Survey on Attitudes to Corruption, Misconduct and ......Survey on Attitudes to Corruption, Misconduct and Maladministration in the Local Government Context Survey Report May 2014 Prepared

Survey on Attitudes to Corruption, Misconduct

and Maladministration

in the Local Government Context

Survey Report

May 2014

Prepared by:

University of Adelaide

Dr Gabrielle Appleby

Paul Leadbeter, Professor Deborah Turnbull, Professor John Williams

Consultants:

Peter Lockett, Dr Candice Oster and Dr Ian Zajac

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Foreword by Project Leader

This project was funded by the Local Government Association of South Australia through their

research and development scheme, established to support research projects for the benefit of

legal government in South Australia.

The project began in 2013, after the passage of legislation to establish the Independent

Commissioner Against Corruption (ICAC) in South Australia The ICAC commenced its

operations in September 2013. The introduction of the ICAC provided an opportunity for the

government sector to evaluate understanding of corruption, misconduct and maladministration

within the sector.

The project was to build from the work already undertaken by the LGA by developing an

understanding of the culture within local government and their communities about what

amounts to corruption, misconduct and maladministration in public administration, and how

people would respond to this type of conduct. Obtaining a comprehensive data set of attitudes

and perceptions at the time when the ICAC is introduced is an initial step towards a systematic

approach to achieving a culture of good public administration across government.

As well as outlining our findings, this report provides recommendations for further work by the

LGA, local government and the public sector across the State to target education campaigns and

training. Ideally, it will form part of a longitudinal study of perceptions and attitudes that

follows the implementation of the ICAC to determine the extent to which it has achieved a

change in governance culture, specifically within the local government context.

The survey was initially due to be deployed in mid-2013. However, due to the timing of the

federal election and the proposed referendum on financial recognition of local government in

September 2013, it was decided by the research team, in consultation with the LGA, to delay the

deployment of the survey until after these events. As such, the initial timetable for the project

was pushed back, with the delivery date amended to end of May 2014.

I would like to acknowledge the work that has been put into developing, deploying and

analysing the survey by the project team. We were ably assisted by a Research Assistant, Clare

McGuiness, during the design and analysis of the survey. Heidi Long also provided us with

assistance during the survey’s deployment and initial analysis. The LGA also provided us with

ongoing support, information and access to councils through the project as required, and I

would particularly like to thank Wendy Campana, Jacqui Kelleher, Chris Russell and Shane Sody.

Finally, I would like to thank the local councils and their staff, and those members of the public

who gave up their time to complete the survey, and who have provided the data for the project.

The cooperation of local governments was pivotal to ensuring the project’s success.


Project Leader

30 May 2014

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Table of Contents

Foreword by Project Leader .................................................................................................................................... 1

Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................................................... ii

Executive Summary and Recommendations ................................................................................................. vi

Recommendation 1 – Assistance to Local Government ................................................................................x

Recommendation 2 – Tailoring of education and training within local government .................... xi

Recommendation 3 – Public education campaign ....................................................................................... xii

Recommendation 4 – Need for information sharing and coordinated responses .......................... xii

Recommendation 5 – Future studies ................................................................................................................. xii

1. Background to Survey ....................................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 The Independent Commissioner Against Corruption ........................................................................ 1

1.2 The Role of this Project: Attitudes Towards and Perceptions of Corruption, Misconduct

and Maladministration ............................................................................................................................................... 3

2. Previous Studies ................................................................................................................................................... 5

2.1 Seminal study: Peters and Welch (1978) ............................................................................................... 5

2.2 Australian Studies: ......................................................................................................................................... 7

2.2.1 NSW ICAC (1994 to today) ..................................................................................................................... 7

2.2.2 ANU Study (October 2012).................................................................................................................. 11

2.3 Influence on designing this study .......................................................................................................... 12

3. Methodology ........................................................................................................................................................ 13

3.1 Stage 1: Designing the survey ................................................................................................................. 13

Table 1. Variables used in scenarios. ............................................................................................................. 14

3.2 Stage 2: Testing the Survey...................................................................................................................... 14

3.3 Stage 3: Implementing the Survey ........................................................................................................ 15

Table 2. Number of responses to each question ......................................................................................... 15

3.4 Stage 4: Analysis .......................................................................................................................................... 17

3.4.1 Quantitative Analysis: ........................................................................................................................... 17

Table 3. Statistical procedures and terminology used in Analysis ...................................................... 18

3.4.2 Qualitative Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 19

Table 4. Number of responses per scenario ................................................................................................. 19

Table 5. Number of responses per statement.............................................................................................. 19

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3.5 Stage 5: Reporting ...................................................................................................................................... 20

3.6 Personnel ........................................................................................................................................................ 21

4. Outline and Discussion of Findings ......................................................................................................... 23

4.1 AGREEMENT WITH STATEMENTS ABOUT CORRUPTION .................................................. 23

4.1.1 Average agreement with statements across groups ....................................................... 23

Table 6. Agreement with statements (Public and LG) ............................................................................. 25

Table 7. Percentage agreement and disagreement with statements (Public and LG) ................ 26

Table 8. Comparison of responses to statements 4 and 5 (Public and LG) ...................................... 29

Table 9. Comparison of responses to statements 11 and 12 (Public and LG) ................................. 31

4.1.2 Effect of demographics on agreement with different statements ........................... 32

4.1.2.1 Effect of supervisory status on statement agreement .................................................. 33

Table 10. Comparisons of Supervisor and Non-supervisor groups’ statement agreement (LG)

..................................................................................................................................................................................... 33

4.1.2.2 Effect of role on statement agreement .................................................................................. 35

Table 11. Comparisons of CEO/EM and Other groups’ statement agreement (LG)...................... 35

4.1.2.3 Effect of highest educational attainment on statement agreement ...................... 37

Table 12. Comparisons of educational attainment groups’ statement agreement (LG) ............ 38

Table 13. Comparisons of educational attainment groups’ statement agreement (Public) ..... 40

4.1.2.4 Effect of previous ICAC training on statement agreement ......................................... 41

Table 14. Comparisons of Training and No training groups’ statement agreement (LG) ......... 42

4.1.2.5 Effect of number of years worked for council on statement agreement ............ 44

Table 15 Comparisons of years worked groups’ statement agreement (LG) .................................. 44

4.1.2.6 Effect of employment type on statement agreement .................................................... 46

Table 16. Comparisons of educational attainment groups’ statement agreement (Public) ..... 46

4.1.2.7 Effect of rural or metropolitan council area ...................................................................... 48

Table 18. Comparisons of Rural and Metro groups’ statement agreement (LG) ........................... 49

Table 19. Comparisons of Rural and Metro groups’ statement agreement (Public) .................... 50

4.2 RESPONSES TO SCENARIOS ..................................................................................................................... 53

Table 20. Overview of scenarios and variables .......................................................................................... 53

Table 21. Scenario corruption rating percentages and averages (LG) ............................................. 55

Table 22. Scenario corruption rating percentages and averages (Public) ...................................... 55

4.2.1 Ranking of perceptions of scenarios ............................................................................................... 56

Table 23. Ranking of scenarios by average corruption rating (Public and LG) ............................. 56

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4.2.2 Perceptions of justifiability, desirability, harmfulness, and corruption .................... 57

Table 24. Mean ratings of scenario desirability, justifiability, harmfulness and corruption (LG)

..................................................................................................................................................................................... 57

Table 25. Do desirability, justifiability, and harmfulness ratings predict rating of corruption?

(LG) ............................................................................................................................................................................ 58

Table 26. Mean ratings of scenario desirability, justifiability, harmfulness and corruption

(Public) ..................................................................................................................................................................... 59


(Public) ..................................................................................................................................................................... 60

4.2.3 Key variables on scenario corruption ratings ........................................................................... 61

4.2.3.1 Effect of nature of benefit on scenario corruption ratings ......................................... 62

4.2.3.1 Effect of size of benefit on scenario corruption ratings ............................................... 63

4.2.3.3 Effect of extent of involvement on scenario corruption ratings ............................. 64

Table 28. Pairwise comparisons of average corruption rating: extent of involvement (LG) .... 65

Table 29. Pairwise comparisons of average corruption rating: extent of involvement (Public)

..................................................................................................................................................................................... 65

4.2.3.4 Effect of motivation on scenario corruption ratings ..................................................... 66

Table 30. Pairwise comparisons of average corruption rating: motivation (LG) ......................... 67

Table 31. Pairwise comparisons of average corruption rating: motivation (Public) .................. 67

4.2.4 Effect of participant group on scenario corruption rating ................................................. 68

Table 32. Comparisons of corruption ratings of scenarios (Public and LG) .................................... 69

4.2.5 Responding to witnessed corruption .............................................................................................. 69

Table 33. Responding to corruption (LG) ..................................................................................................... 70

Table 34. Desired response to corruption (Public) ................................................................................... 70

4.3 DEFINING CORRUPTION IN THE RESPONDENTS’ OWN WORDS ................................................ 72

4.4 WHY WOULD RESPONDENTS REPORT, OR NOT REPORT, CORRUPTION? ........................... 74

4.5 ASSISTING LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDERSTAND CORRUPTION AND REPORTING

OBLIGATIONS ................................................................................................................................................................ 76

5. Conclusion and Recommendations ......................................................................................................... 78

Recommendation 1 – Assistance to Local Government ............................................................................ 78

Recommendation 2 – Tailoring of education and training within local government .................. 79

Recommendation 3 – Public education campaign ...................................................................................... 80

Recommendation 4 – Need for information sharing and coordinated responses ......................... 80

Recommendation 5 – Future studies ................................................................................................................ 80

APPENDIX A – Copy of Survey Instrument: Local Government ......................................................... 82

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APPENDIX B – Copy of Survey Instrument: Public .................................................................................. 100

APPENDIX C – Respondent Profile Summary ............................................................................................ 118

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Executive Summary and Recommendations

Reason for undertaking the survey

Corruption within government at any level, and even the perception of corruption, affects the

Australian community in a number of detrimental ways. Pivotal to combatting corruption is

fostering an awareness of it within the government and the community, and an awareness of the

processes, mechanisms and protections available for reporting corruption. Attitudes to

corruption have been found to be ‘an important determinant of the desire to act corruptly.’1

In 2012, the South Australian Parliament passed the Independent Commissioner Against

Corruption Act 2012 (SA). The creation of the ICAC (and the Office of Public Integrity (OPI)),

provides an important moment to reflect on government and community understandings and

perceptions of corruption, with a view to tailoring future education and training.

This project provides an initial study into the attitudes of those within local government and

members of the general public to corruption, misconduct and maladministration. It is part of a

proactive move within local government in South Australia to respond to the introduction of the

ICAC as a mechanism for increasing awareness of and vigilance against corruption. The result of

this survey will help shape the future response of local government to developing anti-

corruption measures, including education and training in the sector. This project provides an

exploratory study conducted at a point in time when the ICAC is only newly introduced. In doing

so it provides an important base of information for future longitudinal work. Further

information on the objectives and can be found in Part 1, Background to Survey.

Previous studies

This project is loosely based on work undertaken by the NSW Independent Commission Against

Corruption in 1994 that continues today. Further information on these previous studies can be

found in Part 2, Previous Studies.

Methodology

The survey was carefully designed in consultation with the project team with combined

experience in local and State government, and statistical experts. Two surveys were developed,

one for respondents in local government, and the second for members of the general public.

Each survey consisted of three parts. Part 1 asked a series of questions about eleven

hypothetical scenarios depicting different types of conduct that could potentially occur in local

government organisations. Respondents were asked to rate the scenarios in terms of how

desirable, justified and harmful they thought the behaviour depicted was, whether it was

corrupt, and what they would do about the behaviour if they witnessed it. Part 2 asked for

responses to a series of statements about corruption. Part 3 asked demographic questions. Each

part of the survey included closed questions to provide quantitative, statistical data,

1 Tanja Rabl and Torsten M Kühlmann, ‘Understanding Corruption in Organizations: Development and Empirical Assessment of an Action Model’ (2008) 82 Journal of Business Ethics 477, 490.

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supplemented by open questions to allow a richer qualitative analysis of responses. More detail

can be found in Part 3, Methodology. We received 456 valid responses from local government

and 153 valid responses from the public.

Outline of key findings

The findings of this project reveal a high level of interest and concern in government corruption.

They reveal a high level of interest in the recent establishment of the ICAC and how this might

affect government corruption. They demonstrate a strong appetite within the South Australian

public and local government sector for intervention and initiative in tackling corruption.

Statements about corruption: Overall, there was no general identifiable tendency for the public

or the local government respondents to have different views on the various statements about

corruption. Differences were only in the strength of disagreement or agreement; there were no

cases where the average rating amounted to general agreement for one group and general

disagreement for the other.

Both groups weakly agreed with the statement that people who report corruption are likely to

suffer for it. The public agreed with this statement more strongly. A small but reasonable

percentage of respondents from both groups had concerns about repercussions for those

reporting corruption.

Both groups agreed that every councillor and council employee has an obligation to report

corruption. The public agreed more strongly with this statement, although the agreement

among both groups was very high.

On average, both groups disagreed with the statement that conduct must be illegal for it to be

called corrupt. On average, both groups disagreed that avoiding procedure is sometimes

justifiable to get past bureaucratic red tape. Nonetheless, a small but reasonable percentage of

respondents from both groups agreed that avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to get

past bureaucratic red tape. Both groups agreed that the motivation for action, or ‘doing

something for the right reasons’ did not change the nature of corrupt activity. Both groups

disagreed with the statement that most corruption is too trivial to be worth reporting. The

public disagreed with this statement more strongly.

Both groups disagreed that there was no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful

will be done about it, and more strongly disagreed with the statement that there is no point in

reporting corruption because nothing useful can be done about it. The local government group

were less circumspect that nothing could be done about reported corruption than the public.

On average, local government respondents disagreed that they would not know where to report

corruption. However, a small but reasonable percentage of respondents agreed with the

statement.

Both groups disagreed that people who report corruption are just trouble makers. Local

government disagreed more strongly with this statement. This statement elicited the highest

level of disagreement in both groups.

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Both groups agreed that corruption is an issue in South Australia. Both groups disagreed that

corruption is more of an issue in South Australia than other States across Australia. While both

groups agreed that corruption is an issue in South Australia, they were not as concerned that

corruption was more of an issue in South Australia than other States across Australia. On

average, both groups disagreed that corruption was more prevalent in local government than

other levels of government. The local government group was more inclined to disagree with this

statement than the public.

Effect of demographics on agreement with different statements: Within the local government

group, non-supervisors agreed more strongly with a small number of the statements. These

statements included that there is no point reporting corruption because nothing useful will be

done about it; that there is no point reporting corruption because nothing useful can be done

about it; people who report corruption are just trouble makers; corruption is more of an issue in

South Australia than other States across Australia and corruption is more prevalent in local

government than other levels of government. Supervisors agreed more strongly with the

statement that conduct must be illegal for it to be called corrupt. CEOs and elected members

differed from other local government employees in their agreement with a large number of the

statements. In general, other local government employees demonstrated less understanding

about the mechanisms, processes, protections and obligations around reporting corruption.

Those respondents in the local government group who had received previous ICAC training

differed from other respondents in their agreement with a large number of the statements.

Those respondents who had received previous ICAC training were more inclined to agree that

conduct had to be illegal to be called corrupt, to be concerned about even trivial matters or

corruption done with justifications, to be more positive about responses to reporting corruption

and the protections afforded to those who report corruption, to understand where to go to

report corruption and to understand their obligations to report corruption. Those respondents

who had received previous ICAC training were less inclined to be concerned about corruption as

an issue in South Australia and local government.

There were few differences in responses in either the local government or public groups based

on whether they worked/lived in a rural or metropolitan area. No statistically significant

difference was found in the local government or public group based on highest educational

attainment. Within the local government group, no statistically significant difference was found

in respondents based on how many years they had worked for council or their employment

status.

Responses to scenarios: There was great deal of consistency across the groups in terms of

gauging the level of corruption involved in each scenario. The local government and public

groups were similar in terms of the average rating of whether scenarios were ‘desirable’ or

‘undesirable’ and ‘justified’ or ‘unjustified’. For both the local government and public groups,

there was a consistent relationship between the way respondents rated the ‘desirability’,

‘justifiability’ and ‘harmfulness’ of the scenarios and whether these amounted to corruption. In

both groups, for all scenarios, the rating of ‘harmfulness’ was found to improve significantly

prediction of the corruption rating, and changes in the ‘harmfulness’ rating corresponded to the

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largest change in the corruption rating. In the local government group, for most scenarios, a

higher rating of how ‘justified’ the actions were corresponded to a lower rating of how corrupt it

was. In the public group, for fewer scenarios, a higher rating of how ‘justified’ the actions were

corresponded to a lower rating of how corrupt it was. In the local government group, the rating

of how ‘desirable’ scenario actions was not a consistent predictor of how corrupt they were

rated. In the public group, the rating of how ‘desirable’ scenario actions was not a consistent

predictor of how corrupt they were rated.

Neither the public nor the local government group was more likely to interpret the set of

scenarios as corrupt. For three scenarios, (employing the chairman’s sister, favouring local

business in a tender, and lending equipment to the football club), local government respondents

gave higher corruption ratings and the difference was statistically significant.

Effect of variables in scenarios on perception of corruption: The extent of the involvement in the

conduct had an important effect on the perceptions of corruption. In the local government

group, the nature of the benefit appeared to have a small effect only when the size of the benefit

was small. Once the size of the benefit increased, the nature of the benefit did not influence

perceptions of corruption. The nature of the benefit continued to have an effect in the public

group regardless of size. The size of the benefit was found to have only a small effect on the

rating of different scenarios as corrupt. The different scenarios that had different motivations

were perceived differently. For the local government group, awarding a tender to local

businesses regardless of cost was the only scenario rated as significantly more corrupt than all

five others in the comparison.

Responding to witnessed corruption: When asked what they would usually do if confronted with

a situation like the one described in the scenario, the local government group favoured internal

reporting, which was the most common choice for six scenarios. The public group was asked

what response they would most desire be taken, a question which elicited responses regarding

the best possible reporting outcome. Their responses appeared more idealistic, with either

internal or external reporting the desired outcome for all scenarios.

Defining corruption in the respondents’ own words: For those within the local government group,

defining corruption was a complex issue, indicating that there were many shades of grey in their

approach. Context was important in defining corruption. There was an overall perception that

ethics and morality are more important than legality in defining behaviour as corrupt. Members

of the public were more likely to view corruption as a black and white issue. Members of the

public were also more likely to describe the behaviour using legal terms, although ethics and

morality remained important influences on their responses.

Why would respondents report or not report corruption: For those within local government, the

decision about whether or not to take action, and the type of action taken, would depend on the

context, including the amount of information known and the seriousness of the behaviour

involved. Respondents discussed the need to escalate complaints, using internal options first, or

to rectify the situation. There was at times a sense of helplessness in respondents’ discussions,

including a sense that individuals were powerless, reporting was ineffective, or would be met

with repercussions. Members of the general public were less likely to discuss the need to seek

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clarification, more likely to recommend punitive responses to the scenario, particularly firing

the perpetrator of the act, and less likely to discuss the importance of accountability/proof in

reference to ‘whistleblowers’. Members of the public emphasised the importance of reporting,

(irrespective of potential consequences), and expressed less helplessness.

Assistance to local government: Local government respondents preferred publications and

information sheets as their preferred type of assistance, with face-to-face training the next most

preferred. Respondents suggested an independent helpline to provide advice before a complaint

or report about corruption is lodged and updates to be provided about ICAC investigations and

findings.

Recommendations

Five major recommendations were made based on the key findings in this report.

Recommendation 1 – Assistance to Local Government

We recommend that:

(a) The LGA makes its ‘information papers’ more easily available on its website. Ideally, the

information on ICAC and reporting corruption, misconduct and maladministration

would be able to be found on the LGA homepage. We also recommend that the LGA link

to the ICAC’s updated website and fact sheets, which now include information about

how complaints are progressed. These fact sheets are, in general, less detailed and more

simplified than those provided by the LGA, and would provide an important

complementary resource.

(b) The LGA monitors the work of the ICAC and provides updates through its information

papers and other resources with scenario examples taken from current cases. It would

be useful if these updates were circulated to councils to keep council staff and members

up to date and reminded of the importance of vigilance in preventing corruption,

misconduct and maladministration.

(c) The LGA works with the ICAC to establish an advisory service available to public sector

(including local government) employees where they may request anonymous advice

about whether conduct amounts to corruption, misconduct or maladministration,

whether it should be reported, the most appropriate method to do so, and protections

available to the individual against reprisals.

(d) The LGA encourage councils (perhaps through the Corruption and Fraud Prevention

Model Policy) to provide compulsory face-to-face training for all new employees and

members (as part of their induction training), and compulsory refresher training for

existing staff regularly, including updates on current cases. This training should reflect

the tailoring suggestions made in recommendation 2.

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Recommendation 2 – Tailoring of education and training within local government

We recommend that the education and training provided to local government be tailored in

light of those areas of particular concern and misunderstanding revealed by this survey.

Education and training should continue to target everyone within local government, with a

particular emphasis on ensuring that those who are not CEOs, elected members or supervisors

are provided with training on the mechanisms, processes, protections and obligations around

reporting corruption. Further, those within the LGA should receive adequate training in these

areas to assist councils where required.

We recommend that future education and training be designed based on adult learning

principles, drawing on real life scenarios, and be interactive and experiential. Face-to-face

training should be made available where possible, supplemented with online training systems.

We recommend education and training is designed in consultation with ICAC to target:

(a) when conduct is properly referred to as corrupt (which includes only illegal conduct) as

distinct from conduct that amounts to misconduct and maladministration. Within this

classification, there should also be education around:

i. what conduct is too trivial to report, bearing in mind the extensive

definitions in and therefore scope of the Independent Commissioner

Against Corruption Act and the strong public expectations about

reporting of conduct;

ii. the relevance of justification to the appropriateness of behaviour; and

iii. what the potential consequences are and the differences in ramifications

for corrupt conduct and conduct that amounts to misconduct and

maladministration;

(b) when to report corruption, particularly when an individual may have sufficient

information or knowledge about behaviour and its context to avoid frivolous reporting

but to ensure inappropriate behaviour is reported;

(c) the most appropriate place to report conduct, including when it is appropriate to use

internal procedures and when it is appropriate to escalate reporting directly to external

mechanisms, such as the ICAC. This should also include detail of how the different

reporting and investigation mechanisms work; and

(d) concerns over effectiveness of responses to reporting and the protections against

retribution. All corruption training should be accompanied with detailed whistleblower

training.

We recommend that the LGA encourage local governments to maintain a register of their

employees, elected members and CEOs who have undertaken corruption training, and to what

level.

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Recommendation 3 – Public education campaign

We recommend that a public education campaign be developed, preferably by the ICAC, with the

support of the LGA and State government (see the importance of information sharing and

cooperation in recommendation 4 below) that targets public awareness of:

(a) when conduct is properly referred to as corrupt as distinct from conduct that amounts

to misconduct and maladministration;

(b) the mechanisms and processes that are in place to deal with corruption within local

government;

(c) the protection afforded under the whistleblower laws to individuals who report

corruption; and

(d) the extent of corruption as an issue in South Australia.

This education campaign must be carefully crafted, and ought to be based on the literature

around marketing in the social and public policy arena.2

Recommendation 4 – Need for information sharing and coordinated responses

We recommend that the Local Government Association share the results of this project with the

South Australian State government and ICAC, and work with them to address the findings and

recommendations contained within this report.

Recommendation 5 – Future studies

It is recommended that this survey form the basis for ongoing longitudinal research on the

education and perceptions on corruption within the local government sector in South Australia

as the ICAC becomes more established and more interventions (including training) are

implemented. Future studies should explore the impact of those additional variables identified

in this study in the qualitative responses, including:

(a) the impact/success of training and education campaigns within local government and

the public;

(b) whether perceptions of corruption in South Australia have increased;

2 See, eg, Matthew Wood and Julie Fowlie, ‘Using Community Communicators to Build Trust and Understanding between Local Councils and Residents in the United Kingdom’ (2013) 28 Local Economy 527; Matthew Wood, ‘Applying Commercial Marketing Theory to Social Marketing: A Tale of 4Ps (and a B) (2008) 14 Social Marketing Quarterly 76; Tom White and Rob Wall, ‘National Regional and Local Attitudes towards Climate Change: identifying appropriate target audiences for communications’ (2008) 13 Local Environment 589; Eftihia Nathanail and Giannis Adamos, ‘Road Safety Communication Campaigns: Research designs and behavioural modeling’ (2013) 18 Transportation Research 107; Melanie A Wakefield, Barbara Loken and Robert C Hornik, ‘Use of mass media campaigns to change health behaviour’ (2010) 376 The Lancet 1261; VicHealth, VicHealth Review of Communication Components and Social Marketing/Public Education Campaigns Focusing on Violence Against Women (Paper 2 of the Violence Against Women Community Attitudes Project, 2005).

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(c) the perceived role of legality or ethics/morality in determining corruption;

(d) the impact of:

a. different types of benefits (beyond the division between pecuniary and non-

pecuniary benefits) and harms;

b. declarations of behaviour (such as the receipt of gifts);

c. frequency of the behaviour; and

d. consistency of the behaviour with council policy, procedures and guidelines

on perceptions of behaviour as corrupt.

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1. Background to Survey

Corruption, misconduct and maladministration3 each affect the Australian community in a

number of different ways. It is important to have a number of different mechanisms to support

the reporting, investigation and prosecution of inappropriate conduct. Corruption, misconduct

and maladministration within the public sector will affect how taxpayers’ money is spent and

will mean that the community is not receiving appropriate value for money from government. It

can lead to inequality of opportunity for business and individuals within the community, for

example, where there is corruption or misconduct in the conduct of a government tender. This

can have deleterious economic effects. Poor governance, including acting with a conflict of

interest or taking bribes, can be extremely damaging to public confidence in the public sector.4

While the vast number of government employees across federal, state and local government

levels act with honesty and integrity, their reputation within the wider community is easily

sullied by the dishonest actions of a few. This can lead to disaffection with government and

politics, a dangerous path for any democracy. Ultimately, corruption strikes at the trust that is

essential for a functioning democracy.

1.1 The Independent Commissioner Against Corruption

On 20 December 2012, the South Australian Parliament passed the Independent Commissioner

Against Corruption Act 2012 (SA). As the name suggests, the legislation establishes an

Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (ICAC), tasked with identifying, investigating,

preventing and minimising corruption, misconduct and maladministration in public

administration. The ICAC is assisted by the Office for Public Integrity (OPI). Complaints from

government and members of the public are made to the OPI, which may forward the complaint

to the ICAC.

The Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012 applies to members of a local

government body, officers or employees of Local Government bodies and the Local Government

Association of South Australia, the representatives of local government in South Australia.

Under the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012, ‘corruption’, ‘misconduct’ and

‘maladministration’ are defined in section 5. A brief summary of those statutory definitions is

provided below:

Corruption

This includes criminal behaviour in public office, for example by a local government

employee or a councillor. It includes accepting bribes, unlawful use of public funds,

extortion, that is, making threats or reprisals against another public officer and

demanding or requiring benefit on the basis of public office, as well as any other

criminal offence committed by a public officer while acting in his or her capacity as a

public officer. It also extends to aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the

3 These terms are used to delineate different levels of inappropriate behaviour by government officials. See further explanation of the terms below.

4 Manuel Villoria, Gregg G Van Ryzin and Cecilia F Lavena, ‘Social and Political Consequences of Administrative Corruption: A Study of Public Perceptions in Spain’ (2012) 73 Public Administration Review 85.

2

commission of the offence, inducing the commission of the offence, being in any way

knowingly concerned in, or party to, the offence and conspiring to commit the offence.

Misconduct

This includes conduct that does not amount to criminal conduct, but while less serious,

still inappropriate, such as contravention of a code of conduct by a public officer that

constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.

Maladministration

This substantially extends the ICAC’s powers of investigation, it includes matters such as

the irregular and unauthorised use of public money or substantial mismanagement of

public resources, mismanagement in the performance of public functions, negligence

and impropriety, incompetence or negligence.

While the ICAC’s most high-profile function is the public investigation of serious allegations of

corruption, arguably its most important work is its ability to prevent and minimise behaviour

that may amount to corruption, misconduct and maladministration, and encourage cultural

change within government.

It has been observed that anti-corruption bodies have achieved relevance and success only

when they have engaged in a ‘conscious effort of education and community engagement.’5

However, corruption is often presented in the media in black and white terms, but the reality is

far more complex and contextual. Governments work within complex policy and legal

frameworks. Legislative definitions of corruption are often highly technical. The South

Australian ICAC legislation is no different. In May 2014 it was reported that Adelaide City

Councillors had refused to return free memberships of Adelaide oval, the Aquatic Centre and

Golf Course because of confusion as to whether these employment entitlements would amount

to corruption, misconduct or maladministration. It was reported the Adelaide City Council

requested further clarification on the issue from the Attorney-General.6

Government and community engagement and education will be key in ensuring the South

Australian ICAC’s success. This project forms an important dimension of the South Australian

local government response to these challenges.

At the time the research was funded, the LGA had already taken a number of actions in response

to this new legislative framework. This has included the development, in consultation with Local

Government, of Information Papers to assist members, officers and employees in a number of

key functional areas. These are available online.7

There has been further work performed by Mr Peter Lockett to provide further clarity to Local

Government on what is captured by the term ‘maladministration’ and the practical implications

5 Olivia Monaghan, ‘A National ICAC? We need better anti-corruption bodies, not more’, The Conversation, 8 May 2014, http://theconversation.com/a-national-icac-we-need-better-anti-corruption-bodies-not-more-26302.

6 Kevin Naughton, ‘ICAC Confusion: Council in Fight over Freebies’ (InDaily, 13 May 2014).

7 https://www.lga.sa.gov.au/page.aspx?u=2907.

http://theconversation.com/a-national-icac-we-need-better-anti-corruption-bodies-not-more-26302

https://www.lga.sa.gov.au/page.aspx?u=2907

3

for Council CEOs, managers, employees and elected members. This is now available as

Information Paper 11.8

1.2 The Role of this Project: Attitudes Towards and Perceptions of Corruption, Misconduct and

Maladministration

This project builds upon this initial work that has already undertaken. It provides quantitative

and qualitative data on the attitudes towards and perceptions of corruption, misconduct and

maladministration held by Local Government members, officers, employees and constituencies.

The major premise on which the research is undertaken is that the attitudes towards and

perceptions of corruption, misconduct and maladministration within Local Government and the

community may be more salient in determining culture and behaviour than the statutorily

imposed definitions and framework. Attitudes to corruption have been found to be ‘an

important determinant of the desire to act corruptly.’9 In other words, cultures within the

workforce will have a large impact on the likelihood of corruption and its reporting.10 A robust

culture of no tolerance to corruption, misconduct and misbehaviour will be pivotal to the

success of the new regime.

Further, those within Local Government are in the best, and sometimes the only, position to

identify and report on poor administration. The Fitzgerald Report into police corruption in

Queensland found:

Honest public officials are the major potential source of information needed to reduce

public maladministration and misconduct.11

In a similar survey conducted by the New South Wales’ ICAC Research Unit in 1994, the purpose

of understanding attitudes towards and understanding of corruption in the public sector was

explained as follows:

If people do not recognise the activity which they may be witnessing, or in which they may be

participating, as ‘corrupt’, or at least as ‘harmful’ then they are not likely to react to it as such. If

they do recognise the behaviour as ‘corrupt’, but believe that, for example, such behaviour is

appropriate given the circumstances, they too are unlikely to attempt to change the behaviour.12

8 https://www.lga.sa.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/ICAC_Info_Paper_11_-_Understanding_Maladministration.pdf

9 Tanja Rabl and Torsten M Kühlmann, ‘Understanding Corruption in Organizations: Development and Empirical Assessment of an Action Model’ (2008) 82 Journal of Business Ethics 477, 490.

10 R D Hollinger and J P Clark, Theft by Employees (Lexington Books) 126; M Punch, Dirty Business, Exploring Corporate Misconduct, Analysis and Cases (Sage Publications, 1996).

11 Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct, ‘Report of a Commission of Inquiry Pursuant to Orders in Council (‘Fitzgerald Report’)’ (1989) 134.

12 Independent Commission Against Corruption (NSW), ‘Unravelling Corruption: A Public Sector Perspective – Survey of NSW Public Sector Employees’ Understanding of Corruption and their Willingness to Take Action’ (April 1994) 1.

https://www.lga.sa.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/ICAC_Info_Paper_11_-_Understanding_Maladministration.pdf

https://www.lga.sa.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/ICAC_Info_Paper_11_-_Understanding_Maladministration.pdf

4

The general aims of this project are twofold:

1. To investigate the attitudes towards, and perceptions of, the local government sector to

corruption and reporting corruption. This first aim will provide an important empirical

base for designing strategies to deal with corruption and encourage and support those

working in local government to act and report on corruption. It will provide findings and

recommendations to support future educational and training interventions to try to

improve government administration and compliance with the new ICAC framework.

2. To investigate public awareness and expectations regarding corruption. This second aim

will provide an empirical base and recommendations for designing government

interventions, and provide public education campaigns.

More specifically, the objectives of this project are to:

- determine whether key variables, including the public official involved, the scale and

size of the corruption, whether it results in pecuniary or non-pecuniary gain, and

whether it is perceived as justifiable, affects perceptions within local government and

public sector as to whether behaviour is corrupt;

- determine the extent of conformity among participants as to whether certain behaviour

is corrupt, and explore the reasons behind discrepancies in these perceptions, including

by reference their demographic characteristics and perceptions of the conduct as

desirable, justified or harmful;

- determine the range of responses to becoming aware of certain conduct from those

within the local government sector;

- develop an understanding of why people would not report corruption;

- determine the expectations of the public in terms of responses to certain conduct;

- develop an understanding of why public expectations about responding to corruption

are held; and

- develop an understanding of public sector and public attitudes to generalised definitions

of corruption, mitigating factors, and responding to corruption.

An overview of the survey is provided in Part 3.

5

2. Previous Studies

There have been a number of studies conducted on attitudes to corruption overseas13 but

relatively few in Australia.14 This brief introduction to that literature considers a seminal

American study on definitions of corruption that continues to influence the design of corruption

surveys today, and the Australian research pioneered by the New South Wales ICAC in the

1990s that continues today.

2.1 Seminal study: Peters and Welch (1978)

In 1978, John G. Peters and Susan Welch conducted leading empirical research into definitions

of corruption through a survey of American politicians (State Senators).15 They offered a

conceptual framework in which to view corruption, attempting ‘to classify adequately the many

variations of corrupt acts’ and ‘to develop an explanation of why some acts are judged corrupt

and others not.’16 Four component elements were identified to achieve this:

1. the public official involved;

2. the actual favour provided by the public official;

3. the payoff gained by the public official; and

4. the donor of the payoff and/or recipient of the favour act.

Within these component elements, Peters and Welch explored a number of sub dimensions,

including:

- the type of position the public official held and the political nature of the position;

- the relationship between the donor/recipient and the public official;

- the type of benefit/nature of act provided;

- the size, timing, substance and relationship to campaign of the payoff.

The benefit, Peters and Welch explain, of their taxonomy is that it allows researchers to pinpoint

differences between elites and the mass public, and thus to infer why there are divergent areas

13 See, for example, the seminal study of John G Peters and Susan Welch, ‘Political Corruption in America: A Search for Definitions and a Theory, or if Political Corruption in in the Mainstream of American Politics Why is it Not in the Mainstream of American Politics Research?’ (1978) 72(3) American Political Science Review 974, and subsequent studies of Michael M Atkinson and Maureen Mancuso, ‘Do We Need a Code of Conduct for Politicians? The Search for an Elite Political Culture of Corruption in Canada’ (1985) 18 Canadian Journal of Political Science 459; Maureen Mancuso, ‘Ethical attitudes of British MPs’ (1993) 46 Parliamentary Affairs 179.

14 See, for example, Electoral and Administrative Review Commission (Qld), Survey on Queensland public service ethics (1991); Independent Commission Against Corruption (NSW), Unravelling Corruption: A Public Sector Perspective – Survey of NSW Public Sector Employees’ Understanding of Corruption and their Willingness to Take Action (April 1994).

15 John G Peters and Susan Welch, ‘Political Corruption in America: A Search for Definitions and a Theory, or if Political Corruption in in the Mainstream of American Politics Why is it Not in the Mainstream of American Politics Research?’ (1978)72(3) American Political Science Review 974

16 Ibid 975-6.

6

– ‘gray areas of political corruption’. Might it be because the two groups view the ‘payoff’

differently: what is seen as small or petty by public officials may be viewed as large and serious

to citizens? Or, does the divergence lie in the perception of what is extraordinary in the act

providing the favor? Many similar explanations could be posited and tested.17

Moreover, they raise the possibility of research exploring divergences based on social class and

other sub-groups in the population, or psychological or attitudinal positions. They demonstrate

these possibilities through their own findings.

Peters and Welch conducted a survey State Senators across 24 United States through a mailed

questionnaire. They distributed 978 surveys through three mailings; 441 were returned. The

questionnaire asked the respondents to rate ten scenarios on a five-point likert scale in terms

of:

- whether they believed the scenario to be corrupt;

- whether they believed most public officials would condemn this act; and

- whether they believed that most members of the public would condemn the act.

The scenarios were:

1. A presidential candidate who promise an ambassadorship in exchange for campaign

contributions (AMBASSADOR);

2. A member of Congress using seniority to obtain a weapons contract for a firm in his or

her district (WEAPONS);

3. A public official using public funds for personal travel (TRAVEL);

4. A secretary of defense who owns $50,000 in stock in a company with which the Defense

Department has a million-dollar contract (DEFENSE STOCK);

5. A public official using influence to get a friend or relative admitted to law school (LAW

SCHOOL);

6. The driveway of the mayor’s home being paved by the city crew (DRIVEWAY);

7. A state assembly member while chairperson of the public roads committee authorizing

the purchase of land s/he had recently acquired (LAND SALE);

8. A judge with $50,000 worth of stock in a corporation hearing a case concerning that firm

(JUDGE);

9. A legislator accepting a large campaign contribution in return for voting ‘the right way’

on a legislative bill (RIGHT WAY);

10. A member of Congress who holds a large amount of stock (about $50,000 worth) in

Standard Oil of New Jersey working to maintain the oil depletion allowance (OIL).

17 Ibid 982.

7

Peters and Welch explained that they deliberately omitted scenarios that would create near

consensus. That is, where omitted scenarios where the conduct was clearly corrupt or clearly

not corrupt.

Their findings were that acts considered corrupt by the largest percentage of people have many

corrupt characteristics across the component elements. Those acts most disputed have an

intermediate number of corrupt characteristics. Thus, any one attribute, in isolation, probably

does not determine corruptness. Four acts perceived as corrupt by over 90 per cent of the

respondents merged the donor and public official role (that is, the public official was the

beneficiary of the corruption) or there was direct and monetary gain to a third party. Minor

forms of influence peddling were considered corrupt by less than 40 per cent of the

respondents, where payoff is indirect and long range, and the acts are routine. The least

consensus appears over conflict of interest activities. The size of the payoff as well as its

immediacy appeared to have a significant effect on perceptions of corruption. Finally, the nature

of the public office will influence corruption, the less political a role, the higher standards are

applied.

2.2 Australian Studies:

2.2.1 NSW ICAC (1994 to today)

A similar project was undertaken in New South Wales in 1994 after the introduction of the

Independent Commission Against Corruption in that jurisdiction. The aim of the study was:

- to improve understanding of particular types of conduct public sector employees judge

as corrupt; and

- to identify factors which may hinder public sector employees taking action about

corruption which they may observe.18

The study found that previous research suggested that people are more likely to judge conduct

as corrupt when it involves:

- illegal actions;

- a larger payoff;

- a more direct payoff;

- a more immediate (short-range) payoff;

- someone asking for money rather than simply accepting it;

- an offender who is a public official rather than a private citizen, who is a prominent

person rather than an ordinary citizen or who is a judge, in a non-political role; and

- no mitigating motives or circumstances to reduce the severity.

18 Independent Commission Against Corruption (NSW), Unravelling Corruption: A Public Sector Perspective – Survey of NSW Public Sector Employees’ Understanding of Corruption and their Willingness to Take Action (April 1994)

8

The study identified as problematic questions around constituency service and conflict of

interest.19 The study also identified region, party preference, age, gender, education, socio-

economic status, prior political or legislative service and ideology as relevant demographic

factors in assessing relationships relating to judgments of corruption.20

The study considered possible responses to corruption, including:

- denial;

- taking action about the incident oneself;

- reporting the matter either inside the organisation or to an external agency, or

- participation in the actual conduct.21

Consistent with previous studies, the study found that different responses to corruption are due

to ‘a complex range of reasons’, including ‘apathy’, ‘fear of retaliation’ and ‘a belief that there is

no point in reporting some crimes and corrupt conduct as nothing can or will be done about it’.

Differences were identified between genders, supervisors and non-supervisors, those with

different salary and education levels and possibly length of public service.22

The project surveyed more than 1300 NSW public sector employees’ understanding of

corruption and their willingness to take action. Participants were surveyed using 12 scenario

based questions asking them how they would rate the conduct in terms of desirability,

harmfulness, and whether the actions could be justified. They were also asked what they would

do about it – including responses such as nothing, talk to employee, talk to supervisor, report it

outside the organization. There were then 12 attitude statement questions that related to

definitions of corruption, the range of behaviours persons considered acceptable, and reporting

corruption.

The report found that there were extensive differences in social perceptions of whether

particular conduct was corrupt. It noted ‘This lack of precise commonality of understanding

adds to the difficulty of combating corruption.’23 Further, while demographic factors had a

relationship to whether an individual through particular conduct is corrupt, the nature of the

relationship was scenario specific, making it difficult to predict how groups with shared

characteristics would react to new scenarios, this, in turn, ‘makes it difficult to target types of

educational or corruption prevention strategies to specific areas of the public sector.’24

Perceptions of behaviour as harmful, desirable or justified were, however, found to be better

predictors of an individual’s perception of particular conduct as corrupt. In particular, perceived

19 Ibid 18-20.

20 Ibid 20-21.

21 Ibid 76.

22 Ibid 84.

23 Ibid ix.

24 Ibid ix and 133.

9

‘harmfulness’ was a good indicator of whether an individual perceived behaviour as corrupt,

marking it as possible important educational tool.25

In relation to reporting corruption, the study drew a number of important and relevant

conclusions as to what factors hindered an individual’s willingness to report. These included:

- a belief by the public sector employee that the behaviour was justified in the

circumstances;

- the attitude that ‘there is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful will be done

about it’;

- a belief that the behaviour was not corrupt;

- fear of both personal and professional retaliation;

- a relatively lower position within the organisation;

- the employee’s perception of his/her relationships with the perpetrator and the

supervisor; and

- concern about insufficient evidence.26

The report suggested that these results ‘highlight some of the factors to which organisations

could attend, if they wish to encourage their employees to take action about corrupt conduct

witnessed in their workplaces.’27

Since 1993, the NSW ICAC has been regularly conducting surveys of community attitudes to

corruption. In its most recent form (revised in 2012), the survey focuses on a number of areas,

including perceptions of the severity of corruption and attitudes to reporting corruption.28 The

report on the 2012 survey also compared data available on attitudes of public officials to issues

of corruption to that of the public. The survey was conducted through a computer assisted

telephone interview. Respondents were given a definition of corruption to be used in answering

the questions put to them. ‘Corruption’, the participants were told:

is the misuse of public office for private gain, for example, theft of public resources,

misuse of confidential information, favouring a particular candidate during the hiring

process, bribery, et cetera.29

In the 2012 survey, it was found that:

- 31 per cent of respondents viewed corruption as a major problem with 50 per cent

viewing it as a minor problem across the NSW public sector, significantly lower than in

25 Ibid ix.

26 Ibid x.

27 Ibid 136.

28 Independent Commission Against Corruption (NSW), Community Attitudes to Corruption and to the ICAC: Report on the 2012 Survey (July 2013) 5.

29 Ibid 7, fn 3.

10

2009. 37 per cent of respondents viewed corruption within NSW government

departments to be a major problem with 45 per cent indicating it was a minor problem.

36 per cent of respondents indicated that corruption within local councils was a major

problem with 43 per cent indicating it was a minor problem. These figures had not

changed from 2009. There was not necessarily a correlation between those that viewed

corruption generally as a problem and those that viewed corruption in NSW

government departments and councils as a problem.30 Older respondents were more

likely to view corruption as a major problem as were those without a university

degree.31

- 45 per cent of respondents believed corruption in the NSW public sector affected them.

30 per cent of respondents thought it affected them through poor execution of

government functions, 18 per cent through increased costs or taxes, and 18 per cent

through misallocation of funds.32 Older respondents were more likely to indicate

corruption affected them or their family.33

- 58 per cent of respondents believed that specific types of corruption were particularly

problematic. 20 per cent of these identified corruption surrounding planning and

development, 8 per cent around favouritism and nepotism and 7 per cent around taking

bribes.

A comparison between the perception of corruption as a major problem over time between

public officials and members of the public was portrayed in the following graph:

30 Ibid 7 and 9.

31 Ibid 8.

32 Ibid 7-8.

33 Ibid 8.

11

The responses show that across time, public officials were significantly less likely to perceive

corruption as a major problem and that perceptions were higher prior to 2000.34 In contrast,

public officials were significantly more likely to indicate that corruption affected them or their

family.35

The 2012 survey found:

Although most respondents are willing to express an opinion about the severity of the

corruption problem in NSW and almost all believe that the ICAC is a good thing for the

people of NSW, it does not automatically follow that the general public has an adequate

understanding of what corruption is, or is willing to report it.36

Respondents were asked to provide their own definition of corruption. Of the respondents, 33

per cent defined it by reference to self-interest at the expense of government, one’s employer or

the public; 31 per cent defined it by reference to acting illegally, immorally or unethically; and

23 per cent defined it by reference to bribery or other improper payment. The report found this

‘overlaps but is not aligned with the ICAC definition of corrupt conduct’.37

Once provided with a standard definition of corruption (see above), 52 per cent indicated they

were very likely to report corruption with only 30 per cent indicating they were likely to report

it.38 Of respondents, 55 per cent agreed or strongly agreed that something useful would be done

if they reported public sector corruption.39

Respondents who had never been employed in the NSW public sector were significantly more

likely to report serious corruption.40 The report suggests (although without evidence) that this

may be due to fear of retribution. It does note, however, ‘that public sector employees are not

less willing to provide information to the ICAC.’41

2.2.2 ANU Study (October 2012)

The 2012 annual ANUPoll, a national survey undertaken by the Research School of Social

Sciences at the Australian National University, was conducted into ‘Perceptions of Corruption

and Ethical Conduct’. A survey of 2,020 people was conducted between 13 August and 9

September 2012 with a response rate of 43 per cent. Participants in the survey were asked a

series of questions about confidence in government and institutions, perceptions and

experience of corruption, ethical conduct in government, and most important problems and

political mood.

34 Ibid 9.

35 Ibid 10.

36 Ibid 20.

37 Ibid 22.

38 Ibid 20.

39 Ibid 21.

40 Ibid 21.

41 Ibid 22.

12

Relevant for our project was the survey’s questions on perceptions and experience of

corruption and ethical conduct in government. The key findings in these areas were:

Perceptions and Experience of Corruption:

- Very few Australians have direct experience of corruption among public officials. Less

than 1 per cent say they or a family member have often experienced corruption in the

past five years.

- There is a widespread perception that corruption in Australia has increased, with 43 per

cent taking this view and 41 per cent seeing corruption as having remained the same.

- The media, trade unions and political parties are viewed as the most corrupt institutions

in Australian society; the armed services, the public service and the police are viewed as

the least corrupt.

- Around half of those interviewed in the survey did not know to whom or where to

report corruption.42

Ethical conduct in government:

- The public sees relatively few elected representatives as being involved in corruption.

Just over half of the respondents see ‘almost none’ or ‘a few’ federal politicians as being

corrupt.

- Just one in three of the respondents believe that politicians can be trusted to look after

their interests.

- The level of public scepticism about politicians’ motives has been generally consistent

since at least the 1990s, with the exception of when new governments have been elected

in 1996 and 2007.

2.3 Influence on designing this study

The design and implementation of the surveys conducted in this project were heavily influenced

by these previous studies, and particularly that conducted in 1994 by the NSW ICAC. The results

of these earlier surveys assisted us in determining the key variables in scenarios that we put to

participants in our own surveys. We also sought and gained permission from the NSW ICAC to

use scenarios closely modelled on the scenarios adopted by them to facilitate comparisons with

the NSW survey results in future research.

42 ANU, Perceptions of Corruption and Ethical Conduct (ANU Poll, October 2012).

13

3. Methodology

The project was undertaken in five stages.

3.1 Stage 1: Designing the survey

The survey was modelled on a similar survey conducted in 1994 by the NSW ICAC Research

Unit (see further explanation of this survey above in Part 2). All empirical research involving

human subjects undertaken at the University of Adelaide must be approved by the University’s

Human Research Ethics Committee. The necessary approval was obtained in August 2013.

The survey was devised to produce a data set that provided an understanding about:

- perceptions about what might constitute corrupt conduct or conduct that amounts to

misconduct or maladministration;

- what action respondents would consider taking when potentially corrupt activities are

witnessed; and

- perceptions about the types of corrupt activities or misconduct or maladministration

that is of the most concern within Local Government administration.

The survey was targeted at the attitudes and perceptions of two core groups:

- People in local government – staff, elected members, and Chief Executive Officers

(CEOs). This survey was designed to elicit the attitudes of those within local government

to corruption, their understanding of it and to develop a feel for how they would react if

they became aware of corruption in their council.

- Constituents of local government, that is, members of the general public. This survey

was to be designed to elicit the understanding of members of the public regarding

corruption and their expectations about how corruption will be dealt with by

government.

Each survey was made up of three parts.

Part 1: The first part asked a series of questions about eleven hypothetical scenarios depicting

different types of conduct that could potentially occur in local government organisations.

Respondents were asked to rate the scenarios in terms of how desirable, justified and harmful

they thought the behaviour depicted was, whether it was corrupt, and what they would do

about the behaviour if they witnessed it.

Part 2: The second part asked for responses on a Likert scale (of 1-5) to a series of 13

statements about corruption (for the local government group) and 12 statements (for the public

group).

Part 3: The final part required respondents to provide some demographic data for the analysis.

Each part of the survey included both closed questions to provide quantitative, statistical data,

supplemented by open questions to allow a richer qualitative analysis of responses. The open

questions invited respondents to provide any further explanations of their responses to each

scenario and their responses to the statements about corruption.

14

The scenarios used in the first part of the survey were designed in consultation with the project

team. A number of scenarios were considered, based on hypothetical scenarios, previous cases,

and the New South Wales scenarios. The selection of the final scenarios was based on the need

to have a range of types of behaviours, by different actors and in different areas of council. The

scenarios were further reduced and clarified after a small pilot survey was conducted and

feedback was received.

The scenarios were then further reduced in consultation with Dr Ian Zajac to ensure those

scenarios that were included in the final survey would provide a comparison across the

variables we were seeking to test through the different scenarios. The variables that were used

in the design of the scenarios are outlined in Table 1.

Table 1. Variables used in scenarios.

Variable Levels

Nature of benefit Pecuniary (monetary benefit)

Non-pecuniary (non-monetary benefit)

Size of benefit Small (Less than $500)

Medium (More than $500)

Extent of involvement in activity Initiator of activity

Recipient of activity

Willing participant in activity

Bystander in activity

Negligent/incompetence leading to activity

Motivations/justifications for activity Helping friends/family

Personal gain

Supporting local business/community

Acting in best interests of council

Incompetence/laziness

Personal beliefs

The short and largely generalised nature of the scenarios meant that there was, on occasion,

difficulty in neatly characterising them under these variables.

3.2 Stage 2: Testing the Survey

A small sample pilot survey was distributed to ensure questions are meaningful and elicit useful

responses before the full survey was distributed in South Australia. The pilot survey was

distributed to a number of local government employees in Queensland and LGA officers.

Feedback on the sample survey led to change of the survey in one significant respect. The

survey was reduced in length to take 15-20 minutes, as pilot participants indicated that it was

too lengthy (up to 30 minutes).

15

3.3 Stage 3: Implementing the Survey

The survey was made available both electronically and in hardcopy to ensure that it included

participants who may not have access to a computer and the internet. However, only one

council requested that the surveys be provided to them in hardcopy.

Local government participants were selected using an open invitation to councils to be involved

sent by the Local Government Association to all council CEOs. Those councils that indicated they

would like to be involved in the project, were then contacted by Gabrielle Appleby and provided

with emails to send to their employees and members with an invitation to complete the survey.

Two reminders were provided to councils to send to their employees and members.43

Public participants were selected through a number of public invitations predominantly

through local government advertising. All local governments were provided with material to

advertise the survey to their constituents, including flyers, posters, and information for their

websites and newsletters. Local governments were also asked to distribute information about

the survey to any mailing lists of community groups that they engaged for research purposes. In

addition, the LGA put out a media release, resulting in an interview on ABC radio explaining and

advertising the survey. The University of Adelaide Law School published a blog post on its

website explaining the research and inviting people to participate. The number of responses to

each of the statement and scenario questions is detailed in Table 2.

Table 2. Number of responses to each question

Question LG Public

Scenarios

Computer How desirable is this behaviour? 446 150

How justified do you think it is? 445 151

How harmful do you believe it is? 444 150

How corrupt is this behaviour? 446 149

If you witnessed this, what would you do about it? 433 146

Employ How desirable is this behaviour? 452 150





Dinner How desirable is this behaviour? 453 152





List How desirable is this behaviour? 452 149



43 This is consistent with the Dillman method – Deb - reference

16

Question LG Public



Unprepared How desirable is this behaviour? 453 150





Legal How desirable is this behaviour? 453 150





Bypass How desirable is this behaviour? 449 151





Local How desirable is this behaviour? 453 150





Contract How desirable is this behaviour? 446 153





Football How desirable is this behaviour? 448 149





Books How desirable is this behaviour? 449 151





Statements

Conduct must be illegal for it to be called corrupt. 436 147

Avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to get past bureaucratic red tape.

435 146

If something is done for the right reasons it cannot be called corrupt. 436 145

There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful 434 145

17

Question LG Public

will be done about it.

There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful can be done about it.

436 146

People who report corruption are likely to suffer for it. 436 145

Most corruption is too trivial to be worth reporting. 435 145

I would not know where to go to report corruption. 431 n/a

People who report corruption are just trouble makers. 432 146

Every councillor and council employee has an obligation to report corruption.

431 145

Corruption is an issue in South Australia. 430 143

Corruption is more of an issue in South Australia than other States across Australia.

427 142

Corruption is more prevalent in local government than other levels of government.

431 143

Other

Have you previously received any education and/or training on the introduction of the ICAC?

405 n/a

What type of assistance would you find useful to help you understand corruption and your reporting obligations?

370 n/a

3.4 Stage 4: Analysis

The present methodological design required statistical analysis of the quantitative survey data

and thematic analysis of the written answers provided in the qualitative dimension of the

survey. This approach permitted triangulation of quantitative and the qualitative results to gain

a richer understanding of these data.

3.4.1 Quantitative Analysis:

The quantitative analysis was undertaken by Research Assistant Clare McGuiness under the

supervision of consultant, Dr Ian Zajac. After the survey closure (21 April 2014) the data were

downloaded from the online data collection tool (SurveyMonkey) and imported into SPSS

statistical analysis software. A missing values analysis was carried out and cases with less than

50% of the survey (not including the demographic questions) completed were excluded from

further analysis (N=135 from the local government sample and N=61 from the public sample).

Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) and frequencies (percentages of sample

giving certain responses) were produced to summarise responses to the scenarios and

statements. Where comparisons were required, inferential statistics were used. For comparing

the same group’s responses to different questions, paired samples t-tests (for two questions)

and one-way repeated measures ANOVA followed up by post-hoc pairwise t-tests (for more

than two questions) were used. When comparing two or more groups’ responses the same

questions, independent t-tests (for two groups) and one-way independent ANOVAs followed up

by post-hoc pairwise t-tests (for more than two questions) were used. To determine the extent

to which responses to certain questions predicted responses to another question, linear

18

regression was used. Where appropriate, effect size was calculated. Some explanations of

terminology are provided in Table3.

Table 3. Statistical procedures and terminology used in Analysis

Term Explanation

Statistically significant

This term denotes that a finding is very likely (a probability of 95%) to have occurred as a result of the experimental manipulation; that is, there is a 5% or lower probability that the result occurred by chance. This threshold for establishing confidence in statistical outcomes is widely used throughout the sciences to distinguish results that are genuinely enlightening from those that are the result of random variation in the data.

p

The probability, or p-value, denotes the significance of a test. The threshold for statistical significance is p=.05; values greater than this indicate an unacceptable likelihood that the result occurred by chance.

M(SD)

The mean of a population of scores, M, is simply its average. The standard deviation, SD, indicates how much responses vary from the mean. About two-thirds of responses fall within one standard deviation of the mean. For example, a mean of 3 and a standard deviation of 0.5 indicate that the average score is 3 and two-thirds of scores in the sample fall between 2.5 and 3.5.

t-test Used to test whether two means (e.g. group average answers to a particular question) are statistically significantly different from one another.

ANOVA Used to test whether three or more means (e.g. group average answers to a particular question) are statistically significantly different from one another. If a difference is found, pairwise comparisons are performed to determine which means differ from each other.

Logistic regression

A linear model is used to predict an outcome variable (e.g. answers to a question) from one or more predictor variables (e.g. answers to other questions). This allows analysis of the degree to which each predictor variable contributes to prediction of the outcome.

Effect size Cohen’s d: This measure of effect size is prevalent herein and indicates the magnitude of an effect; thus it is more meaningful than a p values in this regard. Cohen’s d indicates the size of the difference between groups in terms of standard deviation units. For simplicity, effect sizes have been reported in descriptive, rather than numerical terms. Using the guidelines set out by Cohen (small=.2, medium=.5, large=.8), the effect sizes were interpreted as follows: Small: >.24; Small-to-medium: .25-.44; Medium: .45-.54; Medium-to-large: .55-.64; Large: >.75.

R-Squared Regression models reported herein use this measure as an estimate of the overall effect. In the case of paired variables, this is a measure of the proportion of variance shared by the two variables, and varies from 0 to 1. For example, an R 2 of 60% implies this proportion of variance in one variable is accounted for by variance in the other (and vice-versa). The R² is always positive, so does not convey the direction of the correlation between the two variables.

19

3.4.2 Qualitative Analysis

The qualitative thematic analysis was undertaken by an external consultant, Dr Candice Oster.

She was provided with the data and conducted a standard thematic analysis. Throughout this

analysis, meetings were held with Dr Oster and other members of the project team to check the

face validity of the emerging codes and themes.

The number of respondents providing qualitative responses to each scenario is presented in

Table 4.

Table 4. Number of responses per scenario

Scenario Local Government

Responses Public Responses

1 127 59

2 76 42

3 80 53

4 74 49

5 122 60

6 117 61

7 159 67

8 96 63

9 120 64

10 135 62

11 81 47

Total 1187 627

The number of respondents providing qualitative responses to general questions about

corruption and reporting corruption is presented in Table 5.

Table 5. Number of responses per statement

Statement Local Government


Conduct must be illegal for it to be called corrupt 36 22

Avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to get past bureaucratic red tape

41 17

If something is done for the right reasons it cannot be called corrupt

40 24

There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful will be done about it

34 26

There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful can be done about it

21 20

People who report corruption are likely to suffer for it

45 28

Most corruption is too trivial to be worth reporting 29 21

I would not know where to go to report corruption 15 -

20

Statement Local Government


People who report corruption are just trouble makers

22 16

Every councillor and council employee has an obligation to report corruption

13 12

Corruption is an issue in South Australia 33 23

Corruption is more of an issue in South Australia than in other States across Australia

29 21

Corruption is more prevalent in local government than other levels of government

36 26

Total 394 256

The qualitative data were thematically analysed following the approach outlined by Braun and

Clarke.44 We used the online qualitative data analysis software, Dedoose (www.dedoose.com) to

assist the data analysis process. All qualitative responses were copied and pasted into a

separate Word document of responses to each survey question. The documents were uploaded

onto Dedoose. The analysis aimed to explore three areas, which had been developed by Dr Oster

by reference to the data. These areas were:

1. how respondents defined corruption, misconduct and maladministration;

2. how respondents identified corruption, misconduct and maladministration; and

3. how respondents responded to behaviour in the context of their understandings of

corruption, misconduct and maladministration.

After reading through the data multiple times to gain familiarisation, initial codes were

developed reflecting the content of participants’ responses (e.g. fair/unfair; benefit; it depends).

The codes were assigned to the relevant pieces of text within Dedoose. The codes were then

collated into potential themes, where a theme ‘captures something important about the data in

relation to the research question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning

within the data set’.45

The results from the qualitative analysis were then compared with the quantitative analysis.

The codes and themes were used to explore further and to explain some of the quantitative

results.

3.5 Stage 5: Reporting

From the statistical and qualitative analysis, the research team met on a number of occasions to

interpret the analysis and develop recommendations from this discussion.

44 V Braun and V Clarke, ‘Using thematic analysis in psychology’ (2006) 3(2) Qualitative Research in Psychology 77.

45 Ibid 82, italics in original.

http://www.dedoose.com/

21

3.6 Personnel

This project was undertaken by a team of academics at the University of Adelaide who have

expertise and experience in administrative and public law, local government and empirical

(quantitative and qualitative) research. The team consisted of:

Dr Gabrielle Appleby, Senior Lecturer, Adelaide Law School, Deputy Director of the

Public Law and Policy Research Unit, University of Adelaide.

Dr Appleby researches in public law, specialising in integrity in government. She has

extensive experience in researching the operation of government integrity mechanisms

using both legal research methodology and qualitative interviewing. Gabrielle managed

the project and oversaw the development of the survey and the writing up of the

findings in the report stage.

Professor Deborah Turnbull, Chair in Psychology, University of Adelaide.

Professor Turnbull is an expert in empirical research methods and evidence-based

practice. Professor Turnbull assisted in the development of survey questions and the

oversight of the testing, implementation and analysis of the survey by the research

assistant. She assisted in the drawing of conclusions from this analysis during the

writing up in the report stage.

Paul Leadbeter, Senior Lecturer, Adelaide Law School, University of Adelaide.

Mr Leadbeter’s experience includes work for 20 years as a partner at Norman

Waterhouse where he was an advisor to Local Government authorities on governance

issues, planning and environmental matters. He was employed as Legal Officer for the

City of Tea Tree Gully prior to joining Norman Waterhouse. He served a two-year term

as the Presiding member of the City of Burnside’s Development Assessment Panel from

July 2011 to June 2013. He continues to provide legal advice to various Local

Government authorities on a range of matters. Paul was responsible for designing and

conducting the Environment Protection Enforcement Certificate Course on behalf of the

SA Environment Protection Authority which was designed to provide authorised officers

under the Environment Protection Act with training in relation to enforcement of that

legislation and which included a component on appropriate conduct as a public officer.

Mr Leadbeter provided advice on the drafting of scenario questions that target attitudes

and perceptions of specific behaviour, and also in drawing conclusions and

recommendations from the analysis of the data set.

Professor John Williams, Dean of Law, Adelaide Law School, University of Adelaide.

Professor Williams’ experience includes working with State and Federal Government in

the development and implementation of new statutory frameworks, including the

management of the Murray-Darling under the new federal Water Act and the roll out of

Opal Fuel into Northern Australia. Professor Williams provided advice on drafting

scenario questions, and also in drawing conclusions and recommendations from the

analysis of the data set.

22

Other Team Members and Consultants

Peter Lockett

The University engaged Peter Lockett, former CEO of the Charles Sturt Council, and now

consultant with Seaview Corporate Services, to provide advice on Local Government

operational issues. Specifically, Mr Lockett provided advice on drafting scenario

questions and also in interpreting findings and developing recommendations from the

analysis of the data set.

Dr Candice Oster, Research Consultant, Visiting Research Fellow, School of Psychology,

University of Adelaide.

Dr Oster is a research consultant specialising in qualitative research. She has extensive

experience in the application of qualitative methods across a range of disciplines.

Candice analysed the qualitative data derived from the survey comments.

Clare McGuiness, PhD student at the University of Adelaide.

Clare McGuiness was engaged throughout the project as a Research Assistant and

assisted with the development of the survey and its marketing, and the quantitative

analysis of the data.

Heidi Long, PhD student at the University of Adelaide.

Heidi Long was engaged with the project as a Research Assistant and assisted in the

deployment of the survey instrument and the cleaning of the data set.

Dr Ian Zajac, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at CSIRO

Dr Zajac is skilled in research design and analyses. Dr Zajac advised on the design of

survey questions, particularly in regards to the structuring of scenarios in order to

permit robust statistical comparisons. He designed, a-priori, an analysis plan and

supervised the research assistant during the generation of statistical results reported

herein. The interpretations of data in this report were also checked and approved.

23

4. Outline and Discussion of Findings

This part will set out the findings from each of the surveys and provide an interpretation and

discussion of those findings. This discussion will form the basis of the conclusion and

recommendations set out in the next section. The findings will not be presented in the same

order as presented in the survey. They are presented in this part as follows:

4.1 Agreement with statements about corruption

4.2 Responses to Scenarios

4.3 Assisting local government understand corruption and their reporting obligations

Note regarding terminology in this part of the report: Throughout this section, the term

statistically significant denotes that a finding is very likely (a probability of 95%) to have

occurred as a result of the experimental manipulation; that is, there is a 5% or lower probability

that the result occurred by chance. This threshold for establishing confidence in statistical

outcomes is widely used throughout the social sciences to distinguish results that are genuinely

enlightening from those that are merely the result of random variation in the data. Noticeable

differences that occur between questions or groups that do not reach this critical level should

under no circumstances be considered statistically meaningful.

4.1 AGREEMENT WITH STATEMENTS ABOUT CORRUPTION

4.1.1 Average agreement with statements across groups

Summary of key findings:

Overall, there was no general identifiable tendency for the public or the local government to

have different views about the statements in the survey. Differences were only in the strength of

disagreement or agreement; there were no cases where the average rating amounted to general

agreement for one group and general disagreement for the other.

Statement 1: On average, both groups disagreed with the statement that conduct must be illegal

for it to be called corrupt.

Statements 2 and 3: On average, both groups disagreed that avoiding procedure is sometimes

justifiable to get past bureaucratic red tape. Nonetheless, a small but reasonable number of

respondents from both groups agreed that avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to get

past bureaucratic red tape. Both groups disagreed with statement (3), that if something is done

for the right reasons it cannot be called corrupt. Disagreement to statement (3) was stronger

than disagreement to statement (2).

Statements 4 and 5: Both groups disagreed with statement (4) and more strongly disagreed with

statement (5). The local government group agreed more strongly than the public group with

statement (4), that there is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful will be done

about it and statement (5), that there is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful

can be done about it. The local government group were less circumspect that nothing could be

done about reported corruption than the public.

24

Statement 6: Both groups weakly agreed with the statement that people who report corruption

are likely to suffer for it. The public agreed with this statement more strongly. Significant

percentages of respondents from both groups had concerns about repercussions for those

reporting corruption.

Statement 7: Both groups disagreed with the statement that most corruption is too trivial to be

worth reporting. The public disagreed with this statement more strongly.

Statement 8: This statement was only asked of local government respondents. On average,

respondents disagreed that they would not know where to report corruption. However, a not

insignificant percentage of respondents agreed with the statement.

Statement 9: Both groups disagreed that people who report corruption are just trouble makers.

Local government disagreed more strongly with this statement. This statement elicited the

highest level of disagreement in both groups.

Statement 10: Both groups agreed that every councillor and council employee has an obligation

to report corruption. The public agreed more strongly with this statement, although the

agreement among both groups was very high.

Statements 11 and 12: Both groups agreed with statement (11) that corruption is an issue in

South Australia. Both groups disagreed to statement (12) that corruption is more of an issue in

South Australia than other States across Australia. While both groups agreed that corruption is

an issue in South Australia, they were not as concerned that corruption was more of an issue in

South Australia than other States across Australia.

Statement 13: On average, both groups disagreed that that corruption was more prevalent in

local government than other levels of government. The local government group was more

inclined to disagree than the public.

The surveys comprised of a series of statements to which participants were asked whether they

agreed or disagreed based on a Likert rating scale (1 to 5). Lower scores indicated

disagreement, higher scores indicated agreement, with a score of 3 considered neutral (i.e.,

neither agree nor disagree). The average rating given to each statement for each of the survey

groups (public and local government) is set out in Table 6.

25

Table 6. Agreement with statements (Public and LG)

Statement

Average rating* M (SD) Higher

agreement

t-test for differences between groups

[effect size] LG

N = 456 Public

N = 153

(1) Conduct must be illegal for it to be called corrupt.

2.13 (.98) 2.14 (1.13) ns

(2) Avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to get past bureaucratic red tape.

2.30 (.99) 2.46 (1.16) ns

(3) If something is done for the right reasons it cannot be called corrupt.

2.12 (.87) 2.05 (.91) ns

(4) There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful will be done about it.

2.28 (1.11) 2.02 (1.21) LG t(577)=2.38, p=.018

[small effect]

(5) There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful can be done about it.

1.95 (.89) 1.75 (.94) LG t(580)=2.24, p=.025

[small effect]

(6) People who report corruption are likely to suffer for it.

3.39 (1.04) 3.66 (1.07) Public t(579)=2.70, p=.007 [small-to-medium

effect]

(7) Most corruption is too trivial to be worth reporting.

2.24 (.90) 1.90 (.88) LG t(578)=3.92, p<.001 [small-to-medium

effect]

(8) I would not know where to go to report corruption

2.22 (1.05) Not asked n/a

(9) People who report corruption are just trouble makers.

1.77 (.66) 1.55 (.62) LG t(576)=3.51, p<.001 [small-to-medium

effect]

(10) Every councillor and council employee has an obligation to report corruption.

4.25 (.83) 4.57 (.70) Public t(574)=4.22, p<.001 [small-to-medium

effect]

(11) Corruption is an issue in South Australia.

3.37 (.90) 3.84 (.92) Public t(571)=5.44, p<.001

[medium effect]

26

Statement


agreement


[effect size] LG

N = 456 Public

N = 153

(12) Corruption is more of an issue in South Australia than other States across Australia.

2.56 (.69) 2.74 (.84) Public t(567)=2.53, p=.012 [small-to-medium

effect]

(13) Corruption is more prevalent in local government than other levels of government.

2.48 (.84) 2.84 (.84) Public t(244.68)=4.50,

p<.001 [small-to-medium effect]

Note. N refers to entire sample; some respondents skipped certain questions. Maximum N missing for any question =

29 (LG), 11 (Public). ns = difference not statistically significant at p=.05 level.

*Agreement ratings: 1 = Strongly disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neither agree nor disagree; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly agree.

Percentages of respondents from both groups who either agreed or disagreed to some extent

are presented in Table 7.

Table 7. Percentage agreement and disagreement with statements (Public and LG)

Statement

LG N = 456

Public N = 153

Disagree* Agree* Disagree* Agree*


79.4 14.4 76.2 16.4


66.7 15.4 54.8 23.2


72.3 6.6 75.9 7.6


66.1 16.6 78 16.5


81 6.9 86.9 8.9

27

Statement

LG N = 456

Public N = 153

Disagree* Agree* Disagree* Agree*


20.4 51.8 17.2 65.5


68.8 10.3 84.1 6.2


74.2 18.8 n/a n/a


89.1 .9 94.6 .7


4.5 89.4 2.1 95.8


13.5 40.5 4.9 60.9


39.1 1.7 30.9 7.7


44.3 5.3 24.5 14

Notes. . N refers to entire sample; some respondents skipped certain questions. Maximum N missing for any question

= 29 (LG), 11 (Public).

* Percentages do not sum to 100 as not all response options included. Disagree = ratings of ‘disagree’ (likert scale 2)

and ‘strongly disagree’ (likert scale 1). Agree = ratings of ‘agree’ (likert scale 4) and ‘strongly agree’ (likert scale 5).

Ratings of ‘neither disagree nor agree’ (likert scale 3) excluded from this table. Missing responses excluded.

Overall, there was no general identifiable tendency for the public or the local government to

have different views about the statements. Of the 12 statements shown to both groups

(statement 8 about reporting corruption was not shown to the public survey group), the

agreement ratings for 9 showed a statistically significant difference between the local

government and public groups, as displayed in Table 6 (statements 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 and

13). However, differences were only in the strength of disagreement or agreement; there were

no cases where the average rating amounted to general agreement for one group and general

disagreement for the other.

28

Statement 1:

For the first three statements, there were no statistically significant differences between the

groups. On average, both groups disagreed with the statement that conduct must be illegal for it

to be called corrupt. Only 14.4 per cent of the local government group and 16.4 per cent of the

public group correctly identified corruption as pertaining to illegal conduct.

Under the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012, only conduct that is

illegal is properly called corruption, as opposed to misconduct or maladministration (see

definitions set out above in Part 1). These terms are often used interchangeably in everyday

language, but they denote differing levels of seriousness and dishonesty involved.46 The

correct classification of conduct as corruption influences perceptions of corruption within

government and therefore may affect public confidence in government.

Statements 2 and 3:

Both groups disagreed with statement (2), that avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to

get past bureaucratic red tape. Nonetheless, 15.4 per cent of local government respondents and

23.2 of public respondents agreed that avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to get past

bureaucratic red tape. Finally, both groups disagreed with statement (3), that if something is

done for the right reasons it cannot be called corrupt. Disagreement to statement (3) was

stronger than disagreement to statement (2).

These two responses reflect the finding (set out below in Part 4.2.3.4 of the Report) that the

effect of motivations on perceptions of corruption in the scenarios was not large. However,

the relatively large number of respondents who agreed that avoiding procedure was

sometimes justifiable may be worth addressing, particularly among the local government

group.

Statements 4 and 5:

Both groups disagreed with statement (4) and more strongly disagreed with statement (5). The

local government group disagreed less strongly than the public group with statement (4), that

there is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful will be done about it and

statement (5), that there is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful can be done

about it.

These results are concerning, as they are indicative of a sense of helplessness, felt more

strongly by those within local government, about the likelihood of corruption being

addressed. This sense of helplessness was also reflected in the qualitative responses (see

below at Part 4.4 of the Report).

Statements 4 and 5 were designed to provide a comparison about perceptions about the

motivation to respond to reporting of corruption in South Australia. The responses to these two

statements were compared to each other, within both groups (Table 8).

46 See also A J Purcell, ‘Corruption and misconduct in local government in Australia: What we know, but have trouble understanding and explaining’ (2012) IIA Australia Journal 35-40, https://www.iia.org.au/sf_docs/default-source/technical-resources/Corruption_and_misconduct_in_local_government.pdf?sfvrsn=0

https://www.iia.org.au/sf_docs/default-source/technical-resources/Corruption_and_misconduct_in_local_government.pdf?sfvrsn=0

https://www.iia.org.au/sf_docs/default-source/technical-resources/Corruption_and_misconduct_in_local_government.pdf?sfvrsn=0

29

Table 8. Comparison of responses to statements 4 and 5 (Public and LG)

Average rating* M (SD)

Higher agreement

t-test for difference between statements

(4) There is no point in reporting

corruption because nothing useful will be done about it.

(5) There is no point in reporting

corruption because nothing useful can be

done about it.

LG (N = 432) 2.28 (1.11) 1.95 (.89) (4)

t(143)=3.01, p=.003 [small-to-medium

effect]

Public (N = 144)

2.02 (1.21) 1.75 (.94) (4) t(431)=9.15, p<.001

[small effect]

Notes. N is number of respondents who answered both questions. *Agreement ratings: 1 = Strongly disagree; 2 =

Disagree; 3 = Neither agree nor disagree; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly agree.

The average response to both statements (4) and (5) in both the local government and public

groups was ‘Disagree’. Both groups disagreed more strongly with the statement ‘nothing useful

can be done’. The difference in agreement with the two statements was statistically significant

for both groups (Table 8).

These differences, although small, indicate that the local government group were more

likely to think that something could be done about reported corruption than the public

group. The results indicate greater public awareness may be needed in relation to what can

be done, and that any sense of helplessness, particularly in those within local government

(a conclusion that comes up repeatedly in these findings) must be addressed.

Statement 6:

Both groups weakly agreed with the statement that people who report corruption are likely to

suffer for it. The public agreed with this statement more strongly. 51.8 per cent of local

government respondents and 65.5 per cent of public respondents had concerns about

repercussions for those reporting corruption.

While the findings that both groups have some concerns about the repercussions for people

who report corruption ought to be addressed, the less strong reaction to the statement by

the local government group may reflect education and training about whistleblower

protections that are available, although the findings provide support for stronger

initiatives in this area.

Statement 7:

Both groups disagreed with the statement that most corruption is too trivial to be worth

reporting. The public disagreed with this statement more strongly. 84.1 per cent of public

respondents disagreed that most corruption is too trivial to be worth reporting while 68.8 per

cent of local government respondents disagreed with the statement. While it is pleasing that

both groups disagreed with the statement, the disparity in the strength of disagreement may

30

have an impact on public confidence that everything possible is being done to target corrupt

conduct.

Statement 8:

This statement was only asked of local government respondents. On average, respondents

disagreed that they would not know where to report corruption. However, the breakdown of

agreement/disagreement reveals that 74.2 per cent of respondents disagreed, whilst 18.8 per

cent of respondents agreed with the statement.

Lack of understanding of reporting pathways within a small but reasonable group is

concerning and must be addressed.

Statement 9:

Both groups disagreed that people who report corruption are just trouble makers. Local

government disagreed more strongly with this statement. This statement elicited the highest

level of disagreement in both groups. Only 0.9 per cent of local government respondents and 0.7

per cent of public respondents agreed with the statement.

This demonstrates a high level of concern and seriousness around corruption in both

groups.

Statement 10:

Both groups agreed that every councillor and council employee has an obligation to report

corruption. The public agreed more strongly with this statement, although the agreement

among both groups was very high. Only 4.5 per cent of local government respondents and 2.1

percent of public respondents disagreed with the statement.

The disparity may reflect views from those within local government that the context and

level of knowledge is an important aspect of reporting corruption (see further discussion of

this in Part 4.3).

Statements 11 and 12:

Both groups agreed to statement (11) that corruption is an issue in South Australia. The public

agreed with the statement more strongly. 40.5 per cent of local government respondents agreed

to the statement while 60.9 per cent of public respondents agreed to it.

The higher percentage of public respondents agreeing to the statements may be of concern

in light of the effect of perception of corruption in government on public confidence in

government.

The public perception of corruption as an issue in South Australia may be as a result of

recent media reports around corruption in the State, for example in relation to the State

government’s zoning approvals process in Mt Barker, or as a result of the publicity around

the introduction of the ICAC in South Australia. The findings provide empirical data that

refutes the claims of the former Premier Mike Rann that corruption is not an issue in South

Australia. The findings support the initiative taken by Attorney-General John Rau in

introducing the ICAC. The high level of concern in government corruption in the State

31

demonstrate a strong appetite within the South Australian public and local government

sector for further intervention and initiative in tackling corruption.

Both groups disagreed to statement (12) that corruption is more of an issue in South Australia

than other States across Australia. The public disagreed less strongly with the statement (30.9

per cent of public respondents disagreed, while 39.1 per cent of local government respondents

disagreed), which may again be of concern in light of the effect of this perception on public

confidence. However, only 7.7 agreed with the statement.

Table 9. Comparison of responses to statements 11 and 12 (Public and LG)


Higher agreement

t-test for difference between statements (11) Corruption is an

issue in South Australia.

(12) Corruption is more of an issue in

South Australia than other States across Australia.

LG (N = 425)

3.37 (.90) 2.56 (.69) (11) t(140)=11.67 , p<.001

[large effect]

Public (N = 141)

3.84 (.92) 2.74 (.84) (11) t(424)=17.23, p<.001

[large effect]

Notes. N is number of respondents who answered both questions. *Agreement ratings: 1 = Strongly disagree; 2 =

Disagree; 3 = Neither agree nor disagree; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly agree.

Comparisons between statements 11 and 12 for both groups are presented in Table 9. The

average responses of the local government sample were around the ‘neither agree nor disagree’

mark, but for statement 11 the response leant towards ‘agree’, and for statement 12, it leant

towards ‘disagree’. This difference was found to be statistically significant. Local government

respondents indicated greater agreement with the idea that corruption is an issue in South

Australia than with the suggestion that this is more so that case than in other states.

Responses by the public to both statements were an average corruption ratings close to ‘neither

agree nor disagree’, but slightly greater disagreement was registered with statement (12). The

difference was small but statistically significant. Compared to the statement that corruption is

an issue in South Australia, members of the public disagreed less, on average, with the idea that

corruption is more of a problem in South Australia than other states.

These results indicate that while both groups agreed that corruption is an issue in South

Australia, they were not as concerned that corruption was more of an issue in South

Australia than other States across Australia.

Statement 13:

On average, both groups disagreed that that corruption was more prevalent in local government

than other levels of government. The local government group was more inclined to disagree

than the public. Only 5.3 per cent of local government respondents agreed with the statement

whereas 14 per cent of the public agreed with it.

32

This is again concerning in terms of effect on public confidence. The perception that

corruption is not more prevalent in local government than other levels of government

demonstrates the need for responses and initiatives to be implemented not only at the local

government level, but across the government sector in the State.

4.1.2 Effect of demographics on agreement with different statements

Summary of key findings:

Effect of supervisor status on statement agreement: Within the local government group, non-

supervisors usually agreed more strongly with the statements where there was a statistically

significant difference between the groups (five statements). These statements included that

there is no point reporting corruption because nothing useful will be done about it; that there is

no point reporting corruption because nothing useful can be done about it; people who report

corruption are just trouble makers; corruption is more of an issue in South Australia than other

States across Australia and Corruption is more prevalent in local government than other levels

of government. For one statement only, there was a statistically significant difference and

supervisors agreed more strongly (the statement that conduct must be illegal to be called

corrupt).

Effect of role on statement agreement: CEOs and elected members differed from other local

government employees in their agreement with 10 of the 13 statements. In general, other local

government employees demonstrated less understanding about the mechanisms, processes,

protections and obligations around reporting corruption.

Effect of highest educational attainment on statement agreement: No meaningful differences

were found between groups’ agreement to the statements in either the local government sample

or public group based on highest educational attainment.

Effect of previous training on statement agreement: Those respondents in the local government

group who had received previous ICAC training differed from other respondents in their

agreement with 11 of the 13 statements. Those respondents who had received previous ICAC

training were more inclined to believe conduct must be illegal to be called corrupt, to be

concerned about even trivial matters or corruption done with justifications, to be more positive

about responses to reporting corruption and the protections afforded to those who report

corruption, to understand where to go to report corruption and to understand their obligations

to report corruption. Those respondents who had received previous ICAC training were less

inclined to be concerned about corruption as an issue in South Australia and local government.

Effect of number of years worked for council: Within the local government group, no meaningful

difference was found between respondents based on how many years they had worked for

council.

Effect of employment type: Within the local government group, no meaningful difference was

found between respondents based on their employment status.

33

Effect of rural or metropolitan classification: In both the local government and public samples

there was no difference between the rural and metropolitan groups’ agreement with most

statements. Local government respondents working for rural councils disagreed less than those

working for metropolitan councils with the statement that if something is done for the right

reasons it cannot be considered corrupt. Members of the public living in rural council areas

agreed more that corruption is an issue in South Australia.

The final part of the survey included a number of demographic questions. Here, the impact of these

demographics on perceptions of the statements is considered.

4.1.2.1 Effect of supervisory status on statement agreement

Local government respondents were asked whether they supervised staff and two groups were

formed containing those who supervised other staff (N = 166) and those who did not (N = 239).

Comparisons between the two groups revealed statistically significant differences in agreement

for 6 of 13 statements (shown in Table 10).

Table 10. Comparisons of Supervisor and Non-supervisor groups’ statement agreement (LG)


Higher agreement

t-test for differences between groups Supervisors

N=166

Non-supervisors

N=239


2.25 (1.04) 2.05 (0.93) Supervisors t(325.51)=2, p=.046

[small effect]


2.21 (0.94) 2.37 (1.04) ns


2.06 (0.83) 2.15 (0.90) ns


2.09 (1.10) 2.42 (1.10) Non-

supervisors

t(374.61)=1.66, p=.003 [small-to-

medium effect]


1.82 (0.82) 2.04 (0.93) Non-

supervisors

t(401.00)=2.49, p=.013

[small effect]

34


Higher agreement

t-test for differences between groups Supervisors

N=166

Non-supervisors

N=239


3.26 (1.02) 3.46 (1.07) ns


2.18 (0.94) 2.29 (0.87) ns


2.10 (1.02) 2.30 (1.06) ns


1.66 (0.62) 1.84 (0.68) Non-

supervisors

t(401.00)=2.70, p=.007 [small-to-medium effect]


4.31 (0.76) 4.22 (0.87) ns


3.24 (0.88) 3.48 (0.91) Non-

supervisors t(399.00)=2.63,

p=.009 [small effect]


2.45 (0.68) 2.63 (0.72) Non-

supervisors

t(396.00)=2.48, p=.013 [small-to-medium effect]


2.38 (0.78) 2.54 (0.89) ns

Note. N refers to entire group; some respondents skipped certain questions. Maximum N missing for any question = 3

(Supervisors), 2 (Non-supervisors). ns = difference not statistically significant at p=.05 level.


For five of the statements where there was a statistically significant difference between the

responses of supervisors and non-supervisors, non-supervisors agreed more strongly with the

statement. Supervisors agreed statistically significantly more strongly with that statement that

conduct may only be labelled corrupt if it is illegal. This demonstrates a slightly higher

understanding of the legal definition of the term within the supervisor group, but still an overall

misunderstanding.

The higher agreement of non-supervisors with statements 4 and 5 reflect a greater sense of

helplessness among this group that anything can or will be done in response to reporting of

corruption. The higher agreement of non-supervisors with statement 9 reflects a stronger

perception of people who report corruption as troublemakers within this group.

35

These findings reveal that more targeted education is required for non-supervisors about

what amounts to corruption, the responsibility to report corruption and the protections

offered to those who report corruption.

The higher agreement of non-supervisors with statements 11 and 12 reflect a stronger

perception of corruption in South Australia.

4.1.2.2 Effect of role on statement agreement

Local government respondents were asked whether they were a CEO, elected member, or

otherwise employed in their Council. Two groups were formed, one containing those who were

CEOs or elected members (‘CEO/EM’, N = 43) and one containing those who were otherwise

employed (‘Other’, N = 386). These groups were compared to determine whether there was a

difference in their agreement with the 13 statements, and the comparisons revealed statistically

significant differences in agreement between the two groups for 10 of 13 statements (shown in

Table 11).

Table 11. Comparisons of CEO/EM and Other groups’ statement agreement (LG)


agreement t-test for differences

between groups CEO/EM N = 43

Other N = 386


2.47 (1.05) 2.09 (0.96) CEO/EM t(427)=2.43, p=.015 [small-to-medium

effect]


1.98 (0.83) 2.33 (1.00) Other

t(56.66)=2.58, p=.012

[small-to-medium effect]


2.21 (0.86) 2.11 (0.87) ns


1.86 (0.90) 2.33 (1.12) Other t(55.87)=3.15, p=.003



1.58 (0.66) 1.99 (0.91) Other

t(427)=2.88, p=.004 [medium effect]


2.95 (1.09) 3.45 (1.03) Other

t(427)=2.96, p=.003 [medium effect]

36



between groups CEO/EM N = 43

Other N = 386


1.74 (0.62) 2.30 (0.91) Other

t(64.22)=5.26, p<.001

[medium-to-large effect]


1.88 (0.83) 2.26 (1.07) Other t(56.80)=2.74, p=.008



1.57 (0.55) 1.79 (0.67) Other t(428)=2.03, p=.043 [small-to-medium

effect]


4.43 (0.83) 4.23 (0.82) ns


3.19 (0.97) 3.39 (0.89) ns


2.19 (0.73) 2.60 (0.68) Other

t(423)=3.78, p<.001



2.07 (0.96) 2.52 (0.82) Other t(427)=3.35, p=.001

[medium effect]


(CEO/EM), 4 (Other). ns = difference not statistically significant at p=.05 level.


CEOs and EM had a higher agreement with the statement that conduct must illegal for it to be

called corrupt, although on average this group still disagreed with the statement. This

demonstrates a slightly higher understanding of the legal definition of the term within the CEOs

and EM group, but still an overall misunderstanding.

Other employees had a higher agreement with the statement that avoiding procedure is

sometimes justifiable to get past bureaucratic red tape, although they still disagreed with the

statement. There was no statistically significant difference between the groups regarding the

statement that if something is done for the right reasons it cannot be called corrupt. There was

also higher agreement from other employees that most corruption is too trivial to be worth

reporting. Other employees had a higher agreement with the statements that there is no point in

reporting corruption because nothing useful will be done about it, that there is no point in

reporting corruption because nothing useful can be done about it, that people who report

corruption are likely to suffer for it, and that people who report corruption are trouble-makers.

The higher agreement with these statements indicates that this group is more likely to feel

37

helpless about responses to reported corruption, and that those who report are likely to suffer

for it. Other employees had a higher agreement with the statement that they would not know

where to go to report corruption.

These findings reveal that more targeted education is required for other local government

employees, as there is less understanding about the mechanisms, processes, protections

and obligations around reporting corruption. This may close the gap revealed by the data

in terms of sensitivity to corruption and knowledge about responses to corruption.

While these results support the need for a more targeted education campaign for non-CEOs

or council members, it should be borne in mind that the public record reveals that where

corruption has been prosecuted in local government across Australia, these have

predominantly been prosecutions of councillors and those in higher management

positions.47 This may reflect the need for greater education in this group; or that greater

understanding of corruption and where to report do not necessarily equate to good conduct

(indeed, corruption is believed to be multi-causal).48 Further, the conduct and attitude of

CEOs and elected members greatly contribute to shaping the conduct of an organisation,

and as such, the importance of their ongoing training and education in the corruption

sphere should not be overlooked.49

While there was no statistically significant difference between the groups about whether

corruption was an issue in South Australia, other employees were more concerned that

corruption is an issue in South Australia than other States across Australia and that corruption

is more prevalent in local government than other government.

4.1.2.3 Effect of highest educational attainment on statement agreement

Local government members, officers and employees

The local government sample was stratified by reported highest educational attainment. The

educational attainment groups were Bachelor Degree or Higher (BD; N = 163), Certificate or

Diploma (CD; N = 148), Trade qualification/apprenticeship (T; N = 24), and School/High School

47 See, for example, examples of prosecutions in relation to Victorian local government at: http://www.dpcd.vic.gov.au/localgovernment/compliance-and-complaints/complaints-and-investigations/prosecutions; examples of ICAC investigations in NSW that in some cases lead to the prosecution and conviction of local government officers at: http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/investigations/past-investigations. Examples include prosecution and conviction on 13 May 2013 of Mr Jack Au, a councillor on Auburn City council, in relation to him accepting a payment of $4,500 from a person in return for him assisting them with a development application for a restaurant which was before the council. Various prosecutions and convictions which arose out of an ICAC Report on an investigation into corruption allegations made against a number of council officers in management positions in the Wollongong City Council in October 2008. Prosecution of the then mayor of Strathfield Municipal council (Mr Alfred Tsang) for corruptly receiving a benefit following ICAC report and recommendation delivered in June 2005.

48 J Gobert and M Punch, Rethinking Corporate Crime (Butterworths LexisNexis, 2003).

49 Purcell, above n 46.

http://www.dpcd.vic.gov.au/localgovernment/compliance-and-complaints/complaints-and-investigations/prosecutions

http://www.dpcd.vic.gov.au/localgovernment/compliance-and-complaints/complaints-and-investigations/prosecutions

http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/investigations/past-investigations

http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/investigations/past-investigations

38

certificate or equivalent (S; N = 50). However, the differences in agreement ratings were non-

significant (and likely represent random variation) for all statements (Table 12).

Table 12. Comparisons of educational attainment groups’ statement agreement (LG)

Average rating* M (SD) ANOVA for differences

between groups BD N=171

CD N=156

T N=24

N N=53


2.18 (1.04)

2.09 (0.91)

2.21 (1.10)

2.06 (0.96)

ns


2.39 (1.02)

2.20 (0.98)

2.54 (1.14)

2.19 (0.95)

ns


2.05 (0.90)

2.13 (0.84)

2.54 (0.98)

2.04 (0.77)

ns


2.25 (1.12)

2.24 (1.05)

2.58 (1.21)

2.40 (1.21)

ns


1.98 (0.92)

1.87 (0.82)

2.21 (1.10)

1.98 (0.92)

ns


3.39 (1.10)

3.33 (0.99)

3.79 (0.88)

3.31 (1.11)

ns


2.24 (0.92)

2.19 (0.86)

2.50 (0.93)

2.33 (0.92)

ns


2.21 (1.06)

2.21 (1.04)

2.46 (1.10)

2.15 (1.03)

ns

39



CD N=156

T N=24

N N=53


1.70 (0.66)

1.79 (0.68)

1.96 (0.62)

1.77 (0.61)

ns


4.38 (0.68)

4.18 (0.96)

4.04 (0.69)

4.25 (0.83)

ns


3.34 (0.92)

3.35 (0.90)

3.54 (0.98)

3.58 (0.85)

ns


2.53 (0.75)

2.56 (0.68)

2.42 (0.72)

2.68 (0.65)

ns


2.49 (0.84)

2.45 (0.86)

2.29 (0.95)

2.56 (0.78)

ns


(BD), 2 (CD), 0 (T), 3 (S). ns = difference not statistically significant at p=.05 level. *Agreement ratings: 1 = Strongly

disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neither agree nor disagree; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly agree.

Members of the public

Comparison were carried out for each statement to determine whether differences in the

highest level of education completed by members of the public predicted differences in

responding to the statements. The comparisons for the educational attainment groups of

Bachelor Degree or Higher (N = 79), Certificate or Diploma (N = 37), Trade qualification/

apprenticeship (N = 3), and School/High School certificate or equivalent (N = 17) are shown in

Table 13.

40

Table 13. Comparisons of educational attainment groups’ statement agreement (Public)



CD N=37

T N=3

N N=17


2.08 (1.04)

2.35 (1.32)

3.00 (1.73)

2.24 (1.15)

ns


2.65 (1.14)

2.27 (1.19)

3.67 (0.58)

2.06 (1.25)

F(3, 130)=2.72, p=.047 No pairwise differences1


1.92 (0.76)

2.19 (1.05)

2.67 (0.58)

2.18 (1.24)

ns


2.07 (1.24)

1.89 (1.22)

2.67 (1.53)

2.18 (1.33)

ns


1.73 (0.91)

1.78 (1.00)

1.67 (0.58)

1.88 (1.20)

ns


3.68 (1.11)

3.70 (1.00)

2.67 (0.58)

3.76 (1.09)

ns


1.93 (0.91)

2.00 (0.94)

1.67 (0.58)

1.82 (0.81)

ns


1.57 (0.64)

1.49 (0.56)

2.00 (1.00)

1.53 (0.72)

ns

41



CD N=37

T N=3

N N=17


4.56 (0.80)

4.62 (0.49)

4.67 (0.58)

4.69 (0.60)

ns


3.75 (0.90)

3.89 (0.98)

4.00 (1.00)

3.94 (0.90)

ns


2.82 (0.86)

2.54 (0.85)

2.67 (0.58)

2.69 (0.87)

ns


2.95 (0.83)

2.80 (0.87)

1.67 (1.15)

2.59 (0.87)

F(3, 127)=2.82, p=.042 No pairwise differences1

Note. N refers to entire group; some respondents skipped certain questions. Maximum N missing for any question =

3 (BD), 2 (CD), 0 (T), 1 (S). Statement 8 not presented to Public respondents. ns = difference not statistically

significant at p=.05 level. *Agreement ratings: 1 = Strongly disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neither agree nor disagree; 4 =

Agree; 5 = Strongly agree.

1. Although the ANOVA detected a difference in means, inspection of pairwise comparisons (i.e. t-tests between each

possible pair of groups) revealed no statistically significant difference between pairs of means. Therefore, the ANOVA

itself should not be interpreted as an indication of statistically significant difference between individual groups.

No robust differences were found when agreement with statements was compared between the

three groups based on highest educational attainment. While the ANOVA tests for group

differences were statistically significant for ‘Avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to get

past bureaucratic red tape’ and ‘Corruption is more prevalent in local government than other

levels of government’, when each group mean was compared to each other (6 pairwise

comparisons per statement), any differences were too small to detect.

4.1.2.4 Effect of previous ICAC training on statement agreement

Local government respondents were asked whether they had previously received any training

on the introduction of the ICAC. Two groups were formed containing those who had received

training (N = 216) and those who had not (N = 189), and these groups were compared to

determine whether there was a difference in their agreement with the 13 statements.

Comparisons between the two groups revealed statistically significant differences in agreement

for 11 of 13 statements (shown in Table 14).

42

Table 14. Comparisons of Training and No training groups’ statement agreement (LG)



between groups Training N=216

No training N=189


2.23 (1.07) 2.01 (0.86) Training t(397.22)=2.32,



2.18 (1.03) 2.44 (0.96) No training


effect]


2.11 (0.94) 2.12 (0.80) ns


2.02 (0.98) 2.58 (1.18) No training

t(363.48)=5.17,

p<.001 [medium effect]


1.79 (0.80) 2.14 (0.96) No training t(366.16)=3.96,

p<.001 [small-to-medium effect]


3.26 (1.11) 3.52 (0.96) No training t(400.88)=2.58,



2.14 (0.89) 2.37 (0.89) No training t(394.89)=2.52,



1.87 (0.90) 2.61 (1.07) No training

t(366.25)=7.42,

p<.001 [medium-to-large effect]


1.70 (0.62) 1.84 (0.69) No training t(401)=2.09, p=.037

[small effect]


4.37 (0.80) 4.13 (0.84) Training


effect]


3.38 (0.87) 3.39 (0.94) ns

43



between groups Training N=216

No training N=189


2.47 (0.69) 2.65 (0.71) No training

t(385.68)=2.60,

p=.010 [small-to-medium effect]


2.36 (0.83) 2.60 (0.84) No training


effect]

Note. Note. N refers to entire group; some respondents skipped certain questions. Maximum N missing for any

question = 4 (Training), 2 (No training). ns = difference not statistically significant at p=.05 level.


Those respondents who had received previous ICAC training were more inclined to believe

conduct must be illegal to be labelled corrupt, to be concerned about even trivial matters or

corruption done with justifications, to be more positive about responses to reporting corruption

and the protections afforded to those who report corruption, to understand where to go to

report corruption and to understand their obligations to report corruption. Those who had

received no training had a higher agreement with the statements that:


(4) There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful will be done about

it.

(5) There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful can be done about

it.



(8) I would not know where to go to report corruption.


Those who had received ICAC training had a higher agreement with the statement:

(10) Every councillor and council employee has an obligation to report corruption

In addition, those respondents who had received previous ICAC training were less inclined to be

concerned about corruption as an issue in South Australia and local government.

These results indicate that training and education have important effects. Training

increases the sensitivity of those within local government to corruption, and the reporting

obligations of all of those working in local government. Training also provides reassurance

to those in local government about the protections offered when corruption is reported.

44

4.1.2.5 Effect of number of years worked for council on statement agreement

Respondents to the local government survey were asked how many years they had worked for

Council, and three groups were formed consisting of those who had worked for up to 5 years

(N=166), 6 to 10 years (N=110) and 11 or more years (N=129). A comparison was carried out to

determine whether differences in this demographic variable predicted differences in

responding to the statements (Table 15).

Table 15 Comparisons of years worked groups’ statement agreement (LG)


between groups <5 N=166

6-10 N=110

>11 N=129


2.06 (0.94) 2.03 (0.89) 2.30 (1.09) F(2, 400)=3.073, p=.047 No pairwise differences1


2.32 (0.99) 2.36 (0.95) 2.24 (1.07) ns


2.15 (0.91) 2.05 (0.78) 2.11 (0.91) ns


2.16 (1.03) 2.46 (1.18) 2.29 (1.14) ns


1.85 (0.82) 2.10 (0.94) 1.95 (0.95) ns


3.26 (1.04) 3.47 (1.11) 3.45 (0.99) ns


2.23 (0.90) 2.26 (0.88) 2.25 (0.92) ns

45


between groups <5 N=166

6-10 N=110

>11 N=129


2.12 (1.02) 2.40 (1.08) 2.17 (1.04) ns


1.73 (0.66) 1.82 (0.67) 1.76 (0.66) ns


4.22 (0.86) 4.28 (0.73) 4.29 (0.87) ns


3.34 (0.95) 3.50 (0.89) 3.34 (0.87) ns


2.56 (0.68) 2.56 (0.71) 2.54 (0.74) ns


2.50 (0.87) 2.48 (0.79) 2.43 (0.87) ns


(<5), 2 (6-10), 3 (>11). ns = difference not statistically significant at p=.05 level. *Agreement ratings: 1 = Strongly

disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neither agree nor disagree; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly agree.

1. Although the ANOVA detected a difference in means, inspection of pairwise comparisons (i.e. t-tests between each

possible pair of groups) revealed no statistically significant difference between pairs of means. Therefore, the ANOVA

itself should not be interpreted as an indication of statistically significant difference between individual groups.

No robust differences were found when agreement with statements was compared between the

three groups based on years worked for council. While the ANOVA test for group differences

was statistically significant for ‘Conduct must be illegal for it to be called corrupt’, when each

group mean was compared to each other (3 pairwise comparisons), any differences were too

small to detect.

46

4.1.2.6 Effect of employment type on statement agreement

Respondents to the public survey were asked about their employment status. The six groups

formed based on this information were Unemployed (U; N=9), Employed in the public sector

(Pu; N=29), Employed in the private sector (Pr; N=40), Self-employed (SE; N=28), Student (S;

N=5) and Retired (R; N=27). Comparisons were carried out to determine whether differences in

this demographic variable predicted differences in responding to the statements (Table 16).

Table 16. Comparisons of educational attainment groups’ statement agreement (Public)


ANOVA for differences

between groups U

N=9 Pu

N=29 Pr

N=40 SE

N=28 S

N=5 R

N=27


1.67 (0.71)

1.97 (0.82)

2.28 (1.11)

2.14 (1.33)

3.00 (1.41)

2.31 (1.35)

ns


2.56 (1.33)

2.64 (1.13)

2.48 (1.01)

2.61 (1.34)

2.20 (1.30)

2.23 (1.27)

ns


2.22 (0.83)

1.68 (0.61)

2.23 (0.78)

2.14 (1.15)

2.00 (1.22)

1.96 (1.04)

ns


2.33 (1.41)

1.93 (1.09)

2.10 (1.26)

2.22 (1.37)

1.60 (0.89)

1.85 (1.26)

ns


1.63 (1.06)

2.00 (1.04)

1.70 (0.97)

1.71 (0.76)

1.40 (0.55)

1.69 (1.09)

ns


3.44 (1.13)

3.79 (1.11)

3.63 (0.98)

3.71 (1.15)

4.40 (0.89)

3.52 (1.05)

ns


1.78 (0.44)

2.07 (0.98)

2.03 (0.97)

1.93 (1.02)

1.80 (0.45)

1.68 (0.69)

ns

47


ANOVA for differences

between groups U

N=9 Pu

N=29 Pr

N=40 SE

N=28 S

N=5 R

N=27


1.33 (0.50)

1.66 (0.67)

1.63 (0.70)

1.64 (0.62)

1.40 (0.55)

1.28 (0.46)

ns


4.56 (0.53)

4.55 (0.83)

4.67 (0.62)

4.50 (0.88)

4.60 (0.55)

4.68 (0.48)

ns


3.89 (0.93)

3.79 (0.77)

3.67 (0.93)

4.07 (1.05)

3.80 (1.10)

3.83 (0.87)

ns


2.44 (0.73)

2.55 (0.83)

2.92 (0.75)

2.64 (0.87)

3.80 (1.10)

2.61 (0.84)

F(5, 126)=2.77, p=.021

Pairwise comparisons in

Table 17


2.44 (0.88)

2.93 (0.59)

2.85 (0.78)

2.71 (1.12)

2.80 (0.45)

3.00 (1.00)

ns


(U), 1 (Pu), 2 (Pr), 1 (SE), 0 (S), 4 (R). Statement 8 not presented to Public respondents. ns = difference not

statistically significant at p=.05 level. *Agreement ratings: 1 = Strongly disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neither agree nor

disagree; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly agree.

The employment type groups in the public sample for the most part did not differ in the way

they responded to the statements. One statement (‘Corruption is more of an issue in South

Australia than other States across Australia’) showed a statistically significant difference in

group responses, and further testing revealed one pairwise difference in agreement with the

statement (Table 17).

48

Table 17. Pairwise comparisons of agreement with ‘Corruption is more of an issue in South

Australia than other States across Australia’: employment (Public)

Higher average statement agreement in pairwise comparison

Pu N=29

Pr N=40

SE N=28

S N=5

R N=27

U N=9 ns ns ns ns ns

Pu N=29 ns ns Student

[large effect]* ns

Pr N=40 ns ns ns

SE N=28 ns ns

S N=5 ns

Note. p < .001 for all differences shown. ns = difference not statistically significant at .05 level.

Named scenario has higher average corruption rating than comparison scenario. *Small sizes of both groups mean

the group difference and effect are not reliable.

Students responded to this statement with an average rating of ‘Agree’ and people employed in

the public sector gave an average rating between ‘Disagree’ and ‘Neither agree nor disagree’.

This difference was statistically significant, but results may have been skewed by the small size

of both groups, and therefore should not be considered a reliable indication of these

respondents’ perceptions.

4.1.2.7 Effect of rural or metropolitan council area


Local government respondents were asked to report which council they worked for. Two

groups were formed containing those whose councils were classed as Rural (N = 132) and those

whose councils were classed as Metropolitan (N = 232). These groups were compared to

determine whether there was a difference in their agreement with the 13 statements.

Comparisons between the two groups revealed a statistically significant difference in agreement

for one statement (shown in Table 18).

49

Table 18. Comparisons of Rural and Metro groups’ statement agreement (LG)



between groups Rural N = 132

Metro N = 232


2.13 (0.91) 2.09 (1.00) ns


2.26 (0.95) 2.36 (1.04) ns


2.27 (0.82) 2.05 (0.91) Rural t(291.66)=2.39,

p=.017 [small-to-medium effect]


2.34 (1.05) 2.28 (1.12) ns


1.98 (0.79) 1.98 (0.96) ns


3.30 (1.02) 3.46 (1.03) ns


2.30 (0.82) 2.24 (0.93) ns


2.21 (0.99) 2.28 (1.08) ns


1.83 (0.61) 1.76 (0.69) ns


4.22 (0.80) 4.24 (0.86) ns


3.29 (0.80) 3.43 (0.97) ns

50




Metro N = 232


2.58 (0.67) 2.57 (0.72) ns


2.47 (0.79) 2.51 (0.86) ns


question = 2 (Rural), 3 (Metro). ns = difference not statistically significant at p=.05 level.


Respondents working in rural and metropolitan councils only differed in a statistically

significant way in their responses to one statement: that conduct done for the right reasons

cannot be called corrupt. Both groups disagreed with this statement, but respondents in the

rural group disagreed less strongly than those in the metropolitan group.


Local government respondents were asked to report their postcode and these were used to

determine their council area. Two groups were formed containing those whose councils were

classed as Rural (N = 24) and those whose councils were classed as Metropolitan (N = 113).

These groups were compared to determine whether there was a difference in their agreement

with the 13 statements. Comparisons between the two groups revealed statistically significant

differences in agreement for one statement (shown in Table 19).

Table 19. Comparisons of Rural and Metro groups’ statement agreement (Public)




Metro N = 113


1.96 (1.20) 2.23 (1.14) ns


2.25 (1.42) 2.55 (1.12) ns

51




Metro N = 113


1.96 (0.95) 2.06 (0.91) ns


2.00 (1.35) 2.03 (1.21) ns


1.63 (0.88) 1.76 (0.96) ns


3.70 (1.02) 3.67 (1.08) ns


1.92 (1.06) 1.93 (0.86) ns


1.50 (0.72) 1.56 (0.61) ns


4.65 (0.49) 4.59 (0.73) ns


4.33 (0.82) 3.71 (0.90) Rural t(131) = 3.15, p=.002



2.54 (1.10) 2.77 (0.78) ns


2.79 (1.14) 2.86 (0.78) ns


question = 1 (Rural), 6 (Metro). ns = difference not statistically significant at p=.05 level. Statement 8 not presented to

Public respondents.


52

Public respondents from rural and metropolitan councils only differed in a statistically

significant way in their responses to one statement: that corruption is an issue in South

Australia. Both groups gave an average response corresponding to ‘Agree’ for this statement,

but respondents in the rural group agreed more strongly than those in the metropolitan group.

53

4.2 RESPONSES TO SCENARIOS

Table 20. Overview of scenarios and variables

Scenario

Variables

Nature Size of benefit

Extent of involvement

Motivations/ justifications

(1) Computer A council CEO’s children use his computer and internet subscription (provided by the council) to play computer games, download music, undertake school projects and internet research.

Non-pecuniary

Medium Initiator Personal gain

(2) Employ The Mayor asks the human resources team at his council to employ the sister of the chairman of a company that has donated $10,000 to his campaign fund. The Mayor wants more donations from the company in the future.

Pecuniary Medium Initiator Personal gain

(3) Dinner The Mayor takes her husband to dinner for their wedding anniversary and uses her council credit card to pay for the meal. She claims this as a ‘work dinner’ on her expenses form.

Pecuniary Small Initiator Personal gain

(4) List A council manager has set up her own online business selling cleaning products. Through her work at the council, she has access to the list of council ratepayers and uses this information to build up her business’ mailing list.

Non-pecuniary

Small Initiator Personal gain

(5) Unprepared A councillor is also a successful businessman. He never reads the council papers in preparation for council meetings because he doesn’t have time. He still votes on all of the council motions.

Non-pecuniary

Small Negligence Incompetence

laziness

(6) Legal A law firm that does some of a council’s legal work provides the council’s CEO with legal advice on his divorce and subsequent property settlement. Without the CEO asking, the law firm performs the work at a heavily discounted rate.

Non-Pecuniary

Small Recipient Personal gain

54

Scenario

Variables

Nature Size of benefit

Extent of involvement

Motivations/ justifications

(7) Bypass A council CEO bypasses the normal council tendering and procurement procedure for an urgent transaction and selects a company known for its excellence.

Non-pecuniary

Medium Initiator Best interests

of council

(8) Local A council calls a tender and after the deadline for receiving tenders has passed the Mayor tells the procurement team that the council must award the tender to a local business regardless of whether they are the cheapest. Supporting local business is not a stated policy position of the council.

Non-pecuniary

Medium

Initiator Support local

business

(9) Contract One of the council’s managers has been performing badly for years. Instead of dealing with the manager’s poor performance, the council’s CEO convinces the manager to resign by offering her a contract as a consultant to the council for the next 12 months.

Non-pecuniary

Medium Initiator

Incompetence negligence

(10) Football A council CEO is a member of the local football club. He arranges for the club to borrow council equipment to maintain the clubhouse and grounds at no charge. This saves the club thousands of dollars each year.

Non-pecuniary

Medium Initiator Support local community

(11) Books The manager of the library in a council refuses to stock a popular series of teen-fiction. He refuses because the books offend his religious beliefs.

Non-pecuniary

Not quant-ifiable

Initiator Personal

beliefs

Note: an explanation of the variable classifications is provided in the Methodology (Part 4) of this Report.

For each scenario, respondents were asked to rate whether they thought the conduct involved

was not at all corrupt (likert rating 1), slightly corrupt (likert rating 2), moderately corrupt

(likert rating 3), very corrupt (likert rating 4) and extremely corrupt (likert rating 5). The

responses given by the local government sample are summarised in Table 21.

55

Table 21. Scenario corruption rating percentages and averages (LG)

N = 456

Percentage of responses* Average rating

M (SD)

1 Not at all corrupt

2 Slightly corrupt

3 Moderately

corrupt

4 Very

corrupt

5 Extremely

corrupt

1 Computer 29.8 32.5 20.4 9.6 7.6 2.33 (1.21)

2 Employ .7 .9 8.0 27.5 63.0 4.51 (0.74)

3 Dinner .4 8.5 16.0 29.6 45.4 4.11 (0.99)

4 List 2.9 7.5 16.6 30.0 43.0 4.03 (1.08)

5 Unprepared 46.4 14.0 21.8 11.1 6.7 2.18 (1.30)

6 Legal 20.0 21.3 22.4 20.4 16.0 2.91 (1.36)

7 Bypass 36.9 19.0 19.2 10.4 14.5 2.47 (1.44)

8 Local 5.8 12.9 24.6 26.6 30.2 3.63 (1.20)

9 Contract 16.4 17.3 22.9 24.5 18.9 3.12 (1.35)

10 Football 8.1 22.5 25.2 22.9 21.3 3.27 (1.25)

11 Books 42.0 21.9 13.6 12.5 10.0 2.27 (1.38)

* Excluding missing responses. N refers to entire sample; some respondents skipped certain questions. Maximum N

missing for any question = 11.

The public responses to the question ‘How corrupt is this behaviour’ are summarised in Table

22 for all 11 scenarios.

Table 22. Scenario corruption rating percentages and averages (Public)

N = 153

Percentage of responses* Average rating

M (SD)

1 Not at all corrupt

2 Slightly corrupt

3 Moderately

corrupt

4 Very

corrupt

5 Extremely

corrupt

1 Computer 30.9 27.5 21.5 12.1 8.1 2.39 (1.26)

2 Employ 0 9.3 7.3 32.7 50.7 4.25 (0.95)

3 Dinner 2.0 4.0 17.2 28.5 48.3 4.17 (0.98)

4 List 3.3 13.3 18.0 26.7 38.7 3.84 (1.18)

5 Unprepared 37.3 16.0 24.0 13.3 9.3 2.41 (1.35)

6 Legal 24.2 23.5 24.8 12.1 15.4 2.71 (1.37)

7 Bypass 43.0 17.4 10.7 14.8 14.1 2.40 (1.50)

8 Local 11.3 22.7 18.7 21.3 26.0 3.28 (1.37)

9 Contract 0 12.4 15.7 22.2 25.5 3.33 (1.33)

10 Football 18.2 25.7 18.2 20.9 16.9 2.93 (1.37)

11 Books 40.3 15.4 19.5 13.4 11.4 2.40 (1.42) * Excluding missing responses. N refers to entire sample; some respondents skipped certain questions. Maximum N

missing for any question = 5.

56

4.2.1 Ranking of perceptions of scenarios

The ratings of the scenarios by each group was ranked (see Table 23). Those scenarios that are

highlighted indicate scenarios that were had an average corruption rating 3 or above (i.e., at

least moderately corrupt).

Summary of Key Findings: There was great deal of consistency across the groups in terms of

gauging the level of corruption involved in each scenario.

Table 23. Ranking of scenarios by average corruption rating (Public and LG)

(Ranked by most corrupt to least corrupt)

LG (N = 456) Public (N = 153)

Scenario Average rating Scenario Average rating

2 Employ 4.51 2 Employ 4.25

3 Dinner 4.11 3 Dinner 4.17

4 List 4.03 4 List 3.84

8 Local 3.63 9 Contract 3.33

10 Football 3.27 8 Local 3.28

9 Contract 3.12 10 Football 2.93

6 Legal 2.91 6 Legal 2.71

7 Bypass 2.47 5 Unprepared 2.41

1 Computer 2.33 7 Bypass 2.40

11 Books 2.27 11 Books 2.40

5 Unprepared 2.18 1 Computer 2.39

Note. Highlighted rankings are above 3 (moderately corrupt). N refers to entire sample; some respondents skipped

certain questions. Maximum N missing for any question = 11 (LG) and 5 (Public).

This ranking reveals a large amount of consistency across the groups in terms of gauging the

level of corruption involved in each scenario. This demonstrates that perceptions of individual

scenarios as corrupt does not differ significantly between those within local government and

the public sector. Both groups make similar differentiations about what they regard as corrupt

behaviour.

57

4.2.2 Perceptions of justifiability, desirability, harmfulness, and corruption

Summary of Key Findings:

The local government and public groups were similar in terms of the average rating of whether

scenarios were desirable or undesirable and justified or unjustified.

For both the local government and public groups, there was a consistent relationship between

the way respondents rated desirability, justifiability and harmfulness and the way they rated

corruption.

In both groups, for all scenarios, the rating of harmfulness was found to significantly predict the

corruption rating. In other words the more a scenario was perceived as being harmful, the more

corrupt it became.

Generally speaking, actions which were perceived as being justified were accompanied by lower

corruption ratings. In the local government group, for 8 of the 11 scenarios, a higher rating of

how justified the actions were corresponded to a lower rating of how corrupt it was. In the

public group, for fewer scenarios (4 of 11), a higher rating of how justified the actions were

corresponded to a lower rating of how corrupt it was.

The rating of how desirable scenario actions were was not a consistent predictor of how corrupt

they were rated, only improving prediction of the corruption rating for two scenarios in the

local government group and three scenarios in the public group. In these cases, higher ratings of

how desirable a scenario corresponded to lower ratings of corruption.

Average ratings were calculated for the scales of desirability, justifiability, harmfulness and

corruption that participants completed in response to each scenario. The average responses are

displayed below for local government respondents (Table 24) and public respondents (Table

26).

Respondents’ ratings of the desirability, justifiability, harmfulness and corruptness of actions in

each scenario were modelled to determine whether the first three ratings predicted the rating

of corruption. See Table 25 (LG) and Table 27 (Public).


Table 24. Mean ratings of scenario desirability, justifiability, harmfulness and corruption (LG)

N = 456 How desirable is this behaviour?

M(SD)

How justified do you think it is?

M(SD)

How harmful do you believe it is?

M(SD)

How corrupt is this behaviour?

M(SD)

Computer 2.06 (0.78) 2.19 (0.91) 2.59 (1.27) 2.33 (1.21)

Employ 1.14 (0.49) 1.16 (0.44) 4.50 (0.79) 4.51 (0.74)

Dinner 1.25 (0.56) 1.22 (0.51) 4.01 (1.09) 4.11 (0.99)

List 1.25 (0.60) 1.26 (0.54) 4.11 (1.09) 4.03 (1.08)

58

N = 456 How desirable is this behaviour?

M(SD)


M(SD)


M(SD)


M(SD)

Unprepared 1.63 (0.63) 1.82 (0.72) 3.54 (1.08) 2.18 (1.30)

Legal 1.84 (0.80) 2.01 (0.87) 3.18 (1.31) 2.91 (1.36)

Bypass 2.19 (0.92) 2.57 (1.13) 2.92 (1.29) 2.47 (1.44)

Local 1.51 (0.72) 1.66 (0.84) 3.94 (1.05) 3.63 (1.20)

Contract 1.61 (0.78) 1.76 (0.84) 3.71 (1.12) 3.12 (1.35)

Football 1.70 (0.81) 1.83 (0.87) 3.36 (1.24) 3.27 (1.25)

Books 1.62 (0.64) 1.68 (0.72) 3.17 (1.21) 2.27 (1.38)

Notes. N refers to entire LG sample; some respondents skipped certain questions. Maximum N missing for any

question = 14. Ratings used Likert scales ranging from 1 (lowest perceived desirability, justification, harm, or

corruption) to 5 (highest perceived desirability, justification, harm, or corruption). Scales can be viewed in

Appendices A and B (survey instruments).

Table 25. Do desirability, justifiability, and harmfulness ratings predict rating of corruption? (LG)

N = 456

ANOVA: does model1 statistically significantly

predict corruption rating?

Variance explained

by model2

Does rating statistically significantly improve prediction of corruption rating?

(Corruption change per 1-point increase3)

Desirable Justified Harmful

Computer F(3,436)=304.43, p<.001 67.7% ns p=.001 (-.22)

p<.001 (+.62)

Employ F(3,443)=174.34, p<.001 54.1% ns p=.030 (-.14)

p<.001 (+.63)

Dinner F(3,439)=235.76, p<.001 61.7% p=.006 (-.18)

p<.001 (-.36)

p<.001 (+.59)

List F(3,445)=283.32, p<.001 65.6% ns p<.001 (-.44)

p<.001 (+.64)

Unprepared F(3,440)=55.84, p<.001 27.6% ns ns p<.001 (+.56)

Legal F(3,446)=356.77, p<.001 70.6% ns p<.001 (-.42)

p<.001 (+.59)

Bypass F(3,432)=427.54, p<.001 74.8% ns p<.001 (-.41)

p<.001 (+.65)

Local F(3,443)=244.41, p<.001 62.3% ns ns p<.001 (+.79)

Contract F(3,438)=144.50, p<.001 49.7% ns p<.001 (-.35)

p<.001 (+.67)

59

N = 456



Variance explained

by model2




Football F(3,438)=360.25, p<.001 71.2% p=.033 (-.13)

p<.001 (-.36)

p<.001 (+.57)

Books F(3,441)=82.19, p<.001 35.9% ns ns p<.001 (+.60)


question = 20. ns = improvement to prediction not statistically significant at the .05 level. 1. ‘Model’ incorporates

three ratings: desirability, justifiability, and harmfulness. 2. r2 can be obtained by dividing percentage by 100. 3.

Assuming other variables held constant.

For all scenarios, a model including the desirable, justified and harmful ratings was statistically

significantly better at predicting the corruptness rating than a model only using the mean local

government sample corruption rating. In other words, there was a consistent relationship

between the way respondents rated desirability, justifiability and harmfulness and the way they

rated corruption.

The relationship of the three ratings individually to the corruption rating was also examined.

For all scenarios, the rating of harmfulness was found to significantly improve prediction of the

corruption rating, and changes in the Harmful rating corresponded to the largest change in the

Corruption rating. The more harmful people rated a scenario, the more corrupt they were likely

to rate it. For most scenarios (8 out of 11), a higher rating of how Justified the actions were

corresponded to a lower rating of how corrupt it was. The rating of how desirable scenario

actions were was not a consistent predictor of how corrupt they were rated, with the Desirable

rating only improving prediction of corruption for two scenarios (higher desirability

corresponding to lower corruption ratings).


Table 26. Mean ratings of scenario desirability, justifiability, harmfulness and corruption (Public)

N = 153

How desirable is this behaviour?

M(SD) N = 1371


M(SD) N = 1392


M(SD) N = 1333


M(SD) N = 1354

Computer 2.04 (0.90) 2.11 (0.91) 2.55 (1.26) 2.39 (1.26)

Employ 1.25 (0.66) 1.29 (0.62) 4.31 (0.93) 4.25 (0.95)

Dinner 1.19 (0.58) 1.14 (0.37) 4.19 (1.04) 4.17 (0.98)

List 1.36 (0.69) 1.33 (0.60) 3.93 (1.19) 3.84 (1.18)

60

N = 153


M(SD) N = 1371


M(SD) N = 1392


M(SD) N = 1333


M(SD) N = 1354

Unprepared 1.59 (0.79) 1.63 (0.74) 3.74 (1.08) 2.41 (1.35)

Legal 2.01 (0.83) 2.15 (0.87) 2.96 (1.29) 2.71 (1.37)

Bypass 2.17 (1.00) 2.57 (1.15) 2.85 (1.34) 2.40 (1.50)

Local 1.61 (0.84) 1.84 (0.97) 3.72 (1.17) 3.28 (1.37)

Contract 1.46 (0.73) 1.63 (0.90) 3.85 (1.11) 3.33 (1.33)

Football 1.90 (0.98) 2.05 (1.06) 3.06 (1.41) 2.93 (1.37)

Books 1.64 (0.79) 1.60 (0.70) 3.27 (1.23) 2.40 (1.42)


question = 8. Ratings used Likert scales ranging from 1 (lowest perceived desirability, justification, harm, or

corruption) to 5 (highest perceived desirability, justification, harm, or corruption). Scales can be viewed in

Appendices A and B (survey instruments).


(Public)

N = 153



Variance explained

by model2




Computer F(3,144)=111.42, p<.001 69.9% p=.032 (-.19)

ns p<.001 (+.63)

Employ F(3,145)=67.67, p<.001 58.3% ns ns p<.001 (+.75)

Dinner F(3,143)=75.43, p<.001 61.3% ns p<.001 (-.59)

p<.001 (+.60)

List F(3,142)=111.18, p<.001 70.1% ns ns p<.001 (+.77)

Unprepared F(3,146)=12.36, p<.001 20.3% ns ns p<.001 (+.48)

Legal4 F(3,143)=152.45, p<.001 76.2% p=.005 (-.40)

p=.001 (-.48)

p<.001 (+.42)

Bypass F(3,142)=165.44, p<.001 77.3% ns p<.001 (-.38)

p<.001 (+.67)

Local F(3,143)=69.70, p<.001 59.4% ns p=.026 (-.25)

p<.001 (+.79)

Contract F(3,148)=35.64, p<.001 41.9% ns ns p<.001 (+.64)

61

N = 153



Variance explained

by model2




Football4 F(3,140)=157.76, p<.001 77.2% ns ns p<.001 (+.55)

Books F(3,145)=23.43, p<.001 32.7% p=.021 (-.41)

ns p<.001 (+.60)

Notes. N refers to entire Public sample; some respondents skipped certain questions. Maximum N missing for any

question = 9. ns = improvement to prediction not statistically significant at the .05 level. 1. ‘Model’ incorporates three

ratings: desirability, justifiability, and harmfulness. 2. r2 can be obtained by dividing percentage by 100. 3. Assuming

other variables held constant. 4. Variance inflation factor > 4; results should be interpreted with caution.

For all scenarios, a model including the desirable, justified and harmful ratings was statistically

significantly better at predicting the corruptness rating than a model only using the mean public

corruption rating. In other words, there was a consistent relationship between the way

respondents rated desirability, justifiability and harmfulness and the way they rated corruption.

The relationship of the three ratings individually to the corruption rating was also examined.

For all scenarios, the rating of harmfulness was found to significantly improve prediction of the

corruption rating, and changes in the Harmful rating corresponded to the largest change in the

Corruption rating. The more harmful people rated a scenario, the more corrupt they were likely

to rate it. For some scenarios (4 out of 11), a higher rating of how Justified the actions were

corresponded to a lower rating of how corrupt it was. The rating of how desirable scenario

actions were was sometimes a predictor of how corrupt they were rated, with the Desirable

rating improving prediction of corruption for three scenarios (higher desirability corresponding

to lower corruption ratings).

Average ratings of desirability, justifiability and harmfulness

The local government and public groups were similar in terms of the average rating of whether

scenarios were desirable or undesirable and justified or unjustified. There was only one

scenario in which the local government and public groups differed in their perception of the

scenarios as harmful. In scenario 2 (employ), the local government group perceived the scenario

as extremely harmful but the public group perceived it only as very harmful. (Ratings of

corruption from the two groups are discussed, including statistical comparisons, in Part 4.2.4.)

4.2.3 Key variables on scenario corruption ratings


Effect of nature of benefit: In the local government group, the nature of the benefit appeared to

have an effect only when the size of the benefit was small. Once the size of the benefit increased,

the nature of the benefit did not influence perceptions of corruption. In the public group, the

nature of the benefit continued to have a small effect.

62

Effect of size of benefit: The size of the benefit was found to have only a small effect on the rating

of different scenarios as corrupt.

Extent of involvement in the conduct: The extent of the involvement in the conduct had an

important effect on the perceptions of corruption.

Effect of motivation: The different scenarios that had different motivations were perceived

differently. For the local government group, awarding a tender to local businesses regardless of

cost was the only scenario rated as significantly more corrupt than all five others in the

comparison.

NOTE: This part analyses the potential effect of the variables discussed above across the scenarios.

The analysis presented in this part provides evidence of possible effects, although it must be

remembered that the differences in perceptions across the scenarios may also have been caused by

other factors.

4.2.3.1 Effect of nature of benefit on scenario corruption ratings

The nature of the benefit obtained in the scenarios was determined as either pecuniary (direct

monetary benefit) or non-pecuniary (this may be financial but was not directly monetary). To

determine whether this made a difference to the level of corruption perceived, the average

ratings were compared between selected scenarios that only differed in this respect.


Comparison of scenarios: Employ and Computer

The average corruption rating given for Computer (a non-pecuniary benefit) was ‘Slightly

corrupt’ and the average rating for Employ (a pecuniary benefit) was ‘Very corrupt’ (N = 441;

see Table 21). Employing the chairman’s sister to encourage donations was perceived as being

statistically significantly more corrupt than the non-pecuniary scenario of allowing the children

to use the computer [t(440)=35.90, p<.001, a large effect]. While this may demonstrate that the

nature of a benefit as pecuniary rather than non-pecuniary is perceived as significant, this effect

may also be explicable by the unique nature of the Computer scenario. The additional responses

to this question indicated that their perception of the conduct was influenced by factors

included its perception as a small and potentially cost-neutral infringement, which occurs

frequently, and could also have been considered part of the CEO’s salary package.

Comparison of scenarios: Dinner and List

When participants rated how corrupt they thought scenario 3 (Dinner, a pecuniary benefit) and

4 (List, a non-pecuniary benefit) were, the average response was similar for both scenarios,

which both received ratings of ‘Very corrupt’ (N = 446; Table 21). Ratings of corruption did not

differ statistically significantly between paying for an anniversary dinner with council money

and the non-pecuniary scenario, using ratepayers’ details for building a business mailing list

[t(445)=1.65, p=.098, a small effect].

63

These results indicate that where the size of the benefit increases, the perception of pecuniary

and non-pecuniary benefits is not perceived as relevant.


Comparison of scenarios: Employ and Computer

Members of the public rated, on average, scenario 1 (Computer, a non-pecuniary benefit) as

‘Slightly corrupt’, while scenario 2 (Employ, a pecuniary benefit) was given an average rating of

‘Very corrupt’ (N = 146; see Table 22). The average corruption rating for employment of the

chairman’s sister, in which a pecuniary benefit was sought, was higher than the rating given for

allowing the children to use the computer and the difference was statistically significant [t(145)

= 15.22, p < .001, a large effect]. Again, while this may demonstrate that the nature of a benefit

as pecuniary rather than non-pecuniary is perceived as significant, this effect may also be

explicable by the unique nature of the Computer scenario (see above).

Comparison of scenarios: Dinner and List

The average ratings of Dinner and List only differed by a small amount, with Dinner being rated

just over, and List being rated just under, ‘Very corrupt’ (N = 148; Table 22). Members of the

public viewed paying for an anniversary dinner with council money as more corrupt than the

non-pecuniary scenario of using ratepayers’ details for building a business mailing list, and the

difference was statistically significant [t(147) = 3.14, p = .002, a small-to-medium effect].

In the public group, the nature of the benefit continued to have a small effect regardless of the

size of the benefit.

4.2.3.1 Effect of size of benefit on scenario corruption ratings

Small, medium or large benefits were obtained in the scenarios. To determine whether this

made a difference to the level of corruption perceived, the average ratings were compared

between selected scenarios that only differed in this respect.


Comparison of scenarios: Dinner and Employ

When Dinner (a small benefit) and Employ (a medium benefit) were compared, both received

average ratings falling within the ‘Very corrupt’ range, but the average rating for employment of

the chairman’s sister was slightly higher (see Table 21). Participants’ ratings of corruption for

employment of the chairman’s sister were higher than those for the smaller-benefit scenario of

the anniversary dinner paid for with council money, and the difference was statistically

significant [t(443)=8.23, p<.001, a medium effect].

64

Comparison of scenarios: List and Computer

The average corruption rating for List (a small benefit) was ‘Very corrupt’, whereas Computer (a

medium benefit) was on average rated as ‘Slightly corrupt’ (Table 21). Using ratepayers’ details

for building a business mailing list was viewed as statistically significantly more corrupt than

allowing the children to use the computer, a larger benefit [t(445) = 26.68, p < .001, a large

effect] (see Table 21 for average ratings). This effect may be explicable by the unique nature of

the Computer scenario (see above).


Comparison of scenarios: Dinner and Employ

An average rating of ‘Very corrupt’ was given to both Employ (a medium benefit) and Dinner (a

small benefit) (N = 149; see Table 22). There was no statistically significant difference between

the average corruption rating for employing the chairman’s sister and the average rating for the

anniversary dinner paid for with council money [t(148) = 1.01, p = .313, a small effect].

Comparison of scenarios: List and Computer

The average corruption rating for Computer (a medium benefit) was ‘Slightly corrupt’ but the

average response for List (a small benefit) was just below ‘Very corrupt’ (N = 147; see Table 22).

Using ratepayers’ details for building a business mailing list was perceived as more corrupt than

the scenario with a larger benefit, allowing the children to use the computer. The difference in

average rating was statistically significant [t(146) = 11.08, p < .001, a large effect]. This effect

may be explicable by the unique nature of the Computer scenario (see above).

4.2.3.3 Effect of extent of involvement on scenario corruption ratings

The subject’s involvement in each corruption scenario was categorised as initiation, receipt, or

negligence. To examine whether this made a difference to the level of corruption perceived, the

average ratings of three scenarios (that only differed in this respect) were compared. The

comparison process involved first checking whether or not any difference existed amongst the

three scenarios. If the first test indicated there was at least one statistically significant

difference, pairwise comparisons were carried out (taking each possible pair and comparing the

two ratings) to determine which individual scenarios differed from each other.


Comparison of scenarios: Unprepared, Legal and List

In the Unprepared scenario, the councillor’s actions were negligent and therefore demonstrated

low involvement. This scenario was rated as ‘Slightly corrupt’. The CEO in the Legal scenario

had medium involvement (receiving discount legal advice), and this scenario was rated on

65

average as ‘Moderately corrupt’. The scenario with highest involvement, List, was given an

average rating of ‘Very corrupt’ (Table 21).

When the three scenarios were compared to one another, their average corruption ratings were

found to differ statistically significantly overall [F(1.95, 861.96) = 335.96, p < .001].

Furthermore, all pairwise comparisons between individual scenarios revealed statistically

significant differences (see Table 28). The average ratings of corruption increased with

increasing involvement, and the differences in ratings were statistically significant.

Table 28. Pairwise comparisons of average corruption rating: extent of involvement (LG)

N = 443 Higher average corruption rating in pairwise comparison

Legal List

Unprepared Legal [medium-to-large effect] List [large effect]

Legal List [large effect] Note. p < .001 for all differences shown.

Named scenario has higher average corruption rating than comparison scenario.


Comparison of scenarios: Unprepared, Legal and List

Unprepared (low involvement) was rated as ‘Slightly corrupt’, whereas Legal (medium

involvement) was rated as just below ‘Moderately corrupt’ and List (high involvement) as

approaching ‘Very corrupt’ (Table 22).

The average ratings of corruption given to scenarios Unprepared, Legal and List were compared

and a statistically significant overall difference was found to exist [F(2, 285.01) = 66.49, p <

.001]. When each scenario was compared to each the other, two pairings were found to have a

statistically significant difference (Table 29). Using ratepayers’ details to grow a business

mailing list was viewed as more corrupt than both receiving discount legal advice and being

unprepared for council meetings. When the latter two scenarios were compared to one another,

the difference in average corruption rating was not statistically significant.

Table 29. Pairwise comparisons of average corruption rating: extent of involvement (Public)


Legal List

Unprepared ns List [large effect]

Legal List [large effect]

Note. p < .05 for all differences shown. ns = difference not statistically significant at the .05 level.


66

4.2.3.4 Effect of motivation on scenario corruption ratings

The motivations involved in the scenarios were varied. To examine whether the motivation

made a difference to the level of corruption perceived, the average ratings of six scenarios (that

only differed in this respect) were compared. The comparison process involved first checking

whether or not any difference existed amongst the six scenarios. If the first test indicated there

was at least one statistically significant difference, pairwise comparisons were carried out

(taking each possible pair and comparing the two ratings) to determine which individual

scenarios differed from each other.


Comparison of scenarios: Computer, Bypass, Local, Contract, Football, Books

Average corruption ratings did not differ widely between the scenarios Computer (personal

gain), Bypass (best interests of council), Local (support local business), Contract

(incompetence/negligence), Football (support local community) and Books (personal beliefs).

Average ratings fell in the ‘Slightly corrupt’ (Computer, Bypass, Books) to ‘Moderately corrupt’

(Contract, Football, Local) range, as shown in Table 21.

When these scenarios were compared to one another, participants’ ratings of corruption were

found to differ significantly overall [F(4.78, 2012.38) = 108.36, p < .001] and in 11 out of 15

pairwise comparisons (see Table 30). This demonstrates that the different scenarios that had

different motivations were perceived differently. Awarding a tender to local businesses

regardless of cost was the only scenario rated as significantly more corrupt than all five others

in the comparison.

Local (support local business) was perceived as more corrupt than Computer (personal gain),

Bypass (best interests of council), Contract (incompetence/negligence), Football (support local

community), and Books (personal beliefs). Contract (incompetence/negligence) was perceived

as more corrupt than Computer (personal gain), Bypass (best interests of council), and Books

(personal beliefs). Football (support local community) was perceived as more corrupt than

Computer (personal gain), Bypass (best interests of council), and Books (personal beliefs).

Computer (personal gain) was not perceived to be more corrupt than the other scenarios

(although, note the unique nature of this scenario that might have affected its perception, see

explanation in 4.3.3.1 above). Bypass (best interests of council) was not perceived to be more

corrupt than the other scenarios. Books (personal beliefs) was not perceived as more corrupt

than the other scenarios.

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Table 30. Pairwise comparisons of average corruption rating: motivation (LG)


Bypass Local Contract Football Books

Computer ns Local

[large effect]

Contract [medium-to-large effect]

Football [large effect]

ns

Bypass Local

[large effect]

Contract [medium

effect]

Football [medium-to-large effect]

ns

Local Local [small-to-medium

effect]

Local [small-to-medium effect]

Local [large effect]

Contract ns Contract


Football Football

[large effect] Note. p < .001 for all differences shown. ns = difference not statistically significant at .05 level.



Comparison of scenarios: Computer, Bypass, Local, Contract, Football, Books

When members of the public rated the six scenarios, average ratings were ‘Slightly corrupt’ for

Computer, Bypass and Books, and ‘Moderately corrupt’ for Local, Contract and Football.

A statistically significant difference was found to exist between mean ratings of corruption

[F(4.83, 671.44) = 20.9, p < .001]; 10 out of the 15 pairwise comparisons had statistically

significant differences (see Table 31). This demonstrates that the different scenarios that had

different motivations were perceived differently.

Table 31. Pairwise comparisons of average corruption rating: motivation (Public)


Bypass Local Contract Football Books

Computer ns Local



Football [small-to-medium effect]

ns

Bypass Local




ns

Local ns ns Local

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Contract

Contract [small-to-medium effect]


Football


Note. p < .05 for all differences shown. ns = difference not statistically significant.


Local (support local business) was perceived as more corrupt than Computer (personal gain),

Bypass (best interests of council), and Books (personal beliefs). Contract

(incompetence/negligence) was perceived as more corrupt than Computer (personal gain),

Bypass (best interests of council), Football (support local community), and Books (personal

beliefs). Football (support local community) was perceived as more corrupt than Computer

(personal gain), Bypass (best interests of council), and Books (personal beliefs). Computer

(personal gain) was not perceived to be more corrupt than the other scenarios (although, note

the unique nature of this scenario that might have affected its perception, see explanation in

4.3.3.1 above). Bypass (best interests of council) was not perceived to be more corrupt than the

other scenarios. Books (personal beliefs) was not perceived as more corrupt than the other

scenarios.

4.2.4 Effect of participant group on scenario corruption rating

Summary of Key Findings: Neither the public not the local government group was more likely to

interpret the set of scenarios as corrupt. For three scenarios, (employing the chairman’s sister,

favouring local business in a tender, and lending equipment to the football club), local

government respondents gave higher ratings and the difference was statistically significant.

Survey participants were either local government members, officers or employees (local

government group) or members of the general public (public group). To determine whether the

two groups gave different corruption ratings, the average corruption ratings given by both groups

were compared for each scenario.

In most cases, there was no statistically significant difference (Table 32). However, for three

scenarios (employing the chairman’s sister, favouring local business in a tender, and lending

equipment to the football club), local government respondents gave higher ratings and the

difference was statistically significant.

For both the local government and public respondents, the eleven individual corruption ratings

were averaged to produce a crude aggregate rating of corruption that would indicate whether

one group was more likely to interpret the set of scenarios as corrupt. When the public and local

government aggregate figures were compared, the difference was not statistically significant

(Table 32).

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Table 32. Comparisons of corruption ratings of scenarios (Public and LG)

Average rating M (SD)

Higher average corruption

rating


LG Public

1 Computer 2.33 (1.21) 2.39 (1.26) ns

2 Employ 4.51 (0.74) 4.25 (0.95) LG t(212.17)=3.13, p=.002


3 Dinner 4.11 (0.99) 4.17 (0.98) ns

4 List 4.03 (1.08) 3.84 (1.18) ns

5 Unprepared 2.18 (1.30) 2.41 (1.35) ns

6 Legal 2.91 (1.36) 2.71 (1.37) ns

7 Bypass 2.47 (1.44) 2.40 (1.50) ns

8 Local 3.63 (1.20) 3.28 (1.37) LG t(230.43)=2.76, p=.006


9 Contract 3.12 (1.35) 3.33 (1.33) ns

10 Football 3.27 (1.25) 2.93 (1.37) LG t(591)=2.83, p=.005


11 Books 2.27 (1.38) 2.40 (1.42) ns

Aggregate corruption rating*

3.17 (.72) 3.11 (.77) ns

Note. ns = difference not statistically significant at the .05 level. * Mean corruption rating across 11 scenarios.

Corruption ratings: 1 = Not at all corrupt; 2 = Slightly corrupt; 3 = Moderately corrupt; 4 = Very corrupt; 5 =

Extremely corrupt.

4.2.5 Responding to witnessed corruption

Summary of Key Findings: When asked what they would usually do if confronted with a

situation like the one described, the local government group favoured internal reporting (for

example to the CEO or a supervisor), which was the most common choice for six scenarios. The

public group was asked what response they would most desire be taken, a question which

elicited responses regarding the best possible reporting outcome. Their responses appeared

more idealistic, with either internal or external reporting (eg, to the police Ombudsman, MP or

ICAC) the desired outcome for all scenarios.

Participants were asked what they would do if they witnessed the behaviour described in each

scenario (or in the case of the public sample, what they would desire the response to be).

Responses for the local government (Table 33) and public (Table 34) samples are summarised

below.

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Table 33. Responding to corruption (LG)

N = 456

Percentage of responses*

Do nothing

Talk to person

Report internally (e.g.

CEO, supervisor)

Report externally

(e.g. police, ombudsman,

MP, ICAC)

Other Highest

percentage

1 Computer 45.7 15.0 25.9 9.0 4.4 Do nothing

2 Employ 9.9 2.2 41.5 43.3 3.1 External rep.

3 Dinner 13.6 2.9 59.7 20.6 3.1 Internal rep.

4 List 10.0 5.8 67.6 15.3 1.3 Internal rep.

5 Unprepared 35.2 11.1 44.7 3.8 5.2 Internal rep.

6 Legal 38.0 12.0 23.1 22.9 4.1 Do nothing

7 Bypass 44.1 12.2 21.0 15.2 7.4 Do nothing

8 Local 17.6 5.0 48.2 25.7 3.6 Internal rep.

9 Contract 32.3 7.5 26.8 26.1 7.3 Do nothing

10 Football 26.3 10.0 33.8 22.0 7.9 Internal rep.

11 Books 12.1 17.4 66.4 3.2 .9 Internal rep.

Note. N refers to entire Public sample; some respondents skipped certain questions. Maximum N missing

for any question = 23. * Excluding missing responses.

Table 34. Desired response to corruption (Public)

N = 153


Do nothing

Talk to person

Report internally (e.g. CEO,

supervisor)

Report externally (e.g.

police, ombudsman,

MP, ICAC)

Other Highest

percentage

1 Computer 19.2 20.5 34.2 18.5 7.5 Internal rep.

2 Employ 0 3.4 18.2 75.0 3.4 External rep.

3 Dinner 0 2.0 36.7 57.3 4.0 External rep.

4 List 2.0 6.8 49.0 38.1 4.1 Internal rep.

5 Unprepared 4.1 21.8 51.0 15.6 7.5 Internal rep.

6 Legal 20.5 17.1 23.3 32.9 6.2 External rep.

7 Bypass 22.4 11.6 26.5 27.9 11.6 External rep.

8 Local 4.1 4.1 31.3 51.0 9.5 External rep.

9 Contract 4.0 3.3 38.0 48.0 6.7 External rep.

10 Football 11.0 6.2 38.4 36.3 8.2 Internal rep.

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N = 153


Do nothing

Talk to person

Report internally (e.g. CEO,

supervisor)

Report externally (e.g.

police, ombudsman,

MP, ICAC)

Other Highest

percentage

11 Books 1.4 12.2 78.2 6.1 2.0 Internal rep.

Note. N refers to entire Public sample; some respondents skipped certain questions. Maximum N missing

for any question = 7. * Excluding missing responses.

In comparing the responses most frequently chosen by local government and public

respondents, it is important to note that because of their differing standpoints the two samples

were asked slightly different questions. The local government sample were asked what they

would usually do if confronted with a situation like the one described. This required

respondents to draw on past experience as well as their working knowledge of the difficulties of

responding to such behaviour, which may be reflected in the four scenarios where ‘Do nothing’

was the most commonly selected response.

Regardless, for the local government group internal reporting was still a favoured

response, being the most common choice for six scenarios. This reflects similar findings in

Part 4.4, where local government respondents discussed the need to escalate complaints,

using internal options first, or to rectify the situation.

The public sample, on the other hand, was asked what response they would most desire be

taken, a question which elicited responses regarding the best possible reporting outcome.

Accordingly, the public responses appeared more idealistic, with either internal or external

reporting the desired outcome for all scenarios.

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4.3 DEFINING CORRUPTION IN THE RESPONDENTS’ OWN WORDS


For those within the local government group, defining corruption was a complex issue, that

there were many shades of grey. Context was important in defining corruption. There was an

overall perception that ethics and morality are more important than legality in defining

behaviour as corrupt. Members of the public were more likely to view corruption as a black and

white issue rather than shades of grey. Members of the public were also more likely to describe

the behaviour using legal terms, although ethics and morality remained important influences on

their responses.

Parts 4.3 and 4.4 provide the results of the thematic analysis of the qualitative responses. These

responses were considered against three themes. The first two themes, how respondents defined

corruption, misconduct and maladministration and how respondents identified corruption,

misconduct and maladministration are presented in Part 4.3. How respondents responded to

behaviour in the context of their understandings of corruption, misconduct and maladministration

are presented in Part 4.4.

The qualitative data supported the conclusion that defining corruption was a complex issue,

that there were many shades of grey. In general, whether or not behaviour was viewed as

corrupt was dependent on the context, with the term ‘It depends …’ commonly expressed in

respondents’ explanations. The context of the behaviour determined the definition assigned to

the behaviour (i.e. whether it was viewed as corrupt, acceptable or unacceptable), the degree of

corruption and also the way the respondents would respond to the situation.

Overall, the responses to the quantitative survey questions reveals that defining behaviour as

corruption was a complex issue, with a number of factors influencing that decision, including

the nature of any benefit obtained, and the extent of the government official’s involvement.

In the qualitative responses, the context was defined by a number of variables by the

respondents in their qualitative responses. While these were discussed separately they were

generally interdependent. Many of these overlapped with the factors tested in the quantitative

analysis. Consistently with the quantitative findings that the nature of the benefit, the factors

referred to in the qualitative responses included the benefit or harm of the behaviour. Here the

definition of the behaviour, the degree of corruption and the respondents’ responses were

determined nature and extent of the benefit or harm, and also who might benefit/be harmed.

Types of Benefits/Harms listed by the respondents in their qualitative responses included:

- Fair/unfair;

- Financial/legal impact;

- Security/privacy;

- Public (or staff) perceptions.

Those who were perceived to benefit/be harmed include:

- The community/ ratepayer/ electorate;

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- The council (or its staff);

- The individual whose behaviour is being questioned.

Consistently with the quantitative findings that the extent of the motivation was relevant to

determining corruption, the respondents explained that they thought scenarios were more

corrupt when the individual perpetrating the behaviour benefited, particularly financially and at

the expense of the community/ratepayer, while behaviour that benefited the

community/ratepayer appeared to be less of an issue.

Other contextual variables that emerged from the qualitative data included:

- whether the behaviour was declared or hidden;

- the frequency of the behaviour (was it regular or a one-off event);

- whether the person intended to act in a corrupt manner;

- whether the behaviour was justified or not; and

- whether or not the behaviour is consistent with or goes against a council policy,

procedures or codes.

While behaviour was generally viewed in terms of shades of grey, with context an important

feature in determining how respondents defined and understood the behaviour, at times

behaviour was discussed in terms of being Black or White. This included some statements that

all behaviour is always black or white, and there are no shades of grey or degrees of corruption,

as well as statements that certain behaviours (as described in the scenarios) are clearly

corruption and the context is irrelevant (often depending on who benefits or is harmed by the

behaviour and in what way).

In terms of corruption, ethics and legality there was an overall perception that ethics and

morality are more important than legality in defining behaviour as corrupt. This is consistent

with the quantitative findings. Respondents identified that behaviour could be legal but still be

considered corrupt, with ethical and moral issues underpinning their sense of what it means for

behaviour to be defined as corrupt; for example ‘Not all immorality is illegal’ and ‘Ethics need to

play a part in determining corruption’.

The general public discussed the issues of defining, identifying and responding to corruption,

misconduct and maladministration in much the same way as respondents from local

government. There were some key differences, however. In particular, members of the public

were more likely to view corruption as a black and white issue rather than shades of grey. This

difference is evident with 235 comments (26.61% of total comments) from member of the

public coded as ‘black and white’ compared to 228 comments (14.42% of total comments) from

local government. Members of the public were also more likely to describe the behaviour using

legal terms (e.g. ‘illegal’, ‘fraud’, ‘stealing’, ‘should be reported to police’ etc), although like local

government respondents they also viewed ethics and morality as important in defining and

understanding corruption.

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4.4 WHY WOULD RESPONDENTS REPORT, OR NOT REPORT, CORRUPTION?


For those within local government, the decision about whether or not to take action, and the

type of action taken, would depend on the context, including the amount of information known

and the seriousness of the behaviour involved. Respondents discussed the need to escalate

complaints, using internal options first, or to rectify the situation. There was at times a sense of

helplessness in respondents’ discussions, including a sense that individuals were powerless,

reporting was ineffective, or would be met with repercussions. Members of the general public

were less likely to discuss the need to seek clarification, more likely to recommend punitive

responses to the scenario, particularly firing the perpetrator of the act, and less likely to discuss

the importance of accountability/proof in reference to ‘whistleblowers’. Members of the public

emphasised the importance of reporting, (irrespective of potential consequences), and

expressed less helplessness.

A number of themes were identified in respondents’ discussions of whether and how they

would respond to behaviour that could be deemed corruption, misconduct or

maladministration.

This includes consideration of the context of the behaviour (see discussion of the importance of

context, above), where the decision about whether or not to take action, and the type of action

taken, would depend on the context. Respondents discussed the need to seek clarification when

contextual factors were uncertain. Respondents also identified the importance of accountability

in taking action, where the response should be based on clear evidence that some form of

corruption, misconduct or maladministration has taken place. When they did consider the

behaviour worth reporting, they discussed internal options (such as a union representative or

the council’s internal reporting process) and external options (such as the Ombudsman or

ICAC). In addition, respondents identified an escalation process whereby they would begin with

internal reporting and then report externally if they were not satisfied with the internal

response. Some respondents also discussed the need to rectify the situation, such as through a

review of council policies or procedures or undoing the harm of the behaviour such as making

the person pay back money.

When discussing how they would respond to behaviour that could be deemed corruption,

misconduct or maladministration, there was at times a sense of helplessness in respondents’

discussions. This was seen in negative perceptions of the effectiveness of reporting behaviour.

Some respondents felt that in many cases reporting had been ineffective in the past or would be

ineffective and nothing can be done; however there were some suggestions that this situation is

improving or will improve with the introduction of ICAC, with the need for an independent

organisation identified. Some respondents were also very fearful of personal repercussions

should they take action on behaviour they deem to be corrupt, maladministration or

misconduct. In addition, some respondents felt that they would have no knowledge or proof of

the behaviour anyway, while others considered themselves to be powerless to act even if they

did witness the situation (e.g. when it is the CEO behaving in a corrupt manner).

Perhaps linked to this sense of helplessness was the view that corruption is pervasive, that

people are innately corrupt and that corruption happens at all levels of government (although

75

there were a few respondents who believed that most people are honest and that there is no

corruption in their organisation). However, despite the need to consider the context in deciding

on what action to take, the sense of helplessness about the effect of reporting corruption, and

the view of corruption as pervasive, there was concern about the consequences of not

responding to corrupt behaviour. Respondents described a slippery slope in the behaviour of

people and organisations that supported the need for reporting corruption. Respondents

discussed how individual behaviours may not be a problem in themselves but when added

together can become a problem, that a particular incident may be indicative of corrupt actions

by the individual more broadly, or that relatively harmless or justifiable behaviour may lead to

further behaviour that could be more harmful or corrupt.

A final issue raised by the responses (although not commonly commented on) was the need to

only report major issues. This related once again to the importance of context in defining what

is/is not corruption and also the seriousness of the act and its impact.

In terms of responding to corruption, misconduct and maladministration, member of the

general public were less likely to discuss the need to seek clarification, more likely to

recommend punitive responses to the scenario, particularly firing the perpetrator of the act, and

less likely to discuss the importance of accountability/proof in reference to ‘whistleblowers’.

They also appeared to emphasise the importance of reporting (irrespective of potential

consequences) to a greater extent than local government respondents (1.71% of local

government comments compared to 5.10% of members of the public comments), and expressed

less helplessness in their views on addressing corruption (no percentages have been calculated

as responses are coded across a number of codes).

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4.5 ASSISTING LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDERSTAND CORRUPTION AND REPORTING

OBLIGATIONS

Summary of Key Findings: Local government respondents preferred publications and

information sheets as their preferred type of assistance, with face-to-face training the next most

preferred. Respondents suggested an independent helpline to provide advice before a complaint

or report about corruption is lodged and updates to be provided about ICAC investigations and

findings.

One of the primary goals of this project is to assist in developing tailored education and training

campaigns around corruption and reporting of corruption for those working in local

government. Participants in the local government survey were asked what type of assistance

they would find useful to help them understand corruption and their reporting obligations.

Eighty-one per cent of local government respondents answered this question. Of these, 62 per

cent chose publications and information sheets as their preferred type of assistance, 54 per cent

selected face-to-face training, 36 per cent selected online training, and 9 per cent indicated they

would prefer some other form of assistance.50 The preference for face-to-face training over

online training may be explained by a trainee’s ability to ask questions during the training and

explore the many nuances involved in this area. For example, one respondent stated that the

‘opportunity to ask more questions please’ would be important.

Other forms of assistance were suggested by participants (33 responses recorded). The most

common suggestion was for an independent helpline that could provide advice before a

complaint or report about corruption is lodged. For example, one participant suggested ‘A

hotline phone number where you could anonymously speak to someone to clarify where to

direct a report or if a report was warranted’. Another common suggestion was the need for

updates to councils on investigations and reports undertaken by the ICAC to raise awareness of

current issues and the ICAC’s approach to them. Some suggestions indicated that the

participants were wary of retributions from within the organisation if they reported corruption.

One participant suggested that making sure the organisation takes the ICAC seriously and

‘doesn’t have an internal person to report to who is already corrupt’. Another explained the

need for ‘Assurance that processes are in place to protect individuals from vexatious actions.’

The concern about retribution is repeated in other results in this report and will be returned to

in our recommendations, below.

One suggestion indicated that maladministration was often caused by insufficient resourcing to

meet the demands contained in policy and procedure. The participant suggests ‘A significant

number of policies & procedures are convoluted, ambiguous and could be streamlined and

made easier.’

Other suggestions included:

- compulsory and regular training across local government (including staff and elected

members), included as part of induction and annual refreshers;

50 Participants could select more than one option, therefore percentages do not sum to 100.

77

- use of real life scenarios in training;

- simple information sheets, for example with flow charts for reporting and for resolving

questions about reporting;

- a better understanding of how processes work once you make a complaint; and

- external assessment and monitoring of councils by external bodies.

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5. Conclusion and Recommendations

The findings of this project reveal a high level of interest and concern in government corruption.

They reveal a high level of interest in the recent establishment of the ICAC and how this might

affect government corruption. They demonstrate a strong appetite within the South Australian

public and local government sector for intervention and initiative in tackling corruption. The

findings also demonstrate that those within local government who have undertaken some

training on corruption are more likely to have a better understanding of what conduct is

inappropriate, where and how to report that conduct as well as the protections that exist for

those who report. They were also less inclined to be concerned about corruption as an issue in

South Australia and local government. The LGA, as the peak local body representing local

government across the State, is uniquely placed to take action to respond to these findings.

While this investigation was limited to the local government sector, it is likely that similar

responses would pertain at the State-wide level. The LGA should take action in cooperation with

State government, the ICAC and other accountability agencies in the State.

Recommendation 1 – Assistance to Local Government

We recommend that:

(e) The LGA makes its ‘information papers’ more easily available on its website. Ideally, the

information on ICAC and reporting corruption, misconduct and maladministration

would be able to be found on the LGA homepage. We also recommend that the LGA link

to the ICAC’s updated website and fact sheets, which now include information about

how complaints are progressed. These fact sheets are, in general, less detailed and more

simplified than those provided by the LGA, and would provide an important

complementary resource.

(f) The LGA monitors the work of the ICAC and provides updates through its information

papers and other resources with scenario examples taken from current cases. It would

be useful if these updates were circulated to councils to keep council staff and members

up to date and reminded of the importance of vigilance in preventing corruption,

misconduct and maladministration.

(g) The LGA works with the ICAC to establish an advisory service available to public sector

(including local government) employees where they may request anonymous advice

about whether conduct amounts to corruption, misconduct or maladministration,

whether it should be reported, the most appropriate method to do so, and protections

available to the individual against reprisals.

(h) The LGA encourage councils (perhaps through the Corruption and Fraud Prevention

Model Policy) to provide compulsory face-to-face training for all new employees and

members (as part of their induction training), and compulsory refresher training for

existing staff regularly, including updates on current cases. This training should reflect

the tailoring suggestions made in recommendation 2.

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Recommendation 2 – Tailoring of education and training within local government

We recommend that the education and training provided to local government be tailored in

light of those areas of particular concern and misunderstanding revealed by this survey.

Education and training should continue to target everyone within local government, with a

particular emphasis on ensuring that those who are not CEOs, elected members or supervisors

are provided with training on the mechanisms, processes, protections and obligations around

reporting corruption. Further, those within the LGA should receive adequate training in these

areas to assist councils where required.

We recommend that future education and training be designed based on adult learning

principles, drawing on real life scenarios, and be interactive and experiential. Face-to-face

training should be made available where possible, supplemented with online training systems.

We recommend education and training is designed in consultation with ICAC to target:

(e) when conduct is properly referred to as corrupt (which includes only illegal conduct) as

distinct from conduct that amounts to misconduct and maladministration. Within this

classification, there should also be education around:

iv. what conduct is too trivial to report, bearing in mind the extensive

definitions in and therefore scope of the Independent Commissioner

Against Corruption Act and the strong public expectations about

reporting of conduct;

v. the relevance of justification to the appropriateness of behaviour; and

vi. what the potential consequences are and the differences in ramifications

for corrupt conduct and conduct that amounts to misconduct and

maladministration;

(f) when to report corruption, particularly when an individual may have sufficient

information or knowledge about behaviour and its context to avoid frivolous reporting

but to ensure inappropriate behaviour is reported;

(g) the most appropriate place to report conduct, including when it is appropriate to use

internal procedures and when it is appropriate to escalate reporting directly to external

mechanisms, such as the ICAC. This should also include detail of how the different

reporting and investigation mechanisms work; and

(h) concerns over effectiveness of responses to reporting and the protections against

retribution. All corruption training should be accompanied with detailed whistleblower

training.

We recommend that the LGA encourage local governments to maintain a register of their

employees, elected members and CEOs who have undertaken corruption training, and to what

level.

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Recommendation 3 – Public education campaign

We recommend that a public education campaign be developed, preferably by the ICAC, with the

support of the LGA and State government (see the importance of information sharing and

cooperation in recommendation 4 below) that targets public awareness of:

(e) when conduct is properly referred to as corrupt as distinct from conduct that amounts

to misconduct and maladministration;

(f) the mechanisms and processes that are in place to deal with corruption within local

government;

(g) the protection afforded under the whistleblower laws to individuals who report

corruption; and

(h) the extent of corruption as an issue in South Australia.

This education campaign must be carefully crafted, and ought to be based on the literature

around marketing in the social and public policy arena.51

Recommendation 4 – Need for information sharing and coordinated responses

We recommend that the Local Government Association share the results of this project with the

South Australian State government and ICAC, and work with them to address the findings and

recommendations contained within this report.

Recommendation 5 – Future studies

It is recommended that this survey form the basis for ongoing longitudinal research on the

education and perceptions on corruption within the local government sector in South Australia

as the ICAC becomes more established and more interventions (including training) are

implemented. Future studies should explore the impact of those additional variables identified

in this study in the qualitative responses, including:

(e) the impact/success of training and education campaigns within local government and

the public;

(f) whether perceptions of corruption in South Australia have increased;

(g) the perceived role of legality or ethics/morality in determining corruption;

51 See, eg, Matthew Wood and Julie Fowlie, ‘Using Community Communicators to Build Trust and Understanding between Local Councils and Residents in the United Kingdom’ (2013) 28 Local Economy 527; Matthew Wood, ‘Applying Commercial Marketing Theory to Social Marketing: A Tale of 4Ps (and a B) (2008) 14 Social Marketing Quarterly 76; Tom White and Rob Wall, ‘National Regional and Local Attitudes towards Climate Change: identifying appropriate target audiences for communications’ (2008) 13 Local Environment 589; Eftihia Nathanail and Giannis Adamos, ‘Road Safety Communication Campaigns: Research designs and behavioural modeling’ (2013) 18 Transportation Research 107; Melanie A Wakefield, Barbara Loken and Robert C Hornik, ‘Use of mass media campaigns to change health behaviour’ (2010) 376 The Lancet 1261; VicHealth, VicHealth Review of Communication Components and Social Marketing/Public Education Campaigns Focusing on Violence Against Women (Paper 2 of the Violence Against Women Community Attitudes Project, 2005).

81

(h) the impact of:

a. different types of benefits (beyond the division between pecuniary and non-

pecuniary benefits) and harms;

b. declarations of behaviour (such as the receipt of gifts);

c. frequency of the behaviour; and

d. consistency of the behaviour with council policy, procedures and guidelines

on perceptions of behaviour as corrupt.

82

APPENDIX A – Copy of Survey Instrument: Local Government

SURVEY ON ATTITUDES TO CORRUPTION,

MISCONDUCT AND MALADMINISTRATION IN LOCAL

GOVERNMENT

Survey for Local Government Employees, Chief Executive

Officers and Elected Members

Explanation of the research project

South Australia has recently passed legislation to introduce an Independent Commissioner

Against Corruption (known as the ICAC). The ICAC will came into operation in September

2013. Its role is to identify, investigate, prevent and minimise corruption, misconduct and

maladministration in public administration. It will investigate these issues across the South

Australian public sector, including at the local government level.

The purpose of this survey is to develop an understanding of attitudes towards corruption,

misconduct and maladministration within government and also the wider community. This

survey is being conducted independently by the University of Adelaide with the support of

the Local Government Association of South Australia (LGA). For further information on

the survey, including its purpose and the use of the survey results, please see below.

This survey is not about individual complaints about corruption, misconduct or

maladministration. Please do not provide information and details about individual

complaints. Any individual cases that are provided will not be investigated or reported to

an investigatory agency, except in the rare circumstance that a mandatory reporting

obligation exists. If you have concerns about an incident of corruption, misconduct or

maladministration, you may be able to refer these to the South Australian Ombudsman, the

Police or to the ICAC.

Explanation of the survey and anonymity

All of the information that you provide will be anonymous (you will not be identified)

and will be kept in a secure and confidential storage facility.

The survey will take approximately 20 minutes to complete. Once you have completed

the survey, please return it either via email, fax or post.

Email: [email protected]

Fax: (08) 8313 4344 (ATTN: Dr Gabrielle Appleby)

Post: Dr Gabrielle Appleby

Adelaide Law School

North Terrace Campus, University of Adelaide

SA 5005

The survey is made up of three parts. The first part will ask you to some questions about

eleven hypothetical scenarios. The second part will ask you to respond to a series of

mailto:[email protected]

83

statements about corruption and the third part asks a few questions about you. Please

complete all three parts in accordance with the instructions provided.

There are no right or wrong answers to the questions. By completing the questions in a

way that accords with your own opinions, you are providing valuable information for the

LGA and local government

Consent

By completing this survey, you agree to take part in this research and that you have

understood the purpose of this research as explained above.

This study has been approved by the University of Adelaide Human Research Ethics

Committee HP-2013-083. For further information about human research and for

information about what to do in the event that you have concerns with the way in which

this survey is conducted, please see below.

Thank you for taking the time to respond to this survey.


Project Co-ordinator


Phone: (08) 8313 0874

September 2013

Other Researchers involved in the Project:

Mr Paul Leadbeter, University of Adelaide

Mr Peter Lockett, Consultant, Seaview Corporate Services

Ms Heidi Long, Research Assistant, University of Adelaide

Dr Candice Oster, Research Fellow, University of Adelaide

Professor Deborah Turnbull, University of Adelaide

Professor John Williams, University of Adelaide

Dr Ian Zajac, Research Fellow, University of Adelaide

84

FURTHER INFORMATION

Purpose of Survey

The purpose of the survey is to provide a snapshot about attitudes towards, and the

perceptions of, corruption, misconduct and maladministration at the local government

level.

The results of the survey will help local government develop education and training

programs and policies and procedures to foster a culture of good public administration. The

results of the survey will be published as a report and given to the Local Government

Association. The results will be used to compare attitudes in South Australia to attitudes

elsewhere in the country. They will also form the basis of an extended study that looks at

changes in attitudes to corruption across the years after the introduction of the ICAC.

HREC and Complaints

The Human Research Ethics Committee monitors all research projects that it has approved.

The committee considers it important that people participating in approved projects have an

independent and confidential reporting mechanism which they can use if they have any

worries or complaints about that research. If you have any questions or problems associated

with the practical aspects of your participation in the project, or wish to raise a concern or

complaint about the project, then you should consult the project co-ordinator:

Dr Gabrielle Appleby, Senior Lecturer, University of Adelaide Law School

Phone (08) 8313 0874 or by email [email protected]

If you wish to discuss with an independent person matters related to:

- Making a complaint, or

- Raising concerns on the conduct of the project, or

- The University policy on research involving human participants, or

- Your rights as a participant,

Contact the Human Research Ethics Committee’s Secretariat on phone (08) 8313 6028 or by

email [email protected].



85

SCENARIOS – Over the following pages you will be presented with 11 scenarios.

Please read each carefully, and fill in your responses below.

Scenario 1:

A council CEO’s children use his computer and internet subscription (provided by the council) to play

computer games, download music, undertake school projects and internet research.


Very undesirable Undesirable Neither desirable nor undesirable

Desirable Very desirable

□ □ □ □ □


Very unjustified Unjustified Neither justified nor unjustified

Justified Well justified

□ □ □ □ □


Not at all harmful Slightly harmful Moderately

harmful Very harmful Extremely harmful

□ □ □ □ □


Not at all corrupt Slightly Corrupt Moderately

Corrupt Very Corrupt Extremely Corrupt

□ □ □ □ □

If you witnessed this, what would you do about it:

□ Nothing.

□ Talk to the person (or persons) involved.

□ Report it internally within council, such as to the person’s supervisor or the CEO.

□ Report it to an outside organisation (for example, a member of the police, a Member of Parliament,

the Ombudsman or the ICAC).

□ Other: __________________________

This space is available for you to provide any further explanations of your responses to this scenario:

86

Scenario 2:

The Mayor asks the human resources team at his council to employ the sister of the chairman of a

company that has donated $10,000 to his campaign fund. The Mayor wants more donations from the

company in the future.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □


□ Nothing.





□ Other: __________________________


87

Scenario 3:

The Mayor takes her husband to dinner for their wedding anniversary and uses her council credit

card to pay for the meal. She claims this as a ‘work dinner’ on her expenses form.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □


□ Nothing.





□ Other: __________________________


88

Scenario 4:

A council manager has set up her own online business selling cleaning products. Through her work at

the council, she has access to the list of council ratepayers and uses this information to build up her

business’ mailing list.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □


□ Nothing.





□ Other: __________________________


89

Scenario 5:

A councillor is also a successful businessman. He never reads the council papers in preparation for

council meetings because he doesn’t have time. He still votes on all of the council motions.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □


□ Nothing.





□ Other: __________________________


90

Scenario 6:

A law firm that does some of a council’s legal work provides the council’s CEO with legal advice on

his divorce and subsequent property settlement. Without the CEO asking, the law firm performs the

work at a heavily discounted rate.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □


□ Nothing.





□ Other: __________________________


91

Scenario 7:

A council CEO bypasses the normal council tendering and procurement procedure for an urgent

transaction and selects a company known for its excellence.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □


□ Nothing.





□ Other: __________________________


92

Scenario 8:

A council calls a tender and after the deadline for receiving tenders has passed the Mayor tells the

procurement team that the council must award the tender to a local business regardless of whether

they are the cheapest. Supporting local business is not a stated policy position of the council.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □


□ Nothing.





□ Other: __________________________


93

Scenario 9:

One of the council’s managers has been performing badly for years. Instead of dealing with the

manager’s poor performance, the council’s CEO convinces the manager to resign by offering her a

contract as a consultant to the council for the next 12 months.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □


□ Nothing.





□ Other: __________________________


94

Scenario 10:

A council CEO is a member of the local football club. He arranges for the club to borrow council

equipment to maintain the clubhouse and grounds at no charge. This saves the club thousands of

dollars each year.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □


Not at all corrupt Slightly corrupt Moderately corrupt Very corrupt Extremely corrupt

□ □ □ □ □


□ Nothing.





□ Other: __________________________


95

Scenario 11:

The manager of the library in a council refuses to stock a popular series of teen-fiction. He refuses

because the books offends his religious beliefs.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □


□ Nothing.





□ Other: __________________________


96

STATEMENTS – Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statements

on the following pages by selecting one option. Below each statement, there is a field

that allows you to explain or clarify your answer if you wish. You do not have to

complete these fields.

Conduct must be illegal for it to be called corrupt.

Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree nor

disagree Agree Strongly agree

□ □ □ □ □ Further explanation of answer (optional):





If something is done for the right reasons it cannot be called corrupt.




There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful will be done about it.




97





People who report corruption are likely to suffer for it.




Most corruption is too trivial to be worth reporting.




I would not know where to go to report corruption.




People who report corruption are just trouble makers.







□ □ □ □ □

98

Further explanation of answer (optional):

Corruption is an issue in South Australia.












99

DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Are you:

□ An elected member of a council?

□ A CEO of a council?

□ Otherwise employed in a council?

What council do you work in? ___________________________________

How long have you worked for council? ________________ years

In your current position do you directly supervise any staff?

□ Yes

□ No

What is your highest education qualification?

□ Bachelor Degree or higher

□ Certificate or Diploma

□ Trade qualification/apprenticeship

□ High School certificate/equivalent

□ School certificate/equivalent

□ Other ___________________________________

Are you

□ Male

□ Female

How old are you? ___________________________________

Have you previously received any education and/or training on the introduction of the ICAC?

□ Yes

□ No

If yes, please explain the extent of this education and/or training:

What type of assistance would you find useful to help you understand corruption and your

reporting obligations?

□ Publications and information sheets

□ Face to face training

□ Online training

□ Anything else ___________________________________

100

APPENDIX B – Copy of Survey Instrument: Public

SURVEY ON ATTITUDES TO CORRUPTION,

MISCONDUCT AND MALADMINISTRATION IN LOCAL

GOVERNMENT

Survey for members of the general public

Explanation of the research project

South Australia has recently passed legislation to introduce an Independent Commissioner

Against Corruption (known as the ICAC). The ICAC will came into operation in September

2013. Its role is to identify, investigate, prevent and minimise corruption, misconduct and

maladministration in public administration. It will investigate these issues across the South

Australian public sector, including at the local government level.

The purpose of this survey is to develop an understanding of attitudes towards corruption,

misconduct and maladministration within government and also the wider community. This

survey is being conducted independently by the University of Adelaide with the support of

the Local Government Association of South Australia (LGA). For further information on

the survey, including its purpose and the use of the survey results, please see below.

This survey is not about individual complaints about corruption, misconduct or

maladministration. Please do not provide information and details about individual

complaints. Any individual cases that are provided will not be investigated or reported to

an investigatory agency, except in the rare circumstance that a mandatory reporting

obligation exists. If you have concerns about an incident of corruption, misconduct or

maladministration, you may be able to refer these to the South Australian Ombudsman, the

Police or to the ICAC.

Explanation of the survey and anonymity

All of the information that you provide will be anonymous (you will not be identified)

and will be kept in a secure and confidential storage facility.

The survey will take approximately 20 minutes to complete. Once you have completed

the survey, please return it either via email, fax or post.

Email: [email protected]

Fax: (08) 8313 4344 (ATTN: Dr Gabrielle Appleby)

Post: Dr Gabrielle Appleby

Adelaide Law School

North Terrace Campus, University of Adelaide

SA 5005

The survey is made up of three parts. The first part will ask you to some questions about

eleven hypothetical scenarios. The second part will ask you to respond to a series of


101

statements about corruption and the third part asks a few questions about you. Please

complete all three parts in accordance with the instructions provided.

There are no right or wrong answers to the questions. By completing the questions in a

way that accords with your own opinions, you are providing valuable information for the

LGA and local government

Consent

By completing this survey, you agree to take part in this research and that you have

understood the purpose of this research as explained above.

This study has been approved by the University of Adelaide Human Research Ethics

Committee HP-2013-083. For further information about human research and for

information about what to do in the event that you have concerns with the way in which

this survey is conducted, please see below.

Thank you for taking the time to respond to this survey.


Project Co-ordinator


Phone: (08) 8313 0874

September 2013

Other Researchers involved in the Project:

Mr Paul Leadbeter, University of Adelaide

Mr Peter Lockett, Consultant, Seaview Corporate Services

Ms Heidi Long, Research Assistant, University of Adelaide

Dr Candice Oster, Research Fellow, University of Adelaide

Professor Deborah Turnbull, University of Adelaide

Professor John Williams, University of Adelaide

Dr Ian Zajac, Research Fellow, University of Adelaide

102

FURTHER INFORMATION

Purpose of Survey

The purpose of the survey is to provide a snapshot about attitudes towards, and the

perceptions of, corruption, misconduct and maladministration at the local government

level.

The results of the survey will help local government develop education and training

programs and policies and procedures to foster a culture of good public administration. The

results of the survey will be published as a report and given to the Local Government

Association. The results will be used to compare attitudes in South Australia to attitudes

elsewhere in the country. They will also form the basis of an extended study that looks at

changes in attitudes to corruption across the years after the introduction of the ICAC.

HREC and Complaints

The Human Research Ethics Committee monitors all research projects that it has approved.

The committee considers it important that people participating in approved projects have an

independent and confidential reporting mechanism which they can use if they have any

worries or complaints about that research. If you have any questions or problems associated

with the practical aspects of your participation in the project, or wish to raise a concern or

complaint about the project, then you should consult the project co-ordinator:

Dr Gabrielle Appleby, Senior Lecturer, University of Adelaide Law School

Phone (08) 8313 0874 or by email [email protected]

If you wish to discuss with an independent person matters related to:

- Making a complaint, or

- Raising concerns on the conduct of the project, or

- The University policy on research involving human participants, or

- Your rights as a participant,

Contact the Human Research Ethics Committee’s Secretariat on phone (08) 8313 6028 or by

email [email protected].



103

SCENARIOS – Over the following pages you will be presented with 11 scenarios.

Please read each carefully, and fill in your responses below.

Scenario 1:

A council CEO’s children use his computer and internet subscription (provided by the council) to play

computer games, download music, undertake school projects and internet research.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □

What would you desire the response to this behaviour to be?

□ Nothing be done.

□ The person involved be spoken to by persons who have witnessed the behaviour

□ The incident reported internally, such as to the supervisor of the person involved or the Chief

Executive Officer of the council

□ The incident reported to an outside organisation (for example, a member of the police, a Member of

Parliament, the Ombudsman, or the ICAC)

□ Other: __________________________


104

Scenario 2:

The Mayor asks the human resources team at his council to employ the sister of the chairman of a

company that has donated $10,000 to his campaign fund. The Mayor wants more donations from the

company in the future.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □








□ Other: __________________________


105

Scenario 3:

The Mayor takes her husband to dinner for their wedding anniversary and uses her council credit

card to pay for the meal. She claims this as a ‘work dinner’ on her expenses form.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □








□ Other: __________________________


106

Scenario 4:

A council manager has set up her own online business selling cleaning products. Through her work at

the council, she has access to the list of council ratepayers and uses this information to build up her

business’ mailing list.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □








□ Other: __________________________


107

Scenario 5:

A councillor is also a successful businessman. He never reads the council papers in preparation for

council meetings because he doesn’t have time. He still votes on all of the council motions.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □








□ Other: __________________________


108

Scenario 6:

A law firm that does some of a council’s legal work provides the council’s CEO with legal advice on

his divorce and subsequent property settlement. Without the CEO asking, the law firm performs the

work at a heavily discounted rate.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □








□ Other: __________________________


109

Scenario 7:

A council CEO bypasses the normal council tendering and procurement procedure for an urgent

transaction and selects a company known for its excellence.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □








□ Other: __________________________


110

Scenario 8:

A council calls a tender and after the deadline for receiving tenders has passed the Mayor tells the

procurement team that the council must award the tender to a local business regardless of whether

they are the cheapest. Supporting local business is not a stated policy position of the council.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □








□ Other: __________________________


111

Scenario 9:

One of the council’s managers has been performing badly for years. Instead of dealing with the

manager’s poor performance, the council’s CEO convinces the manager to resign by offering her a

contract as a consultant to the council for the next 12 months.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □








□ Other: __________________________


112

Scenario 10:

A council CEO is a member of the local football club. He arranges for the club to borrow council

equipment to maintain the clubhouse and grounds at no charge. This saves the club thousands of

dollars each year.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □


Not at all corrupt Slightly corrupt Moderately corrupt Very corrupt Extremely corrupt

□ □ □ □ □








□ Other: __________________________


113

Scenario 11:

The manager of the library in a council refuses to stock a popular series of teen-fiction. He refuses

because the books offends his religious beliefs.




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □




□ □ □ □ □








□ Other: __________________________


114

STATEMENTS – Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statements

on the following pages by selecting one option. Below each statement, there is a field

that allows you to explain or clarify your answer if you wish. You do not have to

complete these fields.

Conduct must be illegal for it to be called corrupt.








If something is done for the right reasons it cannot be called corrupt.




There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful will be done about it.




115





People who report corruption are likely to suffer for it.




Most corruption is too trivial to be worth reporting.




People who report corruption are just trouble makers.








116

Corruption is an issue in South Australia.












117

DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

What is your post code or suburb? ___________________________________

Are you:

□ Unemployed

□ Employed in the public sector

□ Employed in the private sector

□ Self-employed

□ Student

□ Retired

□ Other (please specify) ___________________________________

What is your highest education qualification?

□ Bachelor Degree or higher

□ Certificate or Diploma

□ Trade qualification/apprenticeship

□ High School certificate/equivalent

□ School certificate/equivalent

□ Other ___________________________________

Are you male or female?

□ Male

□ Female

What is your age? ___________________________________

How did you find out about the survey?

□ Internet

□ Local government newsletter □ The newspaper

□ The radio

□ Other ___________________________________

118

APPENDIX C – Respondent Profile Summary

Survey response

593 responses were received from council members, officers and employees; 135 were

excluded due to substantial missing data (this was determined on the basis that the body of the

questionnaire was less than 50% complete) and 2 due to being duplicates, leaving a sample of

456 participants for the LG survey.

214 responses were received from members of the public; 61 were excluded due to having high

levels of missing data, leaving 153 participants in the Public sample.

Sample characteristics

Table C 1. Sample characteristics: age and gender

Age Gender

N Min – Max Mean (SD) Males Females

LG 456 17 – 100* 46.59 (12.20) 46.1% 53.9%

Public 153 20 – 100* 52.70 (12.73) 41.3% 58.7%

Note. Missing responses excluded from percentages and means.

* One respondent in each sample reported their age to be 100. The 5% trimmed means indicated that the presence of

these outliers did not greatly affect the Mean age for either sample. With these outliers excluded the age ranges

would be 17-81 for the LG sample and 20-80 for the Public sample.

Compared to the South Australian population, which is 50.7% female52, the Public sample has a

higher proportion of females (53.9%). However, this difference is relatively minor. The Public

sample had a considerably higher median age (55 years) than the South Australian population

(39 years)53.

Table C 2. Sample characteristics: highest educational attainment

School

certificate or equivalent

High school certificate or

equivalent

Trade qualification/

apprenticeship

Certificate or Diploma

Bachelor degree or

higher

LG 1.2% 12.1% 6.2% 38.4% 42.1%

Public 0% 12.5% 2.2% 27.2% 58.1%

Note. Missing responses excluded.

52 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011 Census QuickStats – South Australia (March 2013)

53 Ibid.

119

Respondents to the Public survey tended to be highly educated, giving the Public sample a

higher level of educational attainment than the South Australian population. In the population,

21.4% of 25 to 64 year-olds have a bachelor degree or above54, whereas in the Public sample

(age range detailed in Table C 1) this figure was 58.1%. In the population, 55.3% of 25 to 64

year-olds have a non-school educational qualification of some sort; in the Public sample a non-

school qualification was reported by 87.5% of participants. Care should be taken in generalising

the findings of the Public survey to populations with a lower (i.e. more normal) level of

educational attainment.

Table C 3. Sample characteristics: employment

Unemployed Employed:

public sector

Employed: private sector

Self-employed

Student Retired

Council employee or elected member

LG * * * * * * 100%

Public 6.5% 21.0% 29.0% 20.3% 3.6% 19.6% n/a

Note. Missing responses excluded.

*Columns 1-6 may be applicable to participants in the LG sample, but the LG survey did not request this information.

The employment question in the Public survey may be too crude to provide employment

information directly comparable with the Labour Force estimates for South Australia. However,

as an indication, in the South Australian population at the time of the survey release, 4.09% of

people were unemployed and 58.1% were employed55. In the Public sample, the rates are higher

than in the population (6.5% unemployed and 70.3% employed).

Table C 4. Responses per rural and metropolitan local government area

LG Public Metro Rural

Adelaide City Council 3 5

Adelaide Hills Council 2 1

Alexandrina Council 15

The Barossa Council 1

The City of Burnside 4

District Council Ceduna 13

City of Charles Sturt 8 12

District Council of Cleve 3

District Council of Coober Pedy 6

The Coorong District Council 10 1

District Council of the Copper Coast 7 1

Town of Gawler 2 1

City of Holdfast Bay 1

54 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Social Trends, data cube (cat. no 4102.0), (July 2008) Table 2.4

55 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force, Australia, Sep 2013 (cat. no 6202.0) (November 2013)

120

LG Public Metro Rural

Kangaroo Island Council 1

City of Marion 42 2

Mid Murray Council 1

City of Mitcham 1 4

District Council of Mt Barker 1 1

District Council of Mt Remarkable 1 3

The Rural City of Murray Bridge 26 7

Naracoorte Lucindale Council 9

The City Of Norwood, Payneham & St Peters 2 1

City of Onkaparinga 96 2

City of Playford 1

City of Port Adelaide Enfield 29 4

Port Augusta City Council 29

City of Prospect 2 1

City of Salisbury 24 4

City of Tea Tree Gully 1 3

District Council of Tumby Bay 1

City of Unley 4 29

City of Victor Harbor 2

Wakefield Regional Council 1

Corporation of the Town of Walkerville 1

Wattle Range Council 1 1

City of West Torrens 13 46

City of Whyalla 1

District Council of Yankalilla 1 4

District Council of Yorke Peninsula 2

Total LG respondents 232 132

Total Public respondents 113 24 Note. Excludes missing responses.

Respondents to the surveys represented 39 local council areas. Of all local participants who

reported this information, 36% worked for rural councils. Of all participants in the public

sample who reported their postcode, 18% lived in rural council areas. The proportion of public

respondents living in rural council areas is roughly representative of the South Australian

population: 29% of the estimated population56 live in a local government area classed as rural

(note that as this figure is based on entire council areas and their classification, it may differ

from other estimates of rural population).

56 Government of South Australia, Projected population by sex: LGAs in South Australia, 2006 to 2026 (2011).

Documents

Survey on Attitudes to Corruption, Misconduct and ......Survey on Attitudes to Corruption, Misconduct and Maladministration in the Local Government Context Survey Report May 2014 Prepared