings, status, and intentions of an uncertain youth population. Research has shown that alarming unemployment rates tend to have “multiplier effects” on instability associated with a population’s youth bulge (Lagraffe 2012). Considering these findings, the measurement of unemployment of youth is a grounded variable to interpret the potential of demographic dividends and demographic bombs. Unemployment will be

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classified as a measure for its relationship with demographic dividend or demographic bomb.

Fertility rates (births per woman) is another measure that will be analyzed as to investigate if a state is more or less inclined to enter into a demographic dividend. Reduced fertility rates are a defining characteristic in youth bulge countries approaching demographic dividend. If a country with a substantive youth bulge is seeing increases in its fertility rates over time, then the possibility for the demographic dividend is reduced dramatically (Inayatullah 2016). Fertility rates must decrease within a youth bulge, otherwise, a demographic bomb becomes more likely.

The last measurement that will undergo content analysis is the World Bank’s political stability and absence of violence/terrorismmeasures. Overall, the goal of this measure is to understand the perceived likelihood of political instability and politically motivated violence in a state. Ranges for the political stability and absence of violence/terrorism measures are at a -2.50 for weak governance and stability and +2.50 for strong governance and stability. Once a youth bulge has reached approximately 20% of an adult population, corruption begins to destabilize political institutions within a country (Farzanegan 2017). With this information, an assertion is made that youth bulge countries are more likely to be unstable. However,

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if there has been a positive change in stability over time, a country may be more primed for a demographic dividend rather than a demographic bomb. Since these findings have been found before, this will be the last measure for suggesting whether or not a youth bulge is leaning toward a demographic dividend or demographic bomb. Political instability is the defining result of a youth bulge becoming a demographic bomb, making this an ideal measurement.

Data:GDP per capita (4/24/2019 US$)

Country 1995 2005 2015

10-Year Change (%) '95 - '05

10-Year Change (%) '95 - '05

Liberia -290.9945

706.0595

- 58.79%

Nigeria407.9425

1267.704

2729.763

67.82% 53.56%

Rwanda218.2048

287.0762

711.774

23.99% 59.67%

Burundi167.7992

150.4876

304.3742

-11.50%

50.56%

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Uganda280.0845

315.788

675.1211

11.31% 53.22%

Sudan467.8137

679.754

2513.885

31.18% 72.96%

Country 1995 2005 2015

10-Year Change (%) '95 - '05

10-Year Change (%) '95 - '05

Liberia 3.81 3.51 3.17 -8.55%-10.73%

Nigeria 8.989 9.037 16.296 0.53% 44.54%

Rwanda 0.647 1.357 1.839 52.32% 26.21%

Burundi 0.647 1.357 1.839 52.32% 26.21%

Uganda 3.042 3.05 2.641 0.26%-15.49%

Sudan 31.208 31.7 26.962 1.55%-17.57%

Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate)

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Country 1995 2005 2015

10-Year Change (%) '95 - '05

10-Year Change (%) '95 - '05

Liberia 6.156 5.456 4.65-12.83%

-17.33%

Nigeria 6.262 5.985 5.591 -4.63% -7.05%

Rwanda 6.172 5.135 3.967-20.19%

-29.44%

Burundi 7.288 6.69 5.781 -8.94%-15.72%

Uganda 7.018 6.583 5.682 -6.61%-15.86%

Sudan 5.829 5.143 4.595-13.34%

-11.93%

Fertility rate, total (births per woman)

*Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism

Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance)

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Data in the tables are provided courtesy of theWorld Bank1

1 "World Bank Open Data." The World Bank. Accessed April 22, 2019. https://data.worldbank.org/.

Country 1996 2006 2016

10-Year Change (%) '95 - '05

10-Year Change (%) '95 - '05

Liberia -2.44 -1.33 -0.44-83.26%

-203.98%

Nigeria -1.06 -2.03 -1.88 48.11% -8.33%

Rwanda -1.84 -0.68 -0.05-170.16%

-1142.48%

Burundi -2.11 -1.43 -1.97-48.14%

27.59%

Uganda -1.53 -1.14 -0.72-34.07%

-59.40%

Sudan -2.48 -2.14 -2.34-15.76%

8.46%

*No data for 1995. Subsequently, 1996, 2006, and 2016 will be used.

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Discussion:After observing each country’s data on GDP

per capita, youth unemployment, fertility rates, and political stability, it is difficult to make a conclusive argument whether any of these variables make a significant impact on deciding a youth bulge’s fate of demographic dividend or demographic bomb. A content analysis will be made concerning how the most unstable states (those closest to -2.50 governance performance) are at risk of demographic bombs with the appliance of at least one developmental paradigm. The case studies that are the most unstable states are identified as Nigeria, Burundi, and Sudan.

NigeriaAfter drastically reducing the poverty rate

from 66.9% to 12.5% in the late 1990s/early 2000s, Nigeria has begun to see an increase in its poverty rates once again (Omoju and Abraham 2014). From 2004 to 2010, Nigeria’s poverty level increased to 14.6%. This mostly impacted the large youth population, who have also struggled with the nation’s corruption, poor infrastructure, increasing unemployment, drug trafficking, sex trafficking, and inefficient government policies (Omoju and Abraham 2014). Inaccessibility to education and reproductive healthcare have only worsened the state of things in Nigeria, causing some to consider

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that the potential demographic dividend is more likely to become a demographic bomb (Omoju and Abraham 2014). Separatist aspirations in several regions of the country, ethnic tensions, and religious conflict also suggest that further instability may be experienced in the future (BBC News 2019).

Nigeria’s 2015 governance performance is at -1.88, making it extremely weak and susceptible to political instability. Although GDP per capita increased by over $1000 between 2005 and 2015, youth unemployment increased by almost 50% in that same time frame. Additionally, Nigeria’s fertility decreased by only 4.63% from 1995 to 2005 and by 7.05% from 2005 to 2015. Modernization theory would likely argue that since economic growth has been increasing significantly in the country, the other consequences are part of the “growing pains” that occurs when development takes place (Kentor 2001). Dependency and world-systems analysis would likely have a different take on these results. Both may argue that an accumulation of wealth by a smaller, economic elite has skewed the GDP per capita scale towards growth. Along with this social hierarchy within the country, not once have fertility rates decreased by at least 10% during the two ten-year intervals. With 19.03% of its population falling within the 15-24-year-old age group, Nigeria’s youth bulge seems to miss its chance at a demographic dividend. While it

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could focus on women’s empowerment, providing jobs for young people who seek it, and resolving its internal strife, the nation seems to focus on increasing its GDP despite still being at threat of political and social instability.

BurundiThe time after Burundi achieved

independence has been a turbulent one. Following decades of civil war occurring between the Hutu and the Tutsi, Burundi continued to experience instability and violence. Civilians would receive the majority of the causalities, resulting in 1.2 million people displaced and 300,000 people dead (Voors 2012). The Hutu and Tutsi leaders’ focus on the three-decade conflict to defeat their rival resulted in reduced interest in development and domestic investment. Youth in Burundi have begun to disassociate peace and progress with the government altogether (Uvin 2007) This is likely due to the ethnic civil war that plagued the nation for the entirety of these youth’s lives. It is difficult for a government without legitimacy to effectively govern and uphold stability within its borders.

Burundi’s 2015 governance performance is at -1.97, displaying how the extremely weak government in the country has not recovered from the civil war. Out of every country sampled, Burundi has the lowest GDP per capita in 2015

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($304.37), smallest growth over the ten-year intervals (-11.50%, 50.56%), and highest fertility rate in 2015 (5.781). Youth unemployment is still very low, but this can be attributed to traditional agriculture dominating the state’s economic landscape (Heritage Foundation 2019). A modernization perspective of Burundi’s current state would be that it is the country’s fault for straying away from the five stages-of-growth and investing its time into an ethnic conflict. In contrast, dependency theory and world-systems analysis would acknowledge Burundi had become dependent on its colonial power before reaching independence. After becoming independent, Burundi did not have the institutions in place to prevent an ethnic conflict of such a large scale. Even now, with their three-decade civil war finished, Burundi is not in a state to achieve a demographic dividend. Rather than a violent demographic bomb, the war-exhausted youth bulge will likely continue to struggle and remain impoverished. Not being able to provide for its increasing population, Burundi has the potential for a demographic bomb that will force the current regime to collapse in and on itself if substantive economic growth for young people is not achieved.

SudanSudan has had several regime changes over

the course of its history. Much of this can be

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accredited to the extension of Islamic imposed beliefs on the country’s populace (Collins 2019). This caused conflict with the predominantly Christian southern region of Sudan, who incited civil wars from 1955 to 1972 and 1983 to 2005 (Collins 2019). While the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005 to end the second civil war, it was not until 2011 that a formal referendum occurred resulting in the South Sudan’s independence (Ottaway and Hamzawy 2011). Recently, inflation caused the Sudanese pound to plummet in value (BBC News 2019). This led to the government enacting austerity measures on a population that was already struggling financially. Protests began to erupt throughout the country and became more prominent throughout 2018. In early 2019, support for Sudan’s long-time dictator, Omar al-Bashir, had deteriorated so much that even the National Security and Intelligence Services of the country called for him to resign (BBC News 2019). Refusing to step down, thousands of young demonstrators began to protest on April 6th, 2019 at the al-Bashir’s compound. Several days later, on April 11th, the military arrested and ousted Omar al-Bashir from office, leaving much uncertainty for the future of the country (BBC News 2019). He was in power for 29 years.

Despite its struggles with inflation, Sudan has seen the largest 10-year change in GDP per

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capita (72.96%) from 2005 to 2015. However, youth unemployment was still at 26.96% in 2015 and the apparent instability was displayed in the country’s governance performance score (-2.34). 20.15% of Sudan’s population are in the 15-24 age group. With growing economic insecurity and a fourth of the country’s youth unemployed, Sudan is seeing the effects of a dissatisfied youth bulge. According to modernization theory, the lack of following Rostow’s model for development is the main reason why this political instability is so prevalent. However, similar to Burundi, the lack of transitional institutions has left Sudan in a state where stability is not an option. This only perpetuates its status as a periphery nation and causes the country to be dependent on more developed nations in order to develop further. Omar al-Bashir’s failure to further development can be interpreted as the prime reason for his ousting by youth dominated demonstrators. The pressure they placed on the military to intervene was enough for the weak government to fall. I would argue that Omar al-Bashir’s resignation and arrest is an example of a peaceful demographic bomb. Sudan now must establish a new regime. If a military-government is put into place, the peaceful demographic bomb may become violent. In contrast, a peaceful transition of power into a

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regime decided by Sudan’s people may open the doors to a demographic dividend.

Conclusion:My primary inquiry of determining whether

certain developmental indicators suggest whether a youth bulge will transform into a demographic bomb cannot be confirmed. Using content analysis on a macro-country level, there were no patterns found in the data that I observed. This limitation and lack of a definitive pattern derive from the exploratory nature of this study. This does not mean that there were no findings, however. Economic insecurity (both youth unemployment and GDP per capita) and high fertility rates despite decreasing fertility still were prevalent in countries with high political instability that were at risk of igniting a demographic bomb. Each of the countries that operate under weak governance also had ethnic or religious conflicts embedded in its identity. This pattern, though not included in our original data, showed how a nation’s historical background and social structure may have an impact on the youth bulge. Including a measurement for the presence of ethnic/religious conflicts would be added in future research. To prevent social and political instability, countries with a youth bulge may opt to work towards demographic dividend. By empowering women, investing in health and education, and

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providing employment opportunities, this can be achieved. Several institutions and theorists have supported this notion. To do so, dependency on external actors would need to be relieved to better focus on independent, domestic development while also working towards sustainable policy solutions. However, as stated before, a country will likely need to come to peace with its ethnic/religious conflicts before being able to pursue the demographic dividend. Dependency theory and world-systems analysis lend insight into how this may be achieved. Frank and dependency theorists would likely suggest that countries with a youth bulge that are currently underdeveloped should become independent from their relationship with their former colonizer states. From this point, a state with the potential to achieve demographic dividend should invest in the policies that help reach it (i.e. women empowerment, health and education, etc.). However, as Wallerstein explains in world-systems analysis, core countries still rely on the production from periphery states. This would make it difficult for a state experiencing underdevelopment and potential for demographic dividend to secure its economic independence. Ever-present economic competition among periphery countries establishes risk for a country that aims to remove itself from the current world-system. Rarely has the colonial and capitalist world-system been challenged and, even

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less frequently, has a challenge been sustained. However, when many states have joined together in resistance, we have seen sustained opposition. Perhaps a stronger, more centralized African Union, African Economic Community (AEC), or Pan-Africanist Organization is required to capitalize on Africa’s youth bulge.

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