SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO , I! 2 6 1995€¦ · TROY ORLANDO GALLEGOS, Respondent. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Case No. 93CA1031 Opinion

SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO , I! IN 2 6 1995

Case No. 95SC13

OPENING BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE CITY OF NORTHGLENN, COLORADO AND COLORADO MUNICIPAL LEAGUE

CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, acting by and through its BOARD OF WATER COMMISSIONERS, a/k/a CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER WATER DEPARTMENT,

Petitioner,

v.

TROY ORLANDO GALLEGOS,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Case No. 93CA1031 Opinion by Judge Ruland

Metzger and Roy, JJ., concur

David W. Broadwell, No. Colorado Municipal League 1660 Lincoln Street, #2100 Denver, Colorado 80264 Telephone No. (303) 831-6411

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE COLORADO MUNICIPAL LEAGUE ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER ACTING BY AND THROUGH ITS BOARD OF WATER COMMISSIONERS

Herbert C. Phillips No. 8773 Hayes, Phillips, Maloney

& Haddock, P.C. 1350 17th Street, Suite 450 Denver, Colorado 80202-1577 Telephone No. (303) 825-6444

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE THE CITY OF NORTHGLENN, COLORADO ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER ACTING BY AND THROUGH ITS BOARD OF WATER COMMISSIONERS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................... .

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................. .

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ................................ .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............•...................•

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................... .

ARGUMENT .............................................. .

1. Legislative History ......................... .

2. Practical Impact of the Decision ............ .

3. Rules of Statutory Construction ............. .

CONCLUSION ............................................ .

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Bertrand v. Board of County Commissioners, 872 P.2d 223, 228 (Colo. 1994) ................................. .

Board of County Commissioners v. Bish, 18 Colo. 474, 33 P. 184 (1893) ...................................... .

Boulder County Board of Equalization v. M.D.C. Construction Co., 830 P.2d 975, 980 (Colo. 1992) ...... .

Charlton v. Kimata, 815 P.2d 946, 949 (Colo. 1991) .....

Charnes v. Boom, 766 P.2d 665, 667 (Colo. 1988) ....... .

City of Craig v. Hammat, 809 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Colo. App. 1990) ..................................... .

City of Ouray v. Olin, 761 P.2d 784, 788 (Colo. 1988) .......................................... ~

Colorado Board of Medical Examiners v. Raemer, 794 P. 2d 1075, 1077 (Colo. App. 1990) ..................... .

Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 174 Colo. 97, 482 p. 2d 968 (1971) ................................... .

Farmers Group v. Williams, 805 P.2d 419, 422 (Colo. 1991) .......................................... .

General Electric Co. v. Niemet, 866 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Colo. 1994) ..................................... .

Harding v. Industrial Commission, 183 Colo. 52, 515 P.2d 95, 98 (1973) .................................... .

Longbottom v. State Board of Community Colleges & Occupational Education, 872 P.2d 1253 (Colo. App. 1993) ..................................... .

People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 180 (Colo. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1018, 111 S. Ct. 662, 112 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1991) .............................. .

People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo. 1986) .......................................... .

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7, 13, 14

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People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374, 376 (Colo. 1990) ....... . 7' 12

Sigman v. Seafood Ltd. Partnership, 817 P.2d 527, 530 (Colo. 1991) ...................................... . 12

Thiret v. Kautzky, 792 P.2d 801, 806 (Colo. 1990) ..... . 12

Whimbush v. People, 869 P.2d 1245, 1249 (Colo. 1994) .......................................... . 13

STATUTES

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2-4-101 ............................. 13

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2-4-201(1) (b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2-4-201(1) (c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2-4-203(1) ( c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8' 14

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-102 ........................... 6

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

OTHER AUTHORITIES

House Joint Resolution 1023............................ 3,4

Research Publication No. 134 (November, 1968)... .. . .... 4

Comment, The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act: A Prescription for Regression, 49 Denver L. J.

567 (1973).............................................. 3

Phillips, The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, 8 Colorado Lawyer 2358, 2359-2360 (1979) ... . . . .. . . . .. . . 3

Uniform Plumbing Code§ 10.3(a)........................ 10

The New Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 587.... .. . . . . . . .... 13

Webster's Third New International Dictionary........... 9

Note, The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act: A Judicial Challenge and a Legislative Response, 44 U. Colo. L. Rev. 449 (1972).. ... ... . .. ........... ... 4

iii

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred by broadening the

definition of "public water facility," as set forth in the Colorado

Governmental Immunity Act, to include private property.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The amicus parties adopt by this reference the statement of

the case contained in the Opening Brief of Petitioner City and

County of Denver, acting by and through its Board of Water

Commissioners ("Denver Water").

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Court of Appeals holding in this case that the term

"public water facility" as used in the Colorado Governmental

Immunity Act (the "Act") includes privately owned facilities

connected to a publicly owned water system, is genuinely

unprecedented. It is inconsistent with the legislative history of

the Act and with the accepted rules of statutory construction.

Moreover, as is discussed below, this decision, if left in place,

will, as a practical matter, impose liability on municipal and

quasi-municipal water providers for damage and injury occasioned by

a wide range of privately owned facilities over which such public

entities have only limited control. This shift of responsibility

from the private landowner to the taxpayers as a whole is not

warranted by either the letter or the spirit of the Act. The Court

of Appeals erred in concluding that private property can constitute

public water facilities, and its decision must be reversed.

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ARGUMENT

The Court of Appeals in this case held that a privately owned

water meter pit was a "public water facility" as to which the

immunity from liability afforded by the Act was waived by operation

of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1) which provides:

[S]overeign immunity is waived by a public entity in an action for injuries resulting from:

(f) The operation and maintenance of any public water facility . by such public entity.

Thus, the outcome of this case turns on the Court of Appeals'

rather startling conclusion that private property can be a "public

water facility."

This brief will first address the legislative history of the

Act, which sheds some light on the legislative intent behind the

use of the term "public water facility." It will then discuss the

practical implications of the Court of Appeals' decision, which are

potentially devastating to public entities providing water and

sewer service. Finally, this brief will apply the legislative

history and settled rules of statutory construction to the term

"public water facility" which inevitably leads to the conclusion

that that phrase was never intended to encompass private property.

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1. Legislative History.

The doctrine of sovereign or governmental immunity has its

roots in early English common law. 1 The doctrine was first

recognized in Colorado in the 1893 decision Board of County

Commissioners v. Bish, 18 Colo. 474, 33 P. 184 (1893).

Early on, the Colorado courts became uncomfortable with the

concept of absolute governmental immunity from tort in all

instances. Various forms of legal contrivance were adopted to

avoid the application of the immunity doctrine as to certain

activities of government. The most commonly applied of these legal

fictions was the distinction between governmental and proprietary

acts, with immunity pertaining for governmental activities but not

for proprietary functions. See discussion in Phillips, The

Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, 8 Colorado Lawyer 2358, 2359-

2360 (1979) .

By the late 1960s, it had become apparent that the case-by-

case determination of liability based on the rather subjective

determination of whether an act was governmental or proprietary, or

discretionary as opposed to ministerial, was unworkable .

Anticipating that the Colorado Supreme Court would shortly abolish

the doctrine, the General Assembly in 1967 adopted House Joint

Resolution 1023 directing the Legislative Council to appoint a

committee to conduct "a study of the problem of governmental civil

1For a discussion of the evolution of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, ~Comment, The Colorado Governmental Immunitv Act: A Prescription for Regression, 49 Denver L. J. 567 (1973).

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immunity with a view toward developing comprehensive legislation to

define and limit the areas of immunity and to provide procedures

for compensation to those affected and to balance the public and

private interests involved." House Joint Resolution 1023.

The committee was duly appointed and, on September 23, 1968,

submitted its report to the General Assembly, Research Publication

No. 134 (November, 1968) (the "Report"), which included a draft of

a "Recommended Bill to Provide for Governmental Immunity and

Liability in Colorado."

The Report, and particularly the draft legislation prepared by

the committee, were the genesis of the Act. When, in 1971, this

Court abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity and invited the

General Assembly to respond, 2 the legislature adopted the

committee's draft legislation with only minor modifications.

2In Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971), and two companion cases, this Court abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity effective June 30, 1972, stating:

If the General Assembly wishes to restore sovereign immunity and governmental immunity in whole or in part, it has the authority to do so. If the legislative arm of our government does not completely restore these immunities, then undoubtedly it will wish to place limitations upon the actions that may be brought against the state and its subdivisions. This, too, it has full authority to accomplish.

174 Colo. at 105, 482 P.2d at 972, n. 16. See also Note, The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act: A Judicial Challenge and a Legislative Response, 44 U. Colo. L. Rev. 449 (1972).

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Among the provisions adopted virtually verbatim from the

committee's draft was the waiver of immunity for injuries resulting

from the operation of any "public water facility." The Report was

apparently the first use of that phrase in Colorado law.

The Report explains that the committee's recommendation on

this point was an attempt to codify the common law governmental/

proprietary distinction.

Water, sewer, trash, and other proprietary activities. The committee determined that the doctrine of immunity should not apply to those activities which are determined to be proprietary in nature and that the liability of an entity when engaged in these functions should be determined as if it were a private corporation or individual. These functions include but are not limited to the following: water, sewer, trash and waste disposal, electric and gas utilities, swimming pools, etc.

Report at 141.

While the available legislative history does not define the

term "public water facility," it does provide guidance as to the

legislative intent. One of the committee's primary goals was to

clearly and unequivocally specify those activities for which a

public entity might be liable, so as to limit the uncertainty which

had prevailed under the common law of sovereign immunity.

The committee recommends favorable consideration of the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act" included in this report. The general plan of the act is to reaffirm governmental immunity to suit and then proceed to carve out specific exceptions thereto. The committee felt that this approach would eliminate possible confusion by restating existing law in Colorado while opening up new areas of specific governmental responsibility as deemed appropriate by the committee to satisfy the demands of justice in a changing society.

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The committee found that this approach would be the easiest to draft and would result in a clear, concise bill. In addition, this approach allows the most flexibility for future change. Most important, however, is that this approach provides a better basis upon which the financial burden of liability can be evaluated in terms of the potential cost of such liability. If the limits of potential liability are known, public entities may plan accordingly, may budget for their potential liabilities r and may obtain realistically priced insurance, for the risk is more clearly defined and lends itself to more accurate assessment, which should result in lower premiums for the coverage had.

Report at xvii (emphasis added) .

The Committee's intention was ultimately set forth in the

Act's declaration of policy:

24-10-102. Declaration of Policy

It is further recognized that the state, its political subdivisions, and the public employees of such public entities, by virtue of the services and functions provided, the powers exercised, and the consequences of unlimited liability to the governmental process, should be liable for their actions and those of their agents only to such an extent and subject to such conditions as are provided by this article. The general assembly also recognizes the desirability of including within one article all the circumstances under which the state, any of its political subdivisions, or the public employees of such public entities may be liable in actions which lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by a claimant and that the distinction for liability purposes between governmental and proprietary functions should be abolished.

Thus, the legislative intent of the Act was to: (i) provide

certainty as to those activities for which immunity was waived; and

(ii) specify that, as to those activities for which immunity did

not pertain, "liability should be determined as if [the public

entity] were a private corporation."

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Neither of these intentions is served by the· decision of the

Court of Appeals.

Far from fostering certainty as to the line of demarcation

between immunity and liability, the Court of Appeals' ruling blurs

the distinction to the point of invisibility. Quite simply, if

private property may be considered a "public water facility" for

immunity purposes, public entities can never be certain where their

liability ends. This uncertainty, as the committee noted,

inevitably results in an inability on the part of public water

providers to "budget for their potential liabilities, and

obtain realistically priced insurance." Far from furthering the

goal that the risk be "more clearly defined," the decision of the

Court of Appeals creates a risk which is indefinite and open-ended,

extending as it does to property not even owned by the public

entity.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals' decision is not in keeping

with the legislative intent that, where immunity is waived,

liability is determined as if the public entity were a private

corporation or individual. Certainly a private individual is not

responsible for injuries on his neighbor's property. Nor should

Denver Water be liable for injuries sustained on private property.

In construing a statute, a court's primary task is to give

effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Bertrand v. Board of

County Commissioners, 872 P.2d 223, 228 (Colo. 1994); Farmers Group

v. Williams, 805 P.2d 419, 422 (Colo. 1991); People v. Terry, 791

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P.2d 374, 376 (Colo. 1990). One of the tools used in ascertaining

legislative intent is the legislative history of the statute.

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2-4-203 (1) (c). The stated legislative intent

behind the adoption of the Act was to define as clearly as possible

the line between immunity and liability. The Court of Appeals'

decision, blurring the distinction between private property and

public water facilities between immunity and liability

frustrates rather than gives effect to the legislative intent. It

must be reversed.

2. Practical Impact of the Decision.

The ruling of the Court of Appeals that a privately owned

water meter pit was a "public water facility" for purposes of the

Act was premised on: (i) the dictionary definition of the term

"facility"; (ii) the fact that Denver Water regulated the

installation, specifications and location of water meters; and

(iii) the conclusion that "it is apparent that operation of

defendant's water system necessarily requires a metering system for

recording water usage in order to charge and collect sums owed by

customers for that usage."

The practical difficulty with the Court's reasoning is that it

renders public entities operating water or sewer systems

potentially liable for injuries resulting from any privately owned

"facility" which is appurtenant to the public water or sewer system

including: service lines, plumbing, spigots, toilets, shower

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heads, meters, sprinkler systems, and even water heaters. An

analysis of each of the Court of Appeals' three premises will

demonstrate this point.

The Court first reasoned that a water meter is a "facility,"

applying the definition of that term contained in Webster's Third

New International Dictionary, quoted with approval in Longbottom v.

State Board of Community Colleges & Occupational Education, 872

P.2d 1253 (Colo. App. 1993). The Court was, of course, correct

that a water meter is a "facility." The issue is, however, whether

it is a "public water facility."

Moreover, the definition employed by the Court was as follows:

(S]omething that promotes the ease of any operation, transaction, or course of conduct something (as . . . plumbing) that is built, constructed, installed, or established to perform some particular function or to serve or facilitate some particular end.

(Emphasis in original.)

By this definition, every private water and sewer line, every

plumbing fixture, every faucet, every sprinkler head is a

"facility," since they all "perform some particular function."

The Court of Appeals' second premise in support of its

conclusion that a privately owned water meter pit was a "public

water facility" was that Denver Water regulated the location,

specifications and location of such meters. Again, this premise is

applicable to virtually all privately owned residential and

commercial plumbing lines, pipes and fixtures.

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Northglenn and the vast .bulk of the Colorado Municipal

League's members have adopted the Uniform Plumbing Code published

by the International Association of Plumbing and Mechanical

Officials (the "UPC") . 3 The UPC comprehensively regulates all

aspects of water and sewer plumbing. It defines its scope as

follows:

{a) The provisions of this Code shall apply to the erection, installation, alteration, repair, relocation, replacement, addition to, use or maintenance of plumbing systems within this jurisdiction.

U.P.C. § 10.3(a). The UPC, in over two hundred pages of detailed

regulations, governs water and sewer facilities literally from A

("abandoned grease interceptors") to Z ("zinc alloy die cast

components").

If, as the Court of Appeals seemingly holds, regulation of a

"facility" is sufficient to make it a "public water facility," it

naturally follows that all private water and sewer plumbing

components are "public water facilities" given the comprehensive

regulation of the UPC. It is for precisely this reason that

Northglenn and the Colorado Municipal League have asked leave to

participate in this case.

The final premise upon which the Court of Appeals relied is

its conclusion that Denver Water's "distribution system necessarily

requires a metering system." The implication is that any

3The UPC is revised by the International Association of Plumbing and Mechanical Officials approximately every three years. Most Colorado municipalities have adopted the 1991 edition or the recently published 1994 edition.

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"facility" necessary to the provision of water is a "public water

facility." Again, the Court's brush paints too broadly.

privately owned water and sewer fixtures are necessary for the

operation of the water and sewer system. What is a water system

without showers, spigots, faucets and internal water lines? What

is a sewer system without toilets, plumbing and outfall lines?

Virtually every component of the system is necessary to its

usefulness and effectiveness and thus, according to the Court of

Appeals' reasoning, every component is a "public water facility."

This is the trap into which the blurring of the distinction

between private and public facilities leads. There is no

principled distinction between a privately owned water meter pit

and any other privately owned water or sewer pipe or fixture. If

the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, municipalities in

Colorado will be faced with the unhappy choice of either abandoning

any regulation of plumbing installations or accepting the risk of

liability for injuries occasioned by any privately owned water or

sewer component. It is respectfully suggested that the social cost

of abandoning public regulation of private plumbing installations

health hazards, shoddy workmanship, and increased injuries --

far outweighs the value of imposing liability on public entities

for injuries occasioned on private property.

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3. Rules of Statutory Construction.

Curiously, the Court of Appeals engaged in no construction or

interpretation of the phrase "public water facility" as used in the

Act. Instead, it simply concluded that the privately owned water

meter was a "public water facility."

The Court's disinclination to engage in any statutory

construction may be the result of an unstated determination that

the phrase "public water facility" is clear and unambiguous. When

statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it is applied as

written without resort to the interpretive rules of statutory

construction. General Electric Co. v. Niemet, 866 P.2d 1361, 1364

(Colo. 1994); Sigman v. Seafood Ltd. Partnership, 817 P.2d 527, 530

(Colo. 1991).

Northglenn and the Colorado Municipal League would tend to

agree that the phrase "public water facility" is unambiguous. It

would seem to clearly and unequivocally exclude private water

facilities such as the privately owned water meter pit.

[6] In interpreting a statute, our primary task is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 180 (Colo. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1018, 111 S. Ct. 662, 112 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1991); People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374, 376 (Colo. 1990). To determine legislative intent, we begin with the language of the statute itself and interpret statutory terms in accordance with their commonly accepted meanings. Thiret v. Kautzky, 792 P.2d 801, 806 (Colo. 1990); People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo. 1986).

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Whimbush v. People, 869 P.2d 1245, 1249 (Colo. 1994).

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2-4-101 (" [w]ords and phrases shall be read in

context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common

usage").

Applying the "commonly accepted meanings" of the words farming

the phrase "public water facility," it is apparent that it cannot

encompass privately owned facilities such as the water meter pit at

issue. Employing, as did the Court of Appeals, the dictionary

definition of the adjective "public," we find that one common

definition is "not private." See ~ The New Merriam-Webster

Dictionary, 587. Thus, the commonly accepted meaning of that word

would seem to exclude private property such as the meter pit.

"Forced, subtle, strained or unusual interpretation should

never be resorted to where the language is plain, its meaning is

clear, and no absurdity is involved." Harding v. Industrial

Commission, 183 Colo. 52, 515 P.2d 95, 98 (1973). See also Boulder

County Board of Equalization v. M.D.C. Construction Co., 830 P.2d

975, 980 (Colo. 1992); Farmers Group, Inc. v. Williams, 805 P.2d

419, 422 (Colo. 1991) . Construing the term "public water facility"

to mean privately owned water facilities is precisely the type of

forced, subtle, strained or unusual interpretation to be avoided.

Even assuming that the phrase "public water facility" is

ambiguous, it cannot, under settled Colorado law, be construed to

include private property.

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First, if the language of a statute is ambiguous, a court may

consider its legislative history to ascertain the legislature's

intent. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2-4-203 (1) (c); Charnes v. Boom, 766

P.2d 665, 667 (Colo. 1988); City of Ouray v. Olin, 761 P.2d 784,

788 (Colo. 1988). The legislative history of the Act, as discussed

above, is entirely inconsistent with the Court of Appeals' blurring

of the line between immunity and liability.

Second, in construing a statute a court must, where possible,

give meaning and effect to each of its words. See Colo. Rev. Stat.

§ 2-4-201(1) (b). See also Charlton v. Kimata, 815 P.2d 946, 949

(Colo. 1991); City of Craig v. Hammat, 809 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Colo.

App. 1990); Colorado Board of Medical Examiners v. Raemer, 794 P.2d

1075, 1077 (Colo. App. 1990). The conclusion of the Court of

Appeals that the phrase "public water facility" includes private

facilities ignores and fails to give meaning or effect to the

adjective "public." It is not to be presumed that the General

Assembly used this word idly. The word "public" was used

deliberately and must be applied. Doing so compels the conclusion

that private water facilities are not public water facilities.

Finally, in construing a statute, it is presumed that the

public interest is favored over any private interest. Colo. Rev.

Stat. § 2-4-201(1) (c). Farmers Group, Inc. v. Williams, supra, at

422. Here, the practical implications of extending the liability

of public entities to injuries occurring on private property, as

discussed above, clearly disserve the public interest.

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Applying the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase "public

water facility" to the facts at hand, it is clear that that term

cannot be applied to a privately owned water meter pit. Even

assuming the phrase is ambiguous, it cannot be construed to

encompass private property. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling

otherwise.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the Court of Appeals that a privately owned

water meter pit is a "public water facility" flies in the face of

the plain language of the Act, its legislative history and the

settled rules of statutory construction. It has profoundly

negative practical effects never contemplated by the legislature.

Denver Water is immune from liability under the Act and reversal is

required. ~

DATED this -~~ay of June, 1995.

HAYES, PHILLIPS, MALONEY & HADDOCK, P.C.

By: ~~-· Herbert C. Phillips, No.~ 773 1350 17th Street, Suite 450 Denver, CO 80202-1517 (303) 825-6444

ATTORNEYS FOR THE CITY OF NORTHGLENN, COLORADO

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::~~:K David W. Broadwell, No. /Z,/7 7 1660 Lincoln Street, #2100 Denver, CO 80264-2101 (303) 831-6411

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the day of June, 1995, a true and correct copy of the within OPENING BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE CITY OF NORTHGLENN, COLORADO AND COLORADO MUNICIPAL LEAGUE was served on the following by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

Dennis H. Markusson, Esq. Joyce L. Jenkins, Esq. Montgomery, Green, Jarvis,

Kolodny & Markusson, P.C. 1050 17th Street, Suite 2300 Denver, CO 80265-0601

16

Hulbert E. Reichelt Legal Section Denver Water Department 1600 West 12th Avenue Denver, CO 80254

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Documents

SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO , I! 2 6 1995€¦ · TROY ORLANDO GALLEGOS, Respondent. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Case No. 93CA1031 Opinion